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THE WORLD'S HISTORY
A SURVEY OF MAN'S RECORD

EDITED BY
DR. H. F. HELMOLT

WITH AN INTRODUCTORY ESSAY BY THE
Right Hon. JAMES BRYCE, D.C.L., L.L.D., F.R.S.

VOLUME VII
WESTERN EUROPE TO 1800

WITH PLATES AND MAPS

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN
1903
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WESTERN EUROPE TO 1800
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

I

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE TIME OF THE CRUSADES

BY PROFESSOR DR. RICHARD MAYR

1. WESTERN EUROPE

For centuries Europe has been far more than a mere geographical conception. The name is not only a term expressing culture—it has become a scientific term, as it were, indispensable to the history of human development. The Europe of to-day, which has risen far above its origins, gained a soul, and become a unit of civilisation, had its beginnings as early as the Middle Ages; foreshadowed by the Carolingian monarchy in the eleventh century, it became a reality within the sphere of influence of the papal and imperial dominion. It first made itself felt as an independent unit of power during the Crusades. It then became a point of departure for common actions, a centre of common ideas, a scene of common interests, independent and complete in itself, yet filled with the most active impulses for development.

The Europe of the history of civilisation has always, however, been restricted to an area smaller than that occupied by what we call the continent of Europe. Even to-day we are in the habit of limiting the conception of Europe as a factor of civilisation to the western half of the continent, retaining the inherited idea by which the Balkan peninsula and the Russian Empire are excluded—and we have an indisputable historical right to do so.

In order to avoid all misunderstanding we shall call the Europe of civilisation by an exact name: Central and western Europe, or simply western Europe, in contradistinction to eastern Europe. As a boundary between eastern and western Europe we may imagine a line drawn from the Adriatic through Königsberg and the Gulf of Bothnia to the North Cape. On the other three sides the peninsula-like western half of the continent is bounded by the sea. To the trunk formed by the central mainland (which stretches from one inland sea to another and is defined by the Gulf of Lyons and the English Channel, the Gulf of Genoa and the North Sea, the Gulf of Venice and the Baltic) are appended four sharply outlined limbs: the Apennine and Pyrenean peninsulas, Great Britain and the adjacent islands (which were united with the continent until the post-tertiary period), and the Danish peninsula with its islands. Western Europe, therefore, includes the countries called in political geography Spain, Portugal, France, Great
Britain and Ireland, Italy, Germany (taking that word in a historical sense to include Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Cisleithan provinces of Austria, but not its Illyrian dependencies, Galicia and Bukovina), Denmark, and Norway-Sweden; for in spite of the fact that the latter peninsula is geographically isolated, it cannot be thought of otherwise than as a part of western Europe. Poland and Hungary, together with the Christian Balkan States, are the morphological transition-forms leading to the semi-Asiatic eastern half of the continent.

Ethnographically considered, western Europe includes the races that speak the Romano-Germanic languages; historically, it embraces the countries of western-Christian (Latin) civilisation. Not all these countries were provinces of the Roman Empire; but all were for centuries under the influence of the idea that the Roman Empire still existed, and under the dominion of the Roman papacy. From these facts and ideas came the unity of the civilisation which we still call European, although the Western Church has lost its autocracy, and the universal monarchy of the empire has ceased to exist even as a dream. This European, or, more accurately, western European civilisation, has developed uninterruptedly since the time of the Crusades; it has expanded far out over the world, so that to-day, not only eastern Europe but the New World and the continent of Australia, not to speak of vast sections of Asia and Africa, have, in various respects, become subject to it.

The western Europeans have introduced their religion, their political supremacy, their social institutions, even their literature and art, into enormous tracts of the globe, and their economic superiority has enabled them to lay the yoke of their commercial interests upon practically the entire inhabited and uninhabited world. Although the regions still inaccessible to Europeans are of but slight importance, so much the greater significance have all occurrences that may be looked upon as signs of the great struggle for independence which the countries that have been overpowered by western European influence are beginning to wage for their economic freedom. The war of economic emancipation has begun, even while western Europe is still in a state of development; and the struggle is now being carried on chiefly by the United States, Russia, and Japan. The history of the economic expansion of western Europe as related in the following pages culminates in this economic war of independence. Here we have not to deal with that which is either invisible or intangible, but with facts, the influences of which extend not only up through the present, but far out into the future. No matter how obscure it may seem to the human intellect, the future will be the product of the present and the past: and the faint light thrown upon the darkness before us, deception though it may sometimes prove, is by no means a despicable return for the pains we bestow on research into the history of bygone days.

2. THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE LEVANTINE TRADE AND THE EXPANSION OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

Since the beginnings of authentic history, since the times of the Phoenicians, Hellenes, Carthaginians, and Italians, the Mediterranean Sea has been the scene of intercourse between races and of commercial activity more important and far-
reaching in their effects than—at least in ancient times—have been witnessed by any other portion of the earth. Finally the Romans united all the countries of the Mediterranean coast under their dominion; and when the economic and political downfall of the western empire took place, together with the development of a new Europe as a result of the migration of nations, the eastern empire still remained firm, maintaining both its dependencies and its civilization, and renounced neither its commercial nor theoretically its political supremacy over the whole Mediterranean region. During the seventh century Mohammedanism forced its victorious way to the Mediterranean, and within a surprisingly short time gained dominion over the half of its coasts. Thus three great spheres of civilization came into contact with one another on the shores of the sea which washes three continents: the western Christian (western European or Latin), the eastern Christian (eastern Roman, Romain, Greek, or Byzantine), and the Mohammedan (Islamitic or Arabic-Moorish). Consequently a struggle for political and economic supremacy between the three great spheres of civilization followed as a historical necessity. The victory was won by the western Europeans, who of all competitors had the poorest outlook at the beginning of the contest.

Before the Arabian conquests—that is to say during the first half of the seventh century—the trade of the Mediterranean region still continued in the hands of the eastern Romans. The Balkan peninsula, as far north as the Danube, Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, the northern coast of Africa to Mauretania, parts of Italy, and, until the year 681, a large portion of Spain, were all under the dominion of the Byzantine Empire. Trade, both foreign and domestic, was carried on by Greeks, Syrians, and Jews. Constantinople and Alexandria were the two great centres of commerce, although the cities of Syria, Asia Minor, Thessalonica, and Carthage continued to maintain a commercial activity that had been carried on from the earliest times. Merchandise from India and China was brought to Byzantium via the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and various overland routes that passed through the interior of Asia. Byzantium was thus a centre of the carrying trade between East and West, the possession of which has ever been a token of control of the world's traffic. Another branch of Byzantine commerce was the domestic industry of silk-weaving. The Byzantine gold coinage, the gold solidus of Constantine (worth about twelve shillings and sixpence), in later times called the “byzantine,” or bezant, became almost a universal standard of value; even Byzantine silver currency was accepted by foreign merchants so long as it maintained its face value.

The commercial supremacy of the eastern Romans passed away with the Arab conquests. Egypt and Syria, commercially the most active of all the Byzantine provinces, were the first to fall into the power of the Caliphate; the coast lands of northern Africa followed somewhat later (Carthage, rebuilt by the Romans, being again destroyed, and Tunis taking its place), and the more important islands of the eastern Mediterranean. In the year 827 the Saracens occupied Sicily and southern Italy, and this also was at the cost of the Roman Empire. It is true that the attacks of the Arabs upon Constantinople were met by a stout resistance on the part of the Byzantines, the capital and the continued

1 Cf. Vol. IV, Chap. I.
control of the Mediterranean trade were rescued by the use of Greek fire; but the empire, hard pressed by Slavs and Bulgarians, and at the same time constantly diminishing in extent in Europe as well as in Asia, lost its position as the leading power of the world during this period of uninterrupted affliction and embarrassment. The Caliphate, however, which first had to carry on devastating wars against united Europe in arms and later became organised as a power, did not gain the supremacy which Byzantium lost, for the new European nations gradually absorbed Eastern wealth and power. Since the ninth century there had been an increasing number of foreign commercial dépôts in Constantinople and settlements of merchants, attracted or kept by the trade of the Golden Horn. As the Byzantines no longer journeyed to foreign lands the foreigners came to them. The active trade of Constantinople became a passive one; its entire life was derived from foreigners. There was even a Mohammedan immigration to Byzantium, where finally a mosque was built for them; here, as in Alexandria and in Antioch, the spirit of trade was more powerful than religious differences.

The Red Sea having lost its importance for the Indian trade, to which the choking up of the old canal of Rameses may have in part contributed, the most important commercial routes from India to the West was by the Persian Gulf and overland through the domains of the Caliphate; even the central Asian commercial routes passed through Mohammedan territory before they reached their goal at the Caspian and Black Seas. Since Constantinople was now the centre for traffic in the spices and other merchandise of southeastern Asia, the peoples of western Europe were compelled to journey thither; for they did not care to dispense with these products, and at that time trade with the Levant could be more conveniently carried on through Constantinople than by any other route.

Thus a period of maritime and commercial expansion dawned for the peoples of Europe when Byzantium lost its former spirit of enterprise under the pressure of unfavourable circumstances. The tendency of this earliest commercial development of the young nations of western Europe was toward the east—the same direction as that taken by the colonising expeditions of the Teutonic race from the time of the Carolingian dynasty.

The first cities to enter into trade with the eastern Roman seaports were the Italian towns which at least nominally recognised the sovereignty of the Byzantine emperor. Indeed, almost all communities that were neither under the rule of the Lombards nor of the Saracens stood in a like relation of partial dependence to the eastern Roman Empire. Besides Bari, Brindisi, Taranto, Salerno, Naples, and Gaeta, Amalfi and Venice belonged especially to this class. Amalfi, which at least as early as the tenth century maintained relations with the Mohammedan countries of the East, with Egypt and Syria, imported Greek wares, and was even able to maintain this economic position after its conquest in 1073 by the Normans under Robert Guiscard, the sworn enemy of the Byzantines. Its fall as a commercial power was brought about by the rivalry of Pisa, which in 1135–1137 attacked and conquered it.

More fortunate than Amalfi, Venice soon rose to the position of mistress of Mediterranean commerce. The city on the lagoons also recognised the suzerainty of the Eastern emperor, and consequently obtained for her citizens the right to
settle in Constantinople. In spite of religious differences ever since the ninth century Venice also had been engaged in active trade with the cities of Egypt and Syria. The prosperity of Venice was due primarily to her favourable geographical situation, and this advantage remained to her so long as the Mediterranean continued to be the centre of the world's commerce. The Venice of the Middle Ages controlled an exceptionally extensive sphere of distribution. Situated at the northern end of the Adriatic Sea, the city was within a short journey of the Alpine passes; the rich plain of the Po lay behind it, the western coast of the Balkan peninsula and the approaches to the lands of the Save and the Danube before it.

The two political parties of the city, the Byzantine and the Italian, represented two complementary commercial interests: the importation of commodities from the East and the exportation of merchandise into the various neighbouring regions of consumption. Moreover, both the eastern and the western empire courted the favour of Venice, which adroitly balanced between them; and thus, at an early age, the Venetians obtained the right of unrestricted trade with both. When the Byzantines lost southern Italy to the Normans they showered favours upon Venice, nominally subject but practically independent, in order to win her alliance. In fact, the constant grasping for territory of the Normans threatened the Venetians also, and they had defeated Robert Guiscard at Durazzo in Albania; the Emperor Alexius I (Comnenus) granted them the right of commerce, duty free, with the whole of the eastern empire (1082). In former days the Venetians had been compelled to pay two solidi on the entrance of every ship into port, and fifteen on its departure. From this time forth their position in regard to commerce with the East was the enviable one, more of the "most favoured nation."

By the time when Venice gained this predominance at the Golden Horn, Pisa and Genoa had reached a commanding position in the western end of the Mediterranean, inasmuch as the decline of the Caliphate at Bagdad had caused a general weakening of Islam, the seaports of western Italy had been able not only to clear Sardinia of the Saracens, but also to extend their power over several strongholds on the northern coast of Africa. Just as the Venetians in Greece, the citizens of Pisa obtained freedom from all customs duties in the empire of the Zirites. In the meanwhile the Norman conquest of southern Italy and Sicily had begun. The Pisans and Genoese also took part in this struggle, for it was clearly to their interest that the way to the East should be rendered open and secure. As Wilhelm Heyd says in his history of Levantine commerce, "The maritime traffic between Spain, southern France, and western Italy on the one hand, the Levant and northern Africa on the other, equally affected Sicily midway between . . . where the letters patent of the Norman kings promised a cordial reception to merchants, and consuls of their own nation, or at least fellow-countrymen settled there, gave them every assistance." Thus Pisans and Genoese journeyed to Egypt and Syria even before the time of the Crusades, and also conveyed pilgrims to the Holy Land, which had become very difficult of access ever since the rise of the Seljuk dynasty.

The Crusades led to a complete transformation in the commercial relations with the Levant. Of the tremendous and for the most part wasted power expended by the nations of western Europe in order to become and to remain mas-

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ters of the Holy Land, at least a certain portion profited the maritime provinces, whose centre of gravity had for centuries been inclined toward the East. After the establishment of the first crusading States, the kingdom of Jerusalem, with its dependent principalities of Edessa, Antioch, and Tripoli (1097–1100), a new field of activity was opened up to Italians, Provençals, and Catalonians. Above all, an opportunity was offered them for crossing the boundaries of Asia, under the protection of western laws and institutions. Moreover, there was also the possibility of winning new privileges; for the Franks or Latins required a constant traffic with the East, and therefore could not dispense with the service of the navigators of southern Europe, whose services they employed in transporting not only merchandise but men. Soon they acquired the possession of entire streets and quarters in the cities of the Crusaders, and land, upon which the Syrian peasants were compelled to labour as serfs. These southern Europeans were also free of taxes; indeed, they often obtained for themselves a portion of the duties collected. The local authorities were not appointed by the king, but by the mother city. Trade was not difficult, for the coveted luxuries and spices of the tropics were transported by the Arabs to the western extremity of Asia via the old commercial routes, without the assistance of Europeans. Nor would it have been advisable for Christian merchants to set foot on the desert trails or the pilgrim roads of Mohammedan Asia. The dangers of traffic by sea between southwestern Europe and the Levant were lessened by the use of convoys, which twice a year brought cargoes of European merchandise of metal and wood, arms and cloth, returning with a freight of silk, glass, cotton, sugar, and spices from the East.

When the kingdom of Jerusalem fell (1187), later to rise again nominally (1229), the western Europeans lost their Syrian possessions, together with all the feudal rights appertaining to them. However, a few seaports remained in their hands until the end of the thirteenth century, and more than this was not needed by the Frankish merchants in order to maintain their commercial connections. Even after the evacuation of Acre (1291) and of Tyre and Sidon (1295), direct traffic between Europe and Syria was not entirely suspended.

In the meanwhile, western Europe was amply compensated elsewhere for what had been lost in Syria. After the arrival of the first army of Crusaders in Constantinople (1096), the policy of the Greeks had become unfavourable to the western nations. In fact the sword of destruction was suspended over the Greek Empire. Each Crusade that passed through its territory threatened its existence, and the Normans of southern Italy were still busied with their old schemes of conquest. In order to divide their enemies the Byzantines continued to shower privileges upon the Italians, granting to all the same favoured position that up to this time had been enjoyed by the Venetians alone. However, this action of the eastern Roman government was not at all in harmony with the spirit of hostility to foreigners shown by the populace. They had just cause of complaint against the Latins (Franks), and especially against the Venetians, who had robbed them not only of their foreign trade but of a considerable part of their domestic traffic, who paid no customs duties, and who showed plainly enough the pride of mastery felt by a rising, active race toward a decaying people that would not attribute the results of its inactivity to itself but to the influence of the foreigners. The reaction against the ascendancy of the hated intruders made itself felt in a treacherous manner. In 1171 the Greek emperor, Manuel I, was compelled by
the pressure of public opinion to issue a secret order in accordance with which all the Venetians in the empire were imprisoned and their possessions seized. Venice answered this demonstration of hostility by entering into an alliance with the Normans, with the result that the Byzantines immediately endeavoured to make peace again. Soon, however, a still heavier blow was dealt, this time not only to the Venetians but to all the Latins. It was an act of national revenge similar to that once executed by the oppressed Asiaties upon the Romans in the days of Mithridates the Great. In consequence of a mandate issued by the Emperor Andronicus I in 1182, all the Latins in the empire were suddenly attacked and either massacred or sold as slaves. Nothing could now save the Byzantines from the vengeance of western Europe, although, after the overthrow of Andronicus, the Emperor Isaac Angelus indemnified the Pisans and Venetians so far as was possible, and restored to them their former rights and privileges. None of the weak Byzantine governments were in a position to offer any surety that atrocities such as those of 1171 and 1182 would not be repeated. However, common action against the Greeks was prevented by the rivalry of the Italian maritime States; single cities were powerless to deal out any effectual punishment to the great and still financially powerful eastern empire.

When, owing to the sudden death of the brilliant Hohenstaufen, Emperor Henry VI (1197), the danger that had long threatened the eastern Roman Empire from southern Italy was averted, the Venetians, and they alone, had an opportunity both for revenge and for the attainment of future security. Doge Enrico Dandolo, powerfully aided by fortune, succeeded in directing the Crusade of 1202 against Constantinople. Almost the entire Byzantine Empire fell a prey to the victorious Latins, and Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault ascended the throne of the "Latin Empire," which existed from 1204 to 1261. At the division of the Greek Empire three-eighths fell to the share of the Venetians, an amount equal to that granted to the new emperor. They retained possession of their share even after the fall of the "Latin Empire." The land consisted of strips of coast and islands, to be sure widely separated from one another, but capable of yielding great profit. Now for the first time the Venetians established themselves in the lands about the Black Sea and absorbed them all into their economic sphere of influence. The medieval expansion of the western Europeans over the Levant attained to its greatest extent when the Greek Empire was re-established with the assistance of the Genoese in 1261. The rivalry between the Ligurian and Adriatic capitals led to a healthy competition which was by no means detrimental to the policy of self-preservation pursued by the Byzantines.

During the second half of the thirteenth century the Genoese penetrated farther into Asia than any western European merchants before them. A region of colonies such as had existed in Hellenic times arose about the Black Sea, of which the chief towns were Kaffa (Feodosia) and Tana (Azov). From this district the Black-Sea-China commercial highway extended through Turkistan and Dzungaria to the Pacific coast.1 Missionaries and merchants brought to the West fabulous stories of the wonders of nature and the civilisation of the Farthest East. As a rule, however, these tales had no effect except upon Western imagination; fully another century and a half were yet to pass before imagination became transformed into

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action, and the apparently fruitless undertakings of casual adventurers were to awaken once more in the glorious discoveries of the Age of Conquest.

The journeys of Marco Polo (1271–1295), who may be taken as a representative Asiatic explorer of the time, would not have been practicable had it not been for the existence of one of the greatest kingdoms of conquest known to history: the Mongolian Empire, or Temudschin, founded by Genghis Khan in the first half of the thirteenth century (about 1220).\(^1\) During the years 1240–1242 hordes of Mongolians encroached on the borders of the western European sphere of civilisation, and for two centuries a large portion of Russia was ruled by Asiatic conquerors.\(^3\) Although during early times the East had repeatedly advanced against the West, such attacks always had their origin in the power of expansion of races related to the Mediterranean peoples: Semites (Assyrians, Carthaginians, Phoenicians) and eastern Aryans (Medo-Persians, Parthians, New Persians). But with the advance of the Huns in 375 a period of repeated inroads of Mongolian races — Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Seljuks, and Ottomans — began, which threatened and indeed narrowed the territories of the stationary Indo-Germanic peoples quite as much as the great Arabic-Berber invasions of the eighth and ninth centuries had done to the southern or Mediterranean region. Although the existence of the great Khan’s empire, which included almost the whole of Asia, rendered it possible to cross the Continent from the Black to the Yellow Sea during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, nevertheless the constant efforts for expansion of the Mongolians by opposing a barrier to the waves of European migration effectually prevented either a lasting occupation of western Asia and the Black Sea region or the establishment of secure commercial relations by the overland route with eastern Asia. The construction of a safe route across Asia is a labour of the present day: it is no work of western Europeans, but a result of the independent action of the rapidly expanding population of eastern Europe.

When in 1368 the native Ming dynasty again closed China — which had just been freed from the Mongols — to Western immigration, the Ottoman Turks had already crossed the Hellespont and taken possession of Gallipolis (1357). This was the turning-point in the history of southern European dominion and commerce in the Levant. Each square mile of ground conquered and occupied by the Turks was from all points of view irrevocably lost to the Christian nations of the West. However, Constantinople and the Black Sea region still remained to them. The Mongolians again advanced, destroyed the army of the Turks, and thus procured a respite of half a century for the eastern Roman Empire; however, Timur (Tamerlane) burnt Tana (1395), as well as Sarai and Astrakhan. After the second Mongol storm had abated, in 1405,\(^8\) the Turks returned, reconquered the Balkan countries, and finally turned their arms against Constantinople. The fall of this city in 1453 marks not only the end of the Byzantine Empire, but also that of western European dominion in the Levant. The Genoese abandoned their colonies on the Black Sea in 1475. Later than this date Italian merchants were still to be seen in the Turkish Levant, but they became more and more isolated and unprotected and possessed of fewer rights. The Ottoman Turk locked up the Bosphorus and put the key into his pocket.

After the fall of the eastern empire the Venetians still possessed considerable

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1 See Vol. III.
2 Comp. Vol. V.
3 Vol. III.
remains of the plunder they had secured at the time of the Crusade of 1204. Many years were yet to pass before the Turkish sultans succeeded in wresting from them all their islands and strips of coast; even after the Morea was taken from Venice at the peace of Passarowitz in 1718 she still retained the Ionian Islands and the Dalmatian-Istrian coast. But these latter dependencies had never been profitable. On the other hand, it would have been of the greatest importance to all Latins, especially to the Venetians, had they been able to maintain their position in Egypt. After the Crusades, Alexandria had once more become the chief centre of Indo-European commerce; Cairo also, with its dense population and its bazaars, offered many inducements to European merchants. However much they had to suffer from the fanatical hatred of the Mohammedans for foreigners, as well as from the thieving government of pashas, their gains in trade acted as balm to all the ill-use they received. They defied the papal prohibition to furnish munitions of war to the unbelievers, and soothed their consciences by the purchase of indulgences. But even before the Turks came to Egypt another event of note in the world's history had already begun to cast its shadow over the commerce of the Levant. This was the discovery by the Portuguese of an ocean route to the East Indies in 1498. The spice trade of Venice decreased with ominous rapidity; indeed, it had never been anything better than traffic at second or third hand. Lisbon now received merchandise directly from the places of production and became the first spice market of Europe.

At about the same time that the Portuguese depleted the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Damascus, Alexandria, and Cairo fell into the hands of the Ottoman sultan (1517–1518), — a concurrence of events that ruined the commerce of Egypt, and greatly injured Mediterranean trade in general. The Mediterranean became more and more a rather dangerous cul de sac, with a considerable coasting trade, it is true, but once that lacked continental importance; in fact, the former centre of the maritime commerce of the world became transformed into a permanent theatre of war, where Mohammedan East and Christian West were constantly fighting their battles. Just as it had been during the heyday of mismanagement by the Roman Republic, the Mediterranean now became once more a scene of uninterrupted piracy; nor did this state of affairs cease until the conquest of Algiers by the French in 1830.

In consequence of the disastrous occurrences at the beginning of the sixteenth century, a restoration of western European influence in the Levant was not to be thought of as an attainable political end for centuries. The spirit of enmity to Europeans, maintained by Oriental policy, did not come to an end until the nineteenth century. It was no longer isolated and mutually hostile city states that endeavoured to force the eastern Mediterranean into the grooves of their narrow economic interests, but powerful modern nations. Although there has not been complete harmony between the European Powers, there is, at any rate, a tremendous difference between their attitude in regard to Oriental affairs, and that of the city states of the Middle Ages. The power of the Italian seaports — not even united after the manner of a Hanseatic League — was, perhaps, great enough to master to a certain degree the decaying Byzantine Empire and the ruined States of the fallen Caliphate; it was not sufficient, however, to enable them to maintain their position against the united military forces of the Sultan. A weak organisation of more or less isolated towns, that had been strong enough at one time to control an exten-
sive foreign sphere of interest, proved to be helpless when opposed by a great military monarchy. Western Europe was unable to resume the struggle with the Turkish East with any hope of ultimate success, until the development of the foremost military and naval Powers had reached an adequate perfection; and even then she had still to pass through a long succession of internal struggles before the expansion of her sphere of influence in the East could again be attempted, where, centuries ago, in spite of quarrels and rivalry, men of the Latin tongue had been dominant.

A similar course of events was taking place at the same time in northern Europe. Here the victorious expansion of a loosely united league of cities, the Hansa, was checked, and the league itself destroyed by the great nations of the North that had been growing in strength since the beginning of the fifteenth century. It was precisely those countries whose seaports had once controlled the inland seas of both northern and southern Europe that were unable to emerge from their state of disunion or to increase their limited areas; for this reason the leadership in the world’s commerce and expansion into previously unknown regions devolved upon the more closely knit and strongly organised nations of western Europe.

3. THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON THE NORTHERN SEAS AND THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE

A. THE CENTRAL AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN SPHERES OF COMMERCE

The inland seas of northern Europe are separated from the Mediterranean by the entire width of the Continent, gradually diminishing in extent toward the west. Just as in the pre-Christian period, so in the following thirteen centuries communication and traffic were carried on between the northern and southern coasts of Europe chiefly by means of overland routes. The way by sea around Spain—dreaded alike by Phoenicians, Greeks, and Romans—was still avoided. Not until the year 1317 did Venetian and Genoese mariners begin to make regular voyages to the coasts of England and Holland, and even then they occasioned no injury to the traffic of the overland routes. For already at that time a sharply defined intermediate zone of commerce and communication had come into existence, consisting of the central countries of western Europe at a distance from the Mediterranean: Upper Germany, the Rhenish provinces, what is now Belgium (Flanders, Brabant), and northeastern France. These central regions, with their large resources, their dense populations, already divided on an orderly social system, and their far-reaching lines of communication, held the commerce of Europe fast to its old continental routes and stations.

If the commercial position of Italy was founded upon the idea of world commerce, that is to say, the importation of the natural products of the tropics into lands of a more temperate zone, her supreme position in the European markets was also due to her own subtropical products, and even more so to her industrial activity, which rested upon Byzantine-Oriental foundations. To a still greater extent the economic importance and prosperity of the central countries of Europe depended upon manufacture and exchange rather than on the production of raw materials.
On the other hand, the region surrounding the inland seas of Northern Europe was of the greatest importance to the trade in natural products obtained from all countries whose rivers flowed into the North Sea and the Baltic. Moreover, by reason of its inferior culture, this region formed a natural area of consumption for wares manufactured by the more developed peoples of the South, and for the luxuries of other zones which passed through so many hands on their journey to the North. Such countries, rich in natural resources but poor in civilisation, require a commercial, in fact a general economic, guardianship until they have attained their economic majority. Geographical situation and an advanced state of development in municipal affairs caused the Low Germans of Germany proper and of the colonial regions to the east of the Elbe to take upon their shoulders the economic guardianship of the Germanic, Lett-Slavic, and Finnic races of the north and east of Europe as an unavoidable historical necessity. The fact that these isolated, loosely united city communities, left by the emperor and the Empire to their own devices, and torn by the feuds of the nobility, were able to undertake such a task was due to the influence of the German Hansa. Nevertheless, the story of the Hanseatic League seldom furnishes us with a cause for indulging in that enthusiasm which, according to Goethe, is the best thing we get from history. Certain bourgeois romanticists with republican tendencies have not only enveloped the Hansa in a deceptive lustre, but have applied to it terms that, like the set phrases of epics, have been repeated over and over again in works intended to popularise history. Some of these regularly recurrent expressions, such as "grand" and "noble," are, perhaps, the least applicable that could be found in the whole language, if the general policy and activity of the Hansa are to be characterised by them. Neither epic nor lyric style, however rich in purely imaginary heroic and chivalrous incident, is capable of furnishing the most suitable expressions for use in a history that treats almost exclusively of the aims and endeavours of tradesmen. Fanciful exaggeration is more easily pardoned in the novelist than in the historian. It is the duty of the latter to strive to rate every phenomenon of history at its proper value, and to form no judgment on it until he has considered the real meaning of every fact.

B. NORTHERN EUROPE PRIOR TO THE HANSA

The connected history of the northern seas, and, in part, that of the lands whose shores are washed by their waters, begins with the expeditions of the Vikings (about 750–1050). It is well known that the Scandinavian freebooters were also discoverers, colonisers, and founders of empires. Their uncontrollable activity and their dread of the feudal service, which the rising kingdom sought to impose upon them, led them to venture into seas unknown to the average mariner of the Middle Ages. They occupied the Faroe Islands and Iceland, discovered and colonised Greenland, where their settlements remained until the beginning of the fifteenth century, and finally sailed along the eastern coast of North America as far south as Florida, without, however, establishing any permanent settlements.\(^1\) In the northern home of the Vikings, practically unknown to Europe until modern times, Old Icelandic, the language of the Eddas, developed from the primitive

Norse tongue. The Old Norwegian spread from Norway over the Faroes, Hebrides, Orkney and Shetland Islands and North Scotland, extending as far as the Isle of Man and Ireland, where it was preserved until the fourteenth century, and on the Orkney and Shetland Islands even as late as the close of the eighteenth century. The Danish, on the other hand, which had been introduced into eastern and southern England during the ninth century, had already disappeared in the eleventh; and the native speech of the Normans who settled on the lower Seine had been entirely replaced by French about the year 1000. In like manner, Old Swedish, introduced into Russia at the end of the ninth century, only continued its existence there until the beginning of the eleventh. That the Scandinavians, relatively few in number, should, together with their language and customs, be absorbed into the more powerful and highly civilised stationary populations of the wide areas of northern colonisation, was of itself a proof that reinforcements were ceasing to arrive from the mother country, and that the migration of the Northmen was gradually coming to an end.

When the three northern kingdoms entered the period of agricultural development through which central Europe had passed some three hundred years before, the nations of more rapid progress had long been familiar with the characteristic distinction between town and country, and a large proportion of their inhabitants already bore the mark of the industrial and commercial civilisation of cities. On the northern seas there was abundance of opportunity for mercantile activity, the security of which could be assured with but little difficulty.

In the economically undeveloped countries from which the Normans had once emigrated, or in which they had settled, commercial representatives of distant nations of higher culture discovered a sphere of trade the possession of which could not be disputed, at least with any prospect of success, by the native inhabitants. The regions into which the Vikings had penetrated and the thinly populated lands of the Scandinavians were destined for centuries to commercial subjection. This condition applied to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Russia, and to a certain extent to the British Isles. That the Low Germans should swing the staff of Mercury as a sceptre over the north of Europe was a matter that during the critical period — that is, in the eleventh century, at the end of the Viking Age — still hung in the balance. The deciding factors through which mercantile leadership was assured to Germany first made their appearance in the twelfth century; during the eleventh the only point in favour of the Germans was the fact that no other European nation was as yet sufficiently mature to undertake the position of leader in the northern sphere of commerce.

C. Economic Conditions in England before the Arrival of the Easterlings

(a) The Arrival of Merchants from the Lower Rhine in England. — England was the first northern country of Europe with which the Germans entered into an over-sea mercantile relationship. "The commercial region of the Lower Rhine," says Karl Lamprecht, "of which the central point was Cologne, had always possessed a peculiar character. Throughout the latter part of its course, as well as in its connection with the Maas, the Rhine points imperatively to the sea, to Flanders, to England. The other regions of early German predominance in trade were
all more or less isolated and adapted for inland traffic; but here the stream of commerce flowed far beyond the narrow continental limits, and met in London as well as on the continental coasts of the English Channel the final offshoots of the great current of Oriental trade that poured out through the Mediterranean northward to the Franco-Germanic coasts. The Lower Rhine trade, under the earlier emperors until the accession of the Hohenstaufen dynasty, was the only international commerce possessed by Germany; Cologne on the Rhine was the one port in the empire of maritime connections. These had been established for many years, and the merchants of Cologne were in all probability justified in boasting of the protection which their London trade had once received from the Emperor Charles the Great." A statute of the reign of Ethelred II (about 1000) enumerated the taxes paid by German merchants in return for the privilege of participating in the London market. Documentary evidence of the existence of an association of Cologne merchants in London has come down to us from the twelfth century (1157). King Henry II took these traders under his protection, nor did it matter into what part of the country they settled; in other documents their wine trade is spoken of on the same footing with the French, and their London house is mentioned. Richard I on his return to England by way of Cologne after his imprisonment granted freedom from customs and taxes, as well as the privilege of trading at all English markets, to the Cologne merchants. Whether other Rhenish and Westphalian towns shared the rights of the Cologne Hansa, and to what extent, is not known to a certainty. At all events the merchants of Cologne, in later times, when a joint association of German tradesmen had been formed in England, had their peculiar rights and privileges confirmed by the English kings; the special aims and endeavours of Cologne made their appearance again and again, even after it had become a member of the common German Hansa.

The policy of the Plantagenet kings was favourable to foreign merchants. Inasmuch as the one point of view from which rulers of the Middle Ages looked upon commerce was that of their own profit, it was quite natural that the English Hennys and Edwards should make use of foreign traders as objects of taxation and sources of revenue; and during the fourteenth century alien merchants were useful to the kings as money lenders. The English barons and large landed proprietors, who were the only possessors of power in addition to the then practically unlimited monarchy, also showed a decided preference for foreign as opposed to native merchants. If the policy of the English towns, in which, as on the Continent, the government was in the hands of mercantile corporations of the guild type, had for its aim the exclusion of foreigners, indispensable as they were to both import and export trade, from domestic commerce, or, in other words, to prevent the loss of their monopoly of the inland trade of England, the English nobility were of the opinion that the domestic middleman paid them too little for the products of their estates and charged them too much for foreign luxuries. In order, therefore, that they might sell dearer and buy cheaper without the intervention of the middleman, the landed proprietors favoured the granting of full commercial rights to foreigners within the kingdom. The granting of privileges to groups of foreign merchants — usually called by the names of their native cities — became more and more frequent during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries; and of these privileges the most valued was permission to trade in all parts of the king-
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dom with whomsoever one desired. Even before commercial relationships had been established between England and the northeast of Germany, the foreign merchant in England was already possessed of rights and privileges that in the course of time had come to be looked upon as indisputable. The Cologne Hansa, with its limited or local character, was during the thirteenth century outstripped by a commercial association that later became of great importance to the Germans as a model; this was the London Hansa of Flemish or, more correctly, Flemish and northern French towns. These were the same cities that had also appeared as a chartered association at the fairs of Champagne and Brie, the greatest markets existing at the time; there was, in fact, no difference whatever between the London Hansa and the “Hansa of the Seventeen Cities” known to the French fairs. The London League was by no means a mere association of Flemish merchants who traded in England, that is, it was no guild or Hansa, in the limited sense of the term, but a union of cities whose merchants carried on trade in foreign countries. Mercantile community and city were at that time, before the guilds of craftsmen forced themselves into the municipal governments, as a rule one and the same; thus when the merchants of various towns extended the previously existing separate associations into a general league for the sake of their commercial interests, the immediate result was a union of the towns themselves.

The cities of Flanders and northern France were chiefly dependent upon the manufacture and sale of cloth. For many years—since the tenth and eleventh centuries—they had obtained a large portion of their raw material from England, whose green valleys were eminently suitable for the raising of livestock, and sheep in particular, and whose damp climate brought the wool to an unusual degree of fineness. Wool had long been the chief article of export from England, and was certainly of far greater importance to the Flemings than the British copper, lead, and tin sought by the ancients and possessing an interest also for the German (Westphalian) metal industries. The manufactured wool was exported by the Flemish-French towns back to England and elsewhere in the shape of finely dyed and finished cloth; England could produce little more than rough homespun during the Middle Ages, nor did it attain complete independence in this branch of manufacture until the sixteenth century, under the Tudors. Common interests of such importance soon caused the cities of France and Flanders, engaged in the wool and cloth trade, to set aside their rivalries and to form an association for mutual protection.

However, this association pursued other objects characteristic of its purely mercantile and undemocratic nature. In accordance with mutual agreements, the true producers of the cloth, the craftsmen, were excluded from the right of purchasing wool as well as from that of selling the finished product; thus the merchants were to retain all the profit, not only from the domestic but also from the foreign industries. The capitalists naturally looked with contempt upon the man who lived by the labour of his dye-stained hands. Only such men as had ceased to ply their trade as craftsmen for the space of a year and a day were eligible to the position of magistrate in their native villages, and later to the right of purchasing a membership in the Hansa. The purchase-money amounted to thirty shillings and threepence; on the other hand, the son of a member of the league had but to pay five shillings and threepence. The Flemish Hansa in London, which flourished during the thirteenth century,
was not so much injured in after years by the German Hansa, modelled after it, as by the English Staple Guild and the Company of Merchant Adventurers\(^1\) that sought to make the trade in cloth and wool national and to wrest it from the hands of the foreigners. In the meantime it was of the greatest significance that at this time leagues of cities to which the word "Hansa" was also applied arose from the earlier guilds and associations of foreign merchants of the same locality. In all the Hansas of German origin complete liberty remained with the individual; each member pursued his business at his own cost and risk, although at the same time he shared all the rights and privileges of his associates.

\(b\) The Advance of Southern European Influences. — Another type of mercantile association, which as early as the twelfth century had begun to extend its influence over the central and northern nations of the Continent, developed in the south of Europe. Ever since the time of the Crusades the stream of Indian, Levantine, and Italian commodities that flowed from south to north had been growing wider and wider. Before the time of the Crusades a byway of the Oriental trade had passed through Russia to the Baltic Sea, and extended west as far as England. Moreover, during these earlier times products of foreign zones also reached the north from southern France. Germany was then practically untouched by the routes of the world's commerce, for this was the period of a quadrangle of routes, — unfortunate for Germany, — the Mediterranean, French, Baltic-North Sea, and Russian. Germany suffered severely because of her unfavourable situation in respect to the routes of the world's commerce until well into the twelfth century. K. W. Nitzsch, the discoverer of the quadrangle of routes, is right in ascribing the economic backwardness of Germany, her long continuance as a country of agriculture and raw products, and her late transition to modern trade conditions to the fact that she was so long excluded from a share in the world's commerce. But during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a rapid change set in. The products of the South that had been accumulating in the Italian markets sought the shortest and least dangerous route to the markets of central and northern Europe, and found it in the overland route through Germany. Once more there was an accumulation of goods in the Flemish towns and at the French fairs, and not till then was there a free and general distribution.

Whatever revolutions may have come about in Europe, whatever battles may have been fought for the highest and most ideal possessions of humanity, it is at least certain that the races of Romano-Germanic tongue have never succeeded in restraining themselves from coveting the material luxuries of more favoured climes. The strongest, the most natural and least spoiled of peoples were unable to withstand the temptation; indeed, Christianity and asceticism have failed to free men from their innate cupidity, — one of the greatest sources of evil to mankind. But we must also add, one of the greatest sources of human activity; for the impulses that have led to the innumerable discoveries, colonisations, conquests, and social institutions through which it has been rendered less difficult for the races living without the tropics and sub-tropics to obtain the

\(^1\) See p. 53.
coveted products of warmer climes, can all be traced back to the same physiological and psychological origin. What energy has had to be expended, what labours performed, what misery endured, in order that Europeans might indulge their desires for novel sensations of taste and smell, for stimulants or for narcotics!

Like the ancient world, the world of the Middle Ages paid the balance of its account with the merchants of the tropics in gold. It was due to the ingenuity of the Italians that this balance diminished in ratio to the total of exchange until in the fifteenth century the produce of European, and after the sixteenth century that of American, mines rendered the flow of precious metals into the tropics, whence there was no return, almost imperceptible. In their transactions with Eastern countries, with the Byzantine Empire and the Mohammedan States, all of which had either an unsatisfactory gold standard or a double standard of gold and silver, the Italians, Provençals, and Catalonians rapidly developed their methods of trade and their knowledge of financial affairs far in advance of the rest of Europe.

Thus, when the Italians journeyed to the North bearing with them the products of the South, they carried a superior commercial system wherever they went,—at first as a personal possession, a secret of trade, for the exercise of which the Northern peoples were not yet sufficiently mature. As early as the twelfth century two forms of mercantile association had developed in Italy: the Commenda, the original form of the later "silent company," as well as of all forms of commission trade, and the "open company;" to these the stock company, which arose from the various shipping societies and associations of State creditors, was added in the fourteenth century. Such companies were established not only in Italy but also in foreign lands, where some of the largest houses were already represented by factors or agents; in general, however, during the Middle Ages the personal presence of the merchant himself was required. The Italians established their consulates in northern Europe as they had in the East; they occupied their own quarters and met together at certain fixed places in the foreign city, just as on the Rialto, or in the loggie (arcades) of their own guildhalls. The beginnings of the modern stock exchange may be perceived in these assemblies, in which business concerning money and bills of exchange was usually transacted.

It is certain that the Italians, or Lombards as they were generally called, would have been able to remain in foreign countries undisturbed and without being exposed to the hatred of the various native populations had they not ventured into the doubtful region of money-lending and taking interest. This was the boundary line that separated Christian from non-Christian, the barrier set by an age of natural economy, thoughtful of the defence of the weak and of the consuming masses against the advancing age of money, capitalism, and international trade. So strong was the instinct of self-preservation in the social organism based on natural economy, that religion itself was called upon for protection: the church sought to enforce its prohibition against taking interest on loans of money by threatening the severest penalties. Still, at the time when the southern Europeans came to the North, lending money at interest, or (as it was indifferently called) usury, was already in full operation. Forbidden to the Christians, it became a field for the commercial activities of
the Jews, who were also active in mercantile pursuits. In fact, at the very
time that the commerce of southern Europe was in the act of expanding over
the central and northwestern portions of the Continent, the financial dominion
of the Jews was beginning to break down under the burden of a detestation
which had arisen not only from religious but also from economic motives.
Thus the Lombards came forward in place of the Jews. With their superior
capital they succeeded almost immediately in controlling the money markets of
countries poor in gold; but they were unable to resist the temptation of succeed-
ning and even outdoing the Jews in the profitable business of money-lending.
For the latter a painful period began, during which the nobles protected them
from extremities and even furthered their trade, in order to render them
the more fit for a systematic extortion on the part of the State, and for various
other plunderings exercised at times of special need, until they were finally
driven away and banned for all times. The Jews were especially unfortunate in
England, where they were forced to submit to all manner of indignities from the
power which was supposed to protect them during the reigns of the early
Plantagenet kings; their final expulsion followed in 1290 under Edward I.

But long before this, Christian usurers also had become objects of hatred
to the English people; the Cahorsins, notorious throughout the whole of Europe,
by whom not only natives of Cahors, but also southern Europeans in general,
are to be understood, finally gave their name to usurers of all nationalities.
As W. J. Ashley says in his “English Economic History and Theory,” “The
Caorsini first came to England in the year 1235 as ‘papal merchants,’ that is to
say, as individuals ready to offer a helping hand in the collection of papal
revenues, and also to assist in sending them to Rome. For this reason it was
difficult to attack the Cahorsins; nevertheless they, and particularly the Sienese,”
—a proof of the wide application of the term even at that early time,—were
exiled from England by King Henry III in 1240. However, the edict proved
futile; they remained in the country, acquired property, and successfully pursed
a business identical with that of the Jewish usurers. Not until the founda-
tion of the great Lombard houses in the fourteenth century — by Lombards,
Italians in general, particularly Florentines, are to be understood — were the
earlier Cahorsins usurers driven into the background. The new banking-houses
of the Bardi, Peruzzi, Frescobaldi, etc., when Edward III was no longer able
to fulfil his obligations (1339), made to the crown the loan which was destined
to have such an influence on their own fortunes, as well as on those of their
native city on the Arno.

D. THE EASTLINGS IN ENGLAND

In addition to merchants from Cologne, France, Flanders, Italy, Spain,
and Scandinavia, the “Eastlings,” from the German coasts of the Baltic,
also came to England during the first decades of the thirteenth century. If the
word “sterling” is derived from Easterling, it follows that the latter term must
have been introduced into the English language at a still earlier period. The
monetary significance of the term stands in close connection with the memo-
rable reform in the currency that took place during the reign of Henry II
(1133-1189).
That the English sovereigns of early times possessed great power is shown by the fact that England alone of all the nations of western Europe had a uniformly regulated coinage during the Middle Ages. While in other countries the right to stamp coins was shared by various spiritual or temporal lords and cities, in England the crown was able to guard its exclusive privilege of issuing currency. A systematic coinage facilitated both domestic and foreign trade, even if it was to the disadvantage of the money-changers, whom the foreigners needed to change the money they brought with them into English coin, for foreign money was excluded from the kingdom. On the other hand, it was forbidden to carry English money out of the country, and thus English merchants about to go abroad were required to exchange it for foreign before sailing. Under Henry II (about 1180) the English standard returned to the full-weight Carolingian pound; the silver penny, the single current coin, was struck, not according to the previously accepted West Frankish or French standard of lighter weight (livre tournois), but according to the heavier East Frankish or German standard, which had been retained in Germany since the time of Charlemagne: 240 pence to the pound, the penny having the weight of 32 grains of wheat (22½ grains). Compared to the standard penny, pound, mark, and shilling were mere units of reckoning until the time of the Tudors. This heavy penny of East Frankish standard was called the "sterling penny."

But at the end of the twelfth century the Easterlings themselves, the inhabitants of the German colonial lands which had developed on the shores of the Baltic, began to come to England. They must have risen to power within a very few years, for the old-established and privileged Cologne Hansa, the "Guildhall," opposed them with such violence that the burghers of Lübeck appealed for help to the Emperor Frederic II, who reprimanded the Cologne association, giving them to understand that the new arrivals had the same right to be in England as they had themselves. The Plantagenets soon began to grant privileges not only to single German cities, such as Cologne or Brunswick, but incidentally to all merchants subject to the "Emperor of Alemannia and the Duke of Saxony." Foreign nations gradually became more and more familiar with the conception — important enough for them — of the "associated German merchants," which summed up a large number of rights and privileges and served as a basis for common interests.

In the meanwhile commercial relationships were opened between the cities of the North Sea, Bremen, Emden, Hamburg, Lübeck, etc., and England. On paying certain taxes the merchants of Hamburg acquired in 1266 the right to form a special Hansa, and in the following year the merchants of Lübeck received the same privilege, inasmuch as the closer alliance which had joined together Lübeck and Hamburg on account of their home interests also made them allies in foreign countries; and further, owing to the fact that Cologne had become weakened by domestic disturbances, and consequently no longer able to offer opposition to the common German policy of the Baltic capitals, the three leagues were incorporated into one league and the three dépots into one dépôt (1282). From this time forth the meeting-place of German merchants in London and England in general was the "Steelyard" on the Thames, a collection of storehouses and offices which the successors of the Hansa, known even in modern times as the Hanse towns, did not abandon until the year 1853. Hanse dépots,
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wherever they were situated, in Bruges, Bergen, or Novgorod, certainly did not present a particularly pleasing picture. The Steelyard was surrounded by high walls, in which the heavy gates were kept carefully locked for fear of attacks. The side facing the Thames was open; a flight of steps led down to the river; a wharf with a crane aided in the unloading of goods that were brought directly to the dépôt on sea-going vessels. Magazines, cellars, offices, and dwelling-houses lay within the peaceful, cloister-like enclosure; a monastic discipline ruled as well among temporary visitors as among the officials, who were bound to remain at their posts unmarried for ten years. It was only in the great hall, the common dining-room, and in the “Rhenish wine-house” that signs of a more joyful life were to be seen. In this realm of mercantile prose, poetry was allowed but a tiny corner in the shape of a small garden; but the prevalence of fruit-trees and grapevines proved that the owners of the dépôt placed a much higher value upon material than upon ideal charms of nature.

Let us picture to our minds the condition of the Germans in England at the end of the thirteenth century. The chief thing to be considered is the fact of the existence of an association of merchants of various cities, having common interests and enjoying common privileges, assured against the hostility and exclusiveness of English corporations, not only by the rights of free passage and free trade throughout the whole of England, but also by the possession of their own self-controlled dépôts. Yet this league of cities did not possess privileges greater than those of other associations of foreigners, nor did it enjoy anything that could be called a monopoly. The union of their citizens in foreign countries had likewise a unifying effect upon the German cities themselves; for the sovereigns of alien nations granted their letters patent and safe conducts for the most part to towns, and not directly to the merchants or associations of merchants. The city and its community of merchants living in foreign countries were kindred conceptions; and every merchant on coming to England enjoyed the same privileges that were possessed by his fellow-townsmen. In fact the merchants who dwelt in foreign countries and the families which ruled in the mother city belonged to the very same social class. On certain occasions it was necessary for a city to stand up for the defence of its merchants who lived abroad; and from this it was but one step to a common diplomatic or, if necessary, military interference in the affairs of foreign States by cities joined together in mutual interests and privileges. It is true that the league of various Low German towns, in later times called the Hansa, partly originated in such private associations of German merchants in foreign countries. Yet they were but one of the manifold sources of the Hanseatic League.

E. THE GERMANS IN WISBY AND NOVGOROD

The organisation of associated communities of merchants made more progress in the East than in the West. From the twelfth century German warriors, priests, and merchants had been steadily advancing in the Slavonic and Finnic countries semi-civilised and difficult of access, where far more than in well-regulated England they were thrown back upon self-protection or such aids as treaties and agreements might bring. Climate, race, and religion in these lands were new and strange to them, but their energy and daring made way against all hindrances.
The most celebrated settlement of these German pioneers of trade was that of Wisby, the capital of the Swedish island of Gotland. Mainly this settlement was of Westphalian origin, and to this day the ruins of Wisby attest the influence of the Westphalian style of architecture.

Looking from the steep cliffs, as Schoefer tells us, one sees the old city enclosed by its great wall facing the sea, while the ruins of forty-eight towers and eighteen churches and the lofty old Marien Kirche (St. Mary’s Church) rising high above the surrounding houses, and St. Nicholas’s with its rose-windows and its lighthouse-gable, show us what Wisby in the Middle Ages must have been,—a miniature presentation of Europe organised on the bases of religion, trade, and war.

The population of Wisby was composed of Swedes and Germans. Here, unlike elsewhere, the Germans had no separate civic establishment, no dépôt, no Guildhall, no Steelyard. But difference of race and creed made an impassable barrier between them and the native Gotlanders. They had to maintain themselves by active and ceaseless vigilance, for the Gotlanders were no mean commercial rivals. Long before the Germans came to Wisby these daring seamen had casted into every creek and cranny of the Baltic, had opened up internal trade with Russia, had visited German markets, and had made Wisby the emporium through which Novgorod and Kiev traded with Lübeck and Cologne. Now with Germans settled in Wisby this trade grew rapidly in volume and importance, and at the close of the twelfth century the Baltic route had practically superseded the uncertain and perilous communication by land over restless and unsettled Poland.

Many things contributed to the success of German colonisation on the Baltic islands. Both Germans and Gotlanders were fearless mariners. Then as now the Russians of pure Slavonic descent disliked the sea. And although Viking adventurers (the Varangians) had founded a Russian dynasty, the rulers, so far from leading their new subjects into maritime activity, were rapidly absorbed into Russian ways of life. Feeble attempts were made now and then to create a Russian sea trade. But they all failed. By the end of the twelfth century itinerant German and Gotlandic merchants made their way direct to Novgorod from Wisby, and in many Russian towns settlements of Germans and Gotlanders founded markets, built churches, and established merchant courts.

Great Novgorod was known to the Germans as Naugarden and to the Gotlanders as Holmgard. As Lübeck was to Germany, so was this strange mart to Russia. With its vast suburbs it was a republic rather than a city. It was the common meeting ground for all who journeyed by the great waterways which opened up internal Russia to commerce. The German colony clustered round St. Peter’s Church, the native merchants met at the church of St. John the Baptist. At the head of this incongruous community stood elective princes, subject, however, to the control of the Vetsche, or popular body, in all affairs of moment. The great fairs were flocked to from all sides. The city was the emporium of East and West. Every winter and every summer the crowd of foreign traders filled the streets, and from the label of tongues a rude jargon of business was evolved.

In Greek orthodox countries all western Europeans were called “Latins,” and Latin churches and buildings not only in Novgorod but in Riga, Vitebsk, and Smolensk show that along all the great rivers and their watersheds merchants from Lübeck and Wisby had made their way.

The German and Gotland merchants who established themselves east of the
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Baltic region did not obtain free rights of settlement as in England, for the Russian merchants, organised into associations, and assured of the support of the native population, which was hostile to foreigners, never lost their grasp of the monopoly of domestic trade. The native retail dealers, and even the Prince of Novgorod himself, were compelled to avail themselves of the services of Russian middlemen in their transactions with foreign merchants. Only the Church traded directly with the foreigners. Nowhere else did the Germans encounter such a difficult task from the very beginning as in Novgorod. The constant dangers to which they were exposed demanded of them the closest of union and the strictest of discipline. The oldest list of the house-rules of the German yard, the often enlarged and altered Novgorod "Skrá," was drawn up in the fourteenth century. At first the superintendents of the St. Peter's dépôt, the two "aldermen," were elected from the winter or summer voyagers to Novgorod, irrespective of the city from which they came. The profits of the dépôt were sent to the St. Peter's chest of St. Mary's Church in Wisby, and in all doubtful points of law appeal was made to the council of Germans in Gotland. During the course of the thirteenth century the city of Lübeck won a signal victory over her rival in acquiring the management of the Novgorod dépôt. From this time forth the posts of alderman were alternately held by merchants of Lübeck and Wisby. The officials elected were responsible to their mother cities only, although the chief alderman had power over life and death. The profits of the association were sent to Lübeck, and the high court of the league at this city, the authority of which was supreme over the entire Baltic colonial region, became the final court of appeal for the Novgorod dépôt also. Lübeck did not succeed in accomplishing her designs without opposition, nor did she henceforth remain undisturbed in her supreme position: Riga, the ambitious head of the cities of Livonia, also strove to obtain the leading place.

During the thirteenth century the relations between the German merchants and the Russians repeatedly became so strained that the cities of Germany were compelled to exercise the sharpest coercive measure at their disposal, the interdiction of trade; that is to say, the suspension of all business with the penalised country. This took place, for example, in 1268–1269. Inasmuch as the Russians finally yielded to the demands of the Germans, the voyages to Novgorod were resumed in 1270. Lübeck first obtained the leadership, to which it now laid claim in all regions, in the eastern sphere of German commercial activity. After the embargo on trade with Russia was renewed, in 1278, Lübeck contracted an alliance with the Germans of Gotland and the merchants of Riga against all countries that were in a position to injure the traffic from the Trave to Novgorod, one of the numerous leagues formed by cities of various regions, and dissolved and renewed at intervals, until in the fourteenth century they assumed a more settled character. In general, even in later times the lesser alliances were more important and effectual than the great league of all cities engaged in the German northern trade, called by preference the Hanseatic League, and always more theoretical than real.

F. THE GERMAN MERCHANT IN THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS

Lübeck and Baltic north Germany did not long remain content with their successes in Wisby and Novgorod alone. In the thirteenth century relations with the Scandinavian kingdoms had become of the greatest importance.
Commercial development progressed far more smoothly in Sweden than in other countries. Some time after the Germans had first set foot in Gotland and Oeland they settled in Sweden itself, and obtained for themselves in the new cities, just then beginning to develop, a position of complete equality with the native population. Stockholm, the new capital, founded in the twelfth century, was decidedly German in character. German merchants supplied the Swedes with luxuries from the South, worked the mines of Atvida and Falun on their own account, and bought up the iron of the forest smithies. By the end of the thirteenth century they possessed such important privileges as exemption from taxes, rights of settlement, protection against the rights of wreckage and against piracy. But the land was poor, and trade was consequently very slight.

Relations with Denmark, which never ceased its endeavours to obtain dominion over the Baltic, were of far greater importance, although more subject to disturbances. Denmark's claims to commercial power were chiefly supported by her geographical situation and extension. Inasmuch as the Danes were in possession of the provinces of Schonen and Halland, in southern Sweden, they dominated the waterways leading from the North Sea to the Baltic. They were able to open and close the straits to the dwellers on the North Sea who desired to exclude Lübeck and the other Baltic ports from the North Sea, and in like manner they could either bar or unlock the Sound and the Great Belt to the Easterlings. Hence it became one of the earliest endeavours of Lübeck — an endeavour never abandoned and never achieved, except for a few brief intervals — to obtain possession of the straits in order to keep the Western races out of the Baltic, and the Gotlanders and, if possible, the merchants of all German-Baltic seaports out of the North Sea. Lübeck desired to monopolise the entire trade between the two seas, to be the one centre of all commerce carried on between the east and west of northern Europe. Since the straits between the North Sea and the Baltic were not seldom impassable, Lübeck fell back on her favourable geographical location, and rendered the moderately long overland road through Holstein accessible; in fact, a considerable portion of the trade between east and west passed over this commercial route. In consequence of the construction of the Stecknitz Canal in the fourteenth century, an uninterrupted waterway, quite large enough to accommodate the moderate-sized vessels used in the Middle Ages, stood at the disposal of commerce.

In the course of the thirteenth century the Danish kings granted at first to single cities, and later to merchants from all parts of the German Empire, exemption from wreckage rights, tolls, and taxes. Thus the idea that members of German commercial associations were to be looked upon as privileged individuals became firmly rooted in this country also. Although trade in Denmark itself was of but little importance, the right to settle in Schonen, a Danish dependency in southern Sweden, was of the very greatest value to the merchant. The southern coast of Sweden was the centre of the herring fishery carried on by Lübeck and its Baltic neighbours, as well as by Bremen, Hamburg, and the seaports of the Low Countries. Smoked or salt fish formed the chief article of the inland trade of these cities. Moreover, the Baltic herring was a valuable commodity even in foreign markets in those days of strict ecclesiastical fasting regulations. The great fishing settlements were situated in the neighbourhood of Skanörs and Falsterbo, then flourishing trading places, although now almost unknown. Gustav Freytag has described the life at the fishing towns as follows: "There on the shore between the
castles of Skanör and Falsterbo the Germans had marked off the land over which their rights extended, and where the banners of their cities waved, from Danish territory by a moated rampart and palisade. Each city or company had its own station, or ‘vitte,’ measured out to it in rods on the valuable ground, and each station was in turn surrounded by poles bearing the coat of arms of its owners. Within each vitte stood the stone houses in which the herrings were smoked and salted, the piles of wooden casks, and the huts for fishermen and labourers; and each was governed according to the law of its own city, administered by a merchant of standing, appointed annually. The superintendence of the whole was in the hands of the Prefect of Lübeck, except that capital cases were reserved to the representative of the King of Denmark. All details were regulated according to a certain standard, the size of the casks, the length of the fish; the quality of the wares was under the supervision of inspectors. . . . The shore was deserted for the greater part of the year; only the armed watchmen and their dogs were then to be seen. But during the fishing season, between St. James’s Day and Martinmas, the fleets of the North Sea and Baltic companies came like endless flocks of swans; the strand echoed with the bustle of busy workmen; thousands of fishing-boats lay with their nets in the sea day and night, and for the night haul torches blazed along the entire coast. On the shore, rope-makers and coopers laboured, and the merchant stored away his goods in the wooden huts. There, between mountains of fish, in the midst of salt and smoke, the most costly wares of the Continent—silks and wines of the South, cloth of the Low Countries, and spices of the Orient—were sold as at a great fair. The hastily freighted vessels made three trips each season to the mainland and back; at the beginning of each October the shores were again deserted.”

In Norway, the classic home of the Vikings, the stormy impulses of bygone centuries were gradually disappearing at the time of the development of the German Hansa. Foreign seafarers—Englishmen, Frisians, and Low Germans—brought to Norway, as poor in population as it was in products, the petty wares for which its inhabitants could afford to pay. The fisheries also enticed foreigners into Norwegian waters. The fish trade, especially traffic in dried codfish, was concentrated in Bergen. Germans, chiefly merchants of Lübeck and Hamburg, acquired at first only the most general privileges,—freedom from wreckage law, unimpeded trade with both natives and foreigners, rights of residence and settlement, and equality with the domestic population in the courts. Although the beginnings of the settlement of German merchants in Bergen took place as early as the thirteenth century, the Norwegian trade did not reach the zenith of its development until the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

G. THE EASTERLINGS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES

The point at which the sharply defined and limited trade of the north of Europe, especially that of the Low Germans, came into contact with the world’s commerce was at Bruges, the great international market that had arisen in the very focus of the central European sphere of communication. Here were stored the valuable products of western and southern European industry, as well as the merchandise of the Levant. Bruges, like Ghent and Ypres,—and, in fact, almost all the towns of Flanders, Brabant, and northern France,—was a manufacturing
city. The chief industries were the various branches of cloth-making, — weaving, fulling, warping, and dyeing. In later times other departments of the textile trade, such as the manufacture of linen, silk, and cotton goods, were also developed. Mining and metal-working were in course of introduction; already in the fourteenth century coal was obtained in Liège; Dinan, the single French-speaking city that belonged to the German Hansa, was far-famed for its copper utensils, called "Dinanderie." The population of this industrial region was so dense, that of Flanders and Brabant (Old Belgium) it had been found necessary to import food-stuffs ever since the thirteenth century. The institution of guilds was in full sway. Even to-day the guild and cloth-halls with their towering belfries bear witness to the prosperity and organisation of the Low Country burghers. In the thirteenth century the industrial guilds struggled for representation in the magistrates' courts and city governments. The patrician merchants, the "Poorters," united with the French out of hatred for the industrial classes; Flanders finally became a portion of the Burgundian provinces of the kingdom of the Valois. The trade of foreign merchants in Bruges was frequently seriously disturbed by conflicts of the different social classes of the city, and by feuds with both domestic and foreign rulers.

Bruges was indebted to the relative proximity of the sea for its commercial prosperity. It was connected with Sluys as well as with Damme by waterways. The harbour of Sluys was shallow and choked with sandbars; on the other hand, the Zwin, an arm of the sea extending inland and navigable as far as Bruges, was widened in order to form the future basin of the harbour of Damme. Vast dykes, built from 1180 on, protected Bruges from the floods of which we hear frequent mention in the history of the Netherlands of the Middle Ages. The bulk of the merchandise sent to Bruges by sea had always to be reloaded on smaller vessels before it reached its destination. Until later than the thirteenth century, products of the Levant were transported overland from the Rhine or from the French markets. It is true that occasionally Italian vessels made their way to Flanders, but not until the year 1317 was there any regular traffic between Italy and the Low Countries by sea. From time immemorial ships of western France, Spain, and Portugal, laden with wine, had landed at the Flemish coasts. Traffic with the German cities of the Rhine was also of unknown antiquity, certainly of earlier date than the appearance of Upper German merchants and Low German seafarers in Flanders. The Easterlings finally came during the thirteenth century, and were granted the same privileges as other foreigners, but no special rights. Margaret of Flanders conferred the usual privileges of trade (1252) upon "all merchants of the Roman Empire who visit Gotland;" and thereafter, in Bruges also, the Easterlings occupied a position of complete equality with their west German predecessors. Nevertheless the claims of the associated German merchants were disregarded and resented in Bruges, and it became necessary for them to retaliate in 1280, temporarily removing their magazines from Bruges to Ardenburg,—a means of coercion frequently employed in later days. In 1283 the Germans returned to Bruges, and wrested rights upon rights with unrelenting persistence until they became a practically privileged class.
H. The Dépôts in Foreign Countries; the Low German Cities and their Unions

As we have already seen, at the end of the thirteenth century German commercial dépôts, in which not only the nearest German cities, but often towns situated a long distance off, had a share, were established in all the nations of northern Europe. In all countries the merchants of single cities first received rights and privileges, until, finally, the total of these special rights was transferred to the great companies of German traders. The necessity for preserving their privileges, and also for settling all disputes among themselves without invoking the aid of foreign powers, led to a closer union of the merchants whose homes were in the “Empire of the Alemanni,” but who lived abroad temporarily, and to the formation of self-governing associations, which remained fixed, in contrast to the constant changes that took place among their members. All these companies, yards, and offices retained their independence in respect to the mother country as long as they were able. They had the power of refusing entrance to whom they chose; there was yet no union of all the towns engaged in foreign trade. In spite of this, however, in the thirteenth century common interests developed between the mercantile settlements in foreign lands and the cities from which they came. Indeed, the privileges were never granted by foreign rulers to individual merchants, but to the mercantile inhabitants or corporations of their native cities. Moreover, appeal was made to the courts at home on all difficult points of law, and it was not seldom that the mother cities, whose co-operation was indispensable, especially in laying embargoes on trade and in bringing about temporary removals of dépôts, were called upon for assistance. However displeasing it may have been to the self-governing unions of merchants in foreign lands, the fact was that the true security of the trader lay in the hands of his native city, which, therefore, acquired the superintendence of all foreign dépôts. The common interests by which the cities of the mother country and the dépôts were bound together finally united all the towns of Germany that were engaged in trade in the North and had common commercial privileges to defend.

Before the end of the thirteenth century leagues of German cities whose merchants were engaged in foreign trade had been formed. The history of this century was characterized by a strong tendency toward federation. The decay of imperial power under the later Hohenstaufens compelled many cities threatened by warlike nobles to join together for the protection of their political rights and economic interests. The majority of the leagues were limited in area or time, although easily renewed whenever necessary. Since the fall of Henry the Lion there had been no ruler in north Germany capable of offering opposition to a foreign enemy. The empire left the North to its fate when Valdemar the Great extended his power over the Baltic and the new colonial regions. This advance of Denmark was checked by a league of which Lübeck also was a member; the battle of Bornhöved 1 secured room for development to the German Baltic regions for many years.

During the following years of peace the towns and principalities of northern Germany rapidly increased in strength; the Dominium maris baltici and supre-

1 See Plate, “The Battle of Bornhöved, July 22, 1227,” in Vol. VI.
acy in northern European commerce was transferred to the Germans. Now begins
the long list of leagues and compacts entered into by cities bound together by
common interests, and whole groups of communities closely united by common
interests are established. As early as 1241 Lübeck and Hamburg had entered
into a treaty, pledging each other to protect the entrance to the Elbe and other
rivers from pirates. As allies, they waged war in 1259 and cleared the coasts of
the sea-robbers. Other cities had at times made similar alliances. But each city
went its own way, and often at critical moments would adopt a policy different
from that of its allies. This was sometimes due to compulsion; for all the towns
were not free cities of the empire, but were under some reigning house, and at best
were only semi-independent. The Pomeranian towns were under the dukes, Ros-
tock belonged to the house of Schwerin, Hamburg to the counts of Holstein, and
so with many others.

Then there were the great ecclesiastical cities governed by bishops or arch-
bishops. No general bond was possible in such circumstances. The cities were
involved in the wars and quarrels of their rulers. They struggled for a position
of direct relation to the empire, and in time under this constitutional demand they
won many privileges and immunities, but until the Treaty of Westphalia their
place in the Imperial economy was ill-defined and uncertain.

Many city groups were formed for common undertakings. There were groups
of Westphalian cities, of Zuyder Zee cities, of Pomeranian, Prussian, and Saxon
cities, of cities which were bishoprics and of cities which were mere markets; but
all these groups were separate and self-dependent, in no way forming parts of a
common league.

After the great Cologne Union of 1367 a general league seemed for a time pos-
sible. Aspirations for such a league were felt everywhere. The cities, separated
as they had been by rivalries and feuds, saw that commercial interests pointed
to common action in many ways. The security of the seas, the settlement of disputes,
the protection of traders in foreign lands, were all matters of common concern.
But no serious attempt to give shape and body to these purposes was made by any
city except by Lübeck alone. Again and again Lübeck had invited the other
cities to form a real league. Her own interests coincided with the general in-
terests of all. And from the Cologne Union onwards Lübeck laboured incessantly
to bring about this desired result. By strict terms of compact in Hansa arrange-
ments, by convoking general assemblies, by inscribing names of members in a
common roll by statutes, ordinances, and bye-laws, she gradually attained this ideal;
but in spite of the glamour that can be exercised by a name or a conception, even by
a dream, there was no Hanseatic assembly that can be proved to have been attended
by all the cities, no resolution by which all the towns usually considered Han-
seatic were bound, no membership roll in accordance with which regular contribu-
tions flowed in from all sides, no universally recognised statute, no common policy
of defence, and no war in which all the members were engaged. In short, the
so-called Hanseatic League was a union of cities, similar in every respect to the
union of German States called the Holy Roman Empire. The same tendency to
the grand style was shown not only in the artistic, but also in the political and
economic, models of this age. The misconception into which the majority of modern
historians have fallen arises from the fact that they all attempt to measure the
medieval Hansa, that was completely in harmony with the spirit of its age, ac-
cording to the standard of modern ideas of confederations. They imagine that the old towns took the field at the suggestion of Lübeck quite as unanimously as the various divisions of the army of the confederated German States advanced against the French in 1870.

Lübeck was no Athens, nor was the Hansa a Delian league. An attempt to introduce the Greek idea of hegemony and alliance in war into a description of Hanseatic affairs would result in a mere caricature. Had Lübeck been as powerful as Athens of the fifth century B.C., perhaps then she would have been able to enforce the coercive measures without which it is impossible to create a community of political individuals. However, the coercive powers of the Hansa never attained to complete development, and the league fell because of their inadequacy. Nevertheless, the cities of the league were by no means unwarlike. All were constantly obliged to defend themselves against foreign princes and their own feudal superiors, against pillage by land and piracy by sea, against their sister cities; and the spirit of war was continually aroused by internal dissensions. For all that, they were always weak from a military point of view; and the only reason why it was possible for them to accomplish anything of a warlike nature was because at that time things were not much better with the forces of their ruling houses, even the large kingdoms. Since Lübeck possessed little more than the average of military power and ability, it is quite evident that an energetic leadership, such as once had been exercised by Athens, Sparta, or Rome, was out of the question for her. Lübeck as a free imperial city was superior to her confederates only from a diplomatic point of view, for the reason that she was not exposed to the hampering paternal interference of a reigning prince. This circumstance heightened the reputation of the city on the Trave even in foreign lands.

The Hansa cannot be likened to a Hellenic league, not merely because of the weakness of the leading power, but by reason of the dependence of the individual cities of the union. The Greek federations were alliances of cities which were independent States; the city leagues of the Middle Ages, especially the Hansa, were associations of towns, all subject to an emperor, and, with but few exceptions, to an immediate lord as well; thus they were never in a position to act independently except when the power of the ruling prince had been overthrown. The Prussian towns, for example, were in the iron grasp of the Teutonic knights for a century and a half, and had no opportunity for self-dependent action until the fall of the order as a power. Membership in the Hansa was of no benefit either to a town or to its confederates, in case the policy and interests of a feudal superior imposed upon it a definite and unalterable attitude in regard to political affairs.

When asked what were the characteristic features by which a Hansa town was to be recognised, we cannot well name more than the one given by Dietrich Schaefer,—participation in the rights of German merchants in foreign countries. If one were to enumerate all the cities that at least some time during their histories have been looked upon as members of the Hansa (in later times when a permanent membership roll was required it was found expedient to draw up lists), the result would be the respectable total of ninety. The geographical region over which the various members of the league were scattered was also very extensive. The northern boundary is formed by the North Sea and the Baltic, although Gotland, Öland, and Kalmar were also included. The continental southern boundary extended from Dinan, through Andernach, Göttingen, and Halle, and curved down-
ward into the regions of the Oder and Vistula to Breslau and Cracow. The farthest point to the west was marked by the towns of Zealand; to the east, by Reval and Narva.

Although the territorial groups of cities held their convocations with or without inviting neighbour groups, Lübeck endeavoured to convert the assemblies of the Lusatian towns into meetings of all the confederated cities taking part in foreign trade, and to transform these Hanseatic conventions, or Hansetage, into periodically recurrent administrative and legislative bodies of the league. Many such conventions were held, not only in Lübeck, but in other cities. Lübeck issued the invitations, presided over the sittings of delegates, and preserved the minutes as well as the other records of the federation. In a very few cases, however, were all the invitations accepted; and very few assemblies were attended by a sufficient number of delegates to deserve the name of Hansetage. Full attendance was impossible, owing to the fluctuating character of the federation; in short, the meetings of the league were in every respect counterparts to the imperial diets (Reichstagen) of the Middle Ages.

The only means at the disposal of the Hansa for the purpose of coercing refractory members was the boycott, or "Verhansung," — the suspension, nay, the prevention, of all traffic with the city in question, the seizure of its ships, cargoes, and other possessions, and the exclusion of its inhabitants from the common rights enjoyed by all merchants of the league in foreign countries; in other words, non-admission to the dépôts and offices of the association from Bruges to Novgorod. It was a very uncertain means of coercion, and, moreover, one that cut both ways. The coercive measures adopted against foreign powers — suspension of commerce, removal of markets, and war — were also of the nature of a two-edged sword. It is no wonder that the sober merchants of the Middle Ages infinitely preferred the most interminable negotiations to action, which as a rule led to nothing but their own damage. The Hanseatic politicians always displayed remarkable dexterity and tenacity in their negotiations. Woe to the opponent when the Hansa possessed any written evidence against him! With a document in their hands, and with all their charted rights behind them, they wareied their enemies into submission. The Hanseatic envoys were indebted for not the least part of their diplomatic successes to the advantage which results from a narrow line of thought, and persistency in always returning to the point of departure.

That the Hanse leagues made such headway during the fourteenth century, and that any practical results were attained, was entirely due to their enemies. They were drawn into the affairs of the Scandinavian kingdoms against their will, and war alone assisted them to the degree of unity of which they were capable. It may be said to their credit that they possessed at least a little heroism as an offset to their bourgeois narrow-mindedness. So long as a merchant was compelled to breathe sea air and face the dangers of long voyages, he could not grow altogether blind and stupid in the semi-darkness of retail shops and herring magazines. Robbers and pirates forced him to be constantly on his guard, and the hostile inhabitants of foreign cities caused him to spring to arms whenever their ill-will against the privileged strangers burst into flame, — an event which the unscrupulous and overbearing conduct of the Hanseatics made by no means rare. In short, the medievel tradesman had not much holiday from the school of war.
J. THE PERIOD OF THE WARS OF VALDEMAR TO THE UNION OF KALMAR

(a) From Eric VI to the Peace of Stralsund and Korsör.—The halt in the development of Denmark which followed the defeat of Valdemar the Great at Bornhöved in 1227, and which proved to be of such advantage to the Baltic colonies of Germany, came to an end during the times of King Eric Menved (1285–1319). Not only did Denmark resume her earlier plans of expansion, but the Counts of Holstein and the Margraves of Brandenburg also aspired to a share in the *Dominium maris baltici*. For five hundred years dominion over the Baltic was contested from two different points of view: from the mercantile—as in the case of the Hanseatic League—and from the financial-political. To occupy the harbours, coasts, and seaports, to open them to commerce or to close them, as expediency demanded, and to be paid for doing it, were the objects held in view by all princes, great and small, who dwelt on the Baltic or who were endeavouring to advance toward its shores. It was with such an end in mind that Count Gerhard II of Plön built a tower at the mouth of the Trave in defiance of Lübeck, just as Valdemar II had already done; Count Gerhard also occupied the region of commercial roads between Hamburg and Lübeck (1306), in order to rob the merchants by compelling them to pay him for the escorts which he forced upon them. During the same period the Ascanian line of Brandenburg once more, as in 1283, advanced against the Lusatian cities and the Pomeranian princes, who immediately looked to Denmark for help. The lords of Mecklenburg and Pomerania could do no otherwise than acknowledge the suzerainty of Denmark; Rostock, Greifswald, and Stralsund became as good as Danish cities. And when in 1307 Lübeck also became subject to the protectorate of King Eric for ten years, and even arranged an annual tribute, it looked very much as if the Baltic States were to become entirely alienated from the Holy Roman Empire.

But Eric was a very incautious ruler, and unable to retain his new territories. The Baltic towns freed themselves from the dominion of Denmark, and got a high price for their return to their former lords. After the death of Eric the whole of Denmark was under German influence. The new king, Christopher II, expelled the country; and Count Gerhard von Rendsburg of Holstein, called by his countrymen "de grote Ghert," and by the Danes "the bald-pated count," became regent in the minority of his ward Valdemar III. At that time southern Jutland, or Schleswig, was already united to Holstein. When Christopher II attempted to regain his kingdom, and was once more repulsed, Gerhard the Great called to his aid the nobility of north Germany, who thereupon took possession of Denmark as a welcome prize. The Danish entanglements, however, were not favoured by the Hanse towns. When Magnus, king of Sweden and Norway, who had ill-treated them in Bergen, occupied Schonen, Halland, and Blekingen, adjacent to Denmark, they feared that the fishing-stations would be rendered inaccessible to them; nevertheless both Easterlings and Westerlings received a confirmation of their old rights and privileges in the towns and fishing-villages of southern Sweden in 1336. Lübeck, whose star had in 1310 seemed about to set, was again, a decade later, playing the leading part in all negotiations with the Northern rulers and the German lords.

"De grote Ghert" was murdered at Randers in 1340 when at the height of his
power; and to this day the Danes sing the praises of his assassin, Niels Eebenson, as the avenger of their nation and their deliverer from the ignominy of foreign rule. Christopher's youngest son, Valdemar IV, Atterdag, now took possession of the kingdom, supported by the Lusatian group, which also aided him in expelling the Holstein nobility and in forcing the Counts of Schauenburg back across the Elder. Valdemar regained possession of Zealand and Funen, and successfully withstood the Emperor Charles IV when, after conquering Brandenburg, he revived the Baltic schemes of the Ascanian Margraves. The princes of Mecklenburg were once more compelled to acknowledge the feudal supremacy of Denmark, in spite of the fact that the emperor had made them dukes and looked upon them as vassals of the empire. Only the distant province of Esthonia was, on payment of a sum of money, resigned by Valdemar to the Teutonic knights. No further prospects were open to the Danes on the continental side of the Baltic; it would have been difficult to gain any ground against the power of the emperor and the Teutonic Order. On the other hand, opportunities for reconquest and for the acquisition of new territories were offered to the Danes on the breaking out of dissensions in the realm of King Magnus of Sweden and Norway. Leagued with north German princes, Valdemar regained Schonen, Halland, and Blekingen in 1360. The kingdom of Gorm the Old and Valdemar the Great was again restored to its former power.

To the horror of the Lusatian towns, who had shortly before concluded a treaty with Valdemar Atterdag, the king turned against Oland in 1361, conquered Bornholm, set sail for Gotland, and before any steps could be taken in its defence captured this most important island. Defeated before their city by his fierce knights, the citizens of Wisby opened the gates to the victor; Valdemar, however, preferred to consider the city as taken by storm, and refused to enter it except through a breach knocked in the wall by his retainers, that so he might have the right to exact enforced contributions from the burghers. As for the fabulous wealth of Wisby, an old song has it that the Gotlanders measured gold by the hundredweight, that precious stones were playthings, that the women spun with golden distaffs, and that the pigs were given to drink out of silver troughs. The latter especially seem to have fired the imaginations of the Danish ironides who followed Valdemar on his plundering expedition. The king of the Danes and Wends henceforth styled himself king of the Goths or Gotlanders also. But the prosperity of Gotland had vanished, never to return. However, it is quite certain that Wisby could not have continued to maintain itself as a centre of trade even under more favourable circumstances, for the towns of Livonia — Riga, for example — had already begun to show far greater powers of development.

The conquest of Schonen and Gotland was a severe blow to the Easterlings, and by no means a matter of indifference to many a western city. Envos from the various Lusatian and Prussian towns assembled at Greifswald resolved on a trade embargo against Denmark, and agreed to the raising of a war tax. In addition to the cities, the kings and princes of the countries of the Baltic coast were also roused to action by the conquests of Valdemar. Thus, six weeks after the capture of Wisby an alliance was entered into by the majority of the German towns, by the kings of Sweden and Norway and the counts of Holstein, in order — to quote the words of E. R. Daenell — “to re-establish the balance of power between the Baltic nations, and to strengthen the position of the Hanse
towns in Schonen. In order to allow for the possibilities of conquest they pledged the entire southern coast of Sweden, together with the castles of Helsingborg, Skanör, and Falsterbo, to the kings.* The Hanseatic fleet first turned toward Helsingborg. In the summer of 1362 it put to sea alone, before the allied princes had completed their preparations, and suffered a crushing defeat. The burgo-master of Lübeck, John Wittenborg, who had been in command, stoned for his ill-fortune on the scaffold. Soon the kings came to an understanding among themselves: Valdemar's daughter Margaret married Hakon of Norway, and thus the first step was taken toward the union of the northern kingdoms; even the cities of the Low Countries entered into a special treaty with Valdemar. The defeated and isolated Easterlings were obliged to agree to an unfavourable armistice and conditions of peace. The league was practically dissolved on the peace of Helsingborg (1365); each city wished to procure some special advantage for itself, yet none received any definite promises from Valdemar, not to speak of tangible concessions.

The impulse toward a fresh alliance against Denmark arose in the Prussian towns, who could not dispense with the passage through the Sound, and had a close community of interest with the cities of the Zuyder Zee region, of which the centre was Kampen in Overyssel. The allied cities of Prussia and the Netherlands now entered into negotiations with the Lusatian group. A general convention was arranged to take place in Cologne in the late autumn of 1367. Here the representatives of Lübeck, Rostock, Stralsund, Wismar, Kulm, Thorn, Elbing, Kampen, Elborg, Hardwick, Amsterdam, and Brielle instituted the celebrated Cologne Confederation of November 11, 1367, in the name of the Lusatian, Prussian, Livonian, Zuyder Zee, and Dutch cities. No mention of the participation of Rhenish-Westphalian, Frisian, Lower Saxon, or Brandenburg towns has come down to us. At the Cologne Assembly a military expedition was arranged for the next year, the size of contingents as well as the amounts of contributions to the cost of the war were determined, and every city agreed to the imposition of a war tax. In February, 1368, the Lusatian cities concluded a two years' alliance with the princes of Sweden, Mecklenburg, and Holstein, who were opponents of Valdemar, and also a league for one year with the cities of Prussia and the Netherlands. Before the war had actually begun the King of Denmark retreated from Zealand, taking his treasures with him and appointing a captain-general in his stead: as a matter of fact, the council of state administered the kingdom during his absence. In the year 1368 the allies captured Copenhagen and the strongholds of Jutland and Schonen, with the exception of Helsingborg, which held out against them until the autumn of 1369. A blockade, through which the English and Flemings also were excluded from Norway, compelled Hakon to negotiate for peace; and since the movement against Mecklenburg, planned by Valdemar, had also failed to attain its hoped-for result, the Danish council of state entered into negotiations with the confederation in 1369, Lübeck representing the cities. Peace was declared in 1370, at a convention in Stralsund. As shown by Daenell, the peace of Stralsund consisted of two series of agreements,—one economic and commercial, and the other political. "In respect to the first, the Hansa obtained practically all the demands that had constantly been made, now by one city, now by another, during the last half-century,—free-trade throughout the whole of Denmark, freedom from strand law, their own jurisdiction over the
fishing-dépôts, and reductions in duties. To the political changes that resulted from the peace of Stralsund belong the pledging to the league of the most important castles of Schonen and those situated on the Sound,—Falsterbo, Skanör, Malmö, and Helsingborg,—together with the payment of two-thirds of the revenues accruing to them during a period of fifteen years. Valdemar was to recognise the peace as binding until Michaelmas, 1371, by affixing his great seal: in case of his abdication or death, no king was to succeed to the throne of Denmark without the approval of the Hansa.

Although the princes allied with the Hansa were not satisfied with the terms of peace arranged by the towns on their own responsibility, they were unable to continue the war unassisted, and so they too came to terms with Denmark at Stockholm, in 1371. Valdemar IV delayed the ratification of the Stralsund negotiations to the last moment, and finally sealed the treaty only with the small seal, obtaining further concessions into the bargain. The management of the pledged castles in Schonen was a source of many difficulties to the league, the division of the revenues in special causing many disputes. When Valdemar died, in 1385, and was succeeded by his grandson Olaf, son of his younger daughter Margaret and Hakon of Norway, who was crowned without the formal assent of the Hansa, a final settlement of Hanseatic affairs seemed probable. However, Olaf refused to confirm the Stralsund peace with the great seal until the Hansa had relinquished their claims to the right of ratifying the Danish succession. Negotiations of a like nature to those of Korsør took place in Kallundborg. Hakon of Norway confirmed all the privileges which had ever been granted in his kingdom to the Hansa, and in addition granted all Hanseatic vessels the right to enter the ports of Norway flying their own flags, which they were not required to lower until landing.

(b) The Last Third of the Fourteenth Century.—The treaties of Stralsund and Korsør secured the rights of the Hanse towns in Denmark for many generations; and with the exception of the pledging of the castles on the Sound, which was only for fifteen years, were on the whole faithfully preserved until the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. The negotiations at Kallundborg had also ended in satisfactory terms with Norway, and for the first time the dépôt at Bergen first began to prosper. The foundations of the rights of the Hansa were now so firmly fixed that the league tried to procure monopolies for its members in accordance with the general aims and purposes of all privileged classes and places in the Middle Ages who looked upon the acquisition of monopolies as the final object at which they ought to aim. So long as the Leaguers held the castles on the Sound this policy was feasible; but when the castles were restored, monopoly was no longer possible. Still the Hansa by vigorous effort won in open competition the predominant position in the Baltic trade.

All the Hansa cities had not joined in the Cologne Confederation, but only those whose trading interests were involved. The peace of Stralsund in appearance confirmed the rights of the Leaguers. But of the two pledges given for securing these rights, one, the right of the Hansa to ratify succession to the Danish throne, was only once exercised, and the other, the occupation of the castles, proved of no value, as the cost of upkeep and of policing the sea absorbed all the revenues available from the occupation.

As the league did not oppose Olaf's succession, his able mother Margaret con-
HANSA SHIPS OF THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

(After Drawings by W. Stower.)
DESCRIPTION OF THE ILLUSTRATIONS OF HANSA SHIPS

1 and 3, Cologne ships of the year 1400. 2, Wisnaw ship. 4, Lübeck ship. 5, Danzig ship. 6, Elbing ship.
(1 and 3, after a Martyrdom of St. Ursula, painted about 1409, and now in the Wallraf-Richartz Museum at Cologne; 2, 4 and 6, after impressions from seals in the Germanic NationalMuseum at Nuremberg; 2, after a seal bearing the inscription, Sigillum Wissenariensis civitatis; 4, after a seal inscribed, Sigillum burgensium de Lubeke; 5, after one inscribed, Sigillum burgensium in Dantizke; and 6, after a seal bearing the inscription, Sigillum civitatis Elbingensis. Drawn by W. Stöwer.)
firmed the Danish privileges of the Hansa. But when Olaf succeeded Hakon of Norway, in 1380, and united both crowns, he declined to confirm the privileges of the Hansa in Norway. Five years later, when the castles reverted to Denmark, the Hansa was reduced to its former position as a purely commercial association, and although negotiations went on for years, the Hansa failed to better its status or to augment its rights. At Olaf's death, in 1387, Margaret played with the cities, cajoling and promising, but doing nothing to renew their privileges.

The struggle for the Swedish throne, in which the claims of Albert were upheld by Kalmar and Stockholm, backed by Wismar and Rostock, while the people favoured Margaret, resulted in an early victory of Margaret's party in 1389, when Albert and his son Eric were captured at Aasele, and all places except Stockholm were reduced to submission by the Swedish national forces. Stockholm was now blockaded and besieged by the Swedes, and the Germans of the place, despairing of help from the Hansa or the Teutonic knights, invited all the corsairs and pirates of the north seas (the Vitalien-Brüder, or Forage Brethren) to bear down upon Margaret's subjects in Denmark and Sweden in the hope that their depredations might be used for the victualling of Stockholm, while the terror of their exploits might bring about the liberation of the king.

The pirate forces conquered Gotland, and even advanced so far northward as to Bergen, which they burned in 1393. All this time the Hansa remained neutral. But now the league offered its services as mediator between the contending parties. Margaret welcomed the offer, and very enlightened proposals were made for the securing of safe commerce on the Baltic. The Prussian and Dutch cities, however, declined to contribute toward the maintenance of the necessary naval forces, and the negotiations led to nothing on this important point; but in 1395, by a settlement made at Skanör-Falsterbo between Margaret and Albert, the king was released from captivity on payment of sixty thousand marks, Stockholm itself to be the pledge of payment. When the stipulated time came, Albert was unable to pay, and Stockholm was given up to Margaret, who thereupon confirmed the city in all its privileges, and finally established the rights of the Hansa in the three kingdoms, for the three Scandinavian kingdoms had in the meantime become one great united monarchy. In 1397, at Kalmar, representatives of the three kingdoms and of the German sojourners solemnly met and declared that for the future there should be a "perpetual union" of the three States under one crown. In reality it was a federation and not a unification. Loose as it was, however, it made a power against which the Hansa could hardly hope to maintain itself, and although a formal confirmation of Hanseatic rights was obtained, all knew that the document was of no real value now that the Hansa was unable to insist upon its fulfilment.

K. The Period of Hanseatic Prosperity

(a) The Hansa and Flanders.—In Bruges from an early date German merchants had settled and opened factories. These factories obeyed the mother cities from which they had sprung. From 1360 to 1380 disputes arose, but the supremacy of the mother cities was finally admitted in Bruges as elsewhere. The rights of the Hansa remained in full force and effect up to 1560, when the markets of Bruges were removed to Antwerp. The success of the Hansa was due to strong measures adopted in 1358, and continued for a couple of years. An embargo
was laid on trade and the markets were temporarily removed to Dordrecht. This drastic policy secured for the Hanseatic traders the right of free settlement in all Flanders. Slight differences arose again in 1388, and finally in 1392 the Germans in Bruges were firmly placed in possession of all the trading rights for which they had contended, and all subjects of the empire were made participators in these rights when settled in Flanders for purposes of trade.

(b) The Hansa and England. — In England also the position of the Hansa at the end of the fourteenth century was becoming increasingly difficult; but here too the German cities finally succeeded in warding off all dangers. The three Edwards were friendly to foreigners, and granted them complete freedom in both wholesale and retail trade throughout the entire kingdom, even in the wool and metal industries. Richard II also confirmed the rights and privileges of the Hansa shortly after his accession. But during the reign of this weak sovereign the national hostility to the commercial dominion of foreigners, which until that time had been held in abeyance, arose in full force. The House of Commons, as the representative of the people, induced the king to suspend all the privileges of the Hansa until the latter had cleared itself of various charges preferred against it. This was the beginning of a long struggle, frequently interrupted, but invariably resumed in order, on the part of the rising native trade, to free itself from the commercial ascendency of foreigners, especially members of the Hanseatic League. Although at first a battle for the markets of England, it soon became a struggle for admission to all the northern European markets, a privilege that the Hanseatics would gladly enough have kept to themselves alone. The English first demanded entrance to the Norwegian and Danish centres of trade, and then to the Hanse towns themselves. The struggle lasted until nearly the end of the Elizabethan Age, and closed about 1600 with the complete victory of England.

During the reign of Richard II a protracted dispute arose on account of the position taken by the Hansa in respect to all foreigners in Norway and Schonen after the conclusion of the peace of Stralsund. The English merchants did not submit like the other non-German peoples. Now as before they sailed boldly into the Baltic and obtained whatever goods they required without the assistance of the Hanseatic, especially the Lübeck, middlemen. The hostile attitude of the Baltic towns was answered by the already mentioned temporary suspension of Hanseatic privileges in England. In addition, the English demanded an equality of rights in all towns and districts of the Hansa. The Germans received the usual confirmation of their privileges toward the end of the year 1380, without having granted full reciprocity to the British. The dispute that followed, made all the more acute through seizures and embargoes, lasted until 1388. From this time forth the English enjoyed free trade with the Baltic seaports. Their merchants organised according to Hanseatic models, and elected an alderman whose duty was to adjust differences and to represent the interests of his countrymen in all their dealings with foreigners. Although bickering still continued between Englishmen and Germans, even after the agreement of 1388, the position of the latter in England remained unaltered. The first of the Lancastrian kings, Henry IV, confirmed the charters of the Hanseatics on their agreeing to an increase in certain customs duties, a procedure indispensable to the wellbeing of the government. The chief feature of Hanseatic-English relations did not lie in the recognition of former
privileges, but in the fact that the league was compelled to grant free play to the
growing sea-power of Great Britain, even while the latter was only beginning to
develop.

(c) *The Migration of the Vitalienbrüder into the North Sea Region.*—
Toward the end of the fourteenth century the Baltic was finally freed from the
plague of pirates brought down upon it by the war of the Swedish succession.
Long after Albert had been set free and Stockholm handed over to the Hansa
as a pledge, the Vitalienbrüder had continued their marauding expeditions, still re-
main in the service of the House of Mecklenburg, who had not yet abandoned
all hopes of regaining possession of the Swedish crown. However, the Vitalien-
brüder removed their headquarters to Wisby, although the greater part of Gotland
continued under the dominion of Margaret. They also found places of refuge in
the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, and even on the coast of Pomerania, but Rost-
tok and Wismar closed their harbours to them. They were of the greatest injury
to the associated German merchants. The situation suddenly became altered when
the Teutonic Order brought Wisby and the rest of Gotland under its jurisdiction
in 1398. Inasmuch as the Lusatian cities had just then completed their prepara-
tions for attacking the freebooters, and had agreed on the raising of a war tax, and
since the queen of the three northern kingdoms had also taken steps against them,
the Vitalienbrüder left their Baltic hiding-place for the North Sea, which they
now made the scene of an activity that had absolutely no political motives what-
soever behind it.

The North Sea had always had pirates of its own, who were chiefly of
Frisian origin. During the Hundred Years' War robberies perpetrated by French
and English buccaneers frequently gave the Hansa grounds for complaint. But
now the Vitalienbrüder in addition disturbed the sphere of western European
maritime commerce from their new headquarters in Friesland. Once more the
Hansa was obliged to unite its merchant vessels bound for the Netherlands
into fleets of about twenty ships each, accompanied by convoy boats. Although
the league vainly endeavoured to obtain the assistance of the cities of Flanders,
a squadron despatched from Lübeck and Hamburg proved strong enough to defeat
the Vitalienbrüder in the Ems (April, 1400). Some of the freebooters fled to Nor-
way, others sought refuge with the Counts of Holland; but Hamburg continued her
campaign against the pirates until finally the chief of the buccaneers, Klaus Störte-
beker, was captured and executed,— an often-sung event that has long been re-
tained in the memory of a people otherwise forgetful enough in regard to historical
occurrences. Nevertheless, piracy on the North Sea continued, and also the name
of the Vitalienbrüder, who for many years enjoyed a second period of prosperity
under the self-chosen designation *Lübbeleer,* or "equal-sharers."

(d) *The Hansa and the Teutonic Order.*— The occupation of Gotland
by the Teutonic Order was a source of great anxiety to the Hansa; for the
order—with which the non-Prussian cities of the Baltic sought to stand upon
as good terms as possible for the sake of their common interests—pursued its
own special aims, and was a very untrustworthy ally; moreover it opposed the
union of the three northern kingdoms, and challenged Margaret of Denmark
to battle for the political supremacy of the Baltic. This caused the Hanse
towns, hitherto neutral, considerable embarrassment. Should they take part in
the struggle between the two powers, or should they let events take their course, as they had done before, in order to be in a position to offer their services as mediators when the right moment arrived? The Teutonic Order would not be turned from its design of occupying Gotland, and its commercial policy immediately proved dangerous to the Hansa. The Prussian, and especially the Livonian towns had always striven in vain for equal rights with Wisby and Lübeck in Novgorod. Now, as a result of an agreement with Lithuania, an independent commercial region, previously open to the Prussian group alone of the Hanse cities, was suddenly closed to them also; the founding of a dépôt in Kovno resulted in a competition which threatened to injure the trade of Novgorod and Pekoff, and in fact did so. The treaty concluded by the Grand Master of the Order and Witold, Grand Duke of Lithuania, on the Sallinwerder (1398) ended the tedious struggles that for a long time had kept both powers in check. This treaty, so favourable to the Teutonic Order, was made by Lithuania because it was necessary for the latter to protect its rear in view of the impending struggle with Russia; and Prussia was quite willing to come to terms, now that Lithuania had ceased to be a heathen land and the scene of uninterrupted religious wars.

Although the relations of the two powers soon became strained again, a fresh struggle culminating in the fall of the order, this had no lasting effects on the independent trade carried on by the Prussian towns in Lithuania and Poland, nor on the dépôt at Kovno. When the old connection between the Prussian Order and its cities was destroyed by the dissolution of the former, the latter did not seek for new relations with the other Baltic towns, but pursued their own course, which was entirely out of harmony with the Lusatian and general Hanseatic interests. The development of the federal character of the Hansa was over. The system of territorial groups of cities corresponding to the general development of the German nation proved fatal to the beginnings of a common league of German towns.

At the very time that the antagonism between the far-seeing commercial policy of the Teutonic Order and the narrower trade interests of the towns subject to it was in process of widening into a gulf that could not be bridged over, a new competitor for the Dominium, or, rather, the Condominium maris baltici, appeared, a pretender that barred the way of the order-state to the sea,—Poland-Lithuania, finally united in 1401. This union was a greater source of danger to the Teutonic Order than was that of the three northern kingdoms. It was impossible for it to live with foes on both sides, so it made peace with the North, ceding the island of Gotland, which it had retained for nine years, to Eric, King of Norway-Sweden-Denmark, in return for a small sum of money (1407). Previously, however, the order had obtained the "New Mark" of Brandenburg from Sigismund of Luxemburg in the form of a pledge (1402), in order completely to bar the way of the Poles to the sea. Further events, such as the battle of Tannenberg (1410), so ruinous to the order, have but little bearing on the present subject. The advance of the western Slavs, who so often succeeded in bringing the eastern expansion of the Teutonic races to a halt, indeed frequently regained extensive tracts of land from the latter, was also a constant source of injury to the Hanseatic League. Owing to their helplessness the cities were unable even to think of attacking Poland; but
on the other hand they looked upon the catastrophe of Tannenberg as having been a desirable check to the ambitions of the order.

(c) Hindrances and Obstacles. — The ancient Greeks have told us with a shudder of sympathetic awe about the children of fortune who, lifted up by fate and tempted to evil by success, suddenly found themselves cast down into the depths of misery from the very zenith of prosperity. To these self-destroying creatures, maddened by happiness, victims of the blind powers of chance, the German Hansa certainly did not belong. The gods did not abruptly thrust it into the abyss after the manner in which they treated the Teutonic Order; but they did not permit the league to expand or to attain to greatness,—they hindered its progress, systematically, as it were, and with a most conscientious attention to detail. Fate never permitted the Germans of the lowlands to develop their commercial activity beyond a certain point, either in respect to privileges or to area controlled. Even Nature herself seems to have taken part in this general conspiracy against them: through an unlooked-for caprice she inflicted an injury on their trade from which the mercantile politicians of the Baltic towns, for all their wisdom, were never able to recover. The herrings, which together with the codfish are admirable types of the most stupid of gregarious animals, were, at the beginning of the fifteenth century, unfaithful to the regions which since the very earliest times they had been accustomed to visit for the purpose of spawning. Why the herrings temporarily deserted the basin of the Baltic Sea at the beginning of the fifteenth century, to return again and again (usually in "fish-periods," lasting sixty years), is a question for which history has no answer. Although in spite of its wanderings into other seas, the herring still remained a fish accustomed to spawn on the coasts, to be caught in nets, and to be salted, smoked, and dried, completely unconcerned as to the nationality of the fishermen, this was by no means a matter of indifference to the Easterlings, who were joined by competitors at the fisheries in the shape of the dwellers on the North Sea coasts, now that the herrings had turned to the waters of England, Scotland, and Norway.

In addition to the fisheries, there were so many different interests to be guarded, that during the fifteenth century the Hanse towns, either singly or in groups, frequently found themselves involved in the most difficult of conflicts. As a foundation for closer union, especially between neighbouring cities, existed the common necessity for protecting the privileges of the municipalities and the welfare of the league against the ill-will and deeds of violence of the ruling princes. During the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the majority of the cities of north Germany, in addition to losing many of their rights of self-government, were compelled by their territorial sovereigns to renounce all participation in the Hanseatic League. The fate of complete dependence on the power of a reigning prince was first visited on the Brandenburg group under the House of Hohenzollern. But the Burgundian, Rhenish-Westphalian, Low Saxon, Pomeranian, and Prussian cities were also gradually subjected to the power of the rulers of their respective States. The latter were supported by the fundamental idea of solidarity, the victorious advance of which could not be withstood by the weakly organised political formations of the Middle Ages.

(f) Struggles within the Towns. — The attacks made by the ruling princes on municipal liberties were furthered not a little by dissensions which arose within
the towns themselves. These conflicts were more serious in north Germany than elsewhere. Central and southern Germany had already passed through the most dangerous phases of the crisis caused by the struggles of the guilds, when the same troubles arose in the Hanse cities. Not only in respect to commerce and culture, but politically, the northern and southern portions of the Holy Roman Empire stood in sharp contrast to one another.

As in the rest of Europe, a patrician class had also developed in the north German cities, an oligarchy of the rich, who held municipal government fast in their own hands, and laid claim to an inherited, exclusive right to the management of all public affairs. As time went on, the upper class became more and more isolated from the lower ranks of the community. It transmitted its privileges by granting equal rights to its descendants; in other words, it became a distinct and separate estate. Members of this class were called "Junkers," and exclusive assemblies and banquets were held in their residences, or "Junkerhöfen." The patrician class of the Hanse towns had arisen from the families of wholesale dealers, and many of them still continued to carry on trade on a great scale. It was not the fact of their being merchants, however, that gave them social standing, but the possession of freehold property or of fiefs, from which they took the name of "Rentner," capitalists. The ordinary merchants, who were accustomed to make annual journeys, often remaining abroad for years, formed a middle class that had no share in municipal offices and exerted no influence on the general affairs of the city. The more wealthy of the craftsmen, the brewers, and the retail dealers in cloth were also in the same position. The chief endeavour of this middle class was to obtain the right to take part in civil government. It was not difficult for them to stir up the masses, and to use the proletariat as a battering-ram in their struggles with the patricians.

The usual course taken by events in a Hanse town during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was, that as a result of rebellions on the part of the middle and lower classes the councillors or aldermen were turned out of office, and various changes introduced in the municipal constitution; patrician reactions almost invariably followed, and the earlier form of government was then re-established, perhaps with some alterations. At the period of the Reformation the city democracies once more began to struggle for the mastery, yet without being able to retain it for any length of time; for the Lutheran clergy were no less anti-democratic and reactionary than their Catholic predecessors. The old class antagonisms in the towns gradually ceased under the increasing pressure of the ruling princes and of the legislation established by them, which now included all municipal affairs within its jurisdiction. Nevertheless, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century troubles between the different classes continued to lead to very serious results. Hate, barbarity, and treachery, with their attendant murder, execution, mutilation, arson, robbery, and pillage, were the chief characteristics of the town life of the period.

Together with the desire for the protection of foreign trade, the tie that prevented the Hansa from falling to pieces until the second half of the sixteenth century was the endeavour of the patrician classes of the various cities to uphold constitutions favourable to their interests. Even Bremen, intractable as she had been, — more than once expelled from the league, — sought help from her sister cities when the patricians were banished in 1365. The Hansetag, or convention
of 1366, decided that sentences passed in one town should be valid for all members of the league. Cologne, Brunswick, Stralsund, Anklam, and Dortmund were all visited by democratic revolutions during the fourteenth century; in Brunswick the guilds obtained the upper hand in spite of temporary expulsion from the Hansa and trade embargoes. Also Lübeck, the chief city of the league, was compelled to employ force in suppressing a movement among the guilds in 1380. As a rule the guilds were supported by the reigning houses in all cities governed by hereditary princes: tyranny, Cesarism, and legitimate unlimited monarchy are, in reality, democratic forces that assist in the destruction of privileged classes and professions. If the monarchical forms of government of the last few centuries have established themselves upon aristocracy of birth and the possession of landed property, it has only been in order that these qualities might be put to use, not because of any real necessity for them.

When this movement of the guilds reached north Germany, constantly threatening to overthrow the governments of all municipal communities, it is not to be wondered that the patrician councillors exercised the utmost caution in dealing with external affairs, in order that their powers might remain concentrated and no occasion be offered to their watchful enemies for taking violent action. The weakness of Hanseatic diplomacy and methods of conducting warfare was chiefly due to the instability of the various city governments.

In Lübeck the endeavour to impose a new excise tax on food-stuffs caused the middle classes of the city to unite and appoint a controlling Committee of Sixty (1406). The merchants who were accustomed to journey to Schonen, Riga, and Bergen, and the great guilds were the chief actors in this bloodless revolution. Since, however, the council delayed in altering the form of municipal government according to the wishes of the people, the masses took up arms, and the Junker councillors, members of such houses as the Pleskow, Westhof, Hoyer, and Warendorf, evacuated the city. The revolution immediately spread to Wismar, Rostock, Stralsund, and Hamburg. Lübeck, being a free city of the empire, was in a position entirely different from that of her sister towns. The refugees, led by Jordan Pleskow, turned to King Rupert, their suzerain, who was unable to effect any change in the state of affairs, although he placed the city under the ban of the empire. The proscription of Lübeck made it possible for its enemies, first, to threaten expulsion from the league, and, second, to arouse the idea of an opposition Hansa for the benefit of Cologne and its following of inland towns. In the meanwhile, Emperor Sigismund, to whom the opposing Lübeck parties had appealed, made the best of his opportunity by demanding payment from both of them. Eric, king of the united northern kingdoms, also interfered in the dispute. Owing to his influence, and to the assistance of neighbouring towns which had been called in as arbitrators, the old council was finally re-established. Eric hoped to gain the chief city of the Hansa, indeed the league itself, over to his side, for he had already begun to make plans for the great undertaking on which he entered immediately after Margaret's death in 1412,—the reunion of Schleswig with Denmark.

(g) The Policy of the Hansa during the Fifteenth Century.—Hanseatic policy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries centred in the relations of the league with the Scandinavian kingdoms. In this case neutrality was of no service,—the
adoption of a definite position alone could secure protection and extension of commercial privileges; in fact, it did not lie beyond the bounds of possibility for the Hansa to determine the course of events through an active interference in political affairs. Both in the Slavic East and in the Romano-Germanic West the league was for the most part forced to permit great political events to run their course. Its position was one of toleration: by actively interfering it would merely have vainly exhausted its insufficient powers of coercion. The attack of King Eric on Schleswig and on the Dukes of Schauenburg compelled the citizens of Hamburg to take up arms in defence of their Holstein neighbours. The strange spectacle was presented of Hamburg and the Vitalienbrüder—who had been persuaded to join their forces against Denmark—fighting on the same side. Lübeck avoided the struggle from the very first, and finally succeeded in negotiating a peace.

At this time the Hansa again took up the policy of union which it had adopted during the wars of Valdemar; the Lübeck Confederation of 1418 was the first since that of Cologne in 1367. A large number of cities, in all, forty-seven, became members of the new association. Inland towns were strongly represented, and many cities of the Netherlands also participated. A definite proportion was laid down for the provision of men and money; and it was decided that if any town of the confederation were attacked, it should receive assistance, first, from the four nearest cities of the association, later, from the eight nearest, and finally, if necessary, from the entire league. The confederation also introduced rules of arbitration, in case of disputes between members. These measures were chiefly directed against such princes as were hostile to the towns. The confederation also adopted a very firm position against the democratic revolutionists. Agreements were also made as to commercial affairs; for example, the exportation of grain not purchased in Hanseatic ports was forbidden. This was a demonstration against the Dutch, who sought out unfrequented harbours and endeavoured to dispense with the intermediate carrying trade of the Hansa.

The Confederation of 1418 had no permanent influence on the political affairs of Germany. It continued to exist, at least in name, until 1430; similar leagues followed in 1430, 1443, 1447, and 1450. The praiseworthy endeavour to establish firmer connections with the less enthusiastic and more distant towns was also shown by the adoption of resolutions which aimed at making attendance at the Hanseetag obligatory; a fine was fixed for members who were absent without sufficient excuse, and incorrigible cases were threatened with expulsion for the term of five years. In spite of this, however, the meetings were very poorly attended. Several groups of towns stood in open opposition to the original Lusatian group: it was thus with the cities of the Low Countries, sometimes also with those of Prussia and Livonia. The towns of Brandenburg and many inland cities neglected to attend the Hanseetag because they did not suffer from the oppression of ruling princes. It was the time of the second great city war, and every town had to keep a sharp lookout for its own safety. The interests of the league, which were, in fact, chiefly the interests of Lübeck, were of small import to them.

In the meanwhile affairs in the North kept the Hanse towns, especially the Lusatian group, constantly occupied. Lübeck was at first allied with King Eric VII, against whom Hamburg was already in arms. Then, through the obvious favour shown to the Hollanders, to whom he opened the Sound, Eric succeeded in alienating his former friends. Lübeck made war on him from 1426
until the peace of Wordingbord in 1435. Schleswig, the bone of contention, remained with the Dukes of Schauenburg; Lübeck was enabled to lock up in her strong chest a new confirmation of the hundred years' old Hanseatic privileges. The relations of the Hansa to the Scandinavian kingdoms underwent no change when Eric was deposed in 1439 and succeeded by Christopher of Bavaria, but complaints became more and more frequent of the favours bestowed upon the Westerlings by Denmark.

After Christopher's death, in 1448, Christian I of Oldenburg, the forefather of the present House of Denmark, ascended the Danish-Norwegian throne with the approval of the Hansa. Although Sweden had separated from the Union, and was now engaged in a seven years' war with the other two kingdoms, the Hansa took no part in the struggle, content with a fresh confirmation of their valuable rights and privileges. Nor did they interfere when, after the main line of Schauenburg had become extinct in 1460, Christian I was invested with the title of Duke of Schleswig and Count of Holstein. From this memorable year date the sufferings of the provinces beyond the Elbe, whose destinies were now united with those of Denmark. Although the Danish-Norwegian king showed no open hostility to the Hansa, Lübeck and Hamburg were at least sufficiently on their guard to increase the height of their walls and to strengthen their towers.

During the reign of Hans, son of Christian I (1481-1513), the citizens of Lübeck came to blows with him because the Hansa supported the Swedes, who had seceded from the Union. Hans gave the German towns their choice between abandoning their alliance with Sweden or their privileges in Norway and Denmark; and he rendered his decision the more emphatic by imposing new taxes and molesting the fishing-stations. Hanseatic ships of war immediately made their appearance in the Baltic (1509), and a naval war began which was to last several years, although the Hanse towns greatly desired its speedy termination, on account of the large costs and the still greater damage caused to commerce. Once more the Lusatian cities — for these alone had borne the brunt of the struggle — won the confirmation of all their rights and privileges at the peace of Malmö (1512). The most important fact to be remembered, however, is that they still continued to control the trade of the three kingdoms.

It was in Norway that the Hansa came nearest to attaining their ideal of a monopoly without competitors. Here they had practically driven away all foreigners, and had compelled the native inhabitants to confine their commercial operations to Bergen. Nowhere were the ill effects of the unscrupulousness peculiar to the rude peoples of these rude times more plainly to be seen than in this city, the chief market-place of Norway. Here amidst barbaric excesses and under barbaric discipline flourished the German quarter, the "Brücke" (bridge) and the "Schustergasse" (cobbler's alley), with an exclusively male population of from two to three thousand. This dépôt, the last one to attain its growth, outlived almost all the others.

In England, also, the league preserved its settlements and privileges during the fifteenth century, although relations frequently became strained, once, indeed, to the point of open war. The English merchants continued their endeavour to nationalise export and maritime trade, and to wrest it from the hands of foreigners; they founded a wool market at Calais, and their mariners appeared in waters over which the Hansa claimed to have exclusive control. Scarcely able to make any head-
way in Norway, the lands of the Baltic (though the Wendish cities were practically inaccessible) offered them an asylum — also visited by the Hollanders — in Danzig. The metropolis of Prussian commerce had advanced in prosperity with the decline of the oppressive dominion of the Teutonic Order. Without breaking with Lübeck, the merchants of Danzig took their own course in regard to trade with Poland-Lithuania, Holland, and England. English merchants founded a dépôt on Hanseatic lines at Danzig in 1428, their rights being based on the treaties of reciprocity between England and the league. Nevertheless Lübeck, always ready to appeal to the law when her interests were threatened, was greatly displeased with the advance of the English into the Baltic regions, although she had but little to fear from competition. The commerce of England was not yet sufficiently developed for that. In fact, owing to the struggle with France and to the Wars of the Roses, England was in no condition to look after her commercial interests with any great care; the civil war gave the Hansa a welcome opportunity of mediating between the two parties, as well as of receiving payment from both for apparent services. During these days of king-making Lübeck boldly ventured to seize and to lay an embargo on British ships in the Sound.

A proceeding of this nature gave the English government occasion to take violent reprisals on the Easterlings dwelling in Great Britain (1468). Thereupon one of the weakest points of the Hanseatic League came to light: the merchants of Cologne, who had always looked upon themselves as the rightful owners of the London dépôt and as having been deposed by the Easterlings, deserted their associates, established themselves as the sole owners of the Steelyard, and obtained documents attributing to them exclusive rights over the German guildhall in London. In the meantime the Hansa had decided to expel Cologne from the league and to boycott English commerce. Since not only Henry VI but Edward IV, on recovering the throne, confirmed the possession of the Steelyard to Cologne, the suspension from the league and the trade embargo continued in force; in fact, a systematic naval war such as the Hansa had never before waged against England, though it had against Denmark, began in 1472. In February 1474, the peace of Utrecht was concluded between the English king and the league. The negotiations were conducted by the municipal dignitaries of Lübeck, Hamburg, Bremen, Dortmund, Münster, Brunswick, Magdeburg, Danzig, Deventer, and Nimègue. The league regained possession of the Steelyard and of the dépôts in Boston and Lynn, and their privileges again came into force. Cologne, abandoned by Edward IV, was readmitted to the league under most humiliating conditions four years after the peace of Utrecht. Free trade with all the Hanseatic cities, "as it had been the custom one hundred years before," was granted to England; but for yet another hundred years complete reciprocity remained an open question that each Hanse town answered according to its own interests. It was not finally settled until the Tudor kingdom gained new strength, and then in a way that proved fatal to German active trade.

While previously divided kingdoms had been united in the north and east of Europe, there arose in the west, on the German-French frontier, a State that included within its dominion the choicest regions of civilisation of the world at that time. This was the Duchy of Burgundy, under the descendants of John the Good, the younger branch of the House of Valois. Having ruled Flanders, the centre of European trade and industry, ever since 1384, the Burgundian dukes,
by combined prudence and boldness, added Holland, Zealand, Hainault, Limburg, and Brabant to their realm in 1433. "The centres of west German commerce having thus fallen into the power of a non-German dynasty, endeavoured to withdraw themselves from the influence of the Hansa, and, leagued with the kingdom of Norway-Denmark, sought to exclude the towns of eastern Europe from trade with the north." — K. W. Nitzsch.

Although it is impossible to say when the idea that it was their indisputable right to close the Baltic to every objectionable intruder, and to compel all the dwellers on this sea to submit to the dominion of their market, first developed and became fixed in the minds of the merchants of Lübeck, it is certain that they held fast to this idea with a pertinacity that increased in direct proportion to the decline of Hanseatic influence and power. To be sure, the Sound could not be closed to the Prussian towns, which were in every way the equals of Lübeck, nor could the trade rights of the latter be forced upon the former; but in the case of the cities of Livonia, Lübeck had instituted a theoretical and practical system that anticipated the colonial policy of the sea powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. On the other hand, it would have been dangerous to oppose the Hollanders in the Baltic with force; in that case the latter would have retaliated on the Hanseatic ships that visited western ports. Nevertheless, the Easterlings continued to pass resolutions against the Hollanders in their Hanseatic. The exasperation felt by Lübeck ever since the time of King Eric outlived the peace of Wordingbord (1435); and shortly after, in the year 1437, war broke out between the Easterlings and Westerlings. Each side captured the mercantile fleet of the other, but the Easterlings suffered the greatest injury, for their ships were the larger and their cargoes the more valuable. In 1441 Duke Philip the Good negotiated a truce, although the chief questions at issue remained undecided. Even if war did not break out again, the connection between Easterlings and Westerlings was severed; moreover, the Hollanders, although no longer members of the league, could not be driven away from Baltic waters.

The Hanse towns maintained their privileges in Flanders, especially in Bruges, during the fifteenth century; they employed their old means of coercion,—threatening to remove their markets elsewhere,—and always with success, against the merchants of Bruges, who were quite as desirous of obtaining a monopoly as they were themselves. In truth, the citizens of Bruges had reason to be discontented with the growth of Hanseatic trade. It is uncertain when the so-called Baitenfahrten of the Hansa (voyages of entire fleets, chiefly laden with wine and salt, to the west coast of France) began; at all events, they were in full sway during the fifteenth century. With such commodities, considered by the merchants of Bruges as monopolies of their own market, the Hanseatics sailed past Flanders, unheeding their former middlemen and brokers.

By the second half of the fifteenth century the city of Bruges was in a pronounced state of decline. Its harbours and canals became more and more choked up with sand; the city was already incapable of serving as the chief market for the trade between the northern and southern European spheres of commerce. The people of Bruges might have overcome their misfortunes to a certain degree by their own exertions; but nothing was done, owing to the political quarrels in which Bruges, accustomed to leadership, insisted on having a part. It occupied the most prominent position in the war that raged through the hereditary dominions
of the House of Burgundy after the death of Charles the Bold in 1477. The foreign merchants, from whose presence Bruges derived its greatness, emigrated in large numbers to Antwerp, a more favourably situated and quieter town. The events of 1488–1489 — when Bruges kept the Archduke Maximilian, husband of Mary, the heiress of Burgundy, a prisoner in the Kranenburg for three months, during which the whole of Flanders was overrun with foreign troops until coerced into humble submission — had a decisive effect in causing the foreigners to migrate. In spite of the horrors of war and pillage the Easterlings continued at their decaying dépôts in Bruges; they remained long after the other foreigners had gone, indeed they were still at their offices when Antwerp surpassed Bruges as a commercial centre, and when the trade of Europe underwent a revolution such as it had never experienced before or since. For two generations the Hanseatics continued obdurate, singing the while the litany of their inalienable rights, until, finally, they also emigrated to Antwerp, and, naturally enough, arrived too late.

The history of the Hansa when at the summit of its power, from the second half of the fourteenth until the end of the fifteenth century, is cheerless and dull, and worthy of but little consideration. Nevertheless, the league prospered, remained in possession of its foreign rights and privileges, and at home continued to be a power in political and economic life. Other cities and groups of cities showed themselves to be no less tenacious than Lübeck and its following of Lusatian towns in holding fast to their traditional claims and pretensions. Indeed, they still maintained the supremacy in northern commerce, and possessed great influence in the northern kingdoms. But with the fundamental change in political affairs that took place within the Hanseatic sphere of influence during the fifteenth century and produced still greater effects during the sixteenth, the German seaports, whether single or united, were no longer able to preserve their commercial supremacy.

L. THE DECLINE OF THE HANSEATIC LEAGUE

(a) Decline of the Hansa in the Slavonian East. — The stone that crushed the feet of clay of the Hanseatic colossus was first set rolling in eastern Europe. The mischief began with the union of Poland and Lithuania, which followed as a result of the downfall of the Teutonic Order at Tannenburg in 1410, of the unfortunate lack of harmony between the policy of the order and the interests of such of its cities as belonged to the Hansa, and, finally, of the second peace of Thorn, through which west Prussia together with Ermeland became Polish (1466). The change in government was ruinous to the smaller towns of Prussia; Danzig, however, having won for itself an exceptional position such as had never been possessed by the free imperial cities of southern Germany, continued to advance in prosperity, equaling Lübeck in commercial power at the end of the fifteenth century and excelling it in the sixteenth. During the days of the Teutonic Order the cities of Prussia had been so loosely connected with the general Hansa, that practically no change came about now that Prussia was separated from the Holy Roman Empire. In order to protect itself against the kings of Poland, Danzig held on to its relations with the Hansa, until the latter itself was dissolved. Although Poland managed to withdraw itself from the all-powerful influence of Germany, that had lasted for so many centuries, it gained little thereby, for city life did not develop, and domestic
trade fell into the hands of the Jews. Export trade, however, remained in the hands of Germans, who shared equally in the profits to be made in the extensive region stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathians, and from the Vistula even beyond the Dnieper.

After west Prussia had been united to Poland, the power of the Teutonic Order still remained supreme in east Prussia and Livonia for some years; commercial relations with the interior also continued to exist as formerly. The important trade with the Russians in Pskoff and Novgorod was also monopolised by the Hansa during the fifteenth century. Only the general mercantile desire for gain and an especially well developed Low German stubbornness enabled the traders to remain at these dangerous posts.

In the meantime things had come to such a pass in the East, that Riga, Dorpat, and Reval had almost attained their object of monopolising Russian commerce, and of compelling their Hanseatic brethren to abandon all direct trade with the Russians. Suddenly, however, the hand of the Muscovite was thrust forth to destroy completely the web of Hanseatic tricks and evasions. Ivan III, Vasilivitch, the deliverer of Russia from the Tartar yoke, demanded that the free city of Great Novgorod should render homage to him as Gossudar (sovereign). When he appeared before the hesitating town with an army in 1477–1479, it yielded. Soon afterward the inhabitants of Novgorod were transported en masse, after the Ancient Assyrian method, into the interior of the Czar's empire, and their places were filled by merchants, warriors, and boyars of Moscow. The Hanseatics who happened to be in Novgorod at the time were plundered, and forced to be content when the diplomacy of Lübeck, which once more represented the associated German merchants, succeeded in bringing about a truce for twenty years, and trade returned to its old channels.

The fact that in 1492 the Czar built the fortress of Ivangorod opposite Narva, in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Finland, was significant enough in view of the hatred for the Livonians and aversion to the Germans which he had displayed ever since he had been grossly deceived when negotiating with the Emperor Maximilian I. Ivan III also entered into correspondence with King Hans of Denmark, an enemy of the Hansa, who, unable to do the league any injury himself, was only too glad to stir up Russian attacks against the Germans. Resolutions were passed in a secret convention to drive all Germans out of Novgorod, and to exclude them from commerce with Russia. An opportunity for a demonstration of hostilities was offered when the merchants of Reval condemned two Russians to the stake,—the one for counterfeiting, and the other for unnatural crimes. "On the 5th of November, 1494, the factories of the Germans and Gotlanders were suddenly attacked by a wild rabble under the leadership of Vasili Shuk, the Czar's private secretary, who had just arrived from the capital, and Daniel Manyreff. The forty-nine inmates—merchants, teachers of languages, and apprentices from Lübeck, Hamburg, Greifswald, Lüneburg, Münster, Dortmund, Bielefeld, Unna, Duisburg, Eimbeck, Duderstadt, Reval, and Dorpat—were taken prisoners, stripped of their boots and breeches, and thrown into filthy dungeons, without either warning or show of justice; their goods, worth a million golden florins, were seized."—A. Winckler. In 1497 the Czar, after receiving many petitions, released the surviving prisoners; but on their journey homeward their ship foundered with all hands.

The supremacy of Low German trade in northwestern Russia ended with the
catastrophe to the Novgorod factory in 1494. Hollanders, Englishmen, and Upper Germans now sought to secure, if not a monopoly, at least a share, of the Russian trade. Nor did the Hanseatics, notably the merchants of Lübeck, withdraw from competition for the markets of Russia. They tried their fortune as petitioners, for the Muscovites were not so easily to be attacked by fleets and mercenaries as were the Danes. It was of great advantage to the Hanseatics that the Russian advance into German territory was checked by the resistance of Livonia under the celebrated Grand Master Plettenberg, and that another alliance was entered into by the Emperor Maximilian and Ivan III. Twenty years after the attack of 1494 the Germans returned to Novgorod and once more settled down in the Petershof. Trade indeed did not flourish, for it was now possible for anybody to carry on a mercantile business in whatever portion of the city he chose: commerce was no longer confined to the privileged guilds and to the dépots of the Hansa. The Lübeck merchants' plan of re-establishing the old rights of monopoly was opposed by the Livonians, the latter claiming that traffic had chosen other lines of communication, now passing through Smolensk and Pskov, and that the Russians also had formed new connections with the Upper Germans through Poland. Lübeck, however, continued to indulge in dreams of long dead privileges, thereby exhibiting an inborn inability to comprehend the changes in the times and to adapt itself to new circumstances. The same obstinacy, in fact, the same pettifogging disposition that ruined the German Reformation, also gave a finishing stroke to the export trade of north Germany during the sixteenth century, although at that time there was indeed but little export trade in the hands of Germans. It was not what the Germans undertook or what they neglected that settled the matter—the fact was, that supremacy in all things relating to commerce had finally devolved upon the once immature but now vigorous and politically superior foreign nations.

A fresh blow was dealt to the Hansa in northeastern Europe through the misfortune that befell Livonia in 1559–1562. In 1558 the troops of Ivan IV (the Terrible) advanced into the territory of the Teutonic Order and captured Narva and Dorpat. Russians, Swedes, Danes, and Poles divided among themselves the remains of the most northerly of all the medieval German colonial regions. Ivan IV chose Narva to be a frontier station for foreign commerce with his empire, and enticed merchants thither through promises of protection and freedom from customs duties. Nevertheless, Swedish and Polish privateers captured merchant vessels bound for Narva, among them ships from Lübeck. The merchants of the latter city appealed to Ivan in their own name and in the name of the league. To their great surprise the Czar, previously an enemy to Germany, but now annoyed with his former favourites, the English, listened to their requests. To be sure, he required them to undertake the clearance of the way to Narva by their own resources, and forced them to begin a new war with Sweden. Unfortunately the allied Swedes and Poles captured Livonia from Russia, Narva falling to the share of the former (1581).

On the accession of Ivan's successor, Feodor I, Ivanovitch, Lübeck entered into negotiations with Russia in the name of the "League of Seventy-three Cities," as the Hansa boastfully called itself. Had it been a matter of agreements only, the Hansa would soon have rejoiced in the possession of greater privileges than ever; for in return for the payment of one-half the customary duties the Czar granted them the right of import and export trade in Novgorod, in Pskov, even in Moscow.
and the seaports of the White Sea (1588). But the Swedes and Poles barred the way of the feeble league to the Russian Empire, and the English, already powerful rivals of the Germans, received freedom not from half, but from the entire customs duty. Germans indeed returned to Novgorod, but St. Peter’s yard had gone to ruin. The Hamburghers alone obtained a share in Russian trade, following the ships of the Dutch and English into the White Sea, whither the Baltic Hanse merchants did not venture to journey.

After the death of Feodor, Lübeck tried her luck with the new Czar Boris. Although the envoys sent from Lübeck asserted that the Hansa still consisted of fifty-eight cities, the Russians knew well enough that it was practically non-existent except as a memory. The privileges granted by Boris in 1603 were expressly restricted to Lübeck, and denied to all the other towns which had been alleged to belong to the league. Lübeck, desirous of maintaining the Hansa in order to preserve her leading position, offered to share the privileges with the other cities, provided permission were given by the Czar. Nothing was done, however, for in Russia the disturbances and wars of Dimitri soon began, and Germany shortly entered upon the most unhappy thirty years of her entire history. Although Lübeck still traded with Russia as late as 1648, it was no longer in the name of the Hansa, for in the meanwhile the latter had expired. Subsequent commercial relations between Germany and Russia were dependent on the agreements made by the various German States with the empire of the Czars. The conception of territorial principality finally won a complete victory over the idea of federation, from which the loosely connected and feeble leagues of cities of the Middle Ages had emanated.

(b) The Decay of Hansaetic Influence in the Scandinavian Kingdoms. — During the course of the sixteenth century — the last hundred years of the Hansa — the majority of the cities of the league were not much worse off than they had been two or three centuries before. On the contrary, most of them increased both in area and population up to the middle of the century. Large amounts of capital — as great as any of the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries — were accumulated in the various towns, although as a rule the Hansa cities were not so wealthy as the marts of Italy and Upper Germany. In spite of all losses, it was long before any sensible decrease in the total trade of the league was to be observed. The centrifugal tendencies also, which have been pointed out by historians as chief causes, or, at least, as indications of the decline of the Hansa were no more marked during the sixteenth century than in the fourteenth and fifteenth. There had always been selfish private aims as well as mutual antagonism and friction. On the other hand, the weaker towns of the interior, when not prevented by their lords, were never more active and enthusiastic members of the league than during the sixteenth century. It was a point of honour to belong to the Hansa; a Hanse town was looked upon by itself, if not by others, as something far better and higher than an ordinary undistinguished provincial city.

The last significant movements of the league took place in the Scandinavian north, the scene of its greatest successes. Like the Hansa, the Kalmar Union had never fulfilled the possibilities which one would have been led to expect from it. For this reason the Hansa and its endeavours for monopoly found relatively less opposition in the three loosely connected kingdoms than in any other portion of its
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Chapter I

sphere of interest. The affairs of the Germans, however, took a decided turn for the worse on the accession of Christian II. Although the king was unable to carry out his plans, his ideas were revived in later times. The Sound was to be opened to all foreigners, all having to pay an equal tax; and instead of Lübeck, Copenhagen was now to become the centre of traffic between the North Sea and the Baltic. A Danish-Swedish commercial association was planned to enter into competition with the Hansa, which would then be excluded from the northern trade. It is related that Christian II, taking advantage of the ignorance of his brother-in-law, Charles V, in regard to German affairs, requested the latter to cede to him a "petty town called Lübeck." He was an opponent who had no scruples whatever against striking at the very roots of Hanseatic existence. Moreover, his policy of furthering the welfare of the peasants and poorer classes of the towns awoke not only the hatred and jealousy of the patrician merchants, but also the hostility of the nobility and clergy. In order to oppose the latter, Christian espoused the cause of the Lutherans. His design to exterminate the Swedish nobility and to bring Sweden absolutely into his power, through the massacre of Stockholm (1520), brought about his fall. In 1522, Gustavus Vasa, supported by Lübeck and Danzig with ships of war and money, invaded Sweden and took possession of the throne. It was characteristic that when Stockholm capitulated, the keys were not handed over to the pretender, but to his allies, the councillors of Lübeck. At the same time, Frederick of Holstein, likewise supported by Lübeck and Danzig, came forward as a competitor for the crown of Denmark, and he also attained his end in 1523. Christian II sought refuge in the Netherlands. Thus once more the Hansa played its part in the struggles for the northern thrones, and, above all, assisted in the dissolution of the union of the three kingdoms which had been so injurious to its commerce.

Yet Lübeck would not have been Lübeck had she not taken advantage of the great moment that arrived after she had "made two kings and driven away a third" in bringing out a new and improved edition of her rights and privileges, or, rather, those of the Hanse towns, in the Scandinavian kingdoms. Gustavus I, who was in the power of the Hanseatic League as its debtor, and who would not be able to pay until he had introduced the Reformation into his country and had confiscated the church property, was compelled to promise what he neither could nor would fulfil, in very much the same manner as had his contemporary, Francis I, during his imprisonment in Madrid. Lübeck and Danzig obliged him to grant exemption from customs, free trade, rights of citizenship in Sweden, exclusion of all foreigners from Swedish commerce, and restriction of Swedish traffic in the Baltic. The other king whom the Hansa had assisted into the saddle, Frederick I of Denmark-Norway, was compelled to show his gratitude by renewing the old privileges in Denmark, Schonen, and Norway. Lübeck and six other cities — in fact, all towns to which the former was willing to grant the right — received the privilege of free passage through the Sound. The same clause was also added to the Swedish privileges; thus lay entirely in the hands of Lübeck whether or not her confederates should share her commercial rights in the entire Scandinavian region. In consequence, the privileged and non-privileged cities separated from one another; smaller communities rallied about Lübeck in order to acquire a share in her privileges, while the more powerful dissolved their connection with the Hansa that they might no longer be dependent on the favours of the leading town.
Although Lübeck willingly accorded to the Westerlings participation in the rights obtained from Gustavus and Frederick, the Netherlands nevertheless took up the cause of Christian II, the enemy of the Hansa, who had sought refuge in their country; furthermore, they concluded a treaty with Gustavus I, who, in direct opposition to the Lübeck agreements, granted them freedom from customs duties and other privileges in 1525. Frederick I also entered into a special treaty with the Netherlands. By 1530, Lübeck was driven back to the position she had occupied before the outbreak of the wars for the thrones of Sweden and Denmark. Sacrifices had been made in vain; idle hopes had been cherished. The dissatisfaction with the dominion of the patrician merchants found new expression; and this time, reformation in the church and a democratic reconstruction of the municipal government, both of which had hitherto been kept back by the ruling classes, were carried through at one stroke.

The popular party accused the patrician class of having neglected the interests of Lübeck, and was therefore bound to take up the conflict with the powers that had so grossly deceived the city. The expectations of the excited people reached the point of positive megalomania. This movement, which had a strong tinge of sectarianism, found its leaders in two men not natives of Lübeck, who were pushed to the front by the exigencies of the time,—Jürgen Wullenweber and Marx Meyer, the statesman and the soldier. It seemed at first as if war would be declared on the Netherlands, for the inhabitants of the Low Countries supported Christian II when he left their land in order to regain his kingdom. He had already brought Norway under his dominion when Lübeck took the field and forced him to surrender; and he stoned for his failure by life-long imprisonment (1532–1544). The Danes and the Hanse towns next demanded indemnification for the cost of the war from the Netherlands, because the latter, in defiance of treaty obligations, had assisted the king in his unfortunate undertaking. Commerce was at a standstill, and preparations were made on both sides (1533) as for a decisive conflict for the supremacy of the sea. Although the Danes were still allied with Lübeck against Christian, they had no interest in a victory for the Hansa, which could only lead to a reassertion of all the old demands for commercial privileges.

On the death of Frederick I the situation changed at once: the most important matter in hand was no longer the war with the Netherlands, but the succession to the throne of Denmark. Wullenweber dashed into the conflict—the so-called Counts’ (or Burgomasters’) War—with great enthusiasm, first negotiating an armistice with the Netherlands. A commander of noble birth was required, and found in the person of Count Christopher of Oldenburg, who took up arms, not in his own interest, but ostensibly in favour of the imprisoned Christian II. He promised Helsingør and Helsingborg, the keys of the Sound, to Lübeck in case of victory. “By this,” says Ranke, “Lübeck would have secured perpetual dominion over the Baltic and the Sound.” Lübeck succeeded in securing the aid of other German nobles besides Oldenburg by offering the Danish crown in all directions. With the exception of these, the democratic populations of some northern towns, and the madly excited peasantry of Denmark, they found no allies. Henry VIII of England, who had carried on negotiations with them, did nothing; even of the Hanse towns, only the neighbouring communities of Rostock, Wismar, and Stralsund were willing to assist the leading city.

When Christian III, son of Frederick I, lay off the mouth of the Trave and
cut Lübeck off from the sea, the populace became incensed with the new municipal government; and after Danish victories at Assens and Bornholm, a cry arose from all sides for the return of the exiled patricians and the former Burgomaster Brüse. Wullenweber escaped, but was captured by the Archbishop of Bremen and delivered up to the Duke of Wolfenbüttel, condemned to death, and beheaded in 1537. "Wullenweber," says Ranke, "displayed in his own person the venturesome spirit which throughout this decade was stirring in the German towns. . . . Once more he awakened the genius of the old Hansa, induced German princes to take part in his wars, and formed alliances with foreign sovereigns. Democratic, religious, mercantile, and political motives were united in him: he thought to make the reformed Lübeck the head of the democratic north, and he himself stepped forward to seize the rudder of this new world. But he and his allies were far too weak to pursue their ideal to the end. . . . However, aside from personalities, one can say truly that this undertaking of Lübeck belonged rather to a past time. The great associations that had penetrated and cemented together all States of the Middle Ages were now in rapid process of dissolution. The existence of an all-embracing order of priests, and a knighthood that bound the entire western nobility into a sort of guild, or society, could not fail to inspire leagues of cities with the idea of extending their commercial monopolies over kingdoms far and near; but with the destruction of the former, the fall of the latter was inevitable. The tendency exhibited in modern history is one directed toward a mutual independence of different peoples and kingdoms in all political relations. A contradiction to universal history lay in the fact that Lübeck, although she wrested herself away from the hierarchy, nevertheless desired to maintain the supremacy of her commerce, not through the natural preponderance of industry, of capital, or of commodities, but by means of forced treaties between nations."

The peace of Hamburg (1586), which ended the Counts' War, was by no means unfavourable to Lübeck: in return for the recognition of Christian III as rightful king, all privileges, even those of Frederick I, were re-established. A formal confirmation of rights was also granted by Christian's successor, Frederick II; nevertheless the Hanse towns were compelled henceforth to pay a tax on tonnage for the passage of the Sound, and the dépôt at Bergen lost its fortifications during a quarrel. The monopoly in Norway no longer existed; neither foreigners nor natives troubled themselves about the complaints of the Germans. In Sweden, too, they had lost their prestige. Gustavus I formally renounced the privileges which had been extorted from him. During the reign of his successor, Eric XIV, Lübeck aroused herself for the last war she was to wage as power against power. The cause of this struggle was the already mentioned capturing of German vessels bound for the northern ports of Russia by Swedish privateers. It is true that Lübeck entered into an alliance with the King of Denmark, but she received no assistance from the Hanse towns. Thus, in by no means inglorious isolation, for seven years Lübeck engaged in the so-called War of the Three Crowns (1563–1570). Although at the peace of Stettin Sweden agreed to open the way to Russia by sea, she immediately closed it again. In 1576 Denmark, the ally of Lübeck throughout the war, successfully demanded the return of Bornholm, pledged to Lübeck by the Hamburg treaties of 1536.

To Christian IV, the successor of Frederick II, the Hansa was little more than an object of vexation and scorn. He removed even their insignia, wherever they
were to be found in his kingdom, as useless relics of a former age. Finally, he declared to the league—-the Thirty Years' War had already begun—that their privileges had been extinguished for years, that he had never confirmed them any more than had the sovereigns of Sweden, England, and the Low Countries, that the times had changed, and there were merchants enough now to trade in his lands; nevertheless, he would as a special favour grant the same rights as were enjoyed by his own subjects—or, at least, so many "that there would be but a small difference"—to all who promised to dispose of their gains to the advantage of his kingdom.

However, it was not Christian IV, but the victorious King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus, the conqueror of Ingria, Livonia, and Pomerania, who put an end to the last remains of Hanseatic dominion over the Baltic. Lübeck, deserted even by the Lusatian group, sank to the position of a commercial city of average importance. It was fortunate for German commerce of later days that neither Russia nor Sweden nor Denmark possessed a latent capacity for becoming commercial nations of the first rank.

(c) The Decline of Trade with the Low Countries.—The Hanseatic League had never taken part in the political affairs of the northwestern regions of German foreign trade whose shores were washed by the waters of the North Sea. Nevertheless commercial jealousy of the Hollander had led to frequent conflicts. The Hanse towns never attained their end; the Netherlands were not to be driven from the North Sea, nor could they be compelled to pay any great attention to the markets of Lübeck. And now, toward the end of the sixteenth century, the decaying power was forced to put up with all the consequences of its invincible rival's development.

Already several decades before in Flanders the Hansa had made a concession to the altered spirit of the world's commerce. After having waited in vain through two generations for the trade between the north and south of Europe to make its headquarters once more at Bruges, the league finally condescended to enter into negotiations with Antwerp. An agreement was entered into with the latter city (1546); but as soon as the arrangements of the new dépôt were discussed by the associated towns, violent opposition was put forward by Cologne and Danzig, not to speak of the smaller cities of Saxony and Prussia. However, the matter was amicably decided in 1554. Inasmuch as Antwerp offered a suitable site for the "House of the Easterlings," in fact agreed to pay one-third of the expenses, the foundations were laid in 1564, and the edifice was completed four years later. Nevertheless the great care lavished on the arrangements of the dépôt by Doctor Sudermann, General Syndic of the Hansa, was of but little avail, inasmuch as Danzig and Cologne set aside the staple laws of the new house, and refused payment of all contributions.

Unfortunately political relations were added to the internal dissensions. The tension between the English and the Spanish, to whom the Netherlands were subject, was increased by an interdiction of trade, and the eighty years' war for freedom waged by the Hollander (1568-1648) broke out during the very year of the opening of the Antwerp dépôt. The Hansa came to Antwerp not only too late, but at the wrong time. How could the new factory have been expected to thrive under such conditions, especially when its medieval constitution made it a curious anachron-
ism? What could be accomplished by an institution under almost monastic discipline in the midst of a town which was the birthplace of modern commercial freedom, of speculative trade, and of the system of international exchanges? In debt from the very beginning, and exposed to the hostility of Danzig and Cologne, the Easterlings suffered all the vicissitudes of war in addition. The Dutch hindered and forbade commerce with Spain, and the Spaniards strove to prevent trade with England. The Scheldt and the Rhine were generally blockaded. After the outbreak of iconoclasm in 1566, and the reign of terror instituted by the Duke of Alva in 1567, the city was devastated by plundering troops of Spanish mercenaries. Finally, Alexander Farnese, after a siege of twelve months, entered Antwerp, only to allow it once more to be plundered after the capitulation (1585).

This series of misfortunes was the cause of the desertion of Antwerp by the foreign merchants, upon whom the prosperity of the town depended, just as they had abandoned Bruges about one hundred years before. Amsterdam succeeded Antwerp, as it had succeeded Bruges. The Hanseatic merchants were left alone here as there. The decaying league lacked the energy requisite for another too long delayed change of residence. Of all the Hanse towns Danzig alone had been engaged in trade at Amsterdam, for many years of much greater importance to the traffic in grain than Antwerp. It is true that the league sought to improve its position by establishing closer relations with the Spaniards; but Spain was defeated in the war, and the course of the world's events changed several times, the declining Hansa all the while possessing no capacity for adapting itself to altered circumstances. Friendly relations with Spain continued to exist after the destruction of the Armada, in 1588. Treaties were made, and a Hanseatic consulate was even established in Lisbon,—as usual, after the glory of Lisbon had begun to fade. A knowledge of the right time to act and the right side to choose had never been the strong point of the league; it usually occupied the position of mediator between two opposing factions, seeking to preserve or to increase its rights through the adoption of a neutral attitude. Likewise during its last days in Holland the league entered into agreements, now with the Spaniards, now with the States-General. In the meanwhile the yard at Antwerp had become so desolate that the Hanse merchants thought it would be well to get rid of it entirely. However, they contented themselves with renting the premises. When war between Spain and the Netherlands broke out afresh in 1621, nothing was left of the Hansa in Holland but a name and a memory.

(ad) The Fate of the Hansa in England. — Although the trade of the Hanseatics in the Netherlands could not be revived during the sixteenth century owing to the unfavourable course of general, especially political affairs, which prevented any accession of power to the league, matters took quite another course in England. Here, after long years of bickering, a struggle began which ended in the complete defeat of the Hansa. During the time of the Plantagenets and the Wars of the Roses, the island kingdom had been free booty for foreigners so far as mercantile affairs were concerned. The Hansa had succeeded at last in successfully defending its position, which had so often been the object of attack, and the peace of Utrecht (1474) was to it nothing less than a token of victory. However, although the commercial supremacy of foreign merchants was injurious to the new economic policy vigorously adopted by the Tudors, they ventured on no open
attack, because the foreign dealers, and especially the Hanseatics and Dutch-
landers, were still indispensable as distributors of domestic products. Henry VII
did not touch any of the rights enjoyed by the league, although he entered into
special agreements with Danes and Hollanders, directed against the commercial
supremacy of the Low Germans. Henry VIII also, in spite of many vacillations
as to details, maintained a like position. But since the economic conditions of
England had become completely changed under the first two Tudor kings, a corre-
sponding alteration in inland and export trade was certain to follow sooner or later.
The motives which led to this movement had a long history.

The exportation of raw wool had become the monopoly of a mercantile asso-
ciation known as the Staple Guild, perhaps as early as the thirteenth, certainly
during the fourteenth century. With the fourteenth century not only sheep-
raising, but also the domestic manufacture of wool, which until this time had
been spun chiefly in Flanders, developed to such an extent that vastly increased
amounts of rough cloth, and gradually of finished products as well, were exported
from the country. The native merchants sought to gain possession of the export
trade in English cloth that had hitherto been in the hands of foreigners, chiefly
Hanseatics. Owing to the difficulties of waging a mercantile war against Hanse
towns and guilds in various parts of the Continent, nothing remained to the English
cloth-dealers except to form an association possessed of rights of monopoly, after
the model of staple guilds, and to limit their dealings in English cloth to a single
market. Before the close of the fifteenth century Antwerp had been chosen for
this purpose. The extraordinary development of this city as a commercial centre
during the sixteenth century was naturally of the greatest benefit no less to the
English merchants, who were now beginning to adopt the factory or dépôt system,
than to the production of raw materials in England. It was from all points of
view to the interest of the English merchant to forbid, or at least to limit, the
exportation of wool and of rough cloth. Nevertheless, a small portion of the
export trade was still in the hands of the Hanse merchants, and so long as they
remained in possession of their rights and privileges no change in affairs seemed
possible.

The Hanse privileges, however, rested upon the principle of reciprocity. Eng-
lish merchants in Hanse towns possessed rights equal to those of the burghers, just
as in England the Hanseatic merchants occupied a position at least equal to that
of the natives. To act otherwise than as equals was unknown to the traditions of
the league; it was much more likely that the rights of preference which had been
enjoyed by Hanseatic merchants in all nations for so many centuries caused them
to look down upon, rather than up to, the domestic populations. In fact, the Hansa
constantly violated the rights of English merchants in Germany; they saw in the
seafaring English, as in the Hollanders, only unauthorised rivals. The most hate-
ful to them of all were the members of the great monopoly that controlled the
foreign trade in English cloth. The Merchant Adventurers Company, who were
constantly in touch—in fact, were practically identified—with the great asso-
ciation of London wholesale dealers, the Mercers Company, occupied the position
of spokesmen in the national struggle that was fought with almost uninterrupted
success against the still influential Hansa from the middle of the sixteenth century
onward.

Quarrels had been breaking out for centuries; but from this time forth the
mercantile war was pursued according to definite plans, though not indeed brought to an end in one campaign. It was more particularly after Sir Thomas Gresham, founder of the Royal Exchange, had become an adviser to the Crown that the contest with the Hansa was taken up with persistency and system. As late as 1550 Hanseatic merchants paid a smaller tax on exported cloth than that paid by all other foreigners, — in fact, by the native merchants themselves. In this year they exported forty-three thousand pieces of rough cloth as well as wool, lead, and tin, bringing back with them to England linen, wax, wood, pitch, and tar from Germany, and from other lands the products of the South, — wines, salt, and dyes. In 1553, during the reign of Edward VI, or, in reality, that of the Protector Northumberland, advantage was taken of a small incident, and the privileges of the Hansa were suspended. It was declared to the German merchants in the official document that their privileges, although of advantage to the country in former times, had now become injurious. Edward VI died soon afterward, and Northumberland was executed. Queen Mary immediately confirmed the old rights of the Hansa. The league of German cities deemed its position in England so secure, that it was threatening the kingdom with an embargo on trade, when, through an increase in the customs duties, the Hansa merchants suffered together with those of all other countries.

It was at this time that the English formed the plan of seeking out a new staple market where they could carry on an active trade independent of the moods of the Hansa. They already possessed such markets in the Low Countries and on the Baltic, but they wished also to own one within the Hanseatic regions of the North Sea. The moment for this, as well as for other momentous undertakings, arrived when Elizabeth succeeded to her half-sister in 1558. Cecil and Gresham, the opponents of the Hansa, who had previously been set aside, once more came into power. The English government still continued to show mercy to the stubborn Hansa for the reason that Germany was a source of all kinds of materials for war, from wood suitable for ship-building to well-drilled mercenaries. Moreover, at that time the leaders of the government had not yet agreed as to which yoke they should shake off first, — the Hanseatic or that of the Netherlands. This was rendered apparent in 1564 by the embargo on trade between the Low Countries and England. While this lasted the question was debated, to what town the cloth dépôt in Antwerp should be removed in case of necessity. Both Hamburg and Emden were mentioned; and the latter was selected, although its location was not especially favourable. In addition, the Hanse merchants were suddenly informed that for the time being they were forbidden to participate in the export cloth trade. As soon as Hamburg became aware of the English plans for a staple market, a communication was addressed to Queen Elizabeth, in which the city expressed its willingness to receive the Merchant Adventurers.

After a lively discussion, the council of Hamburg in 1567 granted them a charter, valid for ten years, and the city became the staple mart for the English cloth trade. “From the moment that Hamburg actually separated from the Hansa and resolutely followed her own path, a new chapter opened in her history as well as in that of German commerce.” — Richard Ehrenberg. It must also be added that after the establishment of the English dépôt in Hamburg, the merchants of the Steelyard were much better treated, that is to say, more in accordance with principles of reciprocity. Nevertheless, owing to the natural progress of Eng-
lish industry, which had been greatly furthered by refugees from the Netherlands, and in consequence of the expansion of English commerce, it soon became necessary to wrest English active trade entirely from the hands of the Hansa and to enter boldly into competition with the latter at all points abroad. The entrance of English merchants into Hamburg alone was sufficient to injure not only Hanseatic trade but that of the Upper Germans in general; for the English penetrated into the interior of the country, taking up their quarters even as far south as Nuremburg, and the wholesale exportation of English cloth wrought havoc to the cloth industry of Germany.

Naturally the league, which saw its own interests threatened, was by no means disposed to let all this pass in silence; even in Hamburg the old Hansa party awoke once more to active life. The league forbade a renewal of the privileges of the Merchant Adventurers; Hamburg agreed, and announced the fact to the English (1578). England answered with reprisals. The privileges of the Hansa were suspended and the inmates of the Steelyard were rendered subject to the usual tax on foreign merchants, whereupon English traders in several of the Hanse towns were likewise burdened with extra customs duties. In face of the complete destruction of Hanseatic trade in England there would have been but little use for the league to trouble itself about receiving a new confirmation of privileges; its most important task was to free itself of "Adventurers" and "Interlopers," that is to say, of merchants who were not members of the guilds of monopoly, but who competed with the Hanseatics even in their own markets.

Finally, at the very last hour, the Hansa bethought itself of its relations to emperor and empire. Polish-Russian affairs also had brought the now declining but once self-sufficient league of cities to attach great importance to the interference of the highest power of the land. Until this time neither empire nor league had been especially solicitous as to one another's welfare. They had no mutual approaches to make, and so far as weakness of government and constitution were concerned, empire and league were equals; their egoism was also very similar. Spanish diplomacy formed a connecting link between them; for Spain, hostile to England and allied with the German Hapsburgs, hoped to rouse the Low German towns against the English. The Hansa, supported by imperial decrees against monopolies, accused its English rivals before emperor and electors with all forms of law. The matter came up for discussion in the Diet of 1582. It was resolved to advise the emperor to banish the Merchant Adventurers and to enter into amicable negotiations with the English government in respect to the suspended privileges. Rudolph II consented to open the amicable negotiations, but did nothing further. Thus no change was brought about, and although the English left Hamburg, they carried on their business at Emden. Soon afterward (1586) the Merchant Adventurers re-established their dépôt in the Netherlands, this time at Middelburg, because the trade of Antwerp had been ruined ever since the events of 1585. Since Emden proved as little suitable now as it had been before, they transferred their German dépôt to Stade, in the immediate neighbourhood of Hamburg, in 1587; as Ehrenberg says, "against the will of the Hansa, in spite of the threats of Hamburg, and in defiance of the decree of 1582."

While the Spaniards and English were on bad terms with one another, the commerce of the Hansa with the peninsula of Spain, which had been by no means insignificant during the earlier part of the sixteenth century, increased in the same
ratio as traffic between England and Spain decreased. When war broke out between the two countries, the Atlantic routes were no longer safe; and when the Armada was destroyed in 1588, the Germans suffered for maintaining connections with a power already in process of decline. Sir Francis Drake captured sixty Hanse ships in Spanish waters at one stroke (1589), alleging that they were freighted with contraband of war. Once more the injured Hansa protested, again the Diet passed a resolution banishing the Merchant Adventurers (1594), and the Emperor Rudolph II requested Queen Elizabeth to restore the rights and privileges of the Hanseatics.

The amicable negotiations miscarried once more, and the emperor finally resolved upon the one vigorous step that was ever taken by the empire in connection with Hanseatic affairs. An imperial mandate of August 1, 1598, forbade all the German States to receive or harbour any of the Merchant Adventurers under pain of subjecting themselves to the ban of the empire; and in like manner all subjects of the empire were forbidden to transact any business or otherwise to associate with them. All traffic must end within three months after the publication of the mandate, which expressly stated that the measures were directed against the monopolising exploiters alone. The Adventurers were forced to yield, and commerce between England and Germany was seriously interrupted; matters were made still worse for the Adventurers by the fact that their enemies managed to raise difficulties for them in their own country also. The company remained in a very critical position for several years; however, it finally managed to overcome all obstacles.

The English government replied to the imperial mandate by excluding the Hansa from all commercial relations with England; it also threatened to seize the Steelyard, and to compel its inmates to leave England on the same day that Englishmen were forced to quit the soil of Germany (January, 1598). In July of the same year the authorities took possession of the Steelyard in the name of the queen; on August 4 the inmates left the dépôt "with troubled minds" and the gates were barred behind them. To this last chapter of English-Hanseatic relations a postscript was added in the year 1606, when James I returned the Steelyard, minus its long-dead privileges, to its former possessors. The Hanseatics now rented the old-fashioned buildings, just as the House of the Easterlings had been rented in Antwerp many years before. The Adventurers, whose fate had in the meanwhile been hanging in the balance, received a confirmation of their charters in 1605. It was not without opposition that the merchants of Hamburg permitted them to use their city as a staple market for the second time (1611). Emperor Matthias, however, offered no objection; and for two centuries long Hamburg remained a dépôt of British commerce with central Europe. The hour of economic servitude had arrived for the German inhabitants of the Holy Roman Empire.

M. INTERNAL DECAY OF THE HANSA

The sixteenth century was the Age of Discoveries, which, however, had little if any influence on the Hansa. No explorer came from the Hanseatic lowlands, and no voyage of adventure was undertaken from a Hanse town. In this respect the north German maritime districts were even behind the inland provinces of
Upper Germany. The only immediate effect on the Hansa of the great discoveries which revolutionised the world's commerce, was the increase of its trade with Spain and Portugal.

The sixteenth century, however, was also the Age of the Reformation. Although in general the intellectual movements of the Middle Ages played but a small part in the history of the Hansa, the effects of the Reformation were no less disastrous to the confederation of north German commercial towns than to the whole national life. Almost all the Hanse cities, excepting the Rhenish-Westphalian, turned to Protestantism between 1520 and 1540. The change in belief was as a rule accompanied by struggles between the patrician class and the guilds — dissensions that in consequence of the interference of princes and priests often continued for years. The immediate result of the revolution in the church was a general increase in the power of the feudal lords. And however violent the opposition of the Hanse towns, even as a league they were unable to prevent the loss of their liberties, and the breaking away of members now completely in the power of their rulers. The natural consequence was, that finally, of all Hanseatic cities, only the free imperial seaports of the north were able to preserve their character as members of the league. Constantly attacked and compelled to resort to measures of defence, the Hansa became less and less able to take proper care of its economic affairs. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries political interests had been subordinated to mercantile. But conditions were reversed during the Age of the Reformation. When the Schmalkaldic League was founded, it was joined by the largest and most influential cities, which unconditionally subjected themselves to their ancient enemies, the ruling princes, to whom this confederation was nothing more than a tool. It was a piece of good fortune that after the battle of Mühlberg in 1547, the cities that had joined the alliance escaped with a fine. The endeavour to establish a confederation whose members should be of the same religious and political inclinations did not cease even after the destruction of the Schmalkaldic League, but it was uniformly unsuccessful.

Finally the Hansa roused itself once more, and sought to avoid complete decay through a convention similar to those which had been held in 1367 and 1418. Yet the cities were no more successful in creating an efficient constitution for the league this time than they had been before. Now, as ever, the necessary harmony was wanting; each town exercised, so to speak, a liberum veto, and power of coercion was lacking to the body as a whole. Nevertheless the effort put forth during the declining days of the Hansa is not without interest. Among other things, the division of the Hanseatic sphere of commerce into quarters was proposed here for the first time. In addition to the Lusatian cities over whose quarter it was to preside, Lübeck was to summon to the councils the three other head cities of quarters, — Cologne, Brunswick, and Danzig, the capitals of the Rhenish, Saxon, and Prussian divisions. The Hansa no longer had any thoughts of carrying on a war against a foreign country, although Lübeck had not such a long time before (1570) brought its last naval struggle to a close. However, the question of an agreement regarding the payment of contributions to a common fund came up for discussion. Other clauses had reference to allegiance to the emperor "in all legitimate and rightful things," to the furthering of commerce, to the settling of their disputes by the cities themselves, and to the assistance and support of any distressed member of the league by all the other associates. Although as many as
sixty-six towns figure in the list of 1579, not more than twenty were possessed of sufficient power or liberty to be worthy of serious consideration.

During its last days the Hansa instituted the office of General Syndic, in order that the constant and difficult negotiations with foreign and domestic powers might be carried through more efficiently. Henry Sudermann and John Domann filled this position each for a term of many years, and numerous instructive writings from the learned pens of both are still in existence.

As late as the beginning of the seventeenth century the Hanse towns were still possessed of so much importance that nations at war with one another competed for their alliance. Both Spaniards and Netherlanders offered commercial privileges as an inducement. The Hansa would have been false to its traditions had it neglected any opportunity for mediating between the two powers. However, the idea of a political union for liberty with the States-General of the Netherlands caused them for a time to forego their customary attitude. When the Thirty Years’ War broke out each city sought its own salvation by preserving the strictest neutrality. If Stralsund and Magdeburg took decisive steps in the struggle, they did so on their own account and at their own risk, as cities, and not as members of the league.

Nevertheless, even during the thirty years of devastation, a remarkable opportunity was offered to the Hansa for rising once more to power and for affording the German Empire a point of support for vast and far-reaching schemes. Yet of what importance were empire and nation to the Germans of those days, and of what account were they ever to the Hanseatici? To be sure, it was not entirely the fault of the league that it was unable to look beyond its own sphere of interests and privileges. When Christian IV of Denmark, the arch-enemy of the Hansa, was stripped of all his dominions with the exception of the Danish Islands by Tilly and Wallenstein, the weakness of Germany once more became apparent, for, in spite of her situation on two seas and the possession of a maritime trade not yet entirely lost, she had no navy with which to complete the subjection of the defeated enemy. Prince Egenberg, prime minister of Ferdinand II, then thought of the fleets of the Hansa and of their warlike deeds at sea. The policy of the empire was closely allied with that of Spain; and an undertaking which included within its scope Germany, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands was proposed in the interests of the House of Hapsburg. But the plan of establishing an imperial navy on the North Sea and the Baltic was no longer new in the year 1627. Rudolph II had already thought of appointing an imperial admiral who should uphold the prerogatives of the empire and look after its maritime interests. In 1624 the Spanish minister, Olivarez, negotiated with the imperial ambassador in regard to the establishment of a Spanish-German trade monopoly, for the protection of which the Hansa — naturally a partaker in the scheme — should fit out a fleet of war vessels. The same ambassador, Count Schwarzenberg, journeyed to Lübeck in 1627 in order to obtain the co-operation of the league in carrying out the maritime plans of the emperor, and endeavoured to gain his point by explaining the proposed plan of a Spanish-Hanseatic monopoly. But in spite of his eloquence his mission was a failure. The prejudice of the Hanse towns against Catholic powers was too deeply rooted to be shaken by argument. They were also influenced by fear of Denmark and Sweden, the possessors of a seapower far greater than that which even had been proposed for Germany, so they merely asked to be allowed to re-
tain their position of neutrality. Wallenstein, who had favoured the scheme of the emperor ever since he had been created "General of the Oceanic and Baltic Seas," applied himself with great enthusiasm to the construction of a fleet, and took possession of the towns of the Baltic coasts. On being made Duke of Mecklenburg he also became lord of the seaports of Rostock and Wismar. However, these maritime undertakings, which were, indeed, Wallenstein's rather than the emperor's, were unfortunate from the very beginning. Christian IV blockaded the harbours, destroyed the war-vessels, and, in alliance with Gustavus Adolphus, assisted Stralsund in her rebellion against Wallenstein's rule. The interference of Sweden in the Thirty Years' War was the final result of the plans for the establishment of an imperial fleet which should dominate the North Sea and the Baltic. The Protestant King of Sweden defended the Swedish Dominium maris baltici, which had long ago been lost to Germany on the battlefields of Breitenfeld and Lützen.

In the same year (1630) that Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania a new Hanseatic convention was held. Only three cities, Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen, were represented. They entered into a closer alliance than had hitherto existed, and resolved to manage the affairs of the Hansa alone, so far as they could, without the assistance of any of the other groups. The thought that the league no longer existed, that it was in reality dead, did not occur to them; and even in later years the ghost of the Hansa still continued to put on an occasional appearance of life. To this day the name Hansa has remained attached to these three cities, Lübeck, Hamburg, and Bremen. That the world still believed in the Hansa during the seventeenth century is proved by a reference to the league and its prerogatives in the peace of Westphalia. The terms to which Leopold I of Hapsburg subscribed in 1658 when elected emperor also contained: "the nullification of all agreements entered into under pretences and appearances of the Hanseatic League." In fact, one more convention, the last, was held in Lübeck in 1669, in which, besides Hamburg and Bremen, the capitals of the quarters, Brunswick, Danzig, and Cologne, were represented by delegates, and other cities by proxies. No resolution was passed at this convention. The heritage of the league devolved upon Lübeck, Bremen, and Hamburg. In 1763, what remained of the factory at Bergen was sold. After the Steelyard was destroyed in the great fire of London in 1666, strangely enough it was rebuilt by the three cities, and retained until the year 1853, when it was sold for the sum of seventy-two thousand pounds. Yet even then the Hansa still owned property in foreign countries. The House of the Easterlings in Antwerp did not finally pass out of their hands until 1868. "Just as the Hansa had no anniversary of foundation to celebrate, having developed by imperceptible degrees, always endeavouring to fulfil the needs of the moment, so, on the other hand, it gradually crumbled away, nor was there any striking event to characterise its last hour." — F. W. Barthold.

V. Conclusion

From beginning to end, the Hansa displayed the same general characteristics and the same method of organisation. It consisted of a varying number of more or less independent municipal communities, each of which, although chiefly interested in its own immediate economic and political sphere, nevertheless belonged to
a group of associates bound together by geographical or historical ties; these
groups then entered into relations with the central group of Lusian cities
gathered about Lübeck, which formed the nucleus of the Hansa, because the
circle of interest of this group included all regions of Low German inland and
export trade. Loosely bound together, without permanent obligations to the whole,
and exposed to no irresistible powers of coercion, each member of the so-called
league pursued its own way, glad of the advantage of being able to find com-
panions in foreign countries, and to be a sharer in rights and privileges which had
cost it little to obtain, and to whose acquisition it had not largely contributed.
Even in struggles with the local nobles and with other communities, and in case
of internal disturbances, members of the Hansa could call upon their allies for
assistance. The reason why such a peculiar structure as the Hanseatic League
could last for over five hundred years was because it laid very light burdens upon
the individual associates, and was by no means barren of advantages to them.

The Hansa could never have been established, nor could it have continued to
exist, had not the interests of the separate towns and the interests of the league as
a whole, been, at least, in some respects in harmony with one another. This was
the case with Lübeck. Her mercantile interests extended over all foreign coun-
tries situated on the North Sea and the Baltic in which German trade was carried
on; at the foreign dépôts her merchants came into contact with others from all the
commercial towns of Germany as well as from the colonial region; by reason of
her location she was a connecting link between East and West. It was only in
Lübeck that an active impulse for holding together the interested cities, for super-
intending the entire area of commerce, and for defending and increasing the rights
and privileges of the league, was constantly present. Lübeck and her nearest fol-
lowers bore the hardships and costs of leadership, even during the most flourishing
days of the Hansa, for the greater part upon their own shoulders; and although it
was certainly to their own interest to do so, their actions were determined by
unsympathetic motives also; and finally, when the league was dissolved, deserted by all,
Lübeck remained the last in the field.

Although in spite of its defects the Hansa raised itself to the position of a
great mercantile power and acquired political authority both in peace and war, the
reason for such successes certainly did not lie in the efficiency of its constitution:
they were due rather to the fact of its being adapted to the general conditions of the
period of its growth and prosperity. The Northern nations were either lacking
in maturity of civilisation, or their economic activities were only partially de-
veloped. In Flanders and Brabant manufacture and inland trade were predomi-
nant; there was scarcely any maritime commerce at all. The Frisians were still
in a state of transition from piracy to commerce. Agricultural interests were
supreme in England, and in Scandinavia a complete development of city com-
munities was lacking. The same may be said of Poland and Lithuania. Conse-
quently there was no proper foundation for trade and industry in these nations;
and as for the Russians, they were and remained an inland race.

Moreover, in the majority of the lands with which the Hansa came into touch,
and over which its influence extended, long-continued political inferiority was
added to economic backwardness. The Low Countries were the classic soil of
municipal and provincial disintegration, of party struggles within cities, and of
political escapades of petty tyrants; as a result they were constantly involved in
exhausting quarrels. In later times they fell victims to the policies pursued by the Houses of Valois and Hapsburg. However much the power of the central government had developed in England, the fact remained that the island kingdom was sparsely populated,—even more so than Germany,—and did not possess a single ship of war; besides, the interests of England lay elsewhere than in northeastern Europe or in maritime affairs and commerce. Denmark, the most vigorous and progressive of the three kingdoms not yet united, had grown up in a constant state of war with the Hansa; during part of the time it had even proved the stronger, and it had nothing to fear from the other two kingdoms until the Middle Ages had come to a close. With the union of the Scandinavian kingdoms the period of Hanseatic supremacy in the Baltic region came to an end; but the insubordination and struggles of Sweden against the union granted to the league many years of grace, in fact, of renewed prosperity. In the Slavonic East the league profited not only by German colonisation, which had been rapidly pushed forward until well into the fourteenth century, but also by the two hundred years' cessation in the development of Russia brought about by the Mongolian invasions. It was, in truth, a negative quantity, an absence of opposing forces that contributed most to the supremacy of the Hansa. Thus the feeble resources of the loosely united cities were sufficient for all purposes, and the general defects of the league proved to be of but little consequence.

During the fifteenth century, when economic and political conditions both within and without the sphere of the Hansa were transformed from their very foundations, the league no longer possessed the power necessary for further development, nor was it capable of adapting itself to the altered circumstances. It fell back, outstripped in the race, and was left to die of mere exhaustion. "The Hansa sank lower and lower as the northern and western European kingdoms developed in internal stability and in external power. The final expulsion of the English from France, the victory of the Tudors in England, the dissolution of the Scandinavian Union, and the rise of the Vasas in Sweden were so many death-blowes to the Hansa, even if the neighbouring political forces, which were constantly increasing in strength, did not always adopt such severe measures as those taken by Ivan III, Vasilivitch, when he closed the Petershof at Novgorod. There was no place for the Hansa in the new Europe. The league had grown strong when opposed to the weak, but it was unable to accomplish its ends against a national will supported by a sovereign such as it had met with in regard to commercial questions in England. It received no assistance from its own country, which was lacking in national unity. The independence of its members was disputed far more often by its own domestic rulers than by any external powers."—Dietrich Schäfer.

It is quite true, as stated above, that the interests of the Hansa found no support among the German people; this was, however, not only due to the want of national unity and the inability to oppose the more powerful and homogeneous States of the North, but also to the fact that the general interest taken by Germans in mercantile and economic affairs was very slight, especially during the sixteenth century, when it sank to the zero point the moment questions of religion arose into prominence. Even in the Hanseatic cities themselves interest was lost in the very things upon which the previous significance of the league had rested. The reigning houses naturally thought more of political than of economic and commercial
matters. Throughout the whole of Germany an agrarian reaction, led by princes and nobility, exerted all its power in opposition to the industrialism and capitalism of the inland towns and the commercial interests of the Hansa. At the beginning of the sixteenth century it appeared almost certain that the German people would lay an economic yoke upon the entire world; nevertheless they patiently submitted to the economic dominion of foreigners at the end of this same century, simply because they had allowed their will to be turned aside in other directions. A long time passed before Germany regained her position as a power; and modern rulers have only recently atoned to the nation for the unpardonable sins committed by their predecessors in the days of the Reformation and counter-Reformation.

Among other causes of the decay of the Hansa may be mentioned the transference of the world's commerce from inland seas and overland connecting routes to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, which followed as a result of the discoveries beginning in 1492 and 1498. There is no doubt whatever that this was the reason why the commerce of the Baltic as well as that of the Mediterranean lost its original importance. However, there were very few traces of such a result during the sixteenth century, at the time of the downfall of the Hansa. It was not until the seventeenth century that the transatlantic discoveries led to a revolution in northern European trade, such as had already taken place during the sixteenth in the mercantile affairs of the southern part of the Continent. If it were true, as is frequently maintained, that the indifference of the Hansa to the results of the discovery of the New World was the immediate cause of the fall of the league, then the English and the Dutch also must have lost their foreign trade, for they too pursued just such a course of inaction as did the Hansa. It was not until the united kingdoms of Spain and Portugal, the exclusive possessors of East and West Indian commerce, adopted their policy of exclusion, that the English and Hollanders were compelled to undertake voyages to the tropics, the latter sailing first in 1595, and the former in 1602. In spite of the century of delay, the commerce of England and Holland prospered, while that of the Hansa was already at that time a thing of the past. Even Lübeck, not to speak of the other towns, no longer possessed the energy requisite for taking up Spain's offer of an alliance on a basis of monopoly, and even less for discovering by experiment whether or not it were possible to recover the trade of Europe by means of transoceanic traffic. Averse to war, and opposed on religious grounds to the predominance of a Catholic power, the Hansa renounced all further competition with Holland and Great Britain.

Powerful and beneficent in a time of trouble and confusion when settled order was unknown, it was helpless in the face of the new industrial, legal, and national arrangements from which modern Europe has been evolved.

4. WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE AGE OF DISCOVERIES

A. THE ECONOMIC REACTION CAUSED BY THE SPANISH AND PORTUGUESE POLICY OF EXPANSION

(a) The Continuation of the War with Islam. The Mediterranean Peoples.
— The permission obtained from the Pope by the rulers of Spain and Portugal to
extend their power over unknown or untrodden regions was a result of the long-
continued war with the Mohammedans, which to the successors of Gregory VII
and Urban II was a continuation of the crusade-policy of the papacy. The
sovereigns of the Iberian peninsula finally succeeded in driving overseas the enemy
who had come upon them in the eighth century. The bloodshed of seven hun-
dred years was brought to a close by the conquest of Granada in 1492. It now
became necessary to render the regained territory secure by occupying the Medi-
terranean coast of Africa. In fact, both Spain and Portugal undertook this task
(see Vol. IV, 535–539), but with the means at their disposal success seemed very
uncertain. It was for this reason that Henry the Navigator (d. 1460) endeavoured
to find a new strategic base of operations, as well as new allies and means, to be
used against the Infidels. Columbus and his patroness, Isabella of Castile, were
also inspired by the same thought. Spaniards and Portuguese alike were filled
with the idea of making use of the treasures of India and China in their struggle
against the Mohammedans. Yet neither Spain nor Portugal was able to carry out
its plans in respect to the conquest of the Barbary States. The Christians were
only able to capture and hold single points along the coast, the so-called presidios
(see IV, 254). The attacks of Charles V on Tunis and Algiers were ineffectual,
and Dom Sebastian's campaign against Morocco ended in 1578 with a defeat that
was decidedly injurious to the future influence of Portugal (IV, 547).

The kings of Spain were obliged to defend the interests of their subjects
against the Mohammedans in the eastern Mediterranean also,—above all, the
commerce of the Catalonians, who since the time of the Crusades had been the
rivals of the Italians and Provençals in the Levant (IV, 521). Moreover, Sicily
had been under the dominion of Aragon for centuries, and Naples became a de-
dependency of Spain in 1504 (IV, 529, 536). It was necessary to defend political
and economic interests against the followers of Islam in this region also. Condi-
tions in the Levant had become completely altered since the end of the Crusades.
The Byzantine Empire was no longer in existence, and the Mohammedan king-
dom of the Turks had arisen in its place. There were no longer any Genoese or
Venetian settlements in the Black Sea region. Anatolia was now a Turkish pro-
vince. Syria and Egypt had been under the dominion of the Sultan of Constanti-
nople since the beginning of the sixteenth century. The sole remains of the
colonial empire of Venice in the eastern Mediterranean were a few islands, con-
stantly threatened, and indeed conquered piecemeal.

In addition to Spain and Italy, there was still another region which the Haps-
burgs, on whose empire the sun never set, were obliged to defend against the Mo-
hammedans. This was Austria, their hereditary kingdom. To be sure, dexterity
and good luck had enabled them in the year 1526 to establish the great union of
nations from which the Austro-Hungarian monarchy developed in later times; but,
owing to the quarrels of the different ruling factions in the lands of St. Stephen,
they were unable to avoid the loss of the greater part of Hungary. It was greatly
to the advantage of the Hapsburgs that the protection of German Austria was
looked upon as a common German, indeed as a common European, cause. Hence
Solyman II, accustomed as he was to victory, failed to plant the crescent on the
walls of Vienna in 1529.1

1 See Vol. V.
The most important part of the policy of Spain, the repulse of the Turks at the time of their final advance against Christendom, was greatly obstructed owing to the fact that France under Francis I was all the while waging a war of self-preservation against the Hapsburgs. Feeling that the existence of his monarchy was threatened by the supremacy of Spanish power, Francis had entered into negotiations with the Porte as early as 1525, when in prison at Madrid. The Spanish-French war of 1526–1529, together with the contemporary attacks of Soliman on Hungary, compelled the Hapsburgs to divide their forces in order to protect themselves on both sides. A few years later, Francis I, fully conscious of the gravity of the step, formed an alliance with the Turks (1535). This was the first open union which had ever been entered into by a Christian-Latin power with the followers of the Prophet. The Turks, in return, put the French king in possession of a Mediterranean fleet. The Spaniards were not only prevented from becoming the rulers of the Mediterranean, but, owing to their position as champions of Christianity, were obliged to forfeit the remains of their commerce in the Levant. In this the Catalonians and the city of Barcelona were the greatest sufferers. The Castilians had nothing to lose in the East, and were looked upon by the other Spaniards as the founders of a world-policy that appeared to be the height of madness.

The decline of commerce in the Levant rendered more acute the antagonism between the different parts of the Spanish Empire, which were bound together only by dynastic ties. In the meanwhile France harvested the material fruits of her unchristian alliance with the Mohammedan East. A commercial treaty, drawn up on very similar lines to the old Hanse compacts, and offering a model for later treaties, was concluded in 1535. It was based on the principle of reciprocity as against other powers. The French in the East were to pay the same tolls and taxes that the Turks themselves paid to their government, and vice versa; further, it was agreed that the French should be legally answerable to their own consul alone, and that they should be permitted to worship according to their own religion in Mohammedan lands. The French flag succeeded to the privileges of the Venetian, and was moreover displayed by all vessels of other nations sailing under French protection.

(b) The Venetians in the Levant. — In contrast to the Spaniards, the Venetians did not allow themselves to be driven from their trade with the Levant. As in earlier times, they would now have preferred to slip in between the hostile powers of the West and East; but during the sixteenth century it was necessary for them to be armed and on their guard against both the Sultan, who desired to get possession of the remains of their colonies, and the emperor, or, rather, the House of Austria, whose sphere of interest in the plain of the Po and beyond the Adriatic extended dangerously near to the boundaries of the territory subject to Venice. Although the continental possessions of Venice were likely to draw her into serious complications, without the revenues from these lands she would be unable to provide the troops and ships required for the defence of her position in the East.

The false notion that the Oriental commerce of the Venetians came to an end because of the discovery of an ocean route to India, and that trade was wrested from Venice by Portugal, is old and seemingly ineradicable. In reality Venice continued to carry on traffic with the Levant not only throughout the sixteenth century, but until the beginning of the eighteenth, so that at least seven or eight
generations passed before the commerce in question entirely lost its earlier importance. Had the Venetians been as stubborn as the Hanseatics, there is no doubt that they would have lost their Oriental trade much earlier than they did; however, when they saw that Alexandria was declining for lack of an import trade because the Portuguese had closed up the entrance to the Red Sea, they did not hesitate for a moment to desert the former mistress of the eastern Mediterranean, and transferred their headquarters to Aleppo, for the reason that the Syrian city had once more become a market for the products of Asia. Arabs, Persians, and Armenians brought merchandise thither from India, for the Portuguese, much as they wished to do so, had not succeeded either in closing the Persian Gulf permanently, in blocking up the overland routes, or in driving the Arabs from the Indian Ocean. They had indeed been successful in rendering the old commercial routes more difficult of access, but they had by no means destroyed them. The fate of Venetian trade in the East did not lie in the hands of the Portuguese, but depended upon the moods, peaceful or warlike, of the Sultan.

How capable the Venetians were of adapting themselves to adverse circumstances was shown by the fact that they struck out an entirely new commercial route, and one, moreover, for which the chief instrument of their trade, their mercantile marine, was practically useless; this was the caravan road that led diagonally across the Balkan Peninsula from Constantinople to Spalato. All wares that did not find purchasers in the last-named city — where trade was entirely in the hands of Venetian merchants — were sent to the capital by ship. Thus Venice was still able to supply her old customers outside of Italy with merchandise from the Orient, in spite of Lisbon and Antwerp, although, to her great regret, she was not able entirely to do away with their competition.

Both before and after the period of discoveries the upper Germans were the most reliable customers of the Venetians. It was an advantage to the south German merchant, now reaching out more vigorously than ever in all directions, that, in spite of the southeast passage to India, the Portuguese and the Netherlands were unable to monopolise the entire trade in Asiatic products. The Germans had their choice of Venice, Lisbon, and Antwerp; there was no reason why they should neglect Venice, indeed there was a far better market for the sale of German products there than in the newly established commercial centres of the West.

How was it, then, that Venice could have, so suddenly as the traditional formula postulates, lost her commanding position in the world's trade? Even granting that the Orient had in reality been hermetically sealed by the Portuguese and Turks, this would not have been sufficient to destroy the trade of Venice, of which one of the chief supports was her domestic industry. During the sixteenth century, the height of the Renaissance, and until late in the seventeenth, Italy dominated the artistic taste of all Europe. The commercial language, customs, and methods of Italians became widely diffused over northern and western Europe for the first time in the sixteenth century. Indeed, the discoveries through which the commerce of the Apennine Peninsula is said to have been destroyed actually contributed, if not to an increase in the commercial power of Italy, at least to an enlargement in its area of distribution; for Venetian and Genoese importers were among the very first to supply Seville and Lisbon with the merchandise that was sent out to the transatlantic possessions in accordance with the Spanish and
Portuguese system of colonisation. The older commercial races, the Italians and the Germans, had no reason for fearing the Spaniards and Portuguese; the English and the Netherlanders were far more dangerous rivals. It was in the North, along the line that divided central from northern European commerce that the Venetians were first compelled to retire from competition. About the year 1560 they suspended the regular sea voyages which they had been in the habit of making to the Low Countries and the British Isles ever since the year 1318, while, on the other hand, English and Dutch navigators had become constant visitors to the Mediterranean.

There can be no doubt but that the centre of gravity of the world's commerce gradually swung westward to the Atlantic coast during the course of the sixteenth century, yet without bringing with it any sudden destruction to German or Italian trade. Both Germany and Italy stretched forth their tentacles over the Iberian Peninsula and the newly developing centres of the world's trade. Adaptation to altered circumstances was now possible, inasmuch as the old and clumsy method of barter had in a large degree been superseded by the use of money and credit; consequently geographical displacements of trade were no longer of any great consequence.

(c) The Reaction upon the Old World of the Discovery of America. — The New World proffered her peculiar flora and fauna to the conquistadores of the sixteenth century in their entire tropical profusion. The existence of a strange race of human beings who lived in other moral conditions was also of consequence to the masters of the new hemisphere, although phenomena of nature and civilisation were of but minor interest to men whose activities were almost exclusively limited to the obtaining of gold.

However, it was at least necessary to settle in the new continent, and to look at it from its most important anthropogeographical point of view, that is, as a territory for residence and subsistence. Had Europe, or even Spain, suffered from excess of population during the sixteenth century, the New World would have been from the very first what it only really became during the nineteenth century, — a region of expansion for such civilised nations of the world as are lacking either in land or in means of subsistence. Since at that time Europe, and especially Spain, had rather too few than too many inhabitants, the New World was at the beginning an unlimited arena for the deeds of adventurers, a fair field for missionaries eager to make converts, and a tremendous crown demesne for the government which bore and continued to bear the expenses of discovery and conquest, and naturally, according to the principles of government which then prevailed, desired an immediate reimbursement of its outlay.

But although emigration from Europe to America did not assume any considerable proportions until the century which has just closed, sporadic settlements were made by eager, enterprising, and highly educated leaders, lay and ecclesiastical, who sowed the seeds of Mediterranean culture in the New World, and, still remaining Europeans, founded that system of hemispheric division of production and distribution which was the keystone of commercial policy for more than two centuries.

The transmission of European civilisation to America, so beneficial to both hemispheres, was dependent on the relations of the colonists to the native races,
who were not thickly settled although sometimes highly developed. Had the methods of the conquistadores been adopted, the red race would soon have been annihilated. However, the influence of Church and State tended to curb the unscrupulous egoism of colonial, mining, and commercial interests. As soon as ecclesiastical and political government took the place of previous anarchy, the native races could at least be rescued from extirpation, although their civilisation was allowed to drift away to destruction because of its heathen origin. Only the more barbarous of the Indians retreated beyond the sphere of European influence, seeking refuge in the forests and deserts. Their civilised brethren did not shrink from the consequences of association with the European intruders; marriage between Europeans and Indian women also contributed toward the establishing of friendly relations. In this way a race of half-breeds, or Mestizos, arose among the pure-blooded European and Indian peoples.

The Old World was far superior to the New in respect to the possession of domestic animals. The llama, the vicuña, and a few varieties of birds were all that America had to offer to European settlers. The great wealth of the new continent in game was not taken into consideration at all by the Spanish and Portuguese colonists. Since practically all the domestic animals of the New World are of Old World origin, first having been imported from Spain or elsewhere,—this applying not only to the tame but also to the wild cattle and horses,—it follows that the exchange of civilisation favoured America from a zoological quite as much as it had from an anthropological point of view.

Although America was more fortunately situated in regard to flora than to fauna, nevertheless the New World received from the Old more than it gave in the shape of useful plants. Such American products as maize, tobacco, potatoes, and Spanish pepper can be cultivated in the more temperate regions of the Old World; in like manner the pineapple, aloe, and cactus have been introduced into the sub-tropical zones; and cocoa and vanilla, together with some medicinal plants, flourish in the tropics of the Eastern Hemisphere. Even if we add to these American dye-woods and timber, the vegetable products that have been transplanted from the New World to the Old fall a long way short both in number and in importance of the total of species that have crossed the Atlantic in the other direction; in fact, the various kinds of grain, wheat, barley, oats, and rye are of themselves sufficient to equalise the balance.

It would take too long to enumerate all the varieties of fruits and vegetables, fibrous plants and herbs used for dyeing, which have been exported across the ocean from the three older continents, and have been found to thrive well in North and South America. To these, sugar-cane and coffee must also be added. Even the two chief varieties of cotton cultivated in America (Gossypium her-
dactyllum and arboresum) are of Old World origin.

Plants and animals were at first exported across the ocean from one hemisphere to the other without much attention being paid to them. Perhaps centuries passed before their useful qualities were discovered and properly valued,—the potato, for example. During the first century or century and a half after the discovery, products of the animal and vegetable kingdoms played a very small part in the traffic between Europe and America. As yet there was nothing from either to be sent back to Europe as a return cargo with which to pay for the importations of European industrial products. Even the quantity of West Indian sugar sent to
Europe in addition to dye-woods and drugs from Central and South America seems not to have been large; the use of sugar itself was yet very limited. In general, none of the products which in later times received the name of "colonial wares" had yet become well known as luxuries. Not until the seventeenth century did the manner of life of Europeans alter to such a degree as to favour trade in such products.

Nevertheless permanent settlements were soon established in America by European immigrants, who required regular importations of the products of Old World industry, for they by no means fell to the level of self-sufficing barbarism. Next in importance to the possession of an unlimited area for residence and subsistence, the occurrence of the precious metals was the foundation of the being and prosperity of the Spanish-American colonies. Ever since the sixteenth century the gold and silver of the New World have exerted a powerful influence on the economic and political history of Europe.

Although the production of the precious metals in America can be expressed in approximate figures, scholars have vainly endeavoured to discover the quantity of gold and silver on hand in Europe previous to the year 1500, when bullion was first shipped across the Atlantic. Perhaps £125,000,000 worth is not too high an estimate. However, there are other facts which, in addition to being firmly established, are of far more importance to the history of European possession and coinage of the precious metals. During the Middle Ages silver was the chief medium of exchange, but owing to the untrustworthiness of silver money, ever since the middle of the thirteenth century wholesale trade had become accustomed to the use of the gold currency which had been employed for many years back in the Levant, within the Byzantine as well as the Mohammedan sphere of civilisation. The Florentine florins and the Venetian ducats, or sequins, served as models for the gold pieces of the Rhineland, France, and Hungary. The smallness of the output of gold in Europe prevented a further extension of the use of a gold coinage. On the other hand, the use of silver greatly increased during the fifteenth, and rose still more rapidly during the sixteenth century. Over-production of silver was rendered impossible, owing to the fact that, even in classic times, there was a constant flow of money, especially of silver, into eastern Asia; this explains the scarcity and high value of money, as well as the favourable ratio maintained by silver to gold. Apart from some temporary fluctuations, at the end of the fifteenth century, the ratio of value of gold and silver was 114:1. During the course of the sixteenth century the effects of the production of the precious metals in America were distinctly felt in Europe. Owing to the continued preponderance of silver, the ratio gradually became more and more favourable to gold, standing at 15:1 from say 1630–40; and this ratio was maintained with but few interruptions until 1874, when 16:1 was exceeded, and a rapid fall in the price of silver began.

The extraordinary increase in the supply of precious metals during the sixteenth century was by no means an unmixed blessing from an economic point of view. According to Georg Wiebe, the joint production of precious metals in Europe and America between 1493 and 1600 amounted to about £77,000,000 in gold and over £175,000,000 in silver,—a total of more than £250,000,000. The New World remained behind the Old in the production of the precious metals until 1544; this was due to the richness of the mines in the Tyrol, Bohemia, and
DESCRIPTION OF THE PLATE ILLUSTRATIVE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COINS OF THE XIIIth–XVth CENTURIES

2. Penny struck at London during the reigns of the first three Edwards (1272–1377). Practically the same dies used in each case.
3. Tournois of King Philip the Fair of France (1285–1314).
5. Sicilus of Doge Peter Gadenigo of Venice (1289–1310).
6. Florin, struck at Florence, bearing the arms of Augustino de Nasis, 1489.
10. Double ducat (Dobla) of King Ferdinand the Catholic of Aragon (1479–1516) and his queen Isabella of Castile (1474–1504, married 1469).
11. a. b. Golden groschen, so called Klappnützmuthaler, of Friedrich III the Wise, Elector of Saxony, struck in association (1500–1507) with his nephew, Duke George, and his brother, Duke John the Constant.
12. a. b. Tirolan thaler of the Archduke Sigismund of Austria, 1486.
13. Half thaler of the same Archduke, 1484.
14. a. b. Golden groschen of Joachimsthal, or thaler of Count Stephan Schlick (died 1528) and his brother.
15. a. b. Half thaler of the same Counts, 1525.
16. Quarter, or Oristhaler of the same Counts.
Saxony, as well as to the superior methods of mining and extraction employed in Europe. But when the silver mines of Potosí in Peru were discovered (1545), those of Zacatecas and Guanajuato in Mexico (1548); when German miners were sent to America, and one of them, whose name is unknown, invented the method of extracting silver from quartz by the use of mercury (see Vol. I, 416), — the production of America soon surpassed that of the Old World, and began to cause a fall in the value of the precious metals. Although the exact quantity of silver and gold shipped from America to Europe is not known, one can at least form some idea of the increase from estimates of the total supply of the precious metals in Europe at different periods. Thus, if the supply in 1493 is reckoned at about £125,000,000, and that in 1600 at £235,000,000, the increase during the sixteenth century must have amounted approximately to £200,000,000.

Since with a constant increase in the supply of the precious metals the purchasing power of money must sink, just as increase in the supply of any commodity is apt to cause a fall in its value, once the normal demand is satisfied, it follows that a fall in the value of money is attended by a rise in prices of all other commodities. A general rise in prices must be felt by all classes of society, especially in cases where there is no increase of income to correspond with the decrease in the purchasing power of money. Experience shows that as a rule men who are dependent upon wages and salaries for their support are not able — certainly not immediately — to increase their incomes proportionately to the increased cost of necessities of life. Hence a crisis in prices is usually accompanied by economic phenomena, which are especially destructive to the welfare of the poorer classes. Workmen who received their pay in currency were better off during the fifteenth century, when wages were relatively high, than during the sixteenth, when, in addition to a fall in wages, there was a decrease in the purchasing power of money; thus the proletariat grew in numbers in spite, rather than in consequence of the opening of the treasures of the New World. The rise in the prices of commodities had also a depressing effect upon incomes derived from interest or rent. On the other hand, producers or dealers who were successful in bringing about an advance in prices were able to add to their wealth without the slightest exercise of labour.

As has been proved by thousands of independent statements, civilised Europe underwent an economic crisis during the sixteenth century. The effects of the fall in the value of money and the general advance in the prices of commodities were felt in all directions, — earlier in the West than in the East, — and this state of affairs continued until well into the seventeenth century. Conditions did not change until about 1650, when a slight reaction set in, and not until the beginning of the eighteenth century was there another constant advance of prices.

The customary term, "revolution in prices," is certainly very inappropriate for the designation of movements that are so slow as almost to remind us of the gradual risings and fallings of continents. Only the attempts of merchants to effect a rise artificially, and the clumsy financial policy of certain politicians, have here and there given to these slowly consummating crises the character of revolutionary movements.

(d) The Effects of the Portuguese Discoveries on Europe. — By turning the Cape of Good Hope, the Portuguese discovered an ocean route to India, the goal which
the Spaniards under Columbus had been so unsuccessful in their endeavours to attain. They set foot in a region with which Europe had been engaged in indirect trade for thousands of years, a densely populated country, abounding in its own peculiar products, possessed of its own independent civilisation, the very nucleus of the world's commerce. Nevertheless the inhabitants of India had no wish to dominate the world's trade, and willingly placed their commerce in the hands of foreigners, through whose activities a market was secured that extended over the broadest spheres of lands and peoples. The Arabs were the masters of the intermediate trade with the coasts of the Indian Ocean, and from their hands the Europeans of the Mediterranean region, the Venetians leading, received the luxuries of India, which then passed through a third, fourth, and perhaps twentieth hand, each exchange aiding the merchants of the Latin and, for a long time, the Byzantine sphere of civilisation to secure the commercial supremacy enjoyed by them for so many years. Eastern Asia no less than western Europe depended upon India for a large part of its commerce, that extended even beyond Japan, losing itself at an indeterminable distance among the islands of the Pacific.

The Portuguese were good seamen and expert in war. Like the Spaniards, they were old enemies of the Mohammedans, whom they had already victoriously followed into north Africa, and now encountered once more in the world of the Indian Ocean. They took possession of the hemisphere that had been granted them by the Pope, nominally, rather than in reality; for a small, sparsely populated country like Portugal could think neither of colonisation nor of any serious effort to subjugate the native inhabitants. However, the hostile attitude of the Arabs rendered it necessary for the Portuguese to occupy and fortify certain points along the coast. In fact, the possessions of Portugal both in Asia and in Africa have never been more than coast settlements. The two objects which Portugal set out to attain — both far beyond her power — were the monopoly of the spice trade in Europe, and the driving away of Asiatic competitors who acted as middlemen in the commerce with European nations. Together with the spice trade at first hand, the Portuguese carried on traffic in negroes, which had grown to considerable proportions since the introduction of slavery into Spanish America; the gold of west Africa was also a source of gain.

Although the undertakings of the Portuguese were at first purely mercantile enterprises, in which no greater expenditure for materials of war had been entailed than in the case of the ordinary traffic in the Mediterranean in later times, the Portuguese crown was obliged to make great military preparations, of which the expense increased from year to year. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese colonial trade was placed under strict State supervision, and all financial affairs organised, nationalised, and put under crown control. A direct participation of foreigners, once permitted, was forbidden for the future. King Manuel the Great concentrated the East Indian trade in the Casa da Índia at Lisbon, and finally declared it to be an exclusive right of the crown. Cargoes of spices had already been sent to England and to the Netherlands; a permanent royal dépôt was now established at Antwerp. Once more the commerce of western Europe possessed two centres in Lisbon and Antwerp (see p. 65). It was not long before Italian, upper German, Spanish, and French merchants took up their quarters in the former city. When the crown handed over the rights of monopoly in the Indian trade to farmers-general (contractadores), the capitalists of Europe competed for access
to this fountain of wealth. Lisbon was also an important centre of the trade in grain and in ship-building materials; north and south German merchants of Danzig as well as of Augsburg shared in delivering the raw products.

B. THE RISE OF THE MONEY SYSTEM AND LARGE CAPITALISTS

(a) The Merchant Princes of the Sixteenth Century. — One of the most significant features of the economic life of the sixteenth century was the introduction of Italian and upper German capital into the sphere of Spanish and Portuguese oceanic trade. However, the finances of the sixteenth century, like those of all other times, were not limited to transactions founded on mere exchange of goods. Whether they would or no, merchants were forced beyond the bounds of commercial affairs and drawn into the currents of national policies, of which money, particularly ready money, is an indispensable factor. As yet, the machinery of European States was not well adapted to the requirements of an age already based on financial principles. The remains of ancient feudal institutions, founded on a more primitive economic system, were everywhere to be seen. Thus a large part of the State revenues came from the natural products of crown lands; there was no system of officials as yet sufficiently developed to be able quickly to raise taxes in the form of money and to accumulate them in a central treasury. For all grants of money the crown was dependent on the estates of the realm, which were only acquainted with their own narrow class interests, knowing nothing of the affairs of nations. On the other hand, the courts lived and moved in an atmosphere of far-reaching national and world policy. It cost money, however, to carry out any policy, whether of peace or of war, especially since regiments of mercenaries, and in some cases standing armies, had come into use in place of the old feudal levies. Governments not only looked about for new sources of income, but also made whatever use they could of those who already possessed money; and sovereigns of the sixteenth century, the period when royal power reached its height, were as little backward in the first respect as in the second. Financiers and merchant princes were offered unbounded privileges and favours in return for financial services to governments, and one loan was, as a rule, apt to draw on ten or a dozen others in its train.

The modern conception of great Powers, which arose at the end of the fifteenth century through the French invasions of Italy and the development of the universal monarchy of the Hapsburgs, created the modern centralised State with its military and financial systems out of the loosely bound confederation of more or less independent units,—the State of the Middle Ages,—and to this effect employed capital, so far as it was already in existence and organised, as its tool. At the same time the large capitalists were exposed to dangers and crises that they would scarcely have survived had it not been that their private affairs were linked together with State interests. It is difficult to conceive that the events of a whole period of the world's history could have been so intimately connected with purely mercantile interests, particularly the affairs of an age which religious, dynastic, and constitutional ideals seemed so to dominate, nay, not only seemed—

for Reformation and counter-Reformation, the duel between the Houses of Hapsburg and Valois, and the war for the independence of the United Netherlands arose from no mere imaginary motives: their sources must have reached to the
very depths of the human soul, or at least have extended far below the level
of self-deception.

Before the most powerful of the merchant princes of the sixteenth century,
the Augsburgers and Nuremberger, were compelled by the natural development
of economic forces and the irresistible tendency of the times to turn from dealings
in tangible commodities to speculation, to banking and exchange, and finally to
purely financial pursuits, the Italians had already passed through all these transition
states, and had acquired an astonishing aptitude in all branches of com-
merce. Italian money-changers, Lombards and Tuscans, followed the expansion
of Italian trade into all countries. They bought and sold the precious metals
either coined or in bullion, bills of exchange, and promissory notes; they negotiated
loans for merchants, attended to the financial affairs of the Roman Curia, and
loaned vast sums to monarchs in return for every conceivable form of pledge.
Their activities developed an international character, and they were therefore
constantly obliged to struggle against the endeavours of the merchants of various
states who sought to nationalise the business of money-lending. This the French
temporarily succeeded in doing in the fifteenth century, at the time when the Flo-
rentine money-lenders were at the height of their prosperity. A citizen of Bourges,
Jacques Coeur, the foremost banker of his age, established connections with the
government, and consequently delivered it from the hands of the international
capitalists. But after the fall of this great financier France once more became
dependent on the Italians in all matters concerning banking, exchange, and loans.
The French kings of the sixteenth century favoured the Florentines for political
reasons, while, on the other hand, the Hapsburgs turned to the Genoese.

(2) Syndicates and Rings of the Sixteenth Century.—The upper German
merchants also were drawn into international finance through their business con-
nections with the House of Hapsburg. A rapid rise, an overwhelming development
of power, and a lamentable fall were the stages passed through by German wealth
in less than a century. Long before the operations in banking and credit of the
merchant princes of upper Germany had attained full sway, the resentment of the
German people had been aroused in full measure; complaints were showered
upon the diet, and the official spokesmen of the nation, Martin Luther among
them, thundered against all doubtful commercial dealings and against usury. The
ecclesiastical law against the taking of interest on loans was still everywhere in
force. The delusion of a just and therefore unalterable price (justum pretium) for
every sort of commodity still dominated the economic thought of the age. When
the Roman Catholic Church adopted a milder attitude toward the practice of
usury, the Protestants offered violent opposition, and thus both Catholics and Pro-
testants were soon compelled to join hands with the general public in their hostility
toward mercantile life and affairs. The economic policy which had arisen in the
small city communities of the Middle Ages—a policy of low prices, of small
dealers and consumers, opposed not only to capitalism but to competition—was
likewise completely in harmony with the ecclesiastical position.

It is not surprising that the masses of the populations of cities were stirred to
their very depths when they beheld speculators arising in their midst, who ad-
vanced prices and carried on their financial operations to a practically unlimited
extent. The most dangerous phenomenon of all appeared to be the combination of
the already all-powerful single houses into syndicates and rings. In order to diminish the risks encountered in their speculations, capitalists united into limited liability companies that could be easily dissolved, and the gains divided in proportion to the original contributions as soon as their original object had been attained. Such associations were frequently able to create a local monopoly in articles of commerce, spices or metals, for example, and sometimes succeeded in influencing prices even in the world markets. However, it may have come about, it is at least certain that the copper and pepper monopolies of the time shortly before the outbreak of the great social revolution (the Peasants' War) of 1525 served the popular agitators as a means for awakening the indignation of the populace, — a means that was only the more efficacious the less the proletarians were able to form any conception of such complicated matters. Nevertheless it is remarkable how soon the non-mercantile classes became reconciled to the new method of making money without labour, which they had at first so violently opposed. Just as during the nineteenth century, the commercial crises have neither assumed great proportions nor caused vast desolation until the private capital of the middle and lower classes has been placed in the hands of stock-jobbers, so was it at the time of the pepper rings. Innumerable small capitalists, whose one idea was the possibility of gain, and who not infrequently lost the whole of their little fortunes when the undertaking collapsed, became members of the associations and companies of the sixteenth century, — a phenomenon which we have seen repeated in our own time in the speculations on the exchanges. Thus even peasants had a share in the dealings of the Höchstetters of Augsburg, and when the leading firm failed, lost their entire scanty savings. Had it not been for supplies furnished by small sources, the great masses of capital with which commercial houses conducted their affairs could never have been heaped together.

(c) The Fuggers and other Upper German Capitalists. — How German capital, and, in fact, all capital that was employed in international commercial operations, came to find itself upon the inclined plane down which it glided during the course of the sixteenth century, may be learned from the history of the Fuggers, the first mercantile house of the age.

In 1367 the founder of the family, Hans Fugger, a weaver of fustian, settled in Augsburg and attained to modest prosperity. His sons soon became distinguished wholesale merchants, and his grandson, Jacob II (d. 1526), made the house famous throughout the world. By furnishing the equipment for the retinue of Emperor Frederick III at the time of his meeting with Charles the Bold, Jacob Fugger opened relations with the House of Hapsburg, which was just then beginning to aspire to the position of a power of the first rank. This connection led to results important to both families. Archduke Sigismund of the Tyrol granted to the Fuggers, for the repayment of a loan, the yield of the Tyrolean silver mines. Henceforth they devoted themselves to the mining operations, to which the rapid growth of their fortune was due. The copper mines at Neusohl in Hungary were also acquired by the house, which was now able to extend its trade as far as Danzig and Antwerp, and even to control the copper market of Venice. The Fuggers also journeyed to Lisbon, where they established a dépôt for the spice trade shortly after preparations had been completed for the first East Indian expedition of the Portuguese. They shared in the expenses of the great expedition of 1505, con-
tributing, together with other upper Germans, the sum total of thirty-six thousand ducats. After the Indian-Portuguese trade was placed under the control of the crown they repeatedly received large quantities of spices, for the most part as payments on loans at high interest to the Portuguese government.

But at the beginning of the sixteenth century, both in Germany and in Italy dealings in commodities had ceased to form the chief business of the merchant princes, who now occupied themselves mainly with the affairs of the money markets, and devoted a large part of their energy to contracting loans for the various governments. By the second decade of the century the Reformation the decision of the most important questions in the world’s history lay in the hands of merchants. The appearance of Luther in the year 1517, and the election of Charles V as emperor of Germany in 1519, were both connected in a most extraordinary manner with the affairs of the house of Fugger.

As early as 1500 the Fuggers possessed a dépôt in Rome, where they executed commissions entrusted to them by the Pope and other ecclesiastical dignitaries. Albert of Brandenburg, who had been elected Archbishop of Mayence in 1517, borrowed 21,000 ducats of the house in order to meet the expenses connected by the Curia with the bestowal of the pallium; he also received, on the payment of 10,000 ducats,—also loaned by the Fuggers,—the position of commissary-general for Saxony of the jubilee proclaimed by Leo X. The archbishop appointed priests to collect the money from the vendors of indulgences, and to hand it over to the agents of the Fuggers, who accompanied them. One half of the amount received by the agents was forwarded to Augsburg toward payment of the archiepiscopal debt; the other half was sent to Rome. It was over this business that Luther and Tetzel were destined finally to fall out. The flow of money to Rome had been for many years a matter of great annoyance to Germany, and the recently introduced traffic in indulgences furnished a welcome opportunity for delivering a simultaneous blow to the papacy and the great commercial syndicates.

Although the Fuggers were only indirectly involved in the causes which led to the revolution in the church, it was certainly their money that procured the victory of Charles V over his competitor, Francis I, at the election of an emperor, following the death of Maximilian I, in 1519. All such elections were nothing more nor less than complicated acts of bribery, the decision being inevitably determined by the amounts expended. The security offered by the Fuggers for the Spanish candidate put an end to the wavering of the electoral princes, for Francis I was unable to obtain equally reliable guarantees. Of the 850,000 golden florins required by Charles V, the Fuggers supplied 543,000, the Welsers 143,000, and the Italians the rest. From this time forth the merchant princes themselves belonged to their puppets, body and soul; for it was necessary to retain sovereigns on their thrones, even at the cost of further loans, if any return from the money already advanced, but not yet repaid, was to be expected. Moreover, the Fuggers were still less able to escape from bondage, inasmuch as they were convinced partisans of the Hapsburgs and of their Roman Catholic policy.

After the election of Charles V, in 1519, Spain became the centre of gravity for the house of Fugger, the creditors of the emperor-king having been assigned shares in the national income. "The Spanish business" gradually absorbed the entire strength of the firm, and finally ruined the greatest mercantile establishment of the age.
Among the many enterprises of the Fuggers in Spain, the leasing of the quicksilver mines at Almaden, of great value ever since the discovery of the use of mercury in extracting silver and gold, may be mentioned. German miners were sent by the Fuggers to Spain, and often to America. Inasmuch as the chief creditors of the government were constantly obliged to grant new loans to the crown in order to secure their old claims, they were often referred to the “silver fleets” returning from the New World and in part laden with the imperial quinto (the twenty per cent share of the crown, see Vol. I, 407). Since the exportation of the precious metals from Spain was forbidden by law, it became necessary for the Fuggers and their compatriots to obtain special licenses that they might be able to place their capital wherever it was most needed. Even the government was obliged to maintain the strictest secrecy in regard to this matter, or the Spaniards would have forcibly prevented the removal of gold from the country. In this manner the stream of precious metal from America flowed on past Spain into the great treasuries of the capitalists, who had also succeeded in drawing to themselves an additional share of the bullion of the New World through the importation of commodities into the as yet industrially undeveloped continent. The Fuggers, however, took but little part in the latter activity; their attention was already sufficiently occupied with the sale of the mining and natural products of the crown possessions that had been yielded to them as pledges.

The Fuggers also maintained permanent financial relations with the German line of the House of Hapsburg. As Ferdinand I had vast domains in Naples, his chief creditors extended their sphere of activity over the southern part of Italy. In like manner the government of the Spanish Netherlands constantly availed itself of the assistance of upper German and Italian capitalists.

After the death of Jacob II the house of Fugger reached the zenith of its power and wealth under the guidance of his nephew, Anton (1526–1560). It was fortunate for the family that it had become a tradition not to divide the wealth of the various members, but to keep it together in one mass, governing it from a central point, in strict monarchical fashion. Although it is true that relatives co-operated with the head of the family, the most important affairs of the house were as a rule under the exclusive control of a single individual, who transacted business even in the most distant countries by means of his factors and agents. Augsburg was the residence of these princes of European finance. Not until after the middle of the sixteenth century did the family ties begin to loosen. Single members then withdrew their money from the firm, and thus rendered it necessary for the house to depart from one of its most firmly established principles; that is to say, if possible, never to put any other capital into an undertaking except that belonging to the family. The more the use of outside capital increased toward the end of the century, the more difficult the position of the house became, especially during critical times.

The turn in the fortunes of the firm arrived during the period of its greatest prosperity, and was brought about by the Schmalkaldic war, 1546–1547. Anton Fugger, who already at that time had serious thoughts of winding up the affairs of the house, must have had an instinctive presentiment of the inevitable end; however, he was no longer able to do as he wished, bound as he was by bands of iron to the Hapsburgs. To hold his own against the Protestant party in Augsburg, it was necessary for him to assist the Catholics to victory. And when Charles V
fled before Moritz of Saxony to Villach, the Fuggers were obliged to come to his aid with four hundred thousand ducats,—an unheard-of sum at that time,—in order not to lose forever the entire amount owed them by both branches of the Hapsburg family. So things went on until the outbreak of the first great financial crisis, in the year 1557; this was followed by a protracted cessation of business. The age of decline had begun not only for the Fuggers, but for all the great capitalists of Europe. The first period of international financial sovereignty was drawing to a close, soon to give place to a national, or at least territorial, economic and financial policy, which was to continue until the French Revolution and the great wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century prepared the way for the rise of new international financial powers.

Many years passed after the first signs of warning in the year 1557 before the final bankruptcy came. After the death of Anton Fugger in 1560, the control of the house passed into the hands of Hans Jacob, his nephew, a well-educated, talented man, with a love for the fine arts, but lacking in the true spirit of commerce, who after a few years resigned his position in favour of the sons of Anton, "Marx Fugger and Brothers." The reality of the family was divided and the business in merchandise brought to a close. Thus the Spanish affairs remained the only enterprise of the house, which rendered necessary constant communication with Antwerp, the most important exchange of Europe. However, the Spanish government was in such a bad way financially that it suspended payment at the end of periods averaging twenty years each, and resorted to compulsory settlements with its creditors. Although the Fuggers were favoured more than other creditors of the State, they were, nevertheless, forced to assent to whatever conditions were imposed upon them. The most burdensome of all was the acceptance of certificates of credit (juros). As a result they did not receive their loans back at full value, but in the shape of interest-bearing, unredeemable, "perpetual" debenture bonds that immediately sank below par value, and consequently could not be converted into specie without loss. Since the bankers in turn paid their creditors and those who had entrusted money to their keeping in debenture bonds of the same description, the result was a miserable series of lawsuits, followed by the absolute ruin, first, of the credit of Spain, and then of that of the bankers. The position of the Fuggers became unbearable after the accession of Philip IV (1621–1665); they were now treated with disfavour by the all-powerful prime minister, Olivarez (see Vol. IV, 549), notwithstanding the fact that in earlier times they had fared far better than the other German capitalists, on account of their undeniable services. They were forced to provide the sum of fifty thousand ducats monthly for the expenses of the court, in return for which they received worthless assignments on the taxes.

After the year 1630 the house was many times compelled to delay its payments, and in 1637 the Spanish affairs of the Fuggers were placed in the hands of creditors, for the most part Genoese. The deficit amounted to over a half million ducats, despite the fact that the claims on the Spanish crown, which were as good as worthless, had been included among the assets. "The total loss sustained by the Fuggers through their dealings with the Hapsburgs up to the middle of the seventeenth century could not have amounted to less than eight million gulden, Rhenish. It would not be far from the truth to say that the bulk of the earnings of the firm during its century of activity disappeared in this way alone."—Ehrenberg.
Nor did the other south German mercantile houses which had ventured into the sphere of international finance fare much better than the Fuggers. The Höchstetters, Paumgartners, Welsers, Seilers, Neidharts, Manlichs, Rems, Haugs, and Herwars, all of Augsburg, were, every one of them, obliged to suspend payment in the course of the sixteenth century, for the most part during the critical years 1550–1570. The Höchstetters, "the most hated monopolists of their age," were the first to fail (1529). The Welsers succeeded for many years in maintaining a position among the upper German firms second only to the Fuggers. They were divided into two branches, one in Nuremberg and the other in Augsburg; the former house wound up their affairs in 1560. Bartholomew Welser, the first and only German who made an attempt to secure territory in the New World, thereby for a short time arousing hopes of German colonial possessions in America, was a member of the Augsburg branch of the family. In contrast to the Fuggers, who were so strongly inclined in favour of the Hapsburgs, the Welsers maintained a neutral position among the contending parties, and even entered into financial negotiations with the French government, thereby suffering not only in consequence of the bankruptcy of Spain, but also on account of the failure of the national finances of France in 1557. Their credit however remained unimpaired, and subsequently the firm was even able to contract loans for the English crown. The affairs of the house did not begin to deteriorate until the end of the century, but in 1614 the Welsers were bankrupt.

The Tuchsers of Nuremberg, another great business house of the century, adopted the principle never on any account to permit themselves to become entangled in the financial affairs of sovereigns or princes, hence they escaped the crises of the seventeenth century unscathed. The Imhofs, another large firm involved in national finance, were not absolutely ruined although forced to retire with considerable losses. With the exception of Augsburg and Nuremberg, the cities of south Germany had but little share in the international operations in capital and credit.

(d) The Genoese and the Florentines. — The Italians, who were not only earlier in the field but showed a greater mastery in all kinds of business, had a longer career than the High Germans, who did not desert the traffic in commodities for that in money until the end of the fifteenth century. During the sixteenth century they were chiefly represented by the Florentines and the Genoese in the international markets.

After the Genoese had lost their position as a commercial power in the eastern Mediterranean, and had found it very difficult to carry on traffic in the western basin of the same sea because of the Barbary pirates (see Vol. IV, 250), the spirit of commerce turned the surplus capital of the Ligurian seaport into new channels, especially into affairs of exchange and credit. The Genoese had been commercially connected with the Spaniards ever since the thirteenth century; their ability as navigators and their capital had been of great assistance to Spain in her occupation of America. They also undertook to supply a certain number of slaves annually to the transatlantic colonies, provided Seville with merchandise to be sent to America, and furnished the money necessary for the equipment of expeditions. Single Genoese firms, such as the Grimaldi, had already entered into financial transactions with the Spanish government. A political alliance had
developed from the union of economic interests. The desertion of Francis I for the cause of Charles V by the house of Doria in 1528, had a decisive effect on the second Spanish-French war. The governing party, called that of the optimates, or the wealthy classes, was divided into two branches, the old and the new nobility (nobili vecchi e nuovi), the former chiefly engaged in financial affairs, the latter in dealings in merchandise. The masses were in favour of the new nobility, inasmuch as traffic in goods was beneficial to the handicrafts, and hence to the prosperity of the working classes. Nevertheless in 1549 the new nobility under Giovanni Luigi de' Fieschi were defeated by the older party led by the Dorias, who now entered into a still closer alliance with Spain. In return, the emperor, and later his son Philip II, granted them a position of the first rank among his financial advisers, the Fuggers being the only other family which enjoyed the same privileges. Among the Genoese houses that were creditors of the Spanish government, the most distinguished were the firms of Grimaldi, Spinola, Pallavicino, Lonellino, Gentili, and Centurioni. The higher they rose in the estimation of the Spanish king, the more dangerous became their position during these times of regularly recurrent financial crises, for the favour of monarchs was not to be had for nothing; in short, the Genoese, like the upper Germans, could not get any repayment of their loans other than unredeemable debenture certificates and worthless assignments of taxes. Nevertheless they continued to maintain their connections with Spain until about the middle of the seventeenth century. By that time all solvent nations had to a great extent nationalised their economic and political affairs, and thus the age of international financial operations was over in any case. In the meanwhile the Genoese capitalists had obtained possession of vast territories in Naples through their connections with the House of Hapsburg, and consequently were able to view the complete prostration of their native city with a certain measure of composure.

In like manner at about the middle of the seventeenth century the Florentines severed their connections with France, where monetary affairs had been in their hands for over a hundred years. During the early days of Florentine finances, at the time of the Baldi and Peruzzi in the fourteenth century, France had been one of the clients of the Tuscan bankers. These relations were renewed in the fifteenth century, when the Medici became the sovereigns of the banking world. During the sixteenth century, when, with the assistance of the Hapsburgs, the Medici obtained political dominion over Tuscany, the Florentine plutocracy nevertheless took the side of the Valois. Business with France continued to flourish, although financial relations ceased with England and the Netherlands as soon as these nations began to control their economic and commercial affairs with their own capital. The most distinguished Florentine capitalists of the sixteenth century were the Frescobaldi, Guaieterotti, Strozzi, Salviati, Guadagni, and Capponi; and in addition to the specifically Florentine houses, the Chigi of Siena, the Buonvisi of Lucca, the Ducci of Pistoia, and the Affaitadi of Cremona may be mentioned. The first crushing blow dealt to the Tuscan firms in their relations with France was the bankruptcy of Henry II in the year 1557. The Huguenot wars broke out not long after this, and during their progress the finances of France became completely disorganised. One can only wonder at the rashness of such bankers as Girolamo Gondi, who still continued to transact business with the French crown. At the end of the reign of Henry IV the Florentines had dis-
appeared from France, although the nation was obliged to make use of foreign capital until the year 1660.

(c) The Marts and Exchanges of the Sixteenth Century.—The modern exchange has developed from the market of the old Frankish-German Empire. The privilege of holding fairs and markets, granted to suitable districts by emperors and kings ever since the time of the Carolingians, was the nucleus around which all the special rights grew up which later constituted the conception of municipal governments. In the midst of the old village communities the independent civilisation of the cities arose, first in the Latin countries, later in the Germanic, isolated it is true, and not destroying the earlier form of social life adapted to the villages. From this time forth village and town, peasant and citizen, were permanently established side by side as opposite types of civilisation; each was unable to attain economic prosperity without the assistance of the other, and for that reason they entered into an organised system of traffic invented by the town dwellers as the more developed of the two types. The weekly market and the precinct, or city boundary, are the characteristic tokens of this mutual adaptation of rural and urban interests. The weekly market assured the city of a supply of the natural products of the neighbourhood, and guaranteed the country dwellers a place for the sale of their goods where prices would not be influenced by the tricks of over and under bidding; the precinct prevented the city industries from being pursued beyond its own limits, and thus assured it of the custom of its peasant neighbours.

The towns experienced greater difficulty in their relations with the heirs of the old feudal lords, the landed nobility. Robber knights were a well-known phenomenon of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The civic estates, merchants and capitalists, had become dangerously powerful and prosperous relatively to the nobility of the country. Robber knight and “pepper-sack” — as the merchant was called in derision — represented two distinct spheres of interest, the agrarian and the industrial-commercial; and the war of social interests embodied in the two classes only ended in the sixteenth century with the overthrow of the landed nobility.

Long before the State interfered in the struggle between the industrial and agrarian classes, the municipal communities had succeeded in firmly establishing their position, although in complete independence of one another. The city as a whole was looked upon as an association of consumers, requiring protection from the natural self-interest of the producers. The inhabitants of a town were all consumers to a certain degree, even the merchants and craftsmen of the city. But since in any town the special interest of the producers was opposed to the general interests of the consumers, it was necessary for the economic policy of the municipality to be one that strove to institute a state of affairs acceptable to both parties. The city government in its endeavour to bring about harmony found itself at least partially united with the organised industries, the guilds, and the various societies of craftsmen. It was found necessary to reduce to the greatest possible degree the rivalry between tradesmen, and to exclude the competition of all foreign industries. Since the city thus secured the home market for the productions of its own industrial classes, and at the same time helped them in their outside competition, it was, on the other hand, entitled to look out for the general interests of consumers.
through the introduction of tariffs on prices and wages, and laws regulating the quality of goods.

It was also to the general advantage of town populations occasionally to introduce the competition of strangers by temporarily opening the city gates to all comers. This object was served by the annual fair, which brought profit to the town by an influx of strangers, and, though it exposed domestic industries to a temporary competition, it also brought them into touch with new circles of customers. In addition to towns, churches and monasteries often obtained market privileges, for the reason that on certain religious holidays they were much visited by pilgrims and guests; in this manner a brisk traffic would arise, as it were, out of nothing. These fairs were of an international type, and are still to be seen in the Mohammedan, Brahmin, and Buddhist countries. For example, the two chief markets of Paris, the fairs of St. Denis and St. Germain, were originally opened for the custom of pilgrims. The same may be said of what was once the greatest annual fair in England, held on an open field near Stourbridge Abbey. The conceptions of market and annual fair soon became one and the same, and it was a long time before men grew accustomed to call the markets of international significance that were repeated several times during the year by the special name of fairs.

Cities could not, however, maintain an important position in commerce as the headquarters of fairs alone. Staple towns also developed, and sometimes one town presented both aspects. Among staple towns, with or without annual fairs, two varieties, natural and artificial, may be distinguished. Natural markets arose at the termini of great commercial highways, especially of sea routes. Such were Venice, Genoa, Barcelona, and Bruges, where goods sent from distant lands were unloaded, and in so far as they were not needed for domestic consumption, were resold and distributed. Every town was not so situated, nor did all cities produce to such an extent that commodities and purchasers could be enticed to them from all sides. Towns past which the stream of commerce would have flowed without stopping, sought to obtain by means of coercion the same advantages that grew up spontaneously in natural staple markets. The method of building up a market by force, such as was once to be seen at Vienna, consisted in obliging foreign merchants to offer their goods for sale in the city for a definite period, sometimes as long as six or eight weeks. They were also forbidden to make a circuit around such a market town, the only road open to them being that which led through the city itself. In all markets a foreign traffic developed independently of definite dates, often continuing throughout the year, or, at least, during the most favourable seasons. Foreign merchants of the same city or country usually had their own staple houses at such markets, as the Germans their Fondaco in Venice, or the merchants of Ratisbon their yard in Vienna; in case they possessed no separate establishment, they had their special quarters in houses of the townsmen, as a rule in the neighbourhood of the money-changers and brokers.

Both in the permanent marts and at the fairs, besides the older trade in commodities actually delivered and paid for in cash, there grew up other more elaborate commercial transactions, in which the Italians led the way. To these belong all the methods designed to obviate the necessity for the transportation of coined money, so dangerous and costly in those times, first and foremost among them being exchange and the whole system connected with it. At the end of the great fairs, when all transactions in actual commodities were over, the money dealers
met and adjusted their various claims in such a manner that only a final balance remained to be paid in coin. If any money was left over, it was frequently loaned at advantageous rates of interest until the time came for the next fair; thus the money-lending system also was closely connected with the settlements of accounts that followed at the close of each temporary market.

In the permanent markets, the great emporiums of European commerce, the custom developed for merchants to meet every day at an appointed place for the purpose of obtaining information from one another as to business affairs and of attending to matters concerning goods, money, and exchange. Business thus transacted was frequently rendered valid by law on the very spot by a notary, and contributed not a little to the establishment of fixed market prices for various classes of goods. Thus the Venetian merchants assembled on the Rialto, the Florentines in the arched hall (loggia) of the Mercato Nuovo, and the Catalonians in the Lonja of Barcelona. In foreign countries, as in Bruges, for example, the Italians usually met in the houses of their consuls. The word “bourse,” which has been introduced into almost every European language, was first employed in Bruges for the usual assemblies of merchants who met for commercial ends. In this chief terminus of the traffic between northern and southern Europe there was a house owned by the Van der Burse family, in which the Venetians had been accustomed to hold their meetings ever since the fifteenth century. The house was called “de burse” for short, and thus the name of the Flemish family finally came to signify a place where such mercantile assemblies were held. The term “bourse” was already fixed in most European languages when a great edifice with halls and columns surrounding an open square in which business was transacted, was erected in Antwerp. In England only was another term employed, and the bourse, constructed in 1570 at the instigation of Sir Thomas Gresham, took the name of “The Royal Exchange.”

Yet in spite of the existence of permanent markets and the development of the bourse system in connection with them, fairs recurring at regular intervals, with a fluctuating population of traders, continued to maintain their importance; indeed for a long time they excelled the permanent markets even in dealings in money and credit after the manner of the bourses. Very few firms could afford to keep agents or factors constantly on hand at the great staple places; the majority of merchants still journeyed in person to the fairs, where the conditions of trade were familiar to them, and where all business was transacted within a certain limited space of time.

From the twelfth to the fourteenth century the bulk of the business carried on between the northern and southern commercial regions of Europe was transacted at the fairs of Champagne and Brie, at Troyes, Lagny, Bar-sur-Aube, and Provins. After the decline of the fairs at Champagne, Geneva became an important market for French, Italians, and Upper Germans. Louis XI endeavoured to entice traffic back to French soil, and granted many privileges to the four fairs of Lyons, at the same time forbidding his subjects to visit Geneva. The French kings made Lyons the centre of their negotiations for loans and the recruiting-place for their armies when the policy of imperialism that arose during the sixteenth century was no longer to be satisfied by the earlier methods of conducting financial affairs. The succession of loans to the French crown continued its course from 1522 until the fateful year 1557, when Henry II, contemporaneously with his opponent, Philip II, suspended all payment of debts. Lyons completely lost its position during the
disturbances that followed the outbreak of the Huguenot wars; nor did it rise again to importance until 1650, and then not as a scene of international finance, but as one of the nationalised centres of French industrial and commercial life.

As the French monarchs had from obvious motives barred the money market of Lyons to their Hapsburg opponents, it was necessary for the Spanish government to seek out other places in which to transact its financial business. Spain itself possessed several towns holding regular fairs, which had arisen in order to supply the needs of domestic traffic in goods; and these cities gained importance also for affairs of finance and exchange, the more the Spanish court and Spanish consumers were compelled to turn to foreign lands for their requirements. The end of each fair at Medina del Campo, Villalon, and Medina de Rioseco marked the arrival of the term at which the foreign creditors of Spain put in their claims and, as far as possible, balanced their accounts.

In order to injure the fairs of Lyons, Charles V opened an opposition market at Besançon in Burgundy, attended by Genoese and Upper Germans, who as subjects of the emperor did not possess full commercial freedom in Lyons. However, the Genoese, dealing in money alone, not in merchandise, soon discovered localities more convenient for their purposes. The so-called Genoese fairs were not held in Genoa, but at first in small towns north of the Alps, in Poligny and Chambéry, then further to the south, in Rivoli, Ivrea, and Asti, from 1579 in Piacenza and from 1621 in Novi. At this time the financial domination of the Genoese was beginning to totter, that of the Upper Germans having already fallen; and with the bankruptcy of the Spanish government in 1627 the last support of the international capitalism of the sixteenth century gave way.

But it was in the North that commercial activity most prevailed. The great fairs and cloth markets grew apace. Even after Antwerp had become a permanent staple town with a bourse in which financial affairs were transacted, the old fairs still retained their importance by marking the time for the recovery of debts and the balancing of accounts. As in Bruges and Lyons, the native-born citizens were not the great merchants and capitalists; the commercial significance of the city depended upon the foreigners, among whom Upper Germans and Italians were the most distinguished. They controlled both the mercantile trade and the traffic in loans, therefore such governments as were in need of money, the municipality of Brussels, the kings of Spain, Portugal, and England, had their permanent agents in Antwerp. About the middle of the sixteenth century business was transacted to the average amount of forty million ducats a year. When Antwerp was practically destroyed as a commercial centre by the wars and disturbances of 1568-1585, several heirs obtained shares in the heritage of the ruined city. The bulk of the world’s commerce fell to Amsterdam; but the business of Frankfort on the Main also increased to such an extent that this city became not only the first market and exchange of Germany, but an international centre of commerce, a position that it retained until late in the seventeenth century.

(f) The Overthrow of International Capitalism and the Downfall of Spain.
— The rise of Antwerp marked the beginning of a new period in the economic history of the world. In the sixteenth century Spain had endeavoured to establish a universal monarchy extending over two hemispheres. But neither the extent nor the wealth in precious metals of the newly discovered lands was sufficient to ensure
the continuance of such a political structure in face of the attacks of its enemies. The imperialistic policy of Spain being closely bound up with the financial powers of the age, these, too, were ruined. Spain absorbed the capital of Europe without attaining her end. The great capitalists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, whose fortunes had been made during the period of Mediterranean commercial prosperity following the Crusades, turned from trade to politics and adopted the imperial policy of the period, which afterward proved so destructive to them. As states became bankrupt the international capitalists also were ruined. Thus ended the first section of the history of international capitalism at the close of the sixteenth century.

The failure of the efforts of Spain to obtain universal power, and the destruction of international capitalism brought about by her attempt to accomplish the impossible, may be described at this point, although the Spaniards did not renounce their policy of imperialism until many years later; indeed, even in the eighteenth century they still possessed a greater colonial territory than any other European nation. The history of the fall of the Spanish Empire has often been told, and the causes that led to it have been enumerated many times. However, it has usually been looked at from the standpoint of political and economic liberalism, as offering a welcome illustration in proof of the correctness of liberal teachings and the perniciousness of all other doctrines. It has been a trump card played by the supporters of the conception of history based on the principles of the freedom of trade. It has been said with fanatical self-confidence that Spain would have remained great had she encouraged liberty in religion and politics and granted freedom for the play of economic forces; but the fact that the nations which outstripped Spain at the end of the sixteenth century not only accepted but built up their power on the very same religious, political, and economic principles, and came to no special harm through them, is completely ignored. Thus modern theorists have not succeeded in proving that religious intolerance, absolutism, and a national economic policy of hostility to foreigners and exclusiveness were the causes of the decline of Spanish influence, for Spain's Protestant and Catholic rivals were without exception no less intolerant than she. All states, whether monarchies or republics, were striving, then as now, for increase and unification of governmental power; and nationalisation of economic life and freedom from foreign economic dominion — whether the yoke of a single race or the burden of international capital — were the ends set before them by all nations and peoples. Generally, too, like the Spaniards, they had an eye to the subjection of other races.

In contradiction to the liberal argument it should be emphasised that it was not an excess of political or economic absolutism which first deprived Spain of her character as a universal Power, and, later, of her importance as a nation, but that the cause of decay lay in the failure of all attempts to unify the isolated, widely separated parts of the empire. The centralising policy of Philip II and Count Olivarez, the prime minister of Philip IV, was wholly unsuccessful. And the reason why Spain could not keep pace with England, with France, or even with the half-ruined Netherlands, lay in the fact that all these nations possessed a firmer central power, or, at least their unity was the result of a stronger cohesive force. Spain was not sufficiently centralised, and except in Castile the power of the Spanish government, far from being absolute, had always been limited by the estates of the realm.
When it is maintained further that the colonial system of Spain also was a cause of the fall of the empire, one can reply not only that the chief commercial Powers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries adopted practically the same system of limiting and restricting traffic without falling into any economic decline, but that the Spanish monarchy succeeded in deriving an actual increase of power from the New World only so long as it did not depart from the principle of exclusion. After emigrants from other European nations had gained a foothold in the West Indies and in North and South America, and had managed to maintain their position in spite of Spain, the prosperity of the Spanish colonial empire decreased, and with it the power of the monarchy. The incoming of Hollanders and Englishmen into the Portuguese East Indies was attended by the same effects to Portugal, and even if she had not been united to Spain (1580) she would hardly have been able to shake off the intruders.

Thus the causes of the fall of the Spanish Empire must be looked for in other directions, or at least be apprehended in a manner different from that of the advocates of the free-trade conception of history. The monarchy was too weak in itself, and too incapable of development for Spain successfully to pursue her imperialistic policy of the sixteenth century; to protect Christianity against Mohammedanism, especially the Mediterranean countries and commerce from the Turks; to defend the Italian and Burgundian lands against the French; to oppose Protestantism and the spirit of independence in the Netherlands; to make use of England, support the German Hapsburgs, and at the same time maintain dominion of the sea, and the exclusiveness of trade in both hemispheres to which the right was based on the papal division of the earth. The economic foundations of Spain were too slight for the support of such a tremendous task. In spite of the treasures of both East and West Indies, and notwithstanding the unscrupulous dealings with capitalists, the national exchequer never once recovered its balance after the time of Charles V; and inasmuch as domestic as well as foreign State creditors were affected by the financial measures of the time of crisis, the nation only became the poorer, the more so as it was constantly being drained of its resources by a pitiless system of taxation. As a rule, the foreigners managed to get paid at the expense of the domestic population, and, in their position of national creditors and promoters, took away with them American silver as well as the products of home labour in the shape of interest on capital and profits.

Unfortunately the financial system harmonised with the national spirit, and was not unpopular. The Spaniards, who had gradually expanded over the peninsula as conquerors and as possessors of flocks and herds, despised industrial activity, and the unchivalrous virtue of thrift. Commerce and manufactures indeed existed in the towns, but the native population looked upon mercantile pursuits with aversion, as better adapted to the talents of Jews and Moors. Since during the course of the sixteenth century domestic industry declined, and commerce fell into the hands of foreigners, the nation was thrown back upon its natural resources. But agriculture suffered from the accumulation of property in the hands of large landowners and from the increase of sheep-farming, with the inevitable result that here, as in contemporary England, cultivated ground was turned into pasture, and the population, deprived of its sources of subsistence, rapidly decreased (see Vol. IV. 543). No nation that stood upon such slender economic supports could sustain for any length of time the imperialistic policy of a Charles V or Philip II,
especially in view of the individual weakness of the various divisions of the monarchy. Thus Spain was soon outgrown by such of the European Powers as had either possessed from the beginning a broader natural foundation for their economic development, or had created through their own industry instruments of wealth which nature had denied them.

5. THE AGE OF THE MERCANTILE SYSTEM

At the end of the sixteenth century, a hundred years after the time of Columbus, Díaz, and Vasco da Gama, the two hemispheres, which had been granted to Spaniards and Portuguese by the Pope, were united under one sceptre. The development of the Iberian race, however, had been at a standstill for two generations. The Spaniards had reached the limit of their requirements for growth at the point where further possession of territory seemed no longer desirable and colonisation no longer profitable enough for them in the tierras di ningun provecho (worthless regions), —worthless according to the notoriously false notion of political economy of the times, because they abounded neither in gold nor in silver nor in precious stones, and possessed no large population adapted for use as slaves. Portugal, dynastically united with Spain since 1580, had reached the limit of her capacity for development years before,—the fatal limit where profits cease and the preservation of possessions already gained devours the entire income derived from them. Further progress was impossible; moreover, it was scarcely desired; and yet the rights of monopoly in the ownership of the earth still remained uncontested. No rival had as yet seriously disturbed the Spaniards in their sole possession of the New World, or the Portuguese in their exclusive commercial proprietorship of the East Indies.

A. THE INCREASE IN THE REQUIREMENTS OF EUROPEAN NATIONS AND IN THE WORLD'S COMMERCE

When the sixteenth century came to an end, no European nation, with the exception of the Spaniards and Portuguese, owned one square foot of territory on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. There had been no lack of attempts to found settlements in regions of the New World not occupied by Spain, nor had inducements such as the fisheries, the fur trade, and the quest of a northeast passage been wanting (Vol. I, 589). Nevertheless all endeavours of the English and French to set firm foot on the continents of America had down to the end of the sixteenth century been miserable failures. Wars, want of the necessities of life, and lack of a marketable return freight for ships bound east had destroyed both colonies and colonists. It was far more enticing to turn corsair, privateer, or smuggler than to die of starvation in a squalid settlement or to be slain by Indians or angry Spaniards, who resented the intrusion of foreigners into what they considered their exclusive possessions. During the years of the English-Dutch war with Spain, from 1568 on, unlawful deeds of violence and robbery received a sort of national heroic consecration. The celebrity of Sir Walter Raleigh and Sir Francis Drake was chiefly due to their cleverness as privateers. From this time forth the traffic with America which set the Spanish monopoly at defiance became a principle of European commerce which had no scruples whatever as to right and
wrong, lawfulness or unlawfulness. Smuggling led to the occupation of the unappropriated Lesser Antilles by Englishmen, Hollanders, Frenchmen, and Danes, with whom the native pirates or filibusters readily associated themselves.

Before the attempts of non-Spaniards to settle in America were renewed, the ban that had apparently been laid upon the East Indies was already broken. Dutch ships cruised in the Indian Ocean, brought home cargoes of spices with them, and awoke in other nations the desire to emulate them.

But the growth of the western European sphere of expansion and the increase of transatlantic traffic were not due wholly or even chiefly to the participation of new commercial peoples or to the rise of permanent colonies. Foreign trade and the development of distant territories depended not only in the seventeenth but in every other century upon the necessities, demand, and consumption of the mother country or continent. The true inciting motive to increased traffic between peoples is not furnished by production alone, whether of raw materials or of manufactured articles, or of the portion of the completed products that falls to commerce; it is consumption, the direct expression of human requirements and desires. The consumer is master; the producer is his servant, and the middleman his go-between. The two latter may, it is true, often entice the former to increase his purchases, but on the other hand they must also await his pleasure. Had it not been for the fundamental changes that came about in manner of life and in custom during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the commerce of the world would not have overstretched its previous limits, it would never have increased its relatively small sphere of activity.

Since the very earliest times, from the days of journeys to the Ophir of the ancient Oriental peoples down to the opening of the seventeenth century, the world's commerce had been little more than traffic in a few spices and luxuries of southeastern Asia, articles for which there is so limited a market that they are scarcely taken into account at the present day, although the quantities dealt in are, if anything, greater now than ever before. Neither during the times of the Phoenicians, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Arabians, the Venetians, and the Genoese, nor later in the days of Portuguese supremacy, did the character of the commercial relations between the Old World civilised nations of the temperate zone and the lands of the tropics alter to any appreciable extent. Even the discovery of tropical and sub-tropical America did not at first bring about any decided change in the variety of articles handled in the world's trade; for the acquisition of the precious metals thrust every other form of commercial activity into the background. The cultivators of sugar-cane, however, soon began to furnish a commodity capable of attaining a largely increased consumption, and not subject to the artificial prices of monopoly, as was the case with spices. Sugar is the oldest of the various articles of luxury to which transatlantic trade was indebted for its development. The plantation system of cultivation, in later times adapted also to the raising of other products, and leading to negro slavery, from which in turn developed a new branch of monopoly, originated in the production of sugar-cane in Spanish America. But, as we have already stated, everything depended upon the demand, upon the adoption of an article by larger and larger circles of consumers.

At about the same time that the sugar-cane of the East Indies found a new home in the Western Hemisphere during the sixteenth century, and sugar first became an important article of commerce through its importation into Europe from
America, American tobacco, on the other hand, became diffused over the Old World, and proved itself to be a herb no less easily acclimatised than acceptable to mankind. In tobacco, an article for wholesale consumption and a commodity of the first importance to commerce was acquired, not to speak of the significance to finance attained in later days through government monopolies by this luxury, the use of which was at first so sternly discountenanced.

Like sugar and tobacco, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries cocoa, coffee, tea, indigo, and cotton became articles of wholesale consumption, and hence of the greatest importance to natural production and commerce. Now for the first time settlements and the acquisition of colonies became remunerative, and commerce between the Old World and the New assumed great proportions, for prior to this time no truly reciprocal traffic had been possible. Trade was completely transformed, owing to its marvellously rapid development. The reason for all this lay in the fact that consumption developed a tendency favourable to foreign products. Europeans, indeed the inhabitants of temperate regions in general, were persistent in their demands for luxuries from the tropics, and supported alien regions of production and alien merchants, however greatly it may have been to their own disadvantage from an economic point of view.

The money paid by consumers for stimulants containing alkaloids was not wasted, as the history of civilisation can testify. These so-called stimulants have in reality a quieting effect on the nerves; they support the nobler powers of intellectual life, and owing to their influence in counteracting the brutalising tendencies of alcoholism have contributed not a little to the civilisation of the European peoples. The age of narcotic antidotes, which is also that of enlightenment and humanity,—the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,—succeeded to the period (from the fifteenth to the seventeenth) of which the chief characteristics had been drunkenness and gluttony. Gentler manners and new currents of thought found their most active upholders in precisely the circles in which coffee, tea, chocolate, and sugar had to a great extent taken the place of alcohol.

B. THE COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY OF THE DUTCH

The first nation to flout the consecrated privileges of Spain and Portugal by venturing into their closed territories was the Dutch Republic. Holland had succeeded in freeing itself from the dominion of Philip II in 1579, and had now taken upon its own shoulders the entire burden of a war with the greatest Power of the age, the southern Netherlands having returned to Spanish rule. The Dutch had already been successful in defending their interests in the carrying trade of Europe against both the German Hansa and the merchants of England. Owing to the geographical situation of their country they had become the recognised middlemen of the traffic between North and South. Moreover, even after the outbreak of the war of independence in 1568, neither Spain nor Portugal excluded the Hollanders, but allowed them to make their purchases of foreign products both in Lisbon and Seville; for the King of Spain regarded the revolutionary party only, not the peaceful merchants of Holland, as his enemies. But when the seven northern provinces finally gained their independence, and allied themselves with Powers hostile to Spain, then Philip II put an end to all free
trade with the Spanish as well as the Portuguese ports, which were at that time subject to his dominion.

After the fall of Antwerp, Amsterdam was beyond doubt the most conveniently situated spice market of northern Europe. The question was, where was Amsterdam to obtain spices now that the ports of Spain were closed to her merchants? The provinces and towns of the new republic had become very independent of one another, owing to the absence of any strong bond of common economic interests; and thus attempts were made by other cities besides Amsterdam to procure on their own account, and directly from the regions of production, the various commodities which had been rendered unobtainable by the closing of the Spanish and Portuguese harbours. Private companies were formed in several towns for the purpose of importing merchandise direct from India; and by exchanging the spices, etc., thus obtained, for the products of northern Europe, the promoters hoped to supply the deficiency in commodities indispensable to the general traffic of the continent. The most important of the small companies established to carry on a direct trade with the East Indies was the “Compagnie van verre” (company of the distant lands), founded in 1594; and it was in the interests of this firm that the first Dutch voyage to Java, Bawean, and Bali was undertaken in 1595, under the command of Cornelis de Houtman. This company, like its rivals, scarcely differed from the ordinary shipping associations, which possess a historical importance from the fact that they were the precursors of stock companies. When the object for which such an association had been formed was attained, the cargoes were divided among the partners, who hoped more than to cover their expenses and make a profit from the sale of the goods. Through the influence of the great statesman, Johan van Olden Barneveldt, all the separate companies were incorporated into one in 1602; and a new type of mercantile association arose, which dominated and characterized the commercial life of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

The United East India Company was a joint-stock association with rights of monopoly. It obtained from the Dutch government the sole right of commerce with the East Indies in the very widest sense. Every Hollander was forbidden even to sail beyond the Cape of Good Hope, not to speak of carrying on trade, without permission of the company; on the other hand, it was open to every Hollander to become a shareholder and partaker in all the company’s rights and privileges by paying a subscription. The originally unequal shares into which the capital of 6,600,000 florins was divided could be transferred without restriction. Toward the end of the seventeenth century a nominal value of three thousand guldens per share was established for the convenience of traffic in the bourses. The affairs of the company, which was divided into provinces, were managed by a committee of seventeen members called directors.

There were many new features in the organisation of the Dutch East India Company, together with much that was old and characteristic of the constitutions of the guilds. Fundamentally new, however, was the endowment of the association with political rights of sovereignty exercised in the name and under the supervision of the States General of the Netherlands. All subsequent trading associations established after the model of the Dutch East India Company are distinguished as political commercial associations. Such companies had the power to declare war and to enter into negotiations and treaties; legislation, administration, and the
enforcement of justice was entrusted to them within their spheres of activity; and
the Dutch government exercised its rights of sovereignty only in form, so long as
the company was able to maintain itself without assistance and remained solvent.

The Dutch East India Company formed the basis of the colonial empire of Hol-
l and in southeastern Asia. The Portuguese were driven out of important points
(Ceylon, Malacca, the Moluccas) and unclaimed regions, that is to say, territories
inhabited by indigenous races only, such as Java, Sumatra, and Celebes, were occu-
pied. A dépôt in Java, which in 1619 received the name of Batavia, was the resi-
dence of the governor-general, who, when the Dutch colonies were at the zenith of
their prosperity in the middle of the seventeenth century, controlled as many as
seven provinces. The sphere of influence of the Hollandered extended as far as
China and Japan, although trade was exposed to many serious difficulties in the
farthest East. One of the company’s servants, Abel Jans Tasman, circumnavigat-
ged Australia, or New Holland, and discovered Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania)
and New Zealand (1642). But these events, however important from a geographi-
cal standpoint, had no immediate commercial result; for the barren coasts of
Australia failed to entice settlers, and its wealth in gold remained, like that of
California, undiscovered for over two hundred years.

The Hollandered carried on traffic in spices in the same manner as the Portu-
guese had done: their one desire was to obtain and to maintain the highest pos-
sible prices of monopoly. In spite of the fact that spices were sold at auction in
the Amsterdam market, and consequently were exposed to free competition, prices
were kept constant through regulation of the amounts of production. The cultiva-
tion of clove-trees was restricted to the island of Ambon, that of nutmegs to the
Banda group; superabundant harvests were reduced by the wholesale destruction
of all products in excess of the quantity required for exportation, which, as a
rule, equalled the average measure of consumption.

When in 1621 the twelve years’ truce with Spain, which had been so beneficial
to the welfare of the Netherlanders, expired, a second joint-stock association, also
furnished with rights of sovereignty, arose. This was the Dutch West India
Company. Just as the Pope had once divided the earth between Spain and Portu-
gal, so the Dutch government now apportioned it between the East and West
Indian Companies. The Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn formed the boundaries
of the hemispheres subjected to their monopolies. Although the Hollandered were
unable to lay claim to international recognition of their proceedings, and although
the orders given by the Dutch government to its subjects and commercial com-
panies had nothing whatever to do with the other Christian nations of Europe,
nevertheless the Dutch continued to act with the utmost unscrupulousness toward
former possessors of the lands occupied as well as later intruders.

During this same period the Dutch theorists,—the teachers of natural right,—
Grotius, Salmasius, Boxhorn, and Delacourt, were dogmatizing on the freedom, or
rather the openness, of the sea to all men (mare liberum), a conception quite in
accordance with the spirit of the time considering that the pretensions of the
Spaniards to monopoly were now completely overthrown. However, these patri-
otic philosophers made no mention at all of the fact that, although the seas had
become open, their countrymen were everywhere doing their utmost to close them
again to all competitors. Nevertheless the Dutch thinkers proved that theory—
for the most part unconsciously—declares that which is most advantageous for
one's own time or for one's own people, even for one's own party, to be the best. The theorists of the seventeenth century developed the same principles of free trade that were realised in England one hundred and fifty years later. It is remarkable that, without exception, the economically stronger nations have ever held forth to their weaker neighbours on the blessings of free trade, of unrestricted competition between States as well as individuals. Although since the end of the eighteenth century the free-trade theories of the British have conquered the world, and contributed not a little to the commercial triumph of England, the assertions of the Dutch jurists of the seventeenth century in regard to the same principles were almost wholly ignored, although the economic practice of the Dutch was a cause of violent reactions as time went on. The West India Company conducted itself even more offensively than did the East Indian; it was in reality a joint-stock association of pirates supported by the State, whose robberies found a counterpart only in the dealings of speculators in company shares at the Amsterdam bourse. However, Holland has the West India Company to thank for Surinam and some of the Lesser Antilles; other regions in America occupied by the company — New Netherlands and Brazil (see Vol. I, 443 f.) — were lost again during the seventeenth century. In like manner the little North Sea nation was unable to retain its west African possessions later than the end of the eighteenth century.

Since the shares in the two mercantile associations were the first effects to be handled in conformity with the regulations of a modern exchange, the Amsterdam Bourse has a legitimate claim to be considered the home of modern stock-jobbery. The building (see plate) was constructed in the year 1613, and from the very beginning was the scene of an unremittling struggle between "bulls" and "bears." The time transactions of modern days, the evil custom of buying on margins, that is to say, purchase and delivery of stock for which one has not paid, against which laws have been enacted without avail, the exchange tax (1689), exchange list, etc., were all either invented, or at least brought to a high state of development, at the Amsterdam Bourse. Inasmuch as the rise and fall of dividends paid by the India Companies depended upon events impossible to foresee, owing to the fact that they were taking place in all quarters of the globe, — the average dividend amounted to twenty-two per cent, — speculation had the character of a game of chance. The desire for gambling became a national vice, as was shown by the notorious tulip-swindle of the year 1630, a ridiculous parody of exchange transactions, carried on outside the bourse. Men speculated on the rise and fall in the prices of real and imaginary tulip bulbs, until finally the whole mad business, tulips and all, disappeared with a crash.

Until the end of the seventeenth century the Amsterdam Bourse was used for the purpose of contracting loans by the Dutch government, as well as by the executives of the provinces and cities of the Netherlands. Naturally the promissory notes and debenture bonds of public authorities were, in these times of war and disturbance, subject to great fluctuations. There was no longer an international loan market such as had once existed in Antwerp, now that the Italian and Upper German capitalists were bankrupts. Every State endeavoured, if possible, to make both ends meet with the aid of its own capitalists. But when Holland was forced out of the world market by the national economic policies of England and France, the capital thus set free accepted such opportunities for investment as were offered
by the great industries which were just beginning to develop. In spite of all, however, capital became heaped up in the land, that not only had sufficient for all its needs, but was still grasping for more. Wealthy men showed less and less desire to take part in laborious or dangerous undertakings, and preferred simply to put their money out at interest. Thus it happened that after the beginning of the eighteenth century impoverished sovereigns who were unable to obtain loans at home sought out Holland as a place for borrowing money. Amsterdam became the scene of international money transactions, and the Amsterdam Bourse the international stock market, whose rates of exchange were the standard followed by all the other European stock exchanges of the eighteenth century.

Once more, after a long period of comparative inaction, an element which has been of like importance to the history of the world and to the history of economics made its appearance, and although it was adapted but ill to its more or less hostile environment, nevertheless persevered, looking forward to a better future. Driven forth from all lands, and persecuted ever since the time of the Crusades, the Jews, even when tolerated for the good of the treasury, had no share in either the local or the international commercial affairs of northern and southern Europe. From the twelfth to the seventeenth century they had managed to maintain a precarious existence as money-dealers and usurers on the very smallest scale. After the conquest of Granada, in 1492, they were expelled from Spain together with the Moors, although a few who had been converted to Christianity were permitted to remain in the country, receiving the name of Maranos. But like the converted Moors, or Moriscoes, they had the reputation of being merely nominally Christian, and in 1609–1611 they were finally turned out of Spain and Portugal neck and crop, as conspirators and rebels. A number of them found a place of refuge in the Netherlands, the Dutch welcoming their arrival as an opportunity for a demonstration of hostility to Spain. A Jewish quarter grew up in Amsterdam, and no hindrances were placed in the way of Jews who wished to share in the commercial life of the city. In a short time daughter communities, like the one at Hamburg, for example, developed from the main colony at Amsterdam. Dutch-Portuguese Jews emigrated to England when the kingdom, closed to them since the time of Edward III, was once more thrown open by Cromwell, in 1657. Amsterdam was the door through which the Jews again found entrance to European civilization. Scattered as they were over all parts of the world, the Jews were the connecting link of what was to be a new development of international capitalism.

For all that the business in money and credit and the non-European commerce of Holland was so extensive, she owed her wealth chiefly to her trade in merchandise with the rest of the Continent. During the seventeenth century the Dutch were the maritime carriers and middlemen of Europe; three-fourths of the mercantile marine of the world belonged to them. The power of the Hanse was gone; the Thirty Years' War had effectually crippled Germany; England was experiencing the greatest crisis of her constitutional existence; France was still prevented from perceiving or attending to her economic interests owing to various political complications; in short, general conditions were now as favourable to the Netherlands, though still feeble in themselves, as they had been in former days to the Hanse. Thus the Dutch were enabled to control maritime trade until finally the tendency of the world's history became unfavourable to them, and the Great Powers vindicated their natural rights of superiority. In the meanwhile, however,
Dutch merchants and ship-owners dominated the commerce of the Baltic, and consequently the grain trade of Europe. "Amsterdam obtained possession of the great surplus quantities of grain grown in the Baltic countries, and thus supplied not only Holland but also western and southern Europe. According to a document of the year 1603, a stock of four million bushels, that is to say, wheat enough to supply eight hundred thousand people for a year, was kept constantly on hand." — G. Schmoller. By closing the mouths of the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Hollanders destroyed the trade of the Spanish Netherlands as well as that of western Germany. The latter region, indeed, became economically subject to them as far south as the Black Forest, and they were already masters of eastern Germany beyond Hamburg and Danzig. They had long been superior to all competitors in Scandinavia and on the northern seas, whether as merchants or as fishermen, their connections extending as far as the coasts of the White Sea. Dutch navigators even cruised about the Arctic Ocean, striving to solve the mysteries of a northeast passage. Southern Europe also had fallen into the net of their all-embracing commerce; they dominated the Mediterranean, and after the conclusion of peace of 1648 appeared once more in the harbours of Portugal and Spain.

How great a burden the Dutch had been to England and France was shown by the violent reaction that arose against them in both nations during the latter half of the seventeenth century. In 1651 the Navigation Acts of Cromwell were passed by the British Parliament. A severe struggle now began for the freedom of English maritime trade and for supremacy in the world's commerce, a struggle in which the weaker nation finally submitted to the stronger, and sought by means of an alliance at a propitious moment with its former opponent to save what it could.

C. THE ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT OF ENGLAND DURING THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

(a) The Independent Economic Policy of the Tudors. — In the eleventh century England had fallen under the political and economic dominion of foreigners. While the permanent foreign and native elements were gradually becoming reconciled to one another, the commercial dominion of strangers, in spite of its nomadic character, became still deeper rooted in the land. Although England yielded an abundance of natural products, there were no developed industries and no maritime traffic or shipping capable of competing with other countries, not to speak of any independent foreign trade. Nevertheless the central government, in spite of all feudal limitations, was powerful enough to maintain a firm and consistent national policy. The kings sought to relieve the economic difficulties of their subjects, and this at a time when throughout Europe economic policy lay almost exclusively in the hands of municipal authorities, or, at the most, under the control of more or less powerful provincial rulers. The struggle of England to free itself from the economic yoke of foreigners began with the establishment of companies, such as the Staple Guild and the Association of Merchant Adventurers.

The accession of the Tudors in 1485 was followed by a change in economic conditions that led to far-reaching results. This was the substitution of "en-
closure" for the "open-field" system of agriculture. The landed proprietors of England no less than of the Continent opposed the old order of economic life, for the reason that it stood in the way of various new and profitable means of making money. When a large amount of farming land was turned into pasture for the sake of sheep-farming, the large wool producers found that their interests were injured by the small properties of peasants scattered over their estates, and that the presence of the village community with its commons was a great hindrance to their plans for pasturage or for the alternate use of the land as meadow and ploughed field. Hence the large land-owners divided their property into enclosed fields without the slightest regard for the ground belonging to the peasant proprietors, unceremoniously taking possession of all land within their hedges, whether it belonged to them or not, either buying it up or alienating it from its true owners with the assistance of various accommodating sheriffs and magistrates. Thus numerous freeholders and tenants were deprived of their land, and of these but a small proportion were able to lease new ground suitable for farming. As a result the country swarmed with paupers and unemployed. Organised relief of the poor was unknown until the reign of Henry VIII, and even then the legislation adopted was quite inadequate. It became a question of vital importance to the nation, either to promote or to create new forms of industry with a view to the relief of temporary want as well as the employment of a future increased population.

One way to this object was discovered by the economists of England in the time of Elizabeth (1558–1603). Among the first measures passed by the Elizabethan government was the currency reform of 1560, which had become necessary owing to the debasement of the coinage brought about during the reign of Henry VIII. The English government was in the fortunate position of never having granted the right to coin money to subordinate powers, as had happened elsewhere in feudal Europe; while, therefore, one sovereign might cause a temporary derangement of the currency, another was able to reduce it to order, for the good of the whole country, which by this time was taking an intelligent interest in the most important economic questions. The measures passed by the government for general economic betterment were approved by the nation, the advantage of State control in economic matters having been exemplified in the case of the currency.

It is true that the English government was unable to look to the public for co-operation in regard to foreign affairs — however much the national intelligence had developed during the early Elizabethan period — until the country was threatened by a foreign invasion. Before a state of complete understanding between government and people had been reached in 1588, at the time of the Spanish Armada, the crown, anxious to avoid any extraordinary taxation, had been obliged to contract loans of very doubtful advantage. At first the Tudors borrowed money in Antwerp, where the celebrated Sir Thomas Gresham (1519–1579) occupied the position of financial agent of the English government. But as early as 1569, after the Duke of Alva had arrived in the Netherlands, and Antwerp had begun to decline, the financial requirements of the English crown were supplied by domestic capital. The government of England had, indeed, freed itself from the dominion of international money-lenders, and had thereby advanced several steps in economic development; but it was necessary at first to resort to forced loans, for at that time the government would not depend on voluntary offers of
surplus capital. The attainment of national independence in all things pertaining to money and credit found expression in the erection of the Royal Exchange by Sir Thomas Gresham in 1566, at his own expense. The queen had already recognised the services of this public-spirited financier by conferring knighthood upon him in 1559; indeed, it had long been the fashion for continental governments to confer patents of nobility on the various German and Italian merchant princes who had been of especial service to them as money-lenders.

The imperialist policy of the Tudors was expensive, like that of the Hapsburgs and Valois. In all lands sovereigns were discovering that their incomes were no longer sufficient to meet their expenses, so much easier had it become to contract debts; and debts required settlement or, at least, interest had to be paid on them. The inhabitants of all the nations of Europe resisted the increasing demands of the governments; and as a result of undeveloped, badly managed systems of assessment and collection, so much money was lost to the national treasuries, that what finally found its way into the coffers of the State amounted to very little indeed. However, necessity led to the invention of various expedients for raising money, which were not only independent of the concessions of parliaments and popular assemblies, but yielded far greater amounts than had any previous source of income. This tendency in the financial policy of the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries is usually known by the name of Regalism, the doctrine of royal prerogative.

The German princes had assumed long before, as heirs of the old Roman Empire, exclusive possession of all the useful prerogatives of royalty, such as the right to coin money, to dig for precious metals, to collect taxes, and to dispense justice; but as time passed these rights were gradually transferred to lesser powers, both temporal and ecclesiastical, and to towns and corporations. The income of a sovereign was limited to the yield of the crown possessions; and had he lost these also, he was powerless, as poor as the German emperors who followed the Hohenstaufens. Minor princes and cities now took upon themselves the duties of government, and in their restricted spheres exercised the same rights of administration as had once been executed by the sovereign himself over his entire domain; but with this step the feebleness of the disunited towns and lesser rulers increased, as was especially obvious when looked at from the point of view of entanglements with foreign powers. Since the incomes derived by princes from the crown lands proved insufficient, they resorted to taxation; but this only resulted in making parliaments and assemblies more and more disinclined to grant the demands of sovereigns. Consequently the latter unearthed their ancient and inalienable royal prerogatives to relieve them of financial embarrassments. The acceptance of Roman law during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries greatly furthered the designs of the rulers. Especially in western Europe regalism was soon in full sway, and was pursued without the slightest regard either to existing rights or to the welfare of subjects. Princes of the small States of Germany and Italy followed the example of the sovereigns of great kingdoms, if not with the same favourable results to their own ends, at least with the same thoroughness and rigour.

Regalism attained to the zenith of its development in England and France. In addition to dues and perquisites, fines and confiscations (the seizure of all monastic property by Henry VIII), and the control of the currency by preceding sovereigns,
Elizabeth declared that the right of carrying on commerce was also a privilege of the crown. Each monopoly was transferred to an individual or to a company on receipt of payment; consequently the favouritism which was, as a rule, so intimately connected with this procedure frequently conflicted with the interests not only of the people but of the crown finances themselves. According to Roscher, the following commodities were included in the crown monopoly of domestic trade: Currants, salt, iron, gunpowder, playing-cards, cowhide, furs, sail-cloth, potash, vinegar, whale-oil, coal, steel, brandy, brushes, bottles, pots, saltpetre, lead, oil, mirrors, paper, starch, tin, sulphur, cloth, sardines, beer, cannons, horn, leather, Spanish wool, and Irish yarn. However, this system of conducting inland commerce was from the beginning so imperfect and faulty that it soon disappeared, leaving no trace behind.

On the other hand, a crown monopoly of foreign trade was much easier to enforce and to maintain, owing to the fact that previous systems could be brought into connection with it. Several guild-like corporations, called “regulated companies,” and formed after the model of the Merchant Adventurers, were instituted with the assistance of the government, which was, of course, well paid for its good offices. The names of these corporations alone are sufficient to convey a vivid idea of the extent of British commerce at the end of the sixteenth century, although it is true that they were not equally prosperous. There was a Russian or Muscovite Company, founded in 1554; a Baltic Company (1579); a Turkish Company (1581); a Morocco or Barbary Company (1585); and a Guinea trade monopoly. In addition to these, the merchants of Exeter and Bristol organised themselves into guilds, having constitutions similar to that of the Mercers’ Company of London. Finally, in 1600 the East India Company, the first joint-stock association to be formed in England, was founded.

We have already described how the English policy during the time of Elizabeth overcame the German Hansa, one of the most powerful enemies of national trade. England had also succeeded in getting the upper hand of the Italians, as was shown by the suspension of the voyages of the Venetians and Genoese. Consequently there remained but one rival in the field, — Holland, the greatest of all; but so long as the Dutch were indispensable to the English as allies in the war against Spain and Portugal, the chief sea-powers of the time, a conflict was not desirable. That England was, however, already prepared to take up arms against the Netherlands may be seen from the events which occurred in 1564, before the uprising of the Dutch against Spain. England and Holland then fought one another with trade embargoes, and England finally removed her cloth staple from Antwerp. During the further course of events England sought to ally herself with Holland (as happened in reality one hundred years later, at the time of William III). The result of this was the war between Spain and England, which culminated in the destruction of the Invincible Armada in 1588. If we were to believe the eloquent rhetorical flourishes with which sectarian and partisan historians delight to adorn their narratives, we could only conclude that with the defeat of 1588 Spanish maritime power was annihilated forever. As a matter of fact, the war between England and Spain continued until after the death of Elizabeth, in 1603, with varying success, and the English had still a long while to fight before achieving a complete victory over their maritime rival.

Shortly after the accession of James I, who, as a Stuart, was friendly to Spain,
peace was concluded with Philip III at London (1604). The Spaniards granted the inhabitants of the now United Kingdom freedom of trade with all their possessions excepting the East and West Indies. However, it was not long before the English found a way of escaping the latter difficulty. The question was, should England permit the Hollanders, who had already extended their trade to the Far East as well as to America, alone to retain possession of the field? Fortunately the treaty of 1604 itself furnished a pretext for intrusion into Spanish and Portuguese domains, inasmuch as according to its terms the English were permitted to seek out and, under certain conditions, take possession of any West or East Indian territory not yet occupied by Spain or Portugal. Thus international law and national interests were — at least in one case — brought into complete harmony with one another.

In spite of the expansion of England’s maritime trade, and notwithstanding the wars into which the nation had been plunged in order to secure freedom from the economic dominion of strangers, the industrial activity of the English — so far as foreign markets were concerned — was, even during the time of the Tudors, restricted to the manufacture of wool products. Not until the first migration of Flemish weavers to England during the reign of Edward III did the manufacture of wool attain to a state of development sufficient to warrant the exportation of cloth. By the middle of the sixteenth century it became necessary to forbid the exportation of sheep and wool, in order that the domestic spinning and weaving industries might not suffer for lack of raw material. Soon afterward the second great immigration of Flemish weavers took place. The fugitives, driven from the Netherlands by the decrees against heretics issued by Charles V and Philip II, were cordially welcomed by the British government, to the great disgust of the domestic industrial classes. From this time forth the wool industry of the Netherlands possessed no special feature that could not easily be duplicated on the other side of the Channel.

During the reign of Elizabeth, the important transformation in industrial conditions that had already taken place a century before on the Continent in several branches of manufacture, began to affect the English wool trade. From its very nature the wool industry could not well be carried on as a handicraft, inasmuch as the same material passed through many hands (spinners, weavers, fullers, dyers) before the cloth was complete and ready for use. Nor did the finished product reach the consumer until it had been exposed for sale in the shops of wholesale and retail dealers. No single establishment was able to fulfil all these conditions. Dealers who owned capital, and even the sheep farmers, found it an easy matter to obtain control of the craftsmen through advances of raw material and wages; and thus the cloth industry soon took the form of a capitalised system of manufacture. Weavers, fullers, and dyers no longer laboured directly for their customers, but for a capitalist, who was the connecting link between the different classes of producers, and at the same time supplied the markets with the finished product. The wool trade did not at once become a great industry, such as is pursued in factories, but continued to be carried on in the homes of the weavers and in small workshops; for the government protected house labour and prevented the introduction of factory industry — at least so far as the manufacture of wool was concerned — until late in the eighteenth century.

The control of commerce and industry which in other countries had gradually
been won from the central governments by independent cities, companies, and territories was in England at the time of the Tudors an undisputed prerogative of the crown. The passing of the celebrated Apprentices Act in 1562 had the effect of determining the organisation of English industry for centuries. This act was a law dealing with the most important of social questions, — the time of apprenticeship (seven years), and matters concerning journeymen, contracts, time, and reward of labour. The municipal authorities were entrusted with its execution in towns, and in the country, the magistrates. The act of Elizabeth remained in force until 1814, although it had long ceased to be observed in many particulars, since new forms of industry and new branches of commerce had sprung up to which it did not apply.

(b) The Struggle between England and Holland. — Although the Tudors had many times been permitted to take the law into their own hands, and without opposition, because their policy was in harmony with the wishes of the British nation, this was not the case with the Stuarts (1603–1688), against whom an active resistance that passed all previously known limits developed in both people and Parliament. Their friendly relations with Spain were not popular, although it would have been advantageous for England to ally herself with this nation against Holland, her more dangerous rival; moreover, such an alliance could not have been otherwise than favourable to the importation of English products into the Pyrenean peninsula and South America. Thus, when the earlier Stuarts desired to collect the money necessary for carrying out their foreign policy, they found neither Parliament nor people disposed to give them any assistance; and since they endeavoured to win their point by invoking the aid of absolutism and divine right, the consequence was that the opposition of the nation increased. Parliament claimed the right of distribution of monopolies in 1623, withdrawing it from the crown, and fought the system of enforced loans (Petition of Rights, 1628). When it granted the taxes on tonnage and poundage to the king, not for life, as to his predecessors, but for a term of one year only, Charles I endeavoured to govern without a Parliament, and to collect taxes without further authorisation than his own will. Still, the English people were not moved to action by economic motives alone; the question of religion, without doubt, predominated, and, according to popular opinion, political interests in the stricter sense of the term were of greater importance than economic affairs.

But just as the material desires of men are expressions of an invincible natural force that mocks all attempts at repression, so also in the lives of nations affairs relating to material welfare invariably press their claims whenever there is a pause in the constant struggle in the spiritual world. The war with the Netherlands for the independence of English foreign trade and for the dominion of the sea was postponed for many years; but as soon as a clear view could once more be had of English affairs as a whole, during the days of the protectorate, the nation did not hesitate one moment to make up for the neglect of a century. Tyranny (for Oliver Cromwell's protectorate deserves this name) has always endeavoured to allay the emotions of a people roused by revolutionary changes, especially in economic matters. In fact, this has been the practice of usurpers in general. In addition, Cromwell acted entirely in accordance with the spirit of his time, when all healthy nations were striving for economic independence, and none were able
to perceive that their welfare could be attained otherwise than at the cost of their rivals. However, Cromwell's personal reasons for a war with Holland were his hatred of the House of Orange, and a desire to punish the Netherlands for having offered a refuge to Prince Charles (afterward Charles II) on his escape from England.

From these causes sprang the Navigation Act of 1651, the economic declaration of independence of the British people. Already under the Tudors, indeed, at the time of the Plantagenets, English merchant vessels had been protected by means of discriminating taxes, coasting ships in special having been favoured by various reservations. In the act of 1651 all the old regulations were renewed and supplemented. From that time no importation of extra-European goods to England was allowed except under the British flag. Commodities of European origin could be sent to England in British ships only, or in vessels belonging to the nation in which their cargoes were produced. It was also determined that voyages should be direct, from port to port, without any stop being made at the Dutch intermediate stations. The coasting trade was reserved to the national flag, and for the improvement of the home fishing industry the importation of salted fish was forbidden. Directions as to the manning of English merchant vessels proved that Cromwell looked upon the merchant marine as the training school for the navy.

Although, owing to the relative weakness of the English mercantile marine, it was long before the Navigation Act had the favourable economic results anticipated, its immediate political effect was a naval war with Holland (1652–1654), in which the English navy under Robert Blake showed itself to be in no wise inferior to the fleets of Holland manned by crews of far greater experience in battle. The great territorial expansion of the Dutch made it possible to deal more serious blows at them, and during the year 1653 the English captured over one thousand Dutch vessels in various parts of the world. According to the terms of the peace of 1654, made on party grounds by the anti-Orange oligarchy under the leadership of the brothers De Witt, Holland agreed to recognise the Navigation Act as well as the supremacy of the British flag in English waters.

But the victory of the English under Cromwell over their ancient enemies, the Spaniards, was of far greater value to the Englishman of the day than the successes won against the Dutch, not because the colonial power of Spain was a hindrance to British expansion, but for the reason that the Spaniards represented Catholicism. We can well imagine the delight of the Protestant Ironsides when they heard how Blake appeared in the Mediterranean, and, after compelling the Pope to pay damages for having supported the Stuarts, chastised the Barbary States and sunk the Spanish "silver fleet." The result of the war was the acquisition of Jamaica and the Belgian port of Dunkirk. The latter might have been a foothold for English power on the Continent, like Calais in former days (1347–1558), but Charles II sold the city to Louis XIV in 1662, because it was too heavy a charge upon his budget.

That the monarchy of the Restoration had no intention of adopting a commercial-political policy other than that introduced by the Commonwealth, was shown by the renewal of Cromwell's Navigation Act in 1660 and 1664,—so to speak, a second and a third enlarged and improved edition of the original act. Great Britain had already given birth to a number of daughter-lands in North
America, whose inhabitants crossed the ocean for the sake of freedom of worship and political independence, and thus were not adventurers and seekers after gold, as were the colonists of Virginia. The iron will of the agrarian colonists of the seventeenth century succeeded in overcoming the difficulties that had been death to their predecessors. In New England the long-wished-for region of distribution and consumption was acquired, a region which the English sought straightway to close to the competition of foreign merchants. Each time the Navigation Act was renewed, clauses were inserted according to which the products of British colonies could be sent to English ports alone, even when intended for another land, and European goods could be exported to the colonies only on British ships, and direct from England and Wales. In spite of objections raised by some of the colonists, this system of restriction remained in force. It was excellent enough for its day, conducive to national trade, and decidedly injurious to the commerce of Holland.

The second naval war with Holland broke out in 1664 as a result of a dispute with the Dutch West India Company. During the course of the hostilities, New Amsterdam — the New York of to-day — and Cape Coast Castle in Guinea were captured by the British. The first guineas were minted at this time of gold brought on the vessels of an English company from the Guinea coast. As the war, after lasting for several years, had resulted in great damage to English commerce, — at this time quite as extensive as that of the Dutch, — peace negotiations were begun at Breda, the progress of which was considerably hastened by the sudden appearance of a Dutch fleet in the Thames in 1667. The peace of Breda granted permanent possession of New Netherlands to the English, who were now masters of the entire Atlantic coast of North America from Acadia to Florida. Considerable light is thrown upon the dependence of German commerce at this time by the fact that, although contrary to the provisions of the Navigation Act, the Dutch were allowed to carry German goods to England in their own vessels.

A third naval war with the Dutch followed (1672–1674), when England, in alliance with France, supported Louis XIV in his attempt to annihilate Holland. Although England gained no new territory by the Treaty of Westminster, it nevertheless prevented Holland from carrying out her intention of forming an alliance with Spain, when the two former mistresses of the sea saw that their interests were equally prejudiced by the rapid development of English maritime power. The troubles with Holland finally ceased when the House of Orange once more stood at the head of the State in 1672, and renewed their dynastic connection with the Stuarts. The result was an adjustment of the interests of the two nations. Holland, satiated with wealth, desired rest and peace, and after having established a permanent alliance with England contented herself with opposing the encroachments of the French, who had now become dangerously powerful in Europe as well as in the colonies.

The wars between England and the Netherlands were but a prelude to the tremendous struggle with France between the years 1688 and 1815. The new Hundred Years' War, that lasted with but few intermissions from Louis XIV's third war of conquest until the Congress of Vienna, was, looked at from the point of view of to-day, the final and decisive contest for the dominion of the world's commerce. Spaniards, Portuguese, Hollander, French, and English — all had striven for it in vain, and with insufficient powers. What was this monopoly of the world's commerce but a phantom that beckoned to each nation in turn, only to vanish into
air; The unconquerable impulse for independence and action displayed by the nations of western Europe, that had been crowded together at an early day by the migrations of peoples, would no more permit the establishment of a commercial than a political world monarchy; and since the very same qualities were developing in the daughter nations in the New World, their dependence on the mother countries became constantly less likely to continue. Yet the pursuit of this phantom of exclusive commercial dominion caused European civilisation to develop more rapidly and to expand over wider regions than any sober estimate of possibilities would have anticipated. Private economic and fiscal endeavours found firm support in the governments and in the colonial policy of nations, for the living representatives of all these varied interests breathed the same stirring atmosphere of imaginary gains and advantages.

D. France, Colbert, and the Mercantile System in General

When at the end of the seventeenth century the French began to make a serious effort to win a share in the sovereignty of the world, they, no less than their English rivals, had left their wars with Spain and Holland behind them. The contest with Spain had begun during the reign of Charles VIII, and continued throughout the sixteenth century. If shortly before the end of that century Philip II had entertained serious thoughts of taking possession of France, circumstances were so changed during the next hundred years that Louis XIV looked upon the Spanish monarchy, together with its possessions on both sides of the Atlantic, as fair prizes that were unable to escape him owing to his ancestral rights and his power.

After Philip II had made peace with France at Vervins, shortly before his death, and the wars of the Huguenots had also come to an end (1598), one of those pauses in the tumult of human affairs ensued during which such peoples and States as are possessed of vitality are able quickly to recover their power, even though a short time before they may have been standing on the very brink of the grave. In France the monarchy took charge of the labour of civilisation, and, moreover, encountered at first little or no opposition. Henry IV, assisted by Sully, succeeded with the aid of commercial treaties, colonising associations, the promotion of industry, and above all by encouraging agriculture, in guiding the French people into the same tendencies of national economic policy that had already led to such great results elsewhere. Richelieu himself, the powerful sunderer of the feudal nobility, in seeking to free the crown from their dishonouring tutelage, pursued the same course, so far as his participation in the Thirty Years' War allowed him to direct his attention to economic questions. But it soon became apparent that the French had been too late in entering the ranks of colonial nations, and that only the leavings of the Spaniards, Portuguese, Hollanders, and English remained to them. French colonists settled, it is true, on the St. Lawrence, in the Antilles, in Guiana, in West Africa, and in Madagascar, yet without any very serious attempt to make these territories their own, and their attention was constantly being taken from their new possessions by political entanglements nearer home.

A new and bitter quarrel arose with Spain during the days of Richelieu (d. 1642), and continued long after the close of the Thirty Years' War, lasting until the peace
of the Pyrenees (1659). At the same time, in the disturbances of the Fronde, the last struggle was fought between the three independent and privileged powers, the clergy, the nobility, and the parlements, and the absolute monarchy, which threatened them all alike. This movement was occasioned by the incredible mismanagement of the national finances, which had begun during the days of Richelieu, and had gone from bad to worse during the ministry of Mazarin, 1642–1661. Ever since the national debts of France had passed from the hands of foreign capitalists into those of domestic money-lenders, the so-called Partisans, the abuse had been current of farming out the rates and taxes to the state creditors in order that they might be able to repay themselves from the sums collected. The result was boundless oppression of the masses, deception of the government, and enrichment of capitalists. A concerted attack, under the leadership of the parliament of Paris, was made on the unlimited monarchy, and the populace of the capital joined in it. But as the disturbances of the Fronde continued, to the great injury of the industrial classes, a reaction followed in Paris; and the king and his all-powerful minister finally obtained the upper hand in this last struggle of feudal institutions against unlimited monarchical power. A sequel to the events of the Fronde followed, when, after the death of Mazarin, the chief cause of the ruin, his financial tool, Nicholas Fouquet, who had outdone even the court of Louis XIV by the magnificence of his household, was sent to prison. The same judgment was passed on the entire tribe of Partisans, although they had been a power in the State, in fact above the State, a precarious support to lawful authority during times of disturbance, and often rather an aid to princely condottieri of the stamp of an Orléans or a Condé, who had become more dangerous to the King of France than Wallenstein had been to the Emperor Ferdinand.

Jean Baptiste Colbert, the new finance minister, whose influence had greatly contributed to the overthrow of the Partisans, retained his difficult position from 1661 until his death in 1683. His first great work was to consolidate the state liabilities, which rested on a thousand separate titles and bore high rates of interest, into a single national debt, paying interest at five per cent. This relatively mild method of acknowledging the bankruptcy of a nation was even then not new to France, and was often resorted to in later times. But Colbert was obliged to forego the task of extinguishing the national debt, as well as any attempt to meddle with the privileges of the nobility and clergy; for upon them depended the foreign and domestic policy of Louis XIV, and the minister of finance had no other desire than to be his faithful servant. The wars of this period caused many more loans to be raised and the public finances once more to be thrown into disorder. The nobility and clergy were subdued and transformed into court domestics, as it were, by deference to their privileges and the offer of certain personal advantages.

A significant change had taken place in the policy of the sovereigns of Europe. Previously kings had been able to keep the privileged classes in check through alliances with the third estate, but now that the kingship had attained to the zenith of its power, it transformed clergy and nobility into pillars of the government, not in order to oppose the masses, its former ally,—the latter had as yet no idea of revolting,—but merely that it might be lifted above all bickerings with the privileged classes, and realise the idea of a centralised government, impartially looking down upon the doings of men from the heights of its absolute position. The king had, in fact, become the highest expression of governmental force, to
which all personal or class rights were as nothing. This form of kingship, which created the unity of the modern State out of the welter of competing independent jurisdictions, was by no means lacking in a conception of its social mission; but the latter remained in the background, certainly so long as the throne was surrounded by troops of privileged courtiers, whose chief office was to increase its splendour and stability. To be sure, now and then a law for the improvement of economic and social affairs made its appearance; for example, Colbert decreased the land-tax (taille) for the benefit of the peasants, the most oppressed of all the social classes. However, the tendency of the unlimited monarchy was far more in the direction of a general and indiscriminate policy of national welfare than in that of protection of the feeble and oppressed. The power and, above all, the military capabilities of the State were to be augmented by an increase in the prosperity of the people; and in order to heighten military efficiency, all endeavours were concentrated in the ideas of protection of the State from without, of increase of territory, and general expansion. The fall of the Spanish Empire was looked upon by France as an invitation to step into that nation's place, and to seize the position of supremacy in Europe, on the high seas, and in all colonial spheres. This vast political programme not only contained within it the germs of renewed struggles with the Spanish and German Hapsburgs, at whose expense France expected to acquire the "natural boundaries" previously denied her, but was a cause of renewed war with Holland and England, the sea powers of the age.

In no empire the world has yet seen have nation and kingship reached such a state of solidarity as in the France of Louis XIV. All variances that arose under his rule and under that of his successors — the downfall of the old monarchy, the great revolution, the empire — had their foundations in the defeats suffered by the French in the struggle with the English. Just as Spain, Holland, and England herself had done, so did France sacrifice hundreds of years of her existence to the attainment of an illusory dominion of the world, established on a monopoly of the world's commerce.

In order that the French, who already saw certain plunder before their eyes in the fallen Spanish Empire, might drive the Dutch and English from the seas, it was necessary for them to mobilise all their military strength and at the same time to open up all their economic resources. The policy of imperialism required wealth such as was possessed by Spain in her mines and by Holland in her commerce. It was also necessary for England, France's rival, in fact, for any nation that expected to maintain itself against Louis XIV, to invent new means for carrying on the struggle. The undirected pursuit of small economic interests with limited spheres was certainly not a means of creating such resources as were needed by Powers of the first rank in their struggle for the world market. However, the economic conditions of the smaller circles, of corporations, cities, territories, and provinces, must at least have suggested thoughts for the guidance of a national policy based on a regard for the public welfare. It was necessary to transfer that which had already been done on a small scale into a greater sphere, to develop and to perfect it.

In fact, the mercantile system, or Colbertism, as it has been called after its classic representative, merely consisted in an extension in the use of economic-political measures that had long been employed in restricted areas. As soon as the State drew within its paternal protection economic affairs which had previ-
ously been left to their own powers of development, like every eager beginner it went too far in the matter, without consideration for the activities of natural production. The latter are of a private, individual nature, the sources of numerous economic phenomena which gradually shade off into the very highest spheres of national and world economy. However, on the whole, mercantilism stood the test of its time; that is to say, it succeeded in western Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It gave to peoples and to States that which they had not before possessed, indeed, that which they could not possibly have acquired through the action of the unregulated forces to which they had previously been accustomed. Nothing short of the centralised power of a modern nation was able to perform that which neither cities nor leagues of cities, nor the provinces of Germany and Italy, nor even the independent provinces of larger States, had been capable of effecting; all of these were obliged to waste a large amount of the forces at their disposal in the conflict of their special interests. Nations of the first rank that included many lesser circles within themselves did away with all internal friction, and produced from the sum of the forces out of which they had evolved effects of constantly increasing magnitude.

A description of the mercantile policy of each single community would lead to endless repetitions; let us, therefore, take France as a representative example. The organisation of the finances, which finally resulted in an annual revenue of one hundred and ten million livres (six hundred million francs) without any increase in the burden of taxation, was, comparatively speaking, one of the least of Colbert's services to the State. Of far greater importance both financially and economically was his policy in regard to the customs. The old provinces of the north and west, Isle de France, Champagne, Burgundy, Picardy, Normandy, Poitou, Anjou, Maine, and Touraine, were, as soon as the former lines of custom-houses had been done away with, united into one revenue district; the newer provinces (provinces étrangères), however, retained their own special tariff rates, for various financial reasons. The mercantile principle of a protective tariff against foreign nations was adopted in the customs regulations of 1667. Through keeping the products of foreign industries out of the domestic markets by means of excessive duties, French industry was incited to greater activity, and money that would otherwise have gone out of France was retained in the country. Industries still lacking to the nation were artificially called into life and furthered in every possible manner; for example, the manufacture of looking-glasses and laces previously made in Venice only, of stockings knitted after the English fashion, of cloth woven according to methods employed by the Dutch weavers, and of the same sort of brass and pewter ware that had in earlier days been imported from Germany. During the years 1666–1683 no fewer than forty-four sets of regulations were issued, all of which contained detailed instructions as to various industries. Colbert himself was of the opinion that the bounties as well as the industrial regulations had an educative value only, and that the time would come when they could be dispensed with altogether. In fact, Colbert did succeed in furthering the technical capacities of the French to an extraordinary degree. However, his legislative works, such as the book of commercial laws (Ordonnance du Commerce, 1673) and the Code Noir (slave law in the colonies) proved to be of more permanence as monuments to his fame than his industrial regulations.

In order to bring money into the country, and to render secure the economic
foundations of France, it was necessary that industrial activity should not be limited to the production of articles for domestic consumption, but that commodities for export should also be manufactured, and consequently that regard should be had for commercial affairs. "Colbert, who was descended from a family of merchants," says Ranke, "may perhaps have set too high a value on the actual possession of money, but he brought his mercantile endeavours into complete harmony with the chief interests of the State,—the elevation of the lower classes, the unifying of the nation, and the strengthening of its position in the world." He furthered domestic traffic by means of highways, canals (Canal du Midi), and posts. Foreign trade was promoted by encouraging the exportation of manufactured products and the importation of raw materials, through the construction of dépôts, harbours (Marseilles, Dunkirk, Bayonne), and naval arsenals. An efficient navy was built, and the merchant marine increased to such an extent that the services of Dutch vessels were no longer required. At the same time, however, in order that the forests of France might be preserved, merchants were allowed to purchase ships built in foreign countries. Maritime commerce was protected not only by the monopoly of coast and colonial trade, but by discriminative taxes favouring domestic vessels.

Colbert also hoped to ensure the prosperity of transoceanic commerce by means of monopolies modelled after the Dutch India Companies. However, such associations were formed with the greatest difficulty, and as a rule their lives were short; none of them attained to the importance of the Dutch and English firms. The Levantine Company (1670-1690), whose headquarters was Marseilles and Smyrna the chief trading place in the East, where competition with the Dutch, who had brought the entire Mediterranean under their dominion, did not present insuperable difficulties, was the most prosperous. The Northern Company experienced less good fortune in the Baltic; the East India Company never succeeded in firmly establishing itself in southeastern Asia, where it had been forestalled by Portuguese, Hollanders, and English; and the West India Company, active on both sides of the Atlantic, existed for ten years only, from 1664-1674.

The supporters of the mercantile system encountered great difficulties in respect to agriculture, especially the question of the grain trade. Two alternatives were presented, — the continuance in its original form of the low-price policy of the towns and provinces, so favourable to consumers, or the introduction of entirely new principles. Colbert treated agricultural products such as were capable of exportation — wine, oil, and fruit, for example — as ordinary commodities, but he regulated traffic in grain and raw materials in conformity with the interests of the industrial and mercantile classes. Sully had permitted the exportation of grain upon payment of the usual customs rates; Colbert's policy, however, in regard to the grain trade was dependent upon conditions of time and place. According to the investigations of Naudé and Schmoller, Colbert forbade the exportation of grain during fifty-six months of an administration which in all lasted fourteen years, or one hundred and sixty-eight months. Thus he permitted exportation either free or on payment of higher or lower duties during one hundred and twelve months.

Colbert's mercantile policy, like that of Cromwell, was directed against the supremacy of Holland; indeed, the very existence of the Dutch nation was threatened by the attack undertaken by Louis XIV in alliance with Charles II in 1672.
However, freed from all danger on the side of England by the peace of Westminster (1674), and supported by the Germans, the Dutchmen managed to weather the storm, and even succeeded in negotiating a favourable commercial treaty in 1678. In order to avoid being exposed to the same difficulties again, William III linked the fate of Holland with that of England, thus causing the rivalry between the two nations to subside. After William ascended the English throne in 1688, England and Holland were companions in arms in the struggle with France.

E. THE NEW HUNDRED YEARS' WAR BETWEEN ENGLAND AND FRANCE

A short time after Colbert's death in 1683, the friendly relations which had hitherto existed with England turned into mutual hostility. Colbert had succeeded in restoring France to the French people; that is to say, he emancipated his country from the mercantile domination of foreigners, and rendered it economically independent. Louis XIV, however, was not content with securing for the material existence of France the isolation considered indispensable to national development and power, he also wished to establish the same exclusiveness in respect to religion. Since the Protestant minority stood in the way of his idea of establishing a Gallican or national church, the king revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and sought to convert such of his subjects as were members of the Reformed Church by means of coercive measures. In spite of a law forbidding emigration, thousands of Protestants fled the country and sought refuge in Switzerland, Holland, England, and Brandenburg. France was not injured so greatly by the consequent decrease of population as by the transplanting to foreign soil of French skill and the capacity for producing articles of French industry and culture,—silk, cloth, hats, gloves, glass, paper, ornaments, etc.

Just as in France, the spirit of religious exclusiveness prevailed in England too; but in England no obstacle was placed in the way of emigration. The colonies in North America with which the mother country now possessed such a lucrative trade monopoly had been founded by nonconformists, or dissenters, including Roman Catholics. James II lost his throne, and was obliged to seek refuge at the court of Louis XIV in 1688, as soon as he ventured to interfere with the Test Act. William III of Orange now became leader of the great league formed for the purpose of resisting the encroachments of France and of re-establishing the European balance of power. From this time forth, as already stated, England and Holland were allies against France. The French fleet under Tournville was destroyed at La Hougue, May 29, 1692, by the united English and Dutch squadrons under the command of Admiral Russell. Although superior to any of her enemies taken singly, France was defeated in the third predatory war on the sea, and in the War of the Spanish Succession on land.

It is remarkable what far-reaching effects were exerted by the war with which the seventeenth century ended and the eighteenth century began, upon the economic conditions of the two hostile nations. The Bank of England was established, and the national debt consolidated amidst the clash of arms; and during the same years the finances of France were so utterly deranged that they could not be put in order again until the drastic settlement of all accounts at the Revolution.

After the first public banks had been established in Genoa and Venice—Italian financiers had succeeded in putting into circulation notes, or paper money
(segni representati), in the place of specie, at the end of the sixteenth century —
the development of the banking system was passed on to the Dutch. The cheque
bank of Amsterdam, founded in 1608, became a model for banks whose chief office
was to attend to the debit and credit accounts of merchants, based on the princi-
ple of a guaranteed deposit. In London, the goldsmiths of Lombard Street had
long been engaged in banking, an especially important branch of their trade being
money changing, from which large profits were obtained during periods of a con-
fused currency. They also received deposits, which they put out at interest, and in
addition negotiated loans for the government.

When Charles II suspended payment of his debts in the year 1672, — the last
State bankruptcy in England, — the goldsmiths of Lombard Street, whom the king
owed one and a third million pounds sterling, also became insolvent. Although
the establishment of a public bank was immediately proposed, the project was not
executed until the time of the third French war of conquest, during the reign of
William III. It was with the greatest difficulty that money was obtained for the
purposes of this war, owing to the lack of a proper financial organisation, although
England had rather a superfluity than a lack of capital. The Restoration period
had been a time of great occasional prosperity, and capital had already turned to
seductive but unsafe schemes like the South Sea Bubble. After the first million
pounds of the consolidated English national debt had been subscribed for in 1692–
1693, the government contracted a new loan of one million two hundred thousand
pounds sterling, at eight per cent. According to the plan introduced by William
Paterson, a Scotchman, who took the bank of St. George at Genoa for his model,
a corporation formed of national creditors received the right to carry on banking,
to the exclusion, however, of all other mercantile affairs, and to issue notes re-
deemable on presentation, as in the system already in use among the goldsmiths.
In a short time the Bank of England became an indispensable feature of the
financial life of the nation, and to this day it remains one of the strongest pillars
of international finance and credit. The Bank of Scotland was founded soon after
in 1695. United dynastically with England in 1603, Scotland had always been
treated very much like a foreign country, so far as commercial matters were con-
cerned, and had no share in the privileges due to it as an integral part of the
United Kingdom. When the Scotch made an independent attempt at colonising
in Darien, on the Isthmus of Panama, it was the English who frustrated their
scheme in 1699. Not until the parliamentary union of 1707 did Scotland suc-
ceed in bringing the economic differences between the two countries to a settle-
ment; but Ireland was still excluded from the kingdom, and was treated like a
colony beyond seas.

When the question of the Spanish succession, the most important in European
politics, arose at the beginning of the eighteenth century, England was prepared
diplomatically and financially, and fully armed to prevent the union of the Span-
ish monarchy with France. The more wealthy sea-powers soon began to assist the
smaller nations, which were poor in capital, with loans, in order that they might
take part in the struggle. Thus during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701–
1714) Austria and Prussia fought not only for their own interests, but also in large
measure for England. Behind the ostensible purposes of the alliances entered into
by the English at this time was concealed the secret intention of making use, good or bad as the case might be, of her allies, and above all of maintaining and
increasing the tension among the nations of Europe, that the various leagues entered into by them might not assume sufficient dimensions to prove an obstacle to English plans of expansion. The interests of England were assisted more effectively by the antagonism of France and Germany than by all the efforts she was able to put forth herself.

The rivalry of France and England in the Spanish and American markets was the commercial basis of the War of the Spanish Succession. Even during the war itself France obtained, through commerce with Spain and with Central and South America, a large portion of the financial power which enabled her to carry on the struggle with England to a comparatively favourable termination in spite of constant defeats. England, however, was able to prevent Spanish-American commerce from becoming the exclusive possession of her rival. The Spanish Empire was torn asunder at the peace of Utrecht, as had ever been the desire of England; the Spanish Netherlands, Naples, Sardinia (exchanged for Sicily in 1720), and Lombardy passed into the hands of Austria; England herself obtained two of the most important posts in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar and Port Mahon in Minorca, and across the Atlantic, Acadia (Nova Scotia).

The English considered the asiento agreement (see Vol. I, 413), through which they, instead of the French, were granted the exclusive right of supplying Spanish America with negro slaves, to be their greatest success. The apparently insignificant favour of being allowed to accompany each fleet of slavers by two vessels of not more than six hundred tons burden and loaded with other than living freight was an immediate source of illegitimate gain to English merchants. Liverpool became enriched through both the slave trade and veiled smuggling.

When, after the close of the War of the Spanish Succession, the English government farmed out the negro asiento to the South Sea Company (by South Sea, the ocean on both sides of South America is to be understood), a period of wild speculation, such as is usually terminated by a catastrophe no less destructive than purifying to the financial atmosphere, followed. Shares in the South Sea Company rose when the latter received the asiento, and were in great demand, for after the close of the war English capital was no longer taken up by the government; in addition, the company wished to provide for the extinction of the national debt. The price of South Sea shares soon rising from £100 to £1,000, grew too high for the small speculators. All sorts of tempting but fallacious associations were established, and however unreasonable and absurd they may have been, were subscribed to with the greatest enthusiasm. Finally Parliament put an end to the wild proceedings, which had become a menace to the public welfare; but many a career was shattered by the bursting of the "bubble" (1720). The South Sea Company also tottered, and its shares declined in value; but it managed to continue its existence until after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, when it lost the asiento.

The effects of the foreign affairs in which England had been so successful soon became apparent in the improved domestic policy that had been completely revolutionised since the year 1688. To be sure the kingdom had very much the appearance of a ball tossed to and fro by the Whigs and the Tories; and the many-headed parliament also seemed to stand at a disadvantage when compared to the closely knit despotism that governed France. But it was precisely the agreement between crown and parliament which rendered possible the accumulation of the larg-
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...funded debt that had yet been known to history. So long as the two forces had been hostile to one another, the credit of the nation had remained at a very low ebb,—at such a low ebb, in fact, that a policy of expansion like that of William III or of Anne would have been out of the question. The Whigs looked upon the Bank of England as their creation, and they also interested themselves in the national loans, owing to the fact that England's participation in the War of the Spanish Succession was to them a party issue. On the other hand, the Tories prided themselves on the advantageous terms of peace of 1713 and 1714,—master-strokes of their leader, Bolingbroke. Nor did the economic antagonism of the two parties lead to a narrow commercial policy. Although the Tories were predominant among the landowning classes, and were the representatives of agrarian interests, they did not annul the protective tariffs and the restrictions on imports and commercial privileges with which the Whigs defended the interests of merchants and manufacturers. On the contrary, the Tories obtained increased incomes from their estates by means of these very tariffs, and thus had no such cause for complaint against a national policy of mercantilism as had the agriculturists and landed proprietors of France. Consequently there grew up a peculiar national commercial policy in England, which Wilhelm Lexis calls "protective solidarity."

England's foreign trade increased threefold during the century beginning with the accession of William III and ending with the French Revolution,—from an annual value of twelve to one of thirty-six million pounds sterling. European trade was the most important; next followed American, then Asiatic, and finally African. Had it not been for a contemporaneous increase in domestic industry it would scarcely have been possible for the English to have retained the balance of trade in their favour.

The older system of industry was adopted in England during the sixteenth century (see above, p. 96), and it preponderated in all the staple branches of manufacturing until the close of the eighteenth. England remained behind the rest of Europe throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, during which period a new method of conducting industries, the factory system, came into vogue on the continent. The origin of factories cannot be traced. This much only may be said with certainty: new forms of industry were gradually introduced into spheres over which the guilds had no control, and such industries were by their very nature adapted to the methods employed by the large manufacturer. Paper-making (for which we have evidence even in the fourteenth century), smelting, carried on in establishments attached to mines, cotton spinning and weaving, for which the raw materials were imported from the Levant, printing, brewing, and sugar-refining, partook largely of the nature of factory industries. The establishments that were called into existence by Colbert and his imitators in order that articles which had previously been imported might be produced at home by domestic labour, were organised throughout after the manner of factories. Wherever the mercantile system was introduced, looking-glass, tapestry, silk, army-cloth, porcelain, and tobacco factories were erected, partly as state, partly as private undertakings. Their prosperity depended upon the nation into which they were introduced and the skill of its inhabitants. The manual dexterity of Italians, High Germans, and French was not to be found everywhere; but owing to unfavourable circumstances both Italians and Germans were driven from competition in the world market during the seventeenth century.
FOUR INDUSTRIAL REFORMERS: (1) COLBERT; (2) TURGOT; (3) ARKWRIGHT; AND (4) WATT
DESCRIPTION OF THE PORTRAITS OF INDUSTRIAL REFORMERS

1. Jean Baptiste Colbert, born in Reims, August 29, 1619; employed in the office of Michel Le Tellier, secretary of state in 1648, assisted to the position of councillor of state and secretary to the queen by Mazarin in 1654; in 1661 surintendent of finance; 1665 comptroller-general of finance; 1669 minister of state, surintendent of the royal buildings, of fine arts and manufactures, and, later, chief of the department of marine. Died as Marquis de Seignelay, September 6, 1683, in Paris.

(Painted by Philippe de Champaigne, engraved by Nanteuil, 1662.)

2. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Baron de l'Aulne; born in Paris, May 10, 1727; in December, 1749, prior of the Sorbonne, in 1751 exchanged the pursuit of religion for a position under the government, becoming the substitute of the procurator-general, and parliamentary councillor in 1752, master of petitions and requests, and member of the royal bed-chamber in 1753; 1761—63 intendant of Limoges; 1774 chief of the war-department and comptroller-general of finance; dismissed from office in 1776; 1777 vice-director of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-lettres. Died March 29, 1781, in Paris.

(Drawn by Panili, engraved by Mansilly, 1775.)

3. Richard Arkwright; born in Preston, Lancashire, December 23, 1732; invented a spinning-machine in 1768, and established a spinnings-mill driven by horse-power in Nottingham; in 1771 founded a second and larger factory, run by water-power, at Cromford in Derbyshire; in 1786 high sheriff of Derbyshire, and soon afterwards knighted. Died August 3, 1792, at Cromford.

(Painted by Wright, engraved by Posselwhite.)

4. James Watt; born at Greenock in Scotland, January 19, 1736; maker of scientific instruments in Glasgow, 1764, 1766 in London, 1767 mathematical instrument maker to the university in Glasgow (until 1764); Surveyor and civil-engineer (until 1774); in 1765 invented the separate condenser and air-pump; established an engineering works in Soho near Birmingham, 1774; 1784 invented the celebrated parallel motion for engines, and applied the power and motion of the piston to a rotating crank. Died August 19, 1819, in Heathfield near Birmingham, buried at Handsworth. (Painted by Sir William Beechey, R. A., drawn by W. Evans and etched by C. Picart.)
Until the eighteenth century, with the exception of metal industries which were carried on outside the cities — the strongholds of the craftsman and the guild,—there was no factory organisation in England. The introduction of the use of coal in metal founding seems to have been a result of the experiments of Dodd Dudley (about 1620). The most important trades, such as wool and linen weaving, tanning, and dyeing, still retained the nature of house crafts. Indeed, even the crafts that were brought into England by the Huguenots, such as the manufacture of silk in Spitalfields, were organised according to domestic industrial methods. Although there were cotton weavers in England, this branch of the textile trade was of little importance, inasmuch as British manufacturers were unable to compete with the West Indians. And yet the cotton industry was destined one day to subject the whole world to the industrial supremacy of England. This became possible owing to the discovery of improved methods for carrying on all branches of weaving,—a trade that had never fallen into the hands of the guilds. The replacing of hand labour in the workman’s home by machine labour in factories brought about a complete transformation in the cloth industry.

A long series of inventions began with the spinning-machines of Wyatt, Hargrave, Arkwright, and Crompton, and the power-looms of Kay and Cartwright. The factories of Richard Arkwright, built in 1768, at first driven by horse and later by water power, were a source of wealth to their founder, that from this time forth the employment of machinery in industry was assured. In the meanwhile James Watt had succeeded in inventing a steam-engine capable of practical use; and the Boulton and Watt works at Soho, near Birmingham, supplied the first machines used in spinning and weaving establishments, breweries, and mills. The making of pottery and porcelain had also assumed the proportions of a factory industry, as exemplified by Josiah Wedgwood’s establishment at Etruria in Staffordshire. In a comparatively few years there was scarcely an industry to which the new sources of power had not been adapted: wool, linen, and silk followed the lead of cotton.

During the sixteenth century the British Isles still bore the yoke of foreign merchants, although the burden had been much decreased by the shaking off of the Hansa. In the seventeenth century the English had become equal to the Hollanders, and, after having contributed their share in bringing about the downfall of Spain, they began the struggle with France for the possession of the trans-oceanic colonies and various commercial advantages. The struggle still hung in the balance, when suddenly, owing to an extraordinary growth of national intelligence, various new and improved methods of manufacturing were introduced, which, together with inventions of machines and engines, secured to England the supremacy of the industrial world.

The region of commercial conquest was situated not only on the continent of Europe, but in other parts of the world, especially in southeastern Asia, where the English East India Company had been at work for one hundred and fifty years, without achieving any great success. It had maintained itself with difficulty against Portuguese and Dutch, and several times had been on the verge of collapse, as, for example, during the days of the Commonwealth. Later, during the reign of William III, it was threatened by an opposition company established by Whigs, until finally the two associations were united in 1701. Prosperity came with the dissolution of the empire of the Great Mogul. To be sure, France began to com-
pete at the same time, but the French pioneers, Bertrand Francis Mahé de Labourdonnais, Joseph Francis Dupleix, and Thomas Arthur, Count of Lally-Tollendal, were so badly supported and so abominably deceived by their own government that they were unable to maintain their position. As soon as the East India Company began to extend its influence over India, the English government took the management into its own hands, assuming the office of superintendence on the passing of Lord North's Regulating Act (1773) and the younger Pitt's East India Bill in 1784. However, India did not become a market for manufacturers until freedom of trade was granted in 1814, when English machine industry was in a position successfully to compete with the hand labour of the East, despite the amazing cheapness of the latter.

In spite of the fact that owing to the War of the Spanish Succession and to the Seven Years' War, France had lost her North American possessions (Canada and the Mississippi Valley), and was at the same time obliged to retire from competition with England in the East Indies, nevertheless during the eighteenth century the mercantile and industrial progress of the French people was remarkable. It is true that during the declining years of Louis XIV the finances of France were in a wretched condition, and immediately after the War of the Spanish Succession the government instituted measures that had the effect of a bankruptcy upon the nation. The evil results, however, were felt chiefly by the successors of the old Partisans, for whom there was but little sympathy. But the misery of the lower classes sank only the deeper into the hearts of such patriots as were able to look out beyond the narrow sphere of class interests. Still, the wars had not been a cause of misfortune to all classes. As soon as peace was concluded, capital became heaped up, as in Holland and England, and hungry for profitable investments.

During the regency of the Duke of Orleans the excited impulse for speculation was furthered by the financial system introduced by John Law, a Scotishman, who founded two stock companies,—a bank of issue (1716), and a colonial association, the Compagnie d'occident (1717), also called the Mississippi Company, with which he united the remains of an East Indian-Chinese trading association under the name Compagnie des Indes in 1719. The bank was supported by the government, Law himself receiving the office of superintendent of finances, and it finally pledged itself to pay the national debt. France was soon flooded with inconvertible notes, and all the while specie was gathered into the State treasury. Inasmuch as the redemption of the notes was impossible, they became worthless, and were called in from circulation. The shares in the Mississippi Company, of very little value in themselves, became "fancies," and were driven up from a nominal value of five hundred livres each to twenty thousand livres; and when, in order to moderate the extravagance of these dealings, the government began to lower the prices by degrees, a sudden revulsion took place in public opinion, and all men sought to get rid of their shares, which finally resulted in their being worth about twenty francs apiece. John Law had fled in the meantime, and the winding up of the affairs of his companies followed. For two generations the effects of this lesson were visible in France. The affair was not forgotten until the days of the Revolution, and even then the revolutionary leaders did not forget to include Law's performances in the catalogue of sins of the Ancien Régime.

Misfortunes in war and finance had never prevented the people of France from realising to the fullest extent their private economic advantages. Between the
supreme heights where the privileged castes lived free from earthly cares and sorrows, and the depths in which the oppressed masses dragged on their miserable existence, lay the great middle class of craftsmen, tradesmen, scholars, to whom it was a matter of regret that they did not possess a position in the State worthy of their material and intellectual significance. The owners of industries had brought French arts and crafts to a high state of perfection, and the entire prosperity of the export trade rested upon their activity. In spite of domestic drawbacks, the foreign commerce of France had increased fivefold during the eighteenth century; and traffic with the colonies had grown to ten times its former proportions, although the colonial area had diminished. But there were still valuable possessions among the colonies which France had managed to retain, above all, San Domingo,—the eastern part of the Spanish Haiti, ceded to the French in 1697,—Guadeloupe, and Martinique in the West Indies, and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. In 1789 the colonial commerce of the French exceeded that of the English by about one hundred and fifty million livres.

Once more during the eighteenth century the possibility of regaining their lost colonies from the English was opened to the French people, when during the American War of Independence the three nations that had been forced from the sea by England—France, Holland, and Spain—entered into an alliance with the revolted colonies. In fact, at the peace of Versailles in 1783, France was awarded the Senegal region, Tobago and Pondicherry, while Spain recovered Minorca and Florida; but the trade with the United States was retained by England, although they were now accessible to merchants and ships of all nations.

During the last years of the eighteenth century men began to look upon the commerce of nations from a broader point of view. Both the English Navigation Act and the traditions of Colbert's system in France had, at least in theory, lost the greater part of their pristine lustre. When France abrogated the Bourbon Family Compact during the Seven Years' War (1761), rights of reciprocity were granted to all lands belonging to members of the House of Bourbon, that is to say, to France, Spain, the Two Sicilies, and Parma. Shortly before the Revolution, the new conceptions of economic freedom having become common property, England and France entered into a commercial agreement, the so-called Eden Treaty (1787), in accordance with which the high protective duties were decreased, and prohibitions removed from many articles of import. The Revolution, however, put an end to any further development of commercial agreements, and caused the old quarrel as to the supremacy of the sea to burst forth anew.

F. THE GERMAN EMPIRE, PRUSSIA, AND AUSTRIA

While Holland, England, and France were competing with one another and increasing their powers in the struggle for supremacy in the world's commerce, national life was at such a low ebb in Germany, that the Holy Roman Empire, which had itself once dreamed of world dominion, became little more than prey to the dominant races of western Europe. As early as the end of the sixteenth century signs of decay had become visible in all directions: the Hansa was gradually approaching its final dissolution, and the power of the upper German capitalists was broken. It was during this period of enfeeblement that the Thirty Years' War began, and transformed Germany from the most densely populated and best
cultivated country in Europe into a desert. Since agriculture began again for the
most part with the reclaiming of barren land, and absorbed into itself almost the
entire working power of the people, German industry was unable to break through
the limits of local demand without the assistance of foreign capital, and as a result
German commerce became linked to foreign interests by ties that could not be
broken. Western Germany on both sides of the Rhine fell into the hands of the
Dutch, who barred the mouths of the Scheldt and the Maas so effectually that the
Spanish (since 1714 the Austrian) Netherlands, or Belgium, was also cut off from
traffic with foreign nations. Since the end of the seventeenth century French
articles of luxury, art, and fashion were imported into Germany from the West, for
ever since the accession of Louis XIV France had taken the place of Italy in
setting the fashions. The decay of the fairs at Frankfort-on-the-Main, which had
possessed a continental importance during the sixteenth century, was a token of
the economic servitude of western Germany. The English were predominant from
Hamburg, where the Merchant Adventurers had established themselves as early
as the sixteenth century, to Saxony and Silesia. Although the North Sea cities
retained their character as dépôts for foreign trade during the very worst years of
the economic dependence of Germany, and in the eighteenth century were quite
capable of taking an independent share in the world's commerce, the harbours of
the Baltic were deserted, Lübeck, once the queen of the North, as well as the
smaller ports. Danzig alone — under the rule of Poland — remained the great
centre of the export trade which was carried on from the richly productive region
of the Vistula; yet even Danzig, like Hamburg, was little more than a link in the
chain of Dutch and English economic interests.

The more the principles of the mercantile system were accepted by the various
German governments, the worse became the condition of the small principalities,
and especially of the industrial cities of the empire, like Nuremberg; for such
towns were so shut in on all points by customs duties and prohibitions on trade that
they were compelled to forego all competition in foreign markets. There was no
unity in Germany such as is brought about by a strong central government or by
the rigid application of the mercantile system. Each of the lesser States to which
complete independence had been granted by the peace of Westphalia imitated the
policy to which the great Powers of western Europe had come through a long
course of development, but this policy had no meaning whatever in a small State.
In Prussia and in Austria only was it possible for the mercantile system to be car-
ried out to success; where, indeed, it attained to the most favourable results, creat-
ing economic unity from various dynastically joined provinces, and transforming
a heterogeneous mass into an organised structure.

It is true that the old German Empire still had an emperor, and even, since the
year 1663, a permanent Reichstag; but after the imperial modifications of the six-
teenth century, which had left both imperial army and finances in a half-organised
state, so that not even such beneficial measures as the regulations respecting the
coinage of 1524, 1551, 1558 could have any practical effect, a period of com-
plete inaction of all governmental functions followed during the seventeenth cen-
tury. Even the atrocious disorder that reigned in the currency at the beginning of
the Thirty Years' War, chiefly due to the activities of money-clippers, was insuffi-
cient to induce the imperial government to take any steps toward establishing
order; it merely renounced its rights in favour of the lesser provincial rulers.
The wars with the Turks and the French alone were of general interest enough to
keep alive a consciousness of common life and aims in the German people. It was
all the more remarkable that, after some fifty years of negotiations, the empire
actually passed a law in regard to an economic-political matter. This was the
Imperial Industry Law of 1731. "The unheard-of had occurred," said Gustav
Schmoller, "the German Empire, after a pause of centuries, finally roused itself
to the enactment of a uniform legislative measure, through which the chief diffi-
culty that had previously stood in the way of corporation reform was overcome.
However, it immediately became evident that uniform legislation without a uni-
form executive is, in a certain sense, very much like a wooden poker."

In fact the organisation of the guilds, originating as it did during the age of
medieval city states, was an anachronism in the days of the mercantile system; it
was at least necessary for it to adapt itself to the requirements of the new economic
life of nations. Long ago, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, crafts-
men and small merchants had united into independent associations in order not
only to limit mutual and foreign competition, but to overcome the supremacy of
the capitalists, who were members of the more or less distinguished patrician
families of the towns. The control of industrial affairs in the cities gradually
became transferred from the guilds to the municipal authorities. Then followed
associations of the guilds themselves, some of which extended their power over
the whole country, indeed beyond the boundaries of the empire. Inasmuch as the
trades corporations represented the interests of the master craftsmen alone,—and
of these only the wealthier,—journeymen and labourers were compelled to form
their own associations (Compagnonages), which from the end of the fifteenth until
well into the eighteenth century carried on an embittered class struggle with the
masters. Such drawbacks to trade were legislated against in France in the indus-
trial regulations of Henry III (1581) and of Henry IV (1597); here, as in Eng-
land, the central government sought to control the guilds and associations of
craftsmen by means of legislative and administrative measures. In Germany also
the ruling princes had the same praiseworthy intention of putting an end to the
nuisance of constant industrial quarrels so hurtful to the community; but owing
to the vast expansion of the various associations of master-craftsmen and journe-
ymen, extending far beyond the boundaries of their territories, the sovereign princes
were unable to accomplish their object until the imperial law of 1731 was passed,
showing them a way how to help themselves out of the difficulty through the
introduction of uniform measures. Improvements, of course, depended on the
good will, the intelligence, and the power of the rulers in whose hands lay the weal
and woe of the crumbling German Empire.

The lesser ruling princes of Germany were able to accomplish but little compa-
red to what was done in Prussia and Austria after these large States had once
adopted the mercantile system, that is to say, at the end of the seventeenth cen-
tury. Both the external and internal policies of the two nations began to develop
at the same time, as did also their rivalry, when, by help of the mercantile
system of western Europe, their monarchs sought to increase the productive
capacity of their countries which were so much behind the times.

The Great Elector Frederick William (1640–1688), the founder of the military
power of Prussia, who united eastern Pomerania and Prussia with Brandenburg,
was also the originator of an economic policy that extended far beyond the narrow
limits of an ordinary German territorial State. In his naval and colonial plans he paid homage to the spirit of the time. Unfortunately he endeavoured to hasten natural development too greatly, with the result that the colonies hurriedly established on the Guinea Coast (Gross-Friedrichsburg) and on the island of Arquin were complete failures, while the Dutch and the French looked upon their new rivals with no friendly eyes. The Great Elector occupies a brilliant place in the history of commerce, inasmuch as he was the originator of the Prussian system of territorial posts and of the canals that connect the rivers of eastern Germany. By means of the Müllrose canal he guided the traffic between the districts of the Oder and the Elbe through his rapidly developing capital of Berlin.

His grandson, Frederick William I, laid the foundations of German bureaucracy, and set the example how a government could pay all claims, whether domestic or foreign, without contracting a national debt—indeed, could have a balance left over at the end of each year to go toward forming a State treasury. Seeing that since the end of the Thirty Years' War no possession was more necessary to the State than inhabitants, he offered a refuge in his dominions to some twenty thousand Protestant refugees who had been driven from Salsburg by their intolerant archbishop, Firmian; in fact, the Great Elector had long ago begun internal colonisation by welcoming Huguenot refugees, who transplanted various branches of French industry to Prussian soil, as well as Irish Catholics flying from Protestant intolerance. In contrast to the Huguenots, the Salzburgers settled down as agriculturists, chiefly in east Prussia. Hussites from Bohemia and Swiss Protestants also found a second home in Prussia, while the Irish swelled the army. As an opponent of the exportation of money, and consequently of the importation of foreign manufactures,—cotton goods, for example,—Frederick William I furthered the domestic cloth industry. A "Russian Company" was founded for the carrying on of traffic in cloth with the Muscovite Empire, and a dépôt erected at Berlin, where small producers could offer their goods for sale after they had been subjected to a thorough inspection.

After Frederick II had used up the army and treasure left him by his father in the Silesian war, he was obliged to look out for fresh supplies; but not until the interval of peace that followed the Seven Years' War in 1763 was he able to carry out his plans of economic improvement. And he, the greatest sovereign of the eighteenth century, clear-sighted, intelligent, and absolute in power, was likewise a mercantilist; that is to say, he was an instructor of an economically backward people in certain theories of commerce. He attained the chief object of exterior commercial policy, a balance of trade, with but little difficulty: the value of imports was from four to five million thalers less than the value of exports annually. However, the king was unable to establish successful transoceanic connections, and the German-Asiatic companies of Emden were failures from the very beginning. Various domestic institutions, such as the Bank of Berlin, the Society of Maritime Commerce, and an institute of credit, formed in order to prevent the families and property of the nobility dwelling east of the Elbe from falling into the hands of usurers, were attended with far greater prosperity. If it required the power of the State to create these institutions, the same was true of the calling of new branches of industry into being. It was only with great difficulty that Frederick II introduced silk-worm culture and silk-weaving into his kingdom. Workmen were needed for all these things; and he enticed them into his domin-
ions by means of awards of money and grants of land; especially when, after the first partition of Poland, west Prussia fell to his share, agriculturists were necessary and were supplied from the overpopulated districts of southwestern Germany, particularly from Württemberg. Nevertheless in 1785, shortly before Frederick's death, Prussia possessed little over five and a half million inhabitants.

Such a small nation, one, moreover, that was obliged to bear the arms of a Power of the first rank even in times of peace, could not preserve its status for any great length of time without suffering from various financial troubles, however much it husbanded its resources. Frederick's administration, particularly the methods of government monopoly and taxation for revenue, organised by the Frenchman, La Haye de Launay, and carried out with the assistance of French financial experts, awakened the hatred and scorn of his subjects. The coffee monopoly was characteristic of his reign; it practically suppressed a commodity whose use took large sums of money annually from the kingdom. But in spite of all his peculiarities, Frederick the Great promoted the economic prosperity of his kingdom. When the Prussian government was once more established after the troubles of 1806–1807, the views and requirements of the people had so altered that practical mercantilism could be looked upon as a thing of the past. Prussia adopted the principles of economic liberalism earlier than did any other German State, for the reason that throughout its development attention had been paid to the preliminary steps toward liberty.

The end of the Thirty Years' War failed to bring peace to the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, as it did to other German territories. French, Turks, and insurgents rendered it necessary for Leopold I and his sons Joseph I and Charles VI constantly to engage in wars, the cost of which had to be borne by the already exhausted provinces of Old Austria and Bohemia. Moreover, the once prosperous trade with Italy had come to an end, and there was no market for the products of the fertile Austrian soil. During the reign of Leopold I attempts were made toward building model workshops and manufactories and establishing monopolies, but there was a lack not only of money but of contractors and competent officials. Escape from financial difficulties was sought through foreign loans, raised in Holland, England, Genoa, and the imperial cities of Germany. By the foundation of the City Bank in Vienna (1706) the government secured a means of obtaining money without going abroad, and drew upon the deposits there for the loans it needed.

There was no consistent commercial policy, based upon a developed mercantile system, in Austria until the reign of Charles VI. The emperor sought to procure for his subjects equality in three directions with the great commercial Powers of the world through the development of commerce. Above all he desired Ostend to be a point of departure for transoceanic traffic, because of its favourable situation in the Spanish — since 1714 Austrian — Netherlands, but the East India Company established for this purpose in 1722 soon fell a victim to the jealousy of Holland and England (1731). He was far more successful in his endeavour to obtain a share in Mediterranean commerce through the Adriatic harbours of Trieste and Fiume, free ports since 1718, as Venice was no longer in a condition to offer any opposition. On the other hand, the attempt to further Eastern trade by means of a great Oriental monopoly company was a complete failure, inasmuch as the company became bankrupt, and brought with it a disaster similar to that which had resulted from Law's companies in France.
The deliberate policy of centralisation adopted during the reign of Maria Theresa was also directed toward unifying the financial and economic affairs of the Bohemian and German provinces; while, on the other hand, the isolated condition of the Hungarian, Italian, and Flemish portions of the empire was allowed to remain unaltered. In the first-named provinces even the inland duties were removed, and the customs service regulated in 1775. In like manner the national debt was consolidated, the currency set on a firm basis,—according to the twenty-florin standard agreed upon with Bavaria in 1753,—and the Vienna bourse made a central point for dealings in money, exchange, and stocks.

The reign of Joseph II was also rich in improvements, not all of them, however, destined to be permanent. Among its failures may be included the commencement of the indebtedness of the government (1782), that unfortunately lasted until 1889. In spite of many protests, Joseph II adopted in 1784 the system of prohibition of various commodities for the sake of protection, which remained in force until 1850. All foreign goods that either were or could be produced at home, or seemed to be superfluous, were put out of the market; that is to say, they were not permitted to be imported for sale. To be sure, men were allowed to bring with them over the frontier certain articles for their own personal use, but heavy duties were exacted. Under the protection of this prohibitory system of Joseph II the industries of Austria began to develop greatly; a large export trade was carried on with Hungary, which until 1850 was a separate customs district, and with the Ottoman Empire. Joseph II also sought to transform the Austrian Netherlands into a maritime commercial country, but the Dutch successfully resisted all his attempts to break through their blockade of the Scheldt (1785).

Thus during the eighteenth century, notwithstanding that there were both Prussian and Austrian regions of production of considerable extent, there was no distinctively German sphere of commerce. Small States and provinces were governed by no definite policy, although, in spite of their weakness and the amazing capacities for misgovernment of some of their sovereigns, a few of them attained to industrial and commercial significance, as, for example, the Electorate of Saxony. Most of them were content with merely bringing forth an excess of population, of which large numbers were sold to foreign countries during the wars of the time by unscrupulous rulers as food for cannon. For this reason a great advance in progress was shown when an excess of population was first used for colonising purposes: by Prussia in her eastern provinces, and by Austria in Hungary and Galicia. In most countries the century was a mere parenthesis, and Europe had at the beginning of the nineteenth century to start afresh.

6. THE LAST ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

Just as Buddhism, Brahminism, and even Islamism formed a cycle of nationalities and customs, so in the fifteenth century the Christian world of the West still formed a whole which rested both on ideal and real grounds of union. It was a unity of faith and knowledge, of customs and morality, of social and political institutions, and, to a certain degree, of economic interests, cemented by a kinship of blood. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Humanism and the Reformation shattered the unity of the higher civilisation for its own ultimate good; but the West had now to reckon with the consequences which these divisions and schisms
brought with them. However much the external relations of the European States to each other were altered by religious and political disputes, still the greater effect was due to those internal struggles from which the absolutism of creed and court in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought back the separate countries and groups of countries to a unity of faith and law. The international unity, which had once been embodied in the Papacy and Empire, disappeared at this period of more rigorous isolation of the separate States, until no traces of it were discernible.

In earlier times it had been the concern of the smaller spheres of interest — of the margraviates, seigniories, towns, provinces, and principalities — to safeguard their own economic advantage, although this multiplicity of divisions had not hindered the establishment of international relations. The centralised State of the Mercantile Age took the charge of the material welfare of the community out of the hands of the smaller circles from justifiable selfishness; the increased prosperity of the people was destined to furnishing it with the means of increasing its power. The financial strength and credit of the States increased amazingly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, although the power of the State was not everywhere exercised firmly, and often only half measures were adopted. No one of the States which were contesting the commercial supremacy of the world could permanently monopolise the desired possession. Another source of failure was that the increased activity in production, anticipated from mutual treaties, in a short time threatened to subside, in consequence of the difficulties of selling due to the similar customs-policy of the civilised States, which were equally under a mercantile administration. Far more disastrous than the much-blamed protection of industries by regulations and measures of supervision was the impotence of the governments to abolish or even to reform the obsolete guild system. They had been equally unable to cope with the difficulties imposed on home trade by a multiplicity of national, provincial, and local taxes handed down from distant generations. They had only made idle concessions to a state of things recognised as harmful, but actually prevalent and persistent in virtue of the law of inertia.

The bad condition of commerce and trade might in itself have been ameliorated without opposition from mercantile statesmanship. But "Mercantilism" suffered from one radical and inseparable defect. The system, as the name implies, was composed of measures, half spontaneous, half elaborated, for the promotion of the trade of the nation and of the individual State on the basis of an increased industrial production. The mercantile State, however, paid as little attention to the economic interests of the agricultural population as any of the medieval cities, whose commercial and industrial policy it merely repeated on a large scale. It is true that the two agrarian classes which served to support absolute monarchy, namely, the nobility and the church, were attracted to it by privileges of taxation and office; but the inferior classes in the country were not only at the mercy of their lords and landowners, but were further burdened with taxes, from which the privileged ranks were entirely or partially exempt. The prices of foodstuffs and raw materials were artificially depressed, as far as possible, in favour of trade and industries, while the farmer had now to pay the monopoly prices of an industry protected by import duties and restrictions. Since the recognised authorities themselves supported trades and industries as against agriculture, it was natural that the commercial and industrial classes should think themselves more important than the agricultural class. The peasants were despoiled as contemptible parish.
Mercantile absolutism had not yet reached its zenith, or at least its greatest expansion, when a change in the existing ideas of divine and human relations heralded the dawn of a new era. This movement, so long as it was limited to the intellectual sphere, or only stimulated superficial reforms, is called the Enlightenment; but the movement, originally immaterial, undermined all the barriers drawn round the established order of things, and became a devastating revolution.

A. THE ENLIGHTENMENT, OR AGE OF REASON

The Enlightenment is the revolt of the civilised western European against his own history. Its object is to unfetter and liberate the separate being — the individual — from the great communities of church, established society, state, people, guild, and tradition. It was intended to begin the process of civilisation afresh, and this time to bring it to a definite conclusion under the guidance of Reason and Nature. (It may also be called Analysis.)

The first two comprehensive systems of national economy were the offspring of the Enlightenment; namely, those of the French Physiocratic School and of the Englishman, Smith, which latter has come down to our day as a classic, or absolute system of political economy.

Neither Francis Quesnay (1694–1774) and his pupils (Gournay, Mercier de la Rivière, Dupont de Nemours, Turgot, the elder Mirabeau), nor Adam Smith (1723–1790) and his followers, recognised the revolutionary range of their ideas, but thought that everything would peacefully arrange itself, if only free scope were given to men and their concerns. However different the arguments of the two systems may be, their common aim is the economic freedom of the individual, in conformity with the principle that the individual should not exist for the sake of the State and the community, but the State and the community for the individual. This alteration of all previously accepted standards of value, this reversal of the historic gradations of rank, led to demands, each one of which must have shattered some portion of the existing social structure, while theory could only offer the vague hope of a better future. The theorists demanded unqualified freedom for the economic movement in the name of the laws of nature, by the side of which all human laws, dating from historic times, must be considered as capricious enactments. “Regarded from the standpoint of the separate branches of industry, three great demands are in the foreground, — freedom of industries, trade, and commerce; independence of position for the peasant; and removal of all restrictions on the possession of land. With reference to the individual this signifies the right of migration, that is, freedom to move from place to place, liberty to exercise any industry, liberty to make labour contracts, liberty to dispose of and to acquire property.” — Eugen von Phillipovich. The philosophy of Enlightenment and the resulting economic theory met with approval from the upper classes, although these were fated to suffer when the demands of the thinkers among them were realised. But most of the distinguished friends of Enlightenment were content to coquet with the new ideas, to gossip about them in the salons, and thoughtlessly to persist in the old order of things. Only a few tried to improve the position of the oppressed classes, as far as lay within their sphere of influence, and to remove the most crying abuses. The clergy, the nobles, and the wealthy classes, when called on to make serious sacrifices, entirely refused, even though the appeal was
made to them from the throne. It was a natural consequence of the doctrine of individualism, that the individual did not choose to make any sacrifice for the great communities under which he was classified, but wished merely to gain increased profits by means of them.

Now, however, the State stood firm and made renewed claims on its members, simply because princes and statesmen were equally swept on by the tide of events. The enlightened rulers were also individuals who sought their own advantage and necessarily strove to bring into their sphere of activity all who, through the struggle against the self-ruling communities, whether church, guild, or municipality, were now without masters or places. It was a unique stroke of good fortune for the absolutism of the State that the organisations, which till then had maintained their separate position, were driven into its net. Finally the Catholic Church, which in virtue of her economic self-sufficiency had resisted all attempts at subordination, was swayed and humiliated by the enlightened State, which was striving for omnipotence.

When the order of Jesuits had been overthrown, from Portugal to Italy, and finally abolished by the Pope (1773), an eager secularisation of its possessions began, which was continued beyond the ocean in Paraguay and in the Antilles. Joseph II had already seized most of the monastic estates, and the Revolution was destined soon to stretch out its hand after all ecclesiastical property, in order to destroy the hated exclusiveness of the greatest autonomous corporation in the world. Together with the ecclesiastical property the educational system had to be secularised. It is characteristic of the enlightened despotism that it founded the first commercial schools and polytechnics and called into life a system of State-organised popular education, while on the other hand it entirely misunderstood the spirit of the universities and of pure science generally.

If the system of mortmain was brought into disrepute by this theory as constituting a check on freedom and a restriction, and was abolished by the absolute State for reasons of expediency, the secular supreme ownership, peculiar to the nobility, the system of Feudalism, was an equal obstacle to the aggrandisement of the State. Few, indeed, of the enlightened princes of the eighteenth century went seriously to the root of the question of feudal lordship, and they met with no real success. Such were Joseph II, Gustavus III of Sweden, and some less important princes. In Austria, however, serfdom was abolished, tribute and forced labour regulated, and the jurisdiction and penal authority of the landowners restricted. No modern State wished any longer to share the administration of justice with persons possessing subordinate authority; no one could endure that the army and the finances should be checked in their development by a class which inserted itself between the highest power in the State and the great and productive masses of the people. If recruiting was to be the recognised system of enlistment, and if a fair but fruitful government tax was substituted for the overburdening of the lower classes, then the rights which the lords claimed over the persons of their subjects must be abolished, and feudal tribute and services be ended. What the absolute State hesitatingly prepared to carry out itself, proceeding tentatively and cautiously, amid the most vigorous opposition from the previously privileged classes, this the Revolution brought about by one violent movement: not indeed all at once in the whole of western Europe, but always in such a way that the liberation of the lower and the abolition of the privileges of
the upper classes, even in the most backward communities, could only be delayed but not entirely neglected.

Finally, as regards industries and trade, the restrictions on liberty imposed by the system of companies were everywhere so rotten that an absolute government had long arranged matters according to its judgment, and indeed in a more liberal spirit than was welcome to traders and industrial workers. In Tuscany, Sicily, and Austrian Lombardy as early as 1780 complete freedom was conceded to the crafts. Absolutism also had made a start by the removal of internal custom-house restrictions: the age of the Revolution only entered on its inheritance. The freedom of external commerce, which was theoretically demanded, free-trade, in short, was, however, in spite of the Revolution, again removed from the order of the day. If the other postulates in the cause of freedom found root in the spirit of the age, and at the same time lay in the interests of the progressive sections of the people, the separate State through free-trade came so much into the rush of international competition that it could no longer keep in view either its general advantage or the private economic interests of its subjects. Public and private interests resisted in this case the demands of a cosmopolitan doctrine, which disregarded alike the advantages of the State and the classes.

B. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND EMPIRE

A wide-spread change was already working in all economic departments when the French Revolution greatly increased the speed at which the reaction had hitherto moved. France, indeed, under Louis XVI had adopted voluntary reforms, but too late and too desultorily. The nation, accustomed to victory, had, since the War of the Spanish Succession, never realised its ambition. Defeats on sea and on land were followed by the loss of its American and Indian possessions. Finally the nation put the responsibility of all calamities on its absolute government, the monarchy and its privileged supporters, the clergy and nobility, who now bore the burden also of all internal grievances. While there would still have been time to adopt remedies, the careless government under Louis XV neglected its duty, and under Louis XVI the right moment had already passed. The Physiocratic, Anne Robert James Turgot (1727–1781; see Fig. 2 on plate at p. 109), who came to the helm in 1774, wished with one leap to overtake the lost opportunity, being, like all men of the period of Enlightenment, filled with the delusion that Nature and Reason must assert themselves. If France could have been saved by royal decrees, the measures prescribed by Turgot, emancipation of the peasants, free-trade in corn and wine, abolition of guilds, regulation of taxes, legal reforms, etc., must have assisted the process. When Turgot was dismissed after two years of official activity (1774–1776), not one of Louis XVI's decrees had been carried out: it required merely another stroke of the royal pen to annul them completely.

Thenceforth all efforts at reform were directed toward the finances. This matter went beyond the court, and especially concerned the Third Estate, to which most of the State creditors belonged. Properly speaking, the people ought to have been accustomed to the fact that the French government did not fulfil its financial obligations, for since the time of Henry IV, that is, within two centuries, it had failed to meet its obligations fifty-six times. In earlier days such catastrophes had
not been announced and publicly discussed. Now all France, which for two generations had been worked upon by the party of rationalism, shared in the outcry against the financial situation. Finally, when the king had for the last time vainly applied to the Notables — the nobility, clergy, high financiers — there was no course left but to try the means by which England once had restored her State credit, — to entrust the finances to the lawful representatives of the people, and so to afford a guarantee which the crown, deserted by its supporters, could no longer offer. There was, however, no such body of lawful representatives to appeal to but the States-General, which had not been summoned since 1614, an interval of one hundred and seventy-five years, — a historical phantom with which the most un-historic of all ages hoped to scare away the old financial distress.

(a) The Revolution. — The Third Estate seized the direction of the National Assembly. It might have been supposed that the man who had been robbed of his money by the Ancien Régime, and had revolted for that reason, would now devote all his efforts toward saving what had not yet been lost and reorganising the financial conditions. Far from it. The Third Estate discussed the rights of man and tried to build up a new constitution; so little does the actual man correspond to the abstract man postulated by the traditional economic theory, which holds him to be dominated by the single impulse of self-interest.

It was only in the intervals of constitution-making that the National Assembly dealt with the great questions of the social and economic reform of France. At last, when the peasantry throughout the country took steps to help themselves, and revolted, as in the times of the Jacquerie (1358), at one single sitting (August 4, 1789) all feudal rights and obligations were abolished without any compensation being paid to their former beneficiaries. In November of the same year the Constituent Assembly declared the entire possessions of the church to be national property, and soon afterward began to issue mortgage securities, which in a short time degenerated into an irredeemable State paper money with an enforced currency (assignats). The confiscation of the landed property of the nobility commenced later, so that the two formerly privileged Estates were for ever deprived of the material foundation of their separate position. The secret ground of the deadly enmity between the Third Estate and the two upper Estates had been the disability of the former to possess and acquire real property with its manifold complications. With the fine word “freedom” the speculators in land cloaked their eagerness to swoop on the expropriated real estate, to buy in order to resell it, to divide, to enfeoff, to burden it, in a word, to change immovable property into moveable, and to acquire wealth and position for themselves. The emancipated serfs longed to stretch their limbs in the beds of their former lords, and above all things to shoot their hares. France in a very few years paid the penalty of her game preserves. A proof that the Revolution really only precipitated the reforms which the absolute sovereignty intended or partially carried out is shown by the abolition of all custom-house restrictions on home commodities, so far as Colbert had left the question untouched, and also by the eventual passing of the decree securing liberty to the trades (1791). The dread of privileged guilds caused a clause to be incorporated into the law which prohibited all coalitions of workmen, employers of labour, and owners of merchandise.

By the declaration of war in 1792 the Revolution completely followed in the
steps of the monarchy, and proved how truly national had been that war policy of
the autocratic sovereigns, which the philanthropists bewailed. The interrupted duel
with England was again resumed (1793), and continued until 1815. The monarchy
had fallen, since it had been unfortunate in its foreign enterprises during the eight-
teenth century, and had not satisfied the national thirst for glory. Henceforth no
government was able to maintain itself which did not always and at once content
the Chauvinism of the French. In consequence of the course taken by the events of
the war, the popular government of the Feuillants and Girondists had been sup-
planted by that of the Jacobin proletariat, and this in its turn was replaced by the
Directoire, a new form of bourgeoisie rule. The financial settlement now ensued
which had been postponed, but also in a certain manner rendered more sweeping,
by the Revolution, and is unparalleled in history. In 1797, 45 milliards of assignats
and 2½ milliards of territorial mandates were taken out of circulation, and besides
this two-thirds of the consolidated national debt was cancelled.

(b) The First Empire. — After the citizen-republic had finished its course, the
restorer of the military glory of the nation proved the saviour of her home affairs.
Napoleon Bonaparte gave the clergy and the nobility once more a position in the
State, but without conferring on them special privileges, or dispossessing the actual
holders of their former estates. The greatest revolution which had occurred in the
conditions of property in any European State since the conquest of England by the
Normans (1066) received the sanction of the legislature. The finances were now
finally regulated and put on a sound footing by a certainly unscrupulous use of the
right of war. The “peasants’ Emperor,” Napoleon I, satisfied even the bourgeoisie
classes by the resumption of the old national system of protection.

No more terrible and infernal machine to crush political rivals in trade has ever
been devised than Napoleon’s continental blockade. Britain, supreme at sea, could
not be vanquished by France. Although the hardships of the war were traceable
even on the other side of the Channel (the Bank of England had in 1798 to sus-
pend the payment in cash of its notes — this restriction lasted until 1821), still,
while fresh foes were being continuously incited against the old rival, it was a too
tempting opportunity of taking away nearly all the colonies which the other Euro-
pean powers still had in foreign parts. By the universal war, which strengthened
England’s power without overstraining her resources, all sections of the population
were gainers, so that even the most peaceable private gentlemen were eager for war,
since they could lend their money to the State at good interest. England submitted
almost without a murmur to the imposition of a productive income tax (1798–
1816) and to the growth of the national debt, which by 1815 amounted to more
than 800 millions sterling. It was a war for bare life after the issue of the block-
dece order of 1806, in which Napoleon announced the prohibition of all trade and
commerce with Great Britain. Primarily this was the answer to a blockade imposed
by the English on all French ports, since both governments continually outbid
each other in hostile counter-measures. Napoleon, however, endeavoured to close
all Europe to English trade, and thus to ruin the trade and manufactures of his
opponents. England was now forced to reconquer the Continent. She accom-
plished this purpose with her own resources only on the Pyrenean peninsula,
allowing her allies to fight out the war by which the universal monarchy of France
was overthrown, the independence of European States re-established, and the naval
and commercial supremacy of the United Kingdom assured for an indefinite period. While the secret feeling in the hearts of the French people and the meaning of French diplomacy were obvious notwithstanding every change of catchword and form of government, the Continent relapsed into the traditional misunderstanding of England and her egoistic and evasive policy.

C. WAR AND PEACE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

The age of colonial and commercial wars, which began with the great discoveries, only ended after the fall of Napoleon with the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). The wars of the Revolution and the Empire (1792–1815) had still exhibited the sharply pronounced type of the wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This character does not appear in the further course of the nineteenth century, whose great wars have been waged over European questions rather than transmarine interests. On the other hand the efforts of the European nations to expand themselves have produced an infinite number of struggles with non-European nations of the most diverse degrees of civilisation, by which indeed the armed collision of European powers has been avoided, but no security given that this will always be the case. By a recurrence to the methods of earlier times, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the powers have waged wars not merely to promote their national interests, but directly for the advantage of small but influential parties. This special class of war has been designated by the title of "Coupon or Dividend Wars" (the Mexican campaign of Napoleon III, 1861–1866, the Anglo-Egyptian war of 1882, the Boer war of 1900). Is there any one who, at the beginning of the new century, feels any doubt that Europe is approaching a new age of colonial and commercial wars, when he reflects on the excessive expansion of the greatest Powers, the increased desire to partition the earth, and the inequality of the rival competitors?

Certainly no war will again break out about the oceans themselves, for the principle has been firmly established that the seas are international and common property, and are therefore neutral. No one therefore can raise any claims of ownership in them, or venture to restrict maritime traffic. The rule is subject to exceptions in so far that individual countries can claim rights of dominion over the sea along their coasts to a distance of three nautical miles, over the havens, embouchures, and bays with a breadth of not more than ten nautical miles, as well as over the inland seas surrounded by the territory of one and the same country. The Congress at Paris (1856) recognised the claims which had been uncertain since the "armed neutrality" of 1780,—the cessation of privateering, restriction on the right of blockade, and respect paid to the neutral flag, under which goods of every sort, excepting contraband of war (ammunition and arms), shall be considered as protected. It is, however, easily to be comprehended that international and maritime law is in important crises observed and followed by the weak rather than by the strong.

The inland waterways have also largely assumed an international and neutral character, since the Congress of Vienna decided that the navigation on rivers which flow through several different territories, as well as that on their tributaries, shall be free for all nations from the point where the rivers are first navigable down to their mouth. There is thus a distinction between national and international rivers. A peculiar class is represented by the "conventional rivers," concerning
which special treaties exist. There is, for example, a Rhine Navigation Act of July 1, 1869, which has abolished the customs retained in the Rhine Navigation Law of 1830, and an Elbe Navigation Statute of July 1, 1870, which has abolished the duties dating from the Elbe Navigation Act of 1821; similarly, a "European Danube Commission," appointed March 30, 1856, a "mixed Pruth Commission," etc. After the blockade of the Scheldt, a long-standing injustice, had been abolished by the French during the Revolution, its representative, the Scheldt toll, introduced by the Dutch in 1831, was redeemed by a payment of thirty million florins to the gaolers of the Belgian and north German trade,—a counterpart to the redemption of the Sound tolls exacted by the Danes (1857).

D. THE RENEWED EXPANSION OF EUROPEAN NATIONS OVER THE SURFACE OF THE GLOBE

If, with Eugen von Philippovich, we distinguish four stages of development of national economy in the history of the world,—(1) the period of exclusive domestic economy, (2) that of trade connected with locality or of town economy, (3) that of trade connected with the State (mercantile age), and (4) that of free-trade,—we must say that Europe, since the beginning of the nineteenth century, has risen from the third to the fourth stage. Commerce spreads itself freely over every ocean where Arctic ice has not placed a barrier on man's efforts at expansion. Even piracy, which during the first three decades of the century was in the Mediterranean still a cause of anxiety to the Hanse towns, has become legendary, as has the once indispensable convoy system. While European commerce up to the sixteenth century was principally on the inland seas, and even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was restricted to certain tracks in the Indian and Atlantic oceans, the nineteenth century may be distinguished as the first of a Pan-oceanic Age, one which includes every ocean. The inland seas surrounded by civilised countries are still, of course, the most frequently traversed. The Mediterranean, which had for so long become merely a secondary sphere for world commerce, a cul-de-sac, has regained its old importance by the opening of the Suez Canal (1869). But these matters have no special significance in comparison with the characteristics of the century, the importance of the traffic on the oceans, and of the connection between sea routes and overland roads which traverse entire continents.

Even where natural waterways already exist between the oceans, it was possible in some parts of the world to make artificial connections which are reckoned among the oldest aspirations of the human race, the so-called inter-oceanic or ship canals. The Suez Canal (constructed between 1859 and 1869), the Corinthian Canal and the North Sea and Baltic Canal (opened 1893 and 1895) have been made by the capital and enterprise of western Europe. On the other hand, the attempt to cut through the Isthmus of Panama has failed in consequence of the criminal misappropriation of the capital, chiefly belonging to French shareholders. The Nicaragua Canal will be a work of the United States, who do not willingly entrust an American undertaking to European hands.

Europe, which has mechanism the New World since the sixteenth century, requires for her self-preservation a further expansion over the globe. The increase of her population continually demands enlarged space and extended economic con-
ditions. While this small part of the world requires for its increasing population increased imports from foreign lands and zones, it cannot help desiring to assert its independence, and this it can most surely do by securing the dependence of those portions of the earth which are useful to it. Mere commercial relations are not sufficient to effect this result. Settlements must be founded, protectorates acquired, and trade enterprise aided by State subsidies.

The population of Europe has practically doubled since the French Revolution. In 1789 there were in Europe less than 200,000,000 inhabitants; at present there are 380,000,000. The increase of population has not been uniform in all parts of Europe. It is greater in the West than in the East, in the North than in the South, amongst the Teutonic than the Latin races, and more marked in the towns and industrial centres than in the country, owing to the migration of the population from the country into the towns.

As regards increase and density of population, as well as the preponderance of the industrial over the agricultural class, England (including Wales, but leaving out Scotland and Ireland) and Belgium come first. England, from the time of the Norman Conquest to the end of the Tudor dynasty (1066–1603), had remained stationary with about 2,500,000 inhabitants. This was precisely the number that the soil could support according to the rude (non-intensive) agriculture of the time. The population grew in the seventeenth century to 5,000,000, in the eighteenth to 10,000,000, until at the end of the nineteenth century it reached the height of 31,000,000; that is, 307 to the square mile. While the population of Scotland has risen between 1801 and 1898 from 1,600,000 to 4,300,000 souls, Ireland, which had only 1,000,000 inhabitants in 1669, contained 4,000,000 to 5,000,000 in 1801, and reached its highest figures about 1845, with from 7,000,000 to 8,000,000. Owing to famine, pestilence, and emigration the population in 1850 had diminished by nearly 2,000,000, and in the succeeding decades it has also shrunk, so that now, at the end of the nineteenth century, it numbers only 4,500,000 souls. France, as is well known, shows the smallest increase in population. She had attained a maximum of 20,000,000 inhabitants by the fourteenth century, and in the succeeding centuries her population dwindled until under Henry IV the numbers began to grow, and in 1750 reached once more the figures of the fourteenth century. France and the countries now comprised in the German Empire had, in 1845, practically the same population (some 35,000,000). A half-century later the former possessed a population of only 39,000,000, while the latter, in spite of large emigrations, had 52,000,000 inhabitants.

The statistics of the increase of population in the large cities best illustrate the rapid change in the composition and agglomeration of the inhabitants. London, which in the fourteenth century had been, with its 35,000 inhabitants, the most populous town in England, and one of the great cities of Europe, contained at the time of the great fire (1666) about 500,000, in 1801 1,000,000, in 1865 3,000,000, and at the end of the nineteenth century 4,500,000 (with the suburbs, over 6,000,000) inhabitants. On the other hand, the population of Paris even in the fourteenth century was estimated at 250,000 persons. Shortly before the Revolution the city on the Seine had 650,000, and shortly after the Revolution only 550,000 inhabitants, while in 1900 it has some 2,500,000. Berlin, which had 6,000 inhabitants after the Thirty Years' War, had reached, under Frederick II (1786), the number of 150,000, and within little more than a hundred years has increased to
1,750,000 souls. Provincial towns have also advanced,—for example, Nuremberg had at the beginning of the nineteenth century hardly 20,000 inhabitants, and had at the end of the century 195,000; Manchester had in 1801 75,000, and in 1900 had 540,000; Glasgow in 1800 had 77,000, and a hundred years later had 660,000 inhabitants, etc. On the other hand, new settlements, such as are found in America, Australia, and even in eastern Europe, are exceptional. Almost all towns of western Europe are distinguishable as early as the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Where a great city has arisen, a fair-sized or small town has always served as a foundation, as is clearly shown by the instance of the thirty towns of Germany which have over 100,000 inhabitants.

A still more important characteristic of the age of unimpeded intercourse than the internal movement and concentration of the inhabitants is their emigration without any intention to return. Up to the end of the eighteenth century the emigration from Europe was insignificant, and had only one objective, America. No real emigration could take place to the colonial districts of the different East Indian and West Indian Companies, since the European settlements in the tropics have no permanency, and are dependent on requirements of trade or cultivation. There is a proper distinction to be drawn between such "plantations" and the colonies in the more restricted sense. When the New World was discovered, Spaniards and Portuguese settled there, but the Iberian peninsula was itself thinly populated, and the government soon placed limits on emigration. The settlement of North America in the seventeenth century similarly did not withdraw large masses of men from northwestern Europe—in fact, in the eighteenth century emigration was so insignificant that the Germans, who gave to the New World some 80,000 or 100,000 souls, were the foremost settlers. Emigration on a large scale as an established custom only began with the nineteenth century, and increased rapidly up to 1880. Such motives as overcrowding and over-competition, political discontent, despair, or love of enterprise urge hundreds of thousands yearly to cross the sea to lands where the soil can be had for nothing, where higher wages are paid, where there are gold and precious stones, where the constitution and the ways of living are more free. In the nineteenth century also America exercised the greatest, if not the exclusive, power of attraction. Between 1801 and 1900 some 20,000,000 Europeans must have emigrated to the United States (7,000,000 or 8,000,000 from Great Britain and Ireland, more than 5,000,000 from Germany), about 3,000,000 to South America, and an equal number to Canada. The total number of Europeans who have emigrated during the century cannot well be less than 30,000,000.

By this migration of nations two continents have been Europeanised. But the absorption of the emigrants by civilised States of European origin separates the detached portions of the people for ever from the mother country; and if the new nation either politically or economically comes into unfriendly relations with the old, then the former comrade becomes a rival and a foe. The European nations have therefore in the nineteenth century again striven to acquire colonies, however depressing the experiences may have been which they suffered with the American colonies. The orators of the anti-colonial liberal school could point amid thunders of applause to the self-won independence of North America (1776) and of South America (1810–1825) as proofs of the natural law that daughter countries when arrived at maturity must fall away from their mother countries like ripe fruit from
the tree. But the necessities of nature have triumphed over the prejudices of a school, although the varying party views have introduced an undeniable irresolution into the colonial policy of the century.

In the nineteenth century, however, western Europe has not remained alone in its colonising efforts, among which must be reckoned actual settlements and also the attempts to bring transmarine countries under the political power and the economic yoke of a sovereign State. The great empire of eastern Europe and the revolted daughter country on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean are stretching out their hands for a share in this new partition of the earth. The three greatest powers, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States, stand facing each other with the intention of making the largest possible portion of the earth's surface subject to their influence. France and Germany may be reckoned as competitors of the second class, and the other powers are hardly to be taken into account as active factors.

The partition of Africa and Asia, so far as anything is left to divide, may be regarded as the programme of those movements which were begun in the years following 1880 and extend into the dark future. Similarly the future of Central and South America, which depends on "Pan-Americanism" (the conception of a closer economic union, if not of an actual confederation, of all America: cf. Vol. I, p. 563), belongs to the problems, which have long been presented but are far from being solved. Since the partition of Africa has been roughly carried out, the Asiatic question keeps the growing powers in suspense. The interests of western and eastern Europe, more particularly those of Britain and Russia, come into contact with each other over the whole Continent from the Bosphorus to the Yellow Sea. Communications have been opened up with European capital, and the treasuries of countries whose culture is flourishing, decaying, or undeveloped have to be exploited. The opening up of China has become the object of increased competition since the peace of Shimonoseki (1895). England really began to nibble at the Middle Empire as early as the opium war of 1840-1841 (cession of Hongkong). The most important result of this first war and those which followed was the admission to certain ports (treaty ports, of which there are now twenty). Russia, on the other hand, took over the whole Amur territory at one swoop (1858). When the weakness of the Chinese, which was revealed in the war of 1894-1895, induced the European powers to deprive the victorious Japanese of their spoil, they were encouraged to take possession of some isolated strips of the coast belonging to the gigantic empire of eastern Asia (for example, Germany took Kiautschou, 1898).

Spain, which at the beginning of the nineteenth century had been the foremost of the colonial powers of western Europe, can now no longer be reckoned among them. Since the peace of Paris (1898) and the sale of the Micronesian islands to the German Empire (1899), she possesses no colonies except the Presidios, the Canaries, and Fernando Po (cf. Vol. IV, p. 562). Yet Spain in 1893 and Portugal in 1898 commemorated the anniversaries of the founders of their dominions beyond the seas. Portugal, however, seems desirous to effect a sale of her remaining colonies, which she cannot make profitable or protect from foreign caprice. France, however, whose colonial possessions were in 1815 reduced to a few scattered islands, has acquired a considerable territory (6,000,000 square miles with 48,000,000 inhabitants) in northwest Africa and Indo-China, although she has mainly
striven for the protectorate of Egypt and the possession of east African countries. The plan of Napoleon III to unite Latin America, starting with Mexico, under the supreme protection of France collapsed in 1866. In Africa the English, in America the United States, barred the execution of French schemes of aggrandizement. Up to 1860 France adhered to the policy of excluding non-French ships from her colonial trade, and exacted lower duties from her colonies than from a foreign power. She then for a period abandoned the different treatment of natives and foreigners, but since 1870 has resumed in details the policy of giving the preference to her own citizens. In 1889 the navigation between Algeria and France was again exclusively reserved to the French flag.

As the nineteenth century was drawing to its close the Italians and the Germans, then for the first time politically united, bethought themselves of their ancient maritime renown and of the improved condition of their power. They claimed a portion of Africa, where the process of partition had begun. The Italians founded on the Red Sea their Erythrean empire (1885–1890), but were compelled to abandon their intentions on Abyssinia in consequence of the disastrous war of 1896. The Germans also, slowly and irresolutely, and not without arousing the displeasure of other powers, have established on both sides of Africa and in Oceania protectorates comprising in the aggregate 3,500,000 square miles with 9,250,000 inhabitants. Even the Belgians have acquired the sovereignty over a strip of the Dark Continent (Congo State, 1885). On the other hand, the Dutch have made no fresh acquisitions, but have certainly known how to profit by the colonies which England restored under the treaties in 1815 (retaining, however, Ceylon, the Cape of Good Hope, and the greater part of Guiana).

The British Empire is unique in its kind both geographically and historically. With a superficial extent of nearly 45,000,000 square miles and a population of 383,000,000 souls (equivalent to a seventh of the surface and a fifth of the population of our planet), it is five or six times larger than the Roman Empire, and can only have been surpassed in size and number of inhabitants by the Mongol empires of Genghis Khan and of Timur (cf. Vols. II and III), which rapidly decayed. It is still increasing, especially on the Indian Ocean, which washes the chief group of its territories. But the scattered positions of the separate possessions and the manifold legal relations which they bear toward the mother country, their head, form the weakness of this world empire, especially in comparison with its rivals, Russia and the United States. British statesmen have been forced to pay attention to the necessity of giving full scope to the efforts of the colonies toward political and economic separation, in order that they might not follow the example of the North Americans and revolt.

During the first half of the nineteenth century the old colonial restrictive system was still in force. The government nevertheless granted, at the cost of the East Indian Company, free-trade with India (1814) and later also with China (1833) to all British subjects. It concluded reciprocal treaties with the foreign powers, and allowed them liberty of commerce with the colonies (1825), with the exception of the East Indies, which was only opened in 1839 to the commerce of all nations at peace with England. The foreigners still had to pay higher tolls and navigation dues than British subjects; but even these distinctions were removed after the repeal in 1849 of the Navigation Acts of Cromwell’s time. The differences between foreigners, colonists, and subjects of the United Kingdom as regards commerce
with the colonies ceased in 1854. It was a great advantage for all parties concerned when, after the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857, the East Indian Company was dissolved, India taken over by the government (1858), and proclaimed an empire (1876). England then, after she had introduced into India her own system of free-trade and finance, with the secret intention of destroying the still young and unprotected manufacturing industry of India in favour of English manufactures, proceeded in 1894 to systematise a five per cent ad valorem duty to be exacted from all imported articles.

The tendency toward protective duties predominates in the colonies to which the mother country granted independence. This tendency has caused trouble more than once. At the time when free-trade ideas were supreme in England (they are still powerful) nothing was done to check the independence and separation of the colonies. In the years succeeding 1880, however, many counter-movements are noticeable, which are directed toward forming a closer bond between the separate parts of the British Empire. One party of Imperialists (Imperial Federation League) asserts the necessity of a political union of the sections of the empire into a Greater Britain, with imperial parliament, imperial army, imperial finances, etc. Another party, which has adherents also in the colonies, advocates only a closer commercial union between the Old Country and the colonies. An important step in this direction has been taken. Not only did the ministers of the colonies, at the London conferences of 1897, express themselves in favour of giving the preference to English products, but Canada, in 1897, made a twelve and a half per cent, and from July 1, 1898, a twenty-five per cent, reduction of the authorised duties in favour of England and her colonies. In this way non-English products are in Canada subjected to distinctive duties which are one-third higher than those on English goods. The treaties concluded with Belgium and the Customs Union, which stood in the way of this innovation, were at once disclaimed by the British government (1898). England thus at the turn of the century has entered on a new era of commercial policy. The feeling of the British people is gradually becoming more friendly toward imperialistic ideas, which must bring about a rupture with the free-trade notions of the past.

E. WORLD ECONOMICS AND MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

The European colonies, whether new or old, the protectorates and spheres of interest, have assumed such importance that “world economics” and the “world-economical” characteristics of the present day are familiar phrases. Statists like to deal with the general conception of world economics as a summing up of all separate national economies. A vivid, historically complete, and exhaustive conception of the idea of world economics will lay most stress on all the economic circumstances which are felt beyond the narrow circle of the more or less restricted interests of family, town, district, or nation. It will thus, consciously or unconsciously, variously influence the economic conditions existing in most other nations. A bad harvest in the United States, for example, increases the price of corn throughout the world; a financial crash in the Argentines ruins English banking-houses; stock-jobbing in the shares of African mines rouses the lust for speculation in both hemispheres; and so on. The conditions of world economics in themselves go back to the early times before writing, since even in the early
Stone Age barter and the spread of discoveries had an economic influence on the most distant lands and peoples. Every section of history, from that of central Asia to the end of the Mercantile Age, is marked by the peculiar power of world economics. But their extent, force, and speed have so increased in the nineteenth century, that it is only now that men fully comprehend them; and nations have the question brought home to them whether they have derived any lasting advantage from the unhindered entrance of world economics into their once so well-fenced circles. So far as we are willing to accept the modern form of world economics as a mere fact, as the result of forces actively at work, and explain it without criticism, we see it limited in the first place by modern means of communication.

The nineteenth century has adopted from the age of enlightenment in the eighteenth century the idolatrous worship of the present, the “modern,” the “actual,” as well as the contempt for the past, the historical, and the permanent. One thing is certain: the century may pride itself on its technical achievements. It has made steam and electricity subservient to the purposes of human interests. By their forced service all means of communication have been radically changed. Communication on the seas by the steamship, communication on land by steam carriages running on rails, communication of news by the telegraph and the telephone. The post has combined these new aids with those already existing into a mighty international organism, just as was done in a different sphere by another great instrument of communication, the international press.

Every invention must be made several times if it does not appear at the right moment, and even then it will have to fight for its existence against folly, apathy, opposition, and selfishness. How many attempts had miscarried before Robert Fulton’s “Vermont” on the Hudson proved that steam navigation was practicable on rivers at any rate (1807), and before the voyage of the “Savannah” over the Atlantic (1819) overcame the firmly rooted idea that the steamship was useless on the sea? The first regular communication by mail steamers between England and America was established in 1840 (Cunard line). To-day the merchant fleets of western Europe possess fifteen thousand steamers, with a combined burden of ten million tons. The numbers and size of the steamers have increased more rapidly than those of the sailing vessels; but even their carrying capacity has been quadrupled between 1820 and the present day. The relation of steamships to sailing vessels is typical of the relation borne by new inventions full of vitality to old inventions which cling tenaciously to life. These latter are not killed or driven out, as the inventors and promoters boast, but are withdrawn to some unassailable post, where they continue to exist, as the sailing vessel exists for the cheap transport of bulky goods.

Almost at the same time as the steamship, steam land-transport was introduced by the inventive genius of man. Here, too, one out of the many who shared the invention won the great prize of success. To George Stephenson the world owes a serviceable locomotive and the first railways; namely, the original railroad from Stockton to Darlington (1825), and the line from Manchester to Liverpool (1830). In the next decade railways were opened in Belgium, France, Austria, Germany, and North America. The agitation for railway construction in Germany was started by far-sighted promoters, amongst whom the economist Friedrich List and the Westphalian merchant Fritz Harkort are conspicuous. List established his head-
AND MANCHESTER RAILWAY 1831.

( B. Cotsworth, Holgate, York.)
quarters in Leipzig, and accomplished the construction of the railway from that city to Dresden, which was opened in 1839 (see the plate "Beginnings of the English Railway System"), while the small Nuremburg-Fürther line had been opened for traffic as early as 1835. The activity in railway construction continually increased from 1840 onward until the most busy period was reached in the eighth decade in western Europe, and in the ninth in the world generally. The unproductive spirit of speculation has seldom caused more havoc than in the railway world. The "railway kings" of North America (Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jay Gould) and of Europe (Baron von Hirsch) have made their wealth out of the ruin of the shareholders and their undertakings. It was a just counterblast to the principle of unrestrained economic liberty when in some countries the railways were made State property, as in Prussia (1879), Bavaria, Saxony, Austria-Hungary, or were at any rate placed under a legal control, as in England and North America.

The history of the electric telegraph discloses no abuses such as mark that of the railways. The State has from the first taken possession of the telegraph system, except in England, where it became government property later (1869). When the Göttingen professors, Gauss and Weber, on the basis of the discoveries of Galvani, Volta, Simmering, Ampère, Örsted, and Schilling, had conducted a current to a distance of one thousand yards (1833), discoveries followed rapidly which enabled telegraphy to be used in the postal and railway service. Now that the continents are connected by submarine cables (the first transatlantic cable of 1866 was chiefly due to the persistency of Cyrus West Field), telegraphy has become the most effective aid to international trade, especially to speculation. The telephone system (Alexander Graham Bell's telephone, 1876) came in the eighties to reinforce the older inventions.

The modern postal system, the history of which begins in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with private local arrangements, assumed its present form in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the transport of letters, passengers, and goods became a royal monopoly. The old German imperial post was a privilege held on a feudal basis by the families of Thurn and Taxis, who had already, under Maximilian I (1516), won for themselves the credit of having introduced a postal system on a large scale, as well as the fruitful idea of international communication. In the seventeenth century the postal system was so far established that the merchant could transact most of his business in writing, trade by agency could be developed, and the carriage of goods could, under some circumstances, be entrusted to the post. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries good highways seldom existed, or soon fell into disrepair; in the nineteenth century not only well-kept roads, but also all the most modern means of communication, were at the service of the post. It has independent progress of its own to show: Uniform postage (due to Rowland Hill, proposed 1836; Penny Postage Act, 1839) and postage stamps (James Chalmers, proposed 1834, first issue of stamps 1840); post cards (introduced first in Austria, 1869), postal orders, money orders, savings banks (an idea of W. Sykes, a Huddersfield banker, carried out in England 1861), etc. The most important achievement in the system is emphatically the "Universal Postal Union," which was founded through the efforts of Heinrich Stephan, the German postmaster-general (October 9, 1874), and now embraces all the civilised States in the world. Berne is the seat of the permanent International Board of the Universal Postal Union, as also of the boards of the International Telegraph
Administration (1868); of the International Association for the Protection of Commercial, Literary, and Artistic Rights (1886); and of the International Conferences on the Railway Goods Traffic (1890). On the other hand, the International Union for the Metric System of Weights and Measures (1876) has its seat in Paris; the Board for the Suppression of the Slave Trade (1890) and the Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs (1890) hold their sittings in Brussels. Including the Potsdam Board for International Measurement of Degrees, there are now eight international associations dealing with matters which extend beyond the sphere of the interests of individual States.

If the aim of the post-office is to transmit news, it is the function of the press to publish and to discuss it. Its true and authentic history in the nineteenth century cannot be written until we have a complete history of the great financial powers of the age. But the turning-point can already be determined when the newspaper system of earlier times entered the service of the great capitalists, and became a wide commercial undertaking. It was the time of the July government, when the great speculator Louis Philippe of Orleans was king of the French (1830–1848). Émile de Girardin, the founder of "La Presse," led the way. The press is now allied to capital in the main. The exhibition system leads to similar results.

F. Money and Credit

The most important of all means of intercourse, money, at least actual coinage, is now indeed no longer exposed to the official jugglery of former times; but with the paper substitutes for money there have been in this period nearly as many underhand dealings as before. The price of the two precious metals and their ratio of exchange are immediately dependent on the amount of the supply. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Brazil, which also supplied diamonds, was added to the sources whence gold came. In the first half of the nineteenth century the Russian mines produced an important increase in the stock of gold. Then, shortly before the middle of the century, the gold-fields of California (1847) and Australia (1851) were discovered, the productiveness of which was announced by the rise in the price of commodities, which was more rapid than had been the case in the sixteenth century. The output of gold from these two sources soon began to diminish, and the fear of a gold famine was already felt, when the South African gold-fields were discovered and became extremely productive, as did the diamond mines in their vicinity. The supply of silver also increased after the middle of the nineteenth century, when the mines in the Cordilleras of South America were added to the sources formerly available. While the demand for gold kept pace with the output, the supply of silver was in excess of the demand, so that in almost all great commercial States the coinage of silver was diminished or suspended. The result of this has been a continuous shrinkage, since 1874, in the price of silver and a corresponding alteration in the ratio of value between the two precious metals. The supply of gold from 1500 to 1800 is estimated at £475,000,000; to this were added in the first half of the nineteenth century £115,000,000, and in the second half nearly £1,500,000,000, so that from 1500 to 1900 we have, roughly, total of £2,000,000,000. While the ratio of value between the white and the yellow metal up to 1870 or so had varied little from that of 1:15¾, which under-
lies the coinage of francs, it has fallen since then, though with constant fluctuations, to an average of 1:35.

The depreciation of silver hastened the transition to a gold standard of currency, which was brought about by many other causes. The currency question of the century is admittedly no mere contest of opinions, but a question of interests which influences political life. In the first half of the century the countries having a silver and bimetallic standard still formed the majority. England alone abandoned the paper-money system which had prevailed during the great war period, and adopted a gold standard (1816). Not till 1873 did any populous country follow the British example. In that year Germany introduced a gold standard. Its example was followed by the Scandinavian Monetary Union, 1873–1875; by Holland, 1875; Austria-Hungary, 1892 (though the matter is not yet definitely settled); and by Japan, 1897. France remained true to her bimetallism, which was established in 1803, even when she concluded the “Latin Monetary Convention” with Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland (1865); but she has suspended the mintage of silver. The white metal, though fallen into disfavour, still had a refuge in southeastern Asia, where it has been collected for many thousand years. In 1893, however, Great Britain prohibited the private coinage of silver even in her Indian empire, which she now threatens with the universal yellow currency. The Americans also had to abandon the attempt, by means of special laws (Bland’s and Sherman’s bills), to put into circulation a part of their silver output. The coined money of the respective districts where it has currency is only partly in circulation; part of it reposes in the cellars of the banks which issue notes, and, fructified by credit, produces paper substitutes. With the exception of the English banks, the arrangements of which rest on the 1844 Bank Act of Peel, the great note-issuing institutions of Europe date from the nineteenth century; namely, the Bank of France (1800), the National Bank of Austria (founded 1816, changed into the Austrian-Hungarian Bank 1878), the Imperial Bank of Germany (1875), the Banca d’Italia, constructed out of the ruins of a great banking crash (1884), etc. While the earlier banks which issued notes were State banks, those of the nineteenth century are mostly private joint-stock banks, and therefore exposed to the influence of the great financiers. But even those governments which wish to be paid for the monopoly granted to the banks frequently influence the note-issuing establishments to the disadvantage of monetary matters. This has been the case in Austria during the war period, 1792–1815. After the “monetary crash” (State bankruptcy) of 1811, and its sequel in 1816, the system of notes was regulated; but there prevails in Austria since 1848 an irredeemable paper currency issued by the banks, to which was joined in 1866 an uncovered State paper currency. Since this has not yet been redeemed, and the State’s debt to the bank is not liquidated, the gold currency, ordered in 1892, has not yet been entirely established. The States of southern Europe are in a still worse plight, to say nothing of those outside Europe, the financial crises of which, in the present amalgamation of world economics, are felt in western Europe, the home of international loans, and produce disastrous results.

The financial requirements of the Great Powers on the threshold of the nineteenth century once more produced an international plutocracy, whose riches and power bear the same proportion to those of the Fuggers as do the economics of the world, nations, and States bear to those of the sixteenth century. It will
be a difficult task to write the history of the age of the Rothschilds. In consequence of individualist freedom of action the old bonds of profession and rank are broken, and individuals are exposed unprotected to immoderate competition and unbridled speculation. Thus temporary associations, such as stock companies, mutual arrangements, or syndicates on the money market, may acquire boundless power.

The denationalising of economic life and the absorption of national economics by universal economics have rendered it possible for the loosely connected international Judaism to establish a sovereignty whose twin pillars are the Bourse and the Press. The alliance between banks and bourses has also produced the characteristic product of the nineteenth century, — the joint-stock bank, or financial company, which is intended to supply speculation with fresh means of gambling by the formation of new companies, and to gain money for itself by speculations. The model of this class of bank is the “Crédit Mobilier” at Paris, which the brothers Jacques Émile and Isaac Péréire, two Jews of Portuguese descent, founded in 1852, with the ostensible object of breaking the power of the German Jews of the Rothschild group. Andreas Langrand-Dumontceaux (1869) and Eugène Bontoux (1880–1882) made similar professions, in order to entice into their net the otherwise inaccessible capital of the clerical and conservative circles.

Individualism, then, or the principle of free competition, in the nineteenth century has led to an invertebrate system of world economics under the despotism of the speculators, who have all fields of production in their power (Rings and Trusts) and foster the continuous fluctuation of all values, from which source come the gains and finally the colossal fortunes of these multi-millionaires.

G. European Agriculture and its Precarious Position

If we cast another glance on the several productive areas of western Europe, agriculture with its various offshoots shows itself to be most deeply affected by the intrusion of world economics into its sphere. When agriculture in Europe was liberated by the Revolution from the fetters of feudalism, a feeling of relief spread through the world, the gleam of a new dawn illuminated human existence in the old vale of tears. The liberation of the peasants in France (1789) was followed by the emancipation in Prussia (1807–1851) and in Austria (enfranchisement of the soil, 1848); even in Russia itself serfdom was abolished (1861). England, which had no serfs and therefore no need for emancipation, placed herself at the head of the movement which aimed at the abolition of slavery. This, however, only indirectly affected European affairs. The slave-trade had been practically ended in 1820, but the abolition of slavery in Central and South America was not completed until 1888.

Agriculture in the nineteenth century made encouraging progress, not merely in social, but also in technical respects. The transition from the three-field system to that of rotation of crops had been effected in the preceding century. Farming, stock-breeding, and forestry, thanks to chemistry and biology, were placed on a rational basis. They became a science, and, where capital could be applied, an industry.

International relations also promised well. Europe seemed desirous to be divided into two spheres: an industrial sphere with insufficient production of food and raw
materials, and an agricultural sphere which should exchange its surplus of foodstuffs and raw materials with the former in return for the products of its industries. Holland and Belgium had been deficient in corn for centuries. Great Britain also now opened her harbours to the ships which imported natural products, after the great landed proprietors, who had obtained an enormous income from land owing to high protective duties, had been deposed by the great industrial organisations, under the leadership of the Lancashire cotton-spinners, and through the agitation which they introduced (anti-corn-law league). The corn duties were remitted in 1846, the import of breadstuffs was free, and Russia, the German provinces on the Baltic, and Hungary took advantage of the remission.

The peaceful division of production between the agricultural and the industrial countries of Europe, by which the former felt themselves prejudiced, was not long maintained. On the one side the industrial population of western Europe increased so much that the imports from the smaller part of the globe were no longer sufficient, and in countries which until then had been predominantly agricultural the industrial population gradually became the majority, as in the German Empire after 1871. On the other hand, more favourably situated districts outside western Europe were able to furnish such supplies of breadstuffs that they could keep pace with the greatest increase of the industrial population. From the moment when transmarine countries entered into competition with the agriculturists of Europe for the supply of food and raw materials, signs were shown of a chronic crisis which has lasted to the present time. Russia alone, thanks to its fertile black-soil (the so-called Tschernosem) and cheap labour, held its own with the United States, India, Australia, and the Argentine Republic.

Since this turning-point in the destinies of western European agriculture was reached in 1875–1876, the crisis has already lasted a quarter of a century. The world at large that lives from hand to mouth concerns itself little with the fact that the soil by the extravagant systems of its workers is nearly exhausted on both sides of the ocean. It cares little whether the grain-exporting countries themselves have enough to eat, or whether myriads of their inhabitants must starve, as in Russia and India. In the trade in natural products — the corn-trade alone embraces the tenth part of the entire trade of the world — it is not the conditions of production, the supply and demand, that in the first place determine the universal prices, from which in every single department of national economics the rent of the soil, wages, and trade profits depend, but the international bourses with their speculation and their sham transactions, by which often thirty times more is sold than is in hand. Besides this, the products, when ripe for use, notwithstanding the low universal prices, which almost ruin the European agriculturists, do not reach the consumer better and cheaper than at the time of the high local prices; for numerous classes of middlemen in turn absorb the difference in price. To that excess of industrial and commercial enterprises, which began in the mercantile system and has been indefinitely increased in the age of free-trade, may be attributed the inanition from which the agriculture of western Europe and the whole world suffers.

H. INDUSTRY AND TRADE

In the face of such crying evils we might refresh our spirits with a comparative estimate of the quantity of coal, iron, cotton yarn, beet-sugar, etc., which Europe
produced at the beginning of the century of free-trade and still produces; but the economic and social changes in the commercial system are discussed in a separate section of the eighth volume. We cannot conceal the fact that in all the technical progress of the age a considerable part of mechanical and chemical ingenuity has been applied to the production of adulterations and substitutions, or the wholesale manufacture of cheap and inferior goods. The point must be emphasised that the manufacture, which the merchant class promoted on account of the profitable foreign trade, has now become a great end in itself, requiring its regular over-production under all conditions to be disposed of by trade. The State, the influence of which the producers otherwise decline to acknowledge, is now expected to support with customs tariffs and commercial treaties, with fire and sword, the business transactions of those circles from whose pockets the professional speculators, who stand aside, will eventually extract the profits.

Over-production and over-speculation are the causes of the crises in markets and speculations, by which the century of commercial competition is divided into alternate periods of economic prosperity and depression. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the separate national industries were more distinct from each other, the return of these crises was first noticeable in the country which had made the greatest commercial progress, Great Britain. As the century advanced and as the universal connection of national economics became wider and wider, so stagnation in production and in sales, followed by precipitation and catastrophes, spread more and more. During the continental blockade (1806–1814) the products of industrial labour in England accumulated, and after its removal could not be sold owing to the deficiency of buyers on the continent, which was exhausted by the war. Great distress therefore prevailed among the industrial firms connected with export business (1815), while production remained for years at a standstill. Over-speculation in foreign loans and shares caused another crisis in 1825. The establishment of an excessive number of banks was the cause of the crisis of 1836–1839, which was rendered more acute by a contemporary crisis in North America. A result of excessive speculation in railways and corn during the forties was the crisis of 1847, which was felt in all the chief commercial centres of the world. Still more wide was the range of the shock caused by the crisis in 1857, when the augmented supply of gold through the discovery of the mines on the Pacific had immensely increased the rage for speculation. The seventh decade began with the cotton crisis during the Civil War in America (1861–1865); besides this a commercial panic prevailed in London (1866) in consequence of over-promotion of joint-stock companies. Then came some years of brilliant prosperity, a period of great commercial opportunities; but it was also marked by the most senseless fury in gambling, owing to the fact that France had to pay to the victorious German Empire during 1871–1873 a war indemnity of £200,000,000 sterling, and there was no lack of tempting profits to be realised. Excessive speculation and reckless formation of companies brought on the “great crash” of 1873, which began in Austria, a country formerly shut off from the world; but the crippling results to universal economics which followed the local catastrophe lasted until 1878. The five years of stagnation were followed by five years of prosperity in international trade (1878–1883), then came once more five years of depression (1883–1888), renewed prosperity, 1888–1890, renewed depression, 1890–1896, and finally prosperity in quite recent years, with unusually favourable turns of the market from 1899 to 1900. Besides this, during the whole period
the money market and stock exchange, as well as each separate article of universal commerce, have their own barometrical variations, their rise and fall, and in this way the all-prevailing spirit of speculation maintains its hold.

What policy, especially what commercial policy, has accompanied these phenomena? At the beginning of the long period of peace after the fall of Napoleon most countries persevered with their traditional system of exclusion and protection, in fact at times, as with France and Austria, they actually intensified it where its rigour had been in some degree modified. In Great Britain the free-trade which was combating the system of protection was no mere theory, but the practical indispensable condition of the further development of the great industries now thrown on to the markets of the world. Only when this country, economically the most powerful in the world, succeeded by diplomacy and by treaties in opening the closed markets of all other weaker countries did she enjoy that supremacy in the world trade which had been destroyed for her by the protective measures of the Continent. Immediately, however, the free-trade party — the great manufacturers and great traders — had to remove the internal obstacles which were put in the way by the Tory chiefs, the great landowners. The first champion of a liberal trading policy was William Huskisson, President of the Board of Trade (1823–1827); the free-trade system forced its way owing to the reforms of Sir Robert Peel (1841–1846), the abolition of the Navigation Acts (1849), and the reforms of Gladstone, in the fifties. The epoch-making Anglo-French commercial treaty of 1860, called the Cobden Treaty, after the English representative, inaugurated the period of international free-trade. While, however, most European countries have returned from unqualified free-trade to moderate protective tariffs, England has up to the present day remained true to the principles of 1860. Quite recently more frequent indications that she is wavering in this policy are apparent. There are at any rate strong counter-currents of opinion, such as imperialism, the tendency toward an imperial tariff, and the Fair Trade League (since 1881), a party which wishes to concede free-trade only in exchange for free-trade, and demands protective duties from States which impose similar duties.

In the other countries of western Europe except Holland the free-trade movement started by England was followed for a time and then the policy of protection was resumed, although generally the principle was upheld that advantages to particular branches of national production might be obtained by treaties on the basis of mutual concessions. The revulsion against free-trade was most emphatically expressed in France. In the first half of the century a complete system of protection with regard to agriculture and commerce had been in force, but in 1860, from general political motives, Napoleon III adopted the system of free-trade. The current of opinion in favour of protection ran from the beginning so strongly in the Third Republic, founded in 1871, that since 1881 it has carried everything before it. Since 1892 France has re-established a system of protective solidarity, with high duties on land products and manufactures, and separate tariffs to the disadvantage of foreigners in the colonies. Foreigners are excluded from coast trade, and a maximum tariff is enforced against all countries which do not grant the French the rights of the most favoured nation. Neither free-trade nor the opposite policy has exercised any unfavourable influence on the continuous increase of the prosperity of France.

German trade also has in the nineteenth century become completely independ-
ent, and, together with revived industrial activity, has shown since the founding of the new empire a prosperity which surpasses the most brilliant stages of the past. At the beginning of the century there was indeed no German national economy. But Prussia soon recognised the advantage which the economic union of Germany under its own flag would give it when facing its Austrian rival. Prussia itself passed a more liberal customs law than any country of that time possessed. In 1833 it concluded the treaties on which is based the German Customs Union (Zollverein), which came into force on January 1, 1834. In conformity with the interests of a people still weak in industries a protective tendency prevailed in the union. After the confederation had twice resisted the attempts of Austria to compel her admission (1853 and 1865), it was carried away by the free-trade movement of the sixties, which reached its culminating point in the year 1877. Bismarck's financial, commercial, and social reforms commenced with the year 1879 on the basis of protective solidarity, in which the agricultural interests so important for the east of Germany were fully recognised. In 1892 the empire concluded with the States of central Europe (Austria-Hungary, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland) agreements as to tariffs which will be in force until 1904. Meantime the empire, with a united trade policy, had become the first commercial power on the Continent and the second in the whole world. As an industrial country, it takes the third place.

Austria-Hungary has also gone through similar phases of commercial policy. The Josephine system of exclusion was still in force up to 1850. The next decade was characterised by a modified protective system, after the customs barriers between the Hungarian provinces and the rest of the empire had fallen. The free-trade impulse, by which the whole world was affected, found expression in the commercial treaties of the sixties. Yet at the beginning of the next decade a strong counter-movement set in, which was strengthened by the unfortunate experiences of the calamitous year 1873. The empire adopted autonomous protective customs in 1878, and joined in 1892 the system of commercial treaties in central Europe. A similar course is taken by the history of commercial policy in Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries.

Nothing is so flattering to the self-complacency of the age as a comparison of the great figures which testify to the upward tendency of production and foreign trade. Men who regard the world from a predominantly concrete standpoint, without any conception of incommensurable values, are completely bewildered when rows of figures are presented to them, according to which, for example, the combined international sale of goods, reckoning together imports and exports, in the year 1897 is computed at from £3,500,000,000 to £4,000,000,000. As concerns the trade balance, the difference between imports and exports, western Europe is completely passive, that is, it imports more than it exports, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, which in this point belongs to the East, while Russia, Servia, Bulgaria, and Turkey have similarly an active trading balance.

The proposition is still true of the trade of western Europe, that it has to supply the industries of its part of the world with raw material, and to bring European manufactures to the countries that have chiefly natural products. But the spread of Europeanism produces the effect that the number of non-European countries with home industries increases, and therefore the number of markets for European wares diminishes. While the agriculture of western Europe is no longer
sufficient to support the population, and further is ruined by foreign competition, the European industrial workers who must obtain by their labour the necessary means of life are approaching the point where competition from non-European countries threatens them. Agriculture suffers under an endless depression, and is the victim of an increasing burden of debt. Industries and trade pass from one crisis to another, and can only flourish under peculiarly favourable conditions. The free-trade principle does not even secure for them the home market, which after all they do not value, as they are eager for the world market. Semi-Asiatic Russia is already fostering industries which have made it more independent of the West than the hungry West is of the Russian corn. It is now extending its railroads to the Pacific Ocean in order to assume the sovereignty in the much-contested East. Like Russia and North America, India is freeing herself, and Japan has thrown off the yoke of west European trade. When southeastern Asia, which numbers 700,000,000 to 800,000,000 tractable, frugal inhabitants, has completely adopted the material civilisation of western Europe, then the industries of the smaller continent must yield to them; and as a merchant the Asiatic has always been at least the equal of the European.

It is the destiny of the universal economic expansion of western Europe to be excluded from or outrun plugged by its natural spheres of expansion, while, notwithstanding the prospect of coming disaster, it must always strive for rapid furtherance of its universal economy in order that it may exist at least for the immediate future. If ever the foreign countries which are still half-grown refuse to Europe proper the tribute of the still ample trading profits, because they have become grown-up, independent, and competent rivals, Europe will have to look for her salvation to those warlike and political forces which the branch of the Indo-Europeans that settled here has never allowed to be neglected. But Nature placed other forces in the cradle of the European, and history has developed them in him,—the gifts of discovery and invention, of thought and form, which confer on him more than the rude tyrant's power, and give him the right of sovereignty over the earth. As Goethe says, "The law is mighty, but necessity is mightier."
II

RENAISSANCE, REFORMATION, AND COUNTER-REFORMATION

BY DR. ARMIN TILLE

1. THE AGE OF THE REFORM-MOVEMENTS IN CHURCH AND STATE

A. THE STIMULUS GIVEN TO CIVILISATION IN WESTERN EUROPE BY THE RENAISSANCE

(a) The Renascence of Classical Learning in Italy. — Italy had already enjoyed a long period of development in culture at the time when the countries northward of the Alps first became the scene of events bearing on the history of the world. The system of latifundia, under the later empire, had depopulated wide tracts and caused such general retrogression in civilisation, that the Germanic invaders of the fifth and following centuries found almost primitive economic conditions prevailing there. The past was forgotten under the supremacy of the youthful Germanic nations. The old civilisation broke up. The remains of the ancient buildings were either wilfully demolished, or fell to ruin from neglect. It was only after some centuries that, as the product of a great blending of nationalities, a new nation was formed which, aided by a favourable economic development, was able to exhibit admirable results in the sphere of intellectual life.

In a country where the city of Rome, more than ever the intellectual centre of the whole world, daily recalled to men's minds the great past of more than fifteen hundred years, a past of which the medieval mind formed a quite peculiar and inaccurate conception, the newly aroused intellectual interest could hardly occupy itself with any other object than the literary productions of the ancients. The most gifted intellects tried to understand the ancients, to breathe fresh life into them, and to emulate the old masters in their lives as well as in their writings. They did not indeed go much further than the attempt. Our later age must pass this verdict even on those intellectual heroes who thought themselves Romans in every respect.

The Laws of Justinian had in the last thirty years of the eleventh century been intelligently readapted for practical purposes in Pavia. After the founding of the University of Bologna (1088), this town became the real home of jurisprudence on the basis of the abstract law of the Roman imperial times. The importance which was attached both there and in Milan to the Corpus Juris is clearly shown by the fact that the law enacted by Frederick I for the peace of the empire (c. 1152), as
well as two books on Feudalism (*libri feudorum*) from the time of Hugolinus de Presbyteris, were actually regarded as supplements to the *Corpus Juris Civilis*. It seemed to the men of that time that such an idea would do more to ensure the observance of those modern laws than the mere proclamation, which otherwise must have sufficed. The scientific treatment of the Roman legal monuments was due to a directly felt practical need, the want of legal standards, which should correspond to the altered economic conditions consequent on more frequent means of communication, and which actually were supplied by the law of the Roman emperors. On the other hand, the eager study of the ancient Roman literature, which began with the end of the thirteenth century, is closely connected with political events. The new conception of the State is an important factor in that intellectual movement which we are accustomed to designate "Renaissance."

The romantic attempt of a Cola di Rienzo to transform Rome into a republic after the ancient model, and to place himself at its head as tribune (May 20, 1347), is only the fantastic realisation of the ancient conception of the State which he had found in the works of Livy and Cicero. The relations of the revived classical learning to politics are clearly shown in the fact that the enthusiastic admirers of antiquity wrote history in a new and conspicuously different form from their mediæval predecessors. Albertino Mussato (1261–1329), when he wrote the history of his time, no longer started with the beginning of the world like a mediæval chronicler, but treated the political events of his century like a man who had himself taken part in political life and had a distinct prejudice in favour of Henry VII. He evidently follows the style of the old Roman models, and their influence is still more apparent in his poems, particularly in his tragedies.

Even before Mussato, Brunetto Latini, a shrewd politician, familiar with the Latin writers, especially Ovid, had designated politics as absolutely the noblest and highest science, and thus proved that he had in a very marked degree risen above the Middle Ages. His practical grasp of political history is attested by a comparison which he has drawn up between England and France; but notwithstanding his familiarity with the ancients he wrote his own encyclopedic works (*Il livres dou trésor*) in French, in order to be universally intelligible. He probably would have been forgotten by now, had he not been the teacher of Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), the man who first so absorbed the learning of antiquity that he created in its spirit works artistically complete and yet modern. These, being written in Italian, not only made the ancient world accessible to the widest circles, but also by the employment of the national language contributed largely to the awakening of a national feeling. His guide through the pagan world was Virgil, the Roman who, in the development of his ideas, came nearest to Christianity.

Dante's general philosophic ideas, as contained in the Divine Comedy, are therefore Christian as a whole, however much they may be in direct opposition to the prevailing theology of his day. He confronted the papal ambitions of Boniface VIII, and in his treatise in Latin, "De Monarchia," he insisted on the independent position of the Roman emperor by the side of the Pope. Although a republican by birth,—Florence was his home,—he advocated a powerful world sovereignty, with Italy naturally as centre. The personality of the emperor Henry VII may have been of considerable influence in thus shaping his thoughts.

Francesco Petrarca (1304–1374) possessed less political talent than Dante. A member of a Florentine family, he had spent his youth in Avignon, and on April 8,
1341, had been crowned as poet at Rome by King Robert of Naples. His Latin poems alone won him this distinction; but his writings, partly historical, partly philosophical (among others one on the best administration of the State, the "Liber de Republica optime administrandâ"), are still more steeped in poetic feeling and display some slight knowledge of politics. As an admirer of Rome and the Latin language he was no petty imitator of the ancients, but a writer in Latin with a style of his own. So far he shows a distinct advance as compared with Dante.

He stands out as a truly modern man in the midst of a still medieval environment from the manner in which he, almost alone at that time, regards astrology as a fanciful illusion, and by the form of his ideal attachment to Laura, whom he extols in his Italian poems. Giovanni Boccaccio (1313–1375), the biographer of Dante and the friend of Petrarch, gives prominence far more than they do to a quite different idea, which is part of the literary property of the age. He remorselessly attacks the church and the clergy, notwithstanding outward piety and submission to the Pope. The corrupt morality of the priests is lashed with biting satire in his "Decamerone," which has unjustly caused him to be reproached with irreligion. He lacked the deeper political ability requisite to attack the secular position of the Pope, although, being often sent on diplomatic missions, he was certainly familiar with the politics of the day.

All sides of an individual intellectual life are embodied in these three men, who went in advance of their age and yet were influenced by it. They themselves were imbued with the idea that a new era was opening, even if their environment had slowly and laboriously to arrive at a similar knowledge. The number of those who understood the Latin of the ancients was still comparatively small. But this was soon changed. Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406), chancellor of the Florentine Republic, introduced the language of Cicero into the State documents, and the Augustinian monk Luigi Marsili (1342–1394), filled with deep reverence for antiquity, was able to combine with his spiritual position vehement attacks on the papacy. Numerous scholars joined him, and Florence became the seat of the ancient learning in a new form.

The writings of the Latins were still almost exclusively the subjects of study. Petrarch himself, with all his reverence for the Greek world, did not master the language. Boccaccio was one of the first who thoroughly understood it, and throughout the whole fourteenth century it was very difficult in Italy to obtain instruction in Greek. It was therefore an event when in 1393, in order to escape the dangers which the siege of Constantinople by Bajazet brought with it, two Greek men of letters, Demetrius Cydonius and Manuel Chrysoloras, came to Venice. Young Florentines went to be taught by them, and in 1396 Chrysoloras was summoned to the University of Florence as public teacher of Greek grammar and literature. He soon afterward taught the new language in Pavia, Venice, and Rome. Then in 1439, at the invitation of the Florentine council, the aged Gemistus Plethon appeared in Italy, lectured first in public on the doctrines of Plato, and by so doing created a counterpoise to Aristotle, whose philosophy then dominated the schools. Platonic academies sprang up at Florence and Rome, and in both towns translators began to show a feverish energy: Polybius, Aristotle, Plutarch, Epictetus, Strabo, amongst others were translated into Latin. Homer alone was as yet left untranslated. Latin and Greek toward the middle of the century stood as equals side by side, and were equally favoured by the two centres, Florence and Rome.
Cosimo de' Medici (1389–1464) was the son of a Florentine merchant. From 1429 onward he stood at the head of his native town, and after 1434 guided its fortunes permanently. An enthusiastic patron of all learning, with ample means at his disposal, he developed great energy in building. At the same time, being himself deeply erudite and possessing a refined knowledge of the authors of ancient Rome, he formed, by means of transcribers and translators, an absolutely unique library of manuscripts. Roberto di Rossi translated Aristotle, Lapi da Castiglione, and Plutarch. A complete circle of scholars assembled round Cosimo: the best known among them is Marsilio Ficino (1433–1499). Cosimo's grandson, Lorenzo the Magnificent (d. 1492), was, like his grandfather, a patron of art. Of artistic and poetic nature himself, he became the Maecenas for the artists and poets of his time. The library was further enlarged by him according to the plan of Cosimo; architecture, painting, sculpture, working in bronze, and even music flourished anew under his rule.

The Archbishop of Bologna, Thomas Pasentucelli, was elected Pope on March 18, 1447, and took the title of Nicholas V (d. 1455). He had lived at Florence in the circle of Cosimo, and now, on accession to the pontificate, he founded a similar scientific centre by the formation of a second library of manuscripts. He sent out collectors to travel and search for manuscripts of ancient writers, and raised his collection of books under the care of the librarian Giovanni Tortello (d. 1466) to five thousand volumes, of which the Greek formed no small part. Among the scholars to whom Nicholas V collected round him, Lorenzo Valla (d. 1457) incontestably takes the first place. In the domain of historical criticism he stands supreme. Besides him Maffeo Vegio (d. 1458), an Augustinian monk well acquainted with antiquity, and Flavio Biondo (1388–1463), the author of a mediæval universal history from the capture of Rome by the Goths to his own time, are worthy of record. This work shows great progress in method. Almost for the first time the events of the thousand years, which were afterward called the Middle Ages, are recorded by the side of ancient history.

The efforts of Pope Nicholas were not appreciated by his successors. Calixtus III (1455–1458) dispersed the library which had been collected with such pains. Pius II (1458–1464), before his pontificate known as Æneas Silvius Piccolomini, was himself familiar with the classics, and was also a spirited and vigorous writer, but he had nothing to spare for other scholars. Paul II (1464–1471) absolutely hated all science, and persecuted the Humanists, although he showed a wish to preserve old buildings. Sixtus IV (1471–1484) was no scholar; but under him the library and the archives were transferred to new and larger rooms, and placed under the competent direction of Bartolommeo Sacchi ("Platina"). Art found once more a vigorous patron in Julius II (1503–1513), and literature in Leo X (1513–1521).

Zeal for learning was not so prominent in the other States of Italy as in Florence and, intermittently, at Rome. Even in Venice, where, owing to the general rich development, much might fairly have been expected, very little was done. Only spasmodic efforts were made, and these often failed. Nevertheless, toward the end of the fifteenth century Aldus Manutius, the liberally educated printer and publisher, acquired his world-wide reputation there. Artistic life, on the contrary, was more flourishing in Venice than in any other city excepting Florence. At first, indeed, it was almost entirely carried on by the people of Murano in the
pay of Venice, but soon, under Paduan influence, art flourished at Venice with almost unparalleled luxuriance. The Bellini in rich and skilful colouring found still more splendid successors in Giorgione (d. 1510), Titian (1477–1576), and Paul Veronese (d. 1588). At the court of Ferrara lived Lodovico Ariosto (1474–1533), the poet of the "Orlando Furioso;" and at Naples Giovanni Pontano (1426–1503), an eager patron of mathematics and astronomy.

(b) The Stimulus to Intellectual Independence given by the Revival of the Antique.—By "Renaissance" we understand primarily that which the word literally signifies, the "new birth," that is, of the antique. The antique was the great model which the supporters of the newly awakened intellectual life followed, or zealously tried to follow; for in truth to the observer, who looks back, the classical model seems to recede far into the distance as compared with the newly discovered independence which forms the chief feature of all this age of culture. Thus the new conception kept the name "Renaissance," but the idea implied something quite different. The Renaissance owes to the antique an infinite abundance of incentives. Ancient works of art were collected, excavations were begun, ancient architecture was sketched and copied. The results of this continuous activity were applied to the new creations, but these were themselves of a quite different style from their models. It is not so important a fact that Niccolo Pisano (d. 1280) adopted figures and even groups of figures from the remains of sculpture which existed at Pisa, giving them a new and Christian meaning, as that he drew his love of the beautiful from the contemplation and study of the antique. The style of his reliefs is quite different from the art of the Roman sarcophagi, and on the whole he owes what is great and new in his work far more to himself and the newly awakened feeling for the life around him than to any model. The slight connection that this new art has with the antique schools is best seen in the productions of his son Giovanni (d. 1320), to whom the storm and stress around him and within him was everything and antique art was nothing.

Within certain limits Giotto (1266–1337) represents a similar stage of development in painting. If the art of the two Pisanos had been already spread throughout all Italy by pupils and fellow-craftsmen, this was still more the case with Giotto's art. The Italian painting of the fourteenth century may without exaggeration be termed Giottesque; and the overpowering impression produced by this new art is due to its vigour, till then unprecedented, its inner truthfulness which aims at the essential,—in a word, its realism. The painting of the fourteenth century derived nothing from antiquity, because there were no remains of ancient pictures. To architecture, on the other hand, the Roman soil, although then much still lay buried, offered, in particular cases at any rate, a supply of good models. But even here the influence of the antique was far less than was once supposed. The problems had become quite different, and they were differently solved. Brunellesco (1377–1446), the builder of the dome of the cathedral at Florence, who is called the first great architect of the Renaissance, has borrowed from the antique little more than the ornamentation and the shaping of the pillars and the entablature, certainly an important part of the edifice.

It is noteworthy that it was not Rome with her world of ancient relics, but Florence, where the early Renaissance was chiefly developed. It is true that very many artists from the Tuscan capital came to Rome in order to copy the Roman
remains, and a great Florentine, Leon Battista Alberti (1404–1472), who worked far more outside his native city than in it, tried to excel the antique in ornamentation, especially in the shape of façades. But Padua still more than Florence became the chief centre of that revival of ancient art. Squarcione (1394–1474) had founded there an atelier, in which copies were made of originals collected from all sources, even, it is said, in Greece itself. This fact explains the stiff sculptur-esque style of the art of his pupil, the painter and etcher, Andrea Mantegna (1431–1506), who has also become known by his representations of ancient subjects, especially by his “Triumph of Caesar.” He carried his art from Padua to Mantua and Rome, while in Venice the Paduan spirit was seen in many works of Jacopo Bellini and his sons, who surpassed him in importance, Gentile (d. 1507) and Giovanni (d. 1516).

The remains of antique architecture, which in many places lay buried under ruins, were not only studied by artists, but preserved. Indeed, they were often formed into collections of antiquities, while strange to relate a quite barbarian delight in destruction often simultaneously showed itself. Nicholas V, the enthusiastic patron of art and science, actually used for his new erections stones from the ruins of Roman architectural monuments, and commanded the temple of Probus to be destroyed; yet under him the enlargement of the Capitol was begun, and much care was devoted to the preservation of old pavements and early Christian tombs. Pius II took more decided steps for the preservation of Roman buildings. Even before his pontificate he cautioned persons against burning the ancient marble to obtain lime, and as pope he issued — although, indeed, without much success — a rescript which threatened the most severe penalties for the further destruction of old buildings (April 28, 1462). Even Pope Paul II, the enemy of the Humanists (1464–1471), not only showed a refined appreciation for the ancient works of art, but was an indefatigably keen collector, who made his collection of Roman antiquities noteworthy even by the side of that of the Medici. A rich native of Treviso had as early as 1335 founded in Venice a collection of medals, coins, bronzes, cut stones, and manuscripts. In the next century the town preserved her reputation and became the chief repository of ancient works of art.

The great personality with whom the history of Italian painting in the fifteenth century begins is Masaccio (1401–1428). The feature which distinguishes his most important work, the frescos in the chapel of the Brancacci, from all earlier productions of painting is its absolute truthfulness. The realism already budding in Giotto had completely ripened in Masaccio. His thorough anatomical knowledge, his better developed perspective, the breadth of his compositions, and his distribution of the masses raised his art far beyond that of the previous century. The art of painting flourished in similar luxuriance throughout the whole fifteenth century. A contemporary of Masaccio is the Dominican Fra Giovanni Angelico (1387–1455), who, from the feeling manifest in his works, is almost more Gothic than a follower of the Renaissance, but nevertheless is in this sense typical of a whole group of artists. After him come Fra Filippo Lippi, Botticelli, Domenico Ghirlandajo, and the group of the painter-sculptor Pollajuoli, Verrocchio, and Lorenzo di Credi, who decorated with their skill the altars and the great surfaces of the walls in the churches of Tuscany.

At the same time, however, amid the great tasks which architecture presented, plastic art had developed a luxuriance to which it had only attained in ancient
Greece. The century opens with the competition for the bronze door of the baptistery. Lorenzo Ghiberti (d. 1455) was the victor, but Donatello (d. 1466) is the foremost plastic artist of the century. He is thoroughly original in every respect. Only in his very earliest works can any connection with the older masters be traced. Then he cast aside all that was non-individual, and gave play only to his uncompromisingly realistic nature, which did not even shrink from what was ugly. He worked for different patrons in wood, clay, stone, and brass. He created for Padua the bronze equestrian statue of Gattamelata (completed 1453). After more than a thousand years a technically difficult task had once more been set, and had been performed artistically on the grandest scale.

An abundant stream of art flowed in the fifteenth century through every part of Italy. Toward the end of the century the foremost artists from Florence and Umbria were summoned to Rome to decorate the Sistine Chapel. In Florence itself all art culminated in the three names Lionardo da Vinci, Michelangelo Buonarroti, and Raphael Santi. Lionardo (d. 1519) was a “universal man,” like Goethe, a marvellously gifted nature, — architect, sculptor, painter, engineer, physicist, and anatomist, a founder and discoverer in every department, and yet in every other respect a perfect human being, immensely strong, beautiful till extreme old age, famous as a musician and composer. In 1505 the Florentine Michelangelo (1475–1564) became his rival. He too was painter, sculptor, and architect, and in addition a thoughtful philosophic poet. The chief scene of his activity was Rome, where the popes of the time, being lovers of art, gave his creative imagination the right opportunities. In Raphael of Urbino (d. 1520) the whole purpose was at last fulfilled which the painting of the fifteenth century had prepared. All the tones ring out full and true in his art.

The direction of all these efforts toward the revival of the classical antiquity implies for the men of that time an immense increase of knowledge and extension of the field of view within a comparatively short time. But scanned from the standpoint of the later development the value of the whole movement consists less in the knowledge actually transmitted than in the stimulus to intellectual freedom, in the promotion of individual thought, which should inevitably lead to a struggle against the spirit of scholasticism.

By the side of Christian authority embodied in the papacy there appeared the completely different system of antiquity, and by the side of Aristotle stood Plato. The question was how to reconcile two authorities which were completely opposed one to the other. From this resulted a struggle against authority generally, out of which individualism emerged in renewed strength. The restoration of the rights of the individual is the essential feature of the new era, which in the sixteenth century saw the religious revolution (1517) and the regeneration of the Catholic Church at Trent (1563).

(c) Avignon. — Pope Boniface VIII (1294–1303) had waged a bitter war with the French kingdom for the secular supremacy, and King Philip IV (1285–1314), who was fortunate in his struggle for absolutism, had proved victorious, even if he could not carry the successor of St. Peter a captive into France. The brief reign of Benedict XI (1303–1304) was not able to weaken the opposition, and at the new election, on June 5, 1305, a Frenchman, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Bertrand of Got, was raised to the papal throne as Clement V. Being entirely submissive to the
influence of the French court, he removed the papal residence to French soil. For seventy years from 1306 Avignon, a town on the Rhone, was the permanent abode of the Vicar of Christ. This event was entirely due to political circumstances, but became of great importance for the civilisation of France and countries beyond. Up to Louis VIII (1223–1226), who, in consequence of the war with the Albigenses, acquired the Burgundian lands of Raymond VI of Toulouse, France had been politically divided into two parts, which showed for centuries marked differences in the development of civilisation. In the south the idea of the Crusades had found from the very first a more favourable soil. The Provençal poetry, mostly lyrical, had flourished there, and had highly developed a language which was intelligible in the whole Romance world. Southern France was the first country of the western world to have a literature of its own in the language of the people. Down to the days of Dante verse and prose even in Italy itself were entirely subject to this Provençal influence; even Brunetto Latini still employed the French language. Although the poetry of southern France had fallen into decay after the Albigensian wars, which inflicted deep wounds on the land, yet an attempt was made in the fourteenth century (at Toulouse, 1324) to inspire new life in it artificially by founding a prize for poets. Meantime the epic of chivalry, at first in the Latin tongue, had been developed in northern France, but after the time of Philip II (1180–1223) the national language seemed here also to have acquired the flexibility requisite for poetical productions. This stage, accordingly, was reached considerably earlier here than in Italy. In the south of France the relations with antiquity had never been lost to the extent they had been on the other side of the Alps. Thus there could not be a violent awakening of ancient life such as was seen in the neighbouring country.

The awakening was peaceful and calm. The national literature soon produced admirable results, which were not so completely overshadowed by Virgil and Ovid. A more advanced national feeling hindered the outbreak of such fervid enthusiasm for a foreign culture. Even the political conditions there were not on the whole so confused that a republic on the model of antiquity was necessarily considered the ideal constitution. Politically, indeed, France was untouched by classic influences.

While Italy, even in the eleventh century, had possessed a seminary for science in the University of Bologna, and another in the twelfth (Salerno), and in the thirteenth added four others (Naples, Padua, Rome, and Ferrara), France could not indeed present an equal number, but possessed instead the recognised foremost theological faculty of the world in the University of Paris, dating from 1200. This, rather than any of the Italian universities, became the model for all future foundations of the sort in the west. Parisian teachers left their chairs in 1378 on account of the schism, and were instrumental in founding German universities in Heidelberg, Cologne, and Erfurt, while two other teaching bodies after the Paris model had already arisen at Prague (1348) and Vienna (1365). In the south of France the University of Toulouse was founded in 1228, and that at Montpellier in 1289. This latter began to contest with the Italian Salerno the reputation of being the most prominent school of medicine. The University at Lyons followed in 1300.

Such was the intellectual life of the environment into which the papacy was removed when it prepared to establish itself at Avignon, at a time when Rome, of
all the more important towns of Italy, was perhaps the least affected by the spirit of the Florentines. During these momentous seventy years constant intercourse between Rome and Avignon was maintained. Several of the most enthusiastic admirers of antiquity, above all Petrarch, came to Avignon, but an independent literary renaissance was not developed at the papal court. Even the University of Paris appeared to be the citadel of scholasticism, and too long opposed the efforts of the Humanists. Yet it was there that the beginnings of a renaissance had shown themselves even before Dante and Petrarch. But after the middle of the fourteenth century these efforts died away without having had any results comparable to those that were accomplished in Italy.

In art, however, Avignon, and southern France as a whole, could seriously challenge comparison with upper Italy. And the artistic development stands, at least partially, in direct connection with the study of the monuments of antiquity, which in this region are peculiarly numerous and imposing. This also, like the literary activity in the south, was the result of a more ample accumulation of wealth, which provided the means of livelihood for many men who were not directly producers. Ecclesiastical and secular powers early vied in the construction of splendid buildings, and Gothic art developed here by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries its finest fruits. In the fourteenth century a decadence in the development of the style had already set in. Its full decorative richness was, however, first developed in the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The church of the Madeleine at Troyes, the cathedrals at Albi, Narbonne, and Toulouse, are buildings in this style, which is represented by numerous examples, especially in the southern district. At the same time castles and town fortifications, town halls, and private houses sprang up in motley variety. The Louvre, which Philip Augustus had built in the year 1204 outside the former boundaries of the city of Paris, was reconstructed by Charles V on a more complete and splendid scale; the castle gradually gave way to the château. At the same time there arose as the royal palace proper the Hôtel de Saint-Paul, an enormous pile, intended especially for holding festivities, which unfortunately, like the old Louvre, was destroyed in the sixteenth century.

A splendid ecclesiastical counterpart to these products of secular art is the palace of the popes at Avignon. The episcopal palaces at Beauvais, Angers, Auxerre, Narbonne, or Albi had gradually taken on the appearance of fortresses as a consequence of wars and feuds. But the papal palace, whose pile still fills the spectator with wonder, was from the first constructed as a fortress, so that it has with justice been described as the edifice which unites to the most conspicuous extent beautiful outlines with strong defensive capabilities. When Clement V (1305–1314) selected Avignon as his abode a spacious dwelling was first erected on a high rock rising above the Rhone; but Benedict XII (1334–1342) had it pulled down, and commenced in 1356 the building of the colossal fortress-like palace after the plans of Pierre Obrier. The northern part of the castle with four towers was finished under him; Clement VI (1342–1352) built the main block (his arms even now adorn a gateway), Innocent VI (1352–1362) added another tower, Urban V (1362–1370) the eastern façade and a seventh tower (the Angel's Tower); and under Benedict XIII (after 1394) the palace had to endure a siege. This gigantic pile, which covers eighteen thousand square yards, was completed in less than sixty years, although at the same time the town fortifications, nearly three
and a half miles long, had been constructed under Clement VI, Innocent VI, and Urban V. Only French architects worked at it in the service of French popes, and produced a work of genuinely French genius which has no parallel in the buildings of the fifteenth century.

(d) The German Humanists. — In Germany the rise of a humanistic movement is connected with the person of Charles IV, who received Cola di Rienzi, the fanciful restorer of the Roman Republic, at his court in Prague, and stood in intimate intellectual relations with Petrarch. Charles himself displayed literary activity in an autobiography, which was, however, unfinished; and this work shows that the tendency of the age toward individualism had left its mark on him. The bent of his mind was strictly religious: he collected relics with indescribable zeal and founded numerous monasteries. He had a corresponding theological training, to which we owe a treatise on theology and morals from his pen; and he has set out in the introduction to his statute-book for Bohemia (the “Majestas Carolina”) his philosophic reflections on the State and society. His most personal work was the founding of the first German university at Prague (1348). He collected costly books and Roman coins, formed a botanical garden, and encouraged the writing of history. The Imperial Chancery, removed from the influence of the spiritual electors by the “Golden Bull” of 1356, was reorganised on the papal model, and entrusted to the Bishop of Olmütz, a man of classical training. The Latin of the State documents was purified and the German language — which since 1283 was admissible equally with Latin for the purpose — was frequently employed; for the court at Prague, as well as its art, was German. The Upper German dialect, which was employed in the Chancery, helped to form the future German literary language, and most of the usually very amusing town chronicles were from that day written in German. A prominent monument of this municipal history is the Chronicle of the Council at Constance, by Ulrich von Richental, the town clerk.

Germans in the fourteenth century were still glad to study the science of law at Bologna, and came back to their homes, sometimes, as Lupold von Bebenburg (d. 1362) did, with the title of a “Doctor decretorum,” and mostly with strengthened national feelings; but these were exceptional men. A general humanistic influence had not yet dawned. The vigorous literary discussion of the important questions arising from the reform of the empire at the time of King Louis of Bavaria had been almost exclusively carried on by Italians, such as Dante and Marsilio of Padua. William of Occam was of English origin, and taught for a time at the University of Paris. Even though he spent the last years of his life in Munich he can hardly be claimed for Germany. Lupold von Bebenburg, the author of the “Tractatus de Regni et Imperii Juristic,” which appeared soon after 1338, was, as already stated, educated in Italy. The use made of Roman legal conceptions in his treaties cannot cause any surprise. Among the champions of Louis, his private secretary, Ulrich Hofmayer, is alone, perhaps, to be regarded as completely a German. Toward the end of the fourteenth century another German came forward, Dietrich von Nieheim (d. 1416), who, notwithstanding his permanent employment in the papal chancery, studied German history from enthusiasm for his German fatherland. He rested his hopes on the kings of Germany, Ruprecht and Sigismund: they were to revive the papacy and the Church. The intellectual life at the court of Charles did not stand in direct connection with the study of the
ancients, it was the result of a tendency of the age toward individualism, favoured by the personal inclinations of the highly gifted king, who adorned the royal town with the most conspicuous monuments of German architecture.

Charles's successors did not continue to work out his ideas; yet Prague long preserved the stamp of a German city. The cultivation of the German language and a love of manuscripts in fair handwriting, ornamented with delicate initials, continued, and the so-called "Wenzel Bibles" in Upper German dialect are among the most splendid fruits of this artistic and scientific movement at the court of Prague, which outlived King Charles (d. 1378). The subjoined plate, "A Page from the Wenzel Bible," shows a sheet from the Vienna manuscript, and is typical not only of the kind of writing usual in 1400, but also of the illumination prevalent before the influences of the Renaissance were felt. German culture had struck such deep root in Bohemia that even in the Hussite movement the Czechish spirit could only temporarily exercise any power. After the first half of the fifteenth century the German spirit prevailed once more even in the historians of Bohemia.

In the fifteenth century for the first time Germany could point to a considerable number of men who were trained in humane studies and displayed a literary activity, whether in the field of politics or in the wider field of scientific work. The ancients never served as models in Germany to the same extent as in Italy; for the ideal of State and culture was differently conceived there. The study of antiquity in literature and art widened the views of the Germans, increased their knowledge, and ripened their minds, but the development in the fifteenth century did not go beyond that. The German Humanists, writing sometimes with national bias, felt themselves Germans, and did not wish to become Romans, though proud of being Latinists.

In the second half of the fourteenth century the society of "the Brethren of the Common Life" had been founded in Holland by Gerhard Groot (1340–1384). Its members were not priests, but wished only to be preachers and to labour as teachers of the people. Popular education from the standpoint of progressive individualism was their goal. This religious society, existing independently of monastic vows, was almost universally attacked by the clergy, for there was not yet any comprehension of popular religious teaching. But finally, in 1431, it received full ecclesiastical recognition from Pope Eugenius IV, and the brethren then displayed a still more zealous activity, particularly in Germany. They devoted their lives to transcribing books and teaching the youth, and soon were able to record considerable successes in both respects. They regarded it as their sacred duty to enrich their own libraries with the writings of the Christian and pagan past, and by selling them to satisfy the cravings of others for knowledge. Their industry was felt throughout Germany; almost all the men, who afterwards came prominently forward as Humanists, enjoyed their first training in their schools. As early as the beginning of the fifteenth century a trade in written books flourished in Germany, especially at Cologne. Louis III, Elector of the Palatinate (1410–1436), carefully collected manuscripts, and laid the foundation of the famous "Bibliotheca Palatina," which was removed to Rome in 1623. Much was copied in monasteries and the private houses of burghers by diligent hands, and the fruits of this labour were disseminated by special agents before Gutenberg had discovered his art. In fact, this was the required economic condition, the universally felt need, without which

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A PAGE FROM THE "WENZEL BIBLE".
From the Manuscript (c. 1400) in the Imperial Library at Vienna.
the art of printing would never have attained its extraordinarily rapid extension and high development.

In Germany, also, the writers on politics attained under the influence of the Renaissance a high position at a somewhat earlier period than those did who were occupied with science or philology. But the German spirit remained untouched by fantastic ideals. They were engaged in practical politics, and therefore came to study the older German history; the main object, indeed, was to grasp the idea of the German Empire and its development since Charles the Great and still further back. Dietrich von Nieheim, whose political ideal was Otto I, had already trodden these paths. He was followed in them by Nicolaus Cusanus (d. 1464), a native of Cues on the Moselle, at once jurist and theologian, and after 1450 Bishop of Brixen. He was conversant with the principles of historical criticism, and eight years before Lorenzo Valla he banished the supposed “Donation of Constantine” into the region of myth. He studied mathematics and astronomy on a scientific method. His knowledge of history assisted him chiefly in developing practical ideas as to a reform of the empire and the Church. In his book “Concordantia Catholica” he laid before the council at Basle (1433) a complete programme of political reform, which, in spite of some amazing proposals, which partly still breathed a true medieval spirit, testifies to a high political grasp of the time. A similar political programme is the anonymously published “Reformation of Emperor Sigismund,” a treatise which not only well depicts the political, economic, and social conditions of the time, but also shows how better conditions may be introduced by means of social reform on a socialistic-communistic basis. Gregory of Heimburg (1410–1472), jurist by profession, a kindred spirit to Nicholas of Cues, vehemently opposed the papal authority, and in the national interests of Germany indignantly rejected all the attempts of strangers to meddle in German affairs. Peter of Andlau (d. after 1475) gave to Germany in the “Libellus de Cesare Monarchiæ” the first system of public law for the German Empire. All these men were inspired with the humanistic spirit, and, without being agitators, contributed toward the transmission to wider circles of a certain knowledge of antiquity and of primitive Germany, at least in the field of constitutional history.

The first German philological Humanists were to some degree in personal relations to these men. Felix Hemmerlin, born at Zurich before 1400, had enjoyed an education in Italy, and became doctor at Bologna, and paraded his mediocre acquirements in Germany. He represented in politics and religion the old school, yet he obstinately attacked the depravity of the clergy and the mischief done by the papal power. His writings, among which his treatise on the nobility deserves to be first mentioned, disclose little classical learning; but he repeatedly gives expression to the thought that a moral improvement of the people can only be introduced by a revival of antiquity. The patrician of Augsburg, Sigismund Gossembrot, is equally impressed with the value of the new studies. Peter Luder (1415–1474), travelling through the world as a roaming Humanist, expounded the old authors in Heidelberg (1444) first, afterward also at Ulm, Erfurt, and Leipzig; but he, like Samuel Karoch of Lichtenberg, did not possess character enough to effect any permanent result. Even Rudolph Agricola of Groningen (d. 1485), whom his contemporaries so greatly honoured, only read the ancients and stimulated others to their study, but did not produce any works of his own.

Theology had hitherto always formed the centre of universal scientific interests,
but after the middle of the century scientific humanism developed in close
connection with the universities, from which, through the medium of the Latin schools,
something of the spirit of the antique passed to the wide circles of learned men.
The medieval university had regarded the faculty of arts merely as a preparation
for study in the three other faculties, especially in that of theology. The number
of hearers in the preparatory faculty was therefore always the greatest, especially
since many did not proceed to one of the higher faculties, but immediately entered
on some practical post equipped with the title of a "magister bonarum artium."
So soon, therefore, as a more thorough treatment of the old Latin authors found
a place in the scheme of instruction in the universities, and the number of sub-
jects taught was increased by the introduction of Greek under Erasmus of Rotter-
dam (d. 1536), and of Hebrew by Johann Reuchlin (d. 1522), it became
impossible to withhold from the faculty of arts its appropriate independent position.
To the five universities of the fourteenth century were added in the fifteenth cen-
tury, Cracow (1400), Würzburg (1403), Leipzig and Rostock (1409), Louvain
(1426), Greifswald (1456), Freiburg (1457), Basle (1459), Ingolstadt and Trèves
(1472), Tübingen and Mayence (1477), as well as Graz (1486); and at the begin-
ing of the sixteenth century new foundations had been started for the east in
Wittenberg (1502) and Frankfort on Oder (1506).

The feud between Gossembrot in Augsburg and Sældner in Vienna after 1432
turned on the position of classical studies. But no decisive step forward was
taken until, under Reuchlin's influence, the study of Literae Poliores was inter-
posed in the University of Tübingen (founded by Eberhart the Bearded) between
the faculty of arts and the other faculties as an independent branch, and Bebel
(d. 1518) and Melanchthon, who went thence to Wittenberg, 1518, assumed the
post of teachers. Already, before this, a door had been opened to the new science
within the faculty of arts at Vienna, where since 1454 Georg Peuerbach had been
lecturing on the Humanities, and at Basle, where, after 1454, Matthias of Gengen-
bach had received a post especially as Humanist. In Erfurt, Mutianus Rufus
triumphantly introduced them; but in Heidelberg, Freiburg, and Cologne the schol-
astic tendency prevailed even in the first decades of the sixteenth century. At
Cologne after 1512, during the Reuchlin feud, to which the delightful "Letters of
Obscure Men" owe their origin, the scholastic party, whose chief representative
was Ortwin Gratius of Deventer, and the Humanists waged a bitter war, in which
the whole learned world took part. The victory, in the eyes of contemporaries,
rested entirely with the Humanists.

The most enthusiastic follower of the classical studies was perhaps Ulrich von
Hutten (1488–1523), who, with his political endowments, in his last years drew
practical deductions from his acquired knowledge. He alone of all Humanists
evinced a conception of the social movement at his day. His last works were
written in German, since they were intended to influence the people; but their
author died, broken and far away from his ideals, in the deepest misery, unnoticed
and unlaunted. Sebastian Brant (1457–1521), professor at Basle, resembled him
in many respects. He too had imbibed the antique culture, but he wrote German
for the multitude. The "Ship of Fools" (1494) reflects the achievements of the
Humanists in the popular language with delineation of individual characters,
although the enumeration of the different sorts of fools cannot be considered as
peculiarly original or as strikingly humorous.
Enen Silvio, when he came in 1442 to Germany to the court of Frederick III, had an indirect success to record, for his Education book, intended for Ladislaus of Hungary, had considerable influence on the subsequent emperor, Maximilian, the really humanistic ruler. Eberhart the Bearded of Württemberg (d. 1498), who learnt Latin in late life, and Albert of Mayence, archbishop after 1480, the patron of Hutten, and the Count of Neuenahr, who died in 1530 as provost of Cologne Cathedral, promoted humanism in many ways. King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary attracted a circle of Humanists to his court. But only the Emperor Maximilian took a deep personal interest in this movement. He employed poets and scholars to work for him, and himself drew up the scheme for the "Weisskunig" and the "Teuerdank," even though he left the execution of it to his private secretaries. The subject of both compositions is the glorification of Maximilian's own life and fortunes.

(e) Art in the Netherlands and in Germany.—So far as literary efforts are concerned, individual Germans had received encouragement and preliminary teaching in Italy, and had further elaborated the system in their own homes after a German method. In the domain of art Germany did not so quickly follow the Italian models; and this was wise, for art, at any rate in the Netherlands, which were then perfectly German in their mental training, had already been developed in the direction which the Renaissance itself took, that is, toward a conception of the outer world based on a study of nature.

Before the beginning of the fourteenth century, art was flourishing in the Netherlands coincidently with the revival of the prosperity of the towns and town industries. The wealth of artistic production even in the first third of the century is proved not only by such scanty relics of that age as are preserved, but more clearly by the circumstance that as early as 1337 the painters and sculptors in Ghent had formed themselves into a guild, the first of the kind. Tournai, Bruges, Louvain soon followed the example set to them. The representatives of other semi-artistic crafts, as goldsmiths and carpet weavers, joined the association of the painters and sculptors. In the last third of the century the artistic individuality of some masters stood prominently out, and their works showed many personal characteristics which forced their way through the restraints of mediavalism.

Modern art in the Netherlands really begins with the fifteenth century, and is illuminated by the brilliant names of the brothers Hubert (d. 1426) and Jan van Eyck (d. 1440). The invention of oil painting was formerly attributed to them, but incorrectly, as has been proved. But even if they had not only brought oil painting to very great perfection, as they actually did, but had really invented it, this would only constitute their smaller title to fame. Their greater claim rests on the fact that they employed in their art every element of knowledge that was available to them, that their works are modern. An infinitely wider circle of life is reflected in them than in the compositions of their predecessors. The life around the medieval painter was non-existent to him, or existed in a very limited sense. But the Van Eycks derived from it the most stirring impulses; they looked lovingly at every flower, every piece of household furniture or clothing, every beam of sunlight, and reproduced with their brush all they saw. The landscape for them — and this point differentiates them from earlier artists — is no strange thing, no isolated phenomenon, but something which necessarily belongs to the general
combination. The idea of aerial perspective was for the first time grasped by them; and Jan, the younger and more able of the two brothers, knew also how to disclose by his art the inner personality of a man. His portraits testify to this skill in fathoming and reproducing character. But the crown of his creations is the Altarpiece at Ghent, which, not merely relatively, presents a masterpiece of painting for all times and all nations. However much artists differ from each other in temperament and means of expression, the painting of all is ultimately to be traced back to Van Eyck.

Plastic art attained a high development in the Netherlands even earlier than painting. The masterpiece, the Moses Fountain, which, like the Altarpiece at Ghent, far surpassed any previous results, was the work of a Flemish artist, Claus Sluter. It was built, not on the soil of the Netherlands, but in Dijon, where the dukes of Burgundy had their court, about 1399, and still forms one of the chief sights in the town. It stands there almost isolated in the vividness of its conception and its impressive individuality, and shows quite clearly how that which is already artistically possible can remain for long years without imitation.

The art of the Netherlands in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is in its inmost nature German, and corresponds to the most advanced intellectual life which the age knows. For this reason hardly any noteworthy influence of the Renaissance on German art-life can be observed before 1500. The first considerable Renaissance building, the "Kilianssturm" at Weinsberg, was only begun in 1513 and completed 1519. Distinct traces of Italian influence in painting are first to be found in the elder Hans Holbein at Augsburg. They were first noticeable in north Germany shortly before 1550. Upper Germany, like the Netherlands, had created, unaided, an artist of its own in Martin Schongauer (d. 1491), who was both painter and engraver and a forerunner of Dürer.

Albert Dürer (1471–1528) is the man in whom, as in a well-defined personality, a great portion of the intellectual culture of the time is reflected. He had been educated to humanism, and was on very intimate terms with Willibald Pirckheimer. He had seen Italy, and received artistic impressions there, which influenced at least one period of his work. He had travelled through great parts of Germany, and became, with ripened powers, the enthusiastic supporter of Luther. As an artist he practised engraving both on wood and copper. The great series of woodcuts, illustrating the Apocalypse (printed complete in 1498), was his first production on a large scale; "The Four Apostles" (1526) formed the absolute end of his work.

The development in plastic art took a similar direction. Veit Stoss (d. 1533) tried chiefly to represent his artistic ideal in wood, Adam Kraft (d. 1507), in stone, and Peter Vischer (d. 1529), who is sometimes compared with Dürer but perhaps may be described as his counterpart, worked in brass. Vischer's most splendid creation, the monument of St. Sebaldus at Nuremberg, is shown on the inserted plate, "German Plastic Art in the Sixteenth Century." It was completed after thirteen years' work, in which five sons of Vischer shared. Italian influences are already discernible on this most magnificent production of German brass-work. The empty tomb of the Emperor Maximilian in the royal church at Innsbruck, designed after the monarch's own ideas, occupied the foremost German brass-founders. The work was commenced in 1509 but not completed until 1583. The emperor is represented kneeling on a colossal marble sarcophagus, and twenty-eight bronze statues, portraying his ancestors and contemporaries, stand round him as
MONUMENT OF ST. SEBALDUS IN THE SEBALDUS CHURCH AT NUREMBERG.

The Masterpiece of Peter Vischer the Elder and his sons, begun 1508 and completed 1519.
(From Seemann's "Wandbilder.")
mourners. The statues of King Arthur of England and of Theodoric, king of the East Goths (see the accompanying plate, right half), are considered Vischer's work and show his ability to model colossal statues, while on the other hand the delicate figures of the Twelve Apostles on the tomb of St. Sebalduv represent his complete powers and his artistic ideal.

Vischer is the last German artist for a long period in the region of plastic art. After him an artistic handicraft was developed under the influence of the Renaissance spirit. It was through it that the German people as a mass came into touch with the Renaissance. The wealthy citizens, who enthusiastically assented to Luther's doctrines, were the first customers for the productions of the artistic handicraft, which helped to make the German home more comfortable and habitable. And after the middle of the sixteenth century, when with the economic and political decadence of the towns the wealth of the citizens diminished, this handicraft could for a long time only maintain a precarious existence. The fresh impulse which from the middle of the fifteenth century quickened men's minds and in the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century guided their intellectual interests into a definite channel, then died away. The great advances which all Germany had made remained resultless. Only in some places, above all in the Netherlands, which now no longer belonged to the German Empire, did the prosperity at all correspond to the great promise with which the fifteenth century began.

B. THE KINGDOM OF FRANCE FROM PHILIP IV TO CHARLES VI

(a) The Last Capets.—The French crown had been considerably strengthened in the thirteenth century. The districts of Poitou and Toulouse were finally united to the kingdom after the death of Count Alphonse, brother of Louis IX (d. 1270), and considerable portions of the English possessions had been won. Henry III of England (1216–1272) had expressed his willingness to acknowledge the feudal lordship of the French king over the possessions in France which he held as Duke of Guienne. Louis IX, in opposition to the papal claims to tax the ecclesiastical bodies, had issued in 1266 the "Pragmatic Sanction," and thus laid the foundation of a French national church.

An internal strengthening of the royal authority corresponded to this external development of power. The mediæval feudal monarchy disappeared in the thirteenth century, giving way to a modern absolute government. The whole kingdom was divided into judicial departments, over each of which a parliament (royal court of justice) was placed, and in this way an organisation was given to the country which in Germany the empire, as such, had never attained. So far as any independent constitutional appointments remained under the monarchy, they were held for the most part by members of the royal family, of whom the king was the natural head. Under Philip IV the Fair (1285–1314), for the first time representatives of the towns appeared at the diets. Thus a new element entered into the political life of France, which was the weightiest counterpoise to the monarchy. In the succeeding years the monarchy grew in both influence and control, so that even in the most difficult times it was always able to show more splendour than the contemporary imperial power in Germany.

The King of England had for many years possessed large territories on the Continent with a French population. To the old Norman possessions in the west
had been added the hereditary lands of the Plantagenets on the Loire and the Garonne, when that dynasty ascended the throne of England in the person of Henry II (1154). The increasing power of the French monarchy must have found it disquieting to have England as a neighbour on the Continent, and nothing was more natural than the wish to drive the British completely out of France. Henry III had already renounced for himself and his successors all claim to Normandy, the counties of Anjou, Maine, Touraine, and Poitou, and was, as Duke of Guinée, vassal of the French crown. When Philip IV ascended the throne Edward I of England (1272–1307) did homage to him at Paris (Easter, 1286), but a few years later a dispute between English and Norman sailors gave occasion to greater hostilities. The French sovereign took up the cause of his subjects, and demanded from England compensation for losses sustained as well as the punishment of the guilty parties. Edward was prepared to come to terms, and wished his brother to conduct negotiations. But, when summoned as a vassal before the tribunal of the French king, he refused to obey, and was therefore declared by Philip to have forfeited his seizes for violation of his oath of allegiance. Edward wished to keep his possessions, and, while engaged in a Scotch war, tried to win over the German king Adolphus. His efforts, owing to the latter's weakness, were unsuccessful, while Philip, by preparing the way for new connections, not only gained the help of the Count of Brabant, but also brought his land, which until then had belonged to the German Empire, into closer relations with France. He was also able to frustrate the attempts of the Count of Flanders, who entered into negotiations with Edward, and even to take the count himself prisoner. Finally, the King of Scotland and the Welsh, incited by Philip, so disturbed Edward's peace that he was forced temporarily to abandon the reconquest of Gascony and Guinée.

Pope Boniface VIII tried to interpose in the quarrel, and Edward was prepared for a truce, but Philip soon noticed that the papal influence was exerted in favour of England, and therefore rejected any interference of the Pope in secular matters. The latter, observing that Philip had exacted contributions to the cost of the war from the churches in his realm, retorted by a bull which threatened every man with excommunication who levied taxes from the clergy without papal sanction. Philip seized this opportunity to prohibit all export of gold, and thus to withdraw from the Pope the financial support of the rich churches of France. Count Guido of Flanders, released from captivity in France, at once allied himself with England, but in return saw Philip overrun his own lands with a large army (1297). The help of King Adolphus was not forthcoming, and that of Edward was so feeble that the cessation of hostilities in late autumn implied the success of France. Boniface, to whom the prohibition against the export of gold was a severe blow, soon virtually withdrew his bull, and Philip then repealed his edict. Louis IX was canonised, and the Pope was accepted in a private capacity as arbitrator between France and England. But Philip disregarded the decision, which, according to his view, was too favourable to England, and renewed the war against Flanders in 1300. Count Guido, deserted by England, was defeated by Charles, the king's brother, in a pitched battle, and lost his lands. But the Pope demanded the release of the count, and saw himself compelled, by other encroachments of Philip on the sphere of his spiritual power, to declare to the king most emphatically that the right to bestow spiritual seizes did not belong to him, but solely to the papal throne. Philip answered with equal firmness, and dexterously emphasised the welfare of
BRONZE STATUE OF ARTHUR, KING OF SILURES IN ENGLAND (PROBABLY CAST BY PAUL VISCHER.)
(From the monument of the Emperor Maximilian in the Franciscan Church at Innsbruck.)
GERMAN STATUARY OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

BRONZE STATUE OF THEODORIC, KING OF THE EAST GOTHS
(From the monument of the Emperor Maximilian in the Franciscan Church at Innsbruck).
the State, which all inhabitants of the land had to serve. The nobility, as well as
the towns, which at this juncture were for the first time summoned to the diets,
joined the side of the king. In fact, the clergy presented a petition to the Pope
that he would forego his demands.

Boniface could not in any way bring himself to take this step. On the con-
trary, he formulated his demands against the secular power in the famous bull
"Unam Sanctam," which marks the climax of hierarchic arrogance. In fact, the
submission of all creation to the Pope is laid down as necessary for salvation. In
April, 1303, Boniface hurled the ban against Philip. Nevertheless the estates of
the realm resolved on the appointment of a new pope and a general convocation
of the churches. Philip, who meanwhile had concluded peace with England, and had
given back Guienne to the English king, sent his chancellor, William of Nogaret,
to Italy, ordering him to enlist troops quietly there, and on September 7 he suc-
cceeded in taking the Pope prisoner in his palace at Anagni. He was liberated, it
is true, by the peasantry, but he raged under the insult, and died October 13, 1303.

The newly elected Pope, Benedict XI, released King Philip from the ban.
After his death, which shortly followed, the position of France became still more
favourable, since the Archbishop of Bordeaux, formerly Philip's opponent, enticed
by the prospect of the high office, put himself at the service of the king, and
actually mounted the throne of St. Peter as Clement V. The Roman party noticed
too late the change of policy. Clement did not venture to enter the city of Rome,
but had himself crowned at Lyons, and after 1309 took up his permanent abode at
Avignon. By this action he also met the wishes of Philip, who thus was able
most easily to make the papal power useful to his purposes. A council met at
Vienne in 1311 with the object of condemning the policy of the late Pope. This
was not attained, but the French crown acquired great possessions through Clement,
who, in 1312, consented, on the ground of alleged licentiousness, to dissolve the
order of Knights Templars, which had been founded for the liberation of the Holy
Sepulchre. The knights were thrown into prison; a confession of the crimes with
which they were charged was extorted from them, and their lands were confiscated
to enrich the king.

Philip knew other ways of procuring ample means of financial supply. He
deprived the nobility of the privilege of coinage, which he made his monopoly, and
at the same time less money was minted. These measures, like the pressure of
taxation, did not contribute to the contentment of the people. Toward the end of
Philip's reign (he died in November, 1314) revolutions were threatening in every
part of the kingdom, fanned in no small degree by the revolt of the Flemish (1302),
who had twice fought with success against French armies. Philip had already
been obliged (1305) to invest the son of Count Guido with the lands of his de-
ceased father, and had so lost once more the only acquisition from the English war.
When Philip's eldest son, Louis X (1314-1316), succeeded his father, the condition
of France was far from being prosperous, but the new king strained every effort to
secure internal peace. A new campaign (1316) against Flanders met with no suc-
cess. The king, who left a daughter, Joan, a minor, died soon afterward before
any renewal of the war could be contemplated. The Flemish war was only ended
under Louis's brother, Philip V (1316-1322), and on the conclusion of peace three
towns finally were given to France. In internal affairs the efforts of the new king
were mainly directed toward expanding the absolute power of the sovereign. A
series of Administrative measures were proposed with the object of weakening the political power of the nobility and the towns. Louis had already allowed his serfs to purchase their liberty in order to fill his own coffers; now the military power of the country also was organised on a uniform system, and an end thus put to the independence of the towns and the feuds of the nobles. Few changes were made under the third brother, Charles IV. (1322–1328). On his death the growth of absolutism came to a standstill; for the Anglo-French war of succession now ensued, which was destined, with various vicissitudes, to claim all the forces of the country for more than a century.

(b) The Anglo-French war of succession to 1422.—The next heir to the throne after the death of Charles would have been Joan, the daughter of Louis X. and grand-daughter of Philip IV. The question whether according to the Salic law her claim could even be considered was hardly discussed at the time; she was given Navarre as an indemnity. At the wish of the States the nephew of Philip IV., Philip VI. (1328–1350), succeeded, and with him the House of Valois came to the throne of France, which it occupied until the death of Charles VIII. (1498). But the right of Philip of Valois to the Crown was disputed by Edward III. of England (1327–1377), who, as grandson of Philip IV, (whose daughter Isabella was his mother) thought that he had better claims to the throne of France. At first, indeed, Edward did homage to the new King as Duke of Guienne, and thus acknowledged him in his character of feudal lord, which was however only due to his royal title; but so soon as his intimate relations with the Flemish town of Ghent, where Jacob van Artevelde was in power, and his growing influence in the Netherlands generally (the Emperor Louis had nominated him Stadtholder of the Empire in Lower Lorraine) led him to believe that the moment was propitious, he assumed the title of King of France and invaded the country in 1339 in order to conquer it. But no battle was fought; in the spring of 1340 Philip collected a fleet in the harbour of Sluys in order to prevent Edward’s crossing; the latter, however, won a brilliant naval engagement in June in that very harbour. The land forces were less successful; Tournay offered a vigorous resistance, and Edward through pressing need of pecuniary resources could not wait any longer and concluded a truce.

A dispute had broken out in Brittany in the year 1341 about the Ducal dignity. The one claimant was supported by France, the other sought the help of Edward, who thus had a pretext for a new war. An English army marched victoriously through Normandy in 1346, and then went up the Seine to the gates of Paris. There first the French under the command of their king confronted it. But no decisive blow was struck until Edward took up a strong position at Crecy-en-Ponthieu, and immediately attacked the advancing French (August 25); in spite of an immense numerical advantage (88,000 against 20,000) Philip was defeated. The day marked a glorious victory of the English arms. In the autumn Edward marched to Calais, and besieged the town, so important to him, for eleven months; when it finally surrendered, English settlers were placed in it, in order to create a permanent base for the English regal power. But the resources for carrying on the war were exhausted by these operations. Through the good services of the Pope a treaty was concluded, which did not however at once apply to Brittany. The struggle for the supremacy in the country still continued there. In August, 1350, Philip VI. died: he was succeeded on the throne by his son John, surnamed
"the Good" (1350–1364), who tried to prolong the truce with England. But he did not succeed in changing it into a permanent peace, for Edward trusted to the fortune of his arms and had not yet relinquished his hope of the French throne. His son also, Edward the "Black Prince," to whom the victory at Crécy was chiefly due, would not hear of a peace. When, therefore, John refused to comply with the request of Edward that the English possessions on French soil should be relieved from feudal jurisdiction, the war began afresh in 1355. Its outbreak was hastened by the circumstance that Charles of Navarre, with whom John had quarreled, implored the help of England against him. The opportunity for new enterprises was eagerly seized. The Black Prince marched with a small force into the Loire district. John met him with superior numbers. After a vain attempt to come to an agreement, John, who himself fell into the hands of the English, was completely defeated at Poitiers (Maupertuis) on September 19, 1356. He was conducted to England, where the King of Scotland also was living as a prisoner of Edward.

A two years' truce between the two hostile powers had been arranged even before the return of the young Edward to Bordeaux; but dangerous disturbances in the interior shook the monarchy during John's imprisonment. The government, and especially the method of levying taxes, had aroused discontent among the towns, which were increasing in wealth, and formed the most powerful part of the States-General. When after the king's imprisonment the dauphin, afterward Charles V, summoned the States of north France and asked for their support in the crisis, the representatives of the towns desired redress for all abuses in the administration, and had their definite demands laid singly before the dauphin by a committee. Under the stress of circumstances the crown was compelled to concede every request of the towns. Nevertheless an open insurrection broke out in Paris (1358). Charles of Navarre, who was still in captivity, was liberated, his adherents, who had been executed, were declared innocent, the prisons also were opened, and the red and blue cap, the badge of the revolutionists, was forcibly placed on the dauphin himself. The example of the towns was followed by the rising of the peasants in the country, the so-called Jacquerie, and it could only be suppressed by most merciless severity. Common cause against the peasant revolt drove the nobility over to the side of the dauphin, and the Spiritual Estates stood by him. When he escaped from the hands of the Parisian mob he had a considerable body of adherents at his command. In Paris the insurgents were not agreed among themselves. There were three factions who fought against each other. The dauphin was soon able to march into the capital, hold a Bloody Assize, and in due form to carry on the government for his captive father. Charles of Navarre, however, began a war against him which did not end until 1359.

In that year Edward appeared again with an army on French soil, after the States-General had rejected the terms of peace already accepted by King John; but he was unable to capture Rheims, in spite of a siege which lasted many weeks. The investment of Paris, which he attempted in the next year, proved ineffective owing to deficiency of provisions. A peace therefore was concluded at Bretigny in May, 1360, according to which France renounced all feudal jurisdiction over the English possessions, while Edward abandoned his claim to the throne of France, and at the same time handed over Normandy and Anjou to John. But, notwithstanding the conclusion of peace, for a long time there was no tranquillity in France, for the
English soldiers remained in the country, contrary to the royal orders, and actually defeated a French army specially levied to oppose them. The raising of the heavy ransom for King John, who returned to his country after a five years' captivity, produced much misery. In one place only could John record a favourable result. The Duchy of Burgundy had fallen to the crown in 1361, and the king conferred it, two years later, on his youngest son, Philip the Bold. The latter founded the new Burgundian dynasty, and through Margaret of Flanders acquired the Franche Comté, belonging to the German Empire, and the Flemish provinces. As one of the princes who was detained in England as a hostage for the ransom had escaped, John himself returned to England once more (1363), and died there in captivity in the spring of 1364. The father was succeeded by the eldest son, Charles V (1364-1380), who as dauphin had already conducted the government after 1356, and had acquired some experience in home politics. Certainly he had no ability as a commander, but Bertrand du Guesclin, a distinguished soldier, stood at his side and conducted with great success the king's wars against England. Charles's system of government was mainly based on a steady resistance to the towns, which prided themselves on their strength, while through economy he restricted the meetings of the States for granting supplies. Besides this, he abolished the representation of the towns by self-chosen deputies. In the municipal administration also the royal power was increased. The nobility and the towns, in spite of the perpetual crushing weight of taxation, felt themselves gradually bound to the king, and differences were adjusted. The gratitude which the people felt toward the king found its expression in the surname “The Wise.”

The mercenary troops, which at the commencement of the reign were marauding everywhere, had been led across the Pyrenees in consequence of the War for the Succession in Castile, so that at last the French soil was rid of them. Since Prince Edward, who governed absolutely in the continental territories of England, took the side of King Peter in the Castilian dispute, the Anglo-French war was renewed on Spanish soil. But Charles V also considered the moment suitable for an advance on his part, especially since great dissatisfaction with the foreign rule was manifested by the population in the English territory. The conditions also of the peace of Bretigny were not yet carried out. The war therefore began afresh in 1369 with the French invasion of Guienne. The Black Prince, who had desolated parts of the country and committed cruel barbarities, worn out by illness, now was compelled to return to England, and there died before his father. Guesclin then succeeded in conquering all the English possessions by the end of 1372. Calais was the only fortified place remaining in English hands. All the British attacks on France were fruitless, since the French on their side avoided every battle, but were indefatigable in skirmishes and pursuits. Du Guesclin, indeed, was the first great guerilla leader of modern times. King Edward III died in 1377, leaving his kingdom to his grandson, Richard II (1377-1399), who was only eleven years old. Charles outlived him three years, and was succeeded by his son, Charles VI, aged twelve (1380-1422).

An inevitable struggle for the guardianship of the youthful king immediately loosened the hitherto compact fabric of the sovereignty. In Paris and elsewhere sanguinary riots broke out, and the royal coffers were plundered; and simultaneously disturbances again arose in the Flemish towns. Ghent had assumed a democratic constitution under Philip van Artevelde, and seriously menaced Count
Louis. Philip of Burgundy, Louis's son-in-law and the future heir to Flanders, espoused his cause therefore, marched with the chivalry of France into Flanders, and defeated the burghers of Ghent at Roosbeke (November, 1382). The result of this campaign was primarily in the interests of Philip's dynasty; but it was generally thought throughout France, with good reason, that the example of the Flemish towns had not been without its influence on their own country, and it was hoped, therefore, that the subjugation of Flanders would restore tranquility to France as well. The royal authority, supported by the nobility, was completely in the ascendancy at Paris after this success in the neighbouring country, and a similar result was visible in the other towns.

In 1388, being then twenty years old, King Charles took over the government. But since after 1392 he became completely mad, the administration was necessarily conducted by a regency under the king's uncle, Philip of Burgundy, and his brother, Louis of Orleans. The two and their followers were most bitterly, even disgracefully, hostile to each other. When after Philip's death (1404) his son, John the Fearless, received the government in Burgundy, open civil war threatened. As John approached the city of Paris in 1405 with a large army, the Duke of Orleans fled with Queen Isabella. A temporary agreement was made. But in 1407 John of Burgundy had his cousin Louis of Orleans treacherously murdered, and then, being hailed by the burghers of the towns as their protector, came forward as the real ruler of France. But the family of the murdered man, supported by the Count of Armagnac, wished to avenge Louis's death. Troops were levied by both sides, and a calamitous party struggle ensued. The town of Paris at first, under the government of the guilds, was entirely Burgundian, and the Orleans family only gained the upper hand after 1413.

These disturbances did not fail to rouse the ambitious schemes of the energetic King Henry V of England (1413–1422). He claimed the English possessions on the Continent, and the payment of the still outstanding ransom for King John, as well as the hand of Katherine, daughter of Charles VI, with a large dowry. Since his wishes were not met by France, he landed with an army in Normandy (1415). Charles VI and the dauphin Louis took the field in person, and a French army met him and placed the English in a very dangerous position; but, as at Crecy and Poitiers, the English arms triumphed once more in a pitched battle at Agincourt. Henry, however, was obliged to return to England without making full use of his victory to enforce his demands, owing to the want of money.

The Orleans party at this time held the chief power in France. The government rested in the hands of Count Armagnac, among whose chief adherents was Charles, son of King Charles VI, who, after the death of his four elder brothers, had become dauphin, and was only now in his fourteenth year. The count banished the queen to Tours, where she held a rival court. Isabella now publicly proclaimed that the regency for her mad husband and the youthful dauphin belonged to her, and that she was resolved to conduct it with the help of John of Burgundy, by whom Paris was taken in 1418. But even the Burgundian troops were not able to restrain the excited populace. Armagnac was murdered, and a great part of his followers met the same fate. Isabella and John made their solemn entry into the capital some time afterward, and banished from the city all who had sided actively with the Armagnac party.

Henry V had already resumed hostilities in 1418. Normandy came into his
power in 1419 owing to the fall of Rouen, but the parties in France continued to fight each other and forgot the common foe. At last, when John of Burgundy had been murdered in September, 1419, by a follower of the dauphin Charles, who was now considered the leader of the Armagnacs, his son Philip, surnamed the Good, sought the help of England and allied himself to Isabella, who now declared the dauphin a bastard. Philip and Isabella made a treaty with Henry V at Troyes in May, 1420, according to which Henry was to marry Katharine, sister of the dauphin, and at the same time was to become the successor of Charles VI and immediately undertake the duties of regent. This treaty made France a province of England. Henry entered Paris, assembled the Estates, and procured from them a ratification of the treaty. The Parliament declared the dauphin Charles to have forfeited his rights, and ordered him to quit the kingdom. Henry conquered almost the whole country north of the Loire, but died in the midst of his victorious career on August 31, 1422. Charles VI died soon afterward (October 22). The dauphin had still a hard struggle before his coronation was celebrated at Rheims in 1429.

C. THE GERMAN EMPIRE, THE GERMAN TERRITORIES AND TOWNS IN THE FOURTEENTH AND FIFTEENTH CENTURIES

(a) The Empire. — The imperial power in the earlier Middle Ages, although amply provided with economic means and represented by great personalities, had had very few duties to perform in comparison with the tasks of the modern State. The administration of justice and the maintenance of peace at home, the full exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction and the protection of the borders of the empire from external foes, almost comprised all its official duties. In principle, even in the fourteenth century, these were still the spheres where the royal power was felt, but in every respect the prerogatives as well as the powers of the empire had diminished. At the period when natural products were the medium of exchange, the German king of the time was the greatest landowner, the richest man in the empire. Even if the imperial estates and the profitable rights had not diminished, the empire, after the introduction of coined money as the medium of exchange in the twelfth century, — a system from which any advantages gained by the royal power must have been due chiefly to privileges of coinage and taxation, — would not have been able to maintain its more prominent position as regards the other powers. But now during the interregnum the property and privileges of the empire had been lost to the crown through reckless gifts and wholesale pawning, so that the imperial power had now only slender needs at its disposal. It could not be supposed that the new economic development would be sensibly influenced by the empire. All that actually was done in that respect was the work of the two younger constitutional organisations, the territories and the towns. Both these represented the standard economic units of the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and on their side followed out that which in modern times is called an economic policy.

An hereditary monarchy existed in France and England. There was a family succession and well-defined crown lands, of which the extent, in France particularly, was steadily increasing. The number of independent princes and counts as vassals of the crown appreciably diminished in both countries. If a fief after its reversion to the crown was granted afresh, it was usually conferred on a member of the royal
house, and so strengthened still more the royal influence. The conditions were quite different in Germany, the electoral empire. The princes electors were anxious to hinder the formation of a firm imperial constitution which would bar the expansion of their own territorial power. It could only be to the advantage of the electors if they chose an unenergetic emperor, and as a reward for their vote repaid themselves out of the imperial possessions. The emperor on his part endeavoured to build up the territorial power of his own house. The imperial crown was a great factor in this territorial aggrandisement. The Luxemburgs as well as the Hapsburgs realised this, and both strove earnestly for imperial sway. In this struggle the Hapsburgs succeeded by right of survivorship.

The Roman imperial crown had lost its splendour after the interregnum. All German kings had, it is true, thought it an honour to cross the Alps and have themselves crowned in Rome. But the last expeditions to Rome were little calculated to produce flattering impressions, even if they did not all turn out so lamentably as that of Ruprecht, 1401–1402. The empty glory of the imperial crown had gradually died away. Charles V was the last German king who wished to be crowned Roman emperor. The kings after him assumed the imperial title immediately on their election, and concealed by the brilliancy of the name the paltry value of German majesty.

As on the one side the royal prerogatives, coinage, customs, safe-conducts, protection of Jews, mining and salt monopolies, courts, etc., were transferred to the territorial princes, so externally also the empire lost in extent. Everywhere large strips were detached on the frontiers and became independent, or actually fell to the neighbouring States.

The imperial dominions stretched nominally westward as far as Flanders and Burgundy and the Rhone land, southward to upper Italy, and eastward as far as the borders of Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland. The eastern countries themselves continually formed closer relations with the empire. They were indeed partly governed, in theory at least, by the German ruler, but they did not become real members of the empire. In the west the imperial dominions were actually diminished. Charles IV had in 1365 received the crown of Burgundy at Arles; but as compensation to the French dauphin, Charles VI, for having renounced his claim on Mary, heiress to the throne of Hungary, and to avoid the double papal election, he conferred on him the vicariate of the empire in Burgundy. The reversion of Burgundy to France was thus settled. The course of affairs in the northwest was similar. When, after the founding of the new Burgundian power (1363), Flanders was allied to Burgundy by the marriage of the heir with the heiress, Margaret, 1384 (cf. above), it withdrew quietly from its dependence on the empire, and the Flemish towns ceased to be members of the Hanseatic League.

Switzerland also became independent, for the Hapsburgs, who struggled to build up their sovereignty there, were compelled to yield to the confederation of city burghers and free peasants. An imperial army made an ineffectual appearance before Zürich in 1354. The peace of the next year clearly implied the expulsion of the Hapsburgs from their old possessions. When, then, the towns of Swabia in 1385 formed an alliance with Berne, Zürich, Zug, Solothurn, Mülhausen, and even with the Hapsburg town of Sempach, the struggle of the Hapsburgs to protect their last rights was inevitable. Leopold of Austria advanced with an army of knights, but was completely defeated in 1386 at Sempach by the “Peas-
The permanence and the strength of the confederation were thus secured. The battle of Nafels (1388) had equally unfavourable results for Leopold's sons. In the peace of 1389 the House of Hapsburg had to renounce its rights of territorial sovereignty, especially its jurisdiction over Lucerne, Zug, and Glarus. The confederates, however, renewed their league; Solothurn joined it, and the "Sempach Letter" in 1393 became the starting-point for the later development of Switzerland. The threatening territorial sovereignty was shaken off, but the empire lacked the power to enforce its rights. The free united Swiss communities from the end of the fourteenth century were quite independent. They did not share politically any more in the common destinies of Germany, but in the sphere of intellectual life the connection became more marked. Basle especially became a seminary of German humanism and a centre of the artistically complete German printing trade. The renewed attempts of the Emperor Maximilian to maintain the alliance of the mountain country with the empire miscarried. After an unsuccessful struggle he was compelled to consent (1499) to the liberation of Switzerland from imperial taxation and jurisdiction. Thus the nominal connection with the empire was dissolved. For the future the confederates were designated with the distinguishing name "Kinsmen of the Empire," until the peace of Westphalia (1648) fully recognised the confederation as an independent constitutional organisation outside the empire.

Within Germany itself the imperial power had very various influence. In the south German districts, where large imperial towns lay close together, where there was a large number of knights of the empire, its importance was distinctly more felt than in the plain of north Germany. The imperial power had never found there, even in previous centuries, so firm support as in the south. With the increasing importance of the trade on the German coast, a separate confederation of the towns, the Hanseatic League, governed the political life. This started with an association of German merchants for the protection of their common interests in foreign countries; but after the beginning of the fourteenth century this association acquired even at home the admitted headship in politics.

A similar position to that of the Hanseatic League in the north was held by the Teutonic Order in the northeast. It had inserted itself between the Poles, Lithuanians, and Russians, and had cut them off from communication with the sea. The land of the order on the Baltic became an important outpost of Germany. Up to the battle of Tannenberg (1410), so momentous for the constitution of the order, ninety-three German towns and one thousand four hundred villages were founded there. Danzig, the most important place in the country, belonged to the Hanseatic League, and was a rival of Lübeck (cf. Vol. V). But the constitution of the order existed only for Germany, not for the German Empire; it formed a separate body, and in the end helped to support the power of the Brandenburg-Hohenzollerns.

In the heart of the empire the districts which as yet saw no sovereign over them were anything but supports of the imperial power. The imperial towns paid their taxes, and in other respects occasionally entered into nearer relations with the emperor, as when a diet was held within their walls. Some, however, were freed from the regular yearly taxation, and were therefore styled "free" towns. And where tracts of land, now fairly numerous, remained without a lord, this signified absolute independence. It was far less possible in their case to bring them
under the imperial taxation than in the case of the princes, who on their side, sometimes at least, had a keen interest in the aggrandisement of the empire. The strength of the imperial power thus varied much in the different parts of the empire, and found a corresponding expression in the services rendered to the empire by the separate districts. Rudolph I and Albert I devoted much pains toward putting the decaying revenues of the empire once more on a better basis, but they were not far-sighted enough to make the commercial aspirations which were the foundation of the new economic conditions profitable to the imperial coffer. They contented themselves with a reorganisation of the governorships in the imperial provinces and of the imperial exchequer, which, together with the fixed taxes imposed on the imperial towns according to agreement, represented the actual revenues of the empire in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

The work done by the imperial power in its own peculiar sphere, the maintenance of peace in the country, corresponded in fact to its resources. Quite apart from the fact that no imperial executive existed capable of punishing offenders against the order for general peace, there are no more instances of an "Imperial Peace," that is, a penal enactment, published for only a definite period against disturbers of public order, and enforceable throughout the whole empire. The imperial peace edicts from the time of Rudolph to Henry VII were practically renewals of the "Public Peace" of Mayence in 1235. After Louis of Bavaria, even these renewals fell into disuse, and only the important law of Albert II (1438) revived the old thought of peace for the whole empire. Ordinarily provincial peace edicts were issued, and show to what extent on the most essential point the conception of empire had given way to that of territory. King Wenceslaus in 1383 once more attempted an "Imperial Peace," but could not carry it out, for he failed to break up the existing confederations of the towns. Now, when the empire could not enforce its power, another path was taken in order to secure the necessary peace, especially in the interests of the towns. The towns concluded "unions," that is, leagues, for a definite period, and pledged themselves to make common cause against any one who should disturb the peace of one of the members. Princes were occasionally parties to such leagues, among which that concluded between the Rhenish and Swabian towns in 1381 stands foremost. As early as 1331 the Public Peace of Ulm included, in addition to twenty-two imperial towns in Swabia, the lords of upper Bavaria and Brandenburg as well as the Bishop of Augsburg. The Golden Bull had expressly permitted the unions for the maintenance of the public peace, while it forbade all coalitions for other purposes, and had thus proclaimed that the empire for its part was no longer able to secure the tranquility of the land. A number of peace edicts were issued in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and a series of unions formed for the preservation of peace until the "Perpetual Public Peace" of the imperial diet at Worms in 1495 forbade as a fundamental principle every feud and all recourse to self-defence. This was, of course, only possible at a time when the territorial lords had mostly acquired sufficient strength to punish rebellious nobles unaided, and an energetic interference of the imperial power was no longer necessary.

The emperor was supreme judge. The counts and all other authorities only judged in his name, and in every place where the king appeared the court was open to him. This, in principle, was the case even in the later Middle Ages; but the "counties" had long become hereditary, and their holders had acquired various
other powers, so that they were mostly present as territorial lords. Aulic privileges had long since infringed the old constitution of the tribunals, and the king had only little left of his sovereign jurisdiction. Although he had from the first the right of "evocation," in virtue of which he could at pleasure give judgment in any matter not yet legally decided, yet he was obliged comparatively soon to renounce this claim as regards individual princes. The Golden Bull of 1356 made the privilege "de non evocando" the legal right of all electors; and in 1487 the royal prerogative of "evocation" was universally abolished. The old constitution of the courts had presupposed a free people; but freemen in large numbers were only found in Westphalia, and there the royal courts, called "Vehmgerichte" ("Vehmic tribunals"), for the trial of crimes existed practically unchanged. It was a court of freemen to try freemen under the presidency of the count. But since in the greatest part of the empire nothing was known of freemen and the count's court, the condition of things in Westphalia seemed to contemporaries a remarkable anomaly. Charles IV had wisely in the public interests made full use of this remnant of Germanic jurisprudence in the Public Peace for Westphalia of 1371, since he entrusted his administration to these Vehmic tribunals, and by so doing contributed greatly to the respect, or rather superstitious fear, with which they were everywhere regarded. Their constitution was such that in the circuit (Freigrafschaft = free county) a judge nominated by the king (Freigraf = free count) with seven free jurors ("Freischaffen") from the "free seat" (Freistuhl) held a court always in the open air and by broad daylight. According as others than the jurors might or might not be present, the matter was called "public" or "secret." The penalty was death by hanging, and was carried out immediately if the accused was present; or, if he did not appear, wherever he was met by three free jurors. The result of this jurisdiction was in the fourteenth century thoroughly beneficial, since grave defects in the criminal law were thus remedied. In the next century the Vehmic tribunals certainly degenerated; the diet at Nuremburg in 1431, and the reforms of Frederick III in 1442 were forced to take measures against the encroachments of the "secret tribunals." Gradually, therefore, they forfeited their importance.

The need of a complete body of law for the empire as a whole was then keenly felt. The imperial towns and the country districts still belonging to the empire seemed to be almost independent constitutional bodies. The person of the emperor was usually unknown to the people, and no proper representation of the imperial rights existed. There was, in fact, in the imperial chancery no register of the constituent members of the empire. Not a single list of the towns and princes was forthcoming, when in 1422 preparations had to be made in hot haste by the empire for the "daily war" in Bohemia. The town of Düren, which from 1242 had been pledged to the count, and subsequent duke, of Jülich, and had long regarded itself in fact as a provincial town, was after 1578 repeatedly summoned to the imperial diets, and called upon to pay the Turks' tax. The chancery was actually unprovided with any proofs by which it might reconcile asserted privileges and actual facts.

The want of an imperial executive machinery was not less bitterly felt. Any one who obtained a legal title by the imperial law had usually to fight for it first. Even if the ban of the empire had been published, there were no means of executing it. When, for example, Charles IV pledged the imperial town of Weil
to Count Eberhard of Württemberg, it joined the Swabian League, existing since 1376, and the emperor suspended the ban over the fourteen towns. Eberhard wished to fight for his claim to the town of Weil; but his son was completely defeated by the towns at Reutlingen in 1377, and the emperor found himself compelled to retract the ban and to cancel the pledge. The towns had in this case conquered the imperial authority and the princely sovereignty. Where the empire wished to exact penalties it was dependent on the good will and the contingent means of the States of the empire charged with the executive. In the sixteenth century, when the division into circles already existed and considerably facilitated matters, an imperial executive system was arranged (1555); but it came too late, for all political power had already passed into the hands of the princes.

(b) The Growth of the Principalities. — The German Empire, at any rate after the Golden Bull, formed a federal union. Hitherto, it is true, the imperial vassals had advised their sovereign in weighty matters, but the decision lay with him. Now in all decisive questions the assent of the electors was a necessary condition, and the imperial assembly was raised to a judicial institution, although the intended annual assemblies of the electors were not carried out. The princes became "estates of the empire," just as under them "estates of the country" were developed. These took a share in the imperial government and came more and more prominently forward. The position of the emperor had now been entirely changed. The formalities of his election were carefully settled; and the selection of seven princes of the empire, in whose hands the election now lay, was an additional cause of weakness to the monarchy, since each elector strove to obtain a compensation for his vote in the shape of imperial lands and privileges. If the electors could choose an emperor, it was a natural consequence that they reserved to themselves a right to interfere during his reign, and sometimes gave expression to their approval in so-called "Letters of Consent" ("Willebriefe"), usually with some personal aim, and in fact they often claimed the right to depose the king, which was actually exercised in the case of Wenceslaus (1400). The Electoral College soon grew to be representative of the empire, and these "Letters of Consent" took the place of the assent of the imperial assembly.

The number of princes of the empire, who in 1350 included in their ranks more than seventy spiritual and forty temporal lords, steadily grew; for, on the elevation of an imperial fief to a military fief (Fahnenlehen), the position of a prince of the empire was easily acquired. In the fourteenth century, among others, Pomerania, Jülich, Guelders, Luxemburg, and Berg, in the fifteenth, Cleves, Holstein, and Württemberg had become military fiefs. The division of inheritances, customary since the thirteenth century in the princeley houses, by which the owner of any portion might retain the position of prince of the empire, increased the number of lay princes and shifted the balance of power in the empire in their favour. The authority of the individual prince within his own district varied according to its origin. Since the emperor gradually abandoned in favour of the princes all supreme rights still remaining to him (the Golden Bull conferred on the electors the right of coining gold, the emperor renounced his right of "evocation" and the exercise of the ban fell into disuse), the power of the local prince became a complete sovereignty. In the fourteenth century above this ordinary sovereignty came the still higher territorial dominion of the electors. The modern independent States of Germany grew up
out of the territories of the Middle Ages, and in the end Austria and Prussia had to fight for the supremacy.

The sovereignty, the distinctive mark of which was the superior jurisdiction, was acquired by counts and lords, as well as by the princes. All these territories, at first only private possessions conferring civil rights, had in contrast to the empire the advantage that the distinctly smaller extent and essential similarity of conditions within the district allowed the lord to exercise a uniformity of administration which had always been wanting in the empire. The territorial civil offices, which at first were granted to the officials concerned with the seignorial rights of the princes, became the foundation-stone of the system of sovereignty which, notwithstanding the very various personalities of the rulers, has, in consequence of an administrative tradition, continuously developed in the direction it once for all took at this time.

The titles, on the basis of which a prince ruled over the separate parts and parcels of his territory, were extraordinarily diverse. By the side of an old allodial holding might be found an imperial fief, in virtue of which the rights of a duke, a margrave, or a count had been conferred on the owner, or a district in which the prince as warden (Vogt) of a small church possessed penal jurisdiction. In another place he was only lord of the manor, in yet a third again he was only trustee of the revenues of the law court. The age, still little adapted to abstract thought, could not always dissociate these different offices, which only by chance were united in a powerful personage, from the idea of that personage. It did not appear surprising if the princes allowed their heterogeneous rights to sink into the background, but in return put their territorial power in the foreground throughout the whole sphere of their authority, and on that basis exercised a new kind of sovereignty previously unknown in Germany.

From the way in which territorial power originated it naturally follows that considerable tracts of land were only exceptionally held by one lord, and that ordinarily the "Territorium" was made up of very various ownerships. This arrangement was very cumbersome both for the administration and for the execution of any measures, as well as for cases when the refractory power of the knights had to be quelled. The case could easily arise where the territorial lord, through the hostility of his neighbour, might be hindered by force from entering great portions of his domains. The more prominent princes had early tried to remedy this evil by obtaining a territorial symmetry. The prince looked for a favourable opportunity to acquire as a gift from the emperor any crown lands lying in the vicinity, or to take them over from an imprecious monarch in return for a large sum as a mortgage security, which neither party ever intended to redeem. An enclosed strip was obtained in exchange for the surrender of a remote estate, or an entire district united to existing possessions through a diplomatic marriage. Sometimes the land of small independent lords was annexed to the Territory, and these latter saw themselves reduced to the status of provincial knights. Where large imperial towns lay within a Territory, their acquisition was not less desirable from the point of view of territorial compactness than it was from regard to their taxable value. This is the meaning of the attack of the Archbishop of Cologne upon Dortmund (1368) and Soest (1447), and of the Margrave Albrecht Achilles of Brandenburg upon Nuremberg (1449). In the fifteenth century the imperial cities of Donauwörth and Mayence became actually tributary to Duke Louis of Bavaria-
Landshut (1458) and Archbishop Adolphus (1462) respectively. Archbishop Baldwin of Trèves was the most successful of the princes of the fourteenth century in carrying out this territorial policy in the west. In the east Charles IV had attained wide and compact dominions, especially as opposed to the Wettinners, partly by unexceptionable feudal methods, partly by cunning and force. His marked business capacities and the comparatively large pecuniary means which stood at his disposal greatly aided him in obtaining these results. In addition to this need of compactness the want was universally felt of a uniform administration, which might be supreme, above all existing seigneurial and similar institutions. The want of a fixed system had made itself appreciably felt in the empire after the break up of the old counties, and was an important factor in the decay of the imperial authority. In the much smaller territories, whose rights were partly resting on civil law, the question of organisation was solved in the following way: The division into circles of jurisdiction was retained, but, for practical convenience, excessively large circles were subdivided and unnecessarily small ones were amalgamated. In the fourteenth century such an arrangement of offices prevailed everywhere. At the head of the circle designated as "Amt," "Vogtei," or "Pflege," stood the "Amtmann," "Vogt," "Pfleger," "Landrichter," "Graf," "Schultheiss," according to his title, which varied in different localities, who was usually a member of the lower nobility and represented as an official all the sovereign rights of the territorial lord. This representative of the territorial lord was a removable official with extensive legal authority and fixed pay, even if the outward form of enfeoffment of office was no longer observed. Since the machinery of the supreme authority, which was identical with the princely court of which the seat was not fixed, often worked irregularly, the Amtmann had to act on his own responsibility in his lord's interests. He was thus closely identified with his circle, in the middle of which he usually lived in a castle, and seemed almost an independent lord, just as his district was often nothing else than a formerly independent lordship. There was no idea of separating administrative and magisterial functions. The Amtmann was therefore in his own person a judicial, administrative, magisterial, fiscal, and military official, in fact he was often president of a seigneurial district belonging to the territorial lord and had a staff of inferior officials under him. It is easy to see the important bearing of such an organisation, with its capabilities of special development, on the growth of a territorial State, if we consider that every individual residiatory official was familiar with the person of the Amtmann, who was daily before his eyes as the vicegerent of the territorial lord.

The essential character of the "Territory" was emphatically rural. As a rule the primitive economic condition of exchange in kind still prevailed, and the town institution of exchange in money seemed strange. The peasant insurrections, which showed themselves long before the fourteenth century, especially in the southwest, were chiefly directed against the exorbitant interest required by town capitalists, and, above all, against the Jews. The Territories primâ facie comprised rural districts, the taxable value of which the territorial lords continually tried to raise in correspondence to the larger requirements necessitated by increased cost of living and war expenses. The territorial towns, more or less important from trade and industrial enterprise, and often mere agricultural towns, were still independent formations, with their own constitutions and government. They were not completely part and parcel of the Territory. Their relations to it
were often limited to the financial support of the territorial lord by taxes. But
the town as a whole paid the sum demanded from it, and the princely administra-
tion was not concerned with the manner in which this taxation was met. The
towns often acquired different profitable privileges from their territorial lords (just
as the princes formerly from the empire) either by lease or as a pledge. The
most profitable source of revenue, the excise, usually lay in their hands. The
financial support lent by the towns was of infinite importance to the princes, and
they therefore assented, voluntarily or by force of circumstances, when the towns
on their side desired information as to the application of the money and other
administrative concerns, and made the execution of every sort of measure depend-
ent on their consent. The declaration of the country towns that they were willing
to guarantee the debt of their lords, became after the fourteenth century a regular
event, and finally led to their forming one of the States of the country, that is,
they were regularly represented at the diet (Land-Tag). Thus the interests of
the towns came in contact with those of the country nobility.

The partition of the princely houses, by which the princely title and court
establishment were retained by each of the sons, was a great drain on the princely
treasuries, and necessitated larger demands from the country. The right of the
prince to levy taxes was absolutely unrecognised. A unilateral tax exacted by
him was called exactio violenta, or tyrannical impost; and the old term “Beede”
was retained for the taxes obtained by an arrangement with the persons liable.
By feudal law the knights were tax-free; they were only bound to render three
kinds of services, namely, to ransom their lord from captivity, to dower his daughter,
and to make his son a knight. Since the knightly vassals of the territorial lords
in other cases also aided their lord with money, they formed the germ of Constitu-
tional States, since the religious bodies already existing in the country, though
by nature tax-free, furnished the prince on special occasions with money, and at
the same time pressed their advice on him, just as much as the towns and the
knights. There were many opportunities for extraordinary pecuniary aids. The
new system of warfare which had been regarded as necessary since the Hussite
disturbances demanded a supply of waggons and artillery, and large sums for the
payment of the foot soldiers. It was then that the working of silver mines gave
some princes, particularly those of Saxony and Tyrol, an advantage over their
neighbours. In general, however, the increased demands were met by indirect
taxes, and thus opportunity was given to the “States”—that is, to the knights,
religious bodies, and towns—to exercise influence on the government of the land
by their assent. A Confederation of States was formed in order to counterbalance
the power of the princes. This new constitutional body, with the three divisions
of States, finally completed the conception of the Territory. The diets now lost
their character of a convention based on civil law; they appeared as a constitu-
tional organisation. The States became the representatives of the land, and (as
in Cleves and in the county of Mark) took an energetic part in the administration
of the country and achieved many financially good results.

The development of the States was an advantage to the territorial lords, in so
far as a systematised financial administration was established under the control of
the States, and the lord’s right of taxation could no longer be denied as a principle.
But, besides this, a multitude of semi-constitutional powers, which in the fourteenth
century had become dangerous rivals of their later territorial lords, but at the end
INDEX TO THE MAP: GERMANY IN THE YEAR 1378
(The letters between brackets [ ] indicate abbreviations in the map)

1. Civil Divisions:

1. Kingdom of Bohemia
   - District of Jekl
   - Bohemia
   - Moravia
   - Silesia
   - Lower Austria
   - Upper Austria

2. Archduchies:
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   - Lower Austria
   - Upper Austria

3. Duchies:
   - Bavaria
   - Saxony
   - Nassau
   - Hesse
   - Pfalz
   - Brabant
   - Burgundy
   - Lorraine
   - Hainaut
   - Holland
   - Zeeland
   - Zeeland

4. Princes:
   - Brandenburg
   - Saxony
   - Pfalz
   - Hesse
   - Nassau
   - Holstein
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   - Sweden
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5. Landgraves:
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6. Margravates:
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   - Brandenburg (electoral princedom)
   - Hesse
   - Thuringia
   - Thuringia
   - Thuringia
   - Thuringia
   - Thuringia

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   - Holstein
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8. Principalities:
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10. Counties:
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11. Seignories:
    - Anhalt
    - Pomerania
    - Brandenburg
    - Hesse
    - Nassau
    - Holstein
    - Denmark
    - Norway
    - Sweden

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### 12. Friesland

### 13. Confederate

### 14. Royal States and Cities:

- **a)** Vogtland
- **b)** Royal Cities:
  - Aachen
  - Aix-la-Chapelle
  - Angers
  - Basel
  - Besançon
  - Biberach
  - Boppard
  - Breslau
  - Bruchsal
  - Buxeuil
  - Cologne
  - Constance
  - Dresden
  - Erfurt
  - Erfurt (AG)
  - Frankfurt (Main)
  - Gera
  - Guettard
  - Hameln
  - Harrisburg
  - Hannover
  - Halle (Saale)
  - Heidelberg
  - Kassel
  - Kempten
  - Koblenz
  - Koln
  - Landau
  - Lübeck
  - Magdeburg
  - Mainz
  - Mannheim
  - Marburg
  - Meiningen
  - Minden
  - Minden (Mecklenburg)
  - Minden (Westfalen)
  - Munich
  - Münster (Altaich)
  - Nuremberg
  - Osnabrück
  - Paris
  - Paderborn
  - Passau
  - Posen
  - Potsdam
  - Pforzheim
  - Prague
  - Prague (Praha)
  - Prague (St. Vitus)
  - Prague (Tyn)
  - Potsdam (Brandenburg)
  - Prague (Strakova)
  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus)
  - Prague (Valladolid)
  - Prague (Charles Bridge)
  - Prague (Hradcany)
  - Prague (Slavkov)
  - Prague (Muráň)
  - Prague (Praha)
  - Prague (Old Town)
  - Prague (New Town)
  - Prague (St. Vitus Cathedral)
  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus Cathedral)
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  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus Chapel)
  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus Column)
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  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus Fountain)
  - Prague (St. Wenceslaus Statue)

### II. Ecclesiastical Divisions:

#### 1. Archbishops:

- Aquileia (patriarchate):
- Cologne (electorate [K])
- Magdeburg
- Mainz (electorate [M])
- Salzburg
- Trent (electorate [T])
- Angers (AG)
- Basle
- Brussels (AG)
- Charleroi
- Namur
- St. Gallen
- St. Gallen (AG)

#### 2. Bishops:

- Angers (AG)
- Basle
- Brussels (AG)

### 3. Abbies:

- Cornelimünster
- Corvey
- Dover
- Eichstätt
- Eichstätt (AG)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Abbey)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Cathedral)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Church)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Tower)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Gate)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Archway)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Column)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Monument)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Fountain)
- Eichstätt (St. Mang's Statue)

### 4. Priories:

- Berchtesgaden
- Blettnitz

### 5. Districts of the German Order (DO):

- H LAND
were reduced to membership of the States, disappeared for the future as independent bodies in the empire, and were able to contribute to the financial strengthening of the Territories. The inserted map, "Germany at the Death of Emperor Charles IV, 1378," gives a picture of the multiplicity of divisions in the empire, although it is very difficult to give accurately the boundaries of every petty territory at any fixed epoch. The index accompanying the map is especially useful in illustrating the endless subdivisions of the empire.

The constitutional nature of the Territories was strengthened from another side. The partition of inheritances, which created petty dominions, was not favourable to the formation of important Territories. Even if the parts, after one or two generations, had been reunited in one hand, there was always the fear that in the long run large Territories, uniformly organised, might again break up. In order to avoid this danger, the family law of Pavia (1329) declared for the first time that no system of alienation should exist for the lands of the House of Wittelsbach, upper and lower Bavaria, with the Rhenish Palatinate. In cases where partition was made, special stipulations were introduced to avoid if possible the disintegrating effects. Frederick II, Margrave of Meissen and Landgrave of Thuringia, partitioned, it is true, his lands on his death (1349) among his four sons, but at the same time ordered a joint government under the guardianship of the eldest brother, and so combined the constitutional advantage of political unity with the concession of equal private rights to each son. The Golden Bull of 1356 absolutely forbade the partition of the electoral Territories, if not of all the domains ruled by an elector, and the Hapsburgs (1364) decreed the indivisibility of Austria, including the privy purse. A corresponding regulation for the House of Brandenburg followed in the "Dispositio Achilles" of 1473, which established the Frankish system of the rights of the younger son, and prohibited the partition of the Mark. Even where no law forbade partition, efforts were made to avoid it, and at the same time to effect the concentration of larger domains in one hand by the so-called treaties of reciprocal succession ("Erverbrüderungen"); that is, compacts between two ruling families by which on the extinction of one branch the other should succeed to the inheritance. Hapsburg Austria alone of the great Territories attained this end. All the former possessions of Luxemburg, owing to the treaty of reciprocal succession in 1364, finally fall to the lords of Austria.

The increasing use of money as the medium of exchange, a custom which, originating in the towns, prompted the princes, on the other hand, if they wished to have any political position at all, to increase and assure their revenues. Only thus was it possible finally to outstrip the towns, whose power in the fourteenth century seemed actually greater than that of the princes. Nearly everywhere there was a marked increase in the income from imperial prerogatives which had been transferred to some prince. The custom-houses, particularly on the Rhine, became considerably more numerous. Archbishop Siegfried of Cologne (d. 1297) had already erected a new customs fortress at Worringen, and others soon followed. But the increasing traffic made the receipts from customs grow rapidly. Ehrenfels returned from its customs in 1377 20,000 golden florins, that is, say, 210,000 worth of gold. In Coblenz the takings increased from 30,000 pounds of silver in 1267 to 100,000 pounds in 1368. Although Albert I in 1301 abolished all new Rhine tolls, this was, however, only a temporary measure. The princes drew their best revenues from the increasing traffic; indeed, from ignorance of economics, they
often overburdened it with imposts. The administration machinery, besides, was so clumsy and costly that comparatively little flowed into the central treasury. But by means of reorganising the administration, large revenues could easily be obtained, as is seen from the financial reforms of Hans von Mergenthal in electoral Saxony after the middle of the fifteenth century. The coffers of the princes had been, indeed, mostly drained. The sums for which privileges were pawned seem to us often ridiculously small, and the rate of interest at which the towns lent money was very high. The towns, although almost alone affected by the taxes on traffic, had still the most favourable financial system. What money they, as States, granted to the princes was usually found by them without difficulty. The case was different with the nobility and the spiritual estates, who, as seigneurs, received chiefly an income paid in kind, and could only within narrow limits bring themselves to sell it in the town markets. They personally regarded themselves still as tax-free, and the taxes which they were bound to pay to their territorial lord were shifted on to the dependent folk, the peasants. The position of the peasants had been very favourable even in the thirteenth century. The rents payable to the lord were fixed, and with increasing profit from the ground this implied a considerable addition to the produce of labour. The overflow of the population was taken away by the colonisation of the east and by the towns, and the village “March” still amply provided every one dwelling near with wood for building or burning and pasture for the cattle. But when there was no longer any place where the superfluous population might find a livelihood, a continual partition of the hides of land began, and poor people settled in huts, with, at most, a diminutive piece of ground, and, as a rule, merely trusting to the inexhaustible wealth of the common “March.” Pasture had to give way to agriculture; there was no other way for averting the threatening distress. But for this not merely the capital, but, more than all, a comprehension of the demands of the age, was wanting, especially among the lords of the manor, who might have done a national service by an opportune improvement of agricultural methods. But nothing of all this was done. The position of the peasants became more and more deplorable, for the lord now claimed a superior ownership in the common “March” itself, and regulated its use at his own discretion.

The old class of manorial lords had greatly diminished, and the petty lords were eager to exercise sovereign rights in imitation of the great lords. This, owing to the pettiness of their condition, led to a systematic and irritating oppression of the peasants. We see this in an increase of forced tasks, in the discontinuance of the measures which had been taken to change burdensome rents in kind to money payments, and above all in the collection of the poll-tax, which threatened to reduce the peasant population to serfdom. This is particularly true of southwest Germany, but not less of Flanders, where as early as 1324 a sanguinary peasant insurrection broke out, and in 1404 the sovereign of the country himself opposed the tyranny of the manorial lords. The peasant no longer took part in the greater intellectual questions of the age, in the administration of justice, and in political life. He remained stationary and stunted, while the citizen population of the towns made great progress, and with increased earnings usually found leisure for higher intellectual training. The thriving burghers came into quite intimate relations with the peasants; for the latter, being completely fleeced by their lord, had only too often to fall back on town loans, and fifty per cent interest was not infrequent.
Whole districts were impoverished and peasant risings followed. These risings were the precursors of the great movement which broke out in the sixteenth century in connection with the new teaching of the gospel. Although the men of the time had not generally a very profound comprehension of social conditions, still it had become clear to the public mind what the hopeless condition of the peasant population really implied for the nation at large. The imperial legislature indeed took up this question at the diet of Augsburg in 1500, but nothing was done to grapple with the evil.

(c) The Towns. — We have already become acquainted with the towns in their relations to the empire, the Territories, and to each other; but our attention must be now given to their internal economy, political, financial, and administrative.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when the use of money as a medium of exchange was spreading, and affected the towns exclusively, the municipal council, a corporation of rich merchants, greatly extended its power to the prejudice of the town rights of the bishops and princes. In most of the towns of south and west Germany this council had acquired, either by peaceful purchase or by stubborn struggles with the actual lord (as in Cologne and Strassburg especially), the rights of the town lord; that is, supreme jurisdiction, right of coinage, and the right of indirect taxation. Under such conditions the council became omnipotent. It had under its control the amount of taxation payable by the burghers, as well as their liability to military service, and was considered both at home and abroad the fully authorised representative of the town. This corporation was at first filled up by selection from the wealthy families, but it gradually became exclusive, and only the members of some few patrician families were able to reach the council. The town population was thus split into two classes,—the ruling patricians and the unprivileged community. The condition of things produced by the wanton oppression of the masses was bound to lead to revolt. In the existing industrial organisation of the guilds, in which the population united their efforts for economic reform, a power was discovered which the council did not venture to resist, at least in the south and west, the old German soil. In the north and east, the colonisation districts, where the principal towns all belonged to the Hanseatic League, the corresponding movement began considerably later.

The guilds, showing a vigorous and progressive economic development, invested by the council with a commercial jurisdiction, and thus raised to a public institution, now included the mass of tax-paying citizens, who at the same time in war were answerable for the town with their lives. Were those who made the greatest sacrifice for the town to be permanently unrepresented in the government? As early as the thirteenth century the artisans in the most progressive towns, Cologne and Ulm, tried by a rising to force the council to acknowledge their importance. They wished to exercise a control over the financial system of the great houses. But the attempts were attended with little success; for the rebels were suppressed by force, partly with the help of the town lords, and their guild organisation was dissolved. The artisans in Ulm were the first to reach their goal (1292). Speyer, Mayence, Ratisbon, Zürich, and Strassburg followed between 1330 and 1336. Soon Berne and Rothenburg were the only important towns in the south where the patricians could still assert their power. Nuremburg by 1349
had yielded to the guild movement. In most places the struggle raged more or less openly for a century, but only in Flanders did it lead to terrible scenes of violence. Terms were finally agreed upon in Cologne (1396) and in Strassburg (1419), and thus a new permanent municipal government was established.

The solution of the disputed questions was excessively complicated, and the influence of the guilds in the prevailing town government very varied. In many places the old families were completely ousted. The guilds had conquered, and now governed in appearance exactly as the council. In other localities the council remained, but its character was altered by the admission of councillors representing the guilds. Again, in other towns the family organisation as well as the guild disappeared as a political body, and the council was for the future elected out of the general community of burghers. The artisans in the fifteenth century had everywhere acquired some share in the town government. Their industrial organisations, which repeatedly seemed too dangerous, and had accordingly been dissolved, but always re-established, saw themselves now confronted by political duties, and their industrial character grew fainter and fainter. The members of the guild now took part in public life, in the government and administration. It was the council which provided the machinery for both, as it selected certain of its members for the discharge of definite business.

The north German towns, which all belonged to the Hanseatic League, were, according to the whole tenor of their past history, mainly occupied with commerce. Industries were of less importance. We do not therefore hear of such violent guild disturbances there as in the south and the west; in any case, they occurred much later. In Lübeck indeed the guilds gained a preliminary success in 1408, and about the same time in Wismar, Rostock, and Stralsund. But in 1416, Lübeck, the leading town, succeeded in restoring the old council, and, by threats of "Verhassung," that is, exclusion from the Hanseatic Union, in maintaining the patricular rule in most towns. At any rate, the disputes between families, guilds, and the community continued there. But in many towns they were non-existent or only arose later in the sixteenth century. The desired object was the same in the north as in the south, namely, an alteration of the constitution in favour of the poorer classes. Facilities for the acquisition of the franchise, and a democratic municipal government, by the side of which the council should continue to exist as an executive body, were especially demanded. This object was only fully realised in Germany by Strassburg, where the whole population actually adopted a monetary system of exchange, and a constitution in the modern sense had grown up on this basis.

The municipal community, like other corporations in the German constitutional system, rested on the "personal principle," that is, under certain antecedent conditions members widely separated in locality might belong to the same association. The idea of acquiring a territory of great extent locally, belonging politically to the town, within which the municipal council — naturally only in imperial towns — exercised the rights of the sovereign, was still far from being realised in the middle of the fourteenth century. Attempts, however, had long been made to attach individuals from the surrounding districts to the town under the name of "Ausbürger" (outburghers) and "Pfahlbürger" (burghers of the palisade). The wealthy citizens, although enjoying full rights in the town, began to invest their surplus money in landed property. They acquired manorial rights in the vicinity of the
town, had tenants in copyhold, and mostly lived outside the town walls. In this way, naturally, the interests of the country were interwoven with those of the town. When disputes arose with a neighbouring lord or knight, the town supported its citizen and his dependants; and imperceptibly the town extended its sphere of interest to the entire possessions of these "outburghers." On the other hand, the country lords, princes, and religious houses had property in the towns, either as dwelling-houses or as warehouses for their surplus crops which were to be put on the market. They saw themselves compelled in the interests of their possessions and their own security to profess friendliness to a powerful council, and to promise their armed assistance as noble burghers in event of a war. Besides this, many wealthy countrymen, indeed whole villages in the neighbourhood of large towns, put themselves under their protection; they became "burghers of the palisade," and thus voluntarily submitted to the municipal government, naturally to the prejudice of any imperial governor or of a neighbouring territorial lord. The Golden Bull of 1356 in its sixteenth chapter had prohibited in the interests of the princes the reception of "burghers of the palisade," but in vain. From the close community of country and town interests arose the town territories, since places which possessed in the town "Burgrecht," namely, a claim to shelter behind the walls in times of need, formed to some degree closer relations with the town itself, especially when the council held also the supreme penal power. Eighty-two localities had the "Burgrecht" in Frankfort, while in Mayence even earlier some forty villages for fifteen miles round enjoyed this privilege. The district of the imperial town Aachen was smaller, while in Cologne the power of the council only extended as far as the town walls.

The foundation for the power of the towns was their peculiar position as commercial centres for the country at a time when the State was badly fitted by organisation or policy to foster trade or to secure the profitable pursuit of business. The source of wealth in the towns was at first the itinerant traffic, mostly prosecuted by firms, which gradually became a fixed trade. The small town of Ravensburg was the home after 1450 of the most important trading company of the time, that of Hündiss, Muntpatat, and Mütteli, a precursor of the Fugger business. To this was soon joined the money-lending and exchange business. But the industries of the artisans now organised in guilds soon gained in importance, and some members of the foremost guilds could compete with the commercial lords.

Together with the accumulation of the great fortunes which now quickly multiplied, a town proletariat was formed; a crowd of indigent people, whose ranks were filled with journeymen with no prospect of ever becoming masters, musicians, porters, and a vast number of mere beggars. These were the people who on many occasions, especially in the fifteenth century, interfered decisively in political disturbances, and sometimes, in common with the country proletariat, fought the common oppressor. The misery of these lower classes was all the greater, since the remedies sought and applied were quite unfit, and in many instances full of mischief. Many of the charitable institutions of an ecclesiastical character which were intended to mitigate poverty were, on the contrary, calculated to bring up the proletariat to pauperism. The social distress had certainly often occupied the serious attention of the town councillors; but their treatment of the malady was as great a failure as were later on the plans for human improvement in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The policy of the towns rather favoured the
growth of capital and strengthened its omnipotence. Corn speculations and the formation of commercial rings were no longer rarities in the fifteenth century. The so-called Reformation of the Emperor Sigismund spoke of it in moving language.

Whatever the towns chose to do for the maintenance of the country's peace, they acted always in a narrow spirit of self-interest, often unconsciously fighting against themselves in the rival town. The external security of intercourse was especially preserved by "unions" of the towns. But the foremost of all the duties which the towns undertook was the regulation and simplification of economic intercourse, the new foundation on which the existence of the town rested. One important task was to resist the debasement of the coinage practised by the princes in their own interests, and to introduce a currency circulating in larger districts. Owing to the six hundred different mints in the empire, the unavoidable exchange of money which the towns mostly transacted in their own banks (thus Ulm as early as 1300, Frankfort after 1402) implied an almost incredible obstacle to intercourse. In place of the prevailing light silver coinage, which had been sufficient in an uncommercial age, larger coins were urgently required for trade purposes, and this want was met by the Bohemian florins, which King John caused to be struck in 1325, after the Florentine pattern. These acquired an international importance.

Except the emperor, Bohemia alone had from the first the right to coin gold. However, this had been conceded to all the electors by the Golden Bull. Even before that, four towns, Lübeck, Frankfort, Trèves, and Cologne, had acquired the same privilege. The German golden florin after the Florentine pattern (see the plate of coins on p. 68.) had by the middle of the fourteenth century acquired an importance for wholesale trading, and after the monetary convention of the four Rhenish electors in 1386 became the universally recognised coin which, in the district of the Rhenish trade and beyond, kept a fixed ratio of value to silver. If the princes were the first to coin gold chiefly, the trading towns remained the first to use the gold pieces. In the monetary convention of 1402 even imperial towns were included, and soon the coinage of the towns of Frankfort, Nuremberg, and Ueberlingen was esteemed of equal value with the golden florin of the four electors. The Rhenish florin, however, was the first coin struck in Germany which passed in the whole empire and beyond. It is true that finally owing to the "Imperial Mint Regulations" of Esling (1524), issued at a time when the increasing silver-mining industry, especially in Saxony and Tyrol, permitted the coinage of heavy silver pieces, the silver coinage alone had currency. But the florin was employed for a long time as the coin of commerce, although the prosperity of the towns, the foundation of political power, decayed with extraordinary rapidity when once the political victory of the princes was finally assured, and the German towns lost their importance for international trade.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and also the first half of the sixteenth, are in Germany taken up by the towns. With comparatively small populations,—in 1449 Nuremburg had a little over 20,000 inhabitants, Frankfort-on-Main between the years 1350 and 1500 never more than 10,000, and even Cologne itself in 1575 had only some 37,000,—the towns as the commercial centres led the nation both in progress and in politics. The imperial policy was always forced to take into consideration the money of the small city republics. Wenceslaus had already once (1389) contemplated the formal admission of the towns to the imperial States.
And after Nicholas of Cues in his programme of political reform had expressly demanded this position for the towns exactly one hundred years later, the admission of the imperial towns to the diet by chosen deputies was finally settled. The imperial assembly then was composed of three colleges: the first consisted of the electors; the second, of the remaining princes, counts, and lords; the third, of the towns. The towns first appeared as a united body in the diet of Frankfurt (1489). After that they are divided into a Rhenish bench with fourteen, and a Swabian bench with thirty-seven members.

D. THE GERMAN EMPIRE FROM THE ELECTION OF CHARLES IV (1346) TO THE DEPOSITION OF HIS SON WENCESLAUS (1400)

The generally gloomy reign of Louis of Bavaria had brought matters in 1338 to such a pitch that the electors thought themselves bound to protect the dignity of the empire, since the emperor refused to do so. Since Louis was totally unable to assert his imperial position against the new Pope Clement VI (1342–1352), Baldwin of Trèves, the most distinguished member of the anti-imperialist party, set about openly to elect Charles, the son of King John of Bohemia, as emperor. When the aspirant to the throne had promised the Pope to remain in Rome only one day for the coronation as emperor, he was chosen on June 11, 1346. Charles was obliged to pay enormous sums to the electors for this honour. Despised in the empire, he could only acquire some influence when Louis died in October, 1347, and when by the death of his father at the battle of Crecy the sovereignty over Bohemia and the Luxemburg hereditary dominions fell to him.

Charles IV had not indeed been long recognised as emperor when in the winter of 1347–1348 he made a triumphant progress through south Germany and received homage in Ratisbon, Nuremberg, and even in Ulm, and was favourably met by a number of princes. The powerful Wittelsbachs, headed by Louis of Brandenburg and Tyrol, were still bitterly hostile to him. At their instigation King Edward III of England was in January, 1348, elected emperor by four electoral votes. But Charles induced Edward by skilful diplomacy to renounce his election, and he made at the same time great advances in north Germany, in the immediate neighbourhood of Brandenburg, a Wittelsbach possession. Not unconnected with this was the appearance of a man who gave himself out as the Waldemar who had been dead for nearly thirty years, and, supported by the enemies of Louis, was universally acknowledged in the March to be the old lord. Charles, who certainly had nothing personally to do with the imposture, naturally took the matter, so favourable to him, in a serious light, ordered the stranger to be solemnly proclaimed as the real Waldemar by people who had known the latter, and gave him the sief of the March in return for the concession of Niederlausitz. The prospect at the same time was held out to the Dukes of Saxony and the Counts of Anhalt that they would succeed to Waldemar's land, in the event of his dying without issue.

In any case Louis had lost his support in the north; he could only hold his own in Frankfort-on-Oder. He did not wish to enter into negotiations with Charles. Indeed, he set up a rival candidate, the energetic Count Günther von Schwarzburg, a petty lord, known as a valiant warrior. On January 30, 1349, Günther was chosen emperor on the plain before Frankfort by the votes of the electors of Mayence, the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Saxony; a few days afterward the town allowed him
to make his entry. But his following did not increase, and Charles made great advances in the empire; especially when in March he married the daughter of the palgrave and thus not only drew the latter over to his side, but at the same time broke up the hostile alliance of the Wittelsbachs. Since Günther refused negotiations with Charles, a short struggle for Castel and Eltville ensued, from which Charles derived considerable advantage. Before matters, however, came to a decision, Louis of Brandenburg himself sued for peace. Günther was abandoned by his party and very soon died at Frankfort, after he had formally relinquished his claim to the empire. Charles now gained the recognition of the princes by making concessions to them. The electors of Mayence, the Palatinate, and Brandenburg declared publicly that they had elected Charles emperor after Günther's death, and he was solemnly crowned, together with his consort, at Aachen, by Baldwin of Trèves.

In Brandenburg meantime fortune had favoured the side of Louis. In a diet at Bautzen the princes declared that they could not consider the claimant as the genuine Waldemar if they were called on to swear to it. Charles, therefore, enfeoffed Louis the elder once more with the March as well as with Carinthia and Tyrol, and promised to take steps toward releasing him from the ban. Louis delivered up the insignia of the empire. The renewed ban did him little harm. He reconciled himself with his neighbours by concessions of territory and payments of money, and, finally, with the Counts of Anhalt (1355). But he transferred the March as a whole to his younger brother, Louis the "Roman" (1351). Tranquillity and order again reigned in the empire. Charles was the only and universally admitted king.

Charles was doubtless aided by an event which only bore on politics through the feelings with which it inspired princes and statesmen. Toward the end of 1347 there first appeared on the shores of the Mediterranean an epidemic which had never yet been known in Germany. It spread with inconceivable rapidity over all western Europe and spared very few districts. The pestilence was called the "black death," and men thought to explain it by accusing the Jews of having poisoned the wells. Although Pope Clement as well as the Emperor Charles gave no credence to the report, a universal sanguinary persecution of the Jews followed, accompanied by hideous acts of cruelty. The loss of life caused by the plague cannot now be even approximately stated. Goswin, a monk of the Convent of Marienberg in Tyrol, considers that hardly a sixth part of the whole population of the country survived. Of his convent brethren only two lived through it, himself and another. Similar results may have been found in other districts. For years afterward the deficiency in population was noticeable.

The event made a marked impression on contemporaries. Since many people saw a divine punishment in this terrible pestilence, a course of life acceptable to God seemed to be the best means of propitiating the wrath of Heaven. Brotherhoods were formed, especially in the Netherlands, which set before themselves the duty of mortifying the body and of doing penance by lacerating their flesh with scourges in the presence of the whole population. The accompanying coloured plate, "The Flagellants at Doornik in 1349," shows a contemporary representation of these "Brethren of the Cross," who obtained everywhere so many followers that this new mental disease caused for some time as much excitement in Germany as the physical disease of the black death.
THE FLAGELLANTS AT DOORNIK IN 1349

The picture on the opposite page represents the appearance of the "Flagellants" or "Brothers of the Cross" (in Latin, "flagellatores" or "poenitentes"; in French, "flagelleurs") who appeared towards the end of the summer of 1349 in the Netherland towns, especially Doornik, and in the public market-place did penance by scourging their bodies in order to free the world from the heavy plague of the "Black Death" or pestilence. AEGIDIUS Li MUISIS, Abbot of St. Martin at Doornik, who expressly mentions the epidemic of Flagellants, has recorded this picture in his Chronicle: the brothers march barefoot, with long robes. Their bared backs are merely covered by a short cloak. They hold in their hands the scourges, the traces of which are discernible on their backs. Their headgear is the hat with the cross, hence the name "Brothers of the Cross."

The text under the picture forms the beginning of the narration by the Abbot, who speaks to us as a contemporary and partly as a co-operator. The legend is written in two columns so that since the lower lines are wanting in our reproduction the right column does not exactly join on to the left.

In the aforesaid year it came to pass that on the day of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin (Aug. 15) some 300 persons came here from Bruges about noon. These remained assembled on the market-place, and immediately the whole town was filled with curiosity as to why these folk had come. The burgesses came in small bodies to the market-place when they heard the news in order to convince them of the fact by their own eyes. Meanwhile the folk from Bruges prepared to perform their ceremonies which they called "penance." The inhabitants of both sexes, who had never before seen any such thing], began to imitate the actions of the strangers, to torment themselves also by the penitential exercises and to thank God for this means of penance which seemed to them most effectual. [And the people from Bruges remained in the town the whole of that day and night.]

INSCRIPTION

Accidit anno praelto quod in die assumptionis virginis gloriosae venerunt a villa brugensis circiter CC homines, quos homin praeliti. Ipsi autem adnauentrunt se in foro, et statim rumor magnus fuit per totam civitatem, unde omnes veniebant. Cessaretiam venerunt ad locum supradictum, quia super hoc rumores audierant et idcirco factum videre affectabant. Illi autem de Brugis interim se preparaverunt et ritum suum, quam penitiam vocabant, facere incipient. Populus autem utriusque sexus, qui nunciam tale quid viderant, cepern unci personis et penitentia condolore et deo gratias redidere super tanta penitencia quam gravissimam reputabant. Remanseruntque dicti Brugenses in civitate tota illa die et nocte.

(The words wanting are supplied from the text of the "Chronica Agidii Li Muisis" in the 2d volume of the "Corpus Chronicorum Flandriæ," edited by De Swet.)
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

In the strain of this terrible time the new emperor had little to contend with: men’s minds were fixed on supernatural issues. Charles now wished to be duly crowned and consecrated; but Clement, who had been bitterly deceived in his protégé, refused his request. It was only after Charles in 1353 had taken for his third wife Anne, daughter of Duke Bolko of Schweidnitz-Jauer, and after Innocent VI had mounted the papal throne, that the journey to Rome took place (spring of 1355). In Rome great hopes were entertained of the grandson of Henry VII. Cola di Rienzo hoped to revive his power by help of the new emperor; but Charles gave no encouragement. The title of Emperor satisfied him. He marched over the mountains with a small retinue, received the crown of Lombardy, and was crowned emperor at Rome. He left the Eternal City the selfsame day in order to return soon to Germany, laden with large sums of money. By the beginning of July he was once more at Augsburg, proud of the imperial title. A few months later he entered Bohemia, and summoned an imperial assembly at Nuremberg, at which the first part of the new State charter, afterward called the Golden Bull, was discussed and solemnly published on January 10, 1356. The second and shorter part was made law in the diet of Metz on December 25, 1356. The Golden Bull in all essential points ratified the existing condition of affairs, and only in isolated sections decided for one of two antagonistic parties. It was the foundation-stone of the German Constitution up to the peace of Westphalia and still later, and was of great importance in the development of constitutional ideas. It has been frequently printed. In 1776 J. S. von Olenschlager’s “New Commentary on the Golden Bull of Emperor Charles IV” appeared at Frankfort and Leipzig as a textbook of constitutional law.

With Poland and Hungary Charles made political arrangements, but with France and with Pope Innocent his relations became troubled, as he made promises to both which he could not possibly fulfil.

So, too, the question of the castle and lordship of Donaustauf, which Charles had acquired from the Bishop of Ratisbon, soon led to a bitter struggle with the Bavarian Wittelsbachs. But the glory of the Wittelsbachs was passed, and the Hapsburgs in Austria had become the leading southern power of Germany, under Duke Albert (d. 1358). His son Rudolf, son-in-law of the emperor, managed by forgeries of imperial grants to secure to himself and his house the rights which the Golden Bull had conceded to the electors. Charles was obliged finally to make some concessions, although he was very indisposed to acknowledge the claims of Rudolf or to agree to his acquisition of Tyrol, which Margaret Maultasch handed over to him in 1363 as a gift. To settle political dissensions he chose Elizabeth, the daughter of the Duke of Pomerania, for his fourth wife. The marriage took place at Cracow in May, 1363. At the beginning of the next year a full peace was concluded with Louis of Hungary and Rudolf of Austria, and a little later followed the important agreement as to the succession between the Houses of Luxemburg and Hapsburg.

When Innocent VI died in 1362 without having accomplished any great results as far as his Italian policy was concerned, and without having advanced the reform of the Church, Urban V was raised to the papal chair in order to continue the efforts of his predecessor in Italy. It now seemed to the Emperor Charles a favourable opportunity to enforce the return of the Pope to Rome. The close connection of the papacy with France implied a danger for the whole of
In the eyes of contemporaries, who without exception attached great weight to externals, the imperial dignity itself was bound to be impaired if merely a legate and not the Pope himself performed the ceremony of crowning. Urban was not opposed to the proposal of leaving Avignon, but could only point out to Charles the quite inescapable obstacles in his way. Charles therefore resolved to go himself to Avignon in order to remove the difficulties and to guide the whole policy of western Europe into another channel. He entered Avignon at the end of May, 1365, and was crowned as king of Burgundy, thus proclaiming his insistence on his right and title. He then commenced negotiations with the Pope and the brother of the French king about a crusade which was intended especially to clear the country from the roving mercenaries who lived in France. When Charles left Avignon he had made every sort of arrangement with Urban about the removal to Rome. In the diet of Frankfort he obtained the consent of the princes to an expedition to Rome, and Urban promised to start in spring, 1367, and in the first instance to live at Viterbo. He sailed in fact from Marseilles on April 30 in an Italian ship, took up his residence at Viterbo, and entered Rome on October 16. But the preparations for war in Germany met with obstacles. Sickness and famine so delayed the assembling of the army that the emperor did not appear in Italy before May, 1368. The war with Bernabo de' Visconti of Milan was unsuccessful, so that a peace was concluded by the end of August. Charles, however, marched on with only a few followers, had a meeting with Urban in Viterbo, and both made their entry into Rome. The emperor stayed this time two months in the city. During this period his consort Elizabeth was crowned empress. He found many fresh complications on his way back, especially with the Milanese, who had broken the peace. He had also forfeited the friendship of Urban long before he reappeared in Germany (August, 1369). For the Pope did not find in Rome what he wished, and in 1370 returned once more to Avignon, where he died in December of that year. His successor was Gregory XI, nephew of Clement VI, a learned man, who was regarded as an especial friend of Charles. The good understanding between Charles and the princes had terminated even before the expedition to Rome. His matrimonial policy made it only too clear how he hoped to enrich his family. In any case the rival princely families saw their hopes deceived. There could be no doubt now that Charles's fervent wish would be to secure the royal crown for his son Wenceslaus, who was betrothed to the Hungarian princess Elizabeth; a splendid prospect, which would raise the Luxemburgs high above all other princely houses. Charles, on his return home from Italy, saw himself confronted by a confederacy to which the Count Palatine Ruprecht, the Bavarian Wittelsbachs, Poland, and Hungary belonged. From this a danger threatened him in the east of his dominions, especially since the March of Brandenburg, which was pawned to him, no longer afforded any real support. Fortunately for him Casimir of Poland, whose realm was now united with Hungary, died at this time; so, too, did Gerlach of Mayence, and the emperor succeeded through papal favour in elevating to the important episcopal throne one of his relations, the Bishop of Strassburg, a man of no independence of character.

Now, however, a new quarrel about the March of Brandenburg broke out. At the beginning of the year 1371 Otto declared his nephew Frederick to be his heir in the March, and thus prejudiced Charles's claims to inherit. War, therefore, began. On the side of the Wittelsbachs Pilgrim of Salzburg and Louis of Hungary fought
together against their inconvenient neighbour. But nothing came of it except plundering and devastation. An armistice was concluded in October, 1371, at Pína; and shortly afterward the King of Hungary, engrossed with the coming war against Venice, withdrew from the alliance. At the same time Charles's second son Sigismund was betrothed to Louis's daughter. The Wittelsbachs now stood alone. Soon after the expiry of the armistice (summer, 1373) an agreement was entered into at Fürstenwalde, by which Otto and Frederick renounced all claim to the March, and received from Charles in all the very considerable sum of five hundred thousand golden florins. The imperial cities must, indeed, have made gigantic efforts in order to raise this money.

Although Charles had not yet reached his sixtieth year, he now thought earnestly on the future of the empire and of his dynasty. His fondest wish, that of seeing his eldest son Wenceslaus elected German emperor, was still to be realised, but could only be so if the adroit father took the appropriate steps during his own lifetime. Moreover, the opportunity was now presented, when for the first time an election could be carried out strictly according to the provisions of the Golden Bull. It was indeed a costly task to win over the three spiritual electors. But by October, 1374, the vote of Ruprecht the count palatine was secured, and at the beginning of the year 1375 Charles had all the votes for himself; for this time the election of the emperor was to be unanimous. The actual elective proceedings had to be postponed until Wenceslaus had completed his fifteenth year and thus attained his majority. When Pope Gregory heard of the intended election he was astounded, but could not by all his threats produce any alteration in the adopted proposal. Without the papal sanction the election of Wenceslaus was settled on June 1, 1376, and was solemnly confirmed on June 10, in the sacristy of St. Bartholomew's at Frankfort. The coronation followed on July 6, at Aachen. Pope Gregory refused his consent, but finally pronounced himself satisfied when the emperor, in a document dated back before the election, asked for his approval. Wenceslaus was now lawful emperor together with his father. But the imperial cities of the south had a dread of new mortgages (naturally enough after their experiences so far), for Wenceslaus's election cost much money. Fourteen imperial cities of Swabia formed a league even before the coronation against "all who oppressed them with taxation or mortgage." The town of Ulm took the lead. Charles advanced with an army up to its walls, but could effect nothing, and marched back again. Other towns joined the league. Count Ulrich of Württemberg was killed at Reutlingen in 1337. Soon afterward Wenceslaus, who meanwhile had become viceroy of the empire, was compelled to promise the cities in the peace of Rotenburg that he would not pawn them.

The emperor had meanwhile journeyed to the court of King Charles V at Paris, and had prevented the threatening alliance of the king's second son, Louis of Orleans, with Mary of Hungary, but was forced in return to confer on the dauphin the vicariate of the empire over Burgundy, and thus to renounce the imperial sovereignty in this part. Soon after his return, Charles fell a victim to fever at Prague on November 29, 1378. His reign marks a turning-point in German history. He was the founder of the Luxemburg dynasty, and through skilful diplomacy left the empire in a more dignified constitutional position than he had found it. His reputation amongst his German contemporaries and in later times has chiefly suffered from the fact that he regarded every political step as a financial
operation, and in an unknightly fashion avoided the fierce contest of the battlefield. But in an age of wars and devastations this fault had many compensations.

The policy of the young Emperor Wenceslaus showed itself in his first public act when he declared himself a supporter of Pope Urban VI. The princes supported him; so did Louis of Hungary. Only Adolphus of Nassau, who was still at enmity with Louis of Meissen about the archbishopric of Mayence, declared himself the friend of the Pope at Avignon, Clement VII. The unity of Germany was thus destroyed, and Clement soon found other friends as well. But the other electors on the Rhine, namely, Cologne, Trèves, and the Palatinate, could not countenance the dissension about Mayence, and at the beginning of 1380 concluded a league at Oberwesel against all adherents of Pope Clement. By this, of course, Adolphus was primarily intended. The latter, when the archbishopric of Mayence was assured him, while Louis was compensated with Magdeburg, returned to Urban. The electors had attained their object without the help of the emperor, and they suspected his policy, since he appeared so little in the empire, and always stayed in his hereditary dominions. Indeed the chief efforts of Wenceslaus were directed toward the maintenance of friendly relations with Hungary and Austria. He therefore abandoned any idea of armed conflict with Leopold of Austria, who openly sided with the Avignonese pope, although his partisanship caused a miniature schism in the bishoprics of Strassburg, Basle, and Constance.

The espousal of Urban's cause by Germany was mainly based on the opposition to France, although Wenceslaus had maintained the good relations with the French royal house which his father had promoted. In devotion to the Roman pope, Germany agreed with England, which hoped by means of papal support to gain advantages in France. Wenceslaus cemented the friendship with England by giving his sister Anne in marriage to King Richard II, and at the same time he skillfully avoided any breach with France. The favourable relations of the German king to Urban had from the first made a journey to Rome, in order to obtain the imperial crown, appear as a desirable object. There were indeed no difficulties in the way, and both Pope and emperor would have derived from it an unmistakable accession of power. The journey over the Alps had been planned for spring, 1383, when dynastic policy put obstacles in the way. There was a prospect of gaining Luxemburg.

Louis of Hungary had died in 1382. In the last year of his life he had won Naples and thus enlarged the extent of his authority. No one of his daughters was yet married; but Sigismund, as prospective son-in-law, was already living in Poland, a country unaccustomed to the Hungarian rule, in order to gain friends for himself there. Mary, Sigismund's betrothed wife, was elected Queen of Hungary; but in Poland the people did not wish for her, at any rate they wanted another daughter of Louis. In October, 1384, Hedwig, a girl of thirteen years of age, was actually crowned at Cracow, and the still pagan Grand Duke Jagiello of Lithuania became her husband. But Sigismund succeeded through his stubborness and skill in procuring for himself the crown of Hungary by the end of March, 1387.

Up to this, Wenceslaus had been variously occupied, but his natural disposition to inactivity became more and more evident. His continued absence caused dissatisfaction in the empire. His nearest relatives, especially Jobst of Moravia, intrigued against him in every way, and in Bohemia, his own home, the lords rose
against his rule. The victim of the supposed conspiracy was the Archbishop of Prague, with his official and his vicar-general, Nepomuk. The Bohemian nobility now found a leader in John, who had quarrelled with his brother Prokop. John, in combination with Sigismund, Albert of Austria, and the Margrave William of Meissen, pursued a policy of hostility against the king, and finally, in May, 1394, brought Wenceslaus prisoner to Prague. Since a movement was made in the empire to liberate the king, he was set free in August. John, in his turn, was made prisoner, but he also was released. War raged in Bohemia, and Albert of Austria, during the confusion, aspired to the vicariate of the empire, in fact to the crown itself. Fortunately he died soon.

Wenceslaus and Sigismund concluded in March, 1396, a compact as to the succession. Sigismund became vicar of the empire, and now aimed at the German crown. His position was not indeed favourable at the moment. An army collected from all Europe under his command was defeated at Nicopolis by the Sultan Bajazet II. Hungary also threatened to be lost to him after Mary's death. John made peace with Wenceslaus in 1397, and received from Sigismund's former domains a compensation in the March of Brandenburg.

Wenceslaus still longed for formal investiture as emperor, and Boniface IX, Urban's successor, would gladly have welcomed him to Rome. But his position in Germany at the same time became more and more precarious. He had never been in the empire since 1387, and alliances of the knights and the towns continually disquieted the land. The cities especially had cause to feel the evils entailed by the absence of the sovereign, and, notwithstanding all the appeals of the electors, Wenceslaus kept away from the empire. Fresh disorders had broken out owing to the vacancy in the archdiocese of Mayence, from which John of Nassau emerged as archbishop. Before this the prince and the two other spiritual electors had convened a diet at Frankfort for May 13, 1397. This was an unprecedented step; but the indifference of the emperor to his duty made such a proceeding seem necessary. Wenceslaus had, it is true, summoned an imperial assembly at Nuremberg; but when he heard of the electoral diet, he unwisely abandoned his own. At Frankfort, with the assent of numerous princes and towns, a vicar of the empire was demanded from Wenceslaus, and a regency of princes was proposed in the event of his absence. The question of the schism was also discussed. Complaints as to the government were sent to Wenceslaus. Great excitement was caused at Prague by the tidings of the proceedings in Frankfort; but nothing happened at the moment. Wenceslaus did not appear in Nuremberg before September, and showed by issuing a "Public Peace" that he was in a position to conduct the affairs of government himself. During the course of proceedings at Frankfort the electors laid before the emperor, at his own wish, further complaints. The question of the Church stood in the foreground, and, closely connected with that, the policy toward France. The opinion was growing that the settlement of the papal dispute would be most easily effected by a "cession," that is to say, by the resignation of both popes. Benedict XIII was elected at Avignon, 1394, on the express condition that he would resign his title to secure unity. The object of the French policy was now to persuade the followers of the Roman pope, Boniface, to make him resign in turn. In March, 1398, Wenceslaus met Charles VI at Reims. The outcome of the meeting was only an exhortation to both popes to abdicate, naturally without result. Wenceslaus stood by Boniface. France
itself opposed Benedict; even the cardinals rebelled against him, and a long siege of the papal fortress at Avignon began.

Wenceslaus, on his return from Reims, found the old disorders in Bohemia; the quarrel in the royal family still lasted. This time he did not omit the appointment of an imperial administrator. But the empire was not benefited at all by this step. The electors of Mayence and the Palatinate, who found the position of affairs obviously most irksome, looked for some remedy, and bound themselves with the elector of Cologne at Boppard in April, 1399, to a common policy in all matters of Church and Empire, with the one exception of electing the king. On the occasion of a meeting of the princes in May, when a compact against the towns was concluded, John Archbishop of Mayence attached new members to the Rhenish confederation, which was clearly formed against the sovereign. Everywhere, then, similar dissatisfaction with Wenceslaus prevailed. The charges brought against him were neglect of the realm, especially through his long absence (he himself by the nomination of Sigismund to the vicariate of the empire had admitted his dereliction of duty), and waste of the crown lands, with special reference to the loss of Milan. In this latter case, it was a question of sacrificing a possession which could no longer be held, just as formerly under Charles IV in the case of the surrender of Arles. The alleged reasons were very weak in so far that the real feeling of all, namely, that the royal power was being used exclusively for the aggrandisement of the Luxemburg dominions, remained actually unexpressed. Interest in the empire may have influenced many; others certainly thought of obtaining the crown for themselves. But all the princes considered that in any case no great loss could be sustained by an alteration.

Wenceslaus naturally heard of these proceedings, and wished to come into the empire and hold a diet; but the electors no longer assented to his proposal. On the contrary, the thought was already expressed in September, 1399, by many princes, that a new king should be elected; clearly, however, no one wished an elector to be king. Not until 1400 were the electors of Saxony and the Palatinate received at Frankfort among the candidates. When Pope Boniface had been informed of the proposed new election, a meeting of the princes and towns was summoned for the end of May at Frankfort, and many visitors put in an appearance. An agreement had already been made as to the person of the new king, when on June 4, Wenceslaus, who on his part had forbidden any resolutions as to Empire and Church to be passed during his absence, was earnestly requested to appear at Oberlahnstein on August 11; otherwise the electors would consider themselves released from the oath which they had taken to him. Wenceslaus did not come. On the day fixed the four Rhenish electors appeared at Oberlahnstein; Rupert's election was settled, and he swore to serve the empire loyally. His election was publicly announced on August 20, 1400, and was ratified next day on the Königstuhl in Rhens.

The deposition of Wenceslaus, although a benefit for the empire, was not constitutionally justified. The most weighty of the accusations brought against him was that he had alienated parts of the imperial dominions, and had done so for base lucre when he elevated Giangaleazzo de' Visconti to be Duke of Milan and Count of Pavia. The new emperor had a wide field of operations before him. Without doubt, great expectations were entertained of him, and at any rate he had the point in his favour that he had not begun by buying the votes of the electors by a shameful traffic in crown lands.
E. RUPERT'S KINGDOM, 1400–1410, AND THE CRISIS IN THE CHURCH — THE COUNCIL AT PISA

WENCESLAUS was infuriated at his deposition, but did not venture on any action or any defence of his rights by the sword. On October 25, Rupert of the Palatinate made his state-entry into Frankfort as German king. Other towns had already joined his cause. Since Aschen did not open its gates, the coronation took place at Cologne on Epiphany, 1401. The crown was now acquired, but the difficulty was to keep it. The war against Bohemia had begun before France, Italy, and the Pope were won over. In France Rupert found a friend in Philip of Burgundy, while Louis of Orleans supported Wenceslaus, as did his German ally, the brave William of Guelders. Henry of England hoped to secure the friendship of Rupert through ties of kinship, and therefore promoted the marriage of his son with Blanche, daughter of King Henry IV. He had also to obtain the recognition of the Pope; in fact, he hoped soon to gain the imperial crown. Boniface, far too engrossed to be able to interfere in German affairs, did not refuse to recognise the new emperor and only tried to make sure of his help in the Italian policy. The conditions were: opposition to the counter-papacy, an immediate expedition to Rome for coronation, and political severance from France.

The emperor improved his position by making a progress through the empire. The important city of Nuremburg opened its gates to him, and in May, 1401, the first diet met there. Rapid preparations for the expedition to Rome seemed desirable, as Florence offered 200,000 florins in gold if he would come that very year and begin the war for the recovery of Milan. The details of the imperial coronation were to have been discussed in Nuremburg; but since the attendance was too small, the matter was put off to a new diet at Mayence. Rupert could now have shunned Germany. There were no further hostilities to be feared from Wenceslaus, Sigismund had been made prisoner by the Hungarian nobility, and in Hungary the election of a new king was contemplated. Jobst again believed that under these circumstances he had a favourable opportunity to gain the crown of Bohemia and renewed the agreement, which had never been entirely dissolved, with the Bohemian nobles. A truce was arranged in July between Wenceslaus and Rupert at Amberg, when the new king formulated his demands, but without producing any effect upon the old sovereign. At the beginning of July the expedition to Rome for the coronation was discussed at Mayence. The Austrians, in return for a large sum (100,000 ducats) allowed a passage through their country and over the Brenner, and the departure of the army from Augsburg was planned for September 8, 1401. There was, however, a want of money, and Florence did not wish to pay until the sovereign was in Italy. Wenceslaus, also, now returned an answer, but not such as Rupert had hoped. He consented to abandon his claim to the kingdom in favour of Rupert, but wished to become emperor himself. Besides this, his daughter Elizabeth was to marry Rupert’s son, Hans, and in return for some support in holding Bohemia, a small cession of territory was planned. Rupert wanted a complete renunciation of all claims by his rival, whose position soon became very favourable. Notwithstanding the distress in the empire, of which his son Louis was to be regent, Rupert prepared to start from Augsburg with an army of some 15,000 horsemen. But since no money was forthcoming,
5000 horsemen had to be at once disbanded. An advance was slowly made to Trient, the proposed starting-point of the campaign against Giangaleazzo of Milan. Small reinforcements came from Italy; the money difficulties increased, since Florence had for the moment sent only 55,000 ducats, to which another sum of 55,000 ducats (and only a small part in cash) was added in the middle of October. The war took an unfavourable turn, since they failed to take Brescia between October 21 and October 25. Most of the German princes (Archbishop Frederick of Cologne, Count Frederick of Mürs, Duke Leopold IV of Austria) now returned home. Rupert, under stress of circumstances, dismissed the greater part of his army, but himself waited on and appeared with 400 horsemen in Padua (November 18), still, of course, without money. There was little inclination in Florence to pay the rest of the 90,000 ducats when the advance against Giangaleazzo had been entirely unsuccessful. Negotiations were still pending with the Pope as to the terms and the form of the recognition. Florence finally paid at the end of 1401, or the beginning of 1402, 65,000 ducats more (44,000 in specie, 21,000 in pay for mercenaries). But the little band of loyal followers round the king daily diminished. And so he remained after December 11 in Venice without any prospect of seeing Rome; for Boniface declared emphatically that the coronation could only take place if the war against Giangaleazzo was vigorously prosecuted, whether by the help of Venice or through royal mercenaries. This result was unattainable, for money was wanting. The king and his followers borrowed what they could, but that was soon spent. After a second stay in Padua (January 29 to the middle of April) he went back to Germany through Friuli. On May 1, 1402, Rupert was again in Munich, and one of the most calamitous expeditions to Rome that had ever been attempted, was thus terminated.

The state of affairs in Germany was equally gloomy. There was a want of money, and nothing was less likely than a general acknowledgment of the king. The Luxemburgs above all persisted in their refusal, although Sigismund, released from captivity, took his brother Wenceslaus prisoner and conveyed him to Vienna. The latter escaped toward the end of 1403, and his sovereignty in Bohemia was again established, while in all parts of the empire violent feuds raged, and the negotiations with other countries about the church question had not yet borne any fruit.

A change in the international relations was introduced by the death of Giovanni Galeazzo of Milan. He had, after the murder of Bernabo Visconti (1385), become the head of the seignories and had bought from Wenceslaus the title of duke and a position as prince of the empire in return for a large sum paid down. He had extended his power, 1399, over Pisa and Sienna, and had become a formidable opponent of the town of Florence, which for its part supported the electors in their action against Wenceslaus, in order to shake Giangaleazzo's position by the fall of his patron. This plan miscarried; for Galeazzo was too shrewd a diplomatist, and so his death was all the more welcome to the republic (September 3, 1402). The Pope at once entered into relations with Florence, and commenced war against the infant children of the Duke of Milan. He would, indeed, at this moment have been glad to see Rupert in Italy even with the reward of the imperial crown, and therefore held out to him, in event of his marching immediately to Rome, the prospect of acknowledgment and coronation at Padua by a cardinal as King of Italy. In return, of course, the king was to promise to take part with Florence in the
struggle against Milan and to represent the interests of Rome against Avignon and France. When Rupert answered in the spring, 1403, he demanded an immediate acknowledgment; the new expedition to Italy was, he said, impossible for the time being. Boniface, who now supported Ladislaus as rival king to Sigismund in Hungary, became anxious, since just then Benedict XIII had again been acknowledged by France as lawful pope. He was bound at all hazards to secure Rupert for his side, and therefore on October 1, 1403, formally proclaimed his approval of Rupert, together with a ratification of Wenceslaus's deposition. For the coming expedition to Rome he granted the king two tithes of the German church.

Rupert did indeed seriously meditate the journey to Italy both in 1404 and again in March, 1405, but it was not carried out. His want of money did not allow him to put such thoughts into action; it rather drove him to oppress his previous supporters, the towns, whose hostility he thus incurred. John of Mayence, who had formerly supported the king, joined the ranks of the discontented in the empire. The result was a confederation for five years between seventeen Swabian imperial towns, Baden, Wurttemburg, and the Bishops of Strassburg and Mayence. A league was formed at Marbach in 1405, which was nominally aimed at all who should injure them in their liberties and rights. The point of it was really opposition to the king, although he was informed of the proceedings and asked for his protection. He himself was clear on the matter and wished in consciousness of his innocence to defend himself against the implied reproach in a diet; but the confederates did not allow that. The Archbishop of Cologne, formerly Rupert's friend, was still desirous of mediating, and at last gained his object in 1407. The confederation indeed remained undissolved, but without any special importance. The king learned a lesson from what had happened, and was cautious in the future not to ask the states for pecuniary support. Without any assistance, he at last achieved some small successes. The town of Rotenburg which had formed a secret alliance with Wenceslaus under its energetic burgomaster, Heinrich Toppler, was punished. The Duke of Guelders joined Rupert and the town of Aachen abandoned its resistance, paid eight thousand florins and prepared a stately reception for the king toward the end of 1407. Liebeck also fell to him.

Shortly before this, Brabant had been lost to the empire. Anton of Burgundy, second son of Duke Philip, had become heir after the death of the Duchess Joanna. He took possession of his country in spite of Rupert's protests, and in so doing enjoyed the favour of Wenceslaus, who gave him his niece Elizabeth to wife. Anton thus acquired the prospect of the hereditary lands of Luxemburg, and on the death of Jobst, in 1411, at once took possession of Luxemburg.

Rupert's struggle against Wenceslaus was dormant, and little attention in the empire was paid to either. But in the momentous question of the council, which now excited Christendom, both once more came into opposition. Wenceslaus showed himself favourable to the idea of the council, and thus earned the approval of the cardinals. Rupert, however, was opposed to this revolutionary conception, and held Gregory in Rome to be the lawful head of Christendom. Wenceslaus, clearly stimulated by the respect shown to him in the circle of the advocates of the council, began once more to resume the work of government in the empire, and would have caused Rupert fresh and serious trouble, but Rupert died on May 18, 1410.
The crying distress of Christianity, the unhappy dispute about the pontificate, had already had a marked influence on the politics of western Europe. But as long as Rupert wore the German crown with little honour, the controversies had become more and more acute. The idea of a General Council which the University of Paris even in the lifetime of Clement VII had quite timidly ventured to entertain, now seemed the only practicable solution.

With the overthrow of the German kingly power, which, illuminated by the splendour of the Roman imperial crown, had once represented the central point of civilisation in western Europe, the universal character of the Church had also been entirely destroyed. The national churches of Germany, Italy, England, and Spain were opposed to each, and the French church outstripped all others in importance. We know how it succeeded in removing the seat of the papacy from Rome to Avignon, and what efforts the French crown made, with the support of French cardinals, to assert their power over the head of Christendom after the return of Urban VI to Italy. Benedict XIII in Avignon, as well as Innocent VII, the successor of Boniface IX (d. 1404), in Rome, were forced to promise the electing cardinals that under certain circumstances they would abdicate in the cause of unity. But neither acted according to their promise, although the healing of the schism was their most sincere wish. How, indeed, could the one have yielded without the other? The French policy, in fact, which refused for five years obedience to Benedict, proved itself quite mistaken, so that after May, 1403, he had again to be acknowledged. The dispute had now lasted twenty years without any end to it being visible, and sowed discord in all sections of the population. As in Mayence, so in many other bishoprics, a bishop had been appointed by both sides; even in the vicarages the same spectacle was visible. Each of the two popes tried to bring over the adherents of the other party by gracious concessions of every sort. The result was a degrading traffic, with which punitive measures, bans, and interdicts alternated in appropriate cases. Germany, Italy, and France as a whole were in favour of the Roman pope; France, Spain, and Scotland of the French pope. A college of cardinals supported each of them.

The struggle between the two representatives of the universal spiritual power was to a large extent only the result of the miserable position of the church in general. In particular the curia, since its migration to Avignon, appeared as an international financial body for the impoverishment of the countries, since the sale of preferments and the accumulation of benefices for the profit of the papal treasury were daily occurrences. The ordinary revenues of the papacy were no longer sufficient for the enormous demands of the Avignonese court establishment, to which were added the claims of the French king. It was necessary to procure fresh means. In theory all ecclesiastical property had for centuries been claimed as the property of the pope, who in the fourteenth century put the theory into practice, and began to grant all benefices as coming from him, and naturally expected some return. At the same time the doctrine of indulgence was developed, and after the end of the fourteenth century the virtues of these compositions in discharge of penitence, which became a never-failing source of profit, were continuously preached. At the same time the practice began of conferring several benefices on one person, so that his income was greatly increased, while the parsonages themselves were filled by vicars. It was the usual rule that canons belonged to several chapters; they naturally resided only at one place and simply derived from
the others the income, in order, often, to live on it in a very ostentatious and even luxurious way.

Just as the electors in the empire still entertained the idea of setting up the king in opposition to the empire, so the more advanced part of the clergy felt more or less clearly the opposition between Pope and Church. The former claimed to represent the Church; the clergy thought they ought to contest this claim, for they knew another real representation of the Church, namely, a general assembly of the churches. In this lies the fundamental significance of the movement, which ends with the Concordat of Vienna, 1448, that the idea of the Church, as it appears embodied in the council, was realised by each individual member of Christianity. The question throughout was not about the faith, but about the constitution of the Church; not about the refutation of false doctrines (the discussion of the doctrines of a Wickliffe and a Huss was only an incident of small importance), but about the moral regeneration of the clergy. The fifteenth century was not able to reach this goal. It was only the mighty shock which the universal church experienced in the sixteenth century, when the discussion of questions of faith estranged great masses of the nations from its bosom, which led to its moral revival at Trent.

Benedict XIII, at Avignon, a Spaniard by birth, was an able and learned man, of strictly moral life, inflexible in his resolution, and the keenest champion of the view that the Church was embodied in the Pope. At Rome Innocent VII had died in 1406, after only a two years' pontificate, and the cardinals chose for his successor a gray-haired Venetian, who took the name of Gregory XII. He was a shifty man, and in spite of his declarations to the contrary, did not seriously trouble himself to settle the dispute. He showed himself apparently favourable to an offer of Benedict, that the two popes should meet to arrange the dispute. When the Avignonesi pope really came to Sarona, he raised all kinds of difficulties. He removed to Lucerne at the beginning of 1408, but by so doing was not really nearer Benedict. Every one now saw that nothing was to be expected from the two popes; only a council could help. Fortunately the two colleges of cardinals, who were earnestly striving for unity, separated from their popes. Gregory, in order to be rid of the insistence of his cardinals, nominated a number of new ones, whereupon the old ones broke off with him and went to Pisa. Not long afterward a French provincial synod declared Benedict an obstinate schismatic and heretic. Thereupon the French cardinals also went to Pisa. Both colleges now jointly issued the invitations to a general council. It was important to win at once the consent of the temporal powers. France was inclined to begin, and England's consent was finally won; but the German king, Rupert, who was invited as defender of the church, did not answer, and thus favoured his rival, Wenceslaus, who immediately acquiesced in the welcome notion, and toward the end of 1408 demanded that his envoys should be regarded as those of the lawful king. Rupert and his learned councillors were distinct opponents of the council. In their eyes Gregory was the legitimate pope, and the action of the cardinals seemed to them rebellion against the spiritual head; the Archbishops of Cologne and Mayence thought otherwise. Yet their plan did not succeed in the Frankfort diet of January, 1409, although the envoy of the cardinals was sympathetically greeted, especially in the towns, while the plenipotentiary of Gregory, who also issued invitations to a council, found full support from Rupert. The king finally appointed three envoys, who in combination with Gregory were to raise protests against all decrees of the council, and
they were thus employed when punctually, on March 25, 1409, the council at Pisa was opened.

The assembly, contrary to all expectation, was largely attended. More than two hundred bishops stood by the side of the representatives of fully one hundred cathedral chapters, and more than three hundred doctors of theology and of the canon law represented, together with the deputies of fifteen universities, the authority of Western learning. At the head of a small body of temporal princes from Germany stood Wenceslaus, who gave the inconsiderate promise that he would help the newly elected pope to his rights by force of arms. The negotiations proceeded quickly. By the beginning of June, both the popes, Gregory and Benedict, were declared deposed as heretics, and toward the end of the month a new pope was chosen in Alexander V. Neither of the deposed popes, it is true, contemplated any resignation. Three popes, each with a considerable following, now reigned over Christendom. At the beginning of July Alexander V dismissed the council, and a new one was proposed for 1412, when the suggested ecclesiastical reforms were to be discussed.

In Germany Rupert still supported Gregory. On the other hand, Wenceslaus, most of the princes, and the towns stood by Alexander. But in Prague itself there was a large party under the direction of the archbishop and the cathedral chapter against any separation from Gregory, while within the university the opposite view was held. A violent dispute broke out between the Bohemian and the three other nations, who had long had a feud with each other, as only the first in accordance with the king's wish for the neutrality of the university expressed its views on the question before the council, while the Saxon, Bavarian, and Polish nations wished, considering the importance of the matter, to take sides, and support the pope chosen by the council. In order to gag the Germans, Wenceslaus, by imperial dispensation, changed the conditions of voting in the senate of the university so that the Bohemians should have three votes, and the combined Germans only one vote. The majority of the body of German students, indignant at this insult, left the town, together with their teachers, and went to the recently founded University of Leipsic, which received its charter from Pope Alexander V.

Open war was now threatening in the empire on account of the Pope. The archbishops, John of Mayence and Frederick of Cologne, united for the common defence of Alexander's rights, while Gregory handed over to the king, as his loyal supporter, the revenues of the dioceses whose bishops supported Alexander. The towns, it is true, still stood by Rupert, but showed no wish to espouse the cause of Gregory with him. Rupert had already allied himself with the lords of Hesse and Brunswick for war against John, when death cut his plans short (May 18, 1410).

However unimportant and unsuccessful Rupert may have been in his policy, his death was an important event. The declared enemy of the council, from which alone, as matters then stood, a solution of the difficult problems could be expected, had now disappeared. The last representative of the papal-absolutist constitution of the church was in the grave. The regular council could now come into life as a church institution, as a representation of Christendom, supported by the German sovereign, the born defender of the church. In comparison with the councils or synods of the early Middle Ages, the field of operations as well as the composition of the council was enlarged. The introduction of the laity, according to the teaching of
Dietrich von Nieheim, was inevitable at any future assembly. The councils wished to gain for themselves an importance far beyond the questions of the church in the narrowest sense, in fact to exercise by themselves both a spiritual and intellectual supervision, such as hitherto the Pope had claimed and exercised in questions of a secular nature. The world, therefore, could hopefully look forward to the intended assembly, which as the successor to the Council of Pisa, should undertake the reform of the church in head and members.

**F. King Sigismund, the Councils of Constance and Basle**

After the death of Rupert it was necessary to elect afresh an emperor for Germany. Wenceslaus, it is true, still claimed to be the lawful sovereign, but he took no serious steps to secure this position for himself. The vote of the Bohemian electorate was for him, Rudolf of Saxony was his friend, and Jobst of Moravia, as holder of Brandenburg, stood by him too. These three, however, only agreed on the advancement of a Luxemburger. Of the remaining electors, those of Cologne and Mayence wished in any case for a supporter of the pope chosen by the council, while those of Trèves and the Palatinate would only choose a friend of Gregory’s papacy. Sigismund of Hungary had hitherto taken very little part in the papal question. He could be reckoned as much an adherent of Gregory as of Alexander, and he was a Luxemburger by descent, although at present no friend of Wenceslaus. His election would help the cause of all three parties.

Sigismund was still Vicear of the empire and acted in this capacity. He was desirous that Wenceslaus should be crowned emperor, and did not directly trouble himself to become Kaiser. But he forfeited the electoral votes of the Palatinate and Trèves by supporting the successor of Alexander, John XXIII, the pope elected by the council. However, he had a claim on the electoral vote of Brandenburg in the place of Jobst, and he commissioned Frederick VI of Nuremburg, the burgrave of the Hohenzollern house, to vote in his stead. The other electors did not, however, agree to this. Nevertheless, the burgrave was admitted as representative of Sigismund to the election in Frankfort at the beginning of September, after he had induced the electors of the Palatinate and Trèves by his declarations on the papal question to favour his principal. The electors of Cologne and Mayence wished to wait for the envoy of the three other electors before the election should be made. But Frederick with the electors of the Palatinate and Trèves insisted on the election and held it in the churchyard of St. Bartholomew’s Church, for the building itself was closed in consequence of the interdict. The three chose Sigismund and soon afterward left the city. The electors of Mayence and Cologne, however, applied to Jobst and offered him the crown, although he had declined the invitation to vote, on the ground that there was a sovereign already. On October 1st the electors of Mayence, Cologne, and Saxony, in the interior of St. Bartholomew’s, finally chose Jobst as emperor. But he took no steps at all to secure the possession of the kingdom, and died in January, 1411. Sigismund now proclaimed that he accepted the choice which had fallen on him in September and entered into negotiations with Wenceslaus. The latter was conceded the title of Roman king, with the prospect of the imperial dignity, to which Sigismund was to help him, and Sigismund was tacitly acknowledged as emperor by the electors.
This was Sigismund's first reappearance in the empire, the conditions of which had become strange to him, and soon after his recognition he went back to Hungary. Before doing so he carried out another arrangement which, insignificant as it seemed, became of the greatest importance for the history of Germany. In return for the support which had been given him in Hungary and at the first election, he conferred on the burgrave, Frederick of Nuremberg, as representative of the sovereign, the disordered March of Brandenburg, where a wide field was open to him for uninterrupted activity. His heirs were destined to remain in possession of this lordship, and the empire could only buy it back at a high price. In the year 1417 the Hohenzollern was formally invested at Constance with the March and the electoral vote thereto appertaining. Brandenburg now had a family dynasty, and from that time the empire was no longer disturbed by the disputes about that country which had lasted almost a century.

Alexander, the pope elected at the Council of Pisa, died before he could enter Rome. His successor, John XXIII, had been legate of Bologna, and was a man of small intellectual capabilities, but a shrewd politician. His first object was to fight King Ladislaus of Naples, who continued to support Gregory XII. But the campaign against him was attended by little success, for Rome and the States of the Church fell into the hands of the Neapolitans. Sigismund took advantage of the Pope’s plight at a time when prudent and quiet conduct would have won for him the gratitude of the whole Christian world. At the end of October he announced to the world that the council planned at Pisa was to meet on November 1, 1414, at Constance (a place which lay beyond the jurisdiction of one of the three popes), John, who on his part also issued a bull of summons in December, was asked to appear, and so was Gregory, and Spain like France, even if unwillingly, had to obey the summons of the German sovereign. Sigismund was all this time in Italy and was engaged in a war with Milan, which he wished to recover for the empire; but before the opening of the council he had to receive the German crown at Aachen, and therefore marched in the spring of 1414 to Germany. After the death of Frederick of Cologne a dispute arose about the succession to the archbishopric, between Dietrich of Mœrs and William of Berg. Sigismund favoured Dietrich and allowed himself to be crowned by him at Aachen. Pope John also favoured him. But an episcopal dispute threatened, since William's succession was ratified by Gregory XII. This added another complication.

Pope John entered Constance about the end of October, 1414; Sigismund appeared at Christmas. An immense crowd was now collected in the city on the lake of Constance. In addition to the high spiritual dignitaries and doctors of theology there appeared princes and knights, jugglers and loose women. The laity, who found amusement and profit there, far out-numbered the body of real members of the council. Sigismund was everywhere regarded as the chief personage. He honestly exerted himself to perform his duties, and above all to restore the unity of the Church; and he had already come to an understanding with England and France that John must surrender his papacy. The numerous Italians would have easily been able to turn the scale. But the system of voting by nations, which was then usual, prevented this. The German nation and newly recognised English

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1 Henry V claimed and obtained the right to send representatives of "a nation" as representatives of the ancient kingdom and "nation" of Ireland.
nation acted together; by them stood the French, Italian, and Spanish nations, each with one vote only. John could not fail to see that he had no support in the assembly. To secure unity the two other popes must be won and negotiation would have implied the admission that he was not the only lawful pope. He promised on March 1, 1415, to resign his office, but recalled his declaration, and with the help of Frederick of Austria secretly escaped from Constance. Gregory XIII voluntarily abdicated, John was pronounced by the council to be deposed, and only Benedict XIII was now left. The departure of John had the immediate consequence that the assembly, in a resolution of immense importance, declared on April 6 that their official authority was derived immediately from Christ, and that even the Pope was obliged to submit to it. By these decrees the council took upon itself great duties, especially since it had been expressly declared that the assembly could not break up before the schism in the Church was healed and the reform of the Church completed. Frederick of Austria, owing to his action, fell under the ban of the empire, and Sigismund intended to crush him completely. However, as Benedict's claims were too great, Sigismund broke off communications with him and arranged with his former supporters, the kings of Aragon, Castille, and Navarre, that they should attend the council and there agree to his deposition. This was duly carried out on July 26, 1417.

Meanwhile, at Constance other questions had come forward for discussion, at the express wish of Sigismund. Measures were taken against heresies which were disturbing the land, and especially against Wickliffe and his Bohemian followers, at whose head stood John Huss. He and his sect had caused much discontent in Bohemia.

At Prague, ever since 1403, it had been clearly seen what dangers lay hidden in the doctrines of Wickliffe, and the University resolved to forbid forty-five articles out of his writings to be taught. The examination of his writings in 1410 showed distinct heresy in the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. Hitherto no stronger measures had been taken against Huss than against any other follower of Wickliffe. Not until 1409 was he summoned to answer for some alleged utterances. The occasion for further steps was given by the appeal of some students, certainly at the instigation of Huss, to Gregory XII against the decrees of the Archbishop of Prague, by which every supporter of Wickliffe's teaching on the Lord's Supper was threatened with penalties as a heretic. Gregory summoned the parties before him, but the archbishop had Alexander V on his side, and he authorised him, at the end of 1409, to act in the spirit of his former decrees, and expressly charged him not to countenance an appeal of the parties concerned. When Huss and his companions, nevertheless, appealed to John XXIII against the archbishop's measures, John excommunicated him for disobedience on July 18, 1410. But the question came before the papal court, and an inquiry was made into the charge of heresy which was raised at Prague. Wickliffe himself had not yet been declared a heretic. Huss was now summoned before the curia; but in the summer of 1411 efforts were still being made to end the proceedings by an agreement between the archbishop and Huss, a proof that until then the charge of heresy had not been raised against Huss. On the complaint of the opponents of Huss at Prague his trial was put into other hands, and the judgment of the archbishop which declared Wickliffe a heretic and Huss his follower was confirmed. Nothing was actually done, but the ban for disobedience
was strictly enforced, and in October, 1412, an interdict was suspended over all places where Huss remained. Nevertheless, he preached in Prague as well as in the country. Up to 1413 neither there nor at Rome had any official sentence been issued against him on matters of faith.

The events in Bohemia were probably well known in the empire. Sigismund, who hardly had any intimate knowledge of them, zealously tried to quiet all disturbances in his own country. He hoped that he would attain this result, if he summoned Huss before the council at Constance, in order to put him on his defence. Sigismund, in so doing, did not propose an ordinary trial for heresy, in which the punishment in event of condemnation always amounted to death at the stake, but a declaration of faith before the whole council, when any one might put questions, and Huss might answer them. With this understanding he promised the defendant his support, and although Huss had already started from Prague on September 28, drew up for him at Speyer, on October 18, 1414, a safe-conduct, that is to say, a simple passport allowing him an undisturbed and fair journey there, as well as a safe return journey, in the event that he started on it. Huss imprudently entered Constance long before Sigismund on the 3d November. The Pope remitted the ban under which he lay, and also removed the interdict and granted him complete liberty until the cardinals, at the instigation of Michael de Causis, the old opponent of Huss, treacherously arrested him without the Pope's knowledge. This took place contrary to the express command of Sigismund and the pledge of the Pope; but the cardinals had gained their point. Then for the first time Huss was charged as a heretic, though the council of John had condemned the writings of Wickliffe in January, 1413, and had even proposed to institute proceedings against his dead person. Sigismund, mindful of his pledge, took instant steps for the liberation of Huss. But he failed, as the council was jealous of his meddling, which threatened to bring the members under the emperor's control. So, at the beginning of 1415, the council, entirely convinced that it had to deal with a heretic, tried to represent the earlier trial of Huss as a consequence of his heresy. All that Sigismund could effect was to insist that the proceedings should be conducted publicly. He gained his point by the end of May, and on June 5th, 7th, and 8th the hearings of Huss did take place in public before the whole council, which gave him the opportunity to declare his beliefs, but otherwise the publicity was wholly unavailing. Sigismund, however, declared that his promise had thus been kept. He took no further steps for the liberation of Huss, and without interfering allowed him to be burnt as a heretic on July 6, 1415. (See the plate, "The Burning of John Huss," in Vol. V.) It had certainly become clear to him, on closer examination, that Huss from the first had been a heretic, and implied a permanent danger to Bohemia. But the rising, in which Czech national feeling was combined with religious fanaticism, when once it broke out, was not suppressed so soon as Sigismund might have hoped. After Jerome had followed his friend to the stake on May 30, 1416, the Bohemians, sword in hand, began to advocate the more liberal doctrines of Wickliffe. For twenty years the "Hussite wars" raged through Germany.

In the summer of 1415 war between England and France had once more been kindled. These events threatened to be momentous for the council, and the representatives of both countries ought indeed to have been working in common at the solution of the great problems. Sigismund had the best intentions of establishing
peace, and with this object went in person to Paris and then to England to the
court of Henry V. Since he did not succeed there in effecting a union between
the two hostile powers, he concluded, in August, 1416, a defensive and offensive
alliance against France. The French members of the council now went over to
the Romance nations, and Sigismund was compelled on his part to declare war
against France in the spring of 1417. But the realm was not in a position to lend
weight to his words by any armed force.

The proceedings of the council in the important question of reform had come
to a standstill during Sigismund’s absence; its time was taken up with trifes.
The opposition between Germanic and Romance nations made itself more and more
felt, and the latter had certainly the predominance. They yielded so far to the
Germans as to agree to the resolution that at least the reform of the papacy and
curia should be taken in hand before the election of a new pope. Sigismund and
the Germans generally wished for a decision on the whole question of church
reform before a pope was elected; but this was impracticable. Resolutions
were hastily adopted in October as to the procedure at a papal election, and some
other points. The English, at the command of their king, deserted the Germans,
and Sigismund saw his work lost, and left Constance. On November 11, 1417, an
Italian, a member of the family of the Colonnas, and of anti-French sympathies,
was chosen by twenty-three cardinals and six prelates of each of the five nations
to be pope under the title of Martin V (1417–1431). He was a man well trained
in the science of the time, and he had been a loyal follower of John XXIII. His
personality was hardly welcome to the cardinals, but the members of the council
were the more pleased to see him. Sigismund was again in Constance on the day
when the election was announced. The existence of a pope, whom he escorted to
enthronisation and coronation, meant much to Sigismund, since such a pope could
not refuse to give his approbation, and place the imperial crown on his head.

The unity of the church was now restored once more. But there was no church
reform. Martin, indeed, set about discussing with a committee of reform in
January, 1418, the programme proposed shortly before his election. But it was
here seen how divergent the wishes and demands of the nations were, and the discus-
sions resulted in concordats which the Pope concluded with each separate
nation only for a definite time. The important resolution as to the regular
summoning of councils was, however, confirmed. The final sitting was on April 22,
1418. The members left Constance, but the world did not see the great hopes ful-
filled with which the opening of the proceedings had been regarded. Sigismund’s
ideal wishes in particular were far from realised. He had wished to obtain peace
for the whole of Christendom, and then to lead its united strength into the field
against the Turks, but all such plans had to be abandoned.

Sigismund appeared to his contemporaries as the lawful ruler, and great things
were expected of him. It is for this reason that the programme of social reform
which was formulated in the last days of his reign was called the “Reformation
of Emperor Sigismund.” He was himself fully conscious of his great duties. He
knew only too well how powerless the empire was, but he endeavoured to create
imperial cities, and not merely to strengthen the possessions of the house of Lux-
emburg. He did perhaps too little for his own dynasty. He gave away Branden-
burg, and granted Lausitz, by way of mortgage, as a prefecture (Landeogeten) to a
knight in 1429. Moravia came into the power of Albert of Austria, the subse-
quent king, who married Sigismund's only daughter, Elizabeth (1422), and so brought the whole inheritance of Luxemburg to the House of Hapsburg.

In Bohemia, where Wenceslaus was still lord, the Hussite insurrection, of which we have seen the beginnings (cf. supra), spread widely and caused the greatest distress in the country. The burning of the teacher roused bitter passions in his home, and the fury of the people was mainly directed against the clergy. The nobility united to protect the liberty of preaching, the university was declared the highest authority in the Church, and all Catholics formed themselves into a counter-league. The religious teaching of Huss had met with response even in the royal family, from the wife of Wenceslaus; and when social distress as well as fanaticism drove the peasants to war, it was too late to suppress the disorders. In the summer of 1419, a few days before Wenceslaus's death, public disturbances and street fighting occurred for the first time at Prague. Sigismund was indeed the natural heir to the Bohemian crown, but nevertheless he appointed the widow of Wenceslaus regent. Under her regency renewed uproar and bloodshed prevailed, clearly in connection with the question of the succession, for the multitude loathed Sigismund, who seemed to be the murderer of Huss. The king ordered a large number of Hussites to be executed at Breslau, and thus gave a new proof of his sympathies in matters of faith. Martin V at the king's desire issued a bull ordering a crusade against the heretics, and Sigismund was prepared to conduct a merciless war against the Hussites. Within the movement itself there were two opposite parties,—the moderate Utraquists (also called Calixtins, who only differed from the universal Church in the observance of the Lord's Supper) and the radical Taborites, who repudiated every cult, and were also the champions of communist ideas. The latter had the upper hand by 1420, committed great excesses in the country, and intimidated the Utraquists, who were chiefly represented in Prague. Toward the end of July, Sigismund appeared with an army reputed eighty thousand strong, and began the siege of Prague. But the fight was attended by little good fortune. After a reverse received on July 14, the army was broken up without effecting any results. Sigismund, however, was crowned King of Bohemia by the Archbishop of Prague.

When the new king left Bohemia in the spring of 1421, the Hussites soon gained the whole country and overrun Moravia. The Archbishop of Prague himself recognised the "Four Articles of Prague" which comprised the Hussite doctrine, but the cathedral chapter remained loyal to the Church. A Bohemian diet thereupon deposed Sigismund, and there was an idea of appointing Wladislaus, King of Poland, in his stead. Sigismund could not submit to this, and in a diet at Nuremberg demanded help from the empire (1421). Since Bohemia possessed an electoral vote, the empire, as such, was interested in these events. The four Rhenish electors shared the same view. They appeared in Nuremberg on the right day, but were compelled to begin the debates without the king. They were chiefly afraid lest the heretical teaching should spread to the rest of Germany, and they tried to guard against this eventuality by a careful search for all heretics. Further measures were settled in May in a diet at Wesel, where a papal legate held out the prospect of a remission of sins to all who took part in the crusade. The king was not present. But the electors for their part announced an imperial campaign, and actually collected a splendid army, which marched into Bohemia from Eger, and lay in September before the town of Saaz. In October John Ziska of
Trocmow advanced with his forces. The army of the crusaders turned to flight, and Sigismund, who now marched forward from Moravia, was also completely defeated on January 8, 1422, at Deutsch-Brod. This misfortune was increased by the suggestions of his contemporaries that he favoured heretics, while Bohemia was completely lost to him, and the Polish prince, Sigismund Corybut, was chosen regent of that kingdom. The position of the king was one of extraordinary difficulty. His presence was clamoured for in the empire, and yet it was necessary in Hungary and Moravia. He made an unwilling appearance in a diet at Nuremberg (1422), when it was decided to support the Teutonic Order against Poland, and to continue the war in Bohemia. It was intended to equip two armies,—one for the relief of Carlstein, the other to be stationed for a year in Bohemia. Frederick, Margrave of Brandenburg, was to be commander-in-chief. To cover the cost the Jews were compelled to pay a tax which amounted to a third of their property. Before Sigismund again left the empire, he nominated Archbishop Conrad of Mayence to the vicariate of the empire, with unusually full authority, but the Palsgrave Louis disputed this position with him. Conrad thereupon resigned the office, but the want of a supreme head was much felt, as neither money nor men were collected. The Margrave Frederick advanced into Bohemia in October with an inadequate force, since he still hoped to be joined by Frederick of Meissen.

The war was again temporarily interrupted, as the Poles made peace with the Teutonic Order as well as with Sigismund, and recalled Prince Corybut from Bohemia. The heresy, however, in Bohemia grew worse and worse, and the different parties began to fight fiercely among themselves.

Since the Palsgrave Louis would not tolerate an actual viceroy of the empire, for he thought the office belonged to him alone, the four Rhenish electors, together with Brandenburg and Saxony, began to govern the empire, as an electoral corporation, and formed at Bingen, on January 17, 1424, an "Electoral Union," in order to restore order in the empire, but, above all, to suppress heresy. The "Electoral Union" was undeniably a measure directed against the king, and some provisions of the agreement showed this more clearly, so that Sigismund was justly incensed when the message of the electors reached him. According to the position of things, he could not fail to see in it a conspiracy organised by the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg, and therefore invited the electors to come to Vienna and to effect a reconciliation between him and the margrave. Although they at first asserted, they did not come, and only professed readiness to treat with Sigismund's envoys at Nuremberg. When the king appeared in Vienna at the beginning of 1425, there were only the deputys of a few towns present. A rupture between king and electors seemed inevitable, but the Rhenish princes were not disposed to let matters go so far. Frederick of Saxony, who had been just invested with this electoral dominion, was on the best terms with Sigismund. The Margrave of Brandenburg, whose relations to Poland (the origin of the quarrel) had altered, was obliged to come to terms with the king. A diet at Nuremberg in May, 1426, effected a complete reconciliation.

In the interval Prince Corybut had again entered Bohemia. But his prospects did not seem favourable. The Elector of Saxony and Margrave of Meissen, the powerful neighbour of Bohemia, had already promised to help Albert of Austria, the king's son-in-law, to the Bohemian crown, and to give him his electoral vote. After the death of the leader of the Taborites, Ziska, on October 11, 1424, the
struggle continued between the Radicals and the Utraquists in Prague, at whose head Corybut placed himself. But at the end of 1425 both parties came to an understanding. It was not, indeed, completely successful, although the new leader of the Taborites, Procop (the Great), was ready to negotiate with the Catholics, the king, and the Utraquists, if only the substance of the faith was not thereby injured. While new war preparations were being made in the diet of Nuremberg, an army of Frederick the Warlike was completely defeated at Aussig on June 16, 1426. Sigismund, now fully occupied with his other duties, intrusted the Bohemian war to his son-in-law. At the beginning of 1427 the Franconian knights dedicated themselves to the war against the heretics, and the electors renewed at Frankfort the Electoral Union of Bingen, while they attempted once more to take the conduct of the empire into their hands, though without any opposition to the king. Archbishop Otto of Trèves was appointed commander-in-chief for the Bohemian war, and the troops assembled in sufficient numbers; but the campaign once more ended with a defeat on August 2, at Tachau.

The year 1427, after the defeat of Corybut, saw the invasion of the neighbouring countries by the Hussites. They were impelled by the ravaging of their homes, and above all by love of plunder. The universal dislike of the clergy felt by the people, which then showed itself in every rising of the urban and country proletariat, had been much intensified by the appearance of the Hussites. A terrible war of annihilation now began to devastate the countries adjacent to Bohemia for miles around. The Utraquists were not quieted until the Council of Basle (1433), in the "Compacts of Prague" conceded to the laity the chalice at the Lord’s Supper, and the sermon in the vulgar tongue. The Taborites, after the death of the two Procoops, on May 30, 1434, at Lipan, from the effect of this defeat surrendered on the same terms, and finally in 1436 recognised Sigismund as king.

The war difficulty was not relieved by imperial armies. But under stress of circumstances a resolution of great significance was passed, through the efforts of Cardinal Henry, brother of Henry IV of England, on the occasion of the diet at Frankfort summoned by him (1427). It had been seen that the constitution of the army, hitherto customary, no longer corresponded to the demands of the time, and that nothing could be effected without a paid army which remained permanently in the field. But to obtain soldiers for the empire money was essential, and this was to be raised according to a dexterous scheme of the cardinal’s, by a universal imperial tax, called "common or general pence." Although the whole notions of the age were thus turned upside down, the tax, which was at once income tax, property tax, poll tax, and class tax, was nevertheless decreed. A commission was appointed to administer the funds, and the electors, with three representatives of the towns, were to decide on their application. Hardly anything indeed was realised, and the idea was not carried out. Nevertheless the proposal and the shrewdly designed system were of great importance as a suggestion for imperial financial reform in later times.

Sigismund allowed the electors full scope in the empire, for the Turks and the Poles occupied him sufficiently. But for the complete execution of his plans against the Hussites, of whom he never lost sight, he required the help of a greater power, and hoped for the support of Pope Martin V. The latter, according to the

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1 Like Peter’s pence to the Pope.
resolutions of Constance, had convoked a council in 1423 at Pavia, whence on account of the plague it was transferred to Sienna. But the assembly, which was very thinly attended, was dissolved in the spring of 1424, before any results had been achieved, and Basle was fixed as the place for the next meeting in seven years' time. Martin had not realised the hopes placed on him; on the contrary, he tried to develop the papal omnipotence once more, and was personally by no means friendly to the council. Sigismund, notwithstanding, looked for a solution of the Hussite question in the first place by a general council, where the reform of the Church should be treated. England and France also urged that a council should be summoned before 1433. Even in Prague itself the idea of a council became less repugnant. After the electors of Mayence and Brandenburg, together with the representatives of some towns had conferred with the emperor at Pressburg (1429), about the pacification of the Empire, the latter came into the empire in the summer of 1430, and held a diet at Straubing. The Hussite question was discussed, but the thoughts of Sigismund were clearly fixed on a march over the Alps, for the Pope still took no steps to summon the much-desired council. At last, yielding to universal pressure, he nominated Cardinal Cesarini, at the beginning of 1431, president, with full jurisdiction. He died soon afterward. Steps were quickly taken to hold a new election, resulting in the choice of Eugene IV (1431–1447), who was forced, however, on his election to swear to comprehensive conditions in favour of the college of cardinals.

Sigismund learned of these events at Nuremburg, where a very crowded diet was just debating the vigorous suppression of the Bohemian heretics. When he heard from Cesarini that the council was actually to assemble soon, he only wished to settle the defence of the frontiers, and then to wait for the proceedings of the council. But the electors were in favour of war; the emperor gave way, and the preparations continued, though slowly, supported by the crusade sermons of Cesarini. On August 14, 1431, the imperial army met the Hussites at Taus, but, although superior in numbers, it was broken up, and thus all the preparations had been futile.

Without any special opening the council at Basle had actually begun its sittings in the spring. After the failure of the Hussite campaign it seemed to the cardinal himself that the religious troubles of the Bohemians could only be solved by encouraging the council, especially since some princes were already attempting to effect a union with the heretics by private treaties. Sigismund's old wish to start the reform of the Church drove him to an interview with Pope Eugene, in order to treat with him about his coronation as emperor. He thought it indeed prudent to clear up every point before his appearance in Basle. After the Duke of Milan had promised monthly payments during the period of the stay in Italy, and an escort to Rome, Sigismund started in the autumn with a small following, and was crowned on November 25, at Milan. The duke now made difficulties, and wished the king to return, especially since there was no prospect of an agreement with the Pope. The latter was emphatically an opponent of the council, and wished that it should sit in an Italian town. When he learned that the council had, on its own responsibility, invited the Bohemians to discuss matters, he hastily decided to dissolve the assembly, and summoned it to Bologna for 1433. But the assembled fathers paid little attention and remained together, mindful of the resolutions at Constance. Sigismund strongly supported this action; he would rather have
renounced the imperial crown, although his position in Italy, without money and without a sufficient following, was very enviable. The council now sent an urgent summons to the Pope himself to appear in Basle, or to send authorised representatives; but he did not come. Sigismund, meanwhile, was hard pressed by Florence and by papal troops, and could not in any case return to Germany, for there he would have been obliged to surrender himself submissively to the council, and his independent policy would have thus been destroyed. Eugene was forced to yield in January, 1433, for the whole of Christendom was for the council and against him. He feared that he would lose the papal states, and tried to prevent this by the bull of February 14, which permitted the holding of the council at Basle, and contemplated the appointment of delegates. Eugene, moreover, met the wish of Sigismund to see himself crowned. On May 31 the coronation as emperor took place, after the ordinary oath had been administered. But the displeasure of the council was excited because the newly crowned emperor was now attached by his oath to the person of the Pope.

Sigismund left Rome in August, 1433, after he had induced Pope Eugene to recognise the council from the very beginning, on condition that it would repeal all the resolutions passed against the Pope. When the emperor entered Basle important duties awaited him, for the assembly was seriously threatening the suspension of the Pope. The extremity to which the Pope had been brought by the events of the war in Italy, finally compelled him to abandon his opposition to the council. He declared the dissolution of it, which he had previously proclaimed, to be null and void, and marked out the duties of the assembly exactly as it had itself comprehended them to be. In April, 1434, the arrangement was completed. Council, emperor, and Pope now worked in common at the reform of the Church; but no progress was made in this direction, and Sigismund left the assembly dissatisfied.

He had, however, done a great work in obtaining a settlement of the Bohemian question. The Hussite leader Procop accepted the invitation of the council to enter into negotiations, and the first conference took place in May, 1432, at Eger. Widely extended legal protection was granted to Hussites of all denominations, and the permission to introduce motions was also conceded. The deputation finally appeared at Basle in October, 1433, Procop also being a member. Discussions of immense length were now started, naturally without result. At last a deputation of the council went with the Bohemians to Prague and there drew up the terms of peace (the compacts of Prague), which were accepted by the council and then ratified by the Bohemian diet on November 30, 1433. Contests indeed were still threatening, for the different Hussite factions began hostilities among themselves, and took warlike measures against the town of Pilsen, which had remained true to the Catholic faith. But in this struggle the moderate nobles won the day, while the Taborites disappeared.

The position in the East was considerably changed by the death of King Wladislaus of Poland, toward the end of May, 1434. There was no longer any fear of a political alliance of the Bohemians with the Poles, even if Sigismund still regarded with distrust the growth of the Polish power and instigated the Teutonic Order to war with it. In autumn, 1434, the emperor left the empire; in the summer of 1435 there were interminable negotiations over the administration of the Compacts of Prague, and the terms on which Sigismund was to be acknowledged king in Bohemia. Without having come to any real result, Sigismund entered
Prague on August 23, 1436, after the compacts had been solemnly published and the king had promised not to allow any one to be forced to receive the communion in both kinds. The disturbances, however, still continued for a long time, but did not any longer affect the empire, but were restricted to Bohemia. Sigismund indeed did not experience much happiness either there or in the Empire; the proceedings in the council, events in the empire, and the threatened war against Burgundy, exhausted him, while gout tormented him. An imperial diet at Eger, in the autumn of 1436, resulted in nothing, and the emperor's hope of seeing his son-in-law Albert chosen Roman king was not realised. Sigismund died on December 9, 1437, at Znaim without leaving any male issue.

At Basle, meantime, an earnest effort was being made to reform the Church and the papacy. But the wielder of the papal power, Eugene IV, was not present to take part in the work; and this led to a bitter feeling among the clergy against the papal absolutism, which could no longer be repressed by pacific means. The resolution of the council, which abolished all the papal revenues derived from the holders of offices, was merely due to this fact, and Eugene naturally refused to acknowledge it. But matters did not come to an open breach until the Greek Church, threatened by the Turkish danger, made proposals in order to effect once more a union with the Roman Church. The Pope wished to discuss this point only in an Italian synod and thus hoped to be quit of the assembly at Basle. But the majority of the council decided to retain Basle; and when Eugene for the second time dissolved the council and convoked a new one at Ferrara for the beginning of 1438, the proceedings against him were opened at Basle. When, however, it was generally known that a large number of attendants at the council were actually in Ferrara, and after February, 1439, in Florence, the best men left the old meeting-place of the council and espoused the papal party. On July 6, 1439, the union, in name at any rate, between the Romans and the Greeks was sworn to in the Cathedral of Florence.

Soon no one troubled himself further about the proceedings at Basle, least of all Pope Eugene, who had been deposed there. In the spring of 1443 the rest of the assembly moved from Basle in order to continue their session at Lausanne. There the assembly was dissolved in 1449, after it had been forced to recognise Nicholas V the successor of Eugene.

The German princes, after 1438, kept, on the whole, in the background; they did not wish again to interfere directly in ecclesiastical questions. The "Concordat of Vienna" was promulgated in 1448 under Frederick III. By this the relations of the curia to Germany were carefully fixed, but at the same time all the results were clearly annulled which the councils had accomplished for Germany. The German princes derived the greatest benefit from the resolutions; indeed to the Duke of Austria, for the moment however only to Frederick III during his life, the right was granted of making proposals as to the tenure of the six bishoprics of his land (1445) and equal privileges were allowed the Margrave of Brandenburg as to the three bishoprics of the March (1447). In France the monarchy celebrated a triumph over the papacy, for on July 7, 1438, through the new "Pragmatic Sanction of the French Church" (an enlargement of the provisions of the Pragmatic Sanction of the year 1268) the Gallican Church arose. In Germany the princes became masters of their churches. Thus even in the field of ecclesiastical institutions the thought of nationality strengthened by the councils could no longer be
repressed. Simultaneously, and not in contradiction to it, an absolutist papacy arose in fresh strength. The college of cardinals lost in importance, and the theory of papal omnipotence was published to the world in many forms of literature.

G. FRANCE TO THE DEATH OF LOUIS XII (1515)

(a) Charles VII, the end of the Hundred Years' War with England. — We have already become acquainted with the destinies of France up to the point when the English king, Henry V, who was then marching victoriously through France, and the French king, Charles VI, who had been insane since 1392, died, one soon after the other. The former Dauphin, Charles VII, who during the feuds had become head of the Armagnacs, was long unable to enter on the heritage of his father; for the English regarded their new king, Henry VI, son of Henry V and Catharine of France, an infant hardly a year old, as the lawful sovereign of the land. The rights of the infant king were guarded for the time by his uncle, the Duke of Bedford, who had twice conquered the partisans of Charles in the field.

But the war was only waged desultorily, until at the end of 1428 the Earl of Salisbury appeared with fresh troops and undertook the siege of the important town of Orleans. The town offered a vigorous resistance; the English leader and many of his soldiers lost their lives in the battle, but the brave citizens could look for no help from their king, Charles. In this desperate state of affairs a saviour appeared to them,—Joan of Arc, born on January 6, 1412, in Domremy, a hamlet situated on the Lorraine frontier of Champagne. She regarded herself as the heaven-sent rescuer of her country, and demanded permission to place herself at the head of an army, in order to free Orleans and lead the king to Reims for his coronation. She knew how to overcome the resistance of her incredulous hearers, and finally she was received by the king and given a detachment of soldiers, in order that, mounted as their commander and in male attire, she might lead them to the relief of the beleaguered town.

Inspired by heaven, Joan bore a white flag with the picture of the Saviour in front of the warriors, and fortunately succeeded in gaining entrance to Orleans during a sortie of the besieged (end of April, 1429). She then commenced at once an attack on the English, who began to fear the "Maid of Orleans" as if she were a daughter of Satan. After a brilliant victory of the French on May 7, the enemy gave up the siege. All Orleans was filled with joy, and convinced of the supernatural mission of Joan, for she had kept her first promise; Orleans was freed. A peasant girl had performed what no commander had yet successfully done, and that in a few days. The royalist party now revived, and their spirit was renewed. Charles's throne seemed rescued, and without any action on his part, for he was only too disinclined to take energetic measures.

Joan now wished to keep her second promise, and to lead Charles to be crowned at Reims. A start was made, notwithstanding the opposition of the generals, who proposed a conquest of Normandy first. The advance was made with a few thousand men; the English were driven from all their posts during the victorious progress, and the king's following was increased on every side. Before Charles entered the city where he was to be crowned, deputies came out to meet him, and promised submission. The king entered the city of Reims, and on July 17 the coronation and anointing were performed. Joan stood during the ceremony at the
king's side, holding a flag. Her mission was completed, according to her own ideas. She now held back in the council, and only inspired the masses of soldiers by her presence. Her family was raised to the nobility, and her native place freed from all taxation.

Charles's position had been completely changed at one blow. He ceased to be the head of the Armagnac party, he was the lawful king, the centre of national feeling. Numerous former adherents of the Anglo-Burgundian party now submitted to him. But Paris persisted in its old hostility, chiefly perhaps from fear of the king's vengeance. An attempt of Joan's to take the city failed, because the king did not support her, and she herself was wounded. She soon had sentiments of her capture. Nevertheless, she defended the town of Compiègne against Philip of Burgundy. There she was actually made prisoner during a sortie on May 23, 1430, and was abandoned to the vengeance of the English, who saw in her alone the cause of their disasters. After long languishing in prison, she was brought before the spiritual court as a witch, and was burned in the market-place of Rouen on May 30, 1431. The ungrateful king never once took up her cause, though it would have been well in his power to do so. The revision of the judgment, which took place twenty-five years later at the command of Pope Calixtus III, and ended in the complete vindication of Joan, can only partially reconcile the world to the ingratitude of the king.

The position of the English did not alter after Joan's death, especially since no such ample reinforcements as might have been expected arrived from home. The most important point was that the Burgundian party, with whose help England had previously made such great conquests, now drew back; in fact, tried for a reconciliation with Charles. This was actually effected by a peace at Arras in 1435. Philip of Burgundy was liberally compensated by gifts of land, and released from feudal obligations for the term of Charles's life. Besides this, the Duke of Bedford, the English commander on the Continent, had died, and among the citizen population of Paris there was a keen wish to see the king once more in their midst. In April, 1436, Charles's army was able to enter Paris, after a complete amnesty had been promised to all who had opposed him, and in 1437 the king himself entered his capital. The whole country, especially the North, had suffered severely under the war and the internal party feuds, so nothing was more sincerely desired than peace. Negotiations led finally to a truce in 1444, since the internal affairs of England made a continuance of the war seem impossible. In France, however, the opportunity was taken to develop an appropriate military system, and on the renewal of hostilities in 1449 the English were deprived of the whole of Normandy in a single year. The province of Guienne also was conquered without any appearance of help from England. At length an English army went to southern France in 1452 under the command of the veteran Talbot. But the general was killed the following summer before Châtillon, and his army completely defeated. The English power was thus driven out of France as far as Calais, the only town which England could hold for the future.

The great enemy had been expelled. But these last, unspeakably calamitous wars had cruelly affected the country. The devastation of the fields could only be gradually remedied by the unceasing toil of the people. Besides, it was necessary to take prompt and vigorous measures against the bands of robber mercenaries who roamed the provinces. The first duty was to exterminate them. In 1444,
Charles, at the request of the Emperor Frederick III, had sent a considerable part of these pillagers of the country into Switzerland to fight against the confederates. The best of the remainder were picked out, and thus a paid body of fifteen troops of cavalry was formed, which was to be permanently under arms. It was now an easy task to deal with the remaining and inferior mercenaries, especially since the regular police force was now available against these hordes.

The defence of the country had then to be better organised to meet all contingencies; a regular reserve was therefore formed, which might be called out in case of war, since every parish was responsible for the arming and training of a guard. A national militia organised on this basis was bound to represent an immeasurably stronger power than the town contingents which had been attached as a whole to the royal army. The fate of the feudal army was sealed in France by these measures, since the means requisite for the maintenance of the troops were obtained by a special universal tax. The Estates were now less frequently summoned, and the towns lost the power which they had formerly possessed in the assemblies of the realm. In 1453 a decree was passed requiring all customary rights to be defined in writing, and in this way the procedure and jurisdiction of the courts of appeal was distinctly improved. The Church developed more than before into a National Church in connection with the resolutions of the council at Basle. The abilities of Charles VII were doubtless more adapted for the work of organisation than for vigorous action; indeed his modern methods of government provoked the opposition of the nobility, who attempted to incite the Dauphin Louis against his father. He succeeded, indeed, at first in frustrating their designs; but just when it seemed that the son would once more rebel against his father, death removed the father in the summer of 1461.

(b) The Beginnings of Absolute Monarchy under King Louis XI: Charles the Bold of Burgundy.—The former rebel was now himself crowned king as Louis XI, and pursued the same objects as his father. His efforts extended to the building up of an absolute monarchy, even if he expelled from amongst his councillors precisely those who had previously been at the helm, and collected new men round him. Nothing was more important than to bind the powerful crown-vassals, the Dukes of Burgundy and Brittany, more closely to the throne. He was successful in the beginning, but Francis of Brittany ventured to resist the claims of King Louis XI. He effected an alliance of the most prominent members of the nobility, and threatened an open attack. Louis tried to win the support of citizen inhabitants of the towns. A war with the nobles ensued, and the Burgundians pressed on to Paris itself. A battle in the summer of 1465 was indecisive, and the united enemies of the king began to besiege the capital. Louis avoided a battle, and tried to keep his enemies at bay. The feeding of such mighty armies was bound soon to break down. After an armistice, they concluded a peace toward the end of October, according to which the brother of the king, the Duke of Berry, who belonged to the insurgents, became ruler of Normandy, while the Duke of Brittany maintained his independent rights unimpaired. The peace was tantamount to a victory of the nobles; but the king did not intend to abandon his policy. It is true that he recalled some of his father's councillors to his court, doubtless a concession to his opponents. But one by one all were overcome who had previously united themselves in common cause against him. The Duke of
Berry soon lost Normandy again; other nobles were won over to the plans of the king, and the weaker ones suppressed by force. Burgundy alone offered a strenuous resistance; in place of Philip, now an old man, his son Charles, surnamed the Bold, had for some years held the reins of government there, and in the summer of 1467 became his lawful successor. Louis would have been glad to turn to his advantage the long-existing quarrel of Charles with Liège, but the Burgundian would not entertain the proposal, and after the conquest of the refractory town in autumn, 1467, his position became still stronger.

The Burgundian kingdom, which extended from Luxemburg to the sea, had only in the last generations, through the skilful policy of aggrandisement practised by its princes, become an important power between France and Germany (cf. above). The brilliant court of Arras became a model for other courts of European princes. Trade and industry, art and intellectual life flourished splendidly in the rich towns. But the government of the country under Philip, and still more under Charles, had suppressed the local authority and attempted a uniform organisation of all political forces after depriving them of their independence. The rich resources of the land enabled the duke to maintain permanently a powerful army, and to furnish it with artillery and wagons, so that it possessed the most complete military equipment of the time. His policy aimed at the protection and enlargement of his power on two sides especially; he wished to be as independent of France as of Germany. Even if the foundation of a Burgundian kingdom at the cost of Germany, a demand that Philip had made in 1447 from Frederick III, had not been realised, yet the position of Charles the Bold, in view of the importance of the German kingdom, which could not prevent the growth of Burgundian influence in the territories of western Germany, was really equivalent to independence. The oath of fealty, which was still taken to the French as well as to the German crown, could have little significance under the circumstances.

King Louis XI had been obliged in 1467 to resume the war with the Dukes of Brittany and Berry and had been successful before Charles of Burgundy was able to lend aid to his friends. War with the latter seemed inevitable. Louis tried in vain to stir up the people of Liège once more against their lord, and to pacify Charles himself with money. At last he had a personal interview with his opponent at Peronne in order to come to terms. But while he was still with him, the terrible tidings spread of a rising of the Liègeois, who had driven out their bishop, and Charles's fury was now turned on the king, since he thought that he possessed unmistakable proof of his treacherous policy. It was with difficulty that Charles was induced to spare the king himself, and he did so only on the concession that he should rule for the future as sovereign over what had hitherto been the feudal dependencies of France. He exacted also some compensation for the Duke of Berry. Louis swore to all demands and was forced to consent to take the field in person against the rebellious town of Liège.

Possibly Louis was never very sincere in his concessions. He succeeded in persuading his brother, the Duke of Berry, to be content with the richer but more distant Guînes in place of the provinces of Champagne and Brie so closely bordering on Burgundy; and by 1469, he effected a complete reconciliation with him. Other rebellious vassals were crushed. By these means the king soon felt such renewed security that he began to despise the sovereignty of Burgundy, and commanded an assembly to proclaim the feudal tenant, Charles, guilty of high treason.
Since the duke did not appear before the court at Paris, royal troops invaded Burgundy at the beginning of the year 1471, and occupied some important places. It was only in February that Charles on his side proceeded to besiege Amiens. But he achieved no successes and bad news came from home, so that in April he was willing to make a truce for a month. He again sought an alliance with the king’s brother, but the latter died, possibly from poison. Before the expiry of the truce Charles renewed hostilities and now was more successful; but his army committed such depredations in the country that the inhabitants were roused to fury, and the citizens of Beauvais in particular offered a most stubborn resistance. The town was not captured, for the Duke of Brittany, being hard pressed by the king, did not come to the aid. Charles, therefore, was forced to retreat, owing to terrible scarceness of provisions, due to the devastation of the land. His retreat was rendered difficult by numerous skirmishes; at last he was compelled to make a new armistice. Louis availed himself of it to subdue his rebellious vassals in the South, especially the Duke of Alençon.

But Charles did not remain quiet, and hoped by an alliance with Edward IV of England finally to conquer Louis. Edward declared himself ready for a campaign against France in 1475, and actually appeared in June before Calais. Charles, however, whose forces had been considerably lessened by the disastrous siege of Neuss, could not give the expected assistance, especially since Louis had again fought with success in Burgundy. Edward had pictured to himself a more favorable state of things in France, and in his disappointment did not hesitate to accept the arrangement proposed by Louis, and, in consideration of a large indemnity, to return home again. Charles, also, who now was intent on other plans, agreed in 1475 to a nine years’ truce. France seemed freed from her most dangerous enemy, although Louis was always counting on a renewed attack of the Burgundian. The complications with Lorraine and the Swiss claimed the attention of the ambitious warrior in the future so closely that he could not think of other hostilities. On January 5, 1477, Charles the Bold was killed in the fight after the defeat at Nancy. His realm, however, through the marriage of the heiress Mary with the young Maximilian, son of Frederick III, came to the House of the Austrian Hapsburgs and not to France.

Of all the enemies of Louis the only survivor was Duke Francis of Brittany, whose secret league with Edward of England had been discovered by the king in 1477. He here contented himself with the confiscation of one county and with a renewed oath of loyalty. But he treated the Duke of Nemours according to his old principle, and took bloody vengeance. His despotic aim, the conquest of all imaginary and actual enemies of his kingdom, was attained. He acquired Provence by inheritance, and the people trembled more than ever before the king—but still more did the king tremble before the people. He suspiciously looked out for conspiracies everywhere amongst servants and ministers, and punished with great severity. After a life of anxiety, at once full of work and empty of pleasures, Louis XI died at the end of April, 1483. The government of France by the States had completely disappeared under him and mainly through him. Modern absolutism, which influences all powers by the constitution, took its start under him, and reached its height through Louis XII.

(c) Charles VIII and his Invasion of Naples. — Charles VIII, son of Louis XI, was only thirteen years old on his father’s death. Of little ability and still less
education he was incapable of reigning independently, and was entirely under the influence of his sister Anne, who was married to Peter, the subsequent Duke of Bourbon. In conformity with the wish of the people, the States-General were summoned at the beginning of 1484 and sat for two months at Tours. Complaints were raised on all sides about the pressure of taxation, but the deliberations had no lasting results. The appointment of a regular regency was refused, to the injury of the country; for once more, as at the beginning of the century, civil war broke out. The husband of Louis's daughter Joanna, Duke Louis of Orleans, did not wish to acknowledge the influence of his sister-in-law, Anne, and in alliance with the Duke of Brittany began war against the party of the king, but was defeated in the summer of 1488 and taken prisoner. Charles, however, wished to act independently and did not allow himself to be guided any longer by his sister. He released the Duke of Orleans from prison, and married, at the end of 1491, Anne, daughter of the deceased Duke Francis. Thus Brittany, the lords of which had been hitherto bitterly opposed to the king, was annexed to the crown of France.

The intended union of this heiress with Maximilian, king of the Romans, had thus been frustrated, and he demanded compensation for this as well as for the fact that the previously arranged marriage of his daughter Margaret with the French king had now become impossible. His ally, Henry VII, was indemnified by a money payment. Maximilian himself lacked the means to make war; for this reason he finally preferred an amicable arrangement (1493), and received back the counties of Burgundy and Artois, where the feeling of the population had already decided in favour of the German sovereign.

Since Charles Count of Maine had died, in 1481, King Louis had acquired the heritage of Provence as well as claims to the kingdom of Naples, and Charles wished to assert this claim when, after the death of King Ferdinand (beginning of 1494) party hatred began to spread its horrors over Italy. In order not to let slip the favourable opportunity of interference, Charles marched in the autumn with a large army over the Alps. Contrary to expectation he obtained favourable concessions from Piero de' Medici, but by so doing caused the banishment of the princely family and could gain little from the indignant citizens of Florence. He now went to Rome where Alexander VI lived in the greatest fear. The Pope agreed to cede to the French some fortresses as bases of operation, and to hand over his son, Cesare Borgia, as hostage. Charles left Rome at the end of January, 1495, and marched to Naples, where Alfonso II, son of Ferdinand I, was governing, tormented by the stings of conscience for his past cruelties. In order to escape the hatred of the people, he resigned his rule and gave over the country to his youthful son, Ferdinand II. The success of the French arms soon disheartened the Neapolitan troops; part of them deserted to Charles, who was able in February to enter Naples and soon was in possession of the whole country.

The French conquerors did not, however, understand how to win the good-will of the people. The brutal treatment which the population received from the French soldiery roused a burning hatred which could not be quenched by the hastily introduced remission of taxation and the inauguration of public amusements. The Pope also refused to crown Charles king at Naples. The lords, formerly at enmity with each other, now united against the common foe, the French intruder. Lodovico Moro of Milan, who had especially invited Charles to make the Italian expedition, Pope Alexander VI, Venice, Ferdinand of Sicily, and the King of the Romans,
Maximilian, all united against the King of France. He marched away unsuspectingly from Naples in May, left half his army behind, and turned homewards with the remainder. But in July an army of Milanese and Venetians attacked him in superior force near Formuovo; nevertheless, he succeeded in worsening them and continued his march. Before he left Italian soil, in October, a treaty was made with the allies, but nevertheless the final results of this Italian campaign were very unfavourable for Charles. Even before he reached France, the banished Ferdinand had attempted to recover his realm, and the revolt of the people against the French yoke assisted his effort. The remains of the French army disappeared in battle or from sickness, and King Charles VIII, soon after his return home, died from the results of an accident in April, 1498.

(d) The Culminating Point of Absolutism: King Louis XII. — Since Charles's sons had predeceased him, he was succeeded on the throne by his cousin Louis, of the elder house of Orleans, as the twelfth of this name (1498–1515). He was in the prime of life when he took the reins of government, and had hitherto played little part in public affairs. But the people soon recognised that the best qualities of a ruler, — justice, clemency, and appreciation of a nation's needs, — were not wanting in him. In foreign policy, it is true, he was no better than the other monarchs of the time in a somewhat inglorious statesmanship, and ambition drove him to the most rash schemes. He procured a divorce from his wife, and married his predecessor's widow, Anne, the heiress of Brittany, in order to annex this duchy permanently to the crown. His predecessor on the throne had opened the road to Italy. Louis was determined to take it. The acquisition of Milan was now the object of the French policy. The grandmother of the king had been the daughter of Galeazzo Visconti, the first Duke of Milan, who died in 1402. (King Wenceslaus had, as we saw, given him this title for one hundred thousand florins in 1395.) After preparations of every kind, which proved the shrewd and far-sighted calculations of the king, an army crossed the mountains in the summer of 1499, and conquered the country, from which the Duke Lodovico Moro had to fly with incredible rapidity. The French king made a solemn entry into Milan, and Genoa surrendered to him. Venice indeed, by virtue of an earlier treaty, received a share of the French victory; but France had thus won a strong base of operations which dangerously menaced Italy. Soon after the departure of the king the storm burst against the foreign dominion; the inhabitants, bitterly exasperated by the outrages of the conquerors, welcomed the old duke when he entered his land in February, 1500, with an army of foreign mercenaries. The French garrisons could offer no resistance, and withdrew. Louis, however, sent reinforcements, and Moro's Swiss mercenaries refused to fight against their countrymen in the French service. The duke's cause was lost; he wished to fly, but was betrayed and led prisoner to France, where he spent ten years in captivity.

Louis was not yet satisfied with this success; his wishes were now centred on Naples. There he came into contact with the powerful Ferdinand the Catholic of Aragon, who, as husband of Isabella of Castile, represented a formidable opponent. The two therefore joined, according to the terms of a treaty, in common action against the uncle of Ferdinand II (died 1496), Frederick of Naples, whose friendly relations with the Turks were to form the pretext. The two kings, thirsting for conquests, posed as the protectors of Christendom. Nothing was known of this
alliance at Naples, where the people thought that Louis alone was their enemy, and actually hoped for Ferdinand's aid against him. When, in the summer of 1501, a French army appeared in Rome, the treaty was disclosed, since both sovereigns demanded and received the papal investiture of Naples. Under these circumstances Frederick could not resist; he surrendered to the French, and lived in France with a large yearly allowance until his death (1504). Louis's pleasure at the possession of Naples did not last long. Since no agreement could be made with Ferdinand as to the frontier, war resulted. In it the Spanish general, Gonsalvo Hernandez de Cordova, the "Great Captain" (cf. Vol. IV, p. 586), was repeatedly victorious, and finally gained sole possession of the capital. Louis, in furious indignation at the failure of his undertakings, immediately equipped several armies against the Spaniards; but at the end of 1503 his most powerful army was completely routed by Gonsalvo on the Garigliano. A three years' truce was concluded in February, 1504, by the terms of which the whole of Naples was annexed to Spain.

The events in Italy were of decisive importance for the king of the Romans, Maximilian, whose vassal had been unceremoniously banished from Milan, and the acquisition of Naples threatened to furnish the French king with another strong centre for operations. King Maximilian, in order not to let his claims on Milan disappear, had already consented to the betrothal of his grandson, Charles, aged a year and a half, to Claudia, infant daughter of Louis, on the condition that both should inherit Milan, and had promised to invest Louis with the duchy. This treaty was in 1504 extended, so that in the event of Louis dying without male issue, Naples, and both Brittany and the duchy of Burgundy in France, should fall to the future wife of Charles. Thereupon Louis was actually invested with Milan. But soon afterwards all idea was abandoned of a marriage between Claudia and Charles. Louis had possibly never seriously contemplated it. In fact the fulfilment of the compact of 1504 would have been equivalent to a partition of France.

In all the negotiations between the kings, Louis and Maximilian, an important part had been played by the latter's son Philip. Out of hatred for him the Spaniard, Ferdinand, was drawn more closely to Louis, and received the hand of his niece, to whom Louis had granted his claims on Naples. The heiress-presumptive of the French throne, Claudia, was betrothed a little later to Count Francis, of Angoulême, and the brilliant prospects of the Hapsburgs were destroyed. Philip would gladly have avenged the affront, but he died in 1506, and King Maximilian was too weak to venture on war with Louis, who successfully crushed a rising in Genoa (1507).

Maximilian soon afterward engaged in an unfortunate struggle with the powerful republic of Venice, which refused him a passage for his troops to Rome, and was forced to conclude a truce in April, 1508. Since the republic seemed equally dangerous to Louis and Maximilian, a treaty was signed at Cambrai on December 10, 1508, when it was arranged that each party should recover from the republic the territories to which he laid claim. The Pope and King Ferdinand of Arragon joined the league, as well as some smaller rulers. In the spring of 1509 a powerful Venetian army was in the field when the French advanced to the attack. Victory rested with the French arms, and each of the allies received the districts which he wished to occupy. Attempts of the Venetians to separate the allies by formal offers proved ineffectual. They succeeded, however, in regaining Padua by
the help of the population. Shortly afterward, King Maximilian, with a powerful
army, supported by French and Spaniards, appeared before the city and began the
siege, but discontent and want of money finally forced him to abandon it. He
marched back to Germany and dismissed the greater part of his army. Pope Julius
II also had obtained from Venice what he wanted. Ferdinand was invested with
Naples, and desisted from the struggle, so that now only France and King Maxi-
milian continued the war.

In order to crush the opposition of the Pope, their former ally, the two kings,
supported by some cardinals, arranged to hold a general council in November, 1510.
It was actually summoned at Pisa, but Julius forbade the assembly, and on his part
convened a Lateran council at Rome. The Pope had now allies in Venice and the
Swiss; Ferdinand of Aragon also was a firm supporter. Thus the so-called "Holy
League" was formed in order to drive out Louis. But the French again were vic-
torious, and captured Brescia with terrible slaughter (1512). The Pope won over
Henry VIII of England for the league, and induced King Maximilian to make a
truce at any rate with Venice, so that Louis now had to trust to his own power
alone. He once more won a decisive victory at Ravenna, but unfortunately, Gaston
de Foix, the youthful French commander fell in it. The Pope, deeply concerned
by the reverse, breathed again when he learned that an army of the Confederates had
invaded Milan, and with the help of Venice was driving the French out of the
country. Maximilian Sforza, a son of Lodovico Moro, now became duke of the ter-
ritory, reduced by the loss of some districts. A new danger was threatening King
Louis from Spain, where Ferdinand brought the kingdom of Navarre under his
dominion. Thus the end of the year 1512 showed a much less favourable prospect
for the French power than the beginning.

However, Pope Julius, who had been the soul of the league, died in February,
1513. Soon afterward Louis concluded with his former bitter enemy, the republic of
Venice, a treaty with regard to the joint conquest of Milan. The new pope of the
family of the Medici, Leo X, a determined enemy of the French, allied himself
against them with King Maximilian, Ferdinand, and Henry VIII, in order to offer
resistance to the combined power of Venice and France. After a preliminary suc-
cess the French were defeated on June 6, 1513, at Novara by the Swiss soldiers of
Sforza, and the Venetians now saw themselves abandoned by Louis. France was
overrun by an army of Henry VIII, which, supported by German knights, con-
quered the enemy in August and captured Tournay. At the same time an army of
Swiss wished to conquer Burgundy. But the French commander entered into a
treaty with them (which the king did not ratify), and thus this threatening danger
was averted. Louis now tried to make terms with his enemies, and succeeded in
doing so. Henry VIII actually gave him the hand of his sister Mary. But on
January 1, 1515, only three months after his marriage, Louis XII died, deeply
mourned by his people, and left his kingdom to Francis, Count of Angoulême, a
great-grandson of their common ancestor, Louis of Orleans.

H. THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER ALBERT II (1438-1439) AND FREDERICK III
(1440-1493)

(a) Albert II. — The German throne, which Sigismund left vacant by his
death, seemed to the princes so little desirable that this time no one sought it
The electors finally chose at Frankfort, in March, 1438, according to the usual ceremony, Sigismund's son-in-law, Albert of Austria, an excellent man, who at first hesitated to accept their choice. The diet of Nuremburg in 1438 established, as the fruit of the efforts for reform, which Albert favoured, a public peace, which formed the foundation-stone of reform in the empire, and only through the early death of Albert failed to have further results for the empire. It provided for a division of the empire into six circles, which were to represent independent constitutional bodies, and for a general improvement in the administration of justice and the total suppression of feuds. Beyond this Albert did not interpose in the government of the empire, for the internal disturbances in his hereditary dominions, Bohemia and Hungary, and the growing Turkish danger entirely claimed his powers. On the way home after a somewhat unsuccessful campaign against the Infidels, he died at the end of October, 1439, before any reform worthy of mention in the empire can be recorded.

(b) Frederick III.—The throne was once more vacant and no one aspired to it. The electors this time (contrary to the advice of his privy secretary, Johann Gert) agreed upon Frederick, who, in common with his brother, possessed Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola. He was with difficulty induced to accept the duties of sovereign. His character was little adapted to these duties; indecision was joined to dislike of military undertakings. It was therefore an easy task for a man of powerful intellect like Aeneas Sylvius, subsequently Pope Pius II, to guide the policy of the emperor according to his views, and this he did above all in the church question, which, owing to the council at Basle, still violently agitated men's minds. It was chiefly due to his influence that the results of the council's proceedings were completely lost in Germany; for all that had been gained was ultimately abandoned in the Concordat of Vienna (cf. in Vol. VI, the end of the section "The Western Development of Christendom," and above).

Since Frederick belonged to the poorer princes, the rank of German king was of peculiar importance to him; he could increase his family possessions by it. An opportunity for doing so was presented him at the very beginning of his reign, when he was appointed guardian of Albert's posthumous son Wladislaw (Ladislaus), the heir of Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, and also guardian of the infant Sigismund of Tyrol. In Hungary, after long party disputes John Hunyadi was chosen governor (1446) during the minority of the king; but Frederick kept his ward to himself together with the royal crown. The Bohemians wished to have Frederick himself as king, but he declined the crown, and in fact did not wish to undertake the regency for Ladislaus. Two administrators, one a Catholic and the other an Utraquist, were now appointed; but Frederick refused to give up the king even to them. The internal disputes led finally to the result that George of Podiebrad and Cunstatt, with the consent of Frederick, became sole administrator after 1452. And when Ladislaus died prematurely (1457), George Podiebrad was chosen king of Bohemia on March 2, 1458. In Hungary in the same year Hunyadi's son, Matthias Corvinus, was elected king. In Austria, the third of Ladislaus's hereditary dominions, where for a long time, in consequence of an open insurrection of the nobility of the country against Frederick, Ulrich von Eitzing, a powerful noble, had held the government, Frederick's brother Albert now governed, while Sigismund himself had ruled in Tyrol since 1446.
Before these unfortunate events in his own house the new king had been crowned at Aachen in June, 1442. Pope Eugene, before the resolution of the Concordat of Vienna, had promised the king that he would crown him emperor, and would provide funds for the expedition to Rome in the event of his showing himself amenable to his views. But the journey to Italy only took place in 1452, just when the Austrians had risen against the royal guardian, and on March 19, 1452, the last solemn imperial coronation of a German king was celebrated at Rome. Frederick did not appear personally in the imperial diets, but willingly let himself be represented by Aeneas Sylvius, and the princes appeared there in correspondingly small numbers. Meanwhile bitter feuds involving unspeakable devastation of the country raged in the Wettin territories between the brothers Frederick and William, and in Franconia between Albert Achilles and the imperial city of Nuremberg and the strong body of supporters on both sides, as well as between the Rhenish princes. Frederick did not once make the feeblest effort to preserve the tranquillity of the land.

Archbishop Dietrich of Mayence and Frederick of the Palatinate, who had hitherto been opponents, now united and set about the deposition of the king. George Podiebrad was to succeed him, since he seemed most adapted to support the anti-papal efforts of the archbishop. But the opposition of the other electors, especially Frederick of Brandenburg, prevented the execution of the plan. Dietrich of Mayence was finally worsted in his struggle with the Pope; he was deposed and Count Adolf of Nassau nominated archbishop in his stead. Since Dietrich gave way reluctantly and found support from his ally the palfgrave, a bloody war ensued, in the course of which Adolf conquered, and the town of Mayence, which stood by Dietrich, lost its position as a free city of the empire (October 27, 1462). At the same time the imperial town Donauwörth was threatened by Louis of Bavaria-Landshut; the king, therefore, suspended the ban over him and entrusted Albert Achilles with his punishment. Louis had allies in the emperor's brother, the Bohemian king, and Frederick the palfgrave; twenty-four cities of the empire, which feared for their own existence, opposed them. But the Brandenburger was defeated on July 19, 1462, by the Wittelsbacher at Giengen, and in 1463 a peace was made there. In Austria the strained relations between the king and his brother Albert continued. The latter roused the city of Vienna to open insurrection against Frederick. When at last the Bohemian king came to his help, a peace was concluded between the brothers (end of 1462); but only Albert's death in December, 1463, prevented a renewal of the war between the brothers.

In Bohemia the religious controversies were still heated. George Podiebrad owed his kingdom to the Utraquist party, and, after he had been recognised in his dignity by emperor and Pope, had always a foe which, on account of his religious attitude, refused to acknowledge him and do homage, that is, the town of Breslau, which belonged to his realm. The inhabitants were at last (in 1459) induced by the mediation of the Pope to promise that they would do homage to the king in three years. Pope Pius II (1458–1464) was indignant at the little attention which King George paid to his favourite scheme, the war with Turkey, and began a war against the Bohemian Utraquists, while he declared the compacts to be void and took Breslau under his especial protection against George. The latter, on the other hand, was driven by the harsh procedure of the Pope to estrange himself more than ever from the Catholics. Pius II died in August, 1464, but his successor, Paul II,
continued still more firmly the policy of his predecessor in the Bohemian question. He released the subjects from their oath of allegiance, deposed the king, and preached the crusade against the Bohemian heretics. In the civil war George himself was victorious over the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus. He did not up to his death (1471) renounce the Bohemian throne, and had chosen his successor. This was the youthful son of the Polish king Ladislaus, but he had to fight for his throne against the claims of King Matthias of Hungary. The war lasted seven years. Poland kept true to Bohemia, but Hungary found supporters in Silesia and especially in the town of Breslau. In the peace (1478) Ladislaus was obliged to cede Moravia, Silesia, and Lausitz to Matthias.

Matthias Corvinus of Hungary had also to fight with the Emperor Frederick. At the very outset of his rule (1458) one party had chosen the emperor as rival king. Frederick was finally compelled to renounce the crown, and to content himself with the prospect of acquiring it in the event of Matthias dying without issue. But while Matthias was fighting with Ladislaus for the Bohemian crown, Frederick provoked him by investing Ladislaus with the electoral vote and Bohemia, and an invasion of Austria by the Hungarian king was the result. In order to free himself, Frederick was obliged to invest the latter with Bohemia and pay a large indemnity. But Matthias came again with an army, and this time remained for many years, since Frederick wished to place the Archbishop of Graz, who had been exiled by him, on the archiepiscopal throne of Salzburg. Vienna itself fell into the hands of the Hungarian king (1485), and Frederick was compelled to ask the help of the empire. It was only in the diet of Nuremberg (1487) that the princes agreed to send help, and in fact a small army was collected under the command of Duke Albert of Saxony. A treaty was concluded by which Matthias retained all conquests until full compensation was given, which Frederick was absolutely unable to do. Fortunately Matthias died in 1490, and thus released the emperor from his unpleasant position.

On the western frontier of Germany a new danger was threatening from the Burgundian kingdom, with the history of which we became familiar when we dealt with the affairs of France. It was a natural consequence of the feebleness of the German king that Charles the Bold caused the greatest uneasiness in the parts of the German Empire adjacent to his land; he had indeed little to fear from the Empire. The district of electoral Cologne seemed mostly endangered, and the emperor was disposed to begin an imperial war there against Charles. Archbishop Rupert, little beloved by his subjects, had been deprived of his office by the Pope, but naturally did not wish to resign the archiepiscopalric, and above all to recognise the authority of the chosen administrator, Hermann von Hesse. Since the whole country, and especially the towns, supported Hermann, he had no other recourse than to appeal to the Burgundian for help. Charles gladly complied, and began in the summer of 1474 the siege of the strong archiepiscopal town of Neuss. He met, however, with unexpected resistance, and had to invest the town for ten months. A strong imperial army appeared in the spring of 1475 under the command of the Margrave Albert Achilles of Brandenburg; Charles abandoned the siege and retired to Burgundy. He declined any further support of Rupert, and the administrator Hermann became Archbishop of Cologne.

While the possessions of the House of Hapsburg in Bohemia and Hungary, and even in Austria, were dwindling, and the incapable King Frederick hardly made
an attempt to maintain for himself and his house their proper power in the German east, his son Maximilian, with youthful energy, was taking a prominent part in the relations with Burgundy on the western frontier. In his whole character a complete contrast to his father, eloquent and liberal, endowed with the most varied interests, he became the idol of the people, and lived long in the memory of the masses as the "Last of the Knights." Indeed his personality cannot be better characterised than as the embodiment of chivalry. His marriage with Mary of Burgundy had been repeatedly the subject of diplomatic relations between Frederick and Charles the Bold. But when the latter died and Mary was actually left heiress of her father's dominions, the marriage of the heiress, aged twenty years, with Maximilian, who was a year younger, was soon celebrated at Ghent in August, 1477. Louis had already begun the war against Burgundy, and internal disorders were rife, especially in the towns of Bruges and Brussels. The first task, therefore, of the new ruler was to subdue his land by force of arms. Fortune favoured him; he defeated the French on August 17, 1479, at Guinegate, and was then able to regard himself as lord of the country.

Two children, Philip and Margaret, were born of the marriage with Mary, and when the duchess died in 1482, Philip, then four years old, was the heir of her dominions. Maximilian was recognised indeed in the north as guardian of the boy, but the town of Ghent got Philip into its power, and Flanders, Holland, and Brabant formed an alliance with France. An understanding with France was finally brought about, without further fighting, by the peace of Arras (end of 1482), according to which a part of the Burgundian kingdom was restored to France, and the marriage of Margaret, a child of two years, with the Dauphin Charles was arranged. But Flanders still professed a sympathy with France, with which Maximilian had difficulty in contending. First and foremost, the province demanded an independent administration under a council of regency, that is, a government by States. Not until the conquest of Sluis in 1485 did Bruges and Ghent acknowledge the guardianship of Maximilian. But in February, 1488, Maximilian himself was taken prisoner at Bruges, and kept prisoner nearly four months. Since public opinion in the other provinces sided with Maximilian, and the emperor also was approaching with an imperial army from Cologne to the relief of his son, he was at last liberated, when he had promised the appointment of the required council of regency and the withdrawal of the foreign soldiers. These promises were, however, disregarded after his liberation, and the imperial army, now under the leadership of Duke Albert of Saxony, advanced to besiege Ghent, which it took in the autumn of 1489. From this time Maximilian was really master in the lands he had inherited. He had won for his house by the acquisition of Burgundy the territory which ensured the Hapsburg ascendancy in the sixteenth century.

The inactivity of Frederick, which had been deeply felt by the princes, and had since 1462 suggested the thought of his deposition, led men once more to entertain such ideas, as Maximilian by his acquisition of Burgundy attracted the attention of all. Against the will of his father, chiefly at the instigation of Bishop Berthold of Mayence, he was chosen "Roman king" in February, 1486, and crowned at Aachen in May. Since 1489, when the possession of Burgundy was assured, Maximilian had become the pillar of the House of Hapsburg. Sigismund of Tyrol renounced his lordship in his favour (1490); and after the death of Matthias, king
of Hungary, Maximilian reconquered Austria and enforced the old claims of the Hapsburgs to the crown of Hungary. He acknowledged in 1491 Ladislaus, who was disputing the crown with his brother John Albert, as king of Bohemia, but obtained on his side recognition of his own claims to succeed to Bohemia and Hungary in the event of the new king dying childless. The Emperor Frederick had also promoted a new alliance in the summer of 1486, with the object of securing the Hapsburg power against the Wittelsbachs in south Germany. In February, 1488, the so-called “Swabian League” was founded at Esslingen, which united princes, towns, and nobles, and was able to place a strong armed force in the field. Since the chief aim of the league was to conquer the too powerful Wittelsbachs, it amounted to a very decided protection of the Hapsburg interests, which it actually afforded in the sixteenth century.

When the Emperor Frederick died on August 19, 1493, his house held a totally different position from that it occupied at the outset of his reign. This was in no way due to his action. Maximilian, on the contrary, had helped to realise this object in the latter years, especially since he proved himself a general. Owing to his family possessions, it was possible for him, although chosen in order to support the empire, to influence the destinies of the nation more decisively than any king for many years.

(c) The Turkish Danger. — The political events of Germany in the fifteenth century were not only determined by the ordinary forces which had worked together for centuries, but an external power gained decisive influence over the destiny of the European West, which it filled with a nameless dread. This was the Turkish Empire, which arose on the lower Danube in the place of the self-contented Byzantium, and from thence penetrated into the sphere of German interests. The circumstance that here a non-Christian foe was in the field turned this rivalry into a religious question. The whole idea of crusades, therefore, revived, although the measures taken in carrying out the idea were far from corresponding to those of the twelfth century.

Toward the end of the thirteenth century a hitherto unknown Turkish tribe arose in Asia Minor which afterward called themselves “Ottomans” after Osman (Othman Khan I, d. 1326), one of their victorious chieftains. The youthful people spread rapidly, at the cost of the Seljuks (cf. Vol. III), as well as of the Byzantine possessions in Asia, and before 1350 had conquered all Asia Minor. During a dispute as to the succession in the Byzantine court, one party called the Mohammedan foes into the country, and Suleiman, son of the Sultan Orchan (d. 1359), determined, even in the lifetime of his father, to take a firm footing on European soil. His brother, Murad I (1359–1389), completed the work, captured Adrianople (1361) and made it his residence (cf. Vol. III). At this moment the Western world recognised for the first time the threatening danger. Pope Urban V (1362–1370) proclaimed a crusade against the Unbelievers; and the countries immediately threatened — that is, Hungary, Servia, and Bosnia — actually opposed the enemy, but were defeated. Gradually all the Slavonic nations became more or less subject to the Ottoman Empire. The year 1387 saw another great rising of the Slavs against their lords; in 1389, however, Sultan Murad won another victory at Cossova, but met his death there. The Turks, with their veteran infantry, the Janissaries, were actually superior on the battle-
field to any European nations, and this reputation had made them appear for centuries as the scourge of Europe. But in these very struggles against a foe superior in the art of war the German people was gradually developed into a nation which was not inferior in military prowess.

Under Bajazet I, surnamed the Thunderbolt, the son of Murad, the victorious Turks marched as far as the Euphrates in Asia and to Greece in Europe. Sigismund of Hungary now began to organise the struggle against the conquerors of the Christians. His messengers went to France, the Teutonic Order was summoned to the fight, and both sides sent help. John the Fearless, the son of Philip of Burgundy, and Frederick of Hohenzollern, the grand prior of the Teutonic Order, marched with him into the field against the Unbelievers. A splendid army of more than fifty thousand warriors, so we are told, assembled at Ofen, and men thought that with this force the Holy Sepulchre might be won back. The first object was the siege of Nicopolis; but it had hardly begun before Bajazet came up to its aid, and the splendid Christian army was annihilated in the battle which the French prematurely began (September 28, 1396). King Sigismund escaped with difficulty on a Venetian vessel. The prisoners were mostly massacred, but the French nobles received their liberty, after a cruel captivity, on payment of an enormous ransom.

Notwithstanding this calamitous ending, the Western attack on Bajazet had the immediate result that any further advance of the Ottomans was checked. Sigismund seemed to have freed the West from the dangerous enemy. There were, in fact, other causes which kept the Sultan back. Above all, a rival appeared on Asiatic soil in the Mongolian chief, Timur, who wished to imitate the old Temujin (cf. above), and had established a mighty empire from the borders of China to the Mediterranean coast of Arabia (cf. Vol. III). It was obvious from the victorious campaigns of both that Timur would collide with Bajazet; in 1401 they first came into contact, and the Ottomans were worsted. Bajazet was utterly defeated and taken prisoner in a great battle near Angors in the summer of 1402, and soon afterward died. Timur also died in 1405, and his empire broke up. Civil war began among the European Ottomans, and their prosperity seemed ended. But the Western nations neglected the favourable opportunity. The greatest blame for this attaches to the monarch most nearly concerned, the Greek Emperor Manuel.

Among the sons of Bajazet, Mahomet I, after 1412, finally won a position which approached his father's; but no military operations on a large scale were undertaken in his reign. His successor, Murad II (1421–1451), had failed, indeed, in an attack upon Constantinople, but soon exacted a tribute from the Greek emperor. Thus, on the breaking up of the Byzantine Empire into separate States the ultimate victory of the Turkish power must have seemed certain to the intelligent observer. Only the West could bring help in this case. Albert II made the attempt in 1439, but lost his life in the campaign (cf. above). So long, indeed, as the schism in the church lasted, there could be no idea of a serious warlike expedition of Roman Catholic Christianity against the Unbelievers in support of Greek Byzantium. At this juncture, therefore, in 1439, the union of the two churches at Ferrara was announced, but only on paper, for the gulf between the two confessions could not be bridged over. Pope Eugene IV now took up the matter, and ordered a crusade to be preached in the West. The Prince of Transyl-
vania, John Hunyadi, had conquered Turkish armies superior in numbers at Belgrade (1441), and (1442) at Maros-Szent-Imre and at the Iron Gates; the Turk was not therefore invincible. The next year the same prince led a large army, in which all the nations on the Danube immediately concerned were represented, as far as the Balkans. In every part of the West men were professing their readiness to share in the coming campaign, when in the summer of 1444 the Sultan Murad concluded a truce for ten years with King Ladislaus of Poland and Hungary, in which the advantage distinctly was on the side of Hungary. War was hopeless without the participation of Hungary. Nevertheless, at the instigation of Cardinal Julian, hostilities were recommenced; even Ladislaus was persuaded to take part in them. This time a fleet was to co-operate with the land army. However, the Hungarian army alone met Murad (Genoese ships had been bribed to transport the enemy across the Bosphorus), and a battle was fought at Warna on November 10, 1444. Ladislaus was slain, and the whole Hungarian army turned to flight. Hunyadi was also defeated by Murad in a bloody battle on the Amselfeld, near Kossova in Servia (October 17-19, 1448).

When Murad died (1451), his son Mahomet II Bujuk (1451-1481) (see his picture on the plate, "Six Sultans of the Osmans," in Vol. V) succeeded. He was firmly resolved to sweep away entirely the decayed Byzantine Empire and to make Constantinople his capital. The Emperor Constantine would not consent to surrender and so the siege of his capital began in autumn, 1452. There was no prospect of help from the West, although the emperor formed an alliance with Pope Nicholas V; for among the Greeks particularly the people were most bitterly opposed to a union with the Roman Church. The Sultan, with an enormous host, invested the city, which could only muster an insufficient garrison. No substantial help was sent to the emperor, except by the Republic of Genoa, whose ships were really far superior to the Turkish fleet. Constantinople finally fell before the assault of the Turks on May 29, 1453. The Emperor Constantine was slain in battle, and the Christians were mostly massacred; the survivors were sold into slavery, and the town was pillaged. Mahomet did not permit the buildings to be injured, for he wished to reside in the city at once. He provided a population for it by forced immigration from Asia Minor, and the transformation of the Hagia Sofia into a mosque announced to the world that Islam had made its entry into the city on the Bosphorus.

The terrible news of the fall of Constantinople spread with rapidity through Europe. In vain the Popes Nicholas, Calixtus, and Pius II tried by assiduous preaching of indulgences to rouse Christendom to a crusade against the dread foes of Christianity. Although no secular ruler except Hunyadi prepared himself for resistance, an enthusiastic crowd, composed of every section of the population, streamed to the standard of the cross, and, led by John Capistrano, a zealous preacher of war, defended Belgrade, to the siege of which Mahomet had advanced in 1456. They actually succeeded in driving back the Sultan's army and in winning rich booty, especially the siege artillery. Unfortunately John Hunyadi, the only man hitherto who had offered serious resistance to the enemy, died a few days later (August 11, 1456) of the plague. But Mahomet's lust for conquest was temporarily diverted by various insurrections of conquered tribes. With Venice alone, on account of the possessions of the Republic in Greece, he waged war for more than fifteen years, only to appear soon after the peace (1479) in Italy, where he
occupied Otranto. On his death, in May, 1481, the Ottomans were obliged to
abandon this base of operations.

Smaller inroads into the Austrian domains and Hungary had also been made
at this time, but the empire had taken no steps against them. In fact the princes
saw in the incursions of the Turks only a danger for the hereditary lands of the
Emperor Frederick. He himself understood only too clearly that such was im-
iminent. He had summoned an imperial diet to Ratisbon on the news of the fall
of Constantinople in order to organise a crusade against the Turks. The decree
was there deferred to a later date. The princes at Frankfort did indeed promise
to send ten thousand cavalry and thirty thousand infantry, but nothing was done.
Pius II took all imaginable trouble and summoned a meeting of the princes to
Mantua (1459) in order to discuss the question of a crusade. The princes did not
appear in person, but only their representatives. He then sent Cardinal Bessarion
to Germany in order to work upon the princes, but fruitlessly. In the diets of
1466 and 1467 there was again much talk about a war with the Turks, but no
results followed. No progress was made until the diet of Ratisbon, in 1471, which
was attended by the emperor himself, and was otherwise well represented. The
emperor asked for ten thousand men at once to guard the frontiers of his
hereditary lands, and the princes were willing to grant them, only the towns op-
opposed it. After a discussion on the method of starting a great expedition in the
next year the matter was allowed to drop. In spite of all speeches and resolu-
tions, no sort of action was taken against the enemy of Christendom. The result
was similar in 1474, when the diet of Augsburg was expressly summoned for this
purpose. Bajazet II, son of Mahomet II, who died in 1481, was, as it happened,
less warlike than his father, and allowed the much-exhausted border lands some
respite. His successor, Selim (1512–1520), had also more to do in the East, and
could think less about inroads into Germany. The danger nevertheless existed for
the German Empire, and became greater than ever under Suleiman, who appeared
before Vienna in 1529.

In the sixteenth century a war might really have been better undertaken, since
a "Turk tax" was available, which, although it was not paid with punctuality or
completeness, still placed certain means at the disposal of the empire. In any
case, the concession of that property tax of ten per cent was a fundamental ac-
knowledgment on the part of the States that the war against the Infidels was the
duty of the German Empire and people, and not merely the concern of the neigh-
bouring princes and their territories.

J. Maximilian I (1493–1519) and Imperial Reform

(a) Retrospect of the Imperial Constitution before King Maximilian.—The
above-described decay of the German monarchy had gradually destroyed the old
traditional constitution of the empire, which was based on the forms of feudalism.
The "Golden Bull" had attempted to establish the conditions existing at the mid-
dle of the fourteenth century, and had, in principle at any rate, done good service
by the codification of the laws of the empire. But the constitutional conditions
developed themselves independently of the wishes of the legislation, which itself
only too soon became antiquated. In the struggle between princes and towns,
which was still undecided at the end of the fourteenth century, victory rested with
the former in the fifteenth century, and they were for the first time really lords
as regards the monarchy. The goal, so far as the imperial constitution was con-
cerned, was the formation of a federal union, within which the king should retain
little beyond the title and honorary presidency.

But the weaker the monarchy became, the more jealously it watched over its
few remaining privileges, and it was in no way disposed to concede the proposals
of the princes. Yet a reform was admittedly essential with regard to the com-
pletely helpless military system of the empire. These problems had been re-
peatedly discussed in the imperial diets; but neither king nor princes nor towns
were disposed to sacrifice even the most modest part of their rights in favour of the
community. Nicholas of Cues met the statesmen with the practical system of an
imperial constitution for which he tried to interest the king at the council of Basle
(cf. above); but all in vain. Even the anonymous “Reformation of Emperor
Sigismund,” with its proposals of reform, which disclose a subtle comprehension of
the phenomena of the age, passed away without a trace. The diet of Frankfort in
1434 at least faced the serious problem. There they agreed to sixteen chief points,
which were to lead to the improvement of the imperial constitution; but the
execution of them was indefinitely postponed. The efforts of Albert II have
already been mentioned. His proposals for the restoration of the Public Peace,
which were put by his chancellor Caspar Schlick before two imperial diets at
Nuremberg (1438), did not meet the approval of the princes, who thought that
they were prejudiced as compared with the towns. If Albert’s life had been pro-
longed, he would certainly have succeeded in carrying out some reforms, for he
possessed the peculiar abilities for doing so. With him, therefore, the hopes of the
nation sank into the grave.

Under Frederick III, as under Louis the Bavarian, the princes occupied them-

selves with the reforms of the empire, and naturally in their own interests. They
brought the direct charge against the emperor that he would do nothing for reform,
and in a memorial of the Electoral College of 1453 the electors were described as
the “ex-officio councillors and coadjutors of the emperor.” They wished to
co-operate not only in the council, but in the execution of the decrees, and hoped
by this means to revive the prestige of the empire. The emperor naturally opposed
this with all the energy of which he was capable. The adoption of such a proposal
would have been tantamount to his deposition. A further attempt, made by
King George of Bohemia, was similarly defeated through the resistance offered to
it both by emperor and princes.

The question of the Public Peace was more hopeful. Since all parts of Ger-
many had been harassed by the most bloody and devastating feuds in spite of the
proclamation of the Public Peace, it must have been clear to the dullest intellect
that the most important point of the discussion must not be legislation, but the
introduction of an executive authority. In the diet at Nuremberg of 1466 the plan
had been already adopted of creating for separate districts some such executive
power on a federal basis. A return was made to the former division of the empire
into circles for the restoration of the Public Peace. This plan had been contained
in the Public Peace proposals of King Wenceslaus in 1381 and of King Albert II.
No immediate steps were taken; but in the “Swabian League,” founded in 1488,
there appeared, for the first time in upper Germany at any rate, a power which pos-
sessed sufficient means to enforce the Public Peace in its district even against the most powerful opposition.

(b) Maximilian’s First Attempts, Milan and Venice. — This was the state of imperial reform at the death of Emperor Frederick III. All the hopes of the nation were now directed toward his youthful and magnanimous son, from whom the whole world thought that some extraordinary results might be expected. The task was indeed difficult, and perhaps harder for so energetic a personality as King Maximilian than it would have been for a prudent head, who might have persuaded himself to sacrifice a portion of the practically vanished regal prerogative theoretically on the altar of patriotism. King Maximilian found in Berthold of Mayence — at first anyway — an adviser who possessed sufficient insight to support him in his work. And so far as there was no question of resigning any legal power and authority, the princes and towns were ready to share in it.

But for the moment these duties lay far from the king. He had formed the mighty plan of energetically confronting the advance of the Turks; then, decked with the laurels of victory over the Turks, he would obtain the imperial crown, and so with greater authority carry out the reform of the empire. That is doubtless the thought which underlies the policy of the emperor to the end of the year 1494. The idea of a war with the Turks had occupied him from his earliest youth, and only a few weeks before Frederick’s death father and son took steps in common to effect a league against the Infidels. Their exertions were fruitless; the enemy was in no way intimidated, but invaded Croatia and returned with rich booty before Maximilian could come up. The king vainly tried with the help of his hereditary lands to raise an army primarily for the protection of Hungarian Croatia. A new Turkish invasion followed in August, 1494. It was now only too clear that without vigorous help from the empire Croatia would be alienated from the Christian faith, and that its embodiment into the Turkish Empire would constitute a serious menace to Germany. Notwithstanding all the king’s exertions no serious measures were taken, and so in April, 1495, Maximilian joined the three years’ truce which Ladislaus of Hungary had struck with the Sultan.

Maximilian had during the lifetime of his father betrothed himself in second marriage with the princess Blanca Maria of Milan, and had secured to her uncle Lodovico Moro his investiture with the Duchy of Milan. The dowry of three hundred thousand ducats, which this matrimonial alliance would bring, induced him to take this step not less than the hope of Lodovico’s help in the impending Turkish war. The marriage of the king with the Milanese princess took place after the death of the Emperor Frederick in November, 1493. Maximilian actually conferred the duchy as an escheated crown land on Lodovico Moro and his male heirs (September, 1494), and the solemn investiture followed in November, 1495.

Maximilian, immediately after he had come into the empire, in order to show himself as sovereign for the first time made it his most earnest duty in the interests of the intended Turkish campaign to suppress by his fiat the long threatening war between the electors of Mayence and the Palatinate. He was, in fact, successful in August, 1495, in bringing about a reconciliation between them. Before this the Public Peace, proclaimed in 1486 for ten years, was prolonged for three years more; that is to say, until 1499. The idea of a lasting Public Peace was thus by implication not entertained by the king. The affairs of Italy now occupied him afresh;
Lodovico Moro found himself hard pressed by France, and desired Maximilian's help to negotiate a peace between Charles and Naples. The two kings agreed to do so; conferences were repeatedly arranged but never held, since Maximilian precisely at the suitable moment was detained by the dispute with Charles of Guelders. Connected with this was the entry of the king into the Netherlands, where the Archduke Philip, a youth of fifteen years, now took over the government himself at the wish of the States. The more unpopular Maximilian himself was in the Netherlands, the more the people hoped to be able to guide his tractable son Philip. His matrimonial alliance with the Spanish Infanta Joanna, which afterward acquired such importance for the destinies of Europe, was celebrated in October, 1496. Father and son thought less of obtaining the Spanish crown by marriage than of creating a counterpoise to the mighty crown of France by an alliance between the royal families of Spain and of the Hapsburgs.

In the year 1497 Margaret, daughter of King Maximilian by his first wife, was married to the Infante John, the only son of Ferdinand and Isabella. But the heir to the Spanish throne died after a very short wedded life, and Margaret returned two years later to Germany as a widow.

Although the German ruler and Charles VIII had no direct personal relations, they had frequent communication by embassies. The result of the negotiations was that France should have a free hand in Naples, but in return was to allow Venice, so important for the Turkish war, to fall to the Hapsburgs. The idea of a war against the Turks was very prominently before the two kings, and Venice had not shown the least friendliness to Maximilian, but had absolutely refused to take part in the Turkish campaign. However, when Charles VIII entered Rome toward the end of 1494, and there was talk of his intentions to win the imperial crown, Maximilian sought an alliance with Venice, and thus on his side to gain an open road to Rome in order to assume the imperial style. We have already mentioned the subsequent events which led to the formation of the Holy League.

(c) Common Penny, Public Peace, and Supreme Court of Judicature.—The coronation journey to Rome, which Maximilian had at first wished to postpone until after the victory over the Turks, had thus become more urgent. But an Imperial Assembly was required to settle the preparations, and was also imperatively demanded by the schemes of reform which were floating in the air. It met at Worms at the end of March, 1495. The king demanded for the protection of Milan an "urgent aid" and besides that a "permanent aid," that is, an army which was to be permanently under arms for at least ten years; in return for this he was prepared to treat about the reform of the constitution. The States, for their part, were willing to discuss the permanent military system of the empire, but would not hear of an immediate expedition to Rome. The majority of the princes were chiefly interested in a radical reform of the system of law and legislation which culminated in the appointment of an Imperial Standing Chamber or Council nominated by the States; this was equivalent to a complete change of the imperial constitution in the direction of the Federal State. The elector, Berthold of Mayence, was the soul of these efforts. He was the author of the practical proposals which in the interest of the empire increased for the time the influence of the electors, but appeared in essentials acceptable to the other princes and the towns. The Wittelsbachs and the Landgrave of Hesse alone adopted an unconciliatory attitude. By the end of
April the Assembly learned of the proposal of the Elector of Mayence, according to which an Imperial Chamber of seventeen members was to be entrusted with the entire government for a definite period. Only such commands of the king as were given through it were to be legally valid in the empire. Its main duties were, the restoration of peace and order in the empire, the administration and expenditure of the imperial revenues, and the charge of the imperial military system. Since the power of pronouncing the ban was assigned to the Supreme Court of Judicature, then called into existence, the king was only left honorary privileges, while the electors were in important cases to have a hearing in the Imperial Chamber.

The king kept silence for a considerable time when the proposals had been communicated to him. It was clear to him that his "supremacy" had not been reserved for him in the form in which he thought he ought to have claimed it. When he appeared in person toward the middle of May and explained the "urgent aid," to the effect that he demanded from the States within six weeks one hundred thousand florins (he was willing to raise fifty thousand himself from his hereditary dominions), the princes informed him that no grant of money could be contemplated before the establishment of order and peace in the empire. Finally, in view of the conditions in Italy the States showed their readiness to grant the money. A committee from the States was, however, to superintend the application of it. But the money was not forthcoming, chiefly through the fault of the towns which would not pay, until first of all they were assured of the acceptance and execution of the proposals for changing the constitution of the empire.

The emperor had not yet made any official statement about the Reform Programme; this was not given until June 22. The counter-proposals which he unfolded that day to the Assembly meant almost the opposite of those laid before him by the States. However welcome the raising of the "Common Penny" might be to him, impeccunious as he always was, he saw too clearly an infringement of his "supremacy" in the formation of an Imperial Chamber. He was willing to recognise an Imperial Chamber only during the period of his absence from the Empire. Wearisome negotiations now began between the States and the king: the former saw that something at least could be obtained from the king, and they wished to have it. His assent was given to the Public Peace and the Supreme Court, with some slight changes; in return the States renounced the institution of an Imperial Chamber. On July 27 the king gave his assent to the renewed separate proposals as regards the Common Penny, the Public Peace, and the Supreme Court, and on August 7 he signed the four documents which related to the institution of the Supreme Court, the Public Peace, the administration of the Public Peace, and the Common Penny. In return Maximilian received, in addition to the one hundred and fifty thousand florins already granted, the guarantee of the States for a further loan of a similar amount.

Undoubtedly the most important of the decrees was that as to financial reform, the provision of money for the Supreme Court, and the expeditions of the imperial army. It did not seem clear how much the "Common Penny" would really bring in. The system of collection — the parish clergy appear to have been the controllers of country taxes — was not remarkable for its simplicity. The collection was provisionally sanctioned for four years. It was confessedly an experiment, but on the expiration of this period the method of its collection, and not the tax itself, was to be discussed afresh. No money at all came in at first. The territorial lords
were first obliged to come to an understanding with their States; the elector of the Palatinate refused his assent absolutely, and in the case of other princes who were absent from the Assembly, as well as of the unrepresented knighthood of the empire, it was necessary to ascertain their willingness to pay. The commissioners, who were to hand over the money received to the seven imperial treasurers, had not even been nominated for the various territories by the summer of 1496. The money could not be collected in any case so quickly as the emperor expected, through the defective administrative organisation of the empire and the complete ignorance of the principles of taxation which prevailed at the time. In Burgundy, however, and other districts there was absolutely no intention of exacting the tax. The Knights of Swabia united in the "Shield of St. George" (Sankt-Georgenschild) declined to do so, as also the Swiss Confederacy, which did not wish to recognise the Supreme Court, and in consequence actually abandoned all connection with the empire after the war of the year 1499, so feebly conducted by the emperor. The promises made in 1495 with respect to the money were not observed by the States, and still less so by the emperor. He carried out his foreign policy on his own responsibility, and tried, without appearing in the imperial diets, to spend as much as possible of the public money without the control of the States.

The condition of affairs in Italy at the beginning of the year 1496 showed little change. Milan and Venice both urgently wished for Maximilian's appearance in person. He eventually crossed the mountains in August, after England, in July, had joined the Holy League. Maximilian did not come as emperor, but as a mercenary of Venice and Milan. They had both invited him in May and had each promised him thirty thousand ducats, for which he was to put two thousand horsemen and four thousand infantry into the field for three months; there was, in addition, an intended extra payment for two thousand Swiss. Notwithstanding all this, his army was excessively weak; by the end of August he had not more than six hundred men, and the enlistment of the Swiss had only just begun. Venice was not yet ready to pay, and in fact would rather not have seen Maximilian come. But he was there already, and endeavoured after the beginning of September to suppress by military occupation the western districts of Italy which were subject to France, and to bring them over where possible to the league of France's enemies. The most suitable plan by which to assert any power would have been to bar the passage of the Alps and thus prevent the concentration of the French. But Venice and Milan, which finally gave way, opposed this scheme, and thus the selfish policy of Venice hindered the full employment of the strategically advantageous position in the interests of the league. Maximilian, instead of returning to Germany, dreamed of great military enterprises to be carried out simultaneously in Italy and Burgundy, for which, unfortunately, money and troops were completely wanting. On the other hand there was no longer any talk of taking serious measures to obtain the imperial crown, although the diet at Worms had expressly promised its assistance. In October the king came to Pisa in order to besiege the important town of Leghorn. But toward the end of the month the French fleet, so eagerly expected by the besieged, arrived, and a favourable wind allowed it to enter the harbour of Leghorn, while Maximilian's attempts to repel it were totally unsuccessful. The attempt on Leghorn finally failed, the siege was abandoned in the middle of November, and since the three months' term of service was over, the force went back over the mountains, although just then a renewed expedition
of Charles VIII was threatening, and even Venice itself would have been glad to see the king longer in Italy. The promise, however, of better success in a war against Burgundy decided his policy.

On December 26, 1496, Maximilian was again at Mals in Tyrol. But he did not go, as might have been expected, to the diet at Lindau, where Berthold of Mayence was busied in closely examining the position of the sovereign toward the empire; the discussion of such questions now seemed to the king almost high treason. The diet at Lindau was unsuccessful, owing to the small attendance, and it finished its sittings on February 9, 1497, whereupon another, equally unsuccessful, was opened at Worms. The only result of it was the actual assembling of the Imperial Supreme Court at the end of May. Notwithstanding every effort, the “Common Penny” was not collected from most districts. Other expedients for raising money failed signally. At last when Maximilian had given a definite promise that he would appear in person in the next diet at Freiburg in Breisgau, the States granted him immediately four thousand ducats on account. But the sovereign, far too much occupied with his hereditary lands, did not go to Freiburg; the States waited for him from October, 1497, to summer, 1498. He remained in Innsbruck, where the news reached him of the death of Charles VIII and he set about levying an army to fight against France. Some seven thousand troops actually entered the enemy’s land. But since neither the league nor the princes (not even his son Philip) thought of sharing the struggle, Frederick of Saxony was selected to conduct negotiations, and the war was broken off. Archduke Philip had already allied himself with Louis XII and on August 16 he promised, as a final compromise, to take the oath of fealty for Flanders and Artois. The simultaneous renunciation by Philip of his claims to Upper Burgundy roused the wrath of his father, who had distinctly hoped for a more favourable result, in the event of his diplomatic representative having brought matters to a settlement.

Maximilian at length appeared on June 18 in Freiburg, with the declared intention of taking the field against France at once. After heated explanations the States were at last prepared to pay the balance of the one hundred and fifty thousand florins, if the king would furnish them an account of what he had already received. With regard to France, they promised to safeguard the interests of the empire; but the king must provide for the collection of the Common Penny and the establishment of peace and justice. The first attempt was now made to survey the receipts from the tax. Fourteen abbots and twenty-seven towns had paid, and of the princes only the Elector of Mayence, so far as any money had been received by the king. The knights of the empire alone raised open objections; with this exception all were ready for payment. Some important decrees were passed concerning the administration of the empire, as a sort of supplement to the reforms of Worms. The final decree of August 24 signified a distinct advance, although a new diet at Worms at the end of September was destined to crown the whole work.

A treacherous attack of the French, in spite of the truce and the pending negotiations, now drove the king to vigorous action. With the force that stood at his disposal, he reached Montbéliard by September 12 and advanced after the retreating enemy, but was unable to come up with them. He remained a short time at Metz on the way back, as the attempts to effect a longer truce with France came to nothing. The king was equally unsuccessful in dissuading his son from the
treaty with France. When, then, at the beginning of the year 1499 Louis entered into an alliance with Venice, it was impossible for Maximilian to make any terms, although he was distracted both by the recent outbreak of war with Guelders and the events in Switzerland.

In addition to this, the diet summoned to Worms did not meet. The king transferred it to Cologne, on account of the quarrel with Guelders, but did not appear himself, and from thence to Ueberlingen on account of the confederates. Meanwhile Archduke Philip actually took the oath of feudal to the French king, as promised in 1498. Louis XII was now prepared to act as arbitrator between the lower Rhenish territories of Jülich, Cleves, and Guelders; and in spite of the grave protests of the German king, who threatened the princes with loss of their privileges, toward the end of the year peace was ratified by the influence of Louis.

Before Switzerland was lost to the empire in 1499, the old peasant freedom in Friesland had been ended. In the diet of Freiburg Maximilian had nominated Duke Albert of Saxony governor of Friesland on July 20, 1498. The Frisians thus received a territorial lord, but obstinately rebelled against him, so that lasting wars followed. The counts of Cirkensen had always to suffer in later times from the ambition of their neighbours; at the beginning of the Thirty Years' War Mansfeld came to an understanding with the States-General. But at last Prussia received from the Emperor Leopold the reversion to the land, and took possession of it after the death of the last count in 1744. The seacoast was a great acquisition for Prussia, but the commercial companies, which were immediately founded, did not fulfill their brilliant promises of success.

(d) The Council of Regency (Reichsrat).—Before his election Maximilian had been famed as an efficient general, but after his accession he was defeated in every campaign which he undertook. All the internal reforms hitherto recorded were in reality only concessions forced from him by his endless need of money. But the work was now begun, and the imperial diet summoned for February, 1500, was to advance it a stage farther. Although the king had been present some considerable time, business did not commence before April. The most important question for Maximilian was that of auxiliary troops, and he came forward with proposals on the point. The Common Penny was universally disliked; it had proved nothing but an abortive scheme. For this reason the attempt was made to raise a permanent imperial army of thirty-four thousand men on the basis of the proposal made in 1486. At the same time, for the relief of the assembly of the empire, a standing committee, the Council of Regency (Reichsrat), was to be appointed, and the supreme court (Kammergericht) once more established. The arrangements for the council were completed in July, and the committee itself met at Nuremberg in 1500. But the king's plan with regard to the army did not meet with the approval of the States; on the contrary, the princes, at Berthold's advice, insisted that the requirements of the empire should be supplied by every member of the empire. One trooper should be furnished by every four hundred persons who had any property, while the lords were to furnish one for every four thousand florins income. The towns were to pay two and one-half per cent. of their revenues, the Jews to pay one florin poll tax. They thus hoped for an army of some thirty thousand men; and the special duty of the Council of Regency was to be the administration of these funds. On this head Maximilian for once agreed with the States.
The assembly, besides treating these questions, was also occupied with the foreign policy, especially the attitude of France, from which an attack long seemed imminent. An imperial embassy to the court of Louis XII was certainly unsuccessful in its demands, but war was temporarily avoided. Louis was now the real master of Milan, and no one could easily dislodge him from that position. It therefore seemed most prudent to the Council of Regency to offer him for a large sum of money the investiture by the empire. The king, indeed, was not quite sincere with his words; but in order to outbid the princes, he agreed with Louis in October, 1501, as to his investiture with Milan, on condition that Louis would assist him in his expedition to Rome for coronation.

The Council of Regency resisted the preaching of indulgences by the papal legate, Cardinal Peraud. At first the cardinal hardly ventured to put foot on the soil of the empire. He did so later, when a pledge had been given that the money should remain entirely in Germany. Maximilian hoped for the fulfilment of his wish, that in this way the means for the campaign against the Turks would be forthcoming. The Council of Regency was forced in the end to allow preaching and collecting; but it interfered in the matter, and hindered the enriching of the papal treasury by German gold. Indeed, the treasury of the empire was to be benefited by the proceeds. As far as the Pope was concerned, the loudly expressed demand that the papal Curia should give back annates already paid, and the revenues from earlier indulgences, was quieted by this undoubtedly large concession. The German princes naturally thought only of the money itself. On no account was the Curia to be enriched at the cost of Germany; but nothing suggested the idea that the States had attacked the indulgence itself as an institution of the church.

The preaching of indulgences had doubtless revived the idea of crusades, and a diet was summoned to Frankfort to deliberate on the question. But the king did not appear; the procedure was too troublesome for him. On the other hand, he summoned the princes on his own authority as a feudal lord to a campaign against the Turks; but this was the most direct violation by the king of the newly created constitutional arrangement. Berthold, from whom Maximilian had demanded the surrender of the imperial seal, summoned, as a counter measure, an electoral diet, after the old style, to Frankfort in May. The assembled princes attacked the king with vehement speeches, but expressed their readiness to join in the Turkish war, although only after long and careful preparations. Meanwhile Maximilian tried to get possession of the money derived from the Jubilee Indulgence, but the legate remained firm to his compact to hand over the amounts raised to the council, which seemed to be nearly ignored through the turn of events. The king's attempt to invite the electors to his court in order to discuss the matter was ineffectual; in fact, on July 4, 1502, a formal combination of the electors took place, the object of which was to oppose the king and protect the constitution created at Worms and Augsburg. A diet, to which the other princes were to be invited, was settled for November in Gelnhausen, in order to deliberate about the Turkish expedition. Maximilian summoned a "strengthened Council of Regency" to the same town for August, but countermanded it when he was certain that no one would follow his orders. The assembly of the electors did not take place, since the king summoned for the same date an imperial diet to Gelnhausen, on which the electors wished to remove to Würzburg. In the end Maximilian for his part relinquished the plan of an immediate war with Turkey, and did not temporarily contemplate calling an
imperial diet. Indeed he once more set into operation the high "imperial chamber," with its undefined powers in law and legislation. Permanently strained relations existed between the king and the electors, but neither side took any action, and the king's financial position was improved, since after the year 1503 really considerable portions of the jubilee's funds flowed into his coffers. In October of this year the electors once more met at Frankfort, but only consented to an imperial diet if Maximilian himself would appear. But Maximilian was now bent on the journey to Rome and the expedition against the Turks.

While all upper Germany was being agitated by the dispute as to the succession in Landshut, which broke out after the death of Duke George of Bavaria, and was settled in the summer of 1505 by the "award of Cologne," Maximilian achieved a certain success in his foreign policy by the treaty at Blois (September, 1504), which was followed by a final accommodation with France at Hagenau, in April, 1505. Louis XII was to be invested with Milan, and Charles, son of Archduke Philip, grandson of King Maximilian, who was betrothed to his daughter Claudia, was to be regarded as his heir. In this way the Hapsburgs might again hope to gain Milan; besides this Louis paid a large sum to Maximilian for the investiture. The two Hapsburgs, father and son, and the King of France, now stood in a close alliance; their spheres of interest in Italy were marked out. And although the treaty was broken by Louis, the international position of the House of Hapsburg was nevertheless more favourable than in previous years, especially since fairly cordial relations existed with Henry VII of England. Maximilian turned his steps from Hagenau down the Rhine to Cologne for the diet, and now, encouraged by the issue of the Bavarian War of Succession, as well as by the success of his foreign policy and the conquest of Charles of Guelders, tried to give his attention once more to imperial reform. He may have seen that reform was impossible without an administrative body, and therefore demanded a new Council of Regency, which was not to trench on royal prerogative, but was to be merely advisory. The old idea of a government by the States was completely abandoned in the proposal. But the princes would not consent to this, and withdrew from the task of reform. A renewed establishment of the Supreme Court was determined, but remained on paper, for it would have been impossible to keep it up. The king now asked for four thousand men from the empire for one year in order to make good his claims to the Hungarian succession, and his request was granted. The means were raised in the old way, by "register contributions" (Matrikularbeiträge); thus the idea of a direct imperial tax was abandoned. But this time also the plan was not carried out, and Maximilian entered into closer diplomatic relations to Ladislaus, as a result of which an arrangement was made in March, 1506, that the Hungarian princess Anne should be married to a grandson of Maximilian. But the danger was not thus ended, since there was the fear that such a marriage would be vigorously opposed by the Hungarian nobles. The demand of the Hapsburgs, that the nobility should renew their guarantee which they gave in 1491, as to the Hapsburg succession, actually conjured up the war. King Maximilian entered into Hungary in June, 1506, with an imposing force. Oedenburg was captured and Pressburg fell. The struggle was interrupted by the birth of a Hungarian prince, who received the name of Louis; he was now the only legitimate successor of Ladislaus. But in the peace of Vienna (July 19, 1506), Maximilian's claims to the succession of Hungary were nevertheless expressly established.
(e) International Policy in Italy. — Meanwhile, it appeared as if the occasion was finally suitable for the expedition to Rome that had been settled at Cologne in 1505, for Pope Julius II had completely quarrelled with France and Archduke Philip had won military successes in Spain. But Julius suddenly turned round and, in the autumn, Rome and Milan, Naples and Venice combined in order to hinder the coronation journey of the German sovereign. All details of the march over the Alps had been arranged in August, and notwithstanding the gloomy tidings as to the turn of politics in Italy, Maximilian had formed the bold plan of forcing an entry into Rome, when the news reached him of the death of his son, Philip (September 25, 1506). The idea of an aggressive war against France in combination with him had therefore to be abandoned. But, in order to carry out the expedition to Rome, which had not been abandoned, Maximilian assiduously sought the advice of the princes, and could hardly wait for the imperial diet convened for the beginning of 1507. The relations of the Pope to France had again become cooler toward the end of the year 1506; in fact, he tried to mediate between Maximilian and Louis, while the latter was preparing to conquer Genoa. The diet, which was eagerly desired in Germany, finally met toward the end of April at Constance. The work of internal reform was actually concluded by a new system of supreme jurisdiction, but unfortunately the important question of the executive was inadequately met. The Supreme Court of Judicature met in Ratisbon about the end of the year, and was transferred two years later to Worms. The States granted the funds for the journey to Rome, and fixed the amount of the register contributions, which then remained permanently in force. Maximilian, on his own initiative, advanced into Italy from Tyrol during the winter, and, assumed at Trient, on February 4, 1508, the title of "a Roman Emperor Elect." Since for the moment, owing to the complications with Venice, an entry into the eternal city seemed to lie in the remote future, a vigorous campaign was now undertaken against the great trading republic, which had seized Istria. After a preliminary success of Trauton, the Germans were completely defeated in March near Pieve di Cadore, while the emperor, far from the army, tried to get reinforcements from Germany. The Venetian commander, Alviano, had still further successes; he took the town of Görz in April, and attacked Trieste, which surrendered on May 6. All the ports fell into the hands of the republic, and a land army threatened Carniola. Maximilian repeatedly tried to obtain money from the States; but the "urgent diet" summoned to Worms was several times adjourned. So he had to consent, on June 6, to a three years' truce with Venice.

This truce, which did not take into consideration the interests of the French king on the frontiers of the German Empire, made Louis dissatisfied with his former allies, the Venetians, and drew him into closer relations with the emperor. The latter, since the death of his son, was guardian of his infant grandsons, Charles and Ferdinand, and had assigned the regency of the Netherlands to his widowed daughter, Margaret, a woman of great practical ability. The English king, Henry VIII, was a suitor for her hand, since he hoped in this way to win influence over the Netherlands, but being rejected, made proposals to enter into a matrimonial alliance with the royal family of France. Such a reconciliation between England and France would have been fraught with great danger to the Netherlands and Germany, and it was necessary to avoid this at all costs. Margaret, therefore, induced her father to resume the former negotiations with France. The result was
the arrangement made in December, 1508, at Cambray, which only became possible through the provisional adjournment of the question of Guelphs. In the so-called "League of Cambray" the kings of France and Germany had combined with the Pope in common action against Venice, and on the terms that the Venetian territory was divided in advance between the three parties. Louis on his part was enfeoffed with the kingdom of Milan on payment of one hundred thousand crowns, and the prospect of investiture held out to him so soon as the French campaign against Venice had actually begun. While France placed an army in the field against the republic, and won a victory in May near Agnadello, Maximilian in vain sought the means for carrying on the war. Pope Julius and the French king took possession of the parts of the country guaranteed to them. Maximilian could not co-operate, but appeared in the middle of August for the siege of Padua. But he abandoned the attack at the beginning of October, and was by the end of the month once more in Tyrol, while the imperial army broke up, and Louis retired from the seat of war, having gained his desired object. Although Maximilian was convinced that the struggle must be continued during the winter, he could not induce his allies to adopt suitable measures. In fact, the strength of the league was somewhat relaxed during the winter, so that the war in 1510 was carried on unenergetically.

A new imperial diet met at Augsburg in March. The emperor demanded military support, and was now prepared to come to an agreement in the matter of reform. But the princes held back; they agreed to nothing, in the conviction that there could be no permanent settlement with this king on the basis of a constitution. The influence also was clearly felt of the Pope, who now was desirous of a peaceful arrangement, and had freed the Venetians from the ban in February. His efforts were directed toward reviving a new league to crush the excessive power of the French. It was impossible for Maximilian in his financial weakness to follow a policy of his own. Driven by necessity he continually drew closer to France and made an agreement with Louis in November that renewed the Treaty of Cambray for the two powers who now alone participated in it. This alliance was really directed against the Pope, and the effective weapon in this war was to be a stoppage of supplies to Rome. A new council, which eventually met at Pisa in November, 1511, was intended to deliberate afresh about church reform.

In consequence of these events, Pope Julius was anxious to enter into relations with each one of the allies, ostensibly in order to restore peace in Italy — in reality, to break up the coalition. However, these attempts miscarried in the spring of 1511. But after the illness which made his life precarious, he was allied with Spain and Venice, and soon found a hearing with Maximilian. He was already inclined toward the "Holy League," especially as England joined it. In June, 1512, the peace negotiations between Venice and the emperor were concluded. The Swiss, also, in return for the assurance that Massimiliano Sforza would be put in possession of Milan, were ready to strike a blow at France. The Bishop of Gurk was the emperor's envoy to the Pope; the latter, on the understanding that the council at Pisa should be abandoned and the Lateran council acknowledged, made the most valuable concessions, since he entirely depended on the emperor for his position toward Venice. The former, even in the winter 1512–1513, had not completely broken with France until the death of Pope Julius, in February, 1513, gave a new turn to the matter.
Giovanni de' Medici was elected as Leo X so rapidly that Maximilian could not exercise any influence over the election at all, and his plan of becoming himself master of the States of the Church after the death of Julius was thus finally frustrated. Leo remained apparently loyal to the Holy League, but soon released King Louis from the ban, while Venice formed a direct alliance with France in March. A little later, King Maximilian, at his daughter's instance, allied himself with Henry VIII of England. The new pope and Ferdinand of Spain were certainly privy to this agreement. A joint attack on the French territory was a preconcerted arrangement. But neither Leo nor Ferdinand was thoroughly sincere in the matter. Ferdinand, indeed, concluded a truce with Louis at the same time. The situation was only cleared up when the confederates, at the beginning of June, 1513, won a decisive victory over the French at Novara, and forced them to evacuate Italy. Ferdinand now showed himself more amenable. Henry VIII appeared on French soil in August, and the Swiss were ready for an attack on Burgundy. Maximilian himself appeared in the English headquarters, and shared as a general in the victory of the English army over the French on August 16, 1513, near the selfsame Guinegate, where thirty-four years before he had already distinguished himself. The fortress of Tournon, on the frontiers of the Netherlands, surrendered a few days later. The Swiss at the beginning of September were before Dijon, but retired home again without having made the least use of their favourable position. At the beginning of October the allies gained a victory in Italy over the Venetians, who were now prepared to open negotiations with pope and emperor. Although the Royal House of England formed more intimate relations with the Hapsburgs through the betrothal of Archduke Charles with Mary, sister of Henry VIII, and although the English made further preparations against France in the winter of 1514, still King Louis succeeded by skilful diplomacy in ridding himself of his foes. In April, 1514, King Henry, affronted at the breaking-off of his sister's marriage, went over to the side of France. In August a peace was struck on the terms of the cession of Tournay to England, and Mary, the king's sister, was given in marriage to King Louis. Under these conditions the emperor had only the support of Ferdinand left. At his advice he approached the Pope, and offered him the imperial fief of Modena. But the negotiations were still in suspense when, on January 1, 1515, Louis XII died, and his son-in-law, Francis of Angoulême, followed him on the throne.

The new king, who planned the marriage of Archduke Charles, now of age, with Renée, the surviving daughter of King Louis, did not wish in the least to renounce the French dominion in Italy, and made immediate preparations to defend his rights. An army was soon in Italy, and won a victory in the two days' fighting at Marignano (September 13 and 14, 1515, now Melegnano on the Lambro), over the famous soldiery of the Swiss. Milan thus fell to the French. Massimiliano Sforza had for the future to live in France. The unexpected death of Ferdinand, in January, 1516, prevented a plan of alliance with the English king, who was willing to lend his help to defend Naples. Venice greeted Francis as her protector. Venetians and French marched together against the Swiss, who were won over by English gold, but were compelled in March, 1516, to retreat from the Mincio to the Adda, and thence to Milan. Maximilian delayed to strike a decisive blow, and could not afterward recover the lost opportunity, since his Swiss mutinied. He still hoped, it is true, for a renewal of the struggle by help of English gold.
Henry VIII was to receive Milan in return. But Henry drew back; and Maximilian, indignant at this behaviour in his ally, began to take part in the negotiations pending between his grandson Charles and King Francis, which led in December to an alliance between Charles and Francis. The basis of this was the surrender of Verona to Venice for the sum of 200,000 thalers in gold (£30,000), while Riva and Rovereto, together with Friuli, remained to the emperor. The treaty which, in the form of a five years' truce, was finally renewed on August 26, 1518, continuously added to the extent of the emperor's power in his hereditary land of Tyrol.

(f) Close of Maximilian's Reign.—While foreign policy took up the emperor's attention, he had not been inactive in other matters. A continuance of imperial reform was impossible from the attitude of the princes. But the diet of Augsburg in 1512 passed the constitutionally important decree that all measures adopted in the diets should be binding on all the States. On the other hand, in order to execute the judgments of the Supreme Court of Judicature and to protect the public peace, ten circles with separate organisation had been established. The renewal of the Swabian League in 1512 was of importance for the maintenance of internal peace; but the simultaneous formation of a "counter league" lessened in many respects the effect of this excellently designed institution. The impoverishment of the German people by the financial practices of the papal Curia was discussed in the diet of 1517; and in 1518 a new Turks' tax was claimed on the part of the Pope, although it was proposed to leave the collection and application of it entirely to the nation. But the States refused to hear of a tax in any form whatever; and raised against the papal extortions well-founded complaints which were no longer irrelevant to the doctrines expounded in those days at Wittenberg. (Cf. on the subject the IIIrd chief section of this volume.)

The Emperor Maximilian had always been inspired with the wish to increase the power of his family. But the older he grew and the less pleasure he could find in the empire and in his foreign policy, the nearer to his heart must have lain the arrangement of the succession. His grandson Charles had attained his majority on January 5, 1515, and had taken over the government of the Netherlands into his own hands. After the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, who had united the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon by his marriage with Isabella, mainly by the tact of Cardinal Ximenes, Charles acquired the direction of affairs in Spain as well, the presumably insane Joanna being passed over or set aside.

In the year 1517 the succession in the empire, about which Maximilian had already entertained the most varied views, became an important question owing to his failing health; and just before his departure, Charles, on an understanding with his grandfather, came forward as a candidate. Indeed the choice of a Roman king during the emperor's lifetime was most important if the Hapsburg succession was not altogether to become doubtful. Some concessions to the electors and payment of old debts soon made them compliant, and the election was fixed for January, 1519, in Frankfurt. Maximilian promised at the same time to have his own coronation as emperor completed, and the Pope, according to all appearance, was ready to do so. But the monarch died on January 12, 1519, at Wels, before he could carry out all these plans. He had not made any definite settlement as to his successor, nor appointed the provisional government necessary in the
absence of both grandsons, and so his reign closed abruptly, leaving all important issues unsolved. His body was buried in the Church of St. George in Vienna, Neustadt, but his magnificent tomb, designed after his own idea, was raised in the royal chapel at Innsbruck, and not, as he had wished, over his actual grave. When Maximilian, on December 28, 1518, signed his will, twenty-eight of the great bronze statues and one hundred and thirty-four of the smaller figures were ready. The masters of the plastic arts at Nuremburg, Landshut, and even in the Netherlands, worked at those statues, the grouping of which, as finally carried out by the grandson, was certainly not according to the idea in the mind of the monarch who gave the original order.

During the reign of King Maximilian, many thoughts were born which afterward obtained a tangible form, and many practical improvements sprung from the creative brain of the king himself. But his changeable nature, with the rapid alteration of plans and intentions, prevented him from carrying out systematically purposes when definitely formed. However little results his exertions in the field of imperial reform may have finally given to the nation, still the nation showed itself grateful. His contemporaries, above all the Humanists, looked up to him with admiration; posterity celebrated him as the “last of the knights.” It was, indeed, the chivalry of his nature that won him the affection of his people, notwithstanding the many evils from which during his reign, and partly through his mismanagement, the German nation suffered.

2. THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION

A. Economic and Intellectual Culture in the Age of the Reformation

However cheerless was the form of the political and national life of western Europe, and especially of Germany in the fifteenth century, however miserable the condition of the people, and however hopeless the future seemed, still it is incontestable that during that century a number of phenomena can be traced which we may regard as the first steps toward what we call modern progress. The progress of that century of growth cannot be comprehended as a unity; it is twofold, and shows often in close proximity by the side of the old rural conditions, which were not only non-progressive but became daily more and more impossible, an active civic life which strives to meet in every respect the demands of the age.

(a) The Condition of the Towns in 1500. — The picture of a west German town between 1400 and 1500 (apart from the maritime districts on the Baltic) embodies all the achievements of progress at that time, although from a modern standpoint much seems wanting. We have shown above the political importance since the fourteenth century of the towns with a few thousand inhabitants. But inside the city walls, and in their immediate vicinity, the buildings and other constructions exhibited, as it were, the reflected image of the external power, that firm foundation for a political existence, a vigorous community with rich sources of wealth. The streets, it is true, were mostly narrow and irregularly built, the houses chiefly of wood, while almost every burgher kept his cattle in the house, and the herd of swine which was driven every morning by the town herdsman to the pasture-
EXPLANATION OF THE PICTURE ON THE NEXT PAGE

This is a representation of the town Cologne on the Rhine after a woodcut of Anton Weenam in 1531. This picture accurately faithful in every detail (all sixteenth century views of towns cannot boast of this merit) is one of the best and at the same time oldest woodcuts of the kind and admirably shows the exterior of a large mediæval town.

Holy Cologne ("hillige Köln") as it was called in the Middle Ages rose on the ruins of the Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium, founded in the year 51 a.D., and bore in the Middle Ages the name "Colonia Agrippinensis." Numerous reminiscences of the former Roman times, especially the churches built in honour of the early Christian martyrs (the Thelian legion, St. Ursula) testify to that past. At the very beginning of the Middle Ages the town, as residence of an Archbishop, who was at the same time Imperial Chancellor for Italy, acquired a high political importance. The economic prosperity due to trade — in consequence of the "staple-laws" every merchant who came down the stream was compelled to offer his wares there for sale — gave an immense development of power to the Imperial city. Cologne, as member of the Hanseatic League, shared in the economic superiority of North Germany, while as the metropolis of trade on the Rhine it connected the towns on the Upper Rhine with the Netherlands.

All this spirit of progress in trade and politics found its expression usually during the Middle Ages in large ecclesiastical and secular buildings, the highest achievements of culture at that time. And our picture shows us the Imperial city of Cologne, which had remained since 1288 entirely un molested by the ambitious schemes of the archbishops, at the moment of its greatest power, as it was when it ventured in 1531 to entertain the Emperor Charles V, and as Johann Haselberg of Reichenau has poetically described it in the same year. The artist has chosen his standpoint on the right bank of the Rhine in Deutz: this is proved by the Romanesque church of St. Heribert (Monasterium Hereberti) which is visible in the foreground: and before us on the stream the shipping presents a lively scene: vessels of all kinds are observable, some drawn up stream by horses, some rowed, some moved by the wind which blows into the sails. Others are moored to the bank in order to lay or discharge goods. One large crane and two smaller ones are at work: their construction and movement by means of a large perpendicular wheel can be recognised—(even at the present day a similar crane is employed at Andernach for loading millstones). The town is surrounded with strong walls as a protection against the enemy: we see them before us along the stream guarded with strong towers, of which the Francentorn is the most conspicuous. The walls are pierced by 31 gates, and 24 of them face the Rhine, to facilitate the traffic to and from the shipping. Most of the gates are strongly fortified, e.g. flanked by turrets. Over the walls peep the gables of numerous small burgery houses, sometimes built into the town wall. Out of the sea of houses in the town proper the tops of trees rise to the right of the Cathedral and suggest what the appearance of the interior of the walls may be.

Amongst the mighty buildings, which rise high above the private houses, the churches chiefly rivet our attention, just as they formed the most important attraction for the visitor of the XVth century. The above mentioned Johann Haselberge enumerates in his "Ecology of the city Cologne" 19 parish churches, some 100 chapels and 24 religious houses, of which 12 were intended for young women. The artist has skilfully introduced the names of the churches and the two larger secular buildings in distinctive places so that each separate edifice is easily recognised. Profane purposes were especially served by the Gürzenich (Gortzenig)—to be seen on the left—the municipal "Dance-House" (Tanzhaus), which was erected towards the middle of the XVth century as the hall for civic ceremonies and from 1475 onwards was repeatedly used for the most magnificent festivities in honour of foreign guests. To the left of the high block of the church Gross St. Martin may be seen the Rathaussturm (Domus Senatorum), which was erected in 1407–1414 in 5 storeys, while the "Rathaus" proper together with the "Hansaaal," dating from the XIVth century, is concealed from the observer's view.

Twenty churches, large and small, of various dates and styles are in view: four of which arouse peculiar attention. The Church of the Apostles (Hap Apostolos) is a handsome pillared Basilica with three aisles and double transept: over the East point of intersection rises a dome
ground, formed an inevitable part of city life. In Frankfort-on-Main it was unlawful after 1481 to keep swine in the Altstadt, but in the Neustadt and in Sachsenhausen this custom remained as a matter of course. It was only in 1645, after a corresponding attempt in 1556 had failed, that the swine-pens in the inner town were pulled down at Leipzig. The rich burghers, who occasionally took part in the great trading companies, were conspicuously wealthy landowners, and had their extensive courtyards with large barns inside the town walls. The most opulent of them owned those splendid patrician houses which we admire even to-day. But even in the older towns most houses of the fifteenth century have disappeared; only here and there a building with open timber-work and overhanging storeys, as in Bacharach or Miltenburg, reminds us of the style of architecture then customary in the houses of burghers. The great bulk of the inferior population, who lived on mendicancy, or got a livelihood by the exercise of the inferior industries, usually inhabited squalid hovels in the Neustadt; the town wall was often the only support for these wretched buildings. The internal fittings of the houses, even amongst the wealthy population, were very defective according to modern ideas; especially since Gothic was as little suitable for the petty details of objects of luxury, as it was splendidly adapted for the building of churches and town halls. It was the influence of the Renaissance which added so much to the comfort of the house.

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries saw the building of those numerous Gothic town churches and town halls which have often served their original purposes up to quite recent times, and indeed are doing so still. The power and prosperity of the towns find their best expression in them and in the fortifications with their strong towers and gateways. Every picture of a town of the sixteenth or later century, which illustrates the conclusion of the outward development, shows conspicuously these erections for the protection and honour of the town. The inserted plate "Cologne-on-Rhine in 1530" gives us an idea of the appearance of Cologne, next to Nuremberg the most populous town of that time. The town did many things which in our time are done by the State. Social problems were taken up by town administration or the corresponding municipal organisation. The regulation of trade (Gewerbepolizei) was the concern of the guilds in agreement with the council, the care of the poor belonged to the church, while the council looked after the protection of the town walls and the regular system of fire brigades; but that department was organised according to guilds and trades. The council, mindful of its social duties, superintended the filling of the municipal granaries, in order to have supplies to draw upon in years of scarcity. Such storehouses were erected in almost every town during the fifteenth century. On the other side, there were tariffs for the sale of all wares, high enough to enable every artisan to make a good livelihood, and to give the purchaser a guarantee for the quality of the wares. Natural competition was diligently discouraged since, except at market times, goods from foreign economic spheres could only be imported and sold under onerous conditions.

The town was also the greatest capitalist; as a seller of annuities on lives and inheritances it was a banker, and enjoyed unlimited credit. Thus it obtained in return means for the construction of fortifications or for the acquisition of sovereign rights from the hand of an impecunious prince. Since the municipal offices were mostly honorary, the government cost little; for this reason, too, the direct
taxes were very moderate, since the taxes on commodities were profitable, especially the excise, which the princes allowed the town councillors to levy, first for a limited period and then permanently. Except a low hearth tax, which was payable by every household, the proper subject of taxation was thought to be the excess which the individual had beyond what was required for a decent livelihood. Therefore, it was only about 1500 that an Income Tax was decided upon; while always up to that time, and often later, a property tax to suit different cases was usual.

The development of the towns followed these paths even in the first half of the sixteenth century. But soon after 1550 the previously flourishing towns felt the consequences of the great economic revolution, which the discovery of the sea route to India caused. After the towns by their attitude in the Schmalkaldic war had incurred the disfavour of the emperor as well as of the princes, their political importance was ended. Both facts worked together and produced first a cessation and then a clear retrogression in the power of the towns. It was finally an event of no importance when in the peace of Westphalia all the imperial towns were given the full rights of imperial States, a privilege which had not been disputed since 1489.

(b) The Principalities in 1500. — The princes, at the end of the Middle Ages, were the embodiment of the second economically and socially effective power; it was the person of the prince with his court ceremony, his courtiers, and princely servants who was the supporter of this power, and not the Territory. His relations to the district were based entirely on private rights; any co-operation of the States, who were in no way representatives of the country, but only protectors of their own interests, was only reluctantly granted, and, as soon as conditions allowed, was restricted and in many cases finally put aside. Politically, the princes gained in influence the more the towns sank into the background; economically, they strengthened themselves by the conquest of towns here and there and by the greater use made of those towns already subject to them. The secularisation of church property, as a consequence of the Reformation in central and eastern Germany, considerably increased the extent of the property held by the territorial lords. In this connection indistinct conceptions of the property of the State and the possessions of the prince made a separation of the two impossible. Not before the second half of the sixteenth century did the constitutional idea of the relations between the prince on the one side, and the territory and the subjects on the other, gain any ground. The last stage in the development was thus reached, so that the German monarchy became constitutionally obsolete; and in the peace of Westphalia it was possible to proclaim the sovereignty of the princes, although "without prejudice to the empire."

Even in the age of the Reformation the princes constituted no separate power. In the place of the old rivalry between princes and towns there came the new opposition between Catholic and Protestant princes — the opposition from which political questions were now treated, and which, in certain cases, drove individual princes into alliances with foreign powers of the same creed. The power of the princes grew in spite of all confusion and distress; the princes became conscious of their duties, and in happier times after the great war lived for the people, so as to raise their economic position. It is through the princes alone that the modern State has become what it is. All that the individual prince did in the
cause of progress, although primarily for his own private ends, has been fruitful for the whole nation. The universities were primarily private institutions established by the princes for the extension of scientific activity. The faculty of jurisprudence served the princes for the training of their officials, and only gradually the modern provincial university was formed in which merely the highest honorary post under various titles is reserved for the ruling prince.

The numerous castles, dating from the Middle Ages, which at the present day as State property afford quarters for judicial and administrative authorities, were founded or acquired by princes, and many gems of secular architecture are due to them. The most magnificent pile among the castles of the Renaissance is shown in the picture (on page 291) of Heidelberg Castle as it was before its destruction. But the palace of the Elector Maximilian at Munich with its Italian style and the castle of the Dukes of Württemberg at Stuttgart vie in artistic beauty with the gigantic building on the Neckar. Such structures imply an advance in technique and an increasing number of able master workmen, as well as the accumulation of large capital in the hands of the reigning prince. It gradually became possible for the princes to live permanently in one place, to create for themselves a royal residence, and the next step was to adorn this place artistically. But even this preliminary condition required considerable wealth and a strict organisation, which had to furnish the means for keeping up a court, and for the first time was able to supply the residence with all that was required.

(c) The Individualism of the Renaissance. — Money becomes for the first time in the development of Germany the all-important power in the towns during the fifteenth century and in the hands of the princes during the sixteenth. Capital produces economic independence, and under the influence of its power the social life is freed from the narrow fetters of tradition. The consciousness of economic freedom is the necessary postulate for every deeper intellectual movement, but in the commencement it leads to the greatest conceivable recklessness, which would seem little fitted to spiritualise existence. And yet that consciousness of outward freedom, which is stamped on it, is the first step toward the individualism which characterises the age of the Reformation. It helps to prepare the soil for the reception of the peculiarly individualist teaching of the Renaissance. It is no accident that Luther's teaching found its most intelligent hearers among the burghers of the towns and the princes in their own persons together with their court, while the peasant, without any knowledge of what economic freedom might be, misunderstood the monk and formed for himself a picture of liberty which closely resembled lawlessness. Even before the Renaissance was felt on German soil (cf. above), the awakening naturalism, which represents the artistic individualism, had shown itself in Flanders, where the towns earliest attained an economic prosperity, first in the plastic arts and then in painting. After the third decade of the fifteenth century splendid easel pictures were produced by the painters Hubert (d. 1426) and Jan van Eyck (d. 1440). In scientific thought scholasticism still served as the only means of mastering knowledge. The Renaissance indeed increased the materials for knowledge, and gave science itself an independent existence in Germany by the side of art. But in the realm of thought scholasticism asserted itself until far into the seventeenth century, when it was replaced, somewhat belated, by the empirico-scientific method of judging the outer world, by a mode of thought which
corresponded to the artistic naturalism and was as unsatisfactory as the system which it so proudly displaced.

(d) The Art of Printing.—We must always gratefully remember what the Renaissance gave to the German people, but we must be careful not to overestimate its importance. Only a people that was ripe for it could familiarise itself so easily with the new world of ideas. Renaissance and Humanism owe their success on German soil to this breaking of the ground by the German culture, which was aspiring to Individualism and to the mastery of the outer world. And Germany herself outstripped in one department even Italy and France. In Germany that art was first discovered which more than any other provides the means for communicating to every member of a nation a certain measure of intellectual culture, the art of printing. This art first rendered possible the distribution of literary productions in a hitherto inconceivable abundance and variety, as well as the development of a comprehensive system of instruction. Its home was on the Rhine, the German highroad of civilisation, where the Main divides the district of the Upper Rhine from the lands of the Middle Rhine, at Mayence. For although Johannes Gansfleisch zum Gutenberg, driven from his home, made his first successful attempts between 1440 and 1450 at Strassburg, yet the first employers of the great invention, Fust and Schöffer, were settled at Mayence.

The preliminary stage to printing was the graphic process of multiplying copies of woodcuts and engravings, which, although long known, had only been employed on a large scale since the beginning of the fifteenth century; the first dated woodcut is from the year 1423. Gutenberg's important discovery consisted in the movability of the letters, which could be used in any combination. But wood, which, on the analogy of the woodcut, was at first used for the types, did not meet the requirements of printing any more than soft lead. Gutenberg therefore, having returned to his native town, associated himself with Johann Fust, whose partner, Peter Schöffer, discovered a metallic mixture which wore well as material for types. This Fust, often confounded in story with Dr. Faust, the professor of the black arts, was for more than three hundred years considered to be the original inventor of printing, until gradually the name of Gutenberg has regained its honourable place.

The new art was used for the first time to influence the masses in the dispute for the bishopric of Mayence, between Diether of Isenburg and Adolphus of Nassau. Innumerable fly-sheets served the same purpose before and during the Reformation on all more important issues. The first printed book, a complete Latin Bible, appeared about 1455. The shape of the letters directly depended on the types used at that time in neatly written copies of books, as the plate on p. 150 shows them half a century earlier. The old prints, called *incunabula*, show almost throughout red ornamentations by the side of the black letters. The initials are usually most artistically designed and not infrequently adorned with pictorial representations like the old manuscripts. The two alphabets, the Latin (*antiqua*) and the German (*black-letter*), have been developed side by side out of those letters by continual change of shape.

The new industry had been at first carried on secretly, but after the capture of Mayence by Adolphus of Nassau in 1462 the workshop was broken up, and the workmen were dispersed over the world and disseminated their art. As early as
German Book Manufacture in the Sixteenth Century: The Workshops of a Paper-Maker, a Printer, and a Bookbinder

(From "Stände und Handwerker," by Jobst Amman.)
1472 the rector of the Paris University, William Fichet, praised in eloquent words the discoverer of printing as the promoter of knowledge, and the Humanist, Conrad Celtes, placed this invention above all the achievements of the ancients. It spread with inconceivable rapidity over every country, a proof that the discovery supplied an urgently felt want. It is hardly to be assumed that we possess information as to the establishment of printing-presses everywhere. It is certain that the art was introduced into the Italian convent of Subiaco in 1464, into Rome in 1467, into Venice and Milan in 1469. Paris followed, 1470, Louvain, Utrecht, and Lyon, 1473, and 1474 Basle, which afterward took a prominent position as a home of printing; Valencia, Barcelona, and London, 1474, Stockholm, 1483, Moscow not before 1563. In Italy Andrea de' Bussi did good service before 1475 in advancing the art; he introduced the prints of the Germans Pannartz and Schweinheim, while he composed letters of dedication to the Pope. But it was the Germans everywhere who in all countries, even in England, Spain, and Portugal, appeared as the first printers. Johann von Speier was the first printer in Venice, where soon a fifth of all the printing-presses were to be found. It was quite natural that in Italy, a country so enriched by capital, printing should be eagerly taken up; and there indeed no time was lost in printing the classics, while in Germany the national literature had the preference at first.

The new products, the "books," which were bound and made ready for use in the printing-press itself, were issued and dispersed by a multitude of travelling booksellers or "colporteurs" through every land. Such a "colporteur" is proved to have visited remote Hermannstadt in Transylvania as early as 1506. All printed matter was as free as the air; there was no idea of the rights of intellectual ownership. A book that held out any promise of profitable returns was reprinted by every printer who chose. Many a publisher and author who had devoted the labour of years to a work were thus defrauded of their property, until at the opening of the sixteenth century it became more usual for emperors and princes to bestow privileges in books. A slight improvement was thus introduced, in so far as unauthorised reprints of such privileged books were not permitted to be sold at the most important book-marts, especially at Frankfort, and afterward at Leipzig. But for a long time after, and in fact until late into the nineteenth century, publishers and authors have had to complain bitterly of literary piracy. Luther was in fact benefited by this copying, for his writings were thus frequently reprinted and circulated in countless volumes, though often in very defective editions. But what suited the age of Luther scarcely suited the age of Goethe.

The technique was naturally more and more perfected in details. The inserted plate, "German Printing Industry in the Sixteenth Century," shows the process of printing in the second half of the sixteenth century; how the paper was prepared by the "papeter;" how the printer worked at the printing-press, and the book-binder made the volume ready for use. The explanatory lines illustrate the style of printing and form of expression at the time. They may also serve as a specimen of the explanatory letterpress under a pictorial representation, such as was circulated everywhere in numerous copies, and formed in the seventeenth century the transition stage to the modern regularly published newspapers. It is significant for the development of publishing that at this period the manufacture of the paper and the binding of the books was a sub-department of the printing-press. The two employments only gradually grew into independent branches of industry.
However important the technical invention was for the multifold reproduction of writing by printing, we must not ignore the fact that the rapid spread and growth of the industry only became possible through the accumulation of capital in the towns. With the art of printing the fundamental economico-technical idea of a wholesale manufacture, for which considerable capital is essential, was for the first time revealed to the world. It was the working capital that first rendered possible printing, which is in its nature no handicraft but an undertaking. The printing industry affords a good example of the great economic importance peculiar to capital. An erroneous assertion is freely put forward and repeated, that the employment of floating capital only tends to the proletarianism of broad sections of the people; it may indeed be an indirect result of this form of operations, but it is not essentially connected with it.

(e) Innovations in Warfare. — The same progress is noticeable during the fifteenth century in quite a different field of human activity, namely, in the conduct of war. The influence of capital is felt here also, through the more general employment of firearms. It is hard to say how far this is the cause for the introduction of paid armies, and how far social causes, such as the existence to hand of an urban and rural proletariat and the decreasing effectiveness of the nobility, led to this result. But the new arm at any rate favoured the progress. It is certainly the most striking phenomenon in the revolution of the military profession.

There is no talk of an "invention" of gunpowder as of printing. In 1324 the town of Metz employed cannons, and the English used them in the battle of Crecy, 1346. But the Arabs of Spain had known them still earlier. Berthold Schwarz, who studied alchemy in the fourteenth century, and is expressly designated as the inventor of powder by Sebastian Frank, the historian and cosmographer of the sixteenth century, may perhaps have newly discovered its manufacture or have perfected it; we have no details on the subject. The new arm has no importance in the warfare of the fourteenth century. Not until the second half of the fifteenth century, especially under Maximilian, who interested himself much in artillery, can firearms be said to have been introduced into the army, while their use for sporting and target shooting was not general until much later, clearly on account of the great cost for individuals.

Maximilian was on the whole unfortunate as a general, but his ill success was due more to his wavering policy and his unstable nature than to mistakes in strategy. Indeed, he distinctly improved the art of war, chiefly by organising the artillery in connection with the older arms of the service. After the army of knights had fallen at Sempach before the spears of the peasants, and the social foundations of the feudal army disappeared more and more with the impoverishment of the nobles, some compensation had to be obtained, and this consisted in an infantry serving for pay. The cavalry still carried great weight, but the lighter armour introduced by Maximilian enabled them to take part in fighting on foot without sacrificing their greater mobility. All fighting men under Maximilian served for pay, which amounted to ten florins monthly for the cavalryman and four for the foot soldier, out of which he had to feed himself. The king's aim was directed toward the formation of a German infantry (Landsknechte), while the Swiss were already organised in a similar fashion. The contrast to the latter was to be expressed in the name. The work of military organisation was in its
main features completed even before 1490, when we hear of the name and tactics of the Landknechte. They were distinguished by their uniform armament. The shield was given up, and every man carried as his chief weapon a long spear; together with this, halberds and muskets were used in a certain proportion. To the company of four hundred men were usually reckoned twenty-five musketeers. Maximilian’s chief attention was directed toward the cannons. He had thoroughly mastered the technical details of their construction and use. Siege-guns and field-pieces were supplied on the system that to an army of ten thousand men two hundred wagons were reckoned, of which some fifty were intended for cannons and the rest for missiles of stone or iron.

The tremendous revolution which these innovations in warfare must have produced, their democratic tendency, and the greater importance attaching to them in consequence, are easily comprehended. Money became more and more a necessity. This was almost always wanting under Maximilian; the troops were often insufficiently paid, and successes were never forthcoming. Nevertheless, under Maximilian larger sums of money had been available for military purposes than at any other period. Capital, the new power which began to rule all manifestations of life, was able to make its influence felt in this also. One further point deserves notice in the growing use of firearms,—that Germans particularly interested themselves in them, and that the universal employment of them started with Germany. Everywhere German gunners were to be found, and even in Morea a traveller met some of them.

(f) The Reaction of the Discoveries on the Conditions of Power in Western Europe.—The discovery of the New World had many direct effects on European countries. At the beginning of the fifteenth century the Hanseatic League was in undisputed possession of the commercial supremacy in the north of Germany; and in the south the towns of Basle, Ulm, Augsburg, Nuremburg, and Vienna had, each for its own district, a similar position, inasmuch as important Alpine routes terminated there. The Hanseatic trade ruled Russia, Scandinavia, and England, and the towns of southern Germany entered into such close relations with Italy, the seat of the trade in the Levant, that the trading-house of the Germans at Venice enjoyed an unexpected prosperity. Germany now for the first time took part in universal commerce. The prosperity of its towns, which were forced to find in material wealth a compensation for the vanished hope of political supremacy, is a consequence of these events; for the wealthy townsfolk, with their more luxurious way of living, were the chief consumers of the costly stuffs and spices which the traders imported. Although Italy, the centre from which the wares of the East circulated through Europe, drew the chief profits from it, and obtained the foundation for a most magnificent development of power, Germany herself did not come off badly. It was always the land through which the North was reached, and its trading companies did business everywhere in the world. The unmistakable prosperity of Italy prompted men to attempt to get communication with India by another way, in order if possible to bring its wares to Europe by the sea route. In Portugal especially the possibility of reaching India by ship was discussed soon after the middle of the fifteenth century. A few decades after, Europeans were living on the western and southern coasts of Africa and in the newly discovered America. Even before the end of the century, in 1498, Vasco da Gama solved the riddle of the day when he ultimately reached India by sea.
These events were of unexpected importance for the destinies of Europe. The result was a complete shifting in the relative power of the European States. Italy and Germany soon lost their position, while Spain, with Portugal and Holland, came forward boldly as colonisers and masters of the world trade. Lisbon now became one of the economic centres of the world; the sea became the universal highroad of commerce, and the ship began to replace the trade caravan. Henceforth the countries on the Mediterranean were no longer the most favoured, but those whose shores were washed by the open sea. Numbers, indeed, of enterprising Germans took part in these long voyages, and tried to win a share in the new acquisitions. By the fifteenth century a German colony existed in Lisbon; the German geographer, Martin Behaim of Nuremburg, was in the Portuguese service; and the Augsburg merchant family of the Fuggers, which had been quite important since about 1460, formed in 1505, in combination with the merchants Welser and Höchstetter, one of the trading companies such as were usually formed in those days to attain a certain definite object, in order to obtain several cargoes of Indian spices by the newly discovered sea route. The Germans had been allowed in 1503 to found trading factories in Lisbon, and from that centre the Welzers, and then, outstripping them, the Fuggers, carried on the spice trade with extraordinary profits.

But these successes of individual German merchant lords, who won for themselves unexpectedly great fortunes, need not deceive us as to the momentous character of the events for Germany as a whole. Contemporaries themselves had a confused conception of the state of things, and expressed their dissatisfaction in accusations, unjustifiable in themselves, that these merchant princes robbed the people by usuriously raising the price of the most necessary commodities. The charge, brought especially by Lutheran preachers, rested on the prevalent conception, which found immorality in all profits derived from trade. The "Reformation of Emperor Sigismund," the programme of social reform with the fundamental thought of Christian communism, had been repeatedly printed since 1480, especially in the agitated times after 1520. Men perceived then for the first time that the economic outlook of Germany was changed, that the masses were far more discontented than in the old days. The blame for all this — and the simple-minded observer had the answer pat — must lie with the great traders, who made such incredible profits, possessed virtual monopolies, and by the splendour of their households outshone the mighty Emperor Charles V. The Fuggers continued to play a part in Spain during the whole sixteenth century, but at the beginning of the seventeenth the decay of the "common Spanish trade" began at a time when in the heart of Germany the calamitous consequences of the overthrow of culture made themselves acutely felt.

The sovereignty of Charles V, who ruled over Spain and Germany, had concealed the beginning of this disaster; but the change, which had set in, showed itself all the clearer in the further course of events. The commerce with Italy lost more and more in importance, and no compensation for this could be found. The Netherlands, the northerly part of which, owing to its favourable position on the Atlantic, became, with Amsterdam at its head, the commercial centre of north Europe, no longer formed an integral part of the empire: indeed, they offered economically the sharpest opposition to central Germany. The Dutch seaports soon outstripped the trading places on the Baltic, so that the Hanse towns themselves in the north
were deposed from their supremacy in trade. Hamburg alone at that time gained in importance, for, thanks to its more favourable position for development, it undertook the part of middleman for the import of Dutch wares into Germany, and with a view to large profits in the future allowed Englishmen to settle within its walls.

The effect of these events, the shifting of all centres of gravity, was soon felt by the people in the heart of the country; for while trade and industries produced incomparably smaller profits, the circulation of money was checked, and a marked rise in the prices of commodities and an increasing depreciation in the value of money were noticeable. The result is again a general retrogression of the nation from the stage of international intercourse to that of mere domestic economy, — a return to economic conditions which had been long since left behind in the west and the south. The situation was different in the districts east of the Elbe. They were still backward in industrial progress. Magdeburg was almost the largest town eastward, the towns were everywhere thinly distributed, and a peasant life prevailed, less degraded, however, than that of the west. These eastern districts were less affected by the general turn of events. Indeed the territorial lords developed a firm government, especially in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Silesia. They knew how to check the States; and they advanced further into the political foreground, especially since the new opposition between Protestant and Catholic princes forced the eastern territories, the principal support of Protestantism, to assume more than before a political position. The revolution in prices was felt most acutely in the east by the country nobility, which had already played a very modest political part. Some of its members indeed appeared regularly at court as officials in the princes’ service; but the mass of them had retired to their country seats, which more and more lost their character as the centre of a territorial dominion and assumed the features of a manor-house. The manorial estate was managed with a view to agriculture on a large scale, a system now first found on German soil; and the hereditary villenage, also called serfdom, represents the peculiar status of labour in this new undertaking.

The development of the country in the south and west of Germany had produced quite different economic and social forms. The continuous parcelling out of landed estates and the frequently increased burdens had placed the peasant, after the cultivation of the land was ended, in a position which made him appear the most harassed person of the times. The same conditions prevailed which in France, aggravated by a strong despotic rule, produced the state of society directly preceding the Revolution of 1789. Such a state of things must arise where the natural overflow of population does not find a suitable opportunity to emigrate, or new opportunities for work through the introduction of fresh branches of industry. And besides this, the peasant was excluded from every higher intellectual employment. He was politically powerless, and the decline of the old system of the lord’s court had much lowered the old position of the “socman” in the supreme court. But no power, whether the territorial lord or the imperial legislature, contemplated doing anything to raise the condition of the peasant, and even if the thought had been entertained, there were no means available for carrying it into execution.

\[(g)\] The Reception of the Roman Law.— The development of the individual spirit, which found the German law as unsatisfactory as the canon law known in
Germany, led quite unintentionally or unwittingly to those legal principles of commercial economy lying ready to hand in the Corpus Juris of Justinian, which the Germans studied in Bologna and Heidelberg. This "written law" penetrated the higher life of the nation in the course of the century; in the recess of 1495 it is recognised as the official law. The Roman law was not indeed "received" in Germany in all its branches; the egoistic spirit became in many ways weakened in practice, but then the matter of the law itself, and not merely the spirit, was trying to gain acceptance. Roman law can be proved to have been first used in temporal courts about 1450. At that time the noble imperial judge was supplanted by a supreme court which was composed of jurists educated in the Roman law, and a similar procedure existed in the provinces. Roman law was taught in the universities; a professorial chair for the Pandects was founded in 1498 at Heidelberg (lectures had previously been given only on the Codex Justinianus and the Institutes), and in 1522 a second professorship for the Pandects was added, while the canon law was neglected. The professors were at the same time members of the princely council; this qualification seems to have been expressly considered when the new chairs were founded. The towns actually began to "reform" their law in the Roman spirit after 1450. But the upper tribunals were always the first influenced, and gradually the movement was extended to the lower courts, so that their judgments might stand in case of an appeal to a higher court. At first amongst the people generally no opposition was shown to the innovation; it only became more vigorous in 1480, and then continued for two generations. This dislike was chiefly directed against the jurists: they alone and not the law were held responsible by the people for the protraction of the unfamiliar procedure and for the economic disadvantages springing from the decision. But after 1540 the opposition flagged somewhat. The Württemberg common law of 1552 was established without the States having any part in it, although they had been summoned to share in the task. It was a work of the Roman jurists. In spite of much harshness which it involved, the "reception" of the Roman law was a blessing for the German people. Through it alone the whole people obtained one common foundation of law, and the development of law itself was rendered simpler and quicker by the more advanced legal system. The German law was for classes, while the Roman law took into account only the masses, all equally subject to it. "Equal laws for all" is a principle of Roman law. Before the "reception" the territorial lord was only a judge in equity in virtue of his personality; his officials represented him and interposed in the administration of justice. Under the influence of the Roman law a complete legal procedure follows; and then first the modern judicial judgment in the name of the territorial lord comes into force. In many departments of law the reception made no change. German law remained in force where it was found to be better and more suitable. The additions to the body of German law continued, family rights were hardly touched by foreign influence, while the right of disposal of property, its divisibility and transferability, were facilitated in accordance with the spirit of the time. Public law was influenced as a whole, not in its particular details; the judicial and administrative functions passed, according to the Roman system, to the territorial lord, and the laity were ousted by legally educated officials. The welfare of the people became for the first time the duty of the State.
The German Peasant in 1500. — However much culture had been promoted by the “reception” of the Roman law for Germany, the severities of the transition period are not to be overlooked, and they pressed on no one so heavily as on the German peasant. He saw in the Roman jurist merely a deceiver, and he stood helpless before him and his incomprehensible teaching. Apart from law, the conception of all conditions of life shifted in the interests of the man most favoured economically or socially. The manorial lord began to feel himself a proprietor in the sense of the Roman law, he thought himself the owner of the land absolutely; the peasant became the “colonus” of Latin legal phraseology; and the fundamental thought of the German law, that every personal relation rested on reciprocity of rights and obligations, disappeared forever. The “reception” is not the cause of the peasant insurrections, but it distinctly fostered them. The urban proletariat was in no enviable position, and in many towns since about 1450, often in conjunction with the peasants of the district, had revolted against the council, and tried by violence to realise its communistic ideal. But the mad fury, capable of any deeds, which we see in the peasant revolt, never showed itself even remotely in these attempts.

After the rising of Peuker of Niklashausen (1476), who felt himself called by God as a reformer of church and society, the insurrections in the Alpine districts and in Friesland, in Franconia and Thuringia, on the Upper Rhine and in Swabia, did not cease. At the same time a movement against the secular privileges of the clergy, especially against their exercise of trades which injured the taxpayer, and against the immunity from taxation enjoyed by clerical property, was noticeable even before Luther’s appearance, and explains the reception of his writings in 1520. There was an equal feeling against the authorities both in town and country. At the beginning of the period from 1520–1530 the land was again in ferment. The revolt this time had been carefully planned, and its object was to carry out Luther’s teaching by force. But the outbreak was delayed for some time. However, in 1524 the Landgraviate Stühlingen on the Upper Rhine revolted, and the town of Waldshut was drawn into the rising; at the same time an open revolt broke out in the territory of the town of Zürich in close connection with the proposals for ecclesiastical reform. Soon the movement spread to all upper Germany; its object was to realise the socialist programme which had long been in the air, and seemed to the peasants synonymous with the “justice” of Luther and the “freedom of a Christian man.”

By the middle of March, 1525, the demands had been formulated in the Twelve Articles of the Peasantry. In other places, especially in Alsace and Austria, the most sweeping political demands were attached to those complaints against the manorial lords which must be reckoned as fair charges. In the Austrian dominions, especially in Tyrol, the rising in the autumn of 1525 was suppressed without much difficulty by concessions. But in Franconia open revolt and hideous outrages followed. In Swabia the “Swabian League” successfully prosecuted the war against the insurgents, and the town strongholds of the peasants, Rotenburg and Würzburg, were captured. The movement spread farther to the north, and there were outbreaks in Thuringia, especially at Mühlhausen. Here the Anabaptist movement was mixed up with the social demands. Thomas Münzer himself led the forces into battle; but he and his companions had to yield to the armies of the princes at Frankenthal, and some six thousand peasants were killed there.
The rising was everywhere practically suppressed before the close of the year 1525. Some slight improvements in the position of the peasants were only indirect results. On the whole, indeed, the position of the peasant population remained the same as before; but the immediate consequences of the war, during which frequently the fields were not sown, weighed heavily on land and people. No fundamental improvement of the conditions which led to the revolt was introduced in the sixteenth century; the peasant remained the most oppressed member of the community. At length when the Thirty Years' War had raged throughout the land and depopulated it, and the industrious peasant was again valued as a profitable worker, under the despoticism of the princes a better time dawned in many districts even for the peasants. Yet even in the eighteenth century the drudgery of the peasant continued until the revolutions swept away the old burdens and made the peasant again that which he once was,—the fully qualified citizen of the State.

Whatever part of the national life we consider, palpable beginnings of the modern development show themselves in the sixteenth century. In the department of pure intellectual life as well as in the field of social and national institutions we find the first stages of that which, when fully formed, represents the progress of the present day. The sharp division of sections of history, by a definite year, if possible, is prejudicial to a profound insight into history. But the old idea which made the “New Era” begin with 1492 or 1517 was so far correct that in the sixteenth century a number of ideas, which according to their nature have prevailed in the nineteenth century also, were certainly widely disseminated whether their intellectual creators lived in the fifteenth century or still earlier. In the department of constitutional law the principles which corresponded to the era had not yet been firmly established; in this respect there was little alteration until the peace of Westphalia. This definitely marked the conclusion of a chapter in history, it abolished antiquated institutions, and at the same time laid the foundation for the existence of the modern State.

B. The Reformers and their Work

(a) Luther and the Reformation in Germany until the Peace of Nuremberg.—Martin Luther, descended from a Thuringian peasant family, which originally was settled at Möhra, was born at Eisleben on November 10, 1483. His father, notwithstanding his small means, sent the boy to school, at first to the village school of the place, and in 1497 to Magdeburg, to the school of “The Brothers of the Common Life.” After a year the boy, aged fifteen years, went to attend the Latin school at Erfurt, and there first came into contact with teachers who had studied “the Humanities.” His circumstances were very straitened, since he was forced to beg his bread by singing, until a friendly reception was given him in the house of the merchant Cotta. During the summer term of 1501 Luther entered the famous University of Erfurt, where philosophers and Humanists worked harmoniously side by side, and was advanced to the degree of Master of Arts in 1505. His father would have been glad if he had chosen the career of a jurist with its rich prospects, and the son had agreed to the suggestion, for great honours could be won in that way.

But before the young student had begun his intended professional studies, something occurred which led him into other paths. Not indeed so much the often-
quoted buffets of fortune, the death of a friend, and the deadly risk he ran through a flash of lightning, as the deep inwardly religious spirit, the conviction that the profession of a lawyer did not offer scope to his talents, drove him to enter a convent. This step was taken in July, 1505, and Luther chose the settlement of the Augustinian Hermits at Erfurt, belonging to the Saxon congregation of the order, which was conspicuous for its strictness. The Bible was studied diligently there, and strict asceticism and self-examination were obligatory on the members. The year of the novitiate, which demanded the performance of the lowest duties, was passed, and the dress of the order assumed in 1506; and with the consecration to priesthood on May 2, 1507, the title of Father was bestowed on him, as well as the permission to perform the mass. Luther had fulfilled his duties in the convent with unwearying zeal, and had diligently studied. He had there seen the Bible for the first time in his life, and had begun to read it without indeed understanding it at first. When he finally abandoned the obsolete ideas of theology learned at school, he began to have an inkling of that which he afterward laid down in weighty propositions.

While still at Erfurt, the young monk had attracted the attention of his superior in the order, the Vicar-General von Staupitz, who intelligently sympathised with his spiritual nature. It was he who transferred Luther after consecration as priest to the convent of the order at Wittenberg, in order to give him at the same time a post as teacher in the philosophical faculties at the university there. His lectures were entirely confined to the well-trodden paths of the academical teaching in philosophy, while metaphysical thoughts were exercising his mind, and he studied the "German Theology" of Tauler, the Strassburg mystic of the fourteenth century. The journey to Rome in the year 1511 on the affairs of the order may well have been of supreme importance for the widening of his range of observation, and the recollections of the life at that time in secularised Rome may have influenced his attacks on the papacy. But immediately after his return home any fundamental opposition to the Church and her institutions was far from his thoughts. An event of greater significance for the future of the young man of twenty-nine was the attainment of the title of a Doctor in Divinity (1512) at the instance of his old friend Staupitz. The subject of his professorial teaching was now theology, not philosophy. His inner religious convictions were thus opened to the circle of his pupils, while he himself was more and more engrossed with the problem of faith. The exposition of the Bible itself was now his task. Both in form and matter he tried to explain it differently from his predecessors and contemporaries in the professoriate, since, while still always taking the text of the Vulgate as his basis, he not only gave the allegorical explanations of the Scripture, but put before his hearers the doctrine of the apostle Paul himself. His interest in Augustine increased visibly, and he was sincerely pleased that the latter was now supplanting Aristotle in the university.

In addition to his lectureship, he was soon given the post of preacher in the convent church, and in 1515 he had, as deputy, to undertake the duties of a town clergyman. During this ministry for the care of souls he first came into contact with the trade in indulgences. Some of his congregation had bought indulgence papers from the Dominican monk Johann Tezel, who was preaching at Jüterbog, in the territory of Magdeburg (the Elector of Saxony had forbidden the preaching of indulgences in his dominions), and had shown them to him. Luther had
already, in 1516, openly attacked this traffic by his sermons. Since money was required at Rome to build the church of St. Peter, indulgence was now granted for money to every one, even the most hardened criminal, and that without the pious deeds formerly required. The religious conviction of Luther that justification by faith was an essential postulate could not possibly allow such encroachments on the rights of the minister to pass unnoticed. He wished at any rate to open a discussion on the indulgence question in order to establish his view of the matter, which was clearly not understood, many thinking it was a mere squabble between monks. He therefore chose the form in which the professors under such circumstances usually invited discussion, that is to say, he published theses composed in Latin, which were nailed up on the door of the castle church at Wittenberg. They were fifty-nine in number (probably as an answer to the fifty-nine instructions given by Archbishop Albert of Mayence to his vendors of indulgences), and the 31st of October, 1517, was chosen, as being the eve of the dedication festival of the Church of All Saints. These propositions went in fulness far beyond what was usually contained in the statements of any one inviting discussion. They not only put questions, but also gave concise answers for any one who could read them, and condemned the abuse, and even the sacrament of penance itself was attacked.

This was the first act of Luther the reformer. But he himself was by no means clear as to its scope, for no thought lay further from him than separation from the Catholic Church. The stone, however, was set rolling and continued to roll, without any special efforts on the part of the man who first put it in movement.

Luther himself sent his theses to the ecclesiastical authorities, notably to Archbishop Albert of Mayence, under whose instructions the indulgence vendors worked. He was conscious of his disinterested motives, and declared himself astonished that no one came forward to the verbal contest, although in a few weeks all Germany was familiar with the contents of the theses, and trumpeted the name of the composer, who even before was not entirely unknown. The immediate object of the attack, the Dominican Tezel, made a literary rejoinder to the theses, and opposed to them one hundred and six propositions based completely on Thomas Aquinas. Tezel won the title of a Doctor in Divinity from the university at Frankfort-on-Oder; and since it was a Dominican who confronted the Augustinian monk, there is no reason to be surprised that at Rome no further importance was attached to the matter, but it was regarded as a quarrel arising from jealousy between the two orders. A writing of Johann Eck, a professor at Ingolstadt, was really more serious for Luther. In this it was clearly stated that many contemporaries saw a heretical action in the publication of the theses, and drew an unmistakable comparison with the Bohemian Huss. Luther did not let himself be frightened by these attacks, but worked out his ideas further in a "Sermon on Indulgence and Pardon," using for this the vernacular; thus the dispute among the learned became a matter for the people. This was a very marked step for the shaping of the future.

There was no wish at Rome to enter into a discussion of the disputed questions in the way that Luther naturally took for granted, but by the spring of 1518 a trial for heresy was suspended over him. When he was summoned before the court of two bishops in Italy, he applied to his territorial lord, the Elector Frederick
of Saxony, who had long been friendly toward him, and asked that he should be given a hearing in Germany. The elector was staying just then in Augsburg, where Maximilian was holding his last imperial diet, and where on account of the Turks' threat the papal embassy was also present. He consequently exercised his influence with the emperor, who was in urgent need of his support for the desired election of his grandson, Charles, that a decree should be passed enacting that the monk of Wittenberg should have a hearing before the papal embassy at Augsburg. The cardinal, Thomas de Vio of Gaeta, usually called Cajetanus, offered no objection, and was ready to try the monk for his audacity; and at the close of the diet in October, Luther, who in April, at a meeting of the order at Heidelberg, had in the circle of his brother monks already defended his views with vigour and courage, now, armed with a safe-conduct from the emperor, appeared humbly before the cardinal. The discussions, although they extended to the real matter at issue, led to nothing. This was inevitable, for Luther did not think of any renunciation of his errors, or of any promise to avoid them for the future. He left the cardinal and so appealed, as the Church required, "from the badly instructed pope to one who was to be better instructed." In the end he secretly quitted Augsburg. The news soon reached him at Wittenberg that the Pope demanded his banishment by the elector, and he was ready, if occasion arose, to leave the country. Nevertheless, he took the last step which was still open to him,—he appealed to a general council at the end of November, 1518.

The papal chamberlain Carl von Miltitz, who, belonging to a Saxon noble family, possessed a greater comprehension of the conditions of the country than an Italian, now appeared as papal legate at the court of the elector in order to induce him to take vigorous measures against Luther. He became convinced of the ferment existing among the people, which made him see that the sympathies of the masses were for the monk, and therefore tried to influence him by conciliatory measures. At a personal interview in Altenburg, Luther finally promised to keep silence on condition that his opponents would do the same; but since they did not agree to this, he did not feel himself bound to silence. The long contemplated discussion between Eck and Luther's colleague, Andreas Rudolf Bodenstein von Carlstadt, was fixed for June, 1519, at Leipsic, and, in spite of a protest from the Bishop of Merseburg, it actually took place. Luther was once more the real object of the attack, as appeared from Eck's theses. These were principally occupied with the question of the papal primacy, upon which Luther had hardly touched. Luther himself did not appear at the discussion until the dispute between Carlstadt and Eck had already lasted several days. Eck drew from him not only the repeated assertion that an acknowledgment of the papal primacy was not necessary for salvation, but also the avowal that even the councils themselves might err, and that only God's word could be accounted infallible. Eck thus won the day; for he had proved Luther's heresy. The latter himself must have felt at that moment for the first time a conviction that he no longer stood within the Church, and must have said to himself that the papal ban would inevitably strike him.

At this stage there was a division of opinion. Men took sides for and against Luther; every one in public life had to adopt some definite standpoint. The greater part of the Humanists stood by the reformer, and in the forefront the teacher of Greek at the University of Wittenberg, Philip Schwarzerd, called Mel-
anchthon, who, perhaps, grasped the questions involved better than all his contemporaries. Luther himself did not rest; he now produced a programme in which he combined all that possessed his soul. In August, 1520, his treatise, "To the Christian Nobles of the German Nation concerning the Reformation of the Christian State," appeared in print. The relations with Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen, into which he had shortly before entered, had distinctly influenced this pamphlet; for, passing over the power of the princes, he placed his hopes on the emperor and the nobility during the impending attempt which was to restore the right relations between secular and spiritual powers. By this train of thought the author met the Humanists, who had for a long time been weary of the ecclesiastical tutelage in intellectual concerns. But Luther taught more emphatically than they did that the opposition between priests and laymen, as it existed in the Church, was unbiblical. At the same time a programme of secular reform was unfolded, which pronounced against the capitalists in support of the knights, and lashed the money-seeking temporal policy of the papacy. In fact, a warning was issued to all temporal authorities that they should no longer allow the export of money to Rome in any form. It is easy to understand the rapid circulation of this treatise, which in an unprecedented manner comprised all that which thousands had long felt, even though as the fruit of quite different trains of thought. Even before the thoughts thus developed had been further expanded from the dogmatic side, especially with reference to the sacraments, in the "Prelude to the Babylonish Captivity of the Church" (he wrote this time in Latin), the news came to Germany of the papal bull issued on the 16th of June, which condemned forty-one propositions of Luther, and required him to recant his teaching within sixty days. His deadly enemy, Eck, had co-operated in the preparation of this threatening bull, and also brought it to Germany, where it was published on September 27. But the most important point, the execution of the bull, which the papal legates at Cologne imperiously demanded in November from the Elector Frederick, was omitted, since the territorial ruler at the advice of Erasmus absolutely refused their request. The bull entirely failed in its effect in Saxony; the University of Wittenberg refused to publish it. In the universities of Erfurt and Leipzig, and even in Vienna, open sympathy was expressed with Luther, who himself on the 10th of December in front of the gates of Wittenberg publicly burnt the decretals and the papal bull, just as his writings had been burnt at Cologne, Mayence, Louvain, and other places.

Before the year 1520 drew to a close, yet a third manifesto appeared from Luther's pen, in which, differing from the criticism hitherto employed, he proceeded to construct a doctrinal edifice of his own. It was the treatise, once more written in German, "Of the Freedom of the Christian Man." It distinguishes between the spiritual and corporeal man: the spiritual man is free through belief in God, the corporeal is in bondage through his fear of his neighbour. The effect of this treatise almost exceeded that of the preceding ones. His words were everywhere read and understood, for what he propounded he said in the language of the people. Personally he gave up monastic practices in the winter of 1521-1522, even though he wore the cowl still longer. Since after four months, the allotted period, Luther's recantation did not reach Rome, Pope Leo X hurled the ban against the heretic and his followers on the 3d of January, 1521, and suspended the interdict over all places where they should remain.
At first the party round the young Emperor Charles openly entertained the plan of using the religious movement in Germany to exercise pressure on the Curia in political questions. On the other hand, the imperial court, however unwillingly, had to pay regard to Luther, if it did not wish to fall out with the Elector of Saxony. One thing was at any rate certain, the diet, which met at the beginning of the year at Worms, must occupy itself with the question which was agitating all leading spirits. The imperial programme of work had not indeed touched the religious question; but the States demanded its discussion. The States would only assent to an imperial decree against the heretic, which would have meant the ban, on the condition that he was tried before the assembly of the empire, and had declared with his own lips that he would not recant.

Luther came to Worms with an imperial safe-conduct on April 16, and on the very next day the hearing began before the emperor and the States. When the emperor put the question to him whether he acknowledged his books, and whether he would recant or not, he asked for time to reflect, and then on April 18 answered to the now more precise question, that he could only think of recantation if he was confuted out of the Scripture or by logical arguments. The effect of his words on the Germans was thoroughly favourable, while the Romanists, and with them the emperor, showed themselves little edified. The result was an imperial proclamation to the States, which confirmed the safe-conduct as far as Wittenberg, but at the same time prohibited the continuance of the preaching, and announced the treatment of Luther as a convicted heretic. On the way back from Worms to Wittenberg Luther, who certainly knew of the plans of the friendly elector, was surrounded in the vicinity of Waltershausen in Thuringia by Saxon horsemen and conducted to the Wartburg, while his friends in Germany considered him to be dead. The emperor now formally proclaimed from Worms the ban of the empire over the heretic, ordered the confiscation of the property of all who adhered to him, and the destruction of his writings; indeed, to avoid further harm the introduction of a general censorship of books was demanded.

From the beginning of May, 1521, Luther lived on the Wartburg; only a very few initiated, above all Spalatin, knew of his abode, which at first was not even revealed to the elector. "Squire George," as the theologian was called there, employed his solitude in studying the New Testament in the original and beginning his translation. In September, 1522, the whole New Testament, but without Luther's name, was printed in German. This was by no means the first German edition of the Bible. During the quiet work on the Wartburg, the reformer, who hitherto had advanced alone into the foreground, lost the reins from his hand, and other men who thought they were working on his lines were the spokesmen. At Wittenberg, professors and students began to translate Luther's ideas into reality, and Carlstadt especially drew the conclusion from the doctrine that there was no separate spiritual class when he demanded the marriage of priests. The Lord's Supper in both forms was administered at Wittenberg in autumn, 1521, to Melanchthon, among others. The wild excesses of the Hussites began to spread in the winter. Altars and pictures were cast out of the churches, and laymen began to preach to the people. At Zwickeu especially, where the clothmaker Nicolas Storch, and the priest Thomas Münzer, tried to kindle the revolt, the image-breakers won adherents, although the council repressed the movement and banished Münzer, who now sought safety in Bohemia, without indeed being able to accomplish much.
Luther had appeared once in December, 1521, for a short time at Wittenberg, in order to express his opinion as to the condition of things in the town, but soon afterward returned to the Wartburg. At the beginning of March he no longer maintained the reserve which was required of him, but left his place of refuge contrary to the will of the elector, and entered Wittenberg in order to preach daily to the people, and to warn them against further blind excess of zeal. One note rang clearly in these exhortations,—that the Master attached weight to faith alone, and in comparison cared little for the externals of religion. His words had a marvellous effect. The development, in the same form as at Wittenberg, spread to the places round, both far and near. In southwest Germany particularly, where the social differences were sharper than elsewhere, the teaching of the monk of Wittenberg found a friendly reception from citizen and peasant, and a flood of printed pamphlets helped to disseminate it.

The princes, indeed, had shown little favour to the ecclesiastical innovations; even Luther's patron, the Elector Frederick, had not openly severed himself from the Church. But nowhere was there any intention of seriously executing the Edict of Worms, and the year 1522 showed how far popular opinion, a hitherto almost unknown power, influenced the States. In answer to the papal demand that the decrees of Worms should be carried out, the council of regency declared that it was unwilling to employ measures of force; on the contrary, a council in a German town with an equal number of clerics and laymen should immediately deliberate upon the questions. Although the papal nuncio Chiaramonti protested against this answer, the matter remained so. It was proposed once more to discuss at a council the question which had really long ago been legally decided. Indeed it was not so much a sincere conviction that forced the States to this view as the fear of a sanguinary rising of the people. The German council and the preliminary council, which had already been summoned to Speyer for November, 1524, did not meet. But the representatives of the papal party assembled in the summer of 1524 at Nuremberg and resolved, in addition to complete condemnation of Luther, to aim at an improvement in some unimportant points (the papal exaction of money and the morality of the clergy). This was the condition of Germany when all parties were equally affected by the outbreak of the Peasant Revolt. Former adherents of Luther, as Thomas Münzer and Carlstadt, fanned the flames and supported the fanatical movement and its communist scheme of economy. Luther in two treatises, "Exhortation to Peace upon the Twelve Articles" (April, 1525), and "Against the Murderous and Marauding Hordes of Peasants," attempted not only to clear himself from the taunt that he was connected with the revolt, but at the same time called for the forcible suppression of the rebels, should timely warning be fruitless.

The result of the Peasant War is well known. It affected the Reformation in the Church in two ways. On the one side the princes of central Germany had heard from Luther's lips the exhortation to use severity, and the reformer now appeared to them as an advocate of the power of the princes: they could make him useful for their purposes. On the other side, in great districts of Germany many still entertained the opinion that at bottom Luther alone was to blame for the whole revolt, and therefore they had good reason to be hostile to the Reformation generally. In these circles an energetic interference of the emperor, who had just come out victoriously from the first French war, was partly advocated, partly dreaded,
while the princes of Saxony, Hesse, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Anhalt, and Mansfeld, with the town of Magdeburg, united themselves in the “League of Torgau,” in order from this time, as guardians of the Reformation, to oppose under certain circumstances even the emperor himself.

The imperial diet of Speyer in 1526 was already subject to this impression. The emperor was again asked to call a German council, and there was no attempt, as regards the Edict of Worms, to put binding demands to the separate States. Each prince was to act as he should be able to answer to God and the emperor. This implied for the members of the League of Torgau an establishment of evangelical national churches, which from this time furnished, in the so-called “church ordinances,” guides for the direction of divine service and schools (in this latter respect Luther had already in 1524 exhorted the towns to energetic measures), as well as of alms-giving and church discipline. The now generally adopted principle of the marriage of priests was of the greatest importance, after Luther himself in 1525 had married a former nun, Catharine von Bora. The position of the priests as a class apart was thus terminated, and at the same time a condition of things established in the evangelical manse which was suitable to the founding of an evangelical tradition.

While the peculiar position of the territorial lords as bishops of their own national churches was being developed, and in the reorganisation of the schools in the country the attempt was being made to raise the peasant intellectually, and to educate him to be a worthy member of the community, the communist and revolutionary efforts, which we have noticed at Zwickau, did not die away. In every part of Germany in the second half of the third decade there appeared representatives of this movement, who mostly designated themselves as “Anabaptists,” and were opposed by the adherents to the old religion as much as by the followers of the Lutheran views. In Zürich the Anabaptist Manz had been drowned in 1527. And at Münster, where in 1534 the Netherlanders Jan Matthys of Haarlem and Jan (Beuckelszoon) of Leiden wished to found a Christian kingdom on a communist basis, the evangelical movement was completely suppressed in 1535. Political and religious aims were mixed up in the affairs at Münster. Similarly at Lübeck, where, under the leadership of Jürgen Wullenweber (1534) the democratic elements conquered the aristocratic council and partly drove its members from the town. Here also the religious and the political revolutionary spirit met, to which latter strict Lutheranism was an uncompromising opponent. But the ecclesiastical zeal of the democratic leader was here distinctly inferior to his political ardour, although he was finally executed by the Duke of Brunswick as an Anabaptist (1537).

The diet of Speyer in 1526 had created an intermediate religious position which was equally insecure for the old and the new faith, for each party had to fear a vigorous onslaught from the other. It did not therefore cause wonder when the Chancellor of Duke George of Saxony, Otto von Pack, told the evangelical princes about a strong Catholic league. Philip of Hesse, in excess of zeal, immediately armed against his presumed foes, at whose head naturally the emperor would stand. He saw at once that the whole policy of Europe was influenced by the religious dissensions, but was fated unfortunately to perceive that the documents of Pack were entirely fictitious, and that thus his plans, for which such a condition of things seemed most profitable, had lost their support (1828).
A new imperial diet met under the pressure of these events in the spring of 1529 at Speyer. The imperial proposition read at the opening held out the prospect of a council, but also disputed the validity of the resolutions passed at Speyer in 1526 with respect to the Edict of Worms. A committee, it is true, somewhat modified the form of the imperial demand; nevertheless the princes of electoral Saxony, Luneburg, Anhalt, and Franconian Brandenburg, as well as the towns, opposed it, and contested the right of the assembly by a resolution of the majority to abolish suddenly the imperial recess of 1526. However, the view which was vigorously supported by Archduke Ferdinand gained the day, namely, that the majority must in all cases be respected. There remained nothing for the disaffected princes but to protest against the proclaimed right, a proceeding which gained them the name “Protestants.” It is to be carefully noticed that in this protest no religious but merely a constitutional question was discussed, that is to say, whether an unanimously passed decree can be abrogated by a majority. In any case a uniform religious conviction spoke in the protest, which, struggling against authority, assumed the right for every estate in the realm to decide these questions by their own power. There was still the inclination to submit to a council.

The immediate result of this protest was the secret league, concluded in April, 1529, between electoral Saxony and Hesse, as well as the towns of Strassburg, Ulm, and Nuremberg, for the common protection of their religious convictions even against the empire, while the Swabian League began to consider itself the champion of Catholicism. The separation between a Germany of the old faith and a Germany of the new faith was thus complete. On each side princes and towns stood united, for the diet of Speyer had broken up the hitherto common principles of the towns, and no council was in the position once more to heal the breach. The soul of the Protestant league was Philip of Hesse. He had high political aims, and wished to effect a union of all who had separated themselves from the Church. His attention was therefore necessarily directed toward the Swiss reform movement, which ran parallel to that of Wittenberg, and was maintained in closer dependence on the humanism of Zwingli. A reconciliation of the dogmatical differences between Luther and Zwingli was the dearest wish of the Landgrave, and he hoped to accomplish this by a religious conference, which met in October at Marburg. Great was the pleasure with which Zwingli and his Humanist friends, Hedio and Oecolampadius, accepted the invitation, it was with heavy heart that Luther appeared at the conference. It was impossible for him to depart in the slightest particular from his standpoint on the doctrine of the Lord’s Supper, which presented the most important subject of dogmatic controversy. The conference, as might be expected, was absolutely barren in results. Luther tried vainly to conceal this fact even from contemporaries by a pamphlet, which epitomised in fifteen articles the points common to the doctrines of the two reformers, as opposed to the fundamental point of difference. The distress in the empire was as a whole very great, owing to the Turkish danger. Nevertheless, the imperial diet, which sat in June, 1530, under the emperor’s presidency at Augsburg, was strongly influenced by the religious or rather theological controversies; for the papal legate and the Protestants were agreed that this was the first matter to be treated. The Protestants, in conformity with the request of the emperor, had briefly drawn up their doctrinal views in the “Confession of Augsburg,” a work of Melanchthon, which offered as mild a resistance as possible to the papal
opponents, and only emphatically repudiated the admission that Luther's doctrine
was heretical, and asserted that on the contrary it coincided with the teaching of
Augustine. Luther, outlawed and excommunicated, did not venture, since the
elector disapproved, to represent his own cause in Augsburg. Melanchthon took
his place, but showed by his yielding disposition that he would not have been the
right man to conduct the real struggle. He still hoped for an ecclesiastical peace,
and would be content with the concession of the marriage of priests, of the chalice
for the laity, and of a reform in the mass, and therefore found support among the
Catholic princes, but not at Rome. A Catholic rejoinder to the “Confession,”
called its “Refutation” (confutatio), expressed, to the benefit of the Protestant
movement, an uncompromising opposition to any concession. The emperor saw
in that the complete victory of his old Church, and the Protestant princes per-
ceived at last that the breach could no longer be healed. From that time the
schism, so calamitous for the common growth of Germany, formed itself into two
confessions, which were often at war and seldom came to terms.

Landgrave Philip had already left Augsburg when the emperor wished to de-
clare in the recess that the Protestants had been refuted out of the Bible. The
latter naturally contested this point, especially by the “Apologia,” composed by
Melanchthon against the “Confutatio.” The emperor did not accept this “Apologia.”
But the Protestant States, with the towns of Augsburg and Memmingen at their
head, refused on their side to acknowledge the recess; they also did not wish to
take part in raising the “Turkish aid.” While the Protestants and the emperor
still desired a council, although from different motives and intentions, Pope Clem-
ent VI was distinctly opposed to one, and tried to influence the emperor with this
view. But the outcry for a reform was not thereby hushed in the ranks of the
followers of the old religion; on the contrary, in Augsburg a declaration similar in
contents to that of the convention of Ratisbon had been accepted, by which an
alliance opposed to the League of Torgau was formed.

After the diet of Augsburg it must have been clear to the Protestant States
that it would now be impossible to support the innovation in religion, as Luther
demanded, and yet continue in allegiance to the emperor. He was no longer an
impartial ruler, as men had fondly imagined, but a strong partisan of the papacy.
A closer union among the Protestants had become necessary. Under the influence
of the election of Archduke Ferdinand as king of Rome, the alliance was formed,
end of February, 1531, at Schmalkalden in Thuringia. The rulers of electoral Sax-
ony, Hesse, Lüneburg, Anhalt, and of Mansfeld, as well as the towns of Magde-
burg and Bremen, united for “the maintenance of Christian truth and peace,
and for the repression of unlawful powers,” while other princes and towns still
hesitated to join. There was no immediate prospect of confederates in south Ger-
many. On the other hand, relations had already been established with King
Frederick I of Denmark and King Gustavus of Sweden; even in England a new
page was opened, since King Henry VIII, completely hostile to the Emperor
Charles, was in his own way effecting a reformation in the Church.

These events, coupled with the fear that all south Germans would join the
Schmalkaldic League, the impossibility of inducing the Pope to convene a council,
and, above all, the increasing danger from the Turks, finally decided the emperor
to abandon the execution of the recess of Augsburg and to conclude a preliminary
peace with the Protestants on July 23, 1532, the so-called Religious Peace of
Nuremburg. By the conditions of this the States should maintain peace among themselves on questions of belief until the council met: under certain circumstances a diet was to be substituted for the Council. In any case, all trials on religious points impending in the Supreme Court should be discontinued for the present. The emperor by this peace formally recognised the League as a political power.

The policy of the empire had been permanently under the influence of the religious movement since 1521, and even more so now. The development of dogma and cult became gradually an esoteric theological concern, and was no longer the chief factor in determining political action. The princes, provisionally united with a part of the towns in the Schmalkaldic League, were from this time the representatives of Protestantism, in place of the professors of Wittenberg. The religious and social age of the new doctrine was ended in order to make room for the political age.

(b) Zwingli.—Huldreich Zwingli, born January 1, 1484, thus almost of the same age as Luther, enjoyed a conspicuously Humanist education, studied under Conrad Celtes in Vienna, and devoted himself especially to the theology of Erasmus. In 1506 he was curate at Glarus, and as such expounded the Bible and studied Origen. But after his expulsion by the French party, who hated him for his sermons against the mercenary system, he went as secular priest to the pilgrimage resort of Maria-Einsiedeln, and began in 1516, actually before Luther, to preach in favour of reformation, but without visibly leaving the Church. Here, and still more at Zürich, where he lived after 1519, he adopted a gradually more independent style of explanatory writing and took up an anti-French attitude in politics. In 1522 his opinions as to the institutions of the Church (fasting, celibacy) became accentuated: he called for a moral reform as the result of justification by faith. In the next year, in a discussion at Zürich (January 29, 1523), which had been started in consequence of a complaint brought by the Bishop of Constance before the council as to the religious innovations, Zwingli rejected everything which did not precisely conform to the ordinances of the Scripture; he was thus far more radical in his proposals than Luther, and met with the approval of the people of Zürich. He married in 1524 Anna Meyer, née Reinhard, a widow aged forty-three, and administered the communion in both kinds.

From Zürich the ecclesiastical reform of the sovereign congregation spread to the other Confederates; in Appenzell the mass was abolished in 1522. But immediately an opposition was raised amongst the “five places.” Schwyz, Uri, Unterwalden, Lucerne, and Zug, which, as favouring the French mercenary system, had been dissatisfied with Zwingli’s protest. The Reformer now (1525) demanded war against the five cantons. But the danger was averted this time; Zürich actually gained the triumph of not being excluded from the Federation, notwithstanding the antagonistic demands of the original cantons, and of finding a comrade in the faith in the canton of Berne (January, 1528). After the democratic municipal government had been introduced (1528) into Berne, the cantons of St. Gallen, Glarus, Schaffhausen, and Basle adopted the Reformation according to Zwingli’s ideas. At the same time, fortunately, more friends were won for it in south Germany. In the towns of Constance, Mühlhausen, Nuremburg, and others there was lively sympathy with the Reformation at Zürich, which was based on civic inde-
pendence; and Zwingli might fairly dream of a larger league of followers, when Philip of Hesse invited him to the religious discussion at Marburg. We know how his hopes were deceived. And now the Five Places were ready to defend their old faith by the sword. They allied themselves with Austria, but received no assistance from that quarter, and were obliged in the summer of 1529 to conclude the first peace of Cappel, which established the equal rights, within the Federation, of the cantons of both religions.

Zwingli had thus obtained a great success, and was by no means conciliatory when, on the part of the Schmalcaldic League, the question was put to him whether he was willing to attach himself and his followers to the union: he still hoped for a great south German league with the towns predominant. A political organisation would bring him nearer this end. Zürich and Berne were, according to his wish, to obtain, constitutionally, the foremost place in the Federation. Zwingli wished therefore to proceed with the utmost rigour against the five cantons who professed the old religion; but he did not find any support from Basle or Berne. The attempt was now made to isolate the five cantons by a blockade of provisions; but they quickly rose against Zürich, and won a complete victory on the 11th of October, 1531, at Cappel. Zwingli himself was slain and his body was quartered. After a second defeat sustained by the citizens of Zürich, the second peace of Cappel was made in November, which assured to the Catholic as well as the reformed States their own confession, but demanded from both the dissolution of their treaties with foreign powers. The Evangelicals were conquered and the old religion recovered lost ground. The south Germans who adhered to the new faith, having nothing more now to hope for from the Swiss, attached themselves more closely to the towns of central Germany which were members of the Schmalcaldic League.

C. THE GERMAN EMPIRE UNDER CHARLES V

(a) Early Policy of Charles [1519–1529].—Even during the lifetime of the Emperor Maximilian his grandson Charles had been ruler in the Netherlands (1515), and at the beginning of 1516, after the death of his grandfather Ferdinand, had also become king of Spain as Charles I. But he had at first no independence and was entirely in the power of his councillors, while no very friendly feeling toward him prevailed in the Netherlands owing to the pressure of taxation, and open insurrection broke out in Spain. This same Charles was in 1519, at the wish of his grandfather, who did not live to see the day of election, chosen German king; and the youth of nineteen, sovereign in three realms, saw himself, apart from the internal difficulties in all three lands, opposed to the rivalry of the two most important political powers of the time, the Pope and the French king. All prospects pointed to a stormy future.

Charles, immediately after the election in Frankfort (June 28, 1519), was forced to make important concessions to the princes in a capitulation; and he did it by his Spanish plenipotentiary, who could not, any more than himself, fail to see the wide-reaching consequences of these promises. It was not until October, 1520, that the “Roman emperor elect” put foot on German soil and was crowned at Aachen. One of the first acts of his reign was to summon a diet to Worms for the
beginning of the year 1521. The new emperor was eagerly expected in Germany, and not least among the friends of the Reformation; for much, if not everything, depended upon his attitude. He also had good reason to be interested in the personality of Luther. In the first place he might, under certain conditions, be used as a weapon against Rome; and, secondly, it was important to conciliate, or at any rate not to incense, his patron the powerful Elector of Saxony. But any comprehension of Luther's teaching, even the bare conception of that which was meant by justification by faith, was completely foreign to the Spaniard Charles, a true adherent of the Catholic Church, notwithstanding any political enmity to the Pope. We know the course taken by the discussion of the religious question at Worms. The emperor had other subjects much nearer to heart. He wished to speak about the administration of the peace of the empire, about the appointment of a Council of Regency to represent him, about the expedition to Rome and the recovery of the territory alienated from the empire. But however much he exerted himself, he did not succeed until he had conciliated the States by the discussion of the religious question which was demanded on all sides. Finally, indeed, some isolated points in the political domain were settled. The succession in the hereditary dominions of the Hapsburgs was assured to Archduke Ferdinand, Charles's younger brother; as regards the government of the empire, it was agreed that it should be mainly in the hands of the States, but that no alliances with foreign powers should be made without the sanction of the emperor. The Supreme Court was revived and an Imperial Defence System established, since a central fund, with a pro rata division among the States, was created by the so-called “Roman month” (=118,000 florins).

The arrangement of these matters was most important for Charles. But it was no end in itself, but merely a necessary preliminary for him, since he did not wish to be disturbed for the moment in his international plans. On his accession he had taken over the quarrel with Francis I of France both on account of Burgundy and also of Naples; and the fear of Charles's superiority in Italy, in case he should, as German king, lay claim to Milan, drew Pope Leo X toward France. An armed collision was inevitable.

The attitude taken up by the Pope was the most important question for Charles, for he could do nothing against France without him. The clever diplomacy of the legate Hieronymus Aleander (1480–1542) solved the problem, since, weighing against each other according to their importance the political and ecclesiastical position of the Pope, he recognised the latter as the most weighty. By means of the treaty which emperor and Pope made on May 1, 1521, he compelled Charles to adopt a fundamentally hostile attitude toward the reform movement, while the alliance of the Pope with King Francis, which appeared appropriate on purely political grounds, was now dissolved. France on the other hand gained an ally in Ferrara, and secured for herself, in spite of the already mentioned protest of the citizens of Zürich, the right to enlist troops in the Swiss cantons. The sympathies of the English inclined more toward Charles, so that the greater power seemed to rest on the side of the German king, especially since the Confederates, faithless to their compact, went over to the papal side in the autumn of 1521.

The imperial army under the leadership of Prospero Colonna conquered in the course of the year 1521 the larger part of Milan, without encountering serious difficulties, since the hated French governor Odet de Foix, Vicomte de Lautrec, lacked
the money to pay his soldiers. At the end of the year, only Genoa, Cremona, and the Castle of Milan were still French. A renewed attempt of the French arms in the next year to expel the invaders failed completely; in fact, Lantrez, defeated on April 27, 1522, at Bisocca by Colonna and the German Landsknechte under Georg von Frundsberg, was compelled to evacuate Italy altogether. Henry VIII of England openly declared war and sent an army into France. Charles was now master of Italy. In August, 1523, there was a renewal of the alliance between him, his brother Ferdinand, Henry VIII, Pope Hadrian VI, the Duke of Milan, and the small Italian republics for the common protection of Italy against Francis, who was preparing a new expedition to Italy for 1524. Francis wished to place himself at the head of the army, and was already on the way when he heard of the plan of his ambitious cousin Charles, Duke of Bourbon, to go over to the emperor. He therefore remained behind and only sent his general, Guillaume Gouffier, Sieur de Bounivet, into Italy, where he achieved some small successes. Meantime the English invaded the north of France once more, and a German army ravaged Burgundy. On April 14, 1524, the combined French and Milanese army of Bonivet was completely vanquished by the German marksmen at Gatinara on the Sesia, and Pierre du Terrail, Chevalier de Bayard, the "knight without fear and without reproach," met his death there.

Charles of Bourbon, together with the Spaniard Fernando Francesco de Avalos, Marchese de Pescara (the husband of the poetess Vittoria Colonna), had commanded the army in this campaign. Now, when the power of France in Milan was completely broken, and Francis II (Sforza) was again installed as duke, he induced Charles himself to invade France; but Marseilles could not be taken, and Pescara was obliged to withdraw to Italy. King Francis now pressed close after him into Milan and sat down before Pavia, while the German army, without any supplies, was seeking a refuge in the mountains. These successes of the French arms at once detached allies from the emperor. Venice went over to Francis, and the Pope and Florence entered into a treaty of neutrality. The German Landsknechte, so soon as their claims for pay were satisfied, reassembled, and, strengthened by a reinforcement of fifteen thousand Germans, invaded the Milanese, where King Francis during the winter of 1524 to 1525 had carried on a wearisome investment of Pavia. The Germans advanced in February, and the Landsknechte were eager for a battle. It was fought on the 24th of February, 1525, and the Imperialists, under the Constable of Bourbon and Pescara, won a complete victory. King Francis was severely wounded and taken prisoner, his army was annihilated, Bonivet slain, and the artillery lost. The emperor was proud of this victory. He wished to make a wise and full use of it, but failed to do so, and wasted time in long negotiations, while at the same time he demanded too many humiliations from the French crown. England concluded peace with France in August; Pope Clement VII had already taken the French side. The other States of Italy had now to fear the supreme power of Charles as much as formerly that of the French king. In liberated Milan voices were now heard against the imperial liberator. A peace between Charles and Francis was finally concluded in January, 1526, at Madrid, which would have meant the complete overthrow of France if it had been Francis's will to keep it. Nothing less than the cession of Burgundy and the abandonment of all claims on Naples, Milan, and Genoa was demanded of him. But Francis, before he actually swore to the treaty, had determined to break it, and expressed this
intention in a proclamation to his councillors, denouncing the treaty as having been procured by constraint.

Only a few months elapsed before the Emperor Charles saw himself faced by another hostile combination. In May the Pope, King Francis, Duke Francis Sforza of Milan and Venice, concluded the Holy League in order to expel from Italy the imperial troops which still occupied the Milanese, and to restrain King Francis from carrying out the treaty into which he had entered. The Pope at once released him from his oath. Burgundy, notwithstanding the energetic protests of the emperor, was not ceded; even pressure on Francis's ally, the Pope, by a warlike demonstration of Colonna against the Medici in September, 1526, had no effect. The Constable of Bourbon had meantime the power in his hands at Milan, but could only offer resistance to the League after a reinforcement by twelve thousand Landsknechte, which Frundsberg brought him at his own cost. The general found himself forced by want of money to lead his army into the hostile States of the Church in February, 1527; nevertheless a mutiny broke out on March 16 at Bologna among the Landsknechte, which was with difficulty suppressed. The deeply mortified commander was prostrated by a fit of apoplexy (he died at his home, Mindelheim, on the 20th of August, 1528). Bourbon's resolve to march on Rome itself was now fixed: he rejected an armistice, which the Pope wished to buy with a large sum, and stood by the beginning of May before the walls of Rome. In the storming of the city, which began the very day after his arrival, May 6, 1527, Charles of Bourbon was slain. His Landsknechte avenged his death, took the city, and began a terrible scene of pillage and murder. The Pope remained a prisoner in the Castle of St. Angelo, and the League brought him no help; he was compelled, therefore, to submit to an agreement by which four hundred thousand ducats and some strongholds were given to the army.

The Emperor Charles had taken no share at all in this expedition, but lost his power over the Landsknechte. At the same time England, which resigned all her claims to the Continent, allied herself closely with France, and the emperor had been deprived of all his conquests of 1525. The French army found a friendly reception everywhere in Italy, and in the autumn of 1527, with the help of Genoa, besieged the imperial city of Naples. Fortunately for Charles, pestilence raged in the French army, and Marshal Lautrec himself finally (August 15, 1528) succumbed to it; and the Genoese leader Doria, who felt himself slighted by the French, placed his ships at the service of the emperor in 1528. Further French operations failed, until at last, in accordance with the heartfelt wishes of both sides, the "Ladies-Peace," mediated by Louise, mother of Francis and Margaret, aunt of Charles, was concluded on the 5th of August, 1529, at Cambrai: France by it renounced all pretensions to Italy and the feudal lordship over Flanders and Artois. Charles, reserving his claims, left Burgundy in the hands of the French, and set at liberty for a ransom of two million crowns the sons of Francis, who were still in his power. Francis, who was to marry a sister of Charles, undertook the duty of reinstating the followers of Bourbon in their possessions.

During his progress through Italy, which Charles commenced immediately after the signing of peace, a treaty was negotiated with Venice and the Duke of Milan. The emperor received from both considerable sums of money, of which he was able to make good use. The Pope crowned him at the beginning of 1530 as emperor at Bologna,—the last coronation of a German by a pope. After a ten years' war
Charles, now a man of thirty, appeared finally as the bringer of peace to Italy, and the conqueror of the French rule. Yet his position, apart from the religious disension in the empire, which then began to influence all political life, was by no means favourable, for the West was continually threatened by the growing danger from the East, the victorious army of the infidel Turks.

(b) The Turkish Menace: Suleiman the Magnificent. — We have already traced the growth of the Turkish power up to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Sultan Selim I (d. 1520) had made conquests mostly on Asiatic soil and had subdued Egypt. But his son Suleiman II, surnamed the Magnificent (see his portrait on the plate "Six Sultans of the Omans" in Vol. V), once more attacked the European powers, conquered Belgrade in 1521, and drove out in 1522 the Knights of St. John from the island of Rhodes, since their grand master, Philip Villiers de l'Isle Adam (1521–1534), appealed to the Christian powers in vain for help. The Knights defended themselves heroically, and at last on New Year's night, 1522–1523, they left the island unmolested under the command of Villiers. The Emperor Charles assigned to them on March 24, 1530, the island of Malta, with Gozzo, Comino, and Tripolis as a home, and thus once more pledged them to wage war against Turks and pirates.

When on the 29th of August, 1521, Belgrade fell before the Turks, Louis II, who had mounted the throne in 1516 at the age of ten years, was king of Hungary. The Turks came once more, in 1526 with an enormous army against Hungary. The king advanced to meet them with an inadequate force, and was defeated and slain on the 29th of August, near Mohacz, while the victors without difficulty took the capital and marched onward, devastating the country with fire and sword. As King Louis II was dead, the old pretensions of the House of Hapsburg were revived. Archduke Ferdinand found, however, an opponent in the waywode of Transylvania, John Zapolya, who allied himself with France and the Sultan, and was elected king by a section of the people on the 10th of November, 1526. Nevertheless, the representative of the Hapsburgs was elected on the 16th of December, 1526, by another section, in a diet at Pressburg, under the influence of the queen-widow, Mary of Austria, and on his advance in the summer of 1527 Zapolya was forced to retreat to Transylvania. Ferdinand was crowned at Stuhlwessenburg in November, and so linked Hungary permanently to the House of Hapsburg, just as at the beginning of the year he had connected Bohemia with it. Thus the Austrian monarchy was founded.

At the same time the Turkish danger became an imperial danger in a more real sense than before, for the imperial hereditary lands were the first object threatened by the attack of the Unbelievers. Suleiman came forward as the avenger of Zapolya in 1529, conquered Ofen on September 8, and caused his protégé to be proclaimed king. On the 27th of September he actually appeared with one hundred and twenty thousand men before Vienna and began the siege. All Europe trembled at this event; but the heroic defence of the garrison so far saved the situation that the Sultan was induced, by the murmurs of his troops and the threatened lack of provisions, to withdraw on October 14, 1529, after he had destroyed the churches and devastated the country far and wide.

The Council of Regency, which had been established on the basis of the resolutions at Worms in 1521, had no longer the character of a board representing
the States, but that of an official body, and therefore possessed little reputation in the empire. It had hardly gained any influence on Protestantism and its development. The emperor himself was, as we know, entangled in great international schemes, and could not, therefore, directly have any part in it, so that the imperial diets of the third decade had very little significance for the constitution and administration of the empire. On the other hand, within the territories, in connection with the Church reform, important alterations were effected, which resulted in the development of the absolutism of the princes and in the suppression of the States. The diet of Augsburg in the summer of 1530 was the first, at which the emperor, having been absent for nine years, was once more present after having at length achieved a victory. There was work enough to do, for in addition to the aid against the Turks urgently needed by the empire, it was essential to deliberate over a great number of imperial laws, amongst others over the criminal code, the so-called Lex Carolina. But the religious question, the solution of which was required by the Protestants before they would consent to aid against the Turks, gradually by its importance supplanted all other subjects of deliberation. It was only after the religious peace of Nuremberg in 1532 that the emperor found himself in the position to carry out the long-cherished plan and to put an imperial army into the field against the Turks. During the summer more than seventy thousand men advanced to the East. Nearly two-thirds of them were troops from the emperor's patrimonial dominions; but still it was an imposing army that marched out against the enemy.

Suleiman had little good fortune in his campaigns of 1532. He besieged in vain the small Hungarian town of Günz, which was bravely defended by Nicholas Jurischitsch. At Gran also the siege was unsuccessful, and the fleet of Genoa won some decided victories at sea. It would have been easy to win back the whole of Hungary by force of arms. But Charles left the army for Italy, in order to come to an understanding with the Pope about the council, while the license of the troops became the pest of the country. No great battle was fought, and the capture of some Turkish standards by the Palgrave Frederick was of little moment. During the protracted negotiations which emperor and Pope carried on at Bologna the advantages gained through the peace of Cambrai (1529) were lost; for the Pope and all other Italian powers gradually inclined more and more toward the French side, without Charles being quite clear on the point himself. Charles left Italy for Spain before any result had been obtained, and from that country undertook an expedition to Tunis against the robber Moors (see the plate, "Sack of Tunis," on p. 252 of Vol. IV), and was afterward involved in a new war (1536–1538) with King Francis.

(c) German Politics and the Schmalkaldic League.—The German princes had meanwhile been left to themselves and formed in the League of Schmalkalde not only a political representation of evangelical interests, but at the same time a union against the encroachments of the Hapsburgs. In 1531 some towns, amongst others Frankfort, Hamburg, and Lübeck, had joined the League, and other towns of upper Germany had followed them; only Nuremberg held aloof. The members of the League had created a military organisation for themselves similar to that which had been formed by the nearly extinct Swabian League. In 1535 the alliance was renewed for ten years. Philip of Hesse undoubtedly
took the lead in political questions, while electoral Saxony under John Frederick sank more into the background. Philip understood how to turn to the advantage of the League all interests hostile to the Hapsburgs both at home and abroad. His greatest success was the restoration of Duke Ulrich, who had been expelled from Württemberg in 1519, to his duchy (1534). This was tantamount to ousting Ferdinand the Hapsburg from his position in south Germany.

Württemberg now adopted the evangelical doctrine and became a member of the Schmalkaldic League, although Ulrich himself showed little gratitude to the landgrave. King Ferdinand was compelled in a treaty at Kaaden (June 29, 1534) to consent to the new state of things, and was unable to prevent Protestantism continually gaining ground in all parts of Germany and even in the crown lands of eastern Austria. Besides Pomerania and Anhalt, the duchy of Saxony and the powerful Brandenburg joined the League in 1539; and the evangelisation in England and the northern kingdoms resulted in a political union of the rulers in those parts with the League.

While the new faith made such progress, Pope Clement VII died. His successor, Paul III (1534–1549), was from the outset willing to concede to the imperial request for a council, and on June 2, 1536, consented to summon it to Mantua for the end of May, 1537. He invited the Lutherans to it. Their leader had really nothing to say against it, but composed for this purpose the so-called "Schmalkaldic Articles" (February–March, 1537), the contents of which, however, demonstrated the impossibility of taking part in the meeting. A national German council would in any case have been acceptable, but no one in the circle of the Evangelicals would hear of a general council.

Since 1536 the emperor had again been involved in a war with France, for Francis would not yet consent to renounce his claims to Italy. Charles invaded southern France and ravaged it mercilessly. Although the French arms were supported by a simultaneous movement of the Turks which was aimed against the republic of Venice, and by the help of the Protestants, yet the success of the war was trifling, and the exhaustion of the two antagonists led to a truce for ten years (July 18, 1538, at Nice): the Pope negotiated it. The reconciliation of the two sovereigns seemed so complete that they were able to plan a common war against the Turks; but first the German Protestants were to be brought back again to the universal church by peaceful methods, according to the emperor's wish. The Protestants, by the widening of their league, had plainly infringed the conditions of the Religious Peace of Nuremberg. It was therefore thoroughly opportune that the Catholics in Nuremberg united themselves, on June 10, 1538, in a counter league, organised on the model of the Schmalkaldic League, with the object of protecting the peace of Nuremberg while excluding foreign powers. Duke Henry the Younger of Brunswick was the leader of the union. The summons to fight was welcomed by the members of the Schmalkaldic League; for the Elector of Saxony, in the event of a favourable result to the war, could make good his claims to the Lower Rhenish Duchy of Cleves against the emperor. But Charles was now inclined for peace. He tried, when the possibility of a council disappeared, to bring about an agreement by similar contrivances on a small scale,—a proof that even yet he was not aware of the opposition between the old and new faith. The "Grace of Frankfort" had already led, on April 19, 1539, to a compact between both religious parties, from which indeed neither side expected much. The em-
peror had quietly brought about a mutual understanding between Catholic and Evangelical theologians in June (at Hagena) and in November, 1540 (at Worms); and on the occasion of the diet of Ratisbon, April, 1541, he wished to crown the work. The antagonists, among them Eck and Melanchthon, actually agreed before long on the most important points of the faith; once again the attempts at union were rejected in Wittenberg and Rome. The most essential result of the arrangements at Ratisbon was that a spiritual prince, the Archbishop of Cologne, Count Hermann of Wied, began on this basis to introduce the Reformation in the archbishopric, and thus to prepare for the secularisation of a spiritual principality.

There were then all along the line conspicuous successes of the new doctrine and the Schmalkaldic party, especially since at this very time Francis I also was ready once more for an alliance against Charles. The struggle between the Catholic and the Protestant league might have begun, and on the whole the latter seemed to have the advantage. But the latter was now no longer compact, and openly split up when the bigamous marriage of Philip of Hesse, concluded with the assent of the reformers of Wittenberg, was known, and John Frederick was deeply affronted by the insult to the Saxon princess, Philip's lawful wife. Hesse and Saxony were separated, and the previous leader of the Evangelicals planned an alliance with the emperor, in fact actually entered into it, on June 13, 1541, although with some provisos as regards the League of Schmalkalde. The League itself was now shattered, and had no longer any suitable leader, and could not seize the opportunity when, in 1542, King Francis, supported by Sweden and Denmark, once more began open war against the emperor, while Suleiman took possession of all Hungary. The leaders of the League remained inactive. They never once supported the Duke of Jülich against the emperor, but, on the contrary, used the opportunity to secularise the bishoprics and seize the confiscated spoils.

On March 24, 1543, Duke William of Jülich had won a victory through his general, Martin von Rossem, with French help, over an imperial army at Sittard. But Charles now obtained Henry VIII of England as an ally, and in the summer appeared on the Lower Rhine with a splendid army (forty thousand men). Düren was soon won, and the whole district was in Charles's hands; the duke, in virtue of his submission made at Venlo on the 6th of September, 1543, ceded Zülpich and Guelders to the Netherlands, and was forced to promise to break off all relations with France and to restore Catholicism in his dominions. The princes of the League may now have been prepared for an attack of the emperor on their weakened alliance. But the diet of Speyer in 1544 produced an acknowledgment from the emperor that he was willing to abandon the idea of the general council and to settle amicably religious troubles within the empire. The princes, after this victory, joined with their forces in the war against France, which led to a peace on the 18th of September, 1544, at Crépy-en-Laonnais, where it was arranged that king and emperor should join in common cause against the heretics. Francis also agreed to share in the war against the Infidels. But a truce with Suleiman, who indeed held the greatest part of Hungary, temporarily averted the Turkish peril (autumn, 1545).

At the beginning of the year 1546 the emperor seemed free to subdue the heretics by force of arms, especially since the Pope, at the council which was eventually held at Trent toward the end of 1545, made a vigorous attack on the Protestant teaching, and promised his support with troops and money in the event
DR. MARTIN LUTHER

After a Picture in the Tower Church at Weimar (begun in 1552 by Lucas Cranach the Elder, and completed in 1555 by his son.)
of a war against the Schmalcaldic League. A formal treaty was made between Pope and emperor in June, 1546. William of Bavaria joined Charles, and so did some Protestant lords; the Hohenzollern margraves, Hans and Albert, and Duke Eric II of Brunswick, entered into the service of the emperor. But the young Duke Maurice of Saxony became gradually more important than these princes. He had withdrawn from the League of Schmalkalde in 1541, and, together with Philip of Hesse, whom he joined in opposition to electoral Saxony, had made overtures to the emperor. He was devoid of religious enthusiasm, but was brave and politic. An alliance with the emperor held out brilliant prospects, and he was therefore not reluctant to accede to this in the diet of Ratisbon in June, although he did not break off every connection that joined him with the League.

The emperor and the Pope were now chiefly concerned with the preparations for a religious war. But such a declaration could not be bluntly made in Germany, if the support of the towns and the knights was to be assured, since they were only averse to the princes, not to the evangelical doctrines. The fact that evangelical princes were allied with the emperor seemed indeed to argue that the war would not be for religion, but the co-operation of the Pope pointed the other way. The emperor had cleverly begun to work with both means; but it must have been doubtful whether he could succeed in keeping his word to both parties. The Protestants were long unwilling to believe that the preparations were made against them, although Philip, who now once more adhered to the League, warned them of their danger. The States were assembled for the diet of Ratisbon. It was certainly felt that warlike movements were impending; but there was a reluctance to question the emperor until the Protestants ventured to do so, and received the answer that the imminent business was the punishment of some refractory princes. This only suggested the Landgrave Philip, who had not come to the diet. The emperor wished by his declaration to separate Hesse and electoral Saxony, but this he did not succeed in doing. Contrary to expectation, the League now held together, and even the towns stood loyally by it.

The campaign was opened toward the latter end of June, 1546. But the man who had always recoiled in horror from a religious war, although in his later years obedience to the emperor did not seem to him so essentially a Christian duty as before, did not live to see this war. Martin Luther died on February 18, 1546, at Eisleben. But his marvellous personality (the inserted plate, "Martin Luther," shows his portrait in the riper years of his life) influenced, although often in a way which history must condemn, the moulding of ecclesiastical matters in Germany for many years.

At the beginning of the war the emperor was still holding a diet at Ratisbon, and remained there until the first days of August, although he had only a small bodyguard with him. His troops were still in foreign countries, while the League had more than fifty thousand men in the field. Had they advanced directly on Ratisbon they must have succeeded; but instead of this, they split up their forces, took Donsauwörth on July 20, and when at last they came into conflict with the imperial army before Ingolstadt were unable to gain any victory. Meanwhile reinforcements to the extent of twenty thousand men joined Charles's army, and by the end of autumn the position became hopeless, when Maurice declared open hostility to his cousin, the elector, on October 27, after he himself had been invested with the title of Elector of Saxony in the place of the proscribed prince.
In conjunction with King Ferdinand he occupied the electorate, and by this movement compelled the forces of the League stationed in Swabia to withdraw at once to central Germany. The emperor had thus become master of the south, for the towns surrendered to him, and Duke Ulrich of Württemberg was forced to abandon his resistance. At the beginning of 1547 the Catholic creed was completely restored in the archbishopric of Cologne. Hermann von Wied resigned on February 25, and was forced to make way for his former coadjutor, Adolf von Schaumberg, while the army of the League broke up in central Germany.

John Frederick's one aim was the reconquest of his dominions. But while he attempted this, Charles returned unmolested from Bohemia to Saxony, and surprised him on April 24, 1547, at Mühlberg on the Elbe. Ferdinand and Maurice were with the emperor; the Saxons deserted their strong position in the town, and were defeated in the pursuit by Duke Alva, the imperial commander-in-chief, on the moors of Lochau. The Saxons were completely routed, John Frederick wounded and captured, and soon afterward Wittenberg fell into the hands of the emperor. In north Germany only Hesse, Bremen, and Oldenburg remained unsubdued. Philip did not wish to commit himself to an uncertain struggle, and accepted the mediation of the Elector Maurice, who made an agreement with the emperor to the effect that the landgrave, if he submitted, should not be further punished. Philip of Hesse came, but, contrary to the spirit of the agreement, though according to the letter of it, which only excluded perpetual imprisonment, was thrown into prison on June 19. Thus the two princes, formerly the most powerful in Protestant Germany, languished in prison, while Charles was freed by the death of King Francis on March 31, 1547, from his dangerous rival, and on June 19 bought a truce for five years from the Turks at the price of a yearly tribute.

The hope entertained by the Pope of a yielding on the part of the Protestants was not fulfilled; on the contrary, the emperor had to grant them complete liberty in the exercise of their religion, and his representatives at Trent did not show any special friendship toward papal pretensions, and were above all resolutely opposed to any removal of the council to Italy. Paul III, however, took that step; on March 11, 1547, he removed to Bologna, presumably from fear of the plague. A schism in the old church now threatened; for in Bologna Charles did not wish to co-operate in the reform of the Church, and since the Pope refused, he was compelled to take it in hand himself, at any rate so far as Germany was concerned.

(a) Charles's Last Years: from the Interim of Augsburg to the Emperor's Abdication and Death (1547–1558). — The diet of Augsburg in the autumn of 1547 produced a scheme, the Interim of Augsburg, in which King Ferdinand had a considerable part. The religious system in Germany was to be re-established in conformity with this until a universally valid decree of the church council should be passed. This system of faith was formulated by the middle of March, 1548. It sufficiently expressed the conquest of the Protestants. Its main requirement was a reversion to the old Church, and it only conceded two points, the communion in two kinds and the marriage of the clergy; for the rest, an attempt was made to evade the real dispute by expressions which admitted of various interpretations. But no unity was produced even on this basis, which was supported by the assent of the Catholics. The Interim was only to be binding on the Protestants, while the members of the old faith refused to comply with it. The emperor's
well-meaning, accordingly, came to nothing. He succeeded better in strengthening his absolute power as emperor; for the towns, treated with equal unfriendliness by sovereigns and princes, now lost their political influence.

Charles now filled the Imperial Chamber with councillors appointed only by himself, and the Netherlands were united with the empire as “a Burgundian circle” on June 26, 1548, but were at the same time declared independent of the Imperial Chamber. The protection of the empire only was contemplated, without any prejudice to the independence of the disturbed territories. Although the Interim was hated by the whole nation on account of its unreasonable demands, and only found here and there a formal recognition, Charles attempted, in connection with the diet of Augsburg, to win support for the election of his son Philip. This time, however, he found opposition, not only from his brother Ferdinand, who had an earlier claim in consequence of his election as king of the Romans, but also from the whole body of princes. The experiences which they had of the Spaniard Charles deterred them from venturing once more to elect a full-blooded Spaniard; national safety demanded a definite refusal of this request. On March 9, 1551, after Philip had already been invested in 1550 with the Netherlands, an agreement was made between the emperor and the king that Ferdinand should be emperor after Charles’s death, but should be succeeded by Philip, who would become meanwhile king of the Romans, and Ferdinand’s son, Maximilian, would eventually succeed Philip. Thus nothing was definitely decided as to the all-important position of the electors; in fact the arrangement was to be regarded as a compulsory one, so far as the younger line of the Hapsburgs was concerned. It was a scheme to fix the empire in one dynastic family.

The diet at Augsburg of 1550–1551 was thinly attended. Much ill-feeling was aroused by the high-handed policy of Charles and his followers toward Germany, especially since Charles, in spite of the urgent requests of the princes, did not consent to dismiss the Spaniards, who were unconstitutionally kept under arms.

In addition to this, there was the peculiar severity of imprisonment of the Landgrave Philip, which had been felt by all princes as a degradation of their order generally. Briefly, there was a general tendency toward rebellion against the emperor, and the power to do so seemed ready to hand. Efforts had already (1548) been made to form a new alliance in the northeast of the empire, and hopes had been raised of French help, and of the cooperation of Protestant Denmark. Dukes Albert of Prussia and John Albert of Mecklenburg, as well as Margrave Hans of Kœstrin, formed a league in February, 1550. And when Maurice of Saxony, who felt himself deeply injured by the emperor, made overtures to the members of the Northern League, a secret treaty was formed in May, 1551, at Torgau to protect the liberty of the princes against the emperor. Maurice, by virtue of the powers vested in him as imperial agent, had previously enrolled an army without attracting notice, in order to enforce against Magdeburg the long-postponed ban of the empire, and continued at the head of these troops. The Ernestines were induced to become neutral; and while it was resolved to spare King Ferdinand as much as possible, negotiations with France were set on foot, which, being successfully conducted in the winter of 1551–1552, were concluded on February 14, 1552, at Friedewald in Hesse.

Henry II promised his help in the war against the emperor, in return for which he was allowed to hold as “Vicar of the Empire,” the towns of Metz, Toul, Verdun,
and Cambry. These proceedings did not remain unnoticed; but the emperor did not himself attach any credence to the reports which reached him at Innsbruck, where he lay sick. He was therefore greatly astonished when the storm burst on him in March. King Henry invaded Lorraine with thirty-five thousand men, and the princes advanced into south Germany as far as Augsburg. Charles was still unwilling to believe in the complicity of Maurice, especially since Maurice had just joined Ferdinand in order by his aid to bring about an agreement between emperor and princes. The town of Magdeburg surrendered to the victors on April 4. The emperor had no resources at his disposal, and was obliged to win time by negotiations. Ferdinand and Maurice met at Linz on April 18. A larger meeting was summoned for the 28th of May at Passau, to prosecute the negotiations, but Maurice did not countenance any lull in hostilities. He wished to cut off the emperor completely, and actually forced him by an advance to the Alps to fly into Carinthia, whither he was accompanied by John Frederick of Saxony, now released from captivity. Maurice took Innsbruck shortly before the beginning of the negotiations at Passau, and the members of the council assembled at Trent fled in order not to fall into the hands of the elector.

Shortly after the appointed day (beginning of June, 1552) the deliberations of the States began at Passau. The emperor and even his brother were refused access to it; nor was French influence to govern the assembly this time. The demands of Maurice were, in Church matters, religious toleration, and in politics, the regency of the princes and the destruction of the imperial supremacy. His princely colleagues were easily induced to assent. The emperor showed more reluctance, but finally agreed to Ferdinand's representations that the questions should be once more discussed in a diet, and that until that time the conquerors should be allowed to exercise their religion according to their conscience. Landgrave Philip was set at liberty in the autumn of 1552. The Interim of Augsburg was thus put aside. For the first time, if only for a brief period, the equality of the two confessions was declared, and the political supremacy of the emperor was broken not only in Germany but in Europe. Charles was no longer the acknowledged master. When at the end of 1552 he marched against King Henry, and invested Metz, Maurice had already followed King Ferdinand to the war against the Turks. In central Germany the licentious Hohenzollern Margrave Albert, at any rate not hindered by the emperor, began a wild career of lawlessness and rapine. The princes of south Germany formed a league against him, and the elector Maurice finally conquered him on the 9th of July, at Sievershausen. Unhappily the elector was wounded in the battle, and died on July 11. Albert was again defeated on June 13, 1554, near Schwarza in Lower Franconia, and fled to France.

Without the help of the emperor the princes had restored peace and order in the empire (1554). But Charles was weary of his sovereignty and began to withdraw from public life. That very year he transferred all sovereign rights in Germany to his brother Ferdinand; his son Philip became in October, 1555, ruler of the Netherlands, and of the Spanish possessions in Italy, with the title of King of Naples; in January, 1556, he similarly received the Spanish crown. The emperor retired in September, 1556, to San Geronimo de Yuste, and died there on the 21st of September, 1558.

It now rested with Ferdinand to arrange the affairs of Germany and to convene the diet promised in the treaty of Passau. It met on the 5th of February, 1555, at
Augsburg. The Protestants demanded immediately a religious peace for the empire with reciprocal recognition of the confessions, taking into account the actual conditions existing at the time of the treaty of Passau. This recognition was, however, only to apply to the States and not to the subjects, whose confession was still to be dependent on that of the territorial lord. Ferdinand was forced to submit to these demands. The following points were agreed upon; that is, that the peace had no limits of time; it was valid for all estates of the empire, to which the right attached of changing the religion in their district; but that this referred only to the confession of the Catholics and to that of the adherents to the confession of Augsburg, not to that of the followers of Zwingli. From this time the empire took the Evangelicals legally under its protection, and the princely power of the Catholic princes was at the same time greatly strengthened, since they henceforth superintended the property of the Church. The death penalty for heresy was abolished, and all were to have free right to leave the country. It was, however, settled at the same time that a spiritual prince might indeed personally go over from the Catholic to the Evangelical faith, but in this case his district or his spiritual office must remain Catholic; he therefore must be separated from it. This last proviso was called "the Ecclesiastical Reservation." The Protestants laid a formal protest against it, but they took care not to hazard the whole work by a too obstinate insistence on an untenable point. So on September 25, 1555, the religious peace was established by the reces, and remained in force up to the peace of Westphalia.

With the religious question the constitution of the empire was necessarily modified, and the government by the States took over, in every important point, the still existing imperial powers; thus the new organisation of the Imperial Chamber put the nomination to the posts and the examination of procedure into the hands of the States. And the new system of circles, which was intended to facilitate the execution of judgments of the Imperial Chamber, produced the result that the last royal privilege, the maintenance of the Public Peace, became the right of the several States. Even the law of the empire recognised by this the fact that the territory of the prince had assumed the character of a complete political organisation.

D. FRANCE AT THE PERIOD OF THE REFORMATION

(a) Francis I. — Louis XII died on the first day of the year 1515, and Francis of Angoulême succeeded him on the throne. The chivalrous king wished to win back Milan for his crown, crossed the Alps in summer, and defeated in the sanguinary battle of Marignano the Swiss of the Duke of Milan. The Pope now wished to be on friendly terms with the victorious king, and the Swiss confederation preferred to make a treaty of peace with him. The position of the French in Italy grew stronger and stronger, especially since after the death of the Spaniard Ferdinand (January 23, 1516) a friendly treaty was effected at Noyon between Ferdinand's son, the future Emperor Charles, and Francis, by which the daughter of Francis was betrothed to Charles, and the French claims on Naples were promised her as a marriage portion. A treaty with the Swiss was concluded in autumn, 1516, by which a yearly sum was guaranteed to every canton; that is the treaty by virtue of which the Confederates so long served under French pay, the same which incurred the bitter criticism of the patriotic reformer Zwingli. We know how the Emperor Maximilian in his latter years concluded peace alike with
King Francis and with Venice, and how then under the Emperor Charles the fortune of war and diplomatic skill brought great results and still greater hopes now to one side, now to the other, until the peace of Crépy-en-Laonnais shattered Francis's expectations of an extension of his dominions.

The king during the period of his reign (1515–1547) was under the influence of his ambitious mother, Louise of Savoy (1476–1531), and his chancellor, Antoine Duprat (1463–1535: cardinal in 1527). His extravagances brought such uncertainty into all his actions as sovereign that his reign was in many respects very unprofitable for France. The Concordat of Bologna settled afresh the relations toward the supreme head of the Church (1516); the Pragmatic Sanction was put aside, and the right of the crown to appoint bishops and abbots was admitted, while the Pope recovered his right to the annates. The country was dissatisfied with this innovation, since the clerical posts were now given away merely by personal interest. The Parliament for a long time withheld its consent, but was obliged finally to yield to the wishes of the despotic king. The perpetual emptiness of the royal treasury, which was inconsistent with the sums lavished on favourites, was partially remedied by the most unworthy transactions, while the king himself sacrificed his oath and his honour in political treaties without any thought of keeping his promises. Francis, and still more his mother, behaved with the same faithlessness to the Constable Charles of Bourbon as to the emperor, since the former was forcibly deprived of the inheritance of his wife, and was finally driven by this treatment into the enemy's camp. Nothing perhaps damaged the king more in the eyes of his contemporaries than the fact that he repeatedly entered into negotiations with the Infidela, the bitterest foes of Christianity, just as, though a good Catholic and keen opponent of heresy, he did not shrink from allying himself with the Protestant princes; and all from enmity to the intolerable power of the emperor Charles. The old position toward England continued under Francis, and we know how Henry VIII temporarily came to an agreement with the emperor in France. A year before the death of Francis, on the 7th of June, 1546, a peace was at length effected with England, which practically deprived the latter of her possessions on the Continent.

While the vicissitudes of the war kept France continually in unrest, the material welfare of the people had been promoted to some extent by the king: the silk industry was introduced at Lyons in his reign. He created a national fleet, and thus gave opportunity for voyages of discovery in the New World and the foundation of French settlements in Canada. He perfected the apparatus of war, especially artillery. He liberally supported scholars (Pélisier, Budjus; the University of Paris gained fresh prosperity through Humanistic studies) and artists (Sarto, Rossi, Primaticcio, Rugieri, Fontana, Bellini). Leonardo da Vinci was brought by him into the country; Raphael is said to have been his court painter. At his court for the first time accomplished ladies played a prominent part, but at the same time a license in manners was introduced which was hitherto unknown.

(6) Calvin. — The new teaching of the gospel had soon spread on French soil. But its followers were immediately subjected to the bitterest persecution, in which the king exceptionally (contrary to the previous ideas, according to which heretics were judged only before the spiritual court), assigned their persecution and punishment to the temporal courts, just as Jacob Sprenger had demanded in his
"Witches’ Hammer" (Malleus Maleficarum; 1st impression: Cologne, 1489). The king himself clung obstinately to the old faith, although he suggested the opposite to the Schmalcaldic princes, and invited Melanchthon to his court for the discussion of religious questions. In January, 1535, he ordered six Protestants to be burnt at the stake, and in 1545 he mercilessly massacred the remnants of the Waldensian community in Provence.

Lutheranism had, during the first twenty years of the century found friends everywhere, and in all classes, including the king’s sister, Margaret of Navarre, and the court poet, Clément Marot. But persecution, as well as the German origin of the doctrine of justification, may have hindered the growth of a sect and any dissemination of the teaching amongst the masses until the church reform in France received a real head in John Calvin (Jean Cauvin), who, leaning more on Zwingli than on Luther, began a work which was in many respects independent (circa 1530). He was born on 10th July, 1509, at Noyon in Picardy, had devoted himself in 1527 to the clerical profession, but exchanged that for the law, when the study of the Scriptures caused doubts to arise in his mind as to the correctness of the Catholic Church system. About 1530 he renounced jurisprudence also, and after 1531 began to work in Paris for the new teaching. But he was forced to fly thence in 1534, and turned his steps to Basle, where he wrote, in 1536, a book on his evangelical doctrines, the "Instruction in the Christian Religion" (Institutio Christianae Religionis), which he dedicated to King Francis personally, in order to vindicate his cruelly persecuted brothers in the faith.

Calvin, after a short sojourn in Italy, came in August to Geneva, where in 1535 the reformed doctrine had been introduced, and made his home there. He attracted a large following; he wrote, disputed, taught, and founded new congregations. But a quarrel with the council of Geneva about the exercise of his religion caused him to withdraw in 1538 to Strasburg, where he acted as preacher to the French congregation and lecturer in the university. He came into contact with Melanchthon (Frankfort, 1539; Worms, 1540; and Ratisbon, 1541), and followed the fortunes of the Reformation in Germany; but, yielding to the requests of the citizens of Geneva, he returned to that town in September, 1541. There he founded the first congregation with a democratic church government (Presbyterian constitution), which eventually led to the organisation of the Reformed Church. He laboured indefatigably at the education of the clergy of his party, and for this object founded a seminary and a theological academy (1559). Notwithstanding his sternness, which saw a grievous sin in any deviation from rigid belief, an agreement was made in 1549 with the followers of Zwingli at Zürich, on the basis of which both parties united as "Reformed," and opposed the Lutherans.

The religious system of Calvin at Geneva acquired the more importance since it found considerable support in France, although Francis’s son, Henry II (1547-1559), persecuted the heretics no less violently than his father, from whose system of government he otherwise deviated in many respects. The chief power at his court was his mistress, Diana of Poitiers (after 1548 Duchess of Valentinois), a reckless opponent of the new Church which, definitely formulated in Calvinism, had a stronger basis than it had before, when individuals rather than dogmas were involved in it. And at the same time court intrigue readily availed itself of the new confession as a pretext for getting rid of objectionable persons, since an edict of 1551 made it the duty of the judges to search out heretics wherever they might
be. As regards external policy, Henry, in agreement with the German Protestants, acquired the towns of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and recovered the town of Calais from England, after an alienation of more than two hundred years. But the government of this personally good-natured but weak and pliable king helped to prepare, under the cloak of religious controversy, that civil war in France which was destined to break out under his sons, Francis II (1559–1560), Charles IX (1560–1574), and Henry III (1574–1589).

(c) The Huguenots. — Francis II was only fifteen years old on the death of his father (10th July, 1559), and had married Mary Stuart, Princess of Scotland, daughter of James V, in 1558. The reins of government were not held by him, but by his mother, the intriguing Catharine de Medici, who associated herself with the two most powerful men in the kingdom, the Dukes Francis and Charles of Guise, by giving the first the control of the army, and promoting the latter, who was Cardinal and Archbishop of Reims, to be chief minister. These two were the leaders of the Catholic party, while the Calvinists, henceforth known as "Huguenots," found a head in Louis of Bourbon, Prince of Condé, a relation of the royal house. Political schemes, amongst the foremost men, at least, were, however, so engrossing that opposition in matters of religion was only outwardly combined with it, in order to have a wider foundation for powerful enterprises. The followers of Condé, and of the Bourbons generally, had agreed that the Guises must be dislodged from their foremost positions. Opinions were only divided as to the best way of doing this. The attempt to win over the queen mother to the plan failed completely.

The thought now suggested itself to form, in accordance with the advice of Gaspard de Châtillon, lord of Coligny, an alliance with the reformed party, which, notwithstanding all persecutions, comprised more than two thousand congregations. This political side of the religious movement was bound to rouse the ruling party to more cruel persecutions. An edict was issued in autumn, 1559, which prohibited the Huguenots from holding public worship under pain of death. This edict cost the lives of many honourable men. A conspiracy, with which the Bourbons were indirectly connected, tried to deprive the Guises and the queen mother of the government by force; but the enterprise was a failure, and the leaders of the plot paid the penalty with their lives. It was only too well known at court in what connection the action of the Huguenots stood with the policy of Condé; but the Guises did not immediately contemplate his punishment, especially as he had retired to his estates. But the prince feared the vengeance of those in power, and preferred, therefore, not to appear at a meeting of the notables which was summoned to Fontainebleau, and may in this way have disconcerted the ruling party at first. A petition for toleration, addressed by the Huguenots to the king, met with no favourable response; indeed, at a meeting of the States-general at Orleans, Prince Condé was arrested on October 30, 1560, and was condemned to death for high treason by a specially appointed commission, of which he emphatically challenged the competence. However, before the sentence could be carried out King Francis II died suddenly (December 5, 1560), and the two persons most nearly concerned, who would have gladly overthrown the Guises, namely, King Antony of Navarre and Admiral Coligny, escaped without any trial.

As Francis left no children, his brother, Charles IX, a boy aged ten years, succeeded to the throne. Under him Queen Catharine held the reins of government
more firmly than ever, and now sought to overthrow the inconvenient supremacy of the Guises. To attain this object it was necessary for her to secure the support of the Bourbons, and after some vain attempts she won their confidence. The prince was acquitted of his crime, and King Antony nominated governor-general for the king, while Catharine claimed for herself the title of regent, and also assigned to Cardinal Guise the administration of the finances. But this was contrary to the promises which the queen-regent had given to King Antony, for they had stipulated the complete retirement of the Guises and religious liberty for the Huguenots. Catharine had in all probability never contemplated fulfilling her promise, since by so doing she would have put herself too completely in the power of the Bourbons. All that King Antony obtained was an edict which substituted exile for death as the punishment for holding heretical public worship, and forbade searches in the interiors of the houses. A religious conference, which was held at Catharine’s proposal, naturally did nothing to clear up the situation, especially since the Catholics now noticed with alarm an inclination of the queen toward the Protestant side, and the Chancellor, Michel de L’Hôpital, zealously advocated toleration. The result was a decree promulgated in January, 1562, which allowed the Huguenots to hold public worship outside the towns, while it also excused them from the restitution of churches and church property to the Catholics. This was distinctly a victory for the cause of the “Reformed” party which was unprecedented, and justified the most sanguine expectations.

King Antony, then, trusting to the easily won favour of King Philip of Spain went over to the side of the Catholics, who were now engaged in civil war, and so forced the queen into the closest alliance with Condé and Coligny. A few weeks after the issue of the Edict, the interruption of an evangelical service by Duke Francis of Guise gave the signal for a sanguinary riot, in the course of which the king and his mother fell into the power of the Catholic party, which held Paris. Condé and Coligny, encouraged by the queen, made preparations at Orleans to liberate the king, while throughout the country the same feud put weapons into the hands of the peasants. A great part of the nobility and the towns stood by the Huguenots, while almost the whole peasantry, excepting that of Normandy, espoused the Catholic cause. Both parties committed equal excesses, ravaging the country with fire and sword; both courted and obtained help from foreign powers, the Catholics from Spain and Italy, the Huguenots from Germany and England. Francis Guise was shot by a fanatical Calvinist during the siege of Orleans, in February, 1563, and the Catholic party, much shaken by the loss of its leader, consented to a peace at Amboise (15th of March, 1563). By this all feudal tenants of the crown acquired for themselves and their subjects the right to exercise their religion without hindrance, the other members of the nobility might do so in their houses, while a similar privilege was conceded to the towns. The English were now driven from the land, and Prince Condé was promised influence in the government; but owing to Catharine’s faithlessness, there could be no confidence that the arrangement would be kept.

After this first religious civil war, the feeling of the two parties among themselves was unfortunately the same as ever; even the terrible sight of a ravaged country did not deter them from new outrages. The young king, who showed no pleasing traits of character, had been proclaimed of age at fourteen, but in reality his mother still ruled; she travelled through the country with him and took this
opportunity of sounding the feeling of the people. Insurrection could only with
difficulty be repressed during the four years subsequent to the unsatisfactory con-
clusion of peace. Even if Coligny appeared outwardly reconciled with the brother
of the murdered Francis Guise, both parties had made up their minds that hostil-
ities would be renewed. On the 27th of September, 1567, the Huguenots rose
under Condé and Coligny in great force; Condé besieged the king and the queen
mother in Paris, which was feebly defended. The Huguenots were obliged
indeed to withdraw without accomplishing their purpose, and suffered a defeat
in November, notwithstanding their gallant resistance. In Lorraine they received
support from the Palatinate, but the royalists were reinforced on their side by
papal troops. Condé had won a distinct advantage when the queen re-commenced
negotiations, and the treaty of 1563 was confirmed on the 23d of March, 1568, by
the treaty of Lonjumeau.

But this time also the mistrust continued. After the chancellor, L'Hôpital,
had been deprived of his office, the edict of peace was revoked by the court, and all
non-Catholic divine worship was forbidden on pain of death. This order was to
be carried out by force, and the Huguenots were prepared to resist. But they were
completely defeated on March 13, 1569, at Jarnac, and Condé fell. Coligny now
rallied all the followers of the reformed teaching, although he had lost almost all
his comrades in arms, and was condemned to death by the Parliament of Paris as
guilty of high treason. Once more the Huguenots conquered in the field, but they
were again totally beaten at Montcontour on October 3, and Coligny was forced to
retreat. The resources of the court were again exhausted, and the king wished for
peace, because dissensions had long prevailed in the Catholic party. The treaty of
1563 was therefore confirmed for the second time on the 8th of August, 1570,
at St. Germain-en-Laye and the validity of all other decrees was annulled; the
Huguenots were in addition allowed this time to occupy four fortresses as a guar-
antee for the fulfilment of the agreement.

It can hardly be assumed that there was any wish at court to make permanent
concessions to the Huguenots, but at any rate this was done. The most impor-
tant event in this connection was brought about by the marriage on the 18th of
August, 1572, of Margaret, the king's sister, with Henry of Navarre, son of Queen
Joanna, who had just fought on the side of the Huguenots. Coligny was also
cordially received by King Charles and appointed to the council of state; but his
advice that the king was now old enough to rule alone proved his ruin. A cer-
tain excitement was caused among the Huguenots by the death of Queen Joanna of
Navarre, since there were rumours of poisoning. The queen mother, in fear lest
Coligny might drive the king to independent action which might lead to her own
expulsion, desired nothing more fervently than the death of the admiral. She
hired an assassin, but his shot only slightly wounded his victim; and the excuse of
the king that he knew nothing about it lulled the suspicions of the Huguenot
chiefs so that they remained — to their destruction — in the city. Catharine was
so infuriated at the failure of her plan that she devised a new scheme; not Coligny
alone but all the leaders of the Huguenots and as many as possible of their follow-
ers were to be sacrificed to her revenge. Attended by a small body of loyal Guises,
she argued with the king on the evening of the 23d of August, 1572, until he at
last issued the command that all Huguenots were to be killed that very night.
The order was so quickly announced and executed that the dawn of the 24th of
August saw the streets of Paris full of blood and corpses: that was the St. Bartholomew's Night (la Saint-Barthélemy). Coligny with all the other leaders and thousands of citizens fell victims to the murderers; but not merely Huguenots were slain; many other motives besides religious zeal, such as revenge, greed, personal hatred, and mere lust of slaughter, caused the death of numerous good Catholics on that night. The massacre can only be set down in the long list of crimes perpetrated under the cloak of religious zeal.

The king was uncertain whether he had commanded this hideous crime or whether it had been perpetrated without or even against his will. Henry of Navarre and Henry of Condé, who were spared on this wicked occasion, submitted themselves to the king and renounced their opinions.

The greater part of the Huguenots fled the country after the terrible catastrophe and sought shelter abroad, since the four places which had been given them as pledges no longer afforded any security; royal troops now began to besiege La Rochelle, the strongest of the places of refuge. But since they failed to take it, the Edict of Boulogne (30th of June, 1573) secured liberty of conscience and the right of public worship to the Huguenots in three of the already privileged towns. The royal court was exposed to further disturbances even before the death of Charles IX on May 30, 1574. The ambitious Queen Catharine had succeeded in placing her favourite son Henry on the throne of Poland, and he had gone to his new kingdom in 1573. Now, however, the question of the succession was being discussed at home, since Charles's death seemed rapidly approaching. A distinct party, which sympathised with the Huguenots, hoped to be able to raise Catharine's fourth son, the Duke of Alençon, to the throne. A rising was already planned, which was to put the government into the hands of the conspirators; but the attempt failed. The queen, who had noticed the threatening danger, recalled Henry from Poland immediately after Charles's death. He delayed on the way, but owing to his mother's solicitude, the throne was secure for him. The character of Henry III (1574–1589) had been moulded by his mother; he was cruel and tyrannical, and indulged in extravagances and pleasures so long as his excesses did not sap his strength. The king's brother, as well as Prince Condé and Henry of Navarre, very soon left the court, and the three placed themselves at the head of the Huguenots. When Condé, in the spring of 1576, supported by the Palgrave John Casimir, advanced with an army, the Huguenots brought forward all their grievances and demanded their right. The court had certainly not the strength to venture on a war, and in the treaty of Beaulieu (8th of May, 1576) not only conceded the free exercise of religion, everywhere with the single exception of the town of Paris, but also admission to the offices and judicial posts. The Duke of Alençon by the bestowal of a governorship was removed to a district which sided with him and was therefore withdrawn from the reformed party. The Catholic court had, however, made these concessions reluctantly. The Catholics found a leader in Henry Guise, the youthful son of Duke Francis, who became the head of the "Holy League." This confederation spread throughout France, and aimed at the annihilation of the Reformists. Its secret plans extended still farther, to the overthrow of the royal family, and the elevation of the young Henry Guise to the throne.

The king at first attached no credit to this secret league, but when he saw that it was useless to oppose it, he joined it and proclaimed himself its head. The dan-
ger of being dethroned was thus obviated. The oppression of the Huguenots was renewed and led to the sixth war, which ended with a treaty at Bergerac in October, 1577. It was more due to the laxity of the government than to any submission to the prevailing conditions that tranquillity reigned for some years after the peace of Fleix negotiated in November, 1580. The league, meanwhile, was on permanently good terms with Philip of Spain and watched for a favourable opportunity. This came when, on the 10th of June, 1584, the youngest brother of the king, the Duke of Anjou, and now also of Anjou, died; and thus, after the death of Henry, who was childless, the House of Valois threatened to become extinct and to give way to that of the reformed Bourbon; for Henry of Navarre, after he had quit the court, had once more entirely identified himself with the Huguenots and their creed. In order to avoid this possibility, the league, in combination with King Philip, took the opportunity to designate as successor to the crown another member of the Bourbon family, the old cardinal Charles of Bourbon, who at once issued a proclamation against the king. Swords were already drawn, and serious results threatened to ensue; the king then betook himself to negotiations and was obliged at Nemours on July 7, 1585, to promise the powerful league that he would consent to the withdrawal of all decrees friendly to the Huguenots. This roused the Huguenots to action. The eighth war produced, however, no decisive results; the king continued to allow the reins of government to slip from his grasp while the reputation of Henry Guise increased. The victory of the Huguenots at Courtrai (20th of October, 1587), was without further consequences; the defeat of Auneau soon followed, and in spring, 1588, young Condé died. The strained relations between the king and Henry Guise, whom the Parisians chiefly favoured, became more and more marked; the king was worsted in a fight between the royal Swiss guards and Guise's followers in the streets of the city (12th of May, 1588: the first street warfare at Paris). As a plot was being hatched against his life, he escaped just in time from the capital. Guise acted as ruler there until, in the treaty of Rouen (15th of July, 1588), he exiled from the humiliated king under the name of governor-general the remaining rights as ruler of the realm. But he did not long enjoy his power: the daggers of the assassins whom the king had hired struck him on the 23rd of December, 1588.

The old queen, Catharine, soon followed. She died at the beginning of 1589. Her weak son now stood quite alone and had not the power to avail himself fully of the favourable position which the murder of his rival had produced. He avoided appearing at once in Paris, where meanwhile the league roused the wildest excitement against the king and openly called for his assassination. But before the Dominican, Jacques Clement, trescheroously stabbed the king while handing him petitions at Saint-Cloud (1st of August, 1589), the dethroned monarch had come to terms with the Huguenots, had become reconciled with Henry of Navarre, and in conjunction with him had begun war on the league. Now on his death-bed the last of the Valois called the Bourbon to him, declared him his successor, and ordered his followers to recognise him as such. Henry of Navarre had to fight for the crown which lawfully came to him, especially since the league was in possession of Paris and shunned the Calvinistic Bourbon as a heretic.

After the death of Henry Guise, his brother, the Duke of Mayenne had assumed the leadership of the league and had made himself governor-general. Henry IV (1589–1610), in order not to make his position at once impossible, promised that he
would for the future support the Catholic confession, and would have himself instructed in it, and would submit himself to a national council. A part of the Catholics, on the strength of these promises, actually stood by him; but the Huguenots, for the same reason, naturally feared his defection. The war between the league and the king remained undecided, until the latter gained a brilliant victory on the 14th of March, 1590, at Ivry-la-Bataille. But the league still held Paris. Henry began the siege, but was forced to relinquish it after some time, since Spain supported the league. Philip did not recognise the Bourbon Henry in any way as king, but the old cardinal who was called Charles X. After the latter's death he counted on the French throne for his daughter, who might be considered a scion of the Valois on the female side.

The war continued. England and Germany sent reinforcements for the king; the members of the league were divided into two camps, since Duke Charles of Guise appeared by the side of Mayenne and the confusion in the country increased. At the beginning of the year 1593 the League wished to choose a new orthodox king, but no conclusion was reached. But Henry soon saw that without a change of faith he could not look for a quiet reign, and he therefore abjured his religion on the 25th of July at Saint-Denis. A considerable part of the Catholics now went over to the side of the king, while another part declared the conversion to be hypocrisy and with that notion continued to instigate the people against the monarch. The murderous attempt of a fanatic fortunately failed. The league, to which Philip now lent only slight aid, offered trifling opposition, and Henry's coronation took place in January, 1594. In March the surrender of the capital was arranged by an agreement with the military commander. Henry made his entry as king, while he cherished nothing but vengeance in his heart against the hostile behaviour of the mob. The war had still to be prosecuted against Mayenne. A second attempt on the life of the king failed (end of 1594). Finally Mayenne recognised the Bourbon as king, after the Pope had received him into the bosom of the Church. The war with Spain lasted a considerable time longer. Henry then began his work of reform and issued on the 25th of April, 1598, the Edict of Nantes which, as little acceptable to the strict reformed party as to the strict Catholics, secured, however, a certain degree of religious peace. This first gave France a legal basis for the organisation of religious matters, in the same way as the religious peace of Augsburg had granted it to the German Empire.

The country had suffered much under the continuous civil wars. Henry's second task was to promote the material welfare. He solved the problem admirably with the help of Maximilian de Bethune, created in 1606 Duke of Sully (1560–1641), a most able financier. The budget which had been neglected for years was once more settled in 1597; and notwithstanding enormous debts, which still had to be liquidated, the exchequer gradually grew fuller. The king fell by the dagger of the fanatic, François Ravillac, just as he was proposing to interfere in the German disputes about Cleves, on the 14th of May, 1610.

A. THE CATHOLIC REACTION IN THE GERMAN EMPIRE AND IN THE NETHERLANDS

(a) The Council of Trent and the Order of Jesuits. — During the religious dissensions in Germany, the Emperor Charles had always been desirous that another council should be held. The session at Trent had at last begun on the 13th of December, 1545, but was interrupted several times by the changes in politics (1547–51; 1552–62), and was reopened for the last time on the 18th of January, 1562, and definitely concluded on the 4th of December, 1563. The course of the assembly had not been altogether a brilliant success. The object in view had been several times changed. Efforts indeed had first been made to win back the heretics, and for this reason, at the beginning of 1552, Protestants also had been from time to time admitted to the conferences. But the effect of the Council of Trent, taken all in all, was nevertheless much more permanent than that of any earlier council. For the organisation of the Church was firmly established, the ecclesiastical constitution reformed, and the contents of the articles of faith authoritatively fixed, so that the form assumed by the Catholic Church in the succeeding period was only the practical result of the resolutions taken at Trent. It had already been recognised that the unclerical life of so many professed servants of God did not harmonise with the requirements of the Church, but all attempts to remedy this had failed until the example of the Evangelicals, who for this very reason were so highly esteemed, made some energetic steps seem doubly urgent. Resolutions in this direction were adopted at Trent, which were intended to solve this problem. The scientific and religious education of the clergy was specially organised and at the same time the plurality of benefices prohibited, so that a less luxurious mode of life should for this reason be adopted.

The solution of the first-mentioned problem would have been the most difficult task for the church twenty years previously, but now it was comparatively easy: for in quite a different quarter the church had found a new ally in the order of Jesuits, which on a basis similar to that of Protestantism used the teaching of the Humanists in order to train the intellect of the future clergy. The founder of the order was Inigo Lopez de Recalde de Loyola (1491–1556) a Spaniard by birth, who at first had followed the profession of arms. Having been severely wounded (1521) he tried to satisfy his religious cravings by asceticism, wandered over the world, diligently studied the theologians, and finally formed the resolve to become the protector and champion of the Catholic Church against the new doctrines. As early as 1528 he found in Paris a circle of enthusiastic followers (Laynez, Salmeron, Bobadilla, Rodriguez, Lefèvre, and Xavier) who were ready to join him in work and in asceticism, and to throw themselves body and soul, in a way hitherto unknown, into the service of the medieval church (1534). An organisation was necessary in order to carry out these purposes. This was created by the papal bull, which on the 27th of September, 1540, instituted "the Company of Jesus," that is to say a community of at most sixty members who promised to devote themselves to the dissemination of the true faith, under the strictest obedience to their superior and the Pope. Their chief duty was missionary work, and this they carried out by indefatigable wanderings through every land. But it was only
after 1543, when the number of members had begun to grow, that the organisation and its efficiency expanded. Loyola himself became in 1541 the first general, whose will was necessarily obeyed by every member of the order by virtue of the implicit yielding up of all individual will or opinion.

The hierarchic system was here developed in the strictest conceivable manner, and the fruits corresponded thoroughly to the exertions of the members of the order. Their numbers and their influence increased with astonishing rapidity in every country; settlements were formed everywhere, which were geographically grouped into provinces, while many individual brothers were busily employed as teachers in grammar schools and universities. This task was doubly important in Germany, since the advanced teaching of the Protestants threatened to gain complete victory; Jesuits appeared as teachers in the Bavarian university of Ingolstadt as early as 1549 and gradually made this academy entirely subservient to them; a Jesuit college was started at Munich in 1559. But even before this Loyola had induced the Pope to take a most important step for the counter-reformation in Germany, by founding the German College at Rome (1552), an institution at which successive groups of German theologians were to be educated in the Jesuitic spirit. The students of this college were to form the flower of the troops in the war against Protestantism, to hold the foremost positions in the German Church and gradually to lead back the lost Germany to the bosom of the Church.

While the Protestant theologians, after the peace of Augsburg, began a violent dogmatic struggle with the Swiss Reformed Church, and while there was furious opposition in Electoral Saxony to Crypto-Calvinism, German Catholicism gained in spiritual strength, and was able to aim a blow at Protestantism from Bavaria and Austria. It is remarkable that the papal policy met with approval from these two temporal princes almost alone, while of the numerous spiritual princes some were openly inclined to Protestantism (especially Gebhard Truchsess von Walsburg in Cologne, who originally was a strong papist), and some were regarded in Rome at least as untrustworthy and could only gradually be induced to acknowledge the Tridentine confession of faith. Now for the first time a closer and more regular bond was drawn between Germany and the Curia, in which a more earnest spiritual life began to be the rule by the founding of so-called Nunciatures, beginning with Vienna and Cologne; a much stronger influence from Rome could thus be exercised on the Cathedral-Chapters, especially at the election of bishops, than by the individual legates of the earlier system. Those who occupied the episcopal sees in Germany after the eighth decade of the sixteenth century, were in fact far more zealous Catholics than their predecessors; being partly younger princes of the families of the Hapsburgs and Catholic Wittelsbachs they were also politically connected with princely houses and prepared to carry out the decrees of Trent within their jurisdictions. In this way a uniformity was again brought into the policy of the many Catholic princes, while on the Protestant side the continual struggle between Electoral Saxony and the Palatinate prevented any uniform action. The Catholics had always the majority in the diet both in the college of the electors and in that of the princes.

In one place only Protestantism gained temporarily a fresh success — on the Lower Rhine — where numerous Evangelicals, banished from the Netherlands, sought refuge. Protestants appeared in the town council of the imperial city of
Aix-la-Chapelle in 1574, and a few years later they were in the majority. In the Archbishops of Cologne, Gebhard Truchsess von Waldburg, no doubt from purely personal motives (he was desirous to marry Countess Agnes of Mansfeld), tried to carry his province into the reform, but at the same time, while violating the conditions of the clerical state, he wished to rule as a temporal prince. Gebhard publicly adopted Calvinism in 1582, and married on February 2, 1583. But the States did not follow him, and since the Lutheran princes took little or no care for the Calvinist, the newly chosen Archbishop Ernest of Bavaria won a victory with Spanish help and was recognised as elector, in 1584, by the empire and even by the Protestant princes.

(b) The War of Independence in the Netherlands. — This was a great success for Catholicism, and all the more so because now for the first time the attempt at establishing Protestantism had failed, and the feeble efforts of the Protestant princes had shown that the days of the Schmalkaldic League were past. On the north-west frontier of Germany a great change had been produced in the Netherlands, where the fanatics had already found a home, and Calvinism began to spread widely. Charles V had taken vigorous measures against the heretics, but without distinct success, more especially since the local ruler was unpopular on political as well as religious grounds. Philip, the son of Charles, had taken over the government in 1556 from his father; but it was inevitable that he should be personally hateful to the Netherlands, as being a true Spaniard, which could not be said of Charles. The presence of Spanish troops during the period after 1550 created intense ill-feeling among the people, while increasing financial difficulties, coupled with dwindling returns from trade, of which England now began to take a share, made themselves felt. All this fostered the thought of revolution among the people, and matured the plan of finally shaking off the Spanish yoke.

When Philip left the Netherlands in 1559 in order to visit Spain, he appointed his step-sister, Margaret of Parma, to the regency, a post she was well qualified to fill, especially since she was supported by a central government which Charles had splendidly organised. But the Council of State contained, besides the Spaniards and Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle (the younger, 1517–1586), a most loyal servant of his king, a large number of the nobility of the Netherlands who were not disposed to submit without demur to Spanish ideas, and adhered to the Evangelical creed. Foremost among them was Prince William I, the Silent, of Nassau-Orange. In order to support the Catholic religion Philip formed new dioceses, and intended to interfere in the French religious struggles in the interests of the Catholic party (p. 274), but he met with the keenest opposition from the leaders of the nobility. William of Orange, in the struggle with Philip, sought an alliance with the German Protestants (he was the son-in-law of Augustus, Elector of Saxony) and with the Huguenots of France. The crisis became more and more acute after 1563. The nobility demanded that the States-General should be summoned, but Granvelle would not entertain the idea. The destruction of the political and ecclesiastical supremacy of Spain would have been sealed by this step. Philip gave way once more to the urgency of the nobility, and recalled Granvelle in the spring of 1564.

Nevertheless, the old spirit still prevailed both in the government and among the people; indeed the Protestant movement became more and more violent, since
the stadholders in the provinces allowed themselves to be taken unprepared to carry out the strict orders of the government against the heretics. The Inquisition had begun its work, but the people and the nobles revolted against it, and Margaret was obliged to consent, in 1565, to the sending of an embassy to the king in order to lay before him the demands of the Netherlands. Count Egmont was chosen for this mission to the royal court; but he achieved no results. The Inquisition was sustained, and the States-General were strictly forbidden to assemble until complete religious, that is to say Catholic, order had been restored. This was more than the people could tolerate. The command of the king was ridiculed; the populace rose in Antwerp, and the provincial stadholders refused to comply with the orders of the government. In November, 1565, by the so-called compromise of Breda, a secret league of the nobility was effected, which meant the paving of the way toward the revolution against Spain and the Inquisition.

The first act of the members of the league was to send a petition, on April 5, 1566, to Margaret, the regent, with the old demands. To this she returned an evasive answer, and the petition resulted in nothing. In the summer, therefore, a new petition was presented, in which the "Beggars" (the "Gueux") — the petitioners had thus styled themselves at the suggestion of Count Henry of Brederode — demanded the abdication of the regent and the appointment of a national government. Philip of Montmorency-Nivelle, Count of Horn, was for the future to guide the fortunes of the country in conjunction with Egmont and William of Orange, and to protect the country by levying troops. But before Margaret had returned an answer, the Calvinists, who were now becoming very powerful, began their career of iconoclasm in August, 1566, and then enlisted troops for the defence of the reformed faith. This riots of religious life appealed but little to the nobility and the great merchants. The regency made some concessions to them, being alarmed at the rising of the masses, and thus the interests of the nobles and the people were divorced. Margaret was able, in 1566 and 1567, to repress the rebellion in the most important places, and, contrary to her former promises, to restore the Inquisition to full activity.

She had won a complete victory, but she did not reap the fruits of her work, since King Philip in August, 1567, sent the Duke of Alva, equally renowned as general and statesman, into the Netherlands in order once more to enforce the recognition of the absolute government. Such full powers were given to Alva that Margaret abdicated in December and resigned her post to the duke. The complete restoration of the old faith was the chief aim of the king and of his stadholder. A specially commissioned board of inquisitors began their bloody work that same winter. Counts Egmont and Horn were arrested on September 9, 1567, and executed on June 5, 1568, while William of Orange escaped to Germany. His attempts there to win help for the liberation of his country were unsuccessful. Alva not only executed with extreme severity all the king's measures, and insisted on the Catholic Church organisation, but also burdened the country with taxes, especially the "tenth penny," for the support of the army, while he gradually disregarded the States-General as a body on whose vote national taxation depended.

A considerable number of Lutherans and Calvinists had escaped execution by flight. They had gone to the coasts and the sea in order to find in a wild, piratical life as "sea-beggars" some compensation for the loss of their former pros-
perity. These freebooters had already recorded a success on April 1, 1572. They captured and held the town of Brielle, and took possession of other places while Alva was busy on the French frontier. William of Orange had always exercised a cheering influence on the rebels from a distance, and had found means to levy troops in Germany. On July 18, 1572, he was nominated by the Dutch provincial states, assembled at Dordrecht, as stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, that is to say, as representative of the King of Spain. This action meant rebellion in Alva's eyes. But it was only after he had captured the town of Mons, in Hainault, that it was possible for him to advance toward the north. Haarlem held out for seven months, and was only taken on July 12, 1573. Other places, especially Alkmaar, showed defiance. Alva, however, before the end of the year, left his post, being thoroughly convinced of the fruitlessness of his exertions.

His successor was the former governor of Milan, Luis de Requesens y Zuniga. The conduct of the Spaniards was changed on his appearance. Requesens would have willingly negotiated for peace; but it was now too late. The "beggars" were ready for all emergencies. The war continued, and not to the disadvantage of the Spaniards; they were victorious under d'Avila on April 14, 1574, at Mooker Heath, and held the town of Leyden closely invested from the 25th May to the 3d October. But before his death, on March 4, 1576, Requesens was fated to see that the rebels had accomplished a union of Holland and Zeeland, and had named William of Orange commander of the forces on sea and land. This was an important advance on the road toward national independence, for the idea of a French or English Protectorate to take the place of Spain had already been mooted. There was now a long interval before a new stadholder appeared. Even the partially victorious troops mutinied when their pay was not forthcoming. They began to roam through the land, plundering on their own account, and so roused the most personal resistance of the population, which, organised into a national guard, took up arms against them at many points.

One thing more was required for the expulsion of the foreigners,—the union of the northern and southern provinces. This was accomplished in the "Pacification of Ghent," on November 4, 1576, by which thirteen provinces united for the common peace of the country, to be crowned by an equal toleration of the Reformed and the Catholic religions. The new stadholder, Don John of Austria, half-brother to the king, was obliged to recognise the agreement on February 12, 1577, and did not enter Brussels until May 1. William of Orange had been unwilling to negotiate with the governor, and soon noticed that John was not sincere in his professions. Indeed Don John had in July occupied Namur in order once more to show the power of Spain. But his attempt was useless; all the provinces except Luxembourg rose again, William entered Brussels, and was nominated as Ruwaard (Regent) of Brabant before Archduke Matthias of Austria (afterward emperor), who had been summoned to the country from the southern provinces, could gain a footing. The States-general were now bold enough to depose Don John, and on December 10, 1577, to form a new league of the seventeen provinces in the union of Brussels, in which the reformed religion was declared on a complete footing of equality with the Catholic.

King Philip had sent Prince Alexander Farnese of Parma with ample forces to the support of Don John, and a victory was won over the army of the federation at the beginning of the year 1578. But the reinforcements grew less, and Don John
died on October 1, 1578. Religious dissensions in the States-general between Calvinists and Catholics arose, and became more and more acute, so as to threaten the recently acquired unity, especially since Alexander of Parma, with wise moderation, conceded to the southern provinces practically all their claims, and so drew them over to the Spanish side; the Spanish regent once more ruled over a people. The great Pacification of Ghent was dissolved by the founding of the Walloon Union of Utrecht, on January 6, 1579. Orange, however, contrived to oppose a northern Protestant district to the southern Catholic district. In the union of Utrecht on January 23, 1579, the provinces of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Gelderland, Groningen, Overysel, and Friesland, formed a combination which, supported by the patriotic citizens of the progressive northern towns, laid the foundation for the later "United Netherlands."

In the meantime Alexander was successful in the field: he took Maastricht and pressed on toward the north. The Union alone could not withstand him, and therefore sought the help of France. At the beginning of the year 1582, Francis, Duke of Anjou, was acknowledged as the future ruler of the Netherlands (except Holland and Zeeland), and allegiance to the Spanish king was renounced, while Archduke Matthias withdrew from the scene of his unsuccessful efforts. The French prince, however, did not enjoy his new position, for contrary to the compact which he had formed, he attempted to undermine the freedom of the Union, and was therefore driven out with his French followers in June, 1583. Even yet the country did not become tranquil, quite apart from the continuously threatening attitude of Parma, for on the 17th of July, 1584, Prince William of Orange fell by the bullet of an assassin, after the southern Walloon Catholic provinces had completely attached themselves to Spain; and in the course of the year 1585 Brussels (March 10) and Antwerp (August 17) fell into the hands of the Spaniards. Thus only the provinces which were united in the Union of Utrecht remained to be conquered.

In the south under Parma's rule Catholicism once more reigned supreme, and although in Antwerp there was no bloody persecution of the Evangélicos, still many wealthy families were forced to leave the city forever. In this strait there was no recourse left to the Union but to ally itself with England. In pursuance of a treaty concluded in the summer of 1585, Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, arrived with six thousand men, and soon acquired a decisive influence over the policy of the League. His action was chiefly directed against Maurice of Orange, William's son. But under the leadership of Maurice the maritime provinces revolted against the Englishman, who thereupon left the Netherlands temporarily, in 1586, and after a second stay withdrew finally, in 1587.

The Union had thus had equally disastrous experiences with the empire, with France, and with England. It now relied on its own resources, and became an aristocratic commercial republic, in which there was no longer any room for the nobility, who up to this time had been so influential. Thus organized it was able to fight vigorously against the old enemy. On May 29, 1588, the Armada, a mighty Spanish fleet of one hundred and sixty ships, with thirty-two thousand men and twenty-six hundred guns, sailed from Lisbon, and left Corunna on July 22, in order to conquer England; but fate was against them, "afflavit Deus et dissipati sunt," and the united forces of the English and the Dutch annihilated it. The mighty effort of Spain had ended in disaster. In the years immediately following, Spain was involved in a war with France, and in this war troops of the Union,
under Maurice of Orange, bore their part. After the death of Parma (December 3, 1592), the difficult post of stadholder was filled by the weak Archduke Ernest (d. 1595), and then by his more energetic brother, Albert, who married Isabella, daughter of Philip II. The Spanish arms were again successful under Albert; they took Calais (1595), and France and England saw themselves equally menaced thereby. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1596, these powers formed an alliance with the States of the Union that was of no very great significance for the conduct of the war, but is important from the fact that the Union was on this occasion for the first time recognised by other governments as an independent State. France, shortly before the death of Philip (September 13, 1598), concluded a peace with Spain, in consequence of which the southern Netherlands, as the inheritance of Princess Isabella, retained an almost completely independent national position. The husband of Isabella, Archduke Albert, continued to wage war with the Union, which still found support from England.

After the death of the English queen, Elizabeth (1603), a truce was inevitable, since for Spain as for the republic the cost of the war was almost crushing, and the trade of Spain was continually diminishing, while the improvement in the Dutch trading enterprises suggested the thought to the merchants who shared the government that it would be more advantageous for the country to follow these profitable occupations than to prosecute the costly war. After many negotiations a peace was settled on April 9, 1609, in the form of a twelve years' truce, in which Spain waived her sovereign rights, and acknowledged the Protestant republic as an independent State. The peace of Westphalia confirmed this treaty and at the same time recognised the severance of the republic from the German Empire, which had actually come about in 1609.

B. The German Empire: Its Catholic and Protestant Princes

(a) Germany under the Hapsburgs, Ferdinand I, Maximilian II, and Rudolph II (1556–1612).—When the Emperor Charles abdicated the sovereignty of Germany in 1554, his brother, Ferdinand I assumed the government, which he conducted with moderation until 1564. The entire policy of the empire at this period was influenced by the religious strife between Catholics and Protestants. In the ranks of the Protestants, who indeed had never been really united, a new dispute arose, since Electoral Saxony represented quite different views both in religious polity and in dogma, from those of the Palatinate, and both had supporters among the princes. A conservative spirit prevailed on the whole in the native country of Lutheranism, which was eager to identify itself closely with the emperor in politics, and in dogma held firmly to Luther. The Electors Palatine, however, were not only zealous advocates of war against Catholicism, and by this offended the emperor, the guardian of the religious peace, but also in dogma leaned toward the more radical Calvinism, and in 1563 actually went over to that doctrine by the introduction of the corresponding church constitution (the Catechism of Heidelberg). The Elector Palatine, Frederick III, was the first imperial prince who introduced Calvinism into his territory; until then it had only found adherents on the borders and at isolated points inside the empire. After that the empire had to face the new sect, which was equally opposed to the Catholic and the Protestant confession, and
Besides that had not been recognised in the religious peace as possessing equal
privileges.
The Emperor Ferdinand had been forced into a peaceful policy by the necessity
of claiming the support of the princes against the Turks in almost every diet. A
proof of his clemency was the demand he made of the Pope to allow communion
in both kinds, and the marriage of the clergy; a request which naturally was not
granted. In every possible way he wished to maintain peace. He had secured
the crown of Bohemia for his son Maximilian in 1562, had obtained his election
in 1563, as king of the Romans, and bequeathed to him the empire on his death
(July 25, 1564). Out of the crown lands Maximilian II (1564–1576) only gov-
erned Austria proper, while his brothers, Ferdinand and Charles, ruled in the other
dominions of the Austrian house. The new emperor was unusually broad minded
in religious matters. He was a “transacting” or reconcilable man of the type
known as “Compromise Catholics.” Before his accession to power he had inclined
toward the evangelical doctrines, and would perhaps have adopted them entirely
had not the petty squabbles among the Protestants disgusted him. As sovereign
he showed toleration toward the nobles, who were mostly Protestants. In spite of
papal opposition, he gave a special constitutional representation and power known
as “religious deputation” to the Evangelical States. In Bohemia, finally, the
Compalects of Prague were set aside in 1567, and a great part of the people
professed the “Confession of Augsburg.”
External relations under Ferdinand and Maximilian were, on the whole, peace-
ful. The Turkish-Hungarian frontier war still continued, but without any consider-
able successes on either side. Suleiman died on September 5, 1566, and two days
afterward his army captured the fortress of Szigetvár, when Nicholas, Count of
Zrinyi, met a hero’s death. But in 1568 an eight years’ truce was concluded
between Maximilian and the Sultan, Selim II, in return, however, for a large
yearly tribute.
In the diets the interpretation of the Religious Peace formed the constantly
recurring subject of debate, especially with reference to the “ecclesiastical reserva-
tion,” which was intended to secure the spiritual principalities permanently to the
Catholic faith. The Elector Palatine was always the first to provoke a conflict.
The Elector of Saxonv usually opposed him, and strongly advocated the peace;
but finally, in 1557, all the Evangelical princes declared that they could no
longer regard the reservation as legally existing. This point seemed to be abso-
lutely the most important for the further dissemination of Protestantism. With
the exception of Austria, Bavaria, and Cleves, all the secular territories were Pro-
estant, so that the Protestant district could only be increased and rounded off by
the acquisition of spiritual territories. Besides this, many members of the cathed-
ral chapters were friendly to the Protestants, and not a few Evangelical bishops
were elected. The princes took further steps at the diet of Ratisbon in 1575 with
reference to the Ecclesiastical Reservation, since they wished to see established as
a law of the empire the promise which Ferdinand had given in 1558, to the effect
that in the spiritual principalities the Evangelicals should enjoy toleration as sub-
jects. The emperor did not comply with the request; and in the diet of the next
year, with the approval of the electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, rejected the
demand which was put forward by the Elector Palatine. This attitude adopted by
the two electors led to a division among the Evangelicals which lasted for decades,
and distinctly favoured the progress of the Counter-Reformation.
In addition to this, Rudolph II (1576–1612), the son and successor of Maximilian, held loyally to the Catholic faith, and the papal policy of proselytising found a warm supporter in him, for he had been educated in Spain at the court of Philip II. Under him the exercise of the Evangelical worship was strictly forbidden in Vienna; some of the preachers were forced to leave the country, and the citizens of the towns were in many cases compulsorily brought back to the Catholic faith, while the Protestant nobles had to live far from the court and its offices. Rudolph exercised the same policy in the empire at large as in his hereditary dominions: the archbishopric of Cologne was secured for the Catholic faith, and Strasburg brought back to it; and Rudolph, by suspending the ban of the empire over the Evangelicals, rendered decisive assistance in the restoration of the Catholic council in Aix-la-Chapelle (1598), which was connected with the expulsion of the Evangelical council and preachers. The Protestant princes allowed all this to be done without interference. The Electors Palatine alone troubled themselves on behalf of their brethren in the faith both within and without the empire. Electoral Saxony now as previously made no use of its political influence, but persecuted the Cryptocalvinists, that is, the Lutherans who inclined to Calvinistic doctrine. The last Lutheran confession of faith, the "Formula Concordiae," which was formally published in Electoral Saxony in 1580, owed its origin to the effort to obtain clear points of differentiation from Calvinism.

The last twenty years of the sixteenth century saw a great advance in Catholicism. It was soon clear that a political union of all Protestants was becoming necessary if a general concession to their opponents was not to be made. England had espoused the cause of the French Huguenots, while Philip of Spain had been equally energetic for the Catholic league. Religion became the leading feature of the politics of western Europe. If the German princes wished to have a voice in these international questions, they must take one side or the other. When, therefore, Henry IV of France went to the German Protestants for help, they did not refuse to give it; but in order to be able to take a vigorous part, the old feud between the Palatinate and Saxony had to be laid aside. This was done in the course of the year 1590, and at the beginning of the following year a union of the foremost Protestant princes among themselves and with France was agreed upon. But this time the consummation of a real alliance was prevented by the deaths within a short period of the chief contracting parties.

A Protestant union at this particular time seemed of the highest value. The question of the succession or the regency in Jülich-Cleves-Berg compendiously included matters vital to the future of the contending parties. The old Duke William had, besides his imbecile and childless son, John William, daughters only, and they were married to Protestant princes. Whoever obtained the regency for John William would naturally have the best prospect of some day becoming his successor. In order to postpone a decision, the emperor entrusted the government to the States; by this the Protestants were temporarily excluded. The hope of eventual success was not indeed yet abandoned, but it could only be accomplished on the basis of a Protestant league.

Other events rendered this course urgent. The Palatinate party in the diet had repeatedly coupled the grant of "Turk-taxes" with the condition that religious grievances should first be remedied, but they had never carried their point, since the party of Electoral Saxony regularly held to the emperor. The situation was
changed when the energetic measures taken by the Hapsburgs against the Lutherans in their hereditary dominions embittered the Saxon elector. Christian II, in 1604, had achieved no success in Vienna with his earnest representations, and, indignant at this, had threatened to withhold the taxes. When the diet met in Ratisbon at the beginning of 1608, the Protestants combined, and finally, since the emperor would not consent to any concessions, left the diet in a body, thus sapping its further efficiency. The Protestants were now united for the first time in many years. The hopes which they rested on this union were the greater since a Protestant movement against the emperor had just been formed in the Hapsburg dominions, which found a leader in his brother Matthias. At the very beginning of 1608 the latter had advanced with hostile intent toward the imperial capital of Prague, and on June 25, 1608, had received the crown of Hungary, as well as the hereditary dominions in Austria and Moravia, as compensation from the emperor. It was natural that the Protestant princes should seek for an alliance with Matthias and with those States in the Hapsburg dominions which held to the Evangelical faith.

(b) Union and League. — Matthias, notwithstanding his opposition to the Catholicising policy of his brother Rudolph, and notwithstanding his support of the Protestant nobility, was no sincere adherent of the Evangelical doctrine. He was little pleased when the Austrian States, before doing homage, demanded binding promises as to the practice of religion, and he only reluctantly gave them assurances in an ambiguous "Resolution" on March 19, 1609. A political union of the Protestant princes with Matthias seemed, under such circumstances, very hopeless, especially since the Calvinists, under the leadership of the Palatinate, now had the upper hand, and on May 14, 1608, formed a union at Auhausen. This included all Evangelical territories, with the exception of Electoral Saxony, represented a defensive alliance, and maintained a separate military organisation. The Catholic counter-alliance of the League was formed on July 10, 1609, under the leadership of Maximilian, Duke of Bavaria, then thirty-six years old, and for the moment reckoned, with the exception of Bavaria, only petty spiritual princes among its members, and created for itself a military system modelled after that of their opponents. The Hapsburgs for the time being kept aloof from this alliance.

The Union had the earliest opportunity of political action. Duke John William of Jülich died on March 25, 1609. The princes, John Sigismund of Brandenburg (as husband of Anne, a niece of the deceased), and Philip Louis, of Neuburg, in the Palatinate (as husband of Anne, his second sister), both members of the Union, were immediately on the spot as candidates for the succession to the duchy, while the emperor regarded the land as an escheated imperial fief, and intended to have it administered by the Archduke Leopold. The latter took the fortress of Jülich in May, 1609, while Brandenburg and Neuburg, in virtue of a special treaty of June 10, took joint possession of the district and capital, Düsseldorf, and governed jointly with the declared consent of the Protestants united in the Union. This would have been in itself quite sufficient to drive the League to the side of the emperor; but no other choice was left them by consideration for one of their own members, the Archbishop of Cologne, to whom the proximity of the Evangelical princes could not be a matter of indifference. The States-General had shortly before made a treaty with France and England for protection against
Spain; this was again reason enough to draw the former to the side of the Union, and Spain to that of the League. There was thus plenty of material for a war involving the whole of western Europe, and only the murder of the French king, Henry IV, on May 14, 1610, prevented it from breaking out. With him disappeared the moving spirit for political actions on a large scale. Instead of the great war, a mere feud developed between Brandenburg and Neuburg, whose joint relations became more and more unsatisfactory. The new quarrel was confirmed in 1613 by the conversion of Wolfgang William, of Neuburg (son of Philip Louis), to the Catholic religion; his marriage with the Bavarian princess, Magdalene, followed at the end of 1615. By this, Neuburg had won the support of the League, while Brandenburg adopted the Calvinistic creed on December 25, 1613, and might now look for a still more powerful furtherance of his interests by the Union. Dutch troops came to the help of Brandenburg, and Spanish troops under Ambrosio Spinola occupied Wesel. But before the close of the year 1614 the two parties formed a truce on the 12th of November at Xanten, on the terms that Neuburg should have the territories of Jülich and Berg, and Brandenburg should take Cleves, Mark, Ravensberg, and Ravenstein. The Dutch, indeed, as well as the Spaniards, occupied some places in the country (partly up to 1672), and at the same time the alliances which the Union had made with England and Sweden, and the league with Lorraine, Savoy, and the Pope, gave cause to fear a new outbreak of hostilities.

The Emperor Rudolph had found no time in his latter years to trouble himself about the affairs on the lower Rhine; his hereditary dominions demanded his attention, and he had to provide for the future. He could not repose any sincere confidence in his brother Matthias, who had opposed him at the head of the States, and he wished, therefore, to help Archduke Leopold to the succession in Bohemia, although Matthias had already, with Rudolph's consent, been accepted by the States as king designate. An attempt by force of arms, in February, 1611, to bring Prague into the power of Rudolph, and to make the States dependent on him, was unsuccessful; the emperor was compelled, in the assembly of the States, to make over the crown of Bohemia to Matthias, who was crowned on May 23, 1611, and granted a mere annual payment to his imperial brother in return for his resignation of all claim on Bohemia, Silesia, and Lusatia (August 11, 1611). Rudolph in his straits turned to the electors and asked their financial aid; but they held the view that such questions could only be discussed in an imperial diet. Rudolph felt no disposition to call one, and yet, considering the age of the emperor, it seemed time to settle the succession. The electors, therefore, on their own motion, called an electoral meeting at Frankfort for April. But Rudolph II died on January 20.

Matthias was now chosen as his brother's successor in the empire (1612–1619), as he already was in Bohemia and Austria. On all sides, even among the Protestants, great hopes had been formed of the new monarch, but it was soon seen on the occasion of the first diet (in August, 1613, at Ratisbon) how little foundation there was for these expectations. The States were again called upon to grant a high "Turks-tax:" the Protestants again demanded in the first place the redress of their grievances, but the emperor, who showed not the slightest trace of his earlier Protestant proclivities, finally under the pressure of a Turkish attack, merely gave permission for the discussion of the grievances outside the diet. The deliber-
ations had, as might be expected, no results. The Protestants, dissatisfied, left the assembly, and the Catholics alone granted the Turks-tax, although they professed to act in the name of the whole assembly, naturally under protest from the Unionists. All the other hopes which the chancellor, Melchior Khlesl (1552–1630), had placed on this session (in particular a reform of the imperial judicial system was to have been discussed) were thus destroyed; and the position was worse than in 1608, since the Turks had actually attacked Hungary, and had made Gabriel Bethlen, of Iktar, Lord of Transylvania (1613). A reconciliation between the two religious parties, such as Khlesl wished, had been made infinitely more difficult by the entry of the emperor into the League, for Matthias now stood no longer above the parties. The chancellor, it is true, busied himself even yet with the meeting of a "diet" for composition and settlement (Compositionstag), which the Union again demanded in their meeting at Nuremberg in 1615, and all the more so as the Union increased its power by closer alliance with the States-general and Denmark, as well as by the formation of a league of the towns.

These efforts led to no result, for a quite different question now occupied the imperial policy,—the succession in the empire and in the hereditary dominions. Matthias, and with him the chancellor, preferred to leave the matter unsettled, since the emperor-elect would have acquired influence on the government. Archduke Maximilian, on the other hand, was straining every nerve to have the strict Catholic, Ferdinand of Styria, elected emperor. By his efforts, which at the same time were aimed at the overthrow of Khlesl, Ferdinand succeeded in concluding a treaty with Spain in June, 1617, in which he secretly promised concessions of territory in the event of his becoming emperor, and was also accepted, although not formally elected, as king by the Catholic States of Bohemia. The Catholic and Protestant States stood confronting each other in this constitutional struggle; the Catholics were decided in regarding Bohemia as the hereditary right of the Hapsburgs, while the Protestants equally distinctly declared the crown to be elective. The claim of the elector was the better founded, as Matthias in 1608 and 1611 had distinctly acknowledged that he had been elected King of Bohemia by free choice, while the Catholic States could only adduce in support of their view the fact that for nearly a century a Hapsburg had always worn the crown.

The nomination of Ferdinand to the throne of Bohemia was certain to lead to war, since the rights of the Protestant States were far from being firmly established. The greatest difficulties had arisen under Rudolph, who had conceded the demands of the Protestants by a "Letter of Majesty" in 1608, and promised religious liberty only under coercion. Matthias had confirmed the Letter of Majesty among the Bohemian privileges, but with regard to other demands of the States he only held out hopes for the future, especially in reference to a union of the States of all the imperial dominions, and the creation of a common military system. In Bohemia ideas were openly entertained of a subordinate government by the Protestant States. The emperor, however, tried to use this idea for his war with the Turks, when he summoned in August, 1614, a committee from his dominions to Linz. But the session had no results. The representatives had not received full authorisation from their districts, and had, besides, no inclination for the Turkish war; there could therefore be no idea of that for the present, and in the summer of 1615 a comparatively favourable treaty was arranged with Gabriel Bethlen as well as with the Sultan, Achmed I. The questions of internal policy
were to be discussed afresh at a general assembly of the States in June, 1615. But besides Upper and Lower Austria, only Bohemia was represented, while Hungary sent no representative; once more the debates were fruitless.

Constant friction between the Catholic and Protestant States, and disputes with the imperial government, were under these circumstances inevitable in Austria and Bohemia, and led to lasting disturbances. The promises made by the emperor in 1609 were still unfulfilled in Austria. In particular the towns were constrained by the influence brought to bear on the election of counsellors in favour of the Catholics, while the Protestant nobles were almost excluded from office. In Bohemia, it is true, there were some Protestants in the higher posts, but the Catholics were in the majority, and used their position to crush Protestantism in the crown lands and in the ecclesiastical fiefs, although the Letter of Majesty gave permission for the building of churches there. Matthias in 1612 entrusted the exercise of his rights of patronage to the Archbishop of Prague; the result naturally was that the benefices were once more filled by Catholics. Since the ecclesiastical domains were considered as royal fiefs, the Protestants, in virtue of the Letter of Majesty, had begun to build churches there as well, although in 1611 Matthias had rejected, in the case of Braunau, this interpretation of the “Letter of Majesty;” the building of churches was undauntedly continued. The archbishop ordered the church at Klostergrab to be closed, and the emperor approved of the decree.

The Protestant States raised vigorous remonstrances against such a conception of religious liberty. Being met in no friendly spirit, they openly talked of the election of another king, who should be a German; in 1614 some party leaders had already treated with the Elector of Saxony as a candidate. After the populace at Braunau had prevented the closing of their church by force, and the archbishop had ordered the church of Klostergrab to be pulled down (end of 1617), an insurrection finally broke out. The Protestant nobles united under the leadership of Henry Matthias, Count of Thurn, and went with a renewed petition first to the stadtholders and then to the emperor; being everywhere repulsed, they proceeded to assert their rights by force. The emperor, besides his uncompromisingly unfavourable decree in reference to Braunau and Klostergrab, had, above all, strictly forbidden the assembly of the Protestants arranged for May 21, 1618. But the States, confident in their privileges, did not allow themselves to be intimidated, and assembled on the appointed day. An imperial decree which repealed the prohibition was read to the assembled body; and when the States communicated their answer to the stadtholders, such excited altercations followed (May 23, 1618), that finally two of the stadtholders, William Slávata (subsequently Count of Chlum and Koschumberg) and Jaroslav Borita of Martinitz, who were universally held to be the guilty parties, and the unoffending secretary, were thrown by the leaders from the window into the castle moat. This gross insult to the foremost imperial officials meant a complete breach with the emperor.

In the western part of the empire, meanwhile, the crisis had become still more acute. Apart from the fact that the treaty of Xanten, which had divided the territories of Jülich, Cleves, and Berg between Neuburg and Brandenburg offered sufficient incentive to further disputes, the electoral house of Saxony had since the summer of 1610 been invested with these very territories, in conformity with an earlier promise of the emperor, which rejected the succession of the female line. The States-general were also anxious to maintain the position which they
had once won, and Archduke Albert, as the Hapsburg representative, made the same effort. The petty war on the Lower Rhine therefore continued. The States-General, in order to execute further plans, formed an alliance with the Hanse towns. And thus before the end of the year 1615 it was clear that the controversies which were pending in the North would have an influence on German politics. In Sweden the Confession of Augsburg had been taken (1593) as the basis for the national church in opposition to the Catholic Sigismund (1592–1599). The assumption of the title of king by the Protestant Charles IX (1604) signified also a serious war against Poland, with which the struggle for the Baltic provinces still continued. Since Sigismund, a son of King John III of Sweden, who had been deposed from the throne of Sweden in 1599, but had been king of Poland also since 1587, entered into closer relations with Austria, Sweden was forced to seek support from the Protestant princes of Germany; for Denmark, which was equally Protestant, and, under the energetic Christian IV (1588–1648), the most important power of the North, was excluded as being a dangerous rival in the Baltic. A war accordingly broke out between the two countries in 1611, on the question of the tolls in the Sound. The States-General and the Hanse towns, which had both suffered grievously under the Danish tolls, took the side of Sweden. However, nothing came of it but a treaty (1613) between the States-general and Lübeck, while the alliance of December, 1615, already mentioned, was only brought about by the desperate position of the Hanse town, Brunswick, which the Duke of Brunswick was besieging with the help of Denmark.

The common feature of all political operations in the decade preceding the outbreak of the great war is the tendency toward alliances, which, increasingly closer and on a wider scale as regards members, objects, and duration, at last divided all Europe into the two hostile camps of the Union and the League.

The Union had received considerable additions since the imperial diet of 1613. The military system and its foundation stone, the finances of the allies, had been organised to some extent. In the year 1614 the league with the States-General, such as had been contemplated by the agreement with England as early as 1612, was really arranged for twelve years. Negotiations were opened with the Protestants of Lower Saxony, especially Lüneburg and Pomerania, as well as with the administrators of the dioceses, who foresaw an uncertain future. Attempts were indeed made to win the important Electoral Saxony, which still kept aloof. In 1615 the important alliance of the Union with the province of Lower Saxony was brought about. In the next year a renewal of the confederation, which would expire in 1618, was discussed. The necessity of the continuance of the Union was universally acknowledged, but Electoral Brandenburg withdrew, since the Unionists, and especially the towns, were not disposed to regard the claims on Jülich as their own. Besides nine princes, the Union now numbered seventeen towns, which would hear nothing of a warlike policy, and bound themselves to the alliance only up to the year 1621.

The League meanwhile had been considerably strengthened by the admission of the emperor and of Wolfgang William of Neuburg in the Palatinate. But the participation of Austria had at the same time destroyed the hitherto uncontested position of Maximilian of Bavaria, for the emperor must now have a voice in the management. The Archbishop of Mayence was able to overcome the difficulties and to effect a reorganisation in 1613, according to which the Hapsburg Maximilian
received, in addition to Mayence and Bavaria, a third federal district of Tyrol, and since the Catholic interests were slightly less emphasised, the Protestant princes had the option of joining. This outcome was by no means satisfactory to the Bavarian. After various attempts to find a solution he left the League in January, 1616, and the rest could do nothing without him. In May, 1617, however, he entered into a new alliance with four spiritual princes for four years.

Meantime, the negotiations as to the succession in the empire had been carried on unceasingly. It was universally admitted that the future emperor must also be ruler of Austria; and Ferdinand of Styria seemed, as the youngest Hapsburg, to be the most suitable. But since 1613 the King of Spain also had raised claims, although at once with the suggestion that he would be satisfied with a concession of territory. Since, however, there could be no thought of winning over the electors of the Palatinate and Brandenburg after the course of the imperial diet of 1613, the spiritual electors and the Elector of Saxony had proposed the summoning of an electoral diet by the emperor, without any statement of the particular object. Khlesl did not wish for that, since his heart was set on an agreement between the religious parties, and he hoped to bring about their reconciliation by the very necessity of some understanding as to the succession. Both parties indeed made in 1615 a statement as to the points on which they must insist, but no meeting for reconciliation was held. Archduke Maximilian attempted to force the emperor to action, and advised, at any rate according to the ideas on the Protestant side, that an election should be held, and, if necessary, enforced by arms. On the other hand, the electors of the Palatinate, Brandenburg, and Saxony deliberated over a choice in the summer of 1616, and came to the decision that they would defer the business of election until after the death of the emperor, and would then perhaps elect Duke Maximilian of Bavaria.

By this, it is true, the succession of Ferdinand in the Austrian dominions seemed secured at the beginning of the year 1617; but his prospects in the empire were all the more unfavourable, and "recognition" in Bohemia as well as his "election" in Hungary, finally arrived at by the States, only offered poor encouragement. Now at least the Saxon elector had been induced to consent to a personal electoral diet for February, 1618, in order to discuss the election, in which Ferdinand's reversion was regarded as obvious. The Elector Palatine, on the other hand, was in treaty at the same time with the Protestant States of Bohemia, which, priding themselves on their right of election, did not acknowledge Ferdinand as lawful king; but there had been no talk of his acquiring the crown of Bohemia before the autumn of 1618. During the whole of this year the most various plans for the election of an emperor were devised. The candidature of Maximilian of Bavaria again came up. There was also talk of parcelling out the Hapsburg territories under an agreement with Savoy. But no results had been arrived at when the Emperor Matthias died, on the 20th of March, 1619. It rested now with Ferdinand to prove whether his statesmanship could secure him the crown.

C. The Thirty Years' War

Even in Austria, immediately after the death of Matthias, he had difficulties in obtaining possession of the sovereignty; the States considered his brother Albert as their lawful sovereign, and the Protestants among them formed an alliance with
the Bohemian insurgents. Ferdinand well understood that the possession of the imperial title would greatly strengthen his position in his hereditary dominions, and went in July to the electoral diet at Frankfort in order to represent the Bohemian vote. But the Elector Palatine and Brandenburg had already agreed not to choose him. Saxony finally joined the spiritual electors; even Brandenburg changed round, so that the Palatinate at last stood quite alone. Ferdinand's election was now secured, especially since he consented that conciliatory measures should be discussed among the electors in November. The election was duly held on August 21. The empire now once more had an emperor. As Ferdinand II (1619–1637) he brought great disasters upon Germany and Europe, since he transferred into the empire the struggle with the States in his hereditary dominions, and laid the ban of the empire on the Elector Palatine, Frederick V, after his expulsion from Bohemia.

(a) The War in Bohemia and the Palatinate (1618–1623).—The insurrection had begun in Bohemia after the window episode (p. 288). The Protestant nobles had become masters of the government and appointed thirty directors. An army under Count Thurn had defeated the Imperialists at Budweis, and the mercenary leader, Peter Ernest of Mansfeld, had taken Pilsen. While Thurn was trying to advance into Austria through Moravia, Matthias died; and a little later the prospects of King Ferdinand seemed somewhat more favourable. Nevertheless, about the same time that he was elected emperor at Frankfort, Frederick V of the Palatinate, leader of the Union, was chosen king at Prague, in virtue of the elective rights of the States, on the 27th August, 1619. At the instance of Christian of Anhalt and in spite of the dissuasion of his father-in-law, King James I of England, he accepted the election, which was only destined to bring on him the loss of his territory, and especially of his splendid castle (see the annexed plate, "Castle of Heidelberg in 1620"), and received the crown on the 3d of November.

Gabriel Bethlen had hitherto, in combination with the Bohemians, attacked the emperor from the side of Transylvania, and had stirred up the Protestant Hungarians to revolt, while the Imperialists were withdrawing to Vienna. Thurn also appeared there, but had not sufficient force to commence a siege. Bethlen also retreated, and an opposing Catholic party arose in Hungary. The Bohemians maintained their position in the winter of 1619–1620, and even received support from Lower Austria. But the emperor induced Spain to invade the Palatinate from the side of the Netherlands, revived the League once more, and concluded a treaty with its head, his friend, Maximilian of Bavaria, in which he promised him the electoral dignity in the event of a successful war. Maximilian on his side obtained the support of the Saxon elector, while the Union did not support their head but also negotiated with the Bavarian. The latter marched into Austria in August, 1620, and into Bohemia in September, found the greatest confusion at Prague, and, thanks to John Tserklaes von Tilly (see his portrait in the plate on p. 295), in combination with the Imperialists under Charles Bonaventura de Longueval, Count of Buquoy, won a decisive victory over the Bohemians under Christian of Anhalt at the "White Hill" near Prague, on November 8. Frederick's "winter kingdom" was now at an end; he fled to Silesia, and the cause of Protestantism was lost. A strict Counter-Reformation began at once in Bohemia and Austria. Ferdinand with his own hands tore up the Letter of Majesty, the
chief nobles were executed, and many thousands who remained loyal to their faith were driven from the land. Frederick did not realise his position. He wished at first only to concede Bohemia to the conqueror in return for compensation; he perceived too late that the emperor believed that he would have to fight him in any case in the Palatinate and as elector. The Spaniards under Spinola had been in the Palatinate since the summer of 1620; in 1621 the Union withdrew, and soon, being leaderless and powerless, broke up completely. Nevertheless Frederick did not follow the advice of his father-in-law, who was busily negotiating with Ferdinand, but offered further resistance. Mansfeld and the margrave George Frederick of Baden-Durlach won a victory, it is true, over Tilly at Wiesloch, on April 27, 1622, but that was neutralised by defeats of the electoral armies at Wimpfen (May 6) and Höchst (June 20, 1622). And when Tilly had taken the capital of the Palatinate, the beautiful town of Heidelberg, and had won a decisive battle at Stadtilohn on the 5th and 6th of August, 1623, the electoral dignity together with the Upper Palatinate was transferred to Maximilian of Bavaria. The Protestants indeed, and Saxony also this time, vigorously protested at the dict of deputies at Ratisbon, but could not alter the fact. Henceforth the Protestants under all circumstances formed the minority in the electoral college.

(b) The War in Lower Saxony and Denmark (1624–1629). — The measure which was intended to strengthen the Catholic party in the empire aroused, on the contrary, new opposition, and that among the Protestant princes of Lower Germany, who until now had kept in the background. George William of Brandenburg (1620–1640) earnestly strove to rouse the Saxon elector against the emperor, but as he refused, the circle of Lower Saxony could not openly take the side of the Elector Palatine. On the other hand, the prospect, not at all attractive to Germany, of the revival of the power of the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs, brought the King of England to the side of his son-in-law, and the latter found support from the States-General and King Christian of Denmark. The King of Sweden was also ready to take part in a war against the Habsburgs. Toward the close of 1625 a league was formed between England (where Charles I now was king), Holland, and Denmark for the restoration of the Palagrove to his hereditary dominions. France supported the undertaking with money; the States of Lower Saxony prepared on their side to expel the army of the League under Tilly, and placed Christian of Denmark at their head. The Danish king, supported by Mansfeld and the Duke of Brunswick, advanced into Lower Saxony without waiting for the conclusion of the negotiations, and was even in strategy a match for his opponent.

The emperor had no means of meeting this unexpected danger. Since, on the other hand, he did not dare to allow the League and the Bavarian elector to become too powerful, he was glad when the Bohemian nobleman, Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Waldstein, commonly called Wallenstein (see his portrait on the plate, "The foremost Generals of the Thirty Years' War," on page 295), who had already in 1617 fought on his side, offered his services, and professed his willingness to raise an army of twenty thousand men at his own cost, and place it at the emperor's disposal, forced Mansfeld to disband his mercenaries. He started for Venice, but died at Rakowitz in Bosnia (November 29, 1626).

Tilly meanwhile (August 27, 1626) had won a victory over Christian at Lutter on the Barenberg, and thereby gained control of all Lower Germany. Now
THE CASTLE OF HEIDELBERG IN 1620

The Count Palatine Rupolff I (1291–1319) first fortified the heights on the left bank of the Neckar, but there were no buildings of importance before those which Ruprech III, German King from 1400, erected. The Electors Frederick I (1440–1476) and Louis V (1508–1544) extended the castle and suitably strengthened its fortifications: but the portions which have given the castle its architectural renown were erected by their successors.

Otto Heinrich, called shortly Ottheinrich, had already, as lord of Palatine Neuburg, raised splendid edifices, and, in 1556 on becoming Elector, began immediately to build a new wing to the castle, called after him the Ottheinrichshaus, a right-angled building, inserted between the already existing old portions. Ottheinrich did not live to see the wing completed by the imperial Hall and rooms, in the construction of which the sculptor Anthoni, who had studied Netherland models, had a special share: the work on which he had set his heart was not finished until four years after his death (1563). A flight of stairs to the portal and statues adorn the niches of the façade.

After a considerable interval building-operations were recommenced under Frederick IV in 1601; the Friedrichshaus along the Neckar, completed in 1607, dates from that time. The architect Johannes Schoch designed the whole, and Sebastian Götz supplied the decorative statues. While in the Ottheinrichshaus the forms of the early Renaissance find expression—ancient models are faithfully imitated and are placed next to arbitrarily different art productions—the Friedrichshaus shows the peculiar High-Renaissance, of which no more splendid architectural example can be found in Germany. And yet the underlying idea of the other part is repeated and only expressed in different forms: the ground floor still shows the ponderous horizontally-divided windows, and the statues look down from their niches on to the castle-yard just as in the Ottheinrichshaus.

Adjoining the Friedrichshaus on the left is the "Frauenzimmerh", which dates from Louis V: it contained the apartments of the court-ladies and cannot as a work of art be compared with the more recent portions. In the southeast corner rises the Dicke Turm, called also Krautm., i.e. Powder tower, which was 24 meters (75 ft.) in diameter, and when blown up in 1693 offered such resistance that the outer half fell into the moat and still lies there in an unbroken mass. Between this tower and the Friedrichshaus rises the Englische Bau, which Frederick V, the Bohemian Winter-King, ordered to be erected in honour of his wife Elisabeth, the daughter of the English King James I: its splendour is said to have surpassed all ideas. We can only admire now the remains of that former magnificence; in order to revive the impression which the castle once produced we must have recourse to that engraving of Merian which depicts its condition in 1630.

We have a bird’s eye view of the castle and are looking on the artistically laid out gardens in the foreground, with the town and Neckar beneath: we must place the picture on the left side in order to adapt it to the points of the compass: the strength of the position is clearly enough seen from the picture: the “Krautm” especially in the left-hand corner stands out with its defiant walls: but the artistic masterpieces, the façades of the courtyard side, are not visible. Only the back of the Ottheinrichshaus with its plain rows of windows in the 4 storeys looks on us, while the Friedrichshaus and the Frauenzimmerh are completely hidden by it. The majestic height (180 m., 600 ft.) at which the castle is enthroned above the town (112 m., 350 ft.), and the height of the wooded mountain (391 m., 990 ft.) towering above it can only be conjectured in the picture: but it is precisely this situation which established the military importance of the fortress.

Only picturesque ruins are now left of all these: the gardens, the terraces, fountains and grottoes, such as the commencing XVIIth century saw, exist no longer. The castle had only suffered slightly at the capture of Heidelberg by Tilly, 1622, and under Charles Louis (*1660) the damage done had been entirely restored. But after the death of the Elector Charles in 1685 Louis XIV laid claims on the Palatinate and ordered the town and castle to be occupied in October, 1688. In March, 1689, as a German army approached, Count Mélas set fire to the town, blew up the fortifications and withdrew. This was however not enough; in May, 1693, the French came a second time and everything which had previously been left was destroyed: the “Dicke Turm” also was blown up then. The attempts of the later Electors to rebuild the castle were unimportant: and the little that had been rebuilt was struck by lightning and burnt down. Since then the ruins, the largest castle grounds in Germany, lie in undisturbed tranquillity and are annually visited by thousands, who pilgrimage to the remains of that magnificent building, on which each successive step of the Renaissance has left its traces.
Wallenstein also advanced and compelled the Danes to retreat to the islands. He drove the Dukes of Mecklenburg from their territory, and his plan firmly to establish the power of the emperor on the Baltic only failed through the resistance of Stralsund (May 23 to August 4, 1628). Since Sweden also was threatening war, a peace with Denmark seemed necessary to the imperial commander; he therefore concluded a treaty at Lübeck on May 12, 1629, by which the king received back all his possessions in exchange for a promise to observe neutrality for the future.

The great commander was now at the zenith of his fortunes. But the princes of the League and the imperial court had long been dissatisfied with him; his mysterious power seemed dangerous to them. After the minister, Hans Ulrich, Prince of Eggenberg, had himself entered into communications with the general, in November, 1626, the complaints were quieted for some time. But they broke out again the more loudly among the members of the League, since it was seen that Wallenstein's conduct of the war was guided more by political than by military considerations, and that his army formed a support for the empire against the princes. A statement of grievances was drawn up at the meeting of the League at Würzburg in 1627, and presented to the emperor, but he could not concede the wishes of the princes. A meeting of the electors toward the end of the same year aimed at the same object; a new and exhaustive bill of complaint as to the oppression of various districts by the army of Wallenstein was forwarded to the emperor, and once more no result followed. Wallenstein's pride increased with his military successes. After the proscription of the Dukes of Mecklenburg, he with some difficulty obtained from the emperor the investiture of their territory in January, 1628, and became hereditary sovereign there in 1629. In other respects, also, his already ample powers were still further enlarged. The "generalissimo, field marshal," — this was now his title — was a loyal servant of his emperor, and had no end in view but to further his imperialistic plans. The question, however, arose whether he might not become dangerous to Ferdinand should a difference of opinion occur. Maximilian of Bavaria as well as the Spanish Hapsburg, Philip IV, worked on the emperor from this point of view, while the most varied rumours were current as to Wallenstein's intentions and schemes. The electors, even before the siege of Stralsund, repeatedly demanded the dismissal of Wallenstein, saying that, should occasion arise, they were ready also to use their arms against him.

After the treaty with Denmark the first difference of opinion between Ferdinand and Wallenstein at last showed itself. The emperor, conformably to an agreement with the princes of the League, issued in the spring of 1629 the so-called Edict of Restitution, which deprived the princes of all ecclesiastical property acquired since the treaty of Passau in 1552, and thus at one stroke took large districts away from the Protestants. A new arrangement on this basis would have given back to the Catholic Church the two archbishoprics of Magdeburg and Bremen and twelve bishoprics, to say nothing of the extensive property of the religious houses. But the edict was a flagrant breach of the religious peace, since the "ecclesiastical reservation," it is true, was to be carried out, but always subject to the condition that there should be absolute religious freedom for all the inhabitants or subjects of the ecclesiastical foundations. Now, however, all the Calvinists and Zwinglians were expressly to be excluded, and none but the adherents of the confession of Augsburg recognised. The whole existing organisation of the empire would have been upset. It was also clear that this attack would call the whole Protestant world to
arms. It was Wallenstein's object to prevent this; he therefore was, and continued to be, an opponent of the Edict of Restitution, and did not use his power to carry it out. The emperor, once more urged by the League, would now gladly have dismissed Wallenstein, but that would have been to leave himself once more without an army. An attack by the Swedish king was threatening, since the war between Sweden and Poland had been ended for the time being by a truce concluded at Altmark, near Stuhm, on the 26th of September, 1629. Moreover, the war with France for the possession of Mantua had already broken out, and part of Wallenstein's army was engaged in it. Nevertheless the complaints against him were repeated in the electoral diet of Ratisbon in July, 1630. The emperor, at last, chiefly through the advice of the Pope, resolved to deprive his generalissimo of his command; and Wallenstein voluntarily withdrew to Gitschin.

(c) The Swedish War (1630–1634).—When Wallenstein's dismissal was decided upon at Ratisbon, the King of Sweden, Gustavus Adolphus (see his portrait on p. 295) had already landed in the North. On July 6, 1630, he had disembarked at the mouth of the Peene, with thirteen thousand men, not mercenaries but Swedish levies, had occupied Stettin, and forced the Duke of Pomerania to conclude an alliance. Although his army was strengthened to forty thousand men by reinforcements from home, grave mistrust prevailed among the Protestant princes, with the exception of those of Hesse-Cassel and Saxe-Weimar: they united in an armed neutrality. On the other hand the Dukes of Mecklenburg, the cousins of the Swedish king, returned to their country, and France promised her aid in a treaty with Sweden in January, 1631. While Gustavus Adolphus in the North took place after place and secured a strong position for himself, Tilly marched with the army of the League to Magdeburg in order to force the town to accept the Edict of Restitution. The Swedes, through the attitude of Brandenburg and the Saxon elector, could neither hasten to its assistance nor effect any change in Tilly's plan of campaign by the capture of Frankfort-on-the-Oder. The town thus fell into the hands of the besiegers on the 20th of May, 1631. A terrible sack began, during which fire broke out and reduced almost all the houses to ashes. The Catholics were triumphant at Tilly's success. The Protestants, however, saw too late that the Swedish king alone could stem the flood of disaster. The fate of Magdeburg might soon befall the other episcopal cities.

Hesse and Weimar on their part now made overtures to Sweden. But Gustavus Adolphus, since the Saxon elector and Brandenburg held back, was at first compelled to decline an alliance. An agreement, however, was eventually concluded with Brandenburg on June 21, by which Gustavus Adolphus was allowed to occupy Spandau and Küstrin, in order always to have a secured retreat to the coast. Success attended his cause, for on July 18 Tilly was defeated for the first time at Burgstall, in the vicinity of Wolmirstedt. Fresh reinforcements from Sweden and England placed the king in a still more favourable position. This induced Saxony also, on September 15, to join his cause; for Tilly was already invading the elector's territories, with the object of depriving him of the secularised bishoprics by virtue of the Edict of Restitution. A decisive blow was soon struck, since the elector wished above all to see the enemy driven far from his territory. The armies met at Breitenfeld near Leipzig, which Tilly had just occupied. The forces of the League were completely routed and their leader himself was wounded. The emperor
THE CHIEF FIELD MARSHALS OF THE THIRTY YEARS WAR
DESCRIPTIONS OF THE PORTRAITS OVERLEAF

1. Albrecht Wenzel Ensebius von Wahlstein, called Wallenstein, Duke of Friedland, Sagan and Mecklenburg, Imperial Generalissimo and Field-marshal, also General of the Baltic and Atlantic seas (1583–1634); painted by Anthonis van Dyck.
2. Johann Tserklaes, Count Tilly, Field-marshal of the Catholic League, also Generalissimo of the Imperial Troops and Army of the League (1559–1632); painted by Anthonis van Dyck.
3. Gustavus Adolphus II, King of Sweden, Duke of Franken (1584–1632); painted by Anthonis van Dyck.
was left without an army, and feared for his hereditary dominions, while Protestant Germany began to hail Gustavus Adolphus as a saviour.

While, then, the Saxons under John George of Arnim marched into Bohemia and seized Prague, Gustavus, passing through Thuringia, reached the Main. On October 18 he captured Würzburg, whither the bishop, a member of the League, had fled, and took Mayence as well in December. Here he spent the winter, received the unfortunate Palsgrave Frederick, and with Richelieu as mediator began negotiations for peace with the League, from which he demanded neutrality during the continuance of the war against the emperor. These transactions led to no results. Gustavus Adolphus therefore, in March, while securing the Rhine, advanced against Bavaria; on April 15, 1632, at Rain on the Lech, he once more defeated Tilly, who was mortally wounded (d. April 20), and made his entry into Munich in the middle of May. The League was shattered, and the emperor would have been lost, if Wallenstein had not for the second time freed him from his difficulties.

The emperor had offered him a new command soon after the battle of Breitenfeld, and again since Arnim's advance into Bohemia; but it was only in December, 1631, that Count Eggenberg had persuaded him, and received the assurance that within three months forty thousand men would be in the field. Wallenstein actually took over the chief command in April, 1632, after the right to conclude treaties had been granted him at Znaim. The first thing to be aimed at was separation of Saxony from the Swedish cause. The powers of the general were now so wide that he had the command of the army and the control of politics entirely in his own hands.

The Saxon elector, John George, had at the beginning of the year entertained the thought of concluding peace with the emperor independently of Sweden, but Brandenburg's attitude prevented him; and Wallenstein's appearance in Bohemia completely prevented the conclusion of a peace which might have secured to Saxony the possession of the ecclesiastical property. The negotiations were, however, continued. When Wallenstein had cleared Bohemia of the Saxons, he sought to unite himself with Maximilian of Bavaria, while Gustavus marched northward in order to hasten to the help of the Saxon elector. The Swedes collected in Nuremburg; but Wallenstein appeared before the town and entrenched himself in a camp near Fürth without engaging in a battle. At last on September 3 Gustavus attacked the enemy's camp unsuccessfully, and after vain attempts to bring about a peace he retreated on September 18. The Swedes next turned southward in order to attack Austria; but when they heard that Wallenstein was pressing Saxony still harder and massing his army at Leipzig, they advanced thither rapidly, joined the Landgrave William of Hesse in Erfurt, and by the middle of November were facing the hostile army. Wallenstein even now wished to avoid a battle. But on the 16th November, 1632, Gustavus Adolphus attacked the enemy at Lützen in order to facilitate a junction with the Saxons. He himself fell in the stubborn fight, while the Imperialists lost the brave cavalry general, Gottfried Henry, Count of Pappenheim. Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar (see his portrait on the accompanying plate, "The most prominent Commanders in the Thirty Years' War") took over the command after the death of the king and occupied the battlefield while Wallenstein withdrew. The joy of the Catholics over this battle sprang less from the supposed "victory" than from the feeling of emancipation which they experienced at the death of the great leader of the Protestants.
Bernard of Saxe-Weimar retained the military command of the orphaned army. The Swedish Council of State entrusted the political representation of Sweden in Germany to the Chancellor Oxenstierna, for whom a hard task was in store. The army especially was no longer the old force of true-born Swedes which had landed, but the greater part of it had been levied in Germany, and even the king had only been able to maintain discipline with difficulty. Henceforth the Swedish army did not differ in the least from the imperialists in the robberies and murders it committed: it became like them the scourge of every district through which it passed. Politically the prosecution of the war was still influenced by France, which contributed subsidies. Richelieu's aims were especially directed toward the acquisition of German soil. But the most important point still was to secure the adhesion of the German confederates to the Swedes.

John George of Saxony, in the negotiations conducted with him before the close of the year 1632, had demanded first of all a greater influence on the management of affairs. It was first resolved to raise two armies, a Swedish under Oxenstierna and a Saxon under John George; only it was doubtful to which of these two the remaining German Protestants would attach themselves. The Upper German and Rhenish princes held to the Swedes, but under French influence an advisory council was set by the side of the Swedish chancellor. This was done in March, 1633, in the treaty of Heilbronn. At the same time the emperor resumed negotiations with Saxony. Wallenstein entered into relations with Arnim, the general of the Saxon army, and was prepared for further concessions in religious matters, contrary to the will of his emperor; but Saxony and Brandenburg did not entertain his proposals. On the other side Oxenstierna was treating with the commander-in-chief, and asked him, in accordance with the wishes of the Bohemian emigrants, to let himself be elected king; but again there were no results. Bernard of Weimar had completely driven the Imperialists out of Saxony after the day of Lützen, and then (10th July, 1633) by the favour of Oxenstierna had become Duke of Franconia, the new duchy formed out of the bishoprics of Bamberg and Würzburg.

Wallenstein had defeated Arnim at Steinau on October 23, 1633, and freed Silesia from the enemy. Since, however, he did not relieve Ratisbon which Bernard of Weimar had taken on November 4, 1633, by a brilliant feat of arms, but withdrew his armies to Bohemia, the emperor conceived great mistrust of his general, who renewed his overtures to Saxony, France, and Sweden, and made a secret agreement with the latter, which was to effect a union of the armies at Eger. Wallenstein was not unaware of this distrust of him in Vienna. He sent in his resignation on January 12, 1634. It was not accepted, although his dismissal had already been pronounced in a secret document on January 24. Wallenstein was publicly declared guilty of treason by the emperor, on February 18, and was murdered on February 25, 1634, at Eger, while even his army was deserting him. The son of the emperor, afterward Ferdinand III, and Count Matthias of Gallas were now placed at the head of the army. With Wallenstein there went to the grave not merely the man of most marked intellectual ability, the splendid general and diplomatist, but also the only one of all the leaders who stood superior to the religious controversy.

His death placed the emperor, and consequently Catholicism, in a more favourable position than had ever been reached before. Now for the first time Ferdinand had an army of his own at his disposal, and he immediately ordered it to advance
to Ratisbon. The town fell into the hands of what had been Wallenstein’s army in July, and on September 6 Gallas won at Nördlingen a complete victory over Bernard of Weimar and Gustavus Horn. Now that the Swedes were defeated, it was an easy task for the emperor to conduct to a successful close the negotiations with Saxony, for which Wallenstein had already paved the way. The preliminary conditions were settled by November, 1634, and were confirmed in the Treaty of Prague on May 30, 1635. By this convention Saxony obtained as hereditary dominions the two provinces of Lusatia which had been pledged to John George I after the dissolution of the “winter kingdom,” and was exempted for the future from enforcing the Edict of Restitution; in return, all claims for the further representation of evangelical interests were to be renounced, and a promise given of help in case of need against the Swedes and French. The majority of the States of north Germany soon gave their adhesion to this treaty, which at once deposed the Swedes from their commanding position and threatened to cut off their connection with their home. Since the dispute as to religious politics between the Catholic and Protestant princes had been accommodated by the most important representatives, henceforth secular interests determined the conduct of the war more distinctly than before. From this time it signified essentially a struggle between Austria and Spain on the one side, and France and Sweden on the other; for Ferdinand III, who had followed his father on the throne in 1637 as emperor and heir to Austria (d. 1657), always maintained the most intimate relations with the Hapsburg dynasty of Spain.

(d) The Franco-Swedish War (1635–1648). — The only course left open to those Protestants who had not acceded to the Treaty of Prague, after the overthrow of the Swedish power, was to form closer relations with France, which under Richelieu’s brilliant statesmanship aimed at depriving both lines of the Hapsburgs of their supremacy in western Europe. The French had fought against Spain in Italy, and since the appearance of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany had operated against the emperor with his support, had made conquests in Lorraine, and had established themselves firmly in the electorate of Trèves. In the spring of 1635 an imperial army had fought with success on the right bank of the Rhine and thereby forced France to an open declaration of war. Richelieu protected himself on two sides, since he bound over the States-General to a common attack on Spain, and the Swedes to a conflict with the emperor that should be terminated only by a joint peace. The emperor thus had henceforth to reckon with a double opposition, both in the battlefield and in any negotiations for peace.

The military events of 1635 were unimportant on the French side; the troops, being inexperienced in warfare, did not wish to enter central Germany and were with difficulty brought as far as the Rhine, while the Imperialists were masters of the situation there in the autumn. In the North, it is true, the Swedes, John Banér and Lennart Torstenson, had won repeated successes, and drove out the imperial army, united with the Saxons, from Mecklenburg and Pomerania. Richelieu in this emergency, on October 27, at St. Germain-en-Laye, concluded a special treaty with Bernard of Weimar, the most competent Protestant commander; by its terms an army of twelve thousand foot soldiers and six thousand horsemen was to be raised in Germany with French money (four million livres yearly), and opposed to the
emperor in the war for the liberation of Germany. A rich reward was held out to the victor in the possession of Alsace, which still belonged to the Hapsburgs.

The year 1636 was, however, disastrous for the French. The Imperialists advanced into the heart of the country, menaced Franche-Comte, and, led by the cavalry general, John von Werth, threatened even Paris itself, while Bernard merely held his own in Alsace. It was only when the French people, recognising the national danger, took up arms that Gallas was forced to retire in November. Shortly before (on October 4, 1636), Banér had again gained a victory at Wittstock over Saxony and the Imperialists, and acquired a commanding position in the North. Saxony and Brandenburg in particular had now to pay dearly for their defection from the Protestant cause by the devastation of their country. One part of the councils of Brandenburg already inclined toward the side of the Swedes, and tried to induce the elector once more to change his party, particularly with a view to Pomerania, where the Duke Bogislaus XIV threatened to die childless, and give Brandenburg a claim to the succession. The elector, however, continued loyal to the emperor; imperial subsidies appeared finally in December. The claims to Pomerania, it is true, when the duke died on March 20, 1637, had first to be contested with arms, and so brought distress into the Mark. Banér in the North had a difficult task in facing the army of Brandenburg and the emperor; he was for a long time separated from Hermann Wrangel, and was forced at length to withdraw to Stettin. The French, it is true, had won advantages over the Spaniards at widely separated points, but in Germany the Imperialists during the year 1637 had again been victorious in every respect.

On March 6, 1638, France and Sweden considered it necessary to renew their treaty and to promise that neither party should commence negotiations for peace without the consent of the other. Bernard's campaign was this year attended with success. He surprised the imperial general Frederick, Duke of Savello, and John von Werth, before Rheinfelden, took both prisoners together with other generals (March 3, 1638), captured Rheinfelden on March 23 and began the investment of the fortress of Breisach. The siege lasted six months. At last on December 17 he entered as conqueror, after the check of the imperial armies had opened the road for Banér in the North to advance into Bohemia and Austria. The success of Bernard filled Protestant Germany with fresh spirit. Banér now wished to join forces with the victor in Alsace and attack the hereditary dominions of the emperor. On the other hand the emperor tried to enlist the services of the famous Bernard; ungrateful France alone was endeavouring to deprive the victor of his promised reward. But Bernard died on July 18, 1639, before, as a second Gustavus Adolphus, he could achieve further successes, and thus the emperor was freed from his most dangerous enemy.

Richelieu, without a moment's delay, availed himself of the favourable opportunity to take over the well-disciplined troops of Bernard, and to form his plans in concert with Banér for continuing the war against the emperor, especially since, by skilful use of internal dissensions in Spain, he might count on favourable results there without any great expenditure of force. Although the French henceforth remained in the closest sympathy with the Swedes and produced competent commanders, such as Henri de Latour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne (1611–1675), and the “Great Condé” (Louis of Bourbon, 1621–1686), yet the military supremacy rested with the Swedes. After the death of Banér (May 10, 1641) Torstenson
obtained decisive successes in Silesia (1642), and in combination with two other
Swedish armies won a complete victory at the second battle of Breitenfeld, near
Leipzig, on November 2, over the Imperialists under Archduke Leopold William
and Octavio Piccolomini. But the emperor's prospects were again improved by
the death in France, first of Richelieu (December 4, 1642) and soon afterward
(May 14, 1643) of King Louis XIII, who left his son Louis XIV not yet five
years old; and, moreover, Denmark was once more involved in a war with the
Swedes.

Cardinal Mazarin now managed the State affairs of France and followed out
the policy of his predecessor with skill and success. In the war against the Danes,
Torstenson was completely victorious in 1643 and 1644. In October, 1644, he
annihilated the imperial army under Gallas in two battles at Jutærbogk and Mag-
deburg, attacked Austria, supported by the Prince of Transylvania, George L.
Károlyi (1630–1648), and advanced almost to the walls of Vienna. The French,
however, had fought with much less success. Just at the time Vienna was being
threatened, Turenne was defeated on May 5, 1645, at Mengenheim, by the Imperi-
alists under Baron Francis of Mercy. The victorious army could now advance to
the relief of the hereditary domains. Torstenson, therefore, in spite of a splendid
victory, won on March 6 at Jankau over Melchior of Hatzfeldt, abandoned the
siege of Brünn and withdrew to Bohemia. But Condé and Turenne advanced in
conjunction into Bavaria, and on August 3 won a victory at Allersheim over
Mercy, who was slain. At the same time (August 25) Denmark made a truce
with Sweden at Brömsebro, and Saxony, completely in the possession of the Swedes
under Hans Christopher of Königsmark, accepted an armistice for six months, in
which Brandenburg was included. The Swedes now had a free hand in north
Germany.

Charles Gustavus Wrangel, who, since Torstenson's retirement (25th December,
1645) had the supreme command, joined forces with Turenne in order to make a
combined advance on south Germany; the whole of Bavaria soon fell into their
hands, and the road to the hereditary domains of the emperor lay open to the allied
army in September, 1646. Maximilian of Bavaria now found himself in a criti-
cal position, which determined him, in March, 1647, to form a treaty of neutrality
with Sweden; Cologne, Mayence, and Hesse joined in it. Wrangel marched into
Bohemia, but he found opposition from the Imperialists, who had once more been
joined by Maximilian of Bavaria at Pilsen in September. The Swedes were forced
to withdraw to the North, especially since Turenne was recalled to France.
Fortune, however, only momentarily smiled on the emperor. Turenne recrossed
the Rhine in the spring of 1648, advanced in combination with Wrangel into Bav-
aria, and gained a victory on May 7 at Zusmarshausen over the imperial and
Bavarian army under Peter Melander, Count of Holzappel. The elector fled, and the
country was ruthlessly devastated. The Swedes under Königsmark went to Bohemia
and captured on July 26 the lower town of Prague. The French and Swedish
arms met with good fortune in other places also (Condé's victory at Lens on
August 20); the position of the emperor was hopeless. The bombardment of
the Old Town at Prague was about to begin, when the news spread through the
country that peace had been signed at Münster on the 24th of October. The vicis-
itudes of the great war, for the theatre of which Germany had been marked out
by the law of geographical position as being the heart of Europe, present a dismal
picture to the memory of the historian. It was a perpetual ebb and flow, not a consistent struggle undertaken with great objects in view. The great personalies, the generals and statesmen, are thus the more conspicuous. However different they may have been, one from the other, one feature is common to almost all of them, and especially to the four chief heroes — Tilly, Wallenstein, Gustavus Adolphus, and Bernard of Weimar (see the plate on p. 295); they were masters of the art of war, men of the modern world, too, and, in spite of repulsive acts, not devoid of high ideals.

D. The Peace of Westphalia

(a) Preliminary Negotiations. — The arrangement between France and Sweden which forbade either to enter alone into negotiations for peace with the emperor had been the outcome of the fine diplomacy of a Richelieu; it was the sudden conclusion of a peace by one of several allies that had hitherto regularly stultified the diplomatic results of the victories on both sides. But France and Sweden were both to a large extent dependent on each other; for the superiority of the former in its ampler resources and the diplomatic training of its leading men was counterbalanced by the success of the Swedish arms. In fact all attempts of the emperor to obtain a separate peace had failed. He was therefore compelled to consent, whether he would or not, that an imperial diet, the first time for twenty-seven years, assembled in 1640 at Ratisbon in order to discuss the steps which might lead to peace; not so much the obstinate emperor as the princes, even the Catholic ones, felt a keen longing for tranquillity. It was seen on all sides that first of all the foreigners must be expelled from Germany; but it was as impossible at once to persuade the emperor to detach himself entirely from Spain as to induce the Protestants to abandon Sweden and France. The negotiations of the imperial diet were therefore fruitless.

But the fervent desire for peace which found expression in them was such that the path once trodden could not be again abandoned. In the year 1641 it was resolved at Hamburg that the imperial envoys should negotiate with the French at Münster, and with the Swedes and German Protestants at Osnabrück; the congresses were to begin in the summer of 1643, and both towns were from that date to be regarded as neutral. The negotiations really commenced in April, 1644. But the news of the military successes of this or the other party prevented quiet discussion and adoption of resolutions, in fact repeatedly jeopardised the whole work that had begun. At last on 8th August, 1648, the terms of peace at Osnabrück were drawn up; those at Münster followed on September 17. Both documents were jointly ratified at Münster on 24th October, 1648. In this way, peace, which most men of that time knew only by hearsay, came at last into the land.

The Peace of Westphalia was of the highest importance in a twofold sense. It not only concluded the era of war and thoroughly settled the ecclesiastical and political disputes which had arisen since 1555, but it also created a basis for further political development, since it confirmed by constitutional law the actual disintegration of the German Empire and recognised the territory as the modern and normal structure of the States which were joined in a federation called the "Roman Empire of the German nation." (See the annexed map, "Germany in the year 1648.")
INDEX TO THE MAP: GERMANY IN THE YEAR 1648

GERMAN EMPIRE

(The letters between brackets [KE] indicate abbreviations in the map)

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8. Royal Dominions in Foreign Possession:

Spanish Possessions:
Free county Burgundy
Spanish Netherlands [NF]

Swedish Possessions:

Bremen (duchy)
Hilper Pomerania (duchy)
Vardar (principality)
Wildenau (seignory)
Wieslar (seignory)

9. Royal Cities:

Aachen
Augsburg
Breslau
Bremen
Buchhorn
Cologne
Duisburg
Dortmund
Esslingen
Frankfort on the Main
Halberstadt
Hamburg (HS)
Halle (Saale)
Heidelberg
Köln
Kempten
Landau
Landau
Landau
Leipzig
Lübeck
Mannheim
Meiningen
Mühlhausen (Thuringia)
Münster (Alsace)
Nordhausen
Nuremberg
Osnabrück
Paderborn
Pfalz-Bishopric
Regensburg
Reutlingen
Rothenburg
Saarbrücken
Salzburg
Sankt Peter (Stettin)
Schaffhausen
Schweinfurt
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<th>B. Ecclesiastical Divisions.</th>
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<td>1. Archbishops:</td>
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<td>Cologne (electorate) [KÖ]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mainz (electorate) [ME]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salzburg (BA)</td>
<td>FH9, 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trent (electorate) [T]</td>
<td>CD9, 4</td>
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<td>2. Bishops:</td>
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<td>Augsburg (AG)</td>
<td>E4, 5</td>
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<td>Bamberg (BA)</td>
<td>EFS, 4,60</td>
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<td>Basel (BS)</td>
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The French monarchy after 1610: Louis XIII and the first ten years of the reign of Louis XIV. — This is not all that lies between the lines of the instruments of the Peace. We read there distinctly that henceforth the French monarchy will hold the first place in European politics, that the age of Louis XIV is approaching. France has finally triumphed over the Hapsburgs in their European position; the dreams of King Francis I are realised. Louis XIII (1610–1643), eldest son of Henry IV, was only nine years old when his father was murdered. His mother, Marie de' Medici, therefore became regent for him, and took the opportunity to introduce a system of government widely divergent from the existing one. Sully, who had been reluctantly tolerated as one of the Reformed, was dismissed and Jesuitical influences began to rule the queen. Universal discontent at this filled not only the land, but also the magnates of the realm and the members of the royal family, who were excluded from any share in the government. The "declaration of majority," pronounced by Parliament in October, 1614, conformably to a family law, made no alteration in this, for the king begged his mother to continue to direct the government. In accordance with the general wish, the queen summoned the estates of the realm, but their deliberations had not the least result, so that the last general diet of the French States before the revolution of 1789 was dismissed without any results having been accomplished. After that time it was reserved for the regular Courts of Justice (Parlements, of which there were twelve, one for each government) to safeguard the rights of the people against the absolute monarchy, but seldom indeed with success.

Owing to the suppression of the Huguenots planned by Marie, it was not long before new hostilities broke out between the religious parties. Prince Henry of Condé allied himself in July, 1615, with the Evangelicals, who took up arms, but a peace (May, 1616) temporarily quieted men's minds, after the prince had been drawn over to the royalist party. The trusted agent of Marie in all her action was the Italian Concino Concini, Marshal d'Ancre. The fury of the people was especially directed against him; voices were raised loudly against the all-powerful minister, so that the king ordered his arrest and murder (24th April, 1617), and immediately himself took over the government. The queen was forced to retire. Louis, under the advice of incompetent ministers (Charles d'Albert, Duke of Luynes, Brullart de Sillery and La Vieuville), sought to mitigate the distress.

But Louis also aroused the discontent of the nobles who were excluded from the government, and in this way fostered the ambitious schemes of his mother, who allied herself with the nobility and threatened a civil war. Before the actual outbreak of the war, an arrangement was effected on August 10, 1620, at Pont-de-Cé, through the efforts of a man who was destined later to lead the fortunes of France, namely, Jean Armand du Plessis de Richelieu; the queen-mother was permitted to return to court. New complications arose owing to the Church question. The Catholic Church had made considerable conquests and commenced once more the campaign against the heretics, since it endeavoured to recover secularised ecclesiastical property and partially carried out its purpose by force. In the year 1621 it came to an open war against the Reformed: in the North they were soon subdued, but in the South the struggle lasted until October, 1622, when the Edict of Nantes was once more ratified in essential points. The queen-mother, however, used her newly acquired influence less in her own private interests than in sup-
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

port of Cardinal Richelieu, whose admission into the Council of State was due to her. After 1624 Richelieu alone guided the affairs of State.

With this commenced the prosperity of the French policy, which henceforth influenced and finally governed European diplomacy. Richelieu's goal was that of Henry IV, the weakening of the power of the Hapsburgs in Austria and Spain. The Dutch Republic, the German Protestants and the Swedes, were supported by France; the War of Succession in Mantua ended on April 6, 1631, to the advantage of France, and Spain thus lost a strong support to her influence in Italy. The government at home was, under Richelieu, inspired alone by State considerations; the representation of private interests ceased, and therefore the Cardinal found intense opposition at court. In order to prevent further disturbances, which for the last century had always been caused with the help of the Huguenots, the cardinal resolved on their subjection and conquest (1628).

Even the aid of Spain was welcomed for this end, while England supported the Reformed party. The strongest place of the Huguenots, La Rochelle, was besieged in 1627 under Richelieu's personal command. It was not until October 28, 1628, when the expected English relief did not appear, that the town surrendered. Famine had made terrible ravages among the inhabitants. Richelieu promised the survivors security of life and property as well as free exercise of their religion; the fortifications were, however, dismantled, and the privileges of the town declared void. By the treaty of the summer of 1629 the fortifications of all the Huguenot places of refuge were destroyed; but religious liberty was retained, although the political representation of the Huguenots was abolished.

The respect formerly entertained by the queen-mother for Richelieu was meantime changed into dislike. She had long intrigued against the minister, but in vain; she had herself been forced to leave the court. The king's brother, Duke Gaston of Orleans, began in her stead to agitate against the minister, and in 1632 ventured with the support of Henry de Montmorency to risk a war; but after the defeat of Castelnaudary (on September 1) which brought the latter to prison and finally to the scaffold, he was compelled to surrender. The attack of the Duke of Orleans was connected with that of Duke Charles III of Lorraine, his father-in-law, who supported the emperor and was therefore forced to open Nancy to the French until the conclusion of peace; in fact the whole country remained occupied by them for almost three decades (until 1659), while Duke Charles vainly fought on the side of the emperor for the recovery of his country. The Duke of Orleans, taken into favour again in 1634, attempted nevertheless a new plot against Richelieu — this time also the plan failed. His hope of succession to the throne was shortly afterwards destroyed by the birth of an heir to the crown, the subsequent Louis XIV (1638). He attempted, however, once more to overthrow Richelieu (1642) in conjunction with Henri Coiffier de Ruzé, Marquis de Cinq-Mars, whom Louis XIII had made Grand Master-of-the-Horse, and in consort with Spain. Once more all was useless. But Richelieu's end was near; he died on December 4, 1642, and on May 14, 1643, the king followed him. Although the Cardinal was not fated to co-operate in the conclusion of peace at Münster, still the weight which France was able there to put into the balance was incontestably the result of his restless activity.

The guardianship of the infant prince was, contrary to the wish of the father, undertaken by the queen, Anne of Austria, with whom Louis had spent an un-
happy married life. The supporters of Richelieu feared an immediate reversal in the system of government. The queen then chose for her trusted servant the Italian Giulio Mazarini, who had been in the French service as Jules Mazarin since 1639: a man who without Richelieu's spirit and energy, was yet, like him, anxious to work for the greatness of France. At home the discontent at the burden of taxation, which was always increasing through the continuous war, led to serious riots (Fronde) at Paris in the summer of 1648; and they ended with a victory of the Parliament, since it compelled the queen to acknowledge its influence on the most important business of government. Any attempts of the queen to annul her concessions were frustrated. She had to give way in the peace of Rueil (April 1, 1649); but Mazarin retained provisionally his commanding position. But when, in concert with the queen, he arrested (18th January, 1650) Prince Louis of Condé, the leader of the opposition, and his kinsmen (Armand of Condé, Henry of Longueville), he brought down on his head a storm which banished him for a time from France, although he supported his queen with counsel from Liège and Brühl. When he wished to return, Condé rose again; and it was only when the latter had been defeated by Turenne in 1652, that Mazarin was able to come home as victor on February 3, 1653. Two years before, Louis XIV had become of age and had formally entered on the government, in reality his mother still remained the sovereign.

The picture of the home affairs in France during the great war could not be called attractive. Yet French policy had turned the scale in the peace of Westphalia. It is due to this alone that the emperor consented to allow princes to attend the negotiations as representatives of the empire. It must be said, no doubt, that the efforts of France were directed not so much towards the advantage of the Protestants as towards her own aggrandisement, and that her only concern was that an uncompromising opponent to the Hapsburg emperor might be permanently established in the German prince-system, irrespective of all question of creed. This object was attained.

(c) The Contents and the Significance of the Peace of Westphalia.—The Peace negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück first of all laid down provisions with respect to the religious question which went considerably further than earlier agreements. The Treaty of Passau, and the Religious Peace of Augsburg, were not only completely confirmed, but extended to the Reformed party. The relations between State and Church were considerably modified in the direction of denominational equality. While earlier centuries had developed a high degree of toleration of the non-Christian, no such attitude can be seen after the complete extension of Christian belief over Germany in the fifteenth century. The Christian Church was actually conceived by its followers as not only the "universal," but the only religious community which could lay claim to this name. No less splendid ideal hovered before the Reformers, and especially before the mighty Luther, than a complete transformation of Christianity according to his view; his doctrine was indeed, in his own conception of it, as he declared, nothing more than the reversion to Augustine. No thought lay farther from him than religious toleration, which after all can only appear as a practically necessary compromise, but never as the outcome of religious conviction; for every representative of a sincerely vigorous view of life feels the wish to propagate his own ideas and to implant his thoughts on the
rest of mankind. The impossibility that a party could really reach this goal compelled politicians to renounce the attempt in that sphere. The instruments of the Peace itself did not indeed proclaim absolute toleration, but limited the power of the territorial lord to determine the community to which his subjects should belong, in so far that the year 1624 was selected as the “Normal Year,” and any one who, in that year, had actually exercised one or the other religion was to be permitted to exercise it on all future occasions. And creed was not to be prejudicial to any one in his “occupation as a citizen.” The coexistence side by side of several confessions in the same territory was thus rendered possible. On the other hand the incidental change of faith by a prince was no longer to force the whole people to take the same step. It is obvious that this new regulation must have introduced a practical toleration, and have finally led to its constitutional and universal acceptance in the popular consciousness. This happened in the eighteenth century, and no less a man than Lessing tried to find the philosophical basis for toleration. (See on this the third section of this volume.)

Nothing final and conclusive was arranged by the Peace instruments. Innumerable disputes arose, both as to the actual conditions in the Normal Year, and as to the interpretation of all other points, and many of them were only ended by the complete destruction of the old empire. But it is clearly recognisable, from the very fact that the interpretation is disputed, that the Peace-document really became a “Fundamental Law of the Holy Roman Empire,” such as was demanded by the so-called “Last Imperial Recess” of 1654, which embodied the full text of the two instruments.

The constitution of the empire was considerably altered from a secular aspect, since Bavaria retained the electoral dignity, and the Palatinate, limited in extent to the Rhenish Palatinate, acquired a new, the eighth, electoral vote. All the States of the empire, princes and towns, obtained at the same time full sovereignty, with the right to contract alliances with each other and with foreign powers, subject to the one limitation that these were not directed against the emperor and empire. The imperial legislation was now placed in the hands of the emperor and the States jointly, and the power of the imperial diet was thus considerably widened. The imperial cities, since their importance had greatly diminished, were now expressly granted the privileges of States of the empire, which had not been seriously disputed since 1489.

More important than those provisions, which only legally confirmed existing conditions, were the answers to the international questions. France obtained considerable portions of the Hapsburg possessions in Alsace (with the express reservation of Strasburg) and the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had been occupied since 1552. Sweden established a firm footing on the mainland, and became a State of the German Empire; for, together with a war indemnity of five million thalers (£750,000), it received Upper Pomerania and Rugen, the smaller portion of Lower Pomerania, with Stettin and the mouth of the Oder, the town of Wismar, the bishopric of Bremen, excluding the town as well as the bishopric of Verdun. Electoral Brandenburg, which had claims on the whole of Pomerania in virtue of hereditary rights, had to be content with the larger portion of Lower Pomerania, but was compensated by the bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden, and the reversion to Magdeburg. On the borders of
the empire two independent republics, which had previously been part of the empire, were finally separated from it. For Switzerland this merely implied the recognition of the conditions prevailing since 1499. The confederation had been weakened by religious dissensions at home since the days of Zwingli and Calvin. France and Spain, as neighbours in the possession of Milan, had repeatedly interfered in the movement; the aristocratical government in the towns, especially in Berne, had repeatedly disturbed the country together with the religious demands of the peasants; even in 1553 a revolt of the peasants in Berne, Lucerne, Solothurn, and Basle was repressed with much bloodshed. The States-General, which now were entering on great economic prosperity (the East India Company had been founded in 1602), had acquired the right to political independence in a still higher degree. Their favourable position on the coast urged the towns, where money had long been in use as the chief medium of exchange, to rule the seas by means of a trading fleet, and the fall of Spain offered at the same time the opportunity of entering on the inheritance of their former persecutors.

The German Empire was, in its essential nature, broken up when the articles of peace came into force. The emperor could now only intervene as master of Austria, and the States of the empire were unfettered in their intercourse with foreign powers. Sweden, once so formidable a foe, had actually become a State of the empire, with a seat and vote in the imperial diet, which itself again was only the caricature of a representative assembly. Henceforth in the German-speaking districts there were only separate princes. One of them, the Prince of Brandenburg, began at once to govern and administer his country differently from the others, so that he accomplished a great work, and on his death (1688) left behind a land quite different from that to which he had succeeded in 1640 (cf. on the point the last section of this volume). In higher politics every German had in the first place to reckon with the neighbour on the west, who was only temporarily satisfied with his acquisitions in the peace-negotiations, and was only seeking the opportunity to annex other portions of German soil. The Peace ended the most gloomy section of German history. It saw an exhausted, devastated, depopulated land, with every sign of ruin. The mere attempt to picture the sufferings which the German country endured must be abandoned. It must suffice to compare the condition of the districts before the beginning of the struggle with that at the close of the war, if a credible picture of the effect produced by the fury of the combatants is to be drawn. The price of food stuffs was often ten times the ordinary price. The number of the inhabitants was terribly diminished. Unfortunately, at this point trustworthy statistics are mostly wanting; only in the case of Bohemia have calculations led to the result, which may be considered as correct, that instead of four millions in 1618, only eight hundred thousand inhabitants were still living at the end of the war. In this connection we must reflect that, as has been shown above, all districts were equally ravaged and equally exhausted by friend and foe. The conclusion of peace did not immediately end all scenes of violence; armies were still stationed everywhere under arms, and individual claims had to be proved and sustained by the interested parties. The task was on the whole discharged at Nuremberg, in the course of the year 1648; "the Principal Recess for the execution of the Peace" was finally issued in June, 1650. Even if all the hopes were not at once fulfilled which inspired German hearts on the news of the conclusion of peace, even if
Germany still suffered from its wounds for centuries, yet, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that only through such hard trials has it been possible for the empire to shatter the old forms of the constitution, and thus to open the road for the modern development of the State which finally in the nineteenth century led to the new German Empire.
III

WESTERN CHRISTIANITY AND ITS ACTIVITY IN THE MISSION FIELD SINCE THE REFORMATION

By PROFESSOR DR. WILHELM WALThER

1. THE DIVISION OF THE CHURCH INTO DENOMINATIONS

A. THE GERMAN REFORMATION (1517–1555)

CHRISTIANITY has at no time faced so dangerous a storm as at the dawn of the "New Era." The religious feeling of the Medieval Church rested on the two pillars of blind submission to authority, and conviction that the spiritual was antagonistic to the temporal. But doubts had been raised for centuries as to the justification for these fundamental conceptions. Humanism had made the opposite ideas the common property of educated men. There was a quickened consciousness of what the inalienable nature of man required, the consciousness that man is an independent personality whose impulse is toward liberty, self-determination, and unhindered development, as well as the consciousness of the position which man has to take with regard to the world around him, the wish for work in the world not less than enjoyment of the world. The child who felt himself happy under the constant care of his parents, and still dreaded the wide world outside, became a youth who wished to decide for himself, and to take a place in the world by his work and by his enjoyment. The Church, however, did not recognize the justification for this effort, nor did she educate all her subjects to religious freedom and independence, as well as to moral activity in the world, and moral joy in existence. No, she rigidly held to her old ideas and would gladly see every one holding them. She trusted still to the efficiency of her means of discipline, as if the time never comes when the son scoffs at the rod of the father.

And yet there was no other Christianity than that which was characterized by those medieval fundamental conceptions. It was clear that the new notions were irreconcilable with the old faith. Men must either believe and live once more according to those old ideals and sacrifice the new ones, or they must hold fast to the new doctrines and abandon the old. Countless numbers had already chosen the latter alternative; they could not stand against the overpowering current of the age. But then they threw all faith away from them, since there was no other than that which was steeped in those old ideas. Custom indeed is a potent factor even in the sphere of religion. Most still preserved the religion in externals for a while; but sooner or later the need of some uniform conception of life prevailed over custom, at any rate among those who were distinguished as spiritual leaders. But alas for that religion to which men adhere only in consequence of the law of
inertia! It is true that at the dawn of the new era the number of those who, from sincere piety, wished to uphold Christianity, was still very large, especially in Germany, indeed larger than ever before. But the Church could no longer satisfy their religious needs, since the desire for subduing all nature to the service of man had already begun to colour religious life, and since even in this domain blind submission and retirement from the world were felt to be an outrage on the nature of man.

Whence was religion to find safety? Only one thing could bring help: a new form of Christianity must be given to the world, a Christianity which would not suppress man's nature, but would rather develop and sustain it, a Christianity which recognised the impulse toward religious liberty and man's domination of nature and tried to guide it into the right paths. It is true that the effort of the Church to crush all religious independence instead of inspiring a spirit of freedom, unfits those who break away from her to become themselves safe guides. Religious freedom is abused in the saddest fashion, but those who thirst for truth are at any rate offered the opportunity of quenching their religious craving. Christianity may revive in them under a new and purer form.

It was not mere chance that this renewal of Christianity was effected in Germany. Even in the Middle Ages all those efforts to divest the faith, which had been transmitted from the Greco-Roman world, of its legal character, and to make it the personal concern of the individual, had originated with Germans. The peculiarly characteristic Germanic sense of reality which hates mere show, the depth of purpose which cannot be satisfied with outward piety, the inquiring spirit which is not contented with any reassurance from human authorities — these caused this intensifying and deepening of religious life to spring up in Germany, the heart of Europe, and to find there an enthusiastic welcome.

Martin Luther grew up amongst mediaeval conceptions. He held by the Church and he obeyed the Church. A reverential awe seized the boy of fourteen when he saw that Prince of Anhalt, in the Franciscan cowl, walking through the streets of Magdeburg, bent double under the heavy beggar's wallet: "Whoever saw him must in devotion kiss him and blush for his own worldly state." But he was consumed with an ardent longing for religious independence, and therefore for a personal conviction that he stood in the right relations to God. He was a man of such astonishing inward sturdiness that it was absolutely impossible for him to flatter or delude himself in any way as to his own state. In order to win God's grace he did not shrink from the most extreme steps which the Church prescribed for that end. He renounced all that was valuable to him on earth, he entered the Augustinian monastery and undermined his health by services which he considered meritorious. But he, as thousands before his time, could not rest satisfied with the idea that he had nothing more to do. For he felt, in his unflinching self-examination, more and more clearly that all his pious deeds were insufficient in the eyes of God; that all was done only from fear, in fact, in his case, with a secret indignation against God who in spite of everything withheld his grace. He only sighed more loudly. "When shall I finally become pious and do enough to obtain a gracious God?" Despair threatened to master him, as he had now, as he thought, learnt from experience that we cannot get for ourselves the one thing on which all depends, the real love of God: we cannot therefore win for ourselves God's favour. "I was destined to sink into hell," he wailed. Then the general of his order, the holy Staupitz, pointed out another
goal for his efforts. It is impossible for us to earn God's grace by our piety. But Christ is our refuge from despair: Christ does not frighten us but consoles us. Through Christ we can obtain forgiveness for not being what we ought to be, forgiveness, and with it God's grace. Instead of the unanswerable question, "When shall I finally become pious?" we must put the other question, "When shall I obtain forgiveness?" And the answer runs, "Only through Christ, through faith in Him," that is, through personal trust in Him who brings God's grace to us.

Luther now read the Bible in quite a new light. "The just shall live by his faith," the saying became great and excellent to him. Faith alone justifies, and brings life. The more he learnt in the long struggle to leave the old way, which the teaching of the Church had pointed out, and to walk in the new way of trust in God's grace, the more he found that this path was the right one. His conscience was calmed. He felt that he now had actually found a gracious God. Thus from his own mental state he convinced himself that he had found the way to salvation, and that the Holy Scriptures are the sole spiritual truth.

The new Christianity which he found was nothing more than his conception of the old, old words, "Come unto me, all ye who struggle and are burdened, and ye shall find rest for your souls. No one comes to the Father but through me" (cf. Vol. IV, p. 163). Luther thus attained independent faith; no human being, no Church had now any authority in his eyes. And yet this faith did not arise from his own liking. On the contrary the objective fact, the grace of God which was objectively present, became his subjective possession. The terrible danger which lay in the awakening of the impulse toward independence in the domain of religion, the danger that each individual constructs some faith for himself and is therewith contented, was to be averted. This faith was to be independent, but not arbitrary; completely subjective, and yet based on that which was present outside him; completely free and yet completely fettered: authorised by the only privileged authority, the living God. How feeble compared to that is the authority of men, the Fathers of the Church, the Popes, the Councils! How dimly shine the beacons-lights on which the sinner, trembling before God, rests his hopes, — the saints with their services and their mediation, those helpers in time of need, the pitying queen of heaven, men's penances and good works, indulgences, the sacrifice of the mass! Whoever stands in actual communion with God needs such things no more. All that is to be retained of such observances, preaching, baptism, absolution, the Lord's Supper, is to serve only for strengthening the sanctifying trust in the grace and love of God.

How splendid a new morality might grow on such a new soil of faith! "A Christian is the free lord of all things, and subject to no one." No sort of compulsion can produce really good works, but as the good tree bears of itself good fruits, so the faith which inspires the man brings forth, as it were involuntarily, actions which are well pleasing to God. The new conditions led to new conduct. Morality is to be quite unconcerned, whether a Church strictly enforces her decrees or not, whether she even tramples them underfoot; conduct is above all commands and prohibitions, all standards of social example. There remains indeed in the heart a tendency toward evil; but faith cannot palter with it, cannot gloss it over with sham works of holiness. For faith, so truly as it loves God, hates evil and therefore fights unwearingly against it.
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

Just as the claim and essence of this morality took a modern form, so, too, did its application. The Middle Ages held that man's highest act of piety was to leave the world, and to devote himself to religious works. But whoever, in the station in which God had placed him, had attained actual communion with God, knew that he had in this station to show his new spiritual attitude, that it was not what he did that made the difference, but how he did it, whether he did it from love of God, because God had called him to this work, and so in the way which was pleasing to God. What folly to consider impure the pure earthly vocations; family life, marriage, civic life! Even the most conspicuous religious work such as prayer, the founding of churches, monasticism, could be impure. While the most inconspicuous secular work is sanctified by faith and love “even were it only to lift a blade of straw.” Was worldly joy to be impure in itself? Whoever has the grace of God, receives with thankful joy from the hand of God all the good that God's goodness gives; this thankfulness keeps him from misusing it. The terrible danger lying in the awakening of the sense which is directed toward the world, lest the man disregard the Creator and Lord of the world in worldly work and worldly enjoyment, and employ both only for his selfish ends, and bring only destruction on himself and on his fellow-men — this danger is surmounted. Christianity has thus won a modern form. It no longer contradicts the ideals of the new era: it wishes and is able rather to keep them from degenerating. However strongly the current of freedom and subjection of nature may flow at that new era, the new-born Christianity lends its aid so that man need not be swept away by the flood. Christianity is thus brought in safety from the old era to the new.

Luther himself did not suspect the epoch-making importance of his religious discovery. The respect for the Church which he had imbibed from earliest infancy did not allow him to contemplate any deviation from her teaching. In order to oppose a mere abuse he nailed his ninety-five theses on Indulgences to the castle-church at Wittenberg. But though their language was temperate, though they expressed little of his new revolutionary thoughts, they kindled like a flash of lightning. When Dr. Fleck had read them, he cried out, “Ha! he will do it: he is the man for whom we have so long waited.” It was felt that a personality was speaking there, which had an ardent longing alike for objective truth and subjective certainty. The supporters of the old order did him good service when by their opposition they disclosed the yawning gulf between their conceptions and his. Many of the Humanists, hitherto indifferent to it, were fired for this struggle by the disputation at Leipzig between Luther and the great Roman theologian Dr. Eck (July, 1519). The movement became a matter of interest to the German people through his treatise “to the Christian nobility of the German nation,” in which (beginning of 1520) he championed with fiery words the complaints against the papal chair and the yearning desire for a really reformatory council.

Rome, regardless of results, passed her verdict. The papacy, with the bull which condemned Luther, his teaching and his followers, stood as an obstacle in the path of the new intellectual movement. When it at length succeeded in drawing the emperor over to the same side, and the Pope's decision was recognised by the suspension of the imperial ban over the innovators, one of two alternatives alone was possible: either the mighty religious revolt must be crushed by force, or Rome must bow before it. But Rome remained firm, and yet political conditions made it impossible for the emperor to carry out the part he had undertaken in accordance
with the judgment of the papal legate, that of being "the obedient executor of the Roman chair."

Thus the Reformation movement, which had incorporated various component parts, found the time to become, as it were, clear about itself and to renounce all that did not agree with its real nature. Whoever wished merely for the abolition of some crying abuses, or in blind submission to the Church expected help from her alone, left Luther so soon as it was apparent that the Church persisted in her condemnatory judgment. Others thought that they ought to go further than Luther, while in fact they had not yet cast the slough of the Middle Ages. This sect of mystics and fanatics saw once more a contrast between the Spirit of God and that of the creature. These men, therefore, demanded an outward renunciation of all that is earthly; they wished that the Spirit of God should speak directly in man, and despised all natural meditation and all historical development. They railed at Luther because he found a pleasure even in earthly things; they pretended that their maddest fancies were revelations of the divine spirit; they repudiated science and study, and wished to abolish everything in the church which did not date from the apostolic age. When Luther was forced to live on the Wartburg, this storm broke in Wittenberg. Professor Karlstadt wished to cease lecturing; the schoolmaster refused to teach any more. All that was the growth of time, especially the images, was to be removed by force. Luther, in spite of the prohibition of his elector left his secure hiding-place, and preached every day for a week against these fanatics, until he had completely calmed the seething waters. In other places, it is true, especially where the Roman antagonists forced their own spiritual instruction upon the people to the exclusion of the new teaching, the sole watchword on which the disaffected were agreed was the rejection of infant baptism. But the movement of Luther was now distinctly separated from this troubled and turbulent wave.

It had to repel from itself a third party, those who complained above all of social evils and did not shun the path of revolution in order to abolish them. This discontent, which had existed long before Luther's appearance (cf. the section "The waning of the Papal Power and the Harbingers of a New Era" at the conclusion of the "Western Development of Christianity," Vol. VI), was destined to burst into flames now that the Roman Church refused to concede the religious liberty demanded, and attempted to suppress all such efforts with bans and excommunication. Luther represented their legitimate grievances with fervour, but still emphasised the point that it is unbecoming in a Christian to use violence against a superior. "Let him who receives my teaching raise no disturbance." When, therefore, the "peasants" began to murder and to burn, and the "lords" became despondent from consciousness of the blame attaching to them for the rebellion, Luther, with the greatest determination, reminded the authorities of their duty to crush remorselessly the sanguinary revolution. Thus he lost the support of all who, in the last instance, wished merely for social, not religious freedom.

Many of the Humanists, owing to Luther, had become absorbed in their struggle against the ecclesiastical wrongs and had completely devoted themselves to his teaching. The "king of the Humanists," however, the great scholar, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, still adopted an uncertain attitude, and with him many others. He rejoiced in the war against the "fat pouches of the monks" and against the extravagantly exalted "triple crown of the Pope." But he attached
more weight to peace and concord than to truth. “Even truth displeases me if disorder is caused by it.” He was wanting in Luther’s marked religious interest. He was finally, in 1524, persuaded to write against Luther. The doctrine of free will served him as a pretext to assert in contradiction to Luther’s certainty of faith resting on experience, that in the sphere of religion there are only views, but no personal certainties. Even Holy Scripture is not clear enough to give us conviction; at most, some certainty is to be obtained, since it is probable that scholars, popes, and councils have found what is right. Generally speaking, less depends on faith than on morality and concord, and, in order to produce these, reliance cannot always be reposed in reasoned truth, for such truth may easily cause harm. Thus the breach between Luther and Erasmus had become visible. Erasmus, since he had not found the religious conviction which the deepest and most religious spirits of that age desired, contented himself with a vague tolerant probability, so that Luther answered him, “The Holy Spirit is no sceptic; he has not inscribed on our hearts a vague delusion, but a potent and great certainty which does not allow us to waver, but makes us, thanks be to God, feel as certain, as we are that two and three make five.” While Luther wished for a moral code which, based on confidence in God, sought only to please God, Erasmus wished for a “morality,” which, if necessary, was to be attained even by unproved assumptions, subject to one provision only, that it did not disturb the peace of the citizens. Thus the claim of a religious feeling springing from God, and directed toward God, on which the whole Lutheran system is based, was rejected by Erasmus. The Humanists, who did not wish for more than Erasmus could offer, now severed themselves definitely from the Reformation.

The supporters of the old order exulted at all the losses which the anti-Roman movement outwardly sustained. But their hopes of seeing it crushed were continually defeated; for its loyal adherents attained by their efforts in these years of schism only a still greater conviction, and in spite of all hostility won an increasing number of followers. Luther, while still on the Wartburg, began his translation of the Bible, which was not, however, the first version in the German tongue. The German New Testament appeared in September, 1522, and in the next twelve years went through at least sixty-eight editions. The separate parts of the Old Testament followed, until in the year 1534 the whole Bible was completed. Luther’s great enemy, Johann Cochlius (Dobeneck), thus testifies to the effect of this work: “Tailors and shoemakers, even women and other simple folk, read Luther’s New Testament with the greatest avidity as being a source of all truth. They were not ashamed to dispute about the faith and the gospel with priests and monks, masters and doctors of divinity.”

Equally great success was attained by the spiritual songs set to new vigorous melodies in which Luther and other Evangelicals, following his example, made the newly discovered faith resound through the world; above all by the hymns, which have soared beyond the Kyrie eleison, the characteristic of medieval Christianity, to the proud joy felt by the child of God sure of the grace of God: “Nun freut euch, liebe Christengemein’, denn ich bin dein, und du bist mein, uns soll der Tod nicht scheiden;” “Ein’ feste Burg ist unser Gott — das Reich muss uns noch bleiben.” The people sang these songs not only in divine service, but also at their work and on the road. The divine worship hitherto held in Latin was performed in the German tongue. The first regulation of Evangelical public worship that is
extant dates from the year 1522, drawn up by Caspar Kanz in Nördlingen. Luther did not follow with his German Mass until 1526, since he was reluctant to propose external innovations as long as the people were not ripe for them. In consequence of the resolutions of the imperial diet of Speyer of 1526, the Evangelical States undertook to regulate the ecclesiastical system in their own provinces on the new basis, and the visitations organised for the purpose revealed the pitiable conditions which had been produced through the neglect of the people by the Roman Church, and had become still more disorganised through the uncertainty of recent years. Luther then gave Christianity his two Catechisms, of which the Lesser Catechism especially, a master-piece, brought the new doctrine home to the people.

But who was to attend to ecclesiastical affairs in the Evangelical districts? Visitations had to be arranged and the parsonages filled up; the monastic property, now derelict, had to be managed and turned to other uses; a definite organisation had to be introduced for Church matters. Most of the bishops, however, resolutely opposed the new religion. Who was then to perform the services, which could no longer be required from them, in the separate provinces? Only the territorial lord possessed the requisite authority and power for such outward Church government. It was not a complete novelty when Luther, in his treatise “To the Christian Nobility,” stated the proposition that, if the need arose, every member of the Church must help her, so far as possible, and when he now called on his sovereign not to refuse to help the Church of his territory in her hour of trial. On the contrary, a return had already been made in the fifteenth century to the idea prevailing in the empire of the Franks before 800 (cf. in Vol. VI the section “Founding of Mediæval Christianity”), that the lord of the country had rights and duties in the Church of his territory; and the Pope himself had conceded many such privileges to the territorial lords. The princes had often done such services to the Church. If over the corruption of the monasteries made reform imperatively necessary, but the bishops had failed in this their duty, then the territorial lords had taken the reform in hand; or if heresies had broken out, they had considered it their duty to guard their subjects from this poison, just as they protected their sovereign from hostile attacks.

Luther certainly, following the text “Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s,” once more clearly separated the spiritual and the secular power, and thus declared that the submission of the secular power to the Church and the thraldom of the conscience under some external power were alike wrong. But yet he assuredly did not wish that the secular princes should exercise a spiritual authority, or should extend their government to the very heart of the Church and subject men’s consciences to compulsion. All the same in this critical time they ought to recognise their duty of attending to the outward welfare of the Church. She ought to follow her own ordinances and laws. But the requisite ordinances and superintendence ought to be provided for her by the princes, who must take the welfare of their subjects to heart, and who, from their prominent position in the nation, are alone in the position to do so. They certainly are able to abuse the influence that is thereby assigned to them, but no form of Church government is imaginable which is not exposed to this contingency. The Church in the Middle Ages flourished, however, when princes, with the feeling that they were members of the Church, attended to her outward organisation; and she was on the very brink of destruc-
tion when she was secured from all interference of the secular power. The spirit that guides her is the all-important point. Starting with this conviction Luther entrusted to the territorial lords the direction of their churches in external matters.

These princes rendered good service to the evangelical cause. It was they who in the imperial diet at Speyer (1529) "protested" that the resolution of the majority should not be published as "passed with their good-will, knowledge, and counsel;" the resolution laid down that those who had hitherto endeavoured to root out the Evangelical doctrine should persist in their efforts, that no one should be allowed to protect those who were prosecuted for religious opinions, and that in the Evangelical districts all the existing remnants of Catholicism were to be preserved. To assent to this, they declared, meant "nothing else than openly to deny Christ and his word." It was they who in the diet at Augsburg (1530) solemnly, in the presence of emperor and States, professed the faith which the highest powers in Christendom had banned and proscribed; it was they who closely banded together in the Schmalkaldic League (1531) for the protection of the Evangelical faith.

The selfish policy of Duke Maurice of Saxony certainly enabled the emperor in the Schmalkaldic war to defeat and take prisoner the heads of the Evangelical League (1546). But when Maurice, in order to undo the consequences of his perfidy, turned against the emperor, the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555) was finally able to make into a principle of jurisprudence the right of religious freedom and political equality for the followers of the different creeds. This applied, indeed, at first only to the authorities. They received the privilege of free choice between the old and the new faith; for the thought that every individual subject should have full liberty in the exercise of his religion was at that time still inconceivable. The feud between the parties in the church was still too fresh and accompanied by too bitter remembrances to allow the idea to be entertained that the different confessions could live peaceably side by side in the same district. But medieval conceptions had been so completely shattered that, after this peace, no one was to be punished on account of difference of faith; subjects who held another religion were to leave the country without incurring any loss of honours or goods. It is small wonder that the Emperor Charles V could not bring himself to co-operate in the conclusion of such a peace.

B. THE INCREASING STRENGTH OF THE DENOMINATIONAL CHURCHES

Luther's appearance on the scene had produced the greatest effect even on those who would not for any consideration desert the papacy. So deep a religious earnestness spoke from his writings, that many within the Catholic Church began to feel ashamed of the immoral life that prevailed among the higher as well as the lower clergy, and of the thoughtless manner in which men had made light of their sins, and, like Luther, they clamoured for a reformation. On the other hand, many good Catholics could not conceal from themselves that all the doctrines and arrangements which had been established in the church were not unassailable. Thus a dangerous uncertainty crept in. Even in the year 1485 Archbishop Berthold of Mayence had instituted a censorship of books in order to suppress the German Bibles, of which there had been many editions, and accordingly men like
Sebastian Brant and Geiler of Kaisersberg had declared it "a wicked thing to print the Bible in German." But now the preparation of a German Bible was advocated by Catholics in the imperial diet at Speyer (1526), and loyal members of the church caused such translations of the Bible to be prepared and circulated; for instance, Emser, "at the gracious command" of the strictly Catholic Duke George of Saxony, Dietenberger, with the "favour and freedom" of the Emperor Charles V. So great was the wish among the Catholic people for German Bibles, that Dietenberger's work, which gave Luther's translation, with slight alterations from a Catholic point of view, was published as a whole or in parts some thirty-five times in the sixteenth century.

Even the chief doctrine of Lutheranism, the proposition "By faith alone we are justified," was acknowledged by the Catholic party, at the religious conference of Ratibon (1541), accepted in connection with a protocol by the imperial councillor Granvella, and sent to Rome for approval by the papal legate Contarini. The Pope indeed rejected this tenet in that crude form and the agreement fell through. But Luther's appearance must have exercised immense influence on those who still remained loyal to the Roman chair when such proposals were possible. It was high time that the Church clearly defined the boundary between herself and the Lutherans, and made it impossible for any of her members to cross it.

This was done at the Council of Trent (1545-1563). "Extermination of heresies and improvement of morals" was the programme. The distortions, therefore, of the primitive Christianity charged by Luther, which, he said, had gradually crept into the Church in early centuries, but of which very different ideas had been permitted, were now declared to be the official teaching of the Church, and so perpetuated; by this all attempts to come to terms with Protestantism, and to be once more united, were finally excluded. It was thus distinctly declared that the tradition of the Church was to be honoured with the same reverence as the Holy Scriptures. Bishop Brentano, when asked what traditions were meant by this, declared, "We accept those which satisfy us; we emphatically reject those which clash with our belief." It is the province of the Church alone to decide what "the true meaning" of Holy Scripture may be. Thus the Church is made the authorised exponent of Holy Scripture, and the doctrine of justification by faith as proved by personal experience is condemned; the Church, moreover, holds the place of mediator for redemption between God and man. Salvation comes through her, and the seven sacraments by their own virtue work as instruments of grace.

On the other hand, the disgraceful exorcences, which had given special cause for "railing against the Church," were cut away, partly by general religious means, partly by direct prohibitions. When Luther attacked the trade in indulgences which the Roman Church carried on, the high papal official, Silvester Mazzolini, called Prierias, thought to annihilate him at Rome by the proposition, "whoever, speaking of indulgences, says that the Roman Church cannot do what she actually does, is a heretic." In the Council, no doubt, the indulgence was praised as something "lordly," and the power to dispense it was declared to have been "conferred by Christ upon the Church;" but orders were also given that moderation should be shown in its bestowal, and that thus "all indiscriminate profit" might be abolished.

The Council resolved on other measures for the removal of all non-Roman practices, but left their execution to the Pope. A confession of faith was estab-
lished which had to be sworn by the holders of any ecclesiastical office and by all teachers at the university. In this, loyal obedience was sworn to the Pope, "the representative of Jesus Christ," and a pledge on oath had to be made that "the Catholic faith, without which no one could be holy, should be supported by all subjects." The "Roman Catechism" was drawn up as a counterblast to Luther's Catechism. The "Index of forbidden books" was introduced for the suppression of poisonous food for the mind. The Council of Trent finally declared the text of the Latin translation of the Bible, the Vulgate, to be "authentic," and orders were given "that no one should venture to reject it on any plea whatever." But since the text of the previous editions showed many differences, it was not clear which translation might not be rejected. Pope Sixtus V (1590) prepared a "completely faultless edition," and, appealing to the guidance promised to the apostle Peter, forbade the faithful to "alter, add to, or omit the smallest particle in it." His second successor, Clement VIII, however, found so many faults in this edition that he ordered all extant copies to be bought up and destroyed, and prepared a new edition, which altered more than twelve thousand passages, and included some books that were not to be found in the original. Verbal inspiration of the Scriptures, still less of translations, has not of course been claimed at any time.

The Catholic Church had by these declarations of doctrine definitely opposed Protestantism, and had declared a bitter war against the new era which had dawned. But afterward a stupendous reaction set in. Once more there appeared enthusiasm for the Catholic cause, a joy of battle, a delight in conquest, a spirit of self-sacrifice. The contest with Protestantism was now changed. The Catholic writers with astonishing diligence and acuteness set about the task of creating a science of theology which, adopting the ideas of the new era sanctioned by Luther, sought to show that these contained the germs of the gravest dangers, unless there was explicit obedience to the Roman Church and her teaching. Others boldly ventured on the domain of history. The catacombs of Rome were said to attest the high antiquity of the Roman teaching and the customs of the church.

What would now have become of the Catholic Church in Germany if it had not at last been roused to a vigorous struggle? Even in those countries where, according to the injunction of Duke William of Bavaria that "he who recanted shall be beheaded, he who does not recant shall be burnt," the anti-Roman movement had been most mercilessly crushed, as, for example, in Austria and Bavaria, Protestantism had nevertheless gained much ground. For example, in 1556, the States of Lower Austria would only grant aid against the Turks on condition that free exercise of religion was conceded them. The Emperor Ferdinand was obliged to grant them at least the communion in both kinds. A few years afterward, even the prelates declared to the emperor that his whole land would fall away from the Catholic faith if the marriage of the clergy and the communion in both kinds were not conceded. The situation became even worse in 1564, on the accession of Maximilian II, who had been brought up in the Evangelical faith. Only consideration for Spain and the Catholic princes of the empire deterred him from formally going over to the Evangelical Church. He granted free exercise of religion to his States. A large part of the nobility introduced the Reformation for themselves and their subjects. A Venetian reported as the result of his observations in Germany, that only one person in ten was still Catholic. In a short time the Catholic Church in Germany must have disappeared.
But a well-equipped army, ready for battle, was now prepared to reconquer for the Papal Church all that had been lost. We read in the official history of the Jesuit order, "God in his eternal wisdom has placed Ignatius Loyola to confront Luther, the scandal of humanity and bane of Europe, that hog from Epicurus's sty that child of evil, whom God and men detest." All the orders created by the Medieval Church had shown themselves incapable of resisting the Reformation. These monks had either themselves joined the Reformation or they had opposed it in a way which caused the world to laugh at them; for they fought with the weapons of a bygone age, with an antiquated conception of life. The intentions of the ex-officer, the Spaniard Ignatius, were something so new that the Inquisition, when men and women, filled with enthusiasm, joined him in his home, became suspicious and arrested him. In fact he, the saviour of the Church, narrowly escaped condemnation. At Rome he wished to place himself and his army, "the Company of Jesus," at the orders of the Pope. But there also he met with universal distrust. Only his consummate skill in estimating and entering into the peculiar nature of his opponent won over the Pope. "Here is the spirit of God," cried the latter as he read the following sentence in the constitution of the order which lay in front of him, "this company and all individuals discharge the warlike services of God in true obedience to our most sacred lord, the Pope." The order was confirmed by the Pope on September 27, 1540.

What was its importance for the history of religion? It sought to adapt Catholic Christianity to an era dominated by new ideas, and to offer to Christianity, in place of the new doctrine which Luther discovered and praised, a substitute which was to be found and used equally in the Catholic Church. No impression could be made any longer on the new era with the medieval ideal of retirement from the world. This new order therefore was not intended to retreat from the world and consume its strength in asceticism, but to work in the world and on the world. Nor does it wish to withdraw its converts from the world. They may remain in the world, if only they remain subject to the Church in spite of secular enjoyments, and are useful to the Church with their secular work. Even blind submission, the other ideal of medieval piety, grew dim, to many at least, before the impulse to win independence and to possess a personal sense of religion. Ignatius showed one way to content this aspiration. The means which Luther desired for the purpose and declared to be attainable, namely, that the individual man should acquire personal communion with God through faith, and thus become a new man, subduing his sinful inclinations, were said to be folly and to contain the greatest of all dangers, since the individual would feel himself at liberty to disregard the Church. The officer Ignatius knew another way. Just as the strength of the body is so built up by military training that its full powers are at the service of the will, so the strength of the soul must be developed by "spiritual training" until all unregulated impulses submit to the control of the reason. If the man is thus properly trained, he can himself regulate his emotions and has the inspiring consciousness of personal development. The eagerness for self-dependence, that marked the new era, found a full satisfaction in the domain of religion. Luther promised the happy condition of religious self-dependence, only to an inner conversion such as God alone can effect. Ignatius did this more easily: even that sovereignty of reason over the other powers of the soul, which the man can create for himself by exercise, fills him with elevating self-trust. By this very sovereignty
over himself the man wins an immense power over others who are not yet become so independent. Just as control over one's own strength was represented by Ignatius as the highest consummation, so sovereignty over others was to be the ultimate object of all efforts. Ambition, that deeply rooted defect of ecclesiastical Catholicism, will flourish in this order, and will more and more destroy the nobler and divine components which ecclesiasticism had retained from the primitive Christianity. In what field especially were these warriors to display their activity? Oral confession, which had become hated and despised, must once more be revived; for whoever submitted to it showed his willingness to allow himself to be ruled. Nothing else afforded so favourable an opportunity to regulate men's consciences. At a time, then, when worldliness was omnipotent and the disinclination for confession and penance universal, the masses could not become once more accustomed to confession unless 'the yoke of Christ was lightened,' as the Jesuits termed it.

They therefore applied their greatest ingenuity toward a revision of the moral code, the precepts of which were to be followed in confession, and tried to establish such elastic principles that consciences must have become dulled but the task of confession made far more simple. Sin, it was said, consists merely in the wrongful act, which is committed not from ignorance or passion, but deliberately. It is not always necessary for a man to do what he himself considers right: he may, contrary to his conscience, obey that which an authority has declared to be permissible. "A woman, for instance, has murdered her husband in order to marry her paramour and has afterward sinned with him. Must she then run the risk of death and shame by revealing this circumstance in confession?" Since one authority, Henriquez, answers in the affirmative, and another, Lessius, in the negative, according to this "probable" view it is permissible for a man to be silent on the point even against his own conscience. Therefore in an act the intention has always to be considered. "It is allowable for a son to desire most earnestly the death of his father, yet not so as to wish any harm to the father, but so as to wish some good for himself, namely, the rich inheritance which will then come to him." Again, it is permissible to deceive others by the choice of words which they are bound to understand in a wrong meaning. Similarly a man may think of something more than is said. If "someone who has killed a 'Pater' is questioned on the matter, he may reply that he has not killed the 'Pater,' since he is thinking of another of the same name." Such conduct is justifiable in a man whenever it is a question of "preserving his person, his life, or his honour, protecting his property or exercising any virtue." ¹

As a confessor might mitigate the penance for sinful love, so he might do also with unbelief. Whereas in earlier centuries a mere assent to that which the Church taught was sufficient, it was now declared to be enough if the faith was not actually disputed. "A man is capable of receiving absolution," so the doctrine is laid down, "even if he knows nothing of the dogmas of the faith." It became possible in this way to bring those who were devoid of all real religious feeling to a purely external submission to the Church which showed itself in confession.

A complete series of other orders or unions owed their rise to the anti-Protes-

¹ The proposition, "The end justifies the means," is not demonstrable in this sense of the word. But Hermann Boesebaum, for example, says, "If the end (sin) is allowed, the means are allowed;" so Hurtado, "By the final end the natural or ordinary means are justified (honestatutum)."
tant movement in the Catholic Church. Their ideal was no longer abandonment of
the world, but activity in the world. The servile bondage under irrevocable vows
was now so universally felt to be contrary to nature, that it was held expedient to
make it possible to withdraw from such societies. The institutions of Vincent de
Paul (1576–1660) became most successful, especially the Society of the Sisters of
Mercy, founded in Paris (1633). These only took their vows for one year. In
the room of the nun who is withdrawn from all mankind, the universal sister
comes forward. The cloister is no longer their secluded world, but the home
which offers them training and rest. What was their final aim? Vincent ex-
plained to the sisters, “It has never been God’s will when he founded your com-
community that you should minister to the body only, for there would never be lack
of persons for that. The intention of the Lord is rather that you help the souls
of the poor to find entrance into paradise.” Thus the conversion of the heretics
is a primary duty of his missionaries and sisters, and the rejoicing is great when in
this or that hospital some score of “unbelievers” are brought back to the fold of
the Church.

Catholicism, thus strengthened and flushed with victory, could set about the
recovery of what had been lost. First some compensation was looked for in foreign
countries. After 1542 the Jesuits worked in East India, Japan, and China (cf.
Vol. IV, p. 214). Since their results did not seem sufficiently rich, it is said that
they so far adapted themselves to circumstances that they preached Christianity
as a Chinese philosophy, and prostrated themselves in devotion before images.
Nobili came forward after 1606 as a Brahman, and allowed the baptised to remain
in their heathen customs. When other Catholic missionaries came there, a hot
dispute raged over this question; but the results obtained by the Jesuits with such
“clemency” were so immense that even the prohibition by the Pope of a method
of conversion which roused such ill-feeling could not induce them to abandon this
procedure. In Japan they were able to baptise many hundred thousand people,
until in their lust for power they meddled with politics and thus called forth a
terrible persecution, which ended in the country being completely barred to all
Christians. In Paraguay, however, they were able to found an independent State
according to their wishes, a model State which consisted of young Indians ruled
by them (cf. Vol. I, p. 400 seq.). Pope Gregory XV, in order to give unity,
combination, and permanence to the Catholic missions, founded the “Propaganda”
at Rome in the year 1622.

Catholicism sought to counteract the movements of the Reformation wherever
they showed themselves in Europe, partly by Jesuitical subtlety, partly by actual
violence. In Scandinavia, however, Lutheranism remained victorious. But the
Inquisition raged mercilessly in the Netherlands after 1555. Yet the people did
not allow themselves to be brought back to the Catholic Church, and the northern
provinces after the most prolonged and sanguinary struggle obtained in 1648 reli-
gious and political liberty.

Since in France, notwithstanding every persecution, the number of Protestants
increased, the penalty of death was pronounced in the year 1557 on all who did
not adhere to the national religion. Blood flowed in streams. The shameful mas-
sacre of the Protestants assembled for divine worship at Vassy gave the signal for
civil war. After religious liberty and civil equality had been reluctantly conceded
to the Huguenots by the Peace of St. Germain (1570), the Catholic court party
employed the most terrible treachery imaginable. The terrible massacre of the Protestant malcontents in Paris began on St. Bartholomew's night (1572), and swift messengers carried the order to murder throughout the land. Henry IV, by the Edict of Nantes (1598), assured to the Protestants their religious and political rights. He fell beneath the dagger of the monk Ravaillac. Richelieu indeed broke the political power of the Huguenots, who persecuted Catholics in turn, but he also confirmed their ecclesiastical privileges in the "Edict of Grace" of Nîmes in 1629. The often-attempted destruction of the French Evangelical Church was only completed some decades later.

The Reformation found supporters in Italy and even in Spain. But there the Church had a free hand, so that in a short time through bloody persecution the last trace of anti-papal movements was obliterated. In 1570 both countries were "purified" in the Catholic sense.

Even in England under the Catholic Mary (1553–1558) an attempt was made to restore the papal supremacy. The leaders of the Protestants, two hundred or three hundred in number, were executed. When the Protestant Elizabeth mounted the throne, Pope Paul IV refused her the crown. Then hundreds of Jesuits gradually crept into the country, exhorted by the Pope "to get rid of the impious Jezebel." Plots against the queen were repeatedly discovered. The Catholic Philip of Spain sent his formidable Armada to England to purge that nest of heretics. Under James I the Catholics were accused of an attempt to blow up the king and all the assembled House of Parliament; the superior of the Jesuits, it is said, knew beforehand of this Gunpowder Plot. Although all these attempts were unsuccessful, yet they showed clearly enough the objects at which the upholders of the papacy aimed.

In Germany the Jesuits, in their chief centres, Vienna, Cologne, and Ingolstadt, undertook the extermination of Protestantism. All Evangelical preachers were driven from Bavaria after 1564, the Protestant nobles were excluded from the diets, and all Evangelical subjects who would not be converted were forced to emigrate. The spiritual princes followed this example. Ferdinand II of Austria, educated by Jesuits, before he mounted the throne took a solemn vow in front of the miraculous image of the Virgin at Loretto that he would at all cost put an end to heresy in his hereditary dominions. Yet in many parts of his realm there were hardly any Catholics left; at Graz, the capital of Styria, only three were to be found. Ferdinand did not rest until he had brought back all his subjects to the fold of the Church, or had expelled them from his land. The action of the Jesuits became bolder and bolder. It was soon openly stated in print that the Religious Peace of Augsburg could no longer be kept. Then, precisely as a book which appeared in 1600 declared, it was an easy thing to completely stamp out the plague of heretics in Germany. There was no leader among the Protestants who was formidable in a war; and, besides that, they were divided among themselves, for the Lutherans and Calvinists did not hold together.

This observation corresponded only too closely to the reality. In Switzerland, by the side of the movement which Luther had inaugurated, a somewhat altered form of the opposition to Rome had developed. The distinction between the Lutheran and the Reformed party may perhaps be traced back to the different conceptions of the Deity held by their founders. Luther claimed that he reached by personal experience the certainty that God was absolute Love. This idea, he said
FACSIMILE OF LUTHER'S HANDWRITING, FROM THE ORIGINAL IN THE ROYAL LIBRARY AT COPENHAGEN

A page from the MS. of the treatise, "That these words of Christ, 'This is my body, &c.,' are still true, contrary to the Fanatics." Published in 1527.
EXPLANATIONS AND COPY OF LUTHER'S HANDWRITING

LUTHER directed his comprehensive treatise "Dass diese Worte Christi, 'das ist mein Leib,' &c. noch feststehen" against the numerous attacks which his teaching on the Communion had sustained. The manuscript, only recently discovered, is kept in the Royal Library at Copenhagen, merely a few leaves have been torn out, which are now to be found in the Royal Public Library in Dresden. It is peculiarly interesting from the comparatively numerous corrections. While nearly all the other productions of Luther's literary skill, which have been preserved in manuscript, flowed so easily from the pen that there are many pages on which he did not think it necessary to alter a single letter, this controversy with the most various opponents on so important a subject caused him no small difficulty. He saw himself therefore compelled to alter isolated expressions or to change the form of the phrase, to strike out whole sections, and to add short or long paragraphs on the margin and on distinct sheets. Indeed he submitted the whole work on completion to repeated revision and made fresh emendations in other ink. Thus on the page which is here reproduced he had begun with the word "folgend," but then determined to say something else and wrote in its place "Er stand older." But before he continued with "trat," he remembered that in the corresponding passage in the Bible it runs "er trat," that is to say, this word ought to come first and the explanation "older stand" afterwards, he therefore altered it to "Er trat older stand." In the revision he recognised that it was necessary for greater clearness to add "das laut" before "als".

The figure 25 has been added in later times as the number of the page. The "H" on the top margin has been marked in red by the compositor to indicate the sheet.

The text, as it should be printed, reads as follows:

Er trat older stand ihn ihrem mittel das laut, als fay er da zuvor gewecht verborgen, und hab sich offenbart, wie er auch Marie Magdalene thet bei dem grabe und allen der er ist erschienen. Und act. 8. erschein er . Stephan ym radhaufe zur recht Gott's stehen und act. 22 erschein er . Paulus ym tempel. Item Matt. 17. erschein der vater ihn der wüsten auf dem Berge Thabor, Und Luce 3. auch der vater ihn einer stimm und der heilige geist ihm der tauben gesagt. Solche und der gleichen erscheinung, den Propheten, apostelen und heiligen gar vielmal geleschen zeigen ia, daz beide Gott und Christus nicht ferne, sondern nahe sind und ist allein Wunder offenbaren zutun. Sintenial sie nicht zu off und unnder, noch hin und her furen weil Gott wunderlich und Christus zur recht Gott's auch fay und nicht wechen. So spricht Christus auch Joh. 3. Niemand spricht gen himmel, denn der erab gesaren ist. des menschen son der ym himmel is. Damit er ia zeiget, dass sein leib zugleich ym himmel und ausser erden ia schon bereit an allen enden is. Denn er ist durch seine ver- stuerung nicht ein ander Person woroden, sondern wie vorhin, so auch heurnach, allezeitlich gegenwertig. Wieden Coslumpad hie widder Wilhelm Pyrckshynner zu Nurnberg eine enorme chre wil eingelogen haben, und weiz nicht wie grosse funde es sein sol, das Pyrckshynner solchen spruch von dem menschen Christo aussaget. Wenn ich aber Pyrckshynner ware, wolte ich Coslumpad einen brill schrift, und bieten das er die buchshaben doch wolte zelen, obwolten mocht das sie nicht so leichtwerig aber die spruch der schrift ihn siren und des zur ihre treume ym die bucher stichten, Was heisst doch filius hominis, Descendit Ascendit? Rebet er doch so fär eraus, vom menschen son, wie der sey her- nüdergesaren und auffst, Nu . . .
Western Christianity] HISTORY OF THE WORLD

had filled him with rapture and given him rest. Zwingli, on the contrary, the more independent he became by freeing himself from the influence of Luther, looked on God as the Highest Being, as the Omnipotent. If he called God “the highest good” he did not include in that expression that which makes God our highest good, but that which tends to make him in himself and for himself the highest. Luther and Zwingli both insisted on God’s honour, but in different directions. Luther wished to preach trust in the love of God; for according to him God’s highest honour, in contradistinction to that on which the selfish man rests his honour, consists in condescension, in giving and blessing. But since man can only be saved on the path of completely free choice, Luther would not hear of any sort of compulsion. He rejoiced if only some individuals attained the true faith; persecution of the truth did not cause him any astonishment. Zwingli, on the other hand, wished that the majesty of God should be maintained at all cost. He therefore wished to create a Christian community, in which God’s law must be followed by all; he would, therefore, make persecution of the truth impossible, and would, on the other hand, repress all error, so that he did not desist from political undertakings for the attainment of his objects.

The contrast was visible in the different positions adopted toward the sacraments. Luther regarded them as proofs of God’s love, which wishes to give us heavenly gifts; Zwingli, as proofs of our obedience toward God. Luther adored the condescension of the Lord, who in the Holy Communion unites himself with his believers (see the subjoined plate, “Luther’s Handwriting”); according to Zwingli’s view the exalted divinity cannot so unite himself with what is earthly; not bread and wine at all, but the body and blood of Christ only, are received. Zwingli declared as early as 1525 that his Lutheran opponents were “impelled by another spirit;” and in the religious conference at Marburg (1529), where Zwingli, full of his political plans, tried to effect a union with the Wittenberg party, Luther could not refrain from the expression, “You have a different spirit from ours.” Although little suspecting the real tendency of this whole discussion, he hoped for a settlement of the dispute in the future.

This Swiss movement, in a slightly altered form, spread far beyond its home. Five years after the death of Zwingli, in the year 1536, Calvin set himself the task at Geneva of founding a community in which everything bowed before the law of God. Every individual citizen was obliged to bind himself by oath to a confession of faith. All members of the congregation were subject to a constant supervision by lay elders. He at last put his ideal into practice by terrible struggles and the unceasing application of the strictest measures. What had at first to be extorted by the severest penalties became gradually public custom. No traces of ungodliness or of religious indifference were now visible. The prescribed Church ordinances and legal rules of life governed everything. Calvin thought by this to have established the supremacy of God. He gave the reformed Christianity its permanent stamp. The party which was started by Zwingli was almost entirely disregarded by him, as he placed Luther, on account of his greater depth of character, far higher than Zwingli; and by his extensive correspondence and his numerous writings he acquired great influence far beyond the borders of Switzerland. Geneva afforded a refuge to the French and English exiles who had been driven from their homes for their religion’s sake, and when quieter years came they returned to their country filled with the spirit of Calvin. He founded in his native Geneva a
university which provided the foreign reformed congregations with preachers and inspired them with the strict Calvinistic spirit.

Thus Protestantism parted into two streams. The true Lutheran spirit laid no stress upon the point whether a man subjected himself in externals only to the commands of God, but feared that such conformity to the law might hinder a man from recognising his inward alienation from God and from seeking and finding fellowship with God. The reformed spirit, on the other hand, emphasised the point that God was the only and the absolute Lord, and it wished to bring about the execution of this Lord's will. Even if all cannot be led to salvation, yet all can be forced to outward obedience. Calvinism had therefore a strict legal character; but it was able far more than Lutheranism to persist in outward works, to produce a universal adherence to the Church and observation of morality, to create national churches and to maintain them in discipline and order. Again, there was an inclination to fight, on behalf of the honour of God, with purely secular means when spiritual means were insufficient. In Geneva, which contained some twenty thousand inhabitants, during the five years of Calvin's rule no less than fifty-eight sentences of death and seventy-six decrees of exile were pronounced. In France, the Netherlands, and Scotland the Calvinists were able to combine into a political party and to take up arms repeatedly in defence of their faith. But, on the other side, this zeal awoke a noble spirit of sacrifice and a great impulse toward action. Hence it followed that while Luther wished to work only where his calling made it his duty, the Calvinists wished to spread the honour of God in every part.

Calvin, for this reason, was not long satisfied with the results that he had attained in Geneva. Just as he gradually supplanted the teaching of Zwingli throughout Switzerland, so he wished to conquer the Lutheran districts of Germany. About 1551 he seemed, in fact, to be near the realisation of this plan. All Evangelical communities of Europe had come under his influence. Only Northeast Germany held fast to Lutheranism. And the man on whom, after Luther's death, the leadership of the Lutherans had fallen, Melanchthon, was himself no longer loyal to the teaching of the German reformer. The Hamburg preacher, Westphal, first warned men of the danger, that Calvinism was threatening to absorb all Lutheranism. Bitter struggles ensued, which opened the eyes of the supporters of Lutheranism to the fact that they, as the heirs of what their fathers won, would have to fight desperately for the maintenance of this inheritance. Even in Electoral Saxony the friends of Calvin's teaching were able to win the supremacy. When it was finally clear to the elector, who held sound Lutheran views, what their intentions were, he threw their leaders into prison and deprived of their offices all preachers who refused to assent to the Lutheran doctrine (1574).

The result of these heated struggles was the conviction of the Lutherans that an ecclesiastical union with Calvinism was impossible, that, on the contrary, the only means for keeping the congregations clear of the greatest confusion was definitely to sever them from the Reformed Church. There was the additional fact that even among themselves disputes had arisen about other points of doctrine. The attempt was therefore made to establish a new confession in order finally to throw light upon the question as to what should be regarded as Luther's teaching. James Andreas, chancellor of the University of Tubingen, made it his life's task to restore a "Concordia" between the various Lutheran groups. A treatise composed by him was submitted to continually new revisions in the course of a series of communica-
tions with princes and scholars. This was the origin of the "Formula of Concord," by which the three creeds of the early Church and the former Lutheran professions, the Confession of Augsburg, composed by Melanchthon, and its Apologia, as well as the Schmalkaldic Articles originating with Luther, and both Catechisms, were combined into one work, the "Book of Concord" (1580). This was signed by fifty-one princes and lords, thirty-five towns, and nine thousand theologians or congregations.

The individual Reformed Churches had already drawn up confessions of their own in the period between 1559 and 1566. But when Arminius at Leyden came forward against the doctrine of Calvin, that God has predestined some to salvation others to damnation, and found numerous followers, the Synod at Dordrecht (1618 to 1619) tried to draw up a confession which would hold good for all Reformists, which declared that the doctrine of predestination was right, but mitigated its too repellent severity. It is true that all the Reformed Churches did not accept the resolutions of Dordrecht. But still an attempt was made by both Protestant Church communities to prevent the continual unrest of the congregations by fixing definite limits. At the same time another form of Protestantism was established. Elizabeth of England hoped finally to secure tranquillity for her country by considering, as far as possible, the wishes of those who were favourable to Rome. With this object the Thirty-nine Articles were drawn up in the year 1563, which determined the special character of the English National Church, a peculiar mixture of the reformed and the Catholic spirit. Thus Western Christianity was divided into four Denominational Churches.

In connection with these events the succession of the Lutheran elector, John Sigismund of Brandenburg, to the Reformed Church (1613) was of great importance. Indeed the excitement in the country at this change of confession was so great that he thought it prudent not to yield to the promptings of his Calvinistic surroundings, but rather to issue a declaration, that he would not force on any congregation a preacher whom they suspected. But in a National Church the example and the wish of the sovereign could not fail to have some effect, and naturally many ways lay open to the elector by which he could restrict Lutheranism without any direct infringements of privileges. By this the foundation was laid for the union policy of the Hohenzollerns. But a dispute arose between the most important Evangelical powers of Germany, between Brandenburg and Saxony, which most dangerously weakened the power of Protestantism.

The consequence of all these occurrences in the domain of religion was the Thirty Years' War. The Evangelical Church in Germany, and as a result the Reformation generally, would have been annihilated had not Gustavus Adolphus, influenced alike by political and religious motives, interfered in the war of religion. The end of this terrible period was the complete exhaustion of both sides. The Catholic party could no longer conceal the knowledge that it was now impossible to destroy Protestantism,—that it must be recognised as an independent power. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) established the equality of the religious parties, even of the Reformists. The Peace of Westphalia ended not merely a thirty years' war, but rather one that had lasted one hundred and thirty years. It recognised the claim to existence, which the Medieaval Church denied, of those who represented the ideas of the new era in the field of religion. If the Catholic Church wished, however, once more to extirpate those ideas, she could not, in Germany at
least, attempt to destroy their representatives. The Evangelical Church had firmly established itself as an independent community.

2. THE PARTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES

A. ORTHODOXY, PIETISM, FREETHOUGHT IN THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH (c. 1650–1750)

The definitive ideas held by a new era as to the freedom of the individual and the rights of the laity had already found political recognition, and now for the first time they could exercise their influence freely in every direction. The new ideas were found not merely in the Protestant countries, but had penetrated more or less into the districts which were still externally subject to the Catholic Church. Secularism now showed an independent development. Public policy, social movements, art and science struck out independent paths. Physical science and philosophy in particular were placed on a firm basis. Thus a large number of interests existed by the side of ecclesiastical and religious interests. The Church no longer occupied the supreme position, and therefore those who could not appreciate her religious importance would no longer acknowledge her as a great power. Many would be estranged from her. And further, now that the Church wished, as indeed was necessary, to be mainly restricted to her primitive domain, it is inevitable that those secular efforts struck into paths which Christianity could not approve, that men, despising and even attacking the Creator and Lord of the world, would abandon themselves unrestrainedly to worldly work and worldly pleasure. Thus it is that, when the stipulation that all compulsion must be excluded from the province of religion had first been acknowledged, this idea of liberty of conscience spread more and more widely. Even when a man did not acquire an independent faith of his own, but only followed an authority, he would not follow it under compulsion, but freely: he chose an authority for himself after his own estimate. Thus an independence of the individual as regards the Church was established. It was then but a step further to make belief something purely arbitrary, to treat it as a matter of mere choice whether a man wished to believe anything at all, or what he wished to believe. While Christianity puts forward the necessity of obtaining personal conviction of that which is true in fact, it is possible for a man to distort this thought in so far that he reasons himself into some conviction and contents himself with it.

Will the Evangelical Church be able to withstand these threatening dangers? Will she not, owing to the abuses which many have introduced, together with the ideas of the new era, be herself once more mistaken in them? Will she not once more give scope to an erroneous criticism of the secular life as if it were in itself sinful? Will she not, in dread of religious liberty, try to obtain a merely outward assent to the faith of the Church? The different denominations have marked themselves off and have preserved their public doctrines in articles of religion. But the Evangelical Church, according to her principles, may never be satisfied with an inheritance. Previous ages may have been contented with a dead possession. In the new era, however, a Church which knows no other duty than outwardly to keep safe the old tradition will soon experience grave opposition. The Evangelical
theologians, happy at having attained their object of checking the development of doctrine by the compilation of articles of religion, had even before this commenced to combine the ecclesiastical doctrines into a compact system. Now when the stability of the National Churches was externally guaranteed, the need was felt still more acutely of securing their internal permanence by means of a distinct statement of doctrine extending to the smallest details, which should protect the particular Church community from the influences of other confessions. In order to hold together these National Churches, composed of such different elements, an attempt was made to bring the separate articles of faith home to the convictions of the lukewarm members. Men tried by a method of proof to impress that conviction which, according to Luther's principles, could only be recognised as truth by those who sincerely seek it on the path of experience. It was more and more thought to be enough if the teaching of the Church found an outward assent and if merely an outward submission to the institutions and precepts of the Church was established. The pleasure of having achieved so much at least compensated for the fact that this religiousness bore no living or worthy fruits. Men were content with a dead orthodoxy.

Essentially this tendency was only that form of disinclination for the true Christianity, the Christianity aiming at the regeneration of man, which was most apparent at the time of the supremacy of the Church and her teaching. We therefore observe continually by its side the other movement, which preserved in greater earnestness the doctrine of the Reformation. Saintly men clearly recognised the danger into which the dead orthodoxy brought the church, and uttered serious warnings; for example, Johann Arndt (superintendent-general at Celle, d. 1621) had already done so in his well-known work, “The True Christianity;” so Heinrich Müller (d. 1675), professor and superintendent at Rostock, who complained of the “four dumb idols of the Church” on which men placed reliance, that is, participation in baptism, preaching, confession, and communion; and Christian Scriver, chief court-preacher in Quedlinburg, who died 1693, with his famous “Treasury of the Soul.” Paul Gerhardt (d. 1676), the indefatigable poet, was so firm in his Lutheran convictions that he gave up his post in Berlin in consequence of the Great Elector's attempts at union, and yet he was able to write with such sincerity and fervour that his hymns spread far beyond the Lutheran Church; and that greatest of all musicians, J. S. Bach (d. 1750), produced all that could move the heart of an Evangelical Christian in his compositions with their incomparable depth.

But all the opponents of the dead religious system were not able to maintain the right attitude. Spener, who had been since 1666 head of the spiritual ministry at Frankfort-on-Main, is the father of German pietism. It redounds to his undying credit that, at a time when self-sufficient orthodoxy had almost attained supremacy in theology, he once more revived religious feeling. It grieved him that the faith on which men prided themselves did not transform their life. He wished to rely on Luther, who had, as he thought, restored the true faith to Christianity. He did not wish in any way to dispute his teaching, and yet he wished to reform life by a system which reached farther than Luther's. In reality, however, in so doing he could not strictly keep to Luther's standpoint, for he retained something of the spirit of orthodoxy. An essential part of the credit to which Luther laid claim consisted in the statement that the real faith creates a new personal relation
of man to God, which of itself promotes new conduct in man. Thus the imagined faith must be shown by its fruits to be dead, and therefore no faith; a living faith must be engendered if real Christian morality is to be produced. So that subjective faith was tested by objective conduct as in the old Church, but the tests were different. Spener taught Luther's doctrine on this point, and this was the source of the new life with which he once more inspired the moribund Church.

But Spener did not content himself with this. He had not only, as he thought, proved the divine truth, but adduced new means to confirm, as it were, the strength of the divine word, and these had something external, legal, mechanical in themselves, and introduced unsound elements into pietism. He established *collegia pietatis*, religious societies, by the side of the community of the Church, on which the maxim was to be impressed that "knowledge was in no way sufficient for Christianity, which depended rather on practice;" in them the members were to give account to each other of their spiritual condition and of the progress they had made in spiritual life, and take counsel together how to get rid of their defects. This was really a Protestant counterpart of Catholic communities. Theological students, above all, were to be trained "to explain from time to time the state of their conscience before the assembled collegium and always to follow its counsel; thus without doubt a splendid advance in holiness would be made in a short period." He wished, therefore, to implant in men by external agencies that which, according to Luther's idea, was through God's power to grow in the individual man from internal workings, and to create this condition by artificial means. Thus a training in godliness was established.

Spener, having been summoned to Berlin, was able, when the new University of Halle was founded, to fill the theological faculty with supporters of his views (1694). In this academy, especially owing to Aug. Herm. Francke, those men were educated who carried pietism further and further into the world. The splendid foundations of Francke testified to the religious zeal and spirit of faith which inspired these teachers. Here men ventured to cast their looks beyond the borders of the Church, and to contemplate the spread of the Evangelical faith among the heathen. The first Lutheran missionaries issued from the orphanage of Francke. More than once, indeed, did orthodoxy engage in a sharp conflict with this new movement, but only to estrange the spirits of inquiring men still more.

Pietism, therefore, stepped into the place of orthodoxy, and became the predominant movement. Thus the task fell to it, not merely of stimulating small circles to religion, but of influencing the masses. This it was not in a position to effect. On the contrary, its weak points became more and more apparent. In contradistinction to orthodoxy, which had laid all weight on sound doctrine, holiness of life was insisted upon, and the teaching of the church, which was after all intended to lead men to the true faith, was regarded as a matter almost of indifference. In this way a piety might be formed which, as the product of vague or impure religious conceptions, was not pure. There was a fresh relapse into the doctrine refuted by the Reformation, of holding that the natural and the temporal were essentially opposed to the divine and the spiritual. The science and secular education which according to Luther were to guard religious feeling from error, were despised and represented as hostile to that devotionality on which everything hinged. Prayer, not study, ought to make the theologian. An outward avoidance of the world was required, and this world was found in such outward things
as theatre-going, card-playing, dancing, following the fashion, laughing, jesting, playing, in which many who had been estranged from godliness found the one pleasure of their life. Among the great mass which only outwardly submitted to the ruling pietism, a religious feeling was created substantially the same as that which was customary at the time of orthodoxy, but apparently still less acceptable. Earnest religiousness was formerly considered unnecessary to insist upon, since men were thorough churchmen; it was thought unnecessary now, because men belonged to the religious Pietists. Formerly the distinguishing badge of the Christian was seen in his obedience to the doctrines and precepts of the Church; it now consisted in the avoidance of some externals, known as "the world." And yet was true Christianity only to be found among the Pietists? The result inevitably was that this Christianity rather repelled all those others whom it was intended to win for the faith. So when once authority is set aside must temperament prevail.

The same sad effect was produced by another peculiar perversion of pietism. The more earnest spirits, who could not satisfy themselves with a pietistic retirement from the world, wished by devout feelings to attain the conviction that they had become new men. They wished to feel a struggle of penance, an inward heavenly joy. They sought to achieve some such result by force. The consequence was a fictitious and artificial Christianity which was bound to produce an impression of falsity upon third persons and to have a repellent effect. German hatred of untruth does not seem to have saved German people from this delusion. But at the same time black clouds gathered in the sky of the Church, and only a strong feeling of belief would have been able to resist the breaking storm. Already a general alienation from Christianity showed itself far and wide. Pietism or orthodoxy could not be made responsible for its appearance, but both these unsound representatives of Christianity were guilty of never having checked this new tendency.

This spirit was the direct antithesis to all forms of religion hitherto noticed by us, for it denied the assumption on which all were based. More or less directly, but always by logical process, it denied that man kind had been granted a revelation, the record of which was furnished by the Holy Scriptures. This spirit had always existed in the Church from the time when she ceased to be a small society based on pure spontaneity and became an institution which embraced the masses. But so long as the education which conferred more or less independence was imparted solely by the Church, and above all so long as the Church ruled the world, such thoughts could not be openly expressed in words. Yet this free-thought now and again appeared distinctly even in the centuries before Luther (cf. Vol. VI), and humanism lent it a new and ample support. Then at the period of the Reformation followed decades of incessant struggle between the old and the new religious ideas. Each of the different religious parties claimed to represent the truth and appealed to the revelation in the Holy Scriptures. Once more it became uncertain which party would finally claim the victory. There were therefore very many who, in order to avoid trouble, preferred to declare for neither of the parties in the Church, to leave the religious question simply unanswered, and to wait for the issue of the struggle. Luther, in deep sorrow and with burning indignation, turned against these "expectants," who held entirely aloof from the Church and her institutions, but had no substitute with which to satisfy religious
needs, and were therefore more and more confused as to the foundation of Christianity and a divine revelation. But the more universally the modern thought of the freedom of faith found recognition, the more justified a man felt himself to be in forming a conception of religion for himself, without thereby binding himself to the hitherto firmly held conviction of the actuality of a divine revelation. So from dogmas arising out of interpretation of Scripture the war passed into the region of the Scriptures themselves.

Again, the new branches of knowledge which that era introduced seemed to prove the doctrines firmly held by the Church to be an obsolete theory. Since, for the purpose of being communicated to others, the religious truth was clothed in a system of doctrines, it was bound to weave for itself a garment from the materials of the prevailing conceptions of nature and the world. Now when the two ideas of the new era, the freedom of the individual and the control of nature, combined to urge men on to an independent exploration of natural laws, a completely different conception was formed of them from that which hitherto had been universally held to be correct. Copernicus entertained doubts as to the entire Ptolemaic system of the universe. Galileo supported this revolutionising discovery by new and irrefragable proofs. The Church was thus confronted with the difficult task of clearly deciding between the matter of the religion which she had to represent and the transitory form in which she had hitherto communicated it, of declaring the latter to be temporary and destructible in order that the two might not be rejected together. She was justified in not changing her representation of the religious truth after every new discovery, because only too often errors had passed for well-established conclusions. But she was held bound, assailants said, to be able to decide between the lasting kernel and the changing husk of her teaching. These new ideas of nature appeared to the Catholic Church, especially when first she realised their vast importance, so grave a heresy that Galileo was compelled to abjure them (1633).

This attitude of the Church toward the new discoveries only hastened the danger which lurked in them. It confirmed many in their errors; the new results of investigation no longer affected the mere perishable garment of Christianity, but Christianity itself. The ideas as to the universe held by the earlier ages were thought to be based on divine revelation; if the former were overthrown, the latter must fall with them. The Evangelical Church, according to its principles, would have been able to help the Christian faith over this great danger, for it had taught men to differentiate what it considered the religious truth from what it believed to be the mere human representation. But neither orthodoxy nor pietism could do so: the former, because it required submission to its entire doctrinal system according to form and contents; the latter, because its retirement from the world, its contempt of science, its self-satisfied conceit, only repelled those who thirsted for the dominion of the world. Both looked on God's teaching as something authoritative, and in no way dependent on individual acceptance or rational proof.

The situation in England was certainly the most dangerous. Firstly, because the Reformation there was, as Germans think, born from different motives from those in Germany, and had been set on foot by King Henry VIII, from reasons unlike those which impelled Luther. It became, indeed, such a pitiable hybrid—a substantially papal religion, but without the Pope—that it could not satisfy any one. Secondly, because the holders of humanistic views had adopted
the new form of the Church without any such severance as had been caused in Germany; and, finally, because the most sanguinary struggles between the different religious parties had made men look for a domain of religious truth lying beyond the conflict, where all reasonable persons might unite. As the first product of this deism which arose in England may be mentioned the treatise of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, completed in 1624, "How Truth is distinguished from Revelation" (De veritate prout distinguatur a revelatione, a verisimili, a possibili et a falso). The essential point according to him is natural religion; the religion of the healthy human understanding, that which is common to all previous religions. That which separates these from each other, the positive, is valueless. The natural moral consciousness teaches us that God exists, that he is to be reverenced by piety and honesty; misconduct is stoned for by repentance; there is a retribution in this world and the world to come. This new religious spirit was spread in the most varied forms by many representatives, until Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678–1751), declared that Christianity, as handed down by the Church, was mainly the work of madmen or gross impostors ("Letters on the Study of History").

The effects which these doctrines caused in England were so great that men did not shrink from truly desperate efforts in order to rescue Christianity once more. In the year 1729 some students at Oxford formed a society with similar objects to those which Spener's collegia pietatis had in view. These men, the brothers Wesley, and George Whitefield, founded Methodism, which actually exaggerated the faults of pietism and developed them into a close system. Methodism wishes by awe-inspiring penitential sermons to crush men's spirits and free them from the shackles of sin; it places the substance of Christianity in emotions, and guards against secession by a disciplinary code. The burning wish of these preachers to save souls and their stern procedure, which did not shrink from compulsion, enabled them to produce great results; principally, indeed, among the lower classes, who felt this Methodist treatment of the inner man not so much as a presumptuous intrusion, as an overpowering force. This stormy movement had a stimulating effect on all sections of the English people, and gave fresh life to dying Christianity.

Meanwhile the spirit of antagonism to revelation, which had arisen in England, had either penetrated the Continent also, or had spontaneously been aroused there. René Descartes (Cartesian, 1596–1650) taught that men must begin by doubting everything: the only undisputed point is the consciousness of self. That which immediately corresponds to this is true, and clearness is the standard of truth. Baruch (afterward Benedict) Spinoza (1632–1677) would apprehend the absolute, the immanent original cause of all phenomena, by means of the reason. Religion demands faith and obedience, philosophy requires reason and love. Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) teaches in his "Dictionnaire historique et critique" how greatly faith and reason contradict each other, and opens up with this work a rich vein for the enemies of religion in the succeeding period. In Halle, hitherto the academy of pietism, Christian Wolff (1679–1754) proclaimed that "all things must be tested by reason as if on the philosopher's stone." He was expelled from the Prussian States in 1723, but recalled after seventeen years, and reinstated triumphantly in Halle. More than a hundred writers in Germany were then following in his steps. In the year 1735, in accordance with this clear philosophy a translation of the Bible for the people with very rationalistic commentaries, the
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Wertheimer Bible, was produced. This translation begins: "All heavenly bodies and our earth itself were in the beginning created by God. With regard to the earth in particular, this was at first quite void: it was surrounded with a dense mist and encircled by water, over which violent winds began to blow. But soon there was some brightness on the earth, as the divine purpose required."

How could the Church of that period have been able to stand against all these floods? Wild havoc was inevitably the immediate consequence.


The Roman Church, even after the Thirty Years' War, was able to make conquests, but not without bringing to light the mighty growth of religious independence. Protestantism indeed owed to no royal house so much as it did to the Saxon and Swedish houses; to the former it was indebted for the first approval of the Reformation, to the latter, for its rescue by Gustavus Adolphus. How great a blow for the Evangelicals when Christine, the daughter and successor on the throne of this monarch, was converted to Catholicism in 1654! But she was not able to bring her country over to her views. She was forced to renounce the crown, and a newly promulgated law condemned every Catholic to exile. Such was the tolerance of those who protested against punishment of spiritual revolt on the part of the old Church. The Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxon adopted the Catholic religion in 1697. But his people held so firmly to the Evangelical faith, that he and his successors had to sign a declaration that they would consent to maintain unimpaired the Evangelical Church of their country, and to allow the government of the Church to be exercised by Evangelical authorities. A long list of scions of German princely houses, who did not, indeed, attain the throne, preferred the Catholic to the Evangelical confession. France had become the first power in Europe. The brilliance of the court of Louis XIV shed such mighty rays that it was essential to good breeding to have seen Paris and the great king. And there it was perceived that the Catholic religion was most accommodating, under the influence of the Jesuits, that it was possible to be pious without any kind of scruples about formal morality.

Ferdinand III of Austria did not recognise the Peace of Westphalia as applying to his hereditary dominions. Thus Silesia, which was almost entirely Protestant, was brought back to the bosom of the Catholic Church. Some thirteen hundred churches were gradually taken by force from the Evangelicals there. Those who would not change their faith were driven to emigrate. In Hungary, under the pretext that a conspiracy was prevailing in the land, streams of blood flowed. The bloody tribunal of Caraffa, at Eperjes (1687), was intended to intimidate the Protestant nobility; and in fact only few of the notables in the country withstood the threats and allurements of the Jesuits. The massacre at Thorn (December 7, 1724) showed what was in store for those who did not pay proper honour to the Jesuits. Archbishop Firman of Salzburg allowed a body of Jesuits to come into his land who were to convert the Evangelicals. They tried to overcome the obstinate by severe punishments. In no country had the Jesuits more opportunity to make a practical application of their "mild" moral principles than in France. The immorality, especially at the royal court, was so shocking that only under the
greatest concessions to "human frailty" could any outward connection of these shameless circles with the Church be maintained. The Jesuits taught in the most gracious way how men could be loyal to the Church, although falling into immorality. How could such a religion have contented the deeper spirits? A twofold reaction was formed within the Catholic Church of France.

Cornelis Jansen was working in the University of Louvain after 1630. He had read the writings of Augustine, the great father of the Church, ten times through, until he was irresistibly convinced that the lax theology of the Jesuits had diverged far from the teaching of Augustine. His work "Augustinus" was most bitterly attacked by the Jesuits and prohibited by the Pope; but his thoughts found a glad assent at Paris in a circle of pious and learned men. The convent of Port-Royal-des-Champs, situated before the town, served them as a centre of their religious life and endeavour. Doctor Antoine Arnauld, of the Sorbonne, who stood at their head, attacked (in his book "De la fréquente Communion") the easy-going practice of the confessional by the Jesuits, which had produced such fruits as this, that fashionable ladies went to the confessional in full dress, on their way to a ball, in order to receive the communion the next day. The celebrated mathematician, Blaise Pascal, pilloried in his "Lettres provençales" with astounding earnestness and sparkling wit the serpent-like wisdom and the immoral morality of these popular father-confessors. But the powers were on the side of the enemy. The Jesuits were able to enforce that all French religious orders, monks, and nuns should be compelled to hold the Jansenite heresy condemned: all who refused were banished. In fact, they did not rest until the last trace of the insult they had sustained was wiped out and the convent of Port Royal was destroyed (1710). Once again Jansenism revived. Paschalis Quesnel, a priest, had published in 1687 and 1693 a translation of the New Testament with explanatory notes, the spirit of which was not that which then prevailed in the French Church. The king at the instigation of the Jesuits procured in 1713 the papal Constitution "Unigenitus," which condemned one hundred and one theses in the book. On the other hand, a powerful party entered a protest against a future council (1717). But the malcontents were reduced to silence by deprivation of office, imprisonment, and exile. The decision of the Pope was enrolled as a statute of the French realm (1730). The Jesuits were once more supreme.

The order of Jesuits was able to remove a second opponent out of their road. As early as the middle of the sixteenth century a tendency was visible in the Catholic Church which, in opposition to the externals of the Church system, aimed at an intensifying and deepening of the Catholic Christianity. By continual spiritual devotion and by completely unselfish love of God the soul is to reach a more complete rest and so be united to God. This quietist mysticism had found a very wide following in Spain, Italy, and France, and in the year 1681 had been declared by the commission of the Inquisition to be in keeping with the belief of the Church. The Jesuits, however, knew that such demands were most directly opposed to the conceptions favoured by them, according to which it "is probable that the command to love God does not arise as a matter of obligation or conscious performance once in every five years," and "it is enough to make definitively the declaration or act of faith once only in a lifetime." They intrigued ceaselessly, until at last, in 1687, "the blasphemous quietist heresy" was condemned. Jeanne Marie Bouvier de la Mothe-Guyon, who adhered to this party, was compelled for long
years after 1688 to endure confinement in a convent and afterward (1695–1696 and 1698–1703) in the Bastile. The document which François de Saligmac de la Mothe-Fénelon, from 1689 tutor to the royal grandchildren, and after 1695 Archbishop of Cambrai, had drawn up in 1696 in defence of the unhappy woman was condemned in 1699 and he himself was forced to submit.

At the same time the Jesuits were able to celebrate a third triumph. They were able to persuade Louis XIV, only too easily, that the conversion of the Protestants of his realm was desirable. His aspirations to the omnipotence of the State, which according to his idea was himself, brooked no religious differences in his dominions. What imperishable fame, then, would accrue to him if he succeeded in that for which four kings in earlier times had vainly struggled with all their strength, if he was in a position to bend the iron consciences of these Huguenots. Finally, could he make a better atonement for his excesses than by extirpating Protestantism in his dominions? The higher place-holders now got to learn what they had lost by their folly when, for religion’s sake, they renounced the favour of the king. A treasury was established for the poorer ones, out of which every secession was paid in ready money. In this way more than fifty-eight thousand souls are said to have been captured in six years. With the year 1681 a still more powerful impetus was given to the machinery of conversion. The terrible dragonnades, this billeting of ten, twenty, or more dragoons, who were allowed to perpetrate every brutality in the houses of the Protestants produced incredible results. The atrocities committed by these monsters spread such an infectious panic that entire localities changed their religion at the mere news of their approach. Many of these converts hoped soon to be able to return to their faith. An edict was therefore published that relapse into Protestantism would be punishable with the galleys or with death. In the year 1685 the Edict of Nantes, which was formerly passed as irrevocable, was simply repealed. All the churches of the Protestants were to be destroyed without delay, their schools shut, and their ministers were to leave the kingdom within fourteen days; all their meetings for divine worship, even in private houses, were forbidden. The one means of preserving the faith, emigration, was prohibited by the penalty of the galleys in the case of men and by imprisonment in the case of women. Nevertheless some half million of these poor wretches succeeded in crossing the frontier and found a resting-place in Brandenburg, Holland, England, and Switzerland. Two million Protestants, more or less, remained behind in France defenceless and outlawed. Many of these took refuge in the mountains of Languedoc. Seized by a fanatical excitement these “Camisards” defended themselves in a ten years’ struggle against the prosecutions of proselytism,—a hideous struggle, differing from that in Ireland only in the fact that in France the minority were proscribed for breaking from the ancient faith, while in Ireland the whole nation was punished for adhering to it.

By persecution no body of men and certainly no Church can gain the good-will and respect of the people. What had been gained by the extermination of Protestantism? These masses of converts were no longer Evangelical. But could they feel love and respect for the Catholic Church? They had abandoned their faith contrary to their conscience. They merely increased the number of those who in the bottom of their hearts hated the Church and yearned to throw off completely the religious yoke which they still outwardly bore. The Jesuits had attempted to crush the actual personal creeds in France. There remained the religion which they
observed, which coexisted at times with empty scepticism and naked immorality; there remained an outward submission to the Church: but for how much longer?

The irreligion which actually prevailed was bound sooner or later to feel the dominion of the Church to be not only something intolerable, but also something unjust. Granted that the Church had hitherto prescribed how much or how little a man ought to believe, a man now wished to believe what he himself wished, even if it were nothing. If the Church hitherto had exacted from immorality the duty of confession and penance, men, once they set about demands for liberty, wished to have complete freedom in immorality. If Christianity had served hitherto as a means toward the dominion of the Church, well, then, it must end with Christianity. Thus there arose on the ground worked by the Jesuits a completely new form of hostility to Christianity. Where the Church, though defective in many respects, still upholds the religious and moral truths which approve themselves to the natural conscience and respects the liberty of conscience, the aversion to Christianity will never wholly lose the consciousness that it is unjustifiable, and therefore will not throw all religious feeling overboard: there will remain the possibility of a return to Christianity. Out of court corruption desist grew up on the Protestant soil of England. For where the Church herself does not uphold the principles of religion and morality in order to assert a purely outward dominion over the conscience, the hostility toward the Christianity represented by the Church will hold itself justified and will develop into the hatred of the slave who no longer submits to his bonds. This happened in France. The solution was contained in Voltaire's "Ecrasez l'infame!" This meant the Church; but men had no other religion than that of the Church. The consequence was, therefore, absence of all religion. But by this the characteristic of human nature was abandoned. Inhuman cruelties, such as the French Revolution witnessed, had become possible.

3. THE REIGN OF FREETHOUGHT

A. FREETHOUGHT AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (c. 1750–1815)

François Marie Arouet, called Voltaire (1694–1778), the pupil of the Jesuits, was thus characterised by his friend Frederick II of Prussia: "It is a pity that so splendid a genius should be joined to such a worthless soul." Voltaire wished to destroy "the old edifice of imposture founded seventeen hundred and seventy-five years ago," the Christian Church, that Christianity "which has torn France with its claws, destroyed men with its teeth, and put ten millions to death by torture." He held self-interest to be the mainspring of all our actions. Only he would not tolerate excesses, since some promoted their own selfish ends at the cost of other equally entitled egoists. He therefore wished for religious toleration. "Since we are all steeped in error and folly, we must forgive each other our follies."

The Encyclopédistes worked in the same direction, but somewhat more boldly. They were the authors of the twenty-five volumes of the "Encyclopedia of all Sciences, Arts, and Industries" (1750 onward). One of them, Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771) preached in his treatise "De l'Esprit" (1758) plain materialism: "The soul is the perceptive faculty, the spirit is its effect; on the death of the body the soul reverts to annihilation. He who so employs himself as not to injure others, but rather promotes their welfare, is the truly good man." Paul
Heinrich Dietrich Freiherr von Holbach (1723–1789) expressed himself still more freely in his “Système de la Nature” (1770). “Christianity makes an educated society impossible. The priests wish by the delusion of religion to adorn their tyranny with the renown of sanctity.” A regular flood of other treatises spread this spirit into every section of the people. He for whom this meat was too strong could enlighten himself by the wisdom of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Although an enemy to the materialism which denied God, he nevertheless inspired the French nation with the courage to take those doctrines in a practical seriousness. His writings met with such extraordinary appreciation simply because so much truth speaks from them by the side of falsehood. What so passionately excited him was the violation of nature in the conditions which had now become historical, above all the vicious perversion of nature in religious matters as organised by the Jesuits. He knew but one means of rescue, and that was the complete demolition and removal of all that had become historical. His book, “Discours sur l’Inégalité parmi les Hommes” (1755), declared this to be the source of all evils. He imagined to himself the happy primitive condition of mankind, and pictured it in such colours that Voltaire wrote to him, “If a man reads your book he is seized with the desire to run on all-fours.” That which he, like the atheistic literature, represented, the thought of the subversion of all existing things, had an irresistible force, owing to the wild heat of passion with which it announced it. When the French clergy made efforts to suppress these writings aimed against the Church, it was shown how general the contempt for the Church had become under the rule of the Jesuits. Men laughed at the feeble efforts which were made to dam the swirling flood.

In addition to all this, there was the universal discontent at the encroachments of the Jesuits in the political and social domain. They had founded a Christian State in Paraguay. When in 1750 a treaty was concluded between Portugal and Spain which was to settle the frontiers on La Plata, the Indians in Uruguay, who were under the Jesuits, declared that they could not submit to it, and it was only after long years of war that those powers could make Paraguay subject to them (cf. Vol. I, p. 404). The excitement caused by the fact that the pious fathers had founded a political State in place of a missionary colony, and had defended it, sword in hand, against the rightful owners, was so great that a reformation of the order was demanded. When the Pope opposed this, and an attempt was made on the life of the King of Portugal, which was supposed to have been instigated by some Jesuits, the order was entirely abolished in all Portuguese territories (September 3, 1759; cf. Vol. IV, p. 552).

France followed this example. There had long been complaints that the Jesuits by help of their missionary activity had seized all transmarine trade for themselves, and sought to dominate politics. Then the Father La Valette became insolvent through his over-venturesome commercial enterprises. His creditors claimed compensation from the order. Parliament assented, and declared that the principles of the order, as they were represented in its constitution, were incompatible with the welfare of the Church and the legal principles of France, and that their teaching was immoral. The king wished to reform the order that he might save it. But its former patron, Pope Clement XIII, decided “Sint ut sunt aut non sint” (Let them exist as they are, or not at all). Thus the order was banished for ever (1764) from France. And so also from other States.
When in 1769 a new Pope was to be elected, only one question had to be considered, Would a friend or an enemy of the Jesuits win the day? Clement XIV, the new Pope, was neither one nor the other. But before his election he had declared to the King of Spain his opinion that the Pope might abolish the order, and that in the interests of peace it was desirable that he did so. The princes now urged him to act in this spirit, and the Jesuits foretold God's vengeance on him if he took such a step. He vacillated for four years. At last on July 21, 1773, appeared the Brief of Abolition, Dominus ac redemptor noster, which he had personally drawn up. This explained that ever since the existence of the order disensions had been caused by it. "In consideration that so long as the Society of Jesus exists it is impossible for the Church once more to obtain a true and lasting peace, we hereby abolish that society. All and every power of the superiors of the order shall be for ever ended. This brief shall be and remain firm, immovable, and valid for ever."

Soon after this the Pope began to fail in health, and died the very next year. All the Catholic States carried out the abolition of the order. But it was now too late, for the seed sown by it was already ripening.

When under Louis XVI measures were necessary to meet the load of debt, which France threatened to sink, Charles Maurice, Count of Talleyrand-Périgord, Bishop of Autun, proposed finally that all ecclesiastical possessions should be sold as national property, and that the clergy should be paid out of the State treasury. The opposition raised against the scheme only revealed the determination of no longer recognising rights based on historical possession and enjoyment, the long-continued user which ripens into irrefragable ownership. With amazing rapidity an advance was made on the path once trodden. Ought any of the property of the convents to be spared? "You wish for free citizens," cried Pierre Joseph Marie Barnave, founder of the Jacobin Club; "all monks are slaves, who have renounced the exercise of their reason." The friends of the Church wished to guard against open desertion from her, and therefore proposed to insert in the constitution a clause to the effect that the Catholic religion was the national religion of France. Honore Gabriel Victor Riquetti, Count of Mirabeau (his portrait is on the plate, "The Six Leaders of the French Revolution," in volume VIII), answered, "From this place I see the window from which a king, the murderer of his subjects, gave the signal for St. Bartholomew's night." Were fresh privileges to be conceded to a Church which had waged so savagely against the people? A new ecclesiastical constitution was promulgated in 1790, the "Civil Constitution of the Clergy." According to its terms all ecclesiastical offices were for the future to be filled by the choice of the people. When voices of protest were raised, the question was asked, how at the time of the supremacy of the Church in France the clergies had come to their offices, whether the bishops had not obtained their positions through the royal mistresses and the pastors through such bishops. All French citizens were forbidden to recognise the authority of a strange bishop. The National Church was thus loosened from the popedom. Every ecclesiastic had to swear that he would uphold the civil constitution to the best of his ability. Not a few clergy took the oath, some from weakness of character, others from enthusiasm for liberty. The Pope excommunicated them. With the fury of slaves who have mastered their overseers, men went to greater extremes. The Christian chronology, the years since the birth of Christ, the weeks of seven days,
even Christianity itself, were declared to be abolished, and Reason exalted to a
divinity. An actress was born into the church of Notre Dame, into the "Temple
of Reason," and received, as the goddess of Reason, the homage of the people.
Some two thousand churches were pillaged in a short period. Even amongst the
clergy themselves a disbelief, hitherto concealed, showed itself, together with a
veritable hatred of Christianity. A priest, after the execution of the king, trampled
a crucifix under his feet, and cried, "The tyrant of the body is destroyed, now we
must annihilate the tyrant of the soul." Another ended his official duties with
a proof that there was no God, and said tauntingly, "Prove thy existence and hurl
thy thunderbolt upon my head."

The deists of Rousseau's stamp were grieved, for freedom and equality would
be impossible if the people no longer believed in the invisible. It was resolved in
May, 1794, on the proposal of Maximilien Marie Isidore Robespierre (see his por-
trait in the plate in Vol. VIII, already mentioned), that the French nation should
acknowledge a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul. When men had
satisfied their indignation against the ambitious Church, and thought that nothing
more must be feared from that source, an attempt was made to distinguish between
her and religion. Men were at last weary of murder. The Directory, in whose
hands the executive power had been placed, granted in February, 1795, liberty to
every form of cult. It was soon shown that the religious needs would be better
satisfied by the Catholic Church than by a newly formed National Church. The
deism advocated by Robespierre might also produce a sort of church organisation.
One of the five directors was among those who formed an association to honour
with a pure form of public worship "the exalted Geometer who presides over the
great fabric of the universe." "Worship God, love your neighbours, make your-
selves useful," was the motto of these Theophilanthropists. But when that director
once asked Talleyrand in what way the victory of this most perfect religion could
be obtained, he received the answer, "Get yourself crucified, and rise again the
third day." In a few years the whole system had melted away.

Even the papacy was drawn into this boiling whirlpool, since Pius VI joined
the opponents of France. In Rome finally a republic was proclaimed. The Pope
was forced to renounce the government, and was dragged from one place to another,
until in 1799 he ended his life in France. The papacy was thus extinguished.
In the succeeding year certainly the cardinals at Venice were able to elect, under
the protection of Austria, a new pope, Pius VII, and Bonaparte used him for the
realisation of his political plans. But when with this object he put forward the
demand, "My enemies must be yours also," and the Pope replied that he could
not begin a war with a part of his fold, Bonaparte declared the donation of "the
Emperor of the French, his exalted predecessor Charlemagne," to the Bishop of
Rome to be revoked. The whole States of the Church were absorbed into the
French Empire, and the Pope, who refused to abdicate, was brought as prisoner to
Fontainebleau (1802). Pius VII finally, indeed, conceded in the Concordat, which
was concluded there, all that the emperor required. But two months afterward
he revoked it all, so that the emperor in his anger declared, "If I do not make some
priests in Fontainebleau shorter by a head, we shall never come to a settlement."

The Catholic Church of Germany had then suffered the greatest shocks both
from within and from without. The spirit of the "enlightenment" penetrated there
also. In the years 1763–1774 there appeared under the name "Justinus Febronius"
a work ("De Statu Ecclesie et Legitima Potestate Romani Pontificis") by the Suffragan Bishop of Trèves, Johann Nikolaus von Hontheim, which laid so little stress on the fundamental differences between the Evangelical and the Catholic Church, that it considered a union to be very simple if only the excessive power of the Pope were sufficiently restrained. This work was studied with peculiar pleasure by the Catholic emperor of the House of Hapsburg, Joseph II, in the Edict of Tolerance of 1781, granted to his Protestant subjects rights of citizenship and free exercise of their religion. The Catholic Church of his empire was, moreover, to become an Austrian National Church, free from Rome, but subject to the State, and securing the purpose of the popular "enlightenment." It was decided that none of the clergy might have a previous education in Rome. The place of the episcopal seminaries was taken by imperial educational establishments, with a staff of liberal-minded teachers who were to "introduce among the people a refined feeling." All monasteries which did not serve practical objects, such as instruction, the care of souls, and nursing of the sick, were dissolved. The Pope did not shrink from the long journey to Vienna in order to change the emperor's purpose, but his visit was entirely fruitless. Many Evangelical congregations were formed in Austria which built themselves Churches, even in Vienna. The first German princes of the Church united to win back their independence, and in the agreement of Ems resolved upon the formation of a National Church of the German Catholics, independent of Rome. Such undertakings were indeed too violent contradictions to historical development, and as such could not have a permanent success. But the extent of the predominance of the spirit of the "enlightenment" in the circles even of educated Catholics is shown by the founding of the Illuminati order, by a pupil of the Jesuits, Adam Weishaupt, Professor of Law at Ingolstadt (1776). The world was to be reformed by enlightenment and humane morality. Catholics as well as Protestants (Goethe, Herder), clergy as well as laymen, princes (Charles Augustus of Weimar, Ernest and Augustus of Gotha, Ferdinand of Brunswick, Dalberg), and subjects united here in a secret league for the ennobling of mankind. It is true that a dispute between the leaders, Weishaupt and Knigge, led to the discovery and dissolution of the order by the Bavarian government (1784-1785); but its after-effects lasted a long time.

The temporal sovereignty of the German spiritual princes gradually died out, and the map of the country was completely altered. By the final resolution of the Imperial Deputation (1803) all spiritual principalities and lordships were divided among the temporal princes, who were for the most part Protestant. More than seventeen thousand square miles with over three million inhabitants were thus transferred from the sovereignty of the crosier to the sceptre of temporal lords. It was in vain that the Pope declared that according to the canon law the possessions of the heretics ought rather to be confiscated and the subjects of an heretical prince emancipated from all allegiance. Even if principles, however sacred, were no longer able to be carried out, it was still intolerable that the property of the Catholic Church should be surrendered to Protestant princes.
B. THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN THE EVANGELICAL CHURCH (ABOUT 1750–1814)

The Evangelical Church also went through a period of revolution, but not in the same way as the Catholic Church. This latter is an essentially outward institution which wishes to govern the nations. Therefore the age which thirsted for liberty brought to her such conflicts as political realms have to expect,—arbitrary measures and limitations of her outward power. The Evangelical Church, on the other hand, recognised in reality but one power, faith; thus only religious wars were forced upon her by the ferment of the times. They were so fiery, that the real Christian faith seemed to be consumed. Complete disorganisation is the characteristic of this era in the domain of religion. The movement which had previously appeared in Germany in opposition to orthodoxy and piety, and exalted the reason to be judge of everything, now united itself with the naturalism to which France had given birth, in order to overthrow the positive Christianity.

The most influential prince of Germany, Frederick the Great of Prussia, had adopted the French ideas of that time. The object he had in view was to "conquer ignorance and prejudices, and enlighten men's brains." But by "prejudices" he chiefly understood Christianity; by "enlightenment," the wisdom of his friend Voltaire. He attracted to his court quite a list of such Frenchmen who were conspicuous for esprit, even the Materialist Julien Offray de La Mettrie, author of the work "L'Homme-machine" (1748). He did not indeed wish to be entirely without religion; he called himself a deist, yet even in his will he expressed himself as follows: "I willingly and without regret give the breath of life which animates me to kindly nature, and my body to the elements. I have lived as a philosopher, and wish to die as such." Certainly his famous saying, "In my dominions every one ought to be blessed in his own way," intends in the first place to express merely the thought of sufferance; but the form chosen for it is a renewed scoff at the faith which hopes for eternal bliss. And much as he praised tolerance, he sneered at Christianity and lent his powerful support to its enemies. He gave his keen wit full play on every opportunity against the sacred institutions of the Church, against hymns, texts, and above all against the clergy, and not merely against unworthy representatives of this estate, but against the estate as such. He could write in the instructions for the education of his nephew, "He does not need to have too great respect for the priest who instructs him."

The note struck in his court resounded throughout Berlin, among the upper classes of the Prussian territory and in other German courts. The conviction spread more and more that the Church was mostly useful for the common people.

The favour which the philosopher Christian Wolff (cf. above) had enjoyed from Frederick the Great was inherited by the heirs of his ideas, the popular philosophers. They wished to popularise the philosophy of the "enlightenment," and by this to make it the universal means of education. The Jew Moses Mendelssohn, the bookseller Christoph Friedrich Nicolai, and their kindred spirits (Johann Jakob Engel, Thomas Abbt), maintained in their "Library of polite learning," and their "Universal German Library," their "sound human understanding," as the only resort of truth. Everything which was deep or aimed at depth was scoffed at as stale, flat, and unprofitable. Opponents were pilloried as feeble intellects or hypocrites. A whole number of preachers, especially in Berlin, agreed with
them. They only clung to the use of a "solemn tone," since they "overthrew superstition and set up a pure morality." In this illustrious circle all confessions and religions extended, as may be supposed, the hand of brotherhood to each other. A man knew himself only as a human being with sound human understanding.

It was now wished to educate the youth to be men. In accordance with Rousseau's ideals Johann Bernhard Basedow (1723–1790) undertook to train up men in his Philanthropinum at Dessau, opened in 1774. The religion which these children were to learn, but not before their tenth year, was to be that which is common to all religions. "In the temple of the Universal Father dissenting fellow-citizens will, in numbers, worship as brethren." No trace of unnatural compulsion may prevail, everything must be learnt in play. When the leaders of this institution who called themselves after the love of mankind became presently bitter antagonists to each other, one of the teachers, Christian Gotthilf Salzmann (1744–1811), founded a second rational educational establishment in Schneipenthal.

A great influence upon wide circles of educated men was exercised by the Wolfenbüttel "Fragments of an Anonymous Writer," published by Leisering (1774 and 1777–1778), taken from a manuscript of Hermann Samuel Reimarus, professor at Hamburg, who died in 1768. They found there the most plausible arguments for their already more or less complete estrangement from Christianity. The archives of Christianity were absolutely irreconcilable with each other; how could they restore revelation? Christ had deceived himself with his hopes, and his disciples had deceived the world, since they forged his teaching and history. Could men do otherwise than turn their backs on this Christianity!

At the time when the teaching of the Church was so boldly contradicted, theology had the task of examining the truth of the charges brought against Christianity, and of rendering them unjustifiable by a purer representation of the immutable central principle. The theology of that period did indeed make the investigation, and admitted that its existing form was not unassailable. But in order to escape from contradiction it assumed more and more the character of hostility to revelation, and in this way abandoned the Christianity which it was its duty to guard. Some among these theologians maintained a sober morality and regarded themselves still as believing Christians. Thus Johann Salome Semler (1725–1791), who declared that everything in the Bible which according to his judgment did not serve to the "moral improvement of mankind," was of no more concern for us, and saw in the history of the Church and her teaching nothing after all except a Comedy of Errors. Others assumed a flippant attitude. Thus Karl Friedrich Bahrdt (1741–1792) could write, "I regarded Moses, Jesus, Confucius, Luther, Semler, and myself as tools of Providence. I was convinced that these and such like men had drawn only from the well of reason." Another, Andreas Riem, a Prussian pastor, actually ventured to cast doubts on the character of Jesus, of whom hitherto men had felt forced to speak with deep reverence. Johann Heinrich Schulz, a preacher in Gielsdorf, near Berlin, declared Moses to be a deceiver, Jesus a good man, who, however, put too much faith in his own ebullient temperament, and called Christianity jugglery, buffoonery, court fashions, invented by ambitious priests for selfish purposes.

It is not surprising that in non-theological circles still more vicious ideas were put forward. According to Jakob Mauvillon (1743–1794), a lieutenant-colonel of Brunswick, Christian ethics made men lazy and cringing, encouraged poverty, celi-
bacy, and intolerance, forbade war, and were unable to improve morality, to extirpate superstition, to enlighten the world, or to promote science and learning. Christianity must therefore be replaced by a morality conformable to reason. An immense number of pamphlets, mostly anonymous, attacked Christianity with a veritable fury. The belief in one God was represented as the source of all woe and misery, and man was declared to be purely animal.

But the enlightened clergy tried, as temperately as possible, to lead the common people, who from old custom held to the Church, to a "rational reverence for God." Thus the extracts from the Bible, which had been traditional for long ages, were still read at divine service; but an attempt was made to render these "profitable" for enlightenment and civilisation. The story of Christmas with the stall and the manger gave an opportunity to speak about the "use of stall-feeding;" the story of Easter, with the women who came early to the sepulchre, allowed a discourse on "the advantage of early rising;" the story of Jesus' entry into Jerusalem, when the crowd strewn branches from the trees, suggested a sermon on trespassing in forests and waste of wood. In the same way familiar church hymns were disused, because they offended the learned men of the time. Even the traditional form of divine service and other church procedure, to which the people were accustomed from childhood, was set aside. What were the inevitable consequences? The services no longer gave the people what they wanted; they felt strange and awkward at them. They therefore followed the example of the educated men, who, as they possessed their rational religion, no longer felt a need for public religious edification. The attendance at public worship so rapidly diminished that many churches were demolished and the site employed more profitably, and in the remainder the number of services was continually lessened. It was only due to the law of inertia that the Church did not need to suspend her activity altogether.

Once, however, an energetic attempt was made to check the current of the age. Frederick William II of Prussia was not convinced that a universal tendency of the times, which had been for nearly half a century treated with the greatest favour by his predecessor Frederick the Great, could not be banished from the world by one single plain command; he thought that he could restore orthodoxy with the Religious Edict of 1788. He was only able to depose one clergyman, the above-mentioned Schulz in Giesdorf, and not even him in the lawful way, but by an order of the cabinet. His successor Frederick William III repealed the whole measure in the year 1797; religion, he said, required no coercion, since, with its inseparable companions, reason and philosophy, it existed in a nation by itself. The enlightenment reigned supreme.

But after 1790 or so a new tendency vigorously asserted itself in it. The sound human understanding, which was so highly praised, made a weak and feeble appearance in many of these self-satisfied speakers. Nevertheless everything was to be disregarded which their reason could not comprehend. In addition to this, many representatives of this capricious use of reason arrived at most terrible results. Men of more serious mood and greater depth felt themselves repelled by this superficiality. Thus the great poets of the German nation, Goethe, Schiller, Tieck, rose against the self-satisfied and conceited methods of Nicolai and his Universal German Library. "What you do not touch with your hands seems to you in your blindness a non-entity, and if you handle anything it is at once defiled." This also was the view of the great thinker Immanuel Kant. He did not wish to attack the.
existing enlightenment, but rather to establish it more firmly. The criticism which
the subjective reason had hitherto applied merely to the objective, to the historical,
was now applied to itself. In consequence of this a distinction was made between
the "pure reason," which was unable to comprehend the objective, and therefore
had to abandon the hitherto existing blind confidence that the truth would in-
fallibly be attained, and the "practical reason," which, without committing itself
to arguments for or against, convinces the man inwardly both of the moral law
which gives a categorical imperative and of the existence of God and of immortality.
This was indeed anything but a restoration of the deposed Christianity. A revela-
tion is denied, the whole of religion resolved into ethics, and man made completely
dependent upon himself alone. There could be no idea of the grace of God, the
predominant thought of Christianity, and of the really attainable communion of
man with God. It was, as Kant himself called it, "rationalism." But in more
than one point he successfully opposed the superficiality of the previously dominant
enlightenment. As, for example, in his theory of the "radical bad" which cannot
be removed by "reparation," but only by a "revolution in the mind," by "a change
of maxims;" or in his keen indication of the moral law as absolutely binding;
above all, by the demonstration of the impossibility of attaining a knowledge of the
supersensible world by pure reason. This moral sincerity and this honest mental
labour were like the keen morning wind which drives away the dark mists of night.
This philosophy, of which Johann Gottlieb Fichte was a typical exponent, was in
reference to religion a rationalism, though full of power and prophetic of a new
era.

The old Christianity, in spite of all this havoc in the Church, had by no means
disappeared. It was but feebly that a number of theologians defended their belief
in a revelation of God and in the Holy Scriptures as its archives. And yet the
writings of these supernaturalists made the return to Christianity more easy for
the coming generation. We notice thus some circles which in that age of disbelief
tried to protect each other against the loss of their Christian convictions, and to
win others for their cause. For instance, that circle in Frankfort-on-the-Main,
where the central figure was Susanne Katharina von Klettenberg (1723–1774), the
"beautiful soul" whose confessions Goethe has published in his "Wilhelm Meister."
It is a noteworthy feature how, in the presence of that bond of sympathy which
rendered these individuals happy, all elements of disunion sank into the back-
ground. Adelheid Amalie, Princess of Galizien (1748–1806), was a Catholic, but
pious Lutherans nevertheless associated with her and her friends. There were also
important intellectual celebrities among them, such as the thoughtful Johann
Georg Hamann (1730–1788), on whom Jean Paul pronounced the verdict that his
commas were planetary systems, his full-stops solar systems, his words complete
sentences; or the warmly sympathetic Johann Kaspar Lavater (1741–1801), who,
although repelling many by his attempts at conversion (Goethe, Mendelssohn),
still by his joyous faith and his sincere piety directed and strengthened many
wavering or timid spirits. Again, the devout Johann Heinrich Jung, surnamed
Stillings (1740–1817), whose autobiography, sc instinct with faith, was printed by
Goethe. The true-hearted, playful, good-natured Matthias Claudius (1740–1815)
thought that the wish to improve religion by reason was, "as if I wished to set
the sun by the old wooden clock in my house," but he called philosophy a broom
"to sweep out the cobwebs from the temple; one might also call it a hare's foot
with which to brush off the dust from the sacred statues." These men show us that the storms which had raged against the Church had worked some good, for what they represented was not dead orthodoxy or corrupt pietism, but a sincere, living, and in many cases (if we may use the word) childlike Christianity. The damage caused by the tempestuous waves of the last decades awoke in some of them the wish to combine into societies, in order, if possible, to rekindle true Christianity in wider circles,—beginnings which the nineteenth century was destined to develop more fully.

But so long as all strength of conviction has not died out in Christianity, there will be religious wars in the future. One feature will distinguish these from those of earlier times: any attempts to compel or to crush religious convictions by the employment of temporal power will be judged by the verdict of the world. That is a gain which is due to the age of enlightenment. Religious ideas have now become so various that uniformity cannot be restored by coercion. Men have become too familiar with this motley mixture in every separate country, for it to be necessary in the interests of peace and civil tranquillity to secure religious uniformity. The consciousness that the individual is entitled to religious liberty and independence has become so definite, that no one would think it morally permissible to influence the religious position of others by any means except spiritual ones which leave scope for liberty; for, indeed, a toleration such that by it all religious wars would be precluded, would only be possible in the case of a complete and universal religious indifference. But that mediæval intolerance which considered itself justified, or rather bound to "the heretic," to obedience by violent means when necessary, is now an exploded theory. The future alone can teach us whether the Papal Church will lose her old position. Time only can tell how and to what extent she has learnt the lessons of adversity, and what her power in the future will be.

4. THE RESTORATION AND THE NEW FEATURES IN THE DISPUTES

A. THE REVIVAL OF THE CHURCH (1814–1840)

Reconstruction of that which had been pulled down is the characteristic of the first decades of our century. It had been only too clearly seen what the fruits of crude unbelief were. Then there was the misery of the French tyranny, which drove men to reflection, and the enthusiasm for the emancipation of Germany. "With God for king and country" became the rallying-cry. Not indeed the God of Holy Writ, who was thought to have appeared "great and wonderful" in the flames of Moscow: it was only the disposer of the history of the world. But it was no mere superficial gossip when men named him; there was a real and firm belief in him. The overthrow of the emperor, who was deemed invincible, greatly strengthened this belief.

It is easily understood that such a vague religious impulse prevented any thorough comprehension of the doctrines of the past. Simple restoration of the old order was first and foremost the object among the rulers. The question was not asked why the old order had so completely broken up. The fury of the French in the cause of liberty was chiefly directed against the Catholic Church.
The princes, instead of investigating the deeper causes of this hostility to the Church, assumed that the altars were the supports of the thrones, and helped the Catholic Church most willingly to obtain, where possible, even more than she had possessed before the last storm. On May 24, 1814, Pope Pius VII was able to re-enter Rome. He was able at once to declare in a brief that the proselytising Bible societies were a plague, by which the gospel of Christ was perverted into a gospel of Satan. He was able on August 7 to revive that order which Pope Clement XIV had dissolved for all time on the ground that its existence rendered the unity of the world impossible. The King of Piedmont could now declare that these Jesuits alone were in a position to keep off the revolution, and no one contradicted him. In the same month the Court of the Inquisition was re instituted. In order to define the ecclesiastical and civil power, the Pope was able to conclude concordats with the separate German sovereigns, by which means the lion's share of power fell to him.

All this brought an immense access of strength to the genuine Roman spirit in the Catholic Church of Germany. There were still two tendencies opposed to it. The doctrine of mysticism found its chief supporters in a circle which gathered round the deeply pious Bishop of Ratisbon, Johann Michael Sailer (1752-1832). But the opposition to this emphasising of the "love of God in Christ" was so violent that the movement gradually died away. A few members only of this sect, such as Johannes Gossner, went over to the Evangelical Church. The other movement, that of freethought, showed itself most strongly among the clergy of Silesia. The use of the German language in divine service and the abolition of celibacy were their chief postulates. But the Prussian government did not choose to quarrel with the Pope, and therefore caused this now obsolete spirit to be gradually suppressed.

Even the defeats which the Catholic Church sustained in the Romance countries did not open the eyes of the infatuated members. In Italy, the Liberation party did not wish to lose any advantages which the French era had brought them. The party of "young Italy" chafed at the restoration of the old noble houses, set aside by Napoleon, and wished to unite and strengthen their country. Austrian troops had to invade the land more than once in order to repress these movements. France could not tolerate the concordat which had been concluded in papal interests in 1817, and it had to be repealed. And when under Charles X the freedom of the press and similar rights which the citizens had won were threatened to be abolished, the people retorted by expelling the Bourbons and raising the House of Orleans to the throne in July, 1830. The Catholic Church lost its privileges as a National Church, and the Jesuits were expelled. In Spain the Liberals were able to take the power into their hands in 1823. Gradually all monastic orders were dissolved, all convents secularised, the property of the Church declared to be a national possession, and the papal nuncio was sent over the frontier. Similar events occurred in Portugal.

A struggle finally commenced in Germany. The law in Prussia since 1803 had been that all children should follow the religion of the father, and it was forbidden that a husband should be compelled by a second person to evade this law. But the Catholic clergy refused to celebrate mixed marriages unless, in contravention of this law, it was agreed that all the children should be educated as Catholics. Clemens August Freiherr von Droste, Archbishop of Cologne, promised the govern-
ment before his election (1835) that he would consent to waive this condition so promotive of controversy. But when this was known at Rome he ordered his clergy in September, 1837, to act as before. He was arrested on November 20, 1837, and removed to Minden. The same controverted point brought Martin von Dunin, Archbishop of Gnosen, as prisoner to the fortress of Kolberg in 1839.

The spirit of the “enlightenment” had so deeply penetrated the Evangelical Church of Germany, that for decades it was at war with the once more awakening positive creed. “To think and will what is right,” was held by Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus at Heidelberg (1761–1851) to be the kernel of Christianity. He wished still to uphold the historical contents of Scripture, but to explain them in a natural sense. The angels which appeared to the shepherds at Bethlehem would have been phantasmal emanations, such as are often found in damp meadows. The error that miraculous cures are recorded in the New Testament rests on the misunderstanding of the methods of narrative employed, since the natural means adopted are not specified, but the result is at once mentioned; the supposed raisings from the dead occurred only in the case of apparently dead persons. The title of “the pope of rationalism” has been given to designate Johann Friedrich Rühr, chief court-preacher and superintendent-general at Weimar (1777–1848), who for thirty-eight years in his “Predigerliteratur” and the “Kritische Predigerbibliothek” defended rationalism against the superior power of the new religious spirit of the times.

“The dregs which remain at the bottom of life after the poetry has been skimmed off” was the name given to this movement by the Romantic school, the chief representatives of which were Johann Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853) and Friedrich von Schlegel (1772–1829). Berlin, which had so long been the centre and home of the “enlightenment,” now became the focus of this new and frothing agitation. Its ideal is not the opposite reason, but the genius which works as if by instinct. It does not love dry abstractions but living actuality, the mysterious, the unknown, the romantic. Thus sympathy is revived with the past, which was still inspired by ideas, by love and chivalry, by renunciation of the world and poetic worship of the saints. As a further antagonist of rationalism, which had removed the highest being to the dim distance, and had found no reason in the history of the world, the philosophy of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) entered the lists. According to it the self-revelation of God lay in nature as well as in history. Equally effective was the philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), in comparison with whose gigantic scheme of thought, with its bold and definite conclusions, the wisdom of the “enlightenment” must have appeared superficial.

The most conspicuous influence on the development of theology was exercised by Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher (1768–1834). His “Reden über die Religion an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächttern” (“Discourses on Religion to Educated Disparagers of her”), which appeared in 1799, caused a prodigious sensation. He wished to win back the vast numbers of men who had virtually turned their backs on all religion. But he does not wish to force once more on his generation those “religious precepts and thoughts” which had served to mislead them as regards all religion. “What you despise is not religion itself. Why have you not penetrated further into the interior of this exterior?” The Rationalists thought to possess religion by mere knowledge and mere moral conduct. But this religion is something far deeper, far more intense—“the sense and taste for the infinite.”
Schleiermacher therefore tries in his Monologues (1800) to define the moral life. The Rationalists had wished to attain a utilitarian morality, which makes everything equal. But the particular qualities of each individual are emphasised as a moral right, indeed as a moral duty. Every man in himself represents humanity under an individual form. He will more and more realise himself, but at the same time he is to be open for everything outside of himself. These were only fragments of Christianity. But the very unfitness of this teaching for the time at which it appeared was the cause of its success later on. After he had migrated from Halle to Berlin in 1807 and had been drawn closer to the positive Christianity, Schleiermacher displayed both in the pulpit (after 1809) and in the professorial chair (after 1810) a most widely reaching activity. In 1821 his theological masterpiece appeared, "The Christian Faith according to the Fundamental Propositions of the Evangelical Church." Thus he thought that he was still standing on the basis of the Evangelical Church. How great an event the publication of this work was may be shown by the proof contained in it, that religion is a matter of fact, a life; that therefore theology, the science of religion, has not to deal with philosophic theses, but with an actually existent human fact. Individual doctrines are therefore referred to the religious interests on which they rest, and dogmas are apprehended as a statement of the subjective religious possession.

But naturally the Christian religious feeling, which was regained under these separate influences, was far from being clearly marked out or definitely stamped. The struggle of the last century had been important for Christianity itself or religion generally. Every one, who amid the storms had preserved a faith, felt himself, as opposed to the powerful antagonist, only a Christian, not a member of this or that confession. Most of those who, after the storm, hastened back to religion were rejoiced that they found once more Christianity; it was indifferent to them whether it had a predominantly reformed or Lutheran stamp. Even Frederick William III of Prussia, once a friend of the "enlightenment," had, especially after the death of his beloved Louise (1810), returned to the old faith. He belonged to the Reformed Church. But he was especially fond of Luther's translation of the Bible and his other writings; he honoured him naturally not as the dogmatist, but as the zealous and heroic Christian. It was therefore not only the cherished wish of the Hohenzollerns to be no longer separated from their own people by difference of belief which made him eager for a union of the Reformed and the Lutheran Church, it was also his sincere conviction that the removal of this partition wall would be acceptable to God and attended with happy results. He therefore issued the order of the cabinet on September 27, 1817, which "was to effect the union of the separated Protestant Churches into one Evangelical Church."

Frederick William III, duly realising that in the domain of religion any real union must not be enforced by external coercion, did not wish to press this union on his people: he enacted, therefore, that there should be absolute freedom of choice as to its adoption. This order so completely met the spirit of the times, that not merely in Berlin, on the Feast of the Reformation in 1817, did the reformed and the Lutheran clergy celebrate the Lord's Supper together, but also the majority of congregations in the rest of Prussia willingly called themselves "Evangelical." It was, however, soon seen that internal concord was by no means yet established; for when the king wished to see general uniformity in the church forms, and with this object introduced a ritual drawn up by himself, opposition arose from the most various
quarters. A second edition of it was necessary to appease the discontented with a larger choice of formularies. The attempt, however, was made to crush the opposition of those who would not hear of a union, by means which are only excusable on the ground that the king thought he detected in it calamitous results of the Revolution of 1830. The remonstrating clergy were deposed. If they refused to acknowledge their deposition they were committed to prison. The members of the congregation were mulcted in a money fine. Several hundred soldiers were quartered in the community of Hönigern, where the preacher was deprived of his office, until gradually the members of the congregation became amenable and accepted the new clergyman appointed by the crown. Finally, when the king had embarked on a serious quarrel with the Catholic Church he wished to have peace in his own Church, and adopted after 1831 a more conciliatory method.

Klaus Harms, a clergyman of Holstein (1778–1855), was one of the opponents to the introduction of the union. When Archdeacon of Kiel he republished, on the jubilee of the Reformation, 1817, Luther's ninety-five theses, “accompanied with ninety-five other theses, being a translation from the year 1517 to the year 1817.” One of these theses ran, “One might wish to make the Lutheran Church, like a poor maiden, rich by marriage. But do not perform the ceremony over Luther's bones: he will be brought to life by it, and then woe to you!” But his chief efforts were directed against the “religion of reason,” which he thought was “destitute either of reason or religion, or both.” These theses produced some two hundred pamphlets. The number of antagonists to rationalism was still greater. They were especially the pupils of August Wilhelm Neander, in Berlin (1789–1850), whose motto was, “The heart makes the theologian;” and of Friedrich August Gotttreu Tholuck in Halle (1799–1877), who with his very varied abilities and his unceasingly active mind exercised an extraordinary influence not only by writing and preaching, but also by personal intercourse with the students. Finally there were the followers of Ernst Wilhelm Hengstenberg in Berlin (1802–1869), who, unmoved by innumerable contests, resolutely maintained his standpoint, and by his “Evangelische Kirchenzeitung” (“Evangelical Church Journal”), founded in 1827, roused the one party to opposition as much as he strengthened the other in the conviction that the whole matter turned on two points equally,—on the belief in what was right, and on the right form of belief (auf die Rechtgläubigkeit wie auf die Rechtgläubigkeit). The credit of having given the deathblow to the old rationalism is due to liberal-minded Karl August Hase in Jena (1800–1890). He answered a feeble attack of Röhr in his “Anti-Röhr” (1854), by the convincing proof that this tendency of mind was no longer entitled to take part in theological questions, since it was an anachronism. From that time this feeble “enlightenment” disappears from theology.

B. GROWTH OF NEW RELIGIOUS CONTROVERSIES (1840–1870)

Pius IX occupied the throne of Peter longer than any one of his predecessors, from 1846 to 1878. He began his reign with such liberal-minded reforms that the joy of the people, who craved for liberty, was unbounded. Having by this broken with the Jesuit party he resolved to support himself on the people alone. But when the storm of revolution of the spring of 1848 raged through Europe, and the demands which the Liberationists put before the Pope continually increased, he at
last thought that he ought not to make further concessions. Then the very insurrectionary volunteer corps, to whom he had formerly given his blessing in the courtyard of the Vatican, stormed the Quirinal. He conceded the demands of the people and escaped from Rome, after the murder of his minister, Rossi, on November 15, 1848, the horror of which led him to retract all his concessions. A republic was set up in Rome, and the papacy was declared to have forfeited all temporal sovereignty. These bitter experiences drove the Pope from all liberal views and exposed him to the influence of the Jesuits. He was able to mount the throne of Peter once more on April 12, 1850. He ascribed his safety to the power of the Virgin Mary, and, to honour her, he announced on December 8, 1854, the newly defined dogma, that she had remained free even from hereditary sin. Since this doctrine of the "immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary," which, while always a pious opinion, had been opposed by highly revered teachers in the Church at all times, was declared to be a tenet binding on the Church, it startled many who thought it an innovation upon the traditional exposition of dogma as depending upon the three essentials, quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.

Victor Emmanuel II became King of Italy in 1861. One after another the papal provinces revolted in order to attach themselves to his kingdom. All the sentences of excommunication pronounced by the Pope on those who contributed to the curtailment of the temporal sovereignty of the successor of Peter had no effect on these Catholic subjects. Only Rome and the Campagna were left to him, being held by the French garrison. All the bolder was his attitude in the domain of the Church. On December 8, 1864, he issued an encyclical letter to the bishops, who were to confute the errors of the time, together with a list of eighty propositions which were to be rejected by all believers as being heretical (syllabus complectens praecipuos nostrae aetatis errores). The doctrine there asserted had often been heard in past centuries. But it was startling that such things should be repeated in solemn earnest during the nineteenth century: the Church has received from Christ the power to curb and to coerce the obstinate with salutary punishment. The Popes have never overstepped the limits of their authority nor assumed the rights of princes. Whoever thinks that the reconciliation of the Pope with modern civilisation is possible and desirable anathema sit. And yet, all civic institutions are based on this modern civilisation — freedom of religion, equality in the eye of the law, the share of the people in legislation. Similarly, modern civilisation considers those encroachments of popes into the arena of politics, those depositions of princes, those bestowals of their kingdoms to others, to be a wanton transgression of the limits imposed on a spiritual power. It was as if the papacy wished to call out to the princes and nations, "Because you have taken from me the temporal sovereignty, I no longer recognise any of your rights or laws."

Pius had still greater ambitions. The Roman system was to be crowned with a brilliant pinnacle which would exclude all else. Often enough the attempt had been made to declare that the Pope, as head of the Church, was infallible. These attempts had always failed. Even this Pope felt giddy before such a dizzy height. But it was clear to the Jesuits that a recurrence of agitations for more liberty within the Church would not be precluded until the question of "Christ's representative on earth" was seriously treated. They prepared men's minds for absolutism in the Church. Believers must not only be ready to devote their property and
their persons to the Pope, but they must be able to offer to him the "sacrifice of the intellect." On December 8, 1869, the council of the Vatican was opened at Rome which was to draw up that new dogma. An opposition party argued strongly that the infallibility of the Pope was unknown to the faith of the Church and was contrary to the Bible, the facts of church history, and to reason. The final voting took place on July 18, 1870. The infallibility of the Pope was decreed by 533 votes to 2. The other opponents of this doctrine had already left the city. On the next day the war between Germany and France was declared. The French garrison, which hitherto had preserved for the Pope the last remnant of his temporal sovereignty, was recalled as indispensable for the war. After the day of Sedan, the Italian people claimed Rome as the capital of the kingdom. The Eternal City was captured by the Piedmontese troops on September 20, 1870. A poll of the people resulted in 40,785 votes for the annexation, and 46 against. Only the rooms in the Vatican were left to the Pope. He refused any terms, any compensation. He did not hail it as a blessing that he was now removed from all the difficulties which the amalgamation of the spiritual and temporal rule brought with it; on the contrary, he was never weary of declaring that he ought to recover his temporal sovereignty.

But, shortly before, this very papacy had been able to celebrate one triumph after another in Germany. In the year 1840 Frederick William IV mounted the Prussian throne, a noble figure, equipped with ample knowledge of science, art, and theology, and filled with glowing religious zeal. There was, however, in him a deeply romantic vein, a pursuit of ideals which prevented his clearly seeing the actual state of things. Thus he was enthusiastic for the thought of the liberty of the Church. But he failed to see that the Catholic Church is not merely a Church, but also a world-empire, against which the State must guard its independence, if it is to discharge its office. He terminated the still agitated church dispute (cf. above) by reinstating the Archbishops of Gnesen and Cologne in their offices without further demur. He renounced the exercise of the royal right of assent to the episcopal elections, and granted full liberty of communication with the papal chair. A special department for Catholic Church matters was erected in the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs (1841), and such unlimited authority was conferred on it that it was called the Ministry of the Pope in Prussia. The constitution of 1850 secured complete liberty to the Catholic Church. Under its protection the Church could look upon the civil laws as not affecting her, could decide all issues according to the canon law and the will of the Pope, could plant one settlement of Jesuits after the other, could continually find new convents which stood under the direction of foreign superiors, could place men of unqualified ultramontane views in schools, seminaries, and universities, and could demand increasingly large sums from the State for purposes of public and ecclesiastical instruction; nor was there any obligation to account to the State for the application of these funds, the amount of which was so great that the Catholic Church received, comparatively, four times as much in State subsidies as the Evangelical Church.

In the domain of theology the ultramontane spirit gained considerable power. Able scholars once more boldly attacked Protestantism and glorified their own faith. Johann Adam Möhler (1796–1838) represented in his Symbolism (1832) the essence of Protestantism to be illegality and irrationality, but the Catholic teaching to be the golden mean between it and unbelief. Johann Joseph Ignaz Döllinger,
the profound historian (1799–1890), held not merely Luther (1851), but the entire Reformation (1846–1848), up to contempt. The Jesuit Giovanni Perrone (1794–1876), by his theological lectures (1825) imbued the clergy of the future with the true spirit of his order. The Jesuit Johann Peter Gury (1801–1866) once more propounded in his compendium of theological ethics all the ambiguous ethics of his predecessors in the order. In the circles of the Evangelical Church it was thought impossible that any danger could threaten from Catholicism, which had long been crushed; for which reason these and similar works were hardly thought worthy of attention, and as they were not refuted, they flattered intensely the confidence of the Catholics. A proof of this is given by the various miracles which were said to have been wrought for the glory of the Church. At La Sallette-Fallavaux near Grenoble, in 1846, and at Lourdes in the Upper Pyrenees (1858), the Blessed Virgin appeared, as also in 1876–1877 at Marpingen, near Trèves, and in 1877 at Dietrichswald in East Prussia. At the place where she appeared, springs gushed forth, the waters of which worked miraculous cures. The same boast was made of the holy coat of Christ in the Cathedral at Trèves, where it was publicly displayed by the bishop, Wilhelm Arnoldi, in 1844. Louise Lateau at Bois d’Haine in Belgium was “favoured,” every Friday after April 24, 1868, with the marks of the wounds on Christ’s body. For many years after March, 1871, she took no nourishment beyond the daily holy communion, and yet remained vigorous and healthy, able to do the hardest work. The Church did not enquire whether the gain, that owing to such miracles many were bound more firmly to the Catholic Church, was not immeasurably counterbalanced by the loss, since many, owing to this, thoroughly misunderstood the Church’s teaching, and so were unhinged in their faith. Pious devices or rash credulity can only end in spiritual confusion.

In the Anglican Church, also, an important movement was prominent after 1833. Such stress was laid on the Catholic element retained in this Church, that both in doctrine and ritual there was a close approximation to the Roman Church. Many of these Ritualists ended by openly going over to the Catholic Church. Pope Pius IX was thus encouraged to entertain the boldest hopes, and once more established, on September 24, 1850, the Roman Catholic hierarchy in England. Twelve bishoprics were created under the Archbishop of Westminster, the energetic and fearless Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman (1802–1865).

In the Evangelical Church of Germany the schism which the union had produced was ended by Frederick William IV. The Prussian Lutherans, who declared that they could not agree to a union of the two Evangelical communities of the Church, were allowed to form themselves into a Church, independent of the State, at Breslau, and were in 1845 recognised by the government as such. In other places, also, it was seen that the time was passed when it had been possible to disregard the distinctions existing between the Reformed and the Lutheran Church. If previously stress had been laid on a universal Christianity, now many persons, through the study of the past history of the Church and in the wish for clear religious ideas, turned once more to denominationalism. While formerly weight had been attached to the personal Christianity of the individual, now the importance was accentuated which the whole had for the individual. An effort was made to place the community of the Church upon well-defined foundations, and thus to protect it from confusion. Thus a Church party and a Dissenting party was
formed. When the purely Lutheran districts of Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein were united to Prussia and were anxious about their religious position, "the universal Evangelical-Lutheran Conference" was founded.

The counterpart to these efforts was formed by a movement which wished to see the different sects enjoying equal rights within the National Churches. First in South Germany (Durlach), later in North Germany also, Protestant unions were occasionally formed, which for the first time, on July 7 and 8, 1865, held a common conference at Eisenach, as the "German Protestant Union." These theologians were called "the Halves" by the representative of a third movement, David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874). Violent excitement was caused by his "Life of Jesus, critically treated," which was published by him in 1835. Starting with the premises that miracles are impossible, and that the idea cannot be fully disclosed in one single individual, he explained the accounts of the New Testament as merely the results of pious myths. But he admits that the crown of honour, with which the first Christians adorned their revered Lord, expressed in a restricted form the thought that in humanity God and man are united. In his "Christian Dogma" ("Christliche Glaubenslehre"), 1841–1842, he believed that he could prove that all Christian doctrines were displaced by the science of modern times. But with the same fury with which he assailed the Christian beliefs he attacked those who thought themselves to be the true representatives of Christianity, and yet amended it as they liked, removing the difficulties of biblical miracles by new interpretations. He finally publicly declared (1872) that he and the followers of his views were no longer Christians, that art must take the place of religion, and thought "the old faith only contradicted reason, it did not contradict itself; the new faith contradicts itself in every part, how could it be reconciled to reason?" Not a few of his school thought to find a justification for their abandonment of Christianity in the new statements of the English naturalist, Charles Robert Darwin, so that Darwinism in Germany — quite otherwise than in its home — has been used as a weapon against Christianity. Finally, we notice, in the middle between these extreme parties and that denominational movement, the so-called "theology of mediation" (Vermittlungstheologie), which is chiefly represented by the moderate section of Schleiermacher's school. It, too, is a warm supporter of the union, but with regard to doctrine is less arbitrary, and in criticism more sober than Schleiermacher was.

During these decades the faith had once more become a living power in large sections of the population, as was shown by the great zeal for its manifestation. We shall systematically illustrate in the next pages the immense progress made by Home as well as by Foreign Missions. Men now thought about the duty of rendering it more easy for Evangelicals who lived among a Catholic population to remain loyal to their Church. With this object the Gustavus Adolphus Institution, which had existed in Saxony since November, 1832, was, on September 16, 1842, extended to the whole of Germany. Its support enabled a number of Evangelical congregations scattered in different parts to build schools, chapels, and churches, and in this way to strengthen their position. Up to the close of the nineteenth century over thirty-three million marks (£1,650,000) had been paid away, and four thousand five hundred and eighteen congregations assisted. One thousand nine hundred and seventy-two churches, chapels, and towers were built, eight hundred and eighty-two schoolhouses, seven hundred and sixty-eight parsonages, five hundred and
sixty-eight houses for candidates for confirmation and orphans. Besides this, the "Lutherische Gotteskästen" (Lutheran poor-box), founded for denominational purposes in 1876, was working with more restricted means. New duties sprang up for these societies through the "freedom-from-Rome" movement, which appeared in Austria at the close of the nineteenth century; its motives were in many cases independent of political aspirations, and its strength could not be broken by the most direct opposition on the part of the Ultramontanes. In the year 1899 some sixteen thousand persons in Austria left the Catholic Church. A wish was felt in England to make the fact visible that "all believing Christians," in spite of difference of creed, felt themselves bound together by that which is common to all. Thus the first Evangelical alliance, attended by delegates from all Evangelical countries, was arranged in London from August 19 to September 2, 1846, and it afterward held meetings in various large towns. In June, 1852, the Evangelical (Eisenach) Church conference was established. Composed of representatives of the Evangelical Church governments, it meets every two years, in order to effect a satisfactory solution of comparatively outside problems, with regard to which some agreement in the different Evangelical districts is possible and desirable. Thus it submitted the text of Luther's Bible to a strict revision and after twenty-five years of labour published, on February 29, 1892, the "Revised Bible." In academical circles also a wish was excited to make the fundamental propositions of Christianity more openly felt in the life of the students. Societies were formed after 1836 which aimed at keeping the liberty and happiness of university life free from unchristian associations. They were amalgamated in the Wingolfsbund and the Schwarzburgbund.

C. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE ASCENDENCY OF THE POPE (KULTURKAMPF)

The negligence of the German governments, for three decades, had allowed the Catholic Church to acquire a really threatening power. The liberal movement especially, which had gradually gained ground among the people, watched this with increasing anxiety, though it could not distinguish between the Christian and the Jesuit spirit, which are combined in the modern Catholicism. As soon as this liberal party acquired greater influence,—which was the case after 1870,—the struggle was certain to commence. The Catholic Church, which had been secured by continuous favour from high quarters, experienced the fourfold mortification that in 1866 Protestant Prussia defeated Catholic Austria, and gained an unusually large increase in territory and influence; that in 1870 and 1871 France, which had been loyal to the Pope under Napoleon III, was deeply humiliated; that in connection with this the Pope lost his temporal sovereignty; that the new imperial crown of Germany was conferred on a Protestant dynasty. The Catholics of Prussia were indeed so accustomed to obtain their wishes from the government that they actually entertained the hope of being able to induce the victorious King William I to restore the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. But already the definite refusal of this request taught them that there was no intention of following the old paths. The leading Catholic circles could no longer conceal from themselves the conviction that they must muster all their forces if they wished to maintain the former power of their Church. They initiated an
immense agitation, when the writs for the German Reichstag were issued. Their
deputies formed a separate party, the Centre, and thus proclaimed that they wished
to treat political questions only according to the results for the Catholic Church
which might be expected from them. This mixture of politics and religion became
more troublesome, because non-Catholics, who wished to prepare difficulties for the
government in the political field (Welfs, Poles), joined this Centre. The German
chancellor of the empire, Otto, Prince Bismarck, did not doubt that this party would
most gladly have destroyed all the successes realised by him. He determined to
confine the Catholic Church to its own limits, and to break its growing power.
The Liberals offered their help as allies. He selected from their numbers on
January 2, 18722, Adalbert Falk (d. July 7, 1900) as Minister of Ecclesiastical
Affairs.

Bismarck took another enemy of the Ultramontanes under his protection, the
Old Catholics. The opponents of the papal infallibility, who had left Rome before
the final voting (cf. above), had one after another submitted to the defined
article of faith, even Karl Joseph von Hefele, Bishop of Rotenburg, who, in
November, 1870, had written, "I will rather lose my throne than my peace of
conscience." Only a small number remained steadfast. The first congress of the
Old Catholics met at Munich in September, 1871. The most important of these
men, indeed, the learned Döllinger, retired from the movement when it was pro-
posed to form congregations which should be independent of Rome. He preferred
to belong to no external church community at all. The Prussian government now
favoured these opponents of the papacy. On October 7, 1873, Falk administered
the oath to Joseph Hubert Reinkens, professor at Breslau, as bishop of the Old
Catholic congregations. It is true that this favour only lasted a short time, since
Prussia did not appear to obtain from them the anticipated powerful assistance in
the struggle.

What weapons did the government employ in this struggle? It did not realize
that the Catholic self-consciousness had been greatly inflated by long years of
favour, and that therefore the proper relations between State and Church were
only to be attained by a cautious withdrawal of the undeservedly awarded conces-
sions; that in the Catholic Church of Germany, above all, religious forces were at
work, which the employment of coercive measures would only render fanatical;
that in order to limit the Catholic influence it was imperatively necessary to
strengthen the Evangelical Church and to afford it readier means of making its in-
fluence felt among the people. Besides this, their opponents included such men
as regarded even the Evangelical Church as retrogressive ("kulturfeindlich"), and
therefore wished to lessen the influence of the Church generally over the people,
or even entirely to abolish it. So the attempt was made to let the Roman Church
feel the displeasure of the State by harsh laws and police regulations, and these
laws, "for the sake of parity," were extended to the Evangelical Church. While
Rome offered a successful resistance to these enactments, and thereby gained no
little in reputation among the people, the Evangelical Church, which holds dif-
ferent views on obedience to the laws of the State, submissively yielded, and thus
diminished her reputation in the eyes not only of her Roman opponents, but also
of those of her members whose loyalty was not sincere.

In Prussia the "Department for Catholic Affairs," in the Ministry of Public
Worship, had been abolished in 1871, the superintendence of schools transferred
from the Church to the State, and members of religious orders prohibited from working in public national schools. Then the German Empire interfered. The abuse of the pulpit for political agitation was punished with imprisonment in a fortress up to two years. The Jesuits were expelled. The Catholic Union was founded in answer to that, and in 1873 followed for Prussia the "May laws" (11–14 May; completed on May 20 and 21, 1874). A special examination in general education was prescribed for all clergymen, including the Evangelical. As the last appeal in ecclesiastical matters, a secular authority, a royal court of judicature, was established. The appointment and removal of clergy were made dependent on the approval of non-ecclesiastical authorities; contraventions were punishable with fines up to one thousand thalers (£150). The Pope declared the Prussian ecclesiastical laws to be invalid. The government, however, thought that these bishops and their clergy would not be prepared to make pecuniary sacrifices. It hoped to be able to tame the refractory by the withdrawal of all State aid (April, 1875). The consequence was that the Catholic Church once more had martyrs, and was stirred with enthusiastic fanaticism, with bitterness and defiance. The number of the members of the Centre comparably grew greater at the elections. The exclusiveness of the Catholic Church, its attachment to the papacy, and its hostility to the Evangelical Church exceeded all bounds. This is shown by the unparalleled audacity to which the keen controversy already observed by us had the presumption to go. Johannes Janssen, with an unexampled certainty of victory, was able to sketch in his "History of the German People from the End of the Middle Ages" a picture of the past which upsets all previous results of enquiry, and this correction of history, according to dogmatism, found thousands of enthusiastic readers. Other writers treated in a number of similar works various points of history in the same spirit, only in a less moderate tone. They were even capable of asserting that Luther had died by his own hand, and attempted to convince their readers of it.

The Prussian government saw that by the method adopted it had brought about the very opposite result to what it hoped to achieve. The new pope, Leo XIII (after 1878), smoothed the way for the inevitable retreat by assurances of his love of peace. The Minister of Public Worship, Falk, was replaced on July 14, 1879, by Robert Viktor von Puttkamer. During the next eight years one after another of those "laws of the struggle" were repealed. There now really remained as the object of repeated attacks by the Centre only the law as to the Jesuits; and not a few men of other parties, in spite of the lessons of history, had considered that a public recognition of the Jesuit order by the State — for the repeal of that law would amount to this — would be entirely free from danger. This modern journey to Canossa filled wide circles of the Evangelical population with deep grief and shame. To prevent, if possible, the repetition of similar occurrences the "Evangelical League for the Preservation of German-Protestant Interests" was founded (August 15–17, 1887), which, by discussions in its branch societies, by its monthly organ the "Church Correspondence for the German Daily Press," and by annual general meetings tried to keep alive or awake afresh the Protestant consciousness. Even the legislature as to the status of citizens (February 8, 1875), to which the State was driven by the "Kulturkampf," was not designed as wisely as could be wished. Since its principal thought might be comprehended in the words, "It is a pleasure to live, because one can now live and die outside the
shadow of the Church," not a few, who were by no means hostile to the Church, were induced erroneously to consider the Church henceforth as superfluous, and to leave the most important crises in life, the entrance into matrimony, the birth of a child, deaths, etc., unconsecrated by religion. But with this many lost the inheritance of religion which they still possessed.

Similar opposition to the Church was shown in other countries. In Austria the government declared that the concordat concluded with the Pope had been partially violated by the declaration of infallibility, and arranged with the Reichstag in May, 1874, ecclesiastical laws which subjected the pastoral letters of the bishops and the tenure of all ecclesiastical offices to the approval of secular authorities, made every abuse of the official power of the Church liable to civil penalties, and regulated the formation of new religious communities. In France, where Ultramontanism had been able once more joyfully to assert itself under MacMahon (president up to January 30, 1879), changes came under Jules Grévy. After 1880 the dissolution of the Jesuit Order and of all orders and congregations not especially sanctioned by the State was enacted, the burial of non-Catholics in Catholic churchyards was permitted, the exemption of pupils in the seminaries from military service was disallowed, convent education was made less essential by the establishment of State girl schools, and all denominational religious instruction was abolished in the national schools. The results of this new situation are still quite incalculable.

An event within the body of the Evangelical Church may be regarded as preparing the ground for the future position of that Church. Just as within the State the people had acquired an influence on the political organisation, so the demand was made that in the Church a share in the government should be given to the laity. A "Presbyterian and Synodal constitution" had been obtained in Hanover as far back as 1866, and ten years later (January 20, 1876) a similar constitution was created for the United Church of Prussia. All the Evangelical Churches of Germany followed this example. Nevertheless the elections for these ecclesiastical representatives resulted differently as a rule from what the majority of those who had advocated them expected; the elected members felt the ecclesiastical functions expected from them to be not so much a privilege which had been won, as a responsible duty. These synods furnished, therefore, much stimulus in a positive sense. And since the individual classes within the Church shared in the care and work for the welfare of the whole body, the Church gained an independence which may be of the first importance in the event of the loosening of the ties between her and the State.

The Evangelical Church did not relinquish the hope of maintaining the religion of the people and of winning back those who were estranged from it. This work was carried out in various ways. Many wished that the Church should share in the solution of the burning social question (cf. on the point the next chief section), and by a manifestation of warm interest for the lot of the working classes should guard them from a complete abandonment of religion. Christian Adolf Stöcker, court-preacher in Berlin, founded on January 3, 1878, the "Christian Social Workingmen's Party," in the hope of being able once more to elevate Christianity into a power which might dominate public life. The "Evangelical Social Congress" (1890) and the "Ecclesiastical Social Conference" (1897) owe their origin to his initiative. Albrecht Ritschl, professor at Göttingen (1822–1899), elaborated a doctrine originally intended for educated persons. It wishes to uphold the central point of Christianity, the personality of Jesus, but also throws overboard everything
which threatens to alienate so many educated persons of the present day from Christianity. The purifying of Christianity, which Luther, as he says, only partially carried out, is by this intended to be completed. It is probable that it may keep many of those who see a contradiction between the old Christian faith and modern civilisation from entirely breaking with Christianity. At any rate, theology has to thank it for a powerful stimulus toward a thorough investigation of the questions, what components of traditional Christianity belong to its inalienable substance, what are to be set aside as foreign accretions brought by the current of ages and, above all, what are to be regarded as consequences of the era of orthodox Catholicism.

D. The Missionary Activity of the Nineteenth Century

In special contradistinction to the views of the left wing of the school of Ritschl, the majority of those in whom a deeper and more powerful religious craving was aroused joined that other party which expected true profit only from an uncurtailed Christianity. Among those who share this conviction are many who content themselves with a mere adherence to the old order, but also not a few who aim at purifying the existing conception of Christianity from the views which have been proved incorrect by the well-ascertained results of modern investigations. The wish, common to all, of proving their faith by works of love and of winning new friends to Christianity has stirred them to great achievements in the field of home and foreign missions.

(a) Home Missions. — Even during the reign of rationalism those who continued in the old faith felt the necessity of combining into unions, in order to influence the people by practical Christian activity. The “German Christian Society” was founded at Basle in 1780 by the exertions of Johann Ursperger, a Lutheran preacher of Augsburg. This was soon joined by many branch societies in Germany and Switzerland. It was intended to promote every imaginable Christian object: the distribution of Bibles and minor religious books (tracts), the care of the poor and sick, establishment of public libraries, missions among Catholics, Jews, Turks, and heathen. A connection was also established by Ursperger with the religious circles in England. There also members of the most various Evangelical communities formed unions. Thus in 1795 the London Missionary Society was formed, in 1799 the Tract Society, in 1804 the British and Foreign Bible Society. Thence the movement went back to Germany. In Berlin a missionary school was founded in 1800, in Nuremberg a Bible society (1805), in Basle a missionary society (1815), at Beuggen in Baden an institute for the education of neglected children and for the training of charity-school teachers (1820). A long list of similar unions and institutions followed.

But the Evangelical Church still was deficient in that which the Catholic Church found in her monks and nuns, namely, men and women qualified for active work in the field of Christian charity. Then Johann Hinrich Wichern (1808–1881) founded, on November 1, 1833, the “Rauhes Haus” near Hamburg, a house of refuge, which at the same time became a training school for helpers in the field of the so-called “Home Missions;” and on October 13, 1836, Thedor Fliedner (1800–1864) started the first house for deaconesses at Kaiserswerth on the Rhine.
These efforts were much stimulated by the events of 1848; for the storm of revolution disclosed an unsuspected religious ignorance in wide sections of the educated as well as of the uneducated classes, and an alarming moral neglect. Wichern sought indefatigably to spread the knowledge that a unanimous and vigorous procedure was necessary if Christianity was not to be lost to the people. His efforts were not in vain. Young men’s unions were established to protect the youth from moral dangers, especially in the large towns; Sunday schools were started for the religious instruction of the children; public libraries were opened to provide the people with healthy reading-matter; and besides this, societies for the aid of discharged prisoners, asylums for infants, homes, institutions for fallen women or epileptics, idiots, and cripples were founded. New institutions were continually springing up for the education of the helpers necessary for all these works, as well as a number of charity clubs, sick clubs etc. Attempts were even made to meet the growing evil of vagrancy by the establishment of labour colonies. The first, which owes its inception to Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, pastor of Wilhelmsdorf, near Bielefeld, was soon rivalled by similar institutions in nearly every province. Even those who did not love the Christian spirit which produced these efforts in the nineteenth century showed appreciation of these humanitarian objects and instituted similar movements.

The great growth, in the last decades, of intelligent zeal for this system of charitable activity may be illustrated by some statistics as to the Evangelical institutions of deaconesses, which are worked in the spirit of the Church. By the side of them numerous more independent institutions, which cannot be included in a statistical computation but are devoted to the same work, have displayed a most profitable activity. The numbers are as follows:

<table>
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<th>Institution (&quot;Mutterhuisen&quot;).</th>
<th>Workers (&quot;Sisters&quot;).</th>
<th>Yearly revenue.</th>
<th>Spheres of work.</th>
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(b) Foreign Missions. — In the same way the zeal for the propagation of Christianity in the heathen world has been greater in Protestant countries in the nineteenth century than in any other century. The movement started in England. The "Universal London Missionary Society," founded in 1795, which sent the very next year twenty-nine messengers of the gospel to the South Sea Islands, was followed during the whole century by a series of similar societies in Scotland, the Netherlands, America, France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In German-speaking countries the most important were the institutions in Baal (1815), Berlin (1823), Barmen (1828), Bremen (1836, first in Hamburg), — all of these working in a unionist spirit, while that in Leipzig (from 1836–1848 in Dresden) and that in Hermannsburg (1849) stood on the basis of the Lutheran creed. Even the more independent party took a share in the work by means of the Universal Evangelical-Protestant Missionary Society, founded at Weimar on June 4 and 5, 1884. The successes attained may be shown by the following figures: In the last twenty-five years the number of Evangelical missionaries has increased from some 2,200 to some 6,000; the number of Evangelical Christians won from the
heathen form roughly 1,500,000 to nearly 4,000,000; now some 100,000 heathen are annually converted to Evangelical Christianity. Coincidently a complete revulsion of opinion has taken place as regards these efforts. The work was at first undertaken by independent societies. The official Church either stood completely aloof or was an opponent: those who were still further from a positive Christianity poured, as a rule, merely ridicule on it. Now, on the contrary, the ecclesiastical authorities tried to promote these efforts and to make it, if possible, the work of their whole body. And, as the English did long ago, the German colonial policy has learnt to value highly the effects on civilisation, intellect, and morality which the energy of the missionaries exercises in heathen countries far outside the circles of the baptised converts.

At the threshold of the twentieth century the most important spheres of this missionary activity and labour present themselves to the enquirer something as follows, (see the annexed “Map of the Religions and Missions of the World”):

(a) America. — In America the Esquimaux in Greenland, through the unwearied patience of the missionaries of the United Brethren (Moravians), have been made a substantially Christian people, and the inhabitants of the coast of Labrador are no longer far from this same desirable condition. Of the Indians in British North America some two-thirds have become Christians, partly Catholic, partly Evangelical. In the United States the work among the aborigines was infinitely more difficult, owing to the unscrupulous seizure of the land by the white settlers. Still out of the 250,000 still surviving redskins, more than one-third have been brought to Christianity, and have therefore abandoned their nomad life. The 8,000,000 or so of negroes imported into North America have almost entirely adopted Christianity, and form, as a rule, independent church communities under coloured clergymen. The possessions which Spain held up to 1899 in the West Indies as well as the republics of Haiti are nominally Catholic. The other parts of that group of islands have become decidedly Evangelical. The Evangelical missionary enterprise could only attain great successes in Dutch and British Guiana, and in the extreme South, amongst the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, who, according to the first opinion of Charles Darwin, were completely incapable of education. So promising a start was made owing to British perseverance that the same scientist afterward declared the success to be absolutely marvellous. The result hitherto achieved by Evangelical missionary labour in America is as follows: In Greenland, Labrador, and Alasks some 18,500 Christians have been won; in Canada and the United States (excluding the negro population), 115,500; in the West Indies, 800,000; in Central and South America, 215,500; altogether, therefore, nearly 1,149,500. The Catholics reckon among the 102,000,000 inhabitants of America 5,000,000 as belonging to their Church, without giving any information as to the number reclaimed from heathendom.

(5) Africa. — On the west coast of Africa, between Senegal and Congo, there are different missionary societies labouring in more than a hundred chief stations. Notwithstanding the obstacles presented by the deadly climate, the low level of civilisation, and the immorality of the inhabitants, which has increased through the trade in spirits, they have been already able to procure some 140,000 heathen Christians. The colony of Sierra Leone, composed of liberated negroes enjoys special
prosperity, as also the colony of Liberia, which serves the same purpose. From Cape Colony an advance was made into the south of this dark continent. Among fully three million coloured inhabitants there are about half a million Christians. Helpers have been trained up out of them everywhere who are employed in schools and churches. Translations of the Bible and similar works have been produced in every African language. On the island of Madagascar the twenty-five years of persecution under Queen Ranavalona I, who reigned up to 1861, was not able to entirely extirpate the Christianity which had been preached there since 1818; and when in 1869 Ranavalona II let herself be baptised, hundreds of thousands of her subjects followed her example. After the forcible annexation of the island by the French (1895) the Jesuits opposed the London missionaries, whom they denounced as agents for the advancement of British interests.

The two famous explorers of Central Africa, the Scotch doctor and missionary, David Livingstone, and the correspondent of the "New York Herald," Henry Morton Stanley (see their portraits on the plate, "The most Successful Explorers of Africa," in the second half of the third volume), in their bold journeys of discovery had the introduction of Christianity into those parts always before their eyes. Stanley in a spirited letter (1875) called upon the Christians of England to send messengers of the gospel into the immense and promising kingdom of Uganda, where he himself had been able to make King Mtesa consent to accept Christianity and build a church in his capital. By the next year the means and men for this great undertaking were ready. It is true that subsequently this mission had more than once nearly disappeared, partly owing to the capriciousness of Mtesa, partly through Mahommedan jealousy, the intrusion of French Jesuits, and revolutionary disturbances. Yet there are now thirty-six Englishmen and ten English women working as missionaries, and the number of the baptised exceeds 10,000. On the Nyassa, again, great activity is shown, especially by Scotchmen, who, attaching peculiar importance to school education, assemble round them many thousands of eager heathen pupils. If we look more closely at the German colonies in Africa, the North German, Bremen, mission has laboured since 1847 on the slave coast among the Evhe negroes, who number some two millions. A part of this field of labour is comprised in the German colonial possession of Togo. The treacherous climate claimed no fewer than sixty-four of their workers as victims. In consequence the results were but small. After twenty-five years there were hardly one hundred Christians won; now there are some nineteen hundred of them. Missionary sisters of mercy exercise over the young females of the population an influence most important for the future, and indisputably the mission has produced an elevation of national life from the point of view of civilisation. In Little Popo, Methodists are also labouring and have made several hundred Christians.

In Cameroon, English Baptists were working as early as 1845. After the annexation of this district by Germany in 1884 they resigned their work to the Basle society. But the Baptist congregations could not amalgamate with it, and now form with their two thousand native Christians mostly free congregations. The Basle Mission succeeded, however, with great sacrifice of life, in founding not only in the Cameroon-basin amongst the Duallas, but also toward the north, south, and west, nine principal stations and ninety outpost stations, while it collected fifteen hundred members of congregation and won native help-
FOUR VIEWS OF THE INDIAN TAMIL MISSIONS
(From the Originals in the Evangelic-Lutheran Mission at Leipzig)
FOUR VIEWS OF THE TAMIL MISSION IN INDIA

Upper view left: The "Heilskirche" in Madura, built in 1883. Madura, the capital of a district in the Madras Presidency, where the Tamils, the noblest branch of the Dravid race, are settled, can reckon some 7,000 Christians among its 8,700 inhabitants. (Since the Catholics do not publish any trustworthy details of their separate stations, reference can only be made to the Government census.)

Upper view right: The Mission House in Madura, built 1887. From this centre the mission work is conducted throughout the district, where in 49 places (with 14 chapels and 17 schools) 1,092 Christians are collected, including two native pastors, 27 school-masters and school-mistresses, and 430 scholars. A European lady mission-teacher educates 49 girls in a boarding-school and gives Christian instruction in the Zenana (women’s quarters) of the heathen houses.

Lower view left: The Jerusalem-Church in Tranquebar, built in 1712 by Ziegenbalg, the oldest Protestant Mission-church in India. Tranquebar in the Tanjore (Tandchaun) District of Madras Presidency, since 1616 the capital of the Danish colonies in India, was sold in 1845 for £20,000 to the British East India Company. King Frederick IV of Denmark had founded there in 1705 the first Protestant Mission in India, the missionaries of which were called by Augustus Hermann Francke, founder of the Orphanage at Halle. Bartholomew Ziegenbalg, Walther, Gercke, and at first also the most famous missionary of the XVIIIth century Chr. Frederick Schwartz (1728-98) laboured here. In 1891 there were more than 2,000 Christians out of 14,000 inhabitants. The mission-station since the year 1847 has been in possession of the Evangelical-Lutheran Mission at Leipzig, the Indian Mission of which has its headquarters here, viz.: Church council, Seminary for Teachers and Preachers, Printing-press, Industrial schools.

Lower view right: The Central-school in Shinjuli (schiali) built in 1894, a "High School" of ten classes, in which 224 boys and youths are taught by 16 masters. The branches of instruction correspond to those of a German "Real gymnasmum." The final examination qualifies for academical studies. Promising scholars from the middle schools, containing seven classes, which are supported in other towns by the mission, are lodged in a boarding-house in connection with the school, in order to pass the three High-school classes; hence the name Central-school.
ers. They have also translated the Bible into Dualla. In German Southwest Africa, which extends from the Cunene to the Orange, Rhenish missionaries have laboured since the "forties," first indeed in the Nama (Hottentot) country, then in Hereroland, and lately also in Ovamboland, after 1870, in common with members of the Finnish missionary society. The fickleness of the Hottentots, the poverty of the country, and the continually fresh war troubles have always been the severest trial on the patience of the missionaries. But now mission stations have been erected at all important points, and although the total number of baptised Christians is only some ten thousand, yet the entire population is now subject to a Christian educating influence which promises happy results, if only at last permanent peace prevails.

The German acquisition of territory in East Africa caused a large number of German societies after 1886 to send missionaries to that part. The Leipzig mission possesses six stations among the Wakamba and the Wadschagga on Kilmanjaro. To the southeast of that, in the country of Usambara, the Berlin Evangelical Missionary Society for East Africa has four flourishing stations, and still more to the south, in the country of Usaramo, in the hinterland of Dar es Salaam, three more stations. In the southwesterly corner of the German district, in Kondeland at the north end of the Nyassa, another Berlin missionary society and the United Brethren have occupied a quite new missionary field since 1891 and have founded ten stations. At the wish of the London Missionary Society the United Brethren have taken over its isolated station Urambo in the Unyamwesi district, and have occupied it with two of their missionaries.

(γ) Asia. — Asia has been a mission field for many centuries (cf. Vol. IV, p. 210 et seq.). But here the victory of Christianity demands long and fierce struggles. For here the question concerns great empires, which feel themselves to be compact unities, and pride themselves on the possession of a civilised historical past and of old uniform religious systems with sacred records, and therefore oppose the intrusion of a new faith with far greater resistance than loosely connected petty tribes without any culture.

In India these difficulties are increased by the iron wall of caste, which stands in the way of all progress. Mission work was commenced there with new force after 1813 by English, Americans, and Germans. But after thirty-eight years of activity there were in Hither India not more than two hundred and sixty congregations with 91,000 Evangelical Christians. When in 1857 the terrible mutiny of the army had been suppressed and in 1858 the sovereignty was transferred from the East India Company to Queen Victoria, mission work first made an encouraging advance (see the adjoining plate "Four Pictures from the Tamil Mission in India"). In 1890 there were reckoned to be 857 missionaries and 797 native pastors, 711 female missionaries and 3,278 native women helpers, 4,863 Evangelical congregations with 559,661 converts, 5,311 schools with 279,716 scholars. The whole Bible has been translated into thirteen languages of India, the New Testament into thirteen others.

In the Dutch possessions, from the second decade of the nineteenth century onward, emissaries of all the eleven missionary societies of Holland were working, besides one English and two German societies. In the north of Sumatra the once so notorious country Silindung has become completely Christian, and reckons some
1,600 converts. Toba, which lies farther to the north, and twenty years ago was quite inaccessible, shows flourishing Christian communities with thousands of members, so that the total number of the Bata Christians reaches some 4,000. The task was harder in Java and Borneo, while on Celebes some 148,000 heathen entered the Christian Church. On the whole, in the Dutch Indies there are about 315,000 Christians.

Although the Christian faith has been so often annihilated in China, yet the Catholic missionaries were able after the commencement of the nineteenth century to realise still greater successes as the result of their support by the French policy, but for the very same reason they certainly made Christianity hated by the great mass of the people. The importation of opium, unjustly forced by England, contributed largely to this result. For this reason the opening of twenty-four Chinese ports, which was gradually obtained by the treaties of Nanking, 1842, and Tientsin, 1858, and by the capture of Pekin, 1860, and religious liberty for the Christians were only tolerated with intense ill-will. Missionary enterprise had to suffer interminably from this hatred of foreigners, as the massacres at Tientsin, 1870, in the valley of the Yangtsékiang at the end of the "eighties," and at Kutschung in 1895 testify. Most Protestant missionaries are agreed that a complete defencelessness of their cause would serve them better than a protection by European cannon. It has not been encouraging to them that the acquisition of the Gulf of Kiautschou by the German Empire has been inaugurated with the murder of two German Catholic missionaries in the south of the province Schantung (1897). The various Catholic statistics compute the total number of the members of their communities in China, inclusive of all European Catholics, as between half a million and a million. English, American, and German missionary societies first obtained a footing on the south and southeast coast. In 1898 they supported 683 missionaries and 641 female missionaries, to which must be added 252 Chinese pastors and some 3,000 native helpers. In this one year 10,268 heathen were baptised. The number of Evangelical Christians collected into some 700 compact communities amounts, at the close of the nineteenth century, to 180,000 at least. The terrible revolt of the Boxers in 1900 directed its fury not less against the native Christians than the "foreign devils."

Since the Americans in 1882 forced the opening of Corea, an organised missionary activity is visible there. About fifty congregations with 2,000 Christians, all told, have been formed, and all accounts agree that this young field of work is one of the most promising.

Japan, the "Great Britain of the East," after nearly three hundred years of exclusiveness has since 1853 opened itself up more and more to intercourse with the world. By 1896, thirty-one missionary societies with 238 missionaries and 234 unmarried female missionaries were labouring on this island world. Owing to the great popular impulse for education, Nesima, a native of Japan who had adopted Christianity, was able to found a Christian academy and to gradually enlarge it into a university. In ten years it contained 230 students; after fifteen years, 900. While up to 1889 great progress in the Japanese mission was made, after that date a retrogression is noticeable. In 1888 the number of baptisms annually of adult heathen was as great as 7,700, but in 1892 only 3,700; and since then it has hardly increased. That striking eagerness for baptism had in many cases only political or educational motives, and the precipitate adoption of Euro-
pean life was not free from dangerous consequences. For this reason the friends of the old state of things might find much support in their request for a return to the old religions. But when in 1899, by the abolition of the consular jurisdiction, all foreigners were made subject to the Japanese laws, the government destroyed the last hopes of the Buddhists that preference would be given to their creed. It was officially announced that according to the constitution it was the duty of every official to grant to all religions the same protection; and instructions were given to the Buddhist high priests that they were to set their faces against any attempt to resist Christianity by force. The Catholics reckon in Japan about 20,000 adherents to their Church, and through the Evangelical mission some 50,000 heathen have been gained for Christianity.

(5) Oceania and Australia. — In the islands of the Pacific Ocean the Evangelical missions have produced so great a transformation that the results have been admitted even by the opponents of Christianity. More than 300,000 natives have become Evangelical, and some 50,000 Catholic, Christians. Not a few islands and groups of islands, such as the Harvey Islands, and the islands of Samoa, Fiji, and Tonga, have forsaken heathenism. The old cannibalism, human sacrifice, infanticide, and perpetual fighting are entirely done away with. There have been complete or partial translations of the Bible into forty languages. More than 100,000 boys and girls attend the numerous schools, and several thousand natives are working as preachers or instructors.

The aborigines, indeed, of Australia, the Papuans, are so low down in the scale of civilisation, and were in former days so brutally ill treated and murdered by the whites, that the result of the missions among them is still very trifling. Perhaps a thousand of them have been baptised. In New Zealand, on the contrary, there are already some thirty thousand Maori Christians to be found.

The islands with which Germany, that has at last appeared as a colonial power, has to be contented are as a whole the most backward. In New Guinea, which stands under the protectorate of Holland, Germany, and England, and is in the interior still unexplored, two German missionary societies, the Neuendettelsau (since 1886) and the Rhenish (since 1887), are labouring in Kaiser Wilhelm's Land. The malignant climate and the stunted intellects of the savage and mutually hostile tribes make this work extraordinarily difficult, so that it is hailed as a hopeful sign when the population begins to trust the missionaries. In the Bismarck Archipelago, which has been a German protectorate since 1884, Methodists from Australia have preached Christianity among the savage heathen in New Pomerania, New Lauenburg, and New Mecklenburg since 1875. At the end of the century they had won more than six thousand Christians, whose knowledge and morality naturally, however, leaves much still to be desired. In the Solomon Islands, the Melanesian mission, with headquarters at Norfolk, is conducted mainly by native teachers educated there, who from time to time are visited by English missionaries. But on the northern islands of this group, which belong to the German Empire, and are covered in the interior with impenetrable tropical forests, the heathen population, numbering one hundred thousand or more, still vigorously opposes the introduction of Christianity.

Micronesia, to which belongs the archipelago of the Marshall Islands, now under German rule, with about fifteen thousand inhabitants, has been occupied
since 1852 by the Hawaiian Evangelical Association, which works there also mainly
with native teachers, some ninety in number. Although these means are not as a
rule adequate for the difficult task, still about a quarter of the population is no
longer to be termed heathenish. The Evangelical mission in the second archipel-
ago of Micronesia, the Caroline Islands, suffered the most serious blow when by
the award of the Pope at the instance of Bismarck this territory fell to Spain. The
Evangelical missionaries were at once expelled, the aged Doane dragged as pris-
oner to Manila, and the Catholic system of compulsory conversion was supported.
The Evangelical missionaries have not yet been permitted to return to the main
island, Ponapi, which contains eighteen hundred Christians. The Samoan Islands,
divided by the convention of 1899 between Germany and the United States,
were first opened up (1830) by John Williams, the "Apostle of the South Sea,"
who, after 1819, having the Society Isles as a centre, carried Christianity from
island to island by extended journeys until, in 1839, he met a martyr's death on
Erromango in the New Hebrides. Missionary work properly speaking is now
ended on the Samoan islands. There are estimated to be thirty-two thousand
Evangelical Christians. Catholic missionaries, who forced their way in, have won
some four thousand followers. Of course, the Catholic Church has vigorously
worked everywhere at missions to the heathen under the tireless guidance of the
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.

(c) New Paths. — While thus the close of the nineteenth century shows us on
the one side a defection from Christianity, or indeed from religion generally, we
see on the other side an active zeal for Christianity. Mere conventional conform-
ity to the Church disappears. A clearer line of distinction and with it keener con-
trovery are observable. Thus it is to be explained that many who are warmly
interested for religion have thought that new paths must be struck out in order
to gain new religious victories. This revivalist movement has been especially de-
veloped in England, where the Christianity restored by Luther was not able to
strike root, but Methodism has had a stimulating influence, and where the popular
character inclines toward sporting enterprises. An English mill owner, Pearsall
Smith, thus, after 1874, held large meetings not only in his own home but also in
other countries, by which the masses were to be aroused. He employed the services
of an interpreter in his addresses on the Continent. He preached the doctrine in-
troduced by the Methodists, that man even while on earth may become sinless.
William Booth, perceiving that many persons were too indifferent toward all re-
ligious truth to be aroused by anything except emotional impressions, founded in
1878 his "Salvation Army." Uniforms, flags, noisy music, deafening war cries,
were to prepare people for the influence of God's word and to strengthen it. This
society, in 1880, undertook "campaigns" in other countries on both sides of the
Atlantic. Its self-denial and its tumultuous zeal have been able to rouse the
lethargy of many, especially among the deeply submerged, and to lead them to a
respectable life, even though some have felt themselves excited to laughter by these
methods, and thus the dignity of Christianity has been impaired.

The movement on which so strong a light has been cast by such phenomena has
gained much ground, although in less striking forms, among the Evangelicals of
Germany. The attempt has been made by the institution of lay preachers, prayer
meetings, and new associations to awaken and increase religious life in
such a way that it is at least open to question whether a real religious spirit or only emotional excitement is produced. Yet such efforts are a proof that in the age which is designated materialistic, the spirit which seeks something beyond that which is perceived by the senses has not been quenched. If at the same time a more pronounced hostility to Christianity shows itself, the Christian Church will see in it a step forward, so far as it is not a result of pure miscomprehension of Christianity, since Christ asserted the claim (cf. Vol. IV, p. 181), "I am come to arouse men." In any case, the history, hitherto, of Christianity, which has been threatened with destruction not only by continually renewed opponents, but often enough by the ignorance of its representatives, has justified the bold words with which the apostle Paul of Tarsus (in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, ch. vi. v. 9) characterised the Christians:

"As dying, and, behold, we live;
As chastened, and not killed."
IV

THE SOCIAL QUESTION

BY PROFESSOR DR. GEORG ADLER

1. INTRODUCTION

A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISTIC PRODUCTION

MODERN society is characterised, technically, by the predominance of great industries and the unsuspected advantage derived from the forces of nature; economically, by freedom of trade and right of settlement; politically, by liberty of speech and of combination, and by popular representation. On this basis, for the first time, the great mass of the productive but dependent population was enabled to take a part in the important movements which make the world's history. These classes previously, leaving out of account isolated risings, had either formed only the passive foundation for all contests for political or social power, or had only been able to struggle for modest improvements in their material welfare.

It is clear that the immediate preliminary condition for an independent advance of the bulk of the people into the field of public and social life is only satisfied when they are allowed to form suitable and permanent organisations with the object of attaining their ends. The working classes, therefore, possessed as a whole, to within the last century, no effective influence, because this condition was not fulfilled. So far as organisations generally were permitted in past ages, as was the case with the members of the guilds in the towns, their sphere of influence was restricted to social and religious requirements, relief funds, information as to work, and the improvement of some conditions of labour contracts; and guilds and authorities assured by close superintendence and merciless severity that these narrow limits were never overstepped by the journeymen's unions.

Notwithstanding, therefore, that before this time occasionally (we may remind our readers of Rome under the empire) a collection of masses of workingmen had been formed in large towns and centres of production; notwithstanding that, even earlier, wide sections of the people had been oppressed and laid under contribution, while at the same time luxury and splendour were publicly paraded, powerful and lasting agitations by the working classes were at that time impossible. There could be nothing more than isolated violent outbreaks, which were fated inevitably to fail, owing to the political immaturity of the rioters and the firmness of the ruling powers; for example, the Greek and Roman slave risings, or the rebellions of the peasants in Western Europe during the fourteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The ruling classes knew how to prevent any immediate repetition of
these attempts by the oppressed to shatter their chains, since after every victory they applied the principle "we Victis," and exacted, with all the cruelty of the times, terrible penalties as a deterrent warning. The people thus felt their helplessness. Oversaw and indifferent to all politics, the peasant went back to his plough and the artisan to the workshop.

If State and society thus seemed in early times safely entrenched behind rampart and moat against the demands of the lower class, the modern State and its liberty offered to the people the possibility of seeing the fall of the hitherto impregnable fortress. This hope and prospect could not fail to contribute toward rousing the people from their indifference, so that sooner or later in all civilised nations the agitation of the lower classes was as general as the former lethargy.

Nothing, however, has been of such wide-reaching importance for the distinctive features of this movement, for its demands and its aims, as the modern industrial development, of which the marked characteristic is the method of capitalistic production. This takes place when a considerable number of workmen are employed by the same individual capital at the same time in the production of the same goods.

Historically, capitalistic production dates its commencement from the "domestic system" which began to develop itself at the beginning of the new era by the side of the handicraft of the guilds. The small exclusive economic spheres of the city states were then transformed into large uniformly administered territories, and owing to the new colonial districts international trade received a great stimulus. Requirements thus arose which could not be met within the old guild organisation. Thus a new form of organisation of industrial work was formed in the "domestic system." Its distinctive feature is that a contractor called a "factor" (Verleger) provides a number of workmen with commissions, which they then execute in their own houses. According to this system, technically the handicraft production still predominates.

But the "domestic system" if not in the manner of production, at least in the manner of sale, denotes an advance beyond handicraft. The master handicraftsman sells his goods directly to the person who requires them; but in the "domestic system" there is always one intermediate dealer between the producer and the consumer, that is, the "factor." And while the individual handicraftsman only sells a small quantity of goods, usually in an adjacent market, the factor places large masses of goods on one or more adjacent or distant markets. With regard to selling, therefore, the domestic system represents a wholesale trade which appears excellently adapted for the supply of distant markets. And for the very reason that it combined the traditional methods of production on a small scale, with a more complete method of sale in large quantities, it must have been recognised from the first as the form of industrial enterprise which, while causing the least alteration in long standing conditions, could satisfy the necessity felt in the new era for a wholesale exchange of commodities between different places or nations. Persons who had some capital, and were far-sighted enough to recognise the tendency of the new want and the extent of the remunerative demand, took the lead, engaged handicraftsmen, day labourers in the towns not belonging to any guild, or hitherto unemployed members of the country population, and started the new organisation.

The "domestic system" was common in England even before the close of
the fifteenth century as the method employed in the cloth industry, supplying
the great markets and the export trade (cf. above). Afterward it continually
spread to other trades, until it became, right up to the eighteenth century, the
ordinary form of the most important industries intended to put wholesale quan-
tities of goods on the markets. In no other country did it attain such importance,
but still it prevailed to a certain degree during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries in France and in the German-speaking countries. Since such large
spheres were formed where the domestic system prevailed, the new industrial
method was justly felt to be a considerable improvement, and its chief promoters,
the "factors," were greeted as national benefactors. Thus, for instance, J. J. Becher,
the most influential German writer on political economy of this age, says: "There
are instances where, owing to them, splendid towns have arisen, and thousands of
men have earned an honest living; they make the country populous and produc-
tive, and are profitable members of the commonwealth, whose object is to increase
and to support the 'societas civilis.'" Frederick the Great termed his Silesian
weaving districts the Prussian Peru.

It has been already noticed that the method of working under the domestic
system remained the same as existed before in the handicrafts, but the change in
the method of the disposal of the products is connected with widely reaching social
consequences. The master workman under the domestic system often, it is true,
works with assistants, frequently is also owner of the tools, and even of a part of
the raw material, quite like the master handicraftsman. But he no longer disposes
of the goods to different consumers: he delivers them, in return for payment of a
previously settled wage, either to the capitalistic "factor," or to some intermediate
persons, "middlemen," who distribute the raw materials, superintend the work,
collect the products, and pay out the wages. Thus he is still master in his house,
but he usually sells the products of his labour in accordance with the commissions
received, and thus stands toward the "factor" in the same relation as the work-
man to the employer. The result follows from this that the master workman in
the domestic system can no longer hold the independent position toward the capi-
talistic "factor" that the master handicraftsman has toward his customers. They
must, therefore, in the course of time sink more and more into the position of or-
dinary workmen, while the "factors" sweep in the substantial profits which are
possible in all industries intended for a large and regular market. "On the one
side, persons who know the world; who, through their knowledge of markets and
their solvency, relieve the small producers of the anxiety of selling; who, by their
journeys, their giving credit, and their connections, transact sales, and can bear
occasional losses better than the producers; who grasp technical improvements
more quickly, since they stand higher in education and are of a quicker intelli-
gence: on the other side, small master workmen, peasants, inhabitants of small
towns and of the mountains, women and children who are glad to get work, who,
in addition to their industrial work are busied with agriculture and cattle breeding;
who are wood-cutters or day labourers, with limited ideas, possessing no great
technical qualifications, no large capital, no division of labour, but slow to adopt
anything new, and clinging tenaciously to their old customs. The master workman
in the domestic system thus is nearly always placed at a disadvantage as compared
with a 'factor,' who knows his business and, being a capitalist, can wait his time."
— Gustav Schmoller.
The result of this is a dark side to the social question which formerly, indeed, when merely the extent of the sales and the interests of the capitalistic producer were considered, could not have been sufficiently realised. Firstly, the lower wages of these producers under the domestic system; secondly, the "sweating" of these isolated and therefore unprotected workers by the "factors" through reduction of wages in particular, through usurious payment for goods and deceitful calculations of the raw materials furnished; lastly,—in the case of more unfavourable conditions, namely, loss of the old markets and similar difficulties,—the greatest distress existing among these very "home workers," because, wishing to turn to some account not merely their powers of work, but their tools, which usually represent their only possessions, they are compelled to accept work at any wage, even though it only affords the barest livelihood. In this way matters have gone so far that finally certain districts where the domestic system prevails have become the first scenes of modern pauperism on a large scale.

The requirements of the wholesale market were attempted to be met by yet another form of work besides the domestic system, namely, the manufactory, which, indeed, has developed more slowly than the former. It consists in the employment by one contractor of a large number of workmen for purposes of production in one building. According to this definition, it does not depend, as the domestic system, on wholesale selling, but on wholesale production. The consequences are far-reaching; according to Marx they are chiefly these: In the first place, where many workmen are busied in the manufacture of one product, an extensive division of the work within the workshop itself can often be effected. The article is no longer the production of one independent craftsman who does various things, but the production of a number of craftsmen working together, each one of whom is continuously discharging one and the same part of the work. The watch which under the guild system was the individual work of a Nuremberg craftsman, becomes in the age of manufactories the production of a number of different workmen. There are now employed on it makers of the rough material, the watch-spring, dial, mainspring, hands, case, screws, etc., a gilder, and a "repasseur" who puts the whole watch together and turns it out in a going condition. The execution is still a "handwork," and therefore dependent on the strength, dexterity, expedition, and accuracy of the individual workman in the handling of his tool. But since the same workman is always closely employed on the same separate part, the manufactory creates great skill in the particular workman. If already from this reason more goods are turned out by manufacture with a less expenditure of labour than in independent handwork, the specialisation of tools now customary must tend in the same direction; for since the working tools are now suited to the exclusively peculiar employments of the individual workman, they thus attain a greater perfection than before, and must at the same time increase the productive power of the work.

Since, again, the result of one man's work is the starting point for the work of another, the uninterrupted progress of the collective work presupposes that in a given working time a given result will be obtained, and that everything is systematically organised. By this interdependence every single man is bound to devote only the necessary time to his operation, by which means continuity, uniformity, regularity, order, and intensity in the work are created on a scale quite different from that in independent handwork.
Again, the workmen, through the division of the collective work into simple and complex, lower and higher employments, can be assigned tasks according to their natural or acquired capabilities. Thus a hierarchy of workers is formed, to which a scale of wages corresponds. Production is, however, naturally assisted by the fact that the capitalist "can procure for himself the exact degree of strength and skill corresponding to every operation." Further, all production requires a number of simple occupations, of which every man who walks and stands is capable; these again, at a time when all operations are resolved into their simplest parts, develop themselves into exclusive occupations of special workmen. The manufactory thus creates a class of unskilled workmen whom the handwork system rigidly excluded. In this way the cheap labour of women and children can be employed.

Manufactories were started in considerable numbers in England after the last third of the sixteenth century, and for two hundred years continually gained in importance. Since the old town constitutions (corporate towns) and the guild system hindered manufactories, they were by preference founded in ports with an export trade, or in places in rural districts where they were only under the control of the laws of the country. Government favoured them in pursuance of the mercantile doctrine, where possible, by protective tariffs and bounties on exports, and by prohibiting the production of certain industrial commodities in the colonies, and by many such measures. The same policy toward the manufactories was adopted by the other States of Europe.

Still we must not overestimate the importance of manufactories at that time. Even in the eighteenth century, as Marx expressly shows, they only partially dominated the national production among the leading civilised nations, and still rested, if we may use the expression, as an economic work of art on the broad basis of town handwork and the smaller domestic and rural industries. Even in England, where the manufactory system gained most ground, it never became so far master of the situation as to succeed in abolishing the old apprentice laws with their seven years of apprenticeship.

But the manufactory system, having arrived at a certain stage of technical development, discovered methods by which it was itself surpassed. It had attained its completion in those industries which were intended to produce the tools, and especially the complicated mechanical apparatus already adopted. The stage had already been reached of setting up machines and continually perfecting them; from this moment dates the slowly and surely developing change of the greater part of manufactories into wholesale industries worked with machinery. This is the change which has impressed a distinctive stamp on the industrial production, and thus on the social life of the nineteenth century.

The machine, with which a new era in the economic-technical development of the modern civilised world is commenced, is in the first place purely technically distinguished from the implement of production in earlier times, the tool. It represents a far more complete form of working implement, permits the employment of mechanical motive powers (wind, water, steam, and electricity) to a conspicuous extent, and thus enormously increases the power of production. While Adam Smith relates with admiration that in a manufactory ten men daily turn out 48,000 needles, Karl Marx records without surprise that a machine for needle-making daily turns out 145,000 needles, and that therefore a woman, whose regular
duty it is to attend to four such machines, daily produces by machinery 600,000
needles.

The difference, however, between a machine and a tool, looked at from the
technical standpoint, is only quantitative, while from the social point of view it is
qualitative. From this aspect the position of the workman who uses the imple-
ment is the criterion; and it is seen (as Adolf Held ascertained after searching
enquiry) that the position of the workman occupied with the machine is distin-
guished, both by the nature of the employment as well as by its place in wholesale
business generally, from the position of the workman using tools. A hammer, a
file, and such like are simple tools. They increase the strength of the human arm
or foot, in fact, of any human organ which moves itself during the work in the same
direction as that in which the tool is moved. The workman can, therefore, regard
the tool as a supplementary organ of himself, and himself as the master of the tool.
In this sense, therefore, a spinning-wheel and a handloom are tools; for the work-
man remains master of these working implements, which, besides, only serve to
strengthen the movement of the human organs. But so soon as an implement
effects more than such an addition of strength, it becomes a machine. Such is forth-
coming “as soon as the man’s powers move in a direction which is entirely divergent
from the movement exclusively produced by the mechanism.” — Adolf Held. A
locomotive, therefore, is a machine, for the handles are moved by the stoker and
engine-driver in a different direction entirely from the locomotive which draws the
load over the lines.

Marx is able, therefore, to sum up the difference between tool and machine, and,
in connection with this, between manufactory and factory (or mill), as follows:
In a manufactory and handwork the workman avails himself of the tool; in the
factory he attends to the machine. In the former the movement of the working
implement is due to him; in the latter he has to follow its movement: in a word,
out of the lifelong habit of guiding a special tool comes the lifelong habit of “tend-
ing” a special machine. “During the manufacture period the exercise of hand
labour, though distributed, remains the basis. The workmen thus form the mem-
bers of a living mechanism. In the ‘factory’ there exists a dead mechanism inde-
pendent of them, and they are incorporated into it as living appendages.” — Karl
Marx. In this sense a factory is defined by Andrew Ure (the first philosopher of
the factory system) as a great automaton, composed of various partly mechanical,
partly self-conscious organs, which work harmoniously and uninterruptedly in
order to produce one and the same object.

The peculiar form of combined production in this form of industry leads to the
result that the factory fully develops many tendencies which are only suggested in
the manufactory. The separation of all the mental parts of the process of produc-
tion from the handwork, the resolution of all processes into their component parts,
that is, into the simplest movements, and the principle of carrying out the separate
operations by distinct workmen suited for the purpose (from the doctor of chem-
istry down to the newly engaged rustic and the child of every age) are all perfected
for the first time under this system. And this again combines to make a barrack-
like discipline, and, corresponding to this, a universal, uniform intensity of work
necessary, if the factory system, with its various workers and all its complex
operations, is to perform its functions properly. Men must now abandon their
irregular habits of work, and imitate the uniform regularity of machinery. Ure
had good reason to speak of the “myriads of vassals” who are collected round the
steam king in the great workshops. But it was this very peculiarity, together with
the enormous increase in production, that contributed to the success of machinery
and factories; for, while the work was done with a hitherto unsuspected uniformity,
continuity, regularity, and speed, all the expectations of an industrial production of
goods for the supply of international markets were fulfilled.

The important inventions of machines, which ushered in the new age of facto-
ries, had been made in the second half of the eighteenth century in the young
cotton industry. This industrial revolution had been preceded by the “ribbon
mill,” which served for the weaving of ribbons and trimmings. This had been
worked at Dantsic as early as the sixteenth century, but had been suppressed by the
council on account of the damage done to competing handicraftsmen. In the sev-
teenth century it was set up at Leyden (“instrumentum textorium, quo solus quis
plus panni et facilius conficiere poterat, quam plures eiguani tempore.” — Bozhorn),
and after various prohibitions by the council, was finally allowed by the States-
General. In the German Empire its use was nevertheless still forbidden, at first
by municipal and then by imperial edicts, which were in force until the middle of
the eighteenth century; while in England the ribbon mill had long been intro-
duced, although it had given rise to disturbances among injured handworkers
and discharged journeymen.

After the last third of the eighteenth century the inventions of the spinning
and weaving machines, the forerunner of which had been this ribbon mill, followed
in rapid succession. About the year 1765 a spinning-machine (the so-called
“jenny”) was invented, which at first set six and soon afterward twenty-five spin-
dles simultaneously in movement, but could still be used in the house of a master.
On the other hand the “water frame,” which was constructed by Arkwright directly
afterward, and was a machine driven by water or steam, and distinctly more
effective, necessitated a special factory building. The first factory was erected by
 Arkwright himself at Nottingham in 1768. The new method of work immedi-
ately was adopted throughout the United Kingdom. Within twenty years Eng-
land and Scotland saw not less than 142 great spinning mills founded, in which
92,000 workmen set into motion more than 2,000,000 spindles, and produced goods
of more than £7,000,000 in value.

The details of the machinery were now quickly perfected. After 1790, when
Watt invented his steam engine, the factories were no longer dependent, as hitherto, on water power, and thus could be erected in any place, and not merely
on the banks of rivers. From this period dates the concentration of factories in
the towns. In 1803 the “dressing-frame” was invented, by which means a child
was enabled to attend to two looms at once, and could weave about three times as
much as an industrious hand-weaver.

Other industries, the woollen industry, the cotton industry, the iron industry,
the smelting and mining industries, equally shared in the development of the de-
tails of machinery, and completed the transition to the factory industry (cf. Adolf
Held’s and Wilhelm Stieda’s account of the history of English industries).
B. THE IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF CAPITALISTIC PRODUCTION

The introduction of the factory system had the most far-reaching results on industrial and social life. In very important branches of industrial activity, especially in cotton spinning and weaving, the factory showed itself far superior to the former domestic and handwork systems. Handwork was in these departments soon put aside, or at least condemned to insignificance; but the "domestic" industry showed distinctly more vitality, owing to its peculiar organisation. If the employment of machinery in the factory reduced the cost of production for the article, the same final result was produced by the "factor" in the domestic industry through reduction of wages and the "sweating" of the home worker and his family. In this way most extensive abuses became inherent in the domestic industry, which afterward weighed like a curse on this system of work. They became possible because the home workers submitted to the lowering of their conditions of life, for they had no way of escape. Thus Marx, without any great exaggeration, could exclaim: "The history of the world shows no more terrible spectacle than the gradual ruin, which lingered on for decades, but was finally sealed in 1838, of the English hand- weavers, many of whom, with their families, eeked out an existence on $1.50 a day. This was the effect of the factory system on the workers of competing trades!"

It was equally disastrous originally to the workers in the factory. Now first, through the new system of division of labour, the introduction, on a large scale of the regular industrial labour of children and women became possible, and their work was highly profitable to the manufacturers, since it cost them far less than that of men. "In so far as machinery dispenses with the necessity of muscular strength, it becomes a means of employing workers without muscular strength or of immature physical development but greater suppleness of limbs. Women's and children's labour was therefore the first word of the capitalistic employment of machinery." — Marx.

It was therefore most remunerative to exact from these cheap workers, who were the least capable of resisting, quite distinctly longer hours of labour. On this point an official report in England establishes the fact that "before the law was passed for the protection of youthful workers (1833) children and young persons had to work the whole night or the whole day, or both ad libitum."

John Fielden, a liberal philanthropist from the middle class, wrote: "In Derby- shire, Nottinghamshire, and especially in Lancashire, the recently discovered machinery was set up in factories close by streams capable of turning the water wheel. Thousands of hands were suddenly required in these places, far from the towns. The custom immediately crept in of obtaining apprentices from the different parish workhouses of London, Birmingham, and elsewhere. Many thousands of these small helpless creatures, in age from seven to fourteen years, were thus sent to the North. The manufacturer had to clothe his apprentices, feed them and lodge them in an "apprentices' house" near the factory. Overseers were appointed to superintend their work; but since their wages stood in proportion to the amount of results that could be extracted from the children, self-interest bade these slave-drivers make the children drudge unmercifully. The consequence was that the children were hounded to death by overwork; they were in many cases
starved to the bone, and kept to their work by the lash. The gains of the manufacturer were gigantic, but that only whetted their ghoulish voracity. They began the practice of night work, i.e. after the one batch of hands were utterly worn out by the day work, they had another batch ready for the night work; the day batch went off to the beds which the night batch had just left, and vice versa. It was a popular tradition in Lancashire that the beds were never cold."

But even the hours of labour for the men, who were unorganised, and did not yet feel themselves, as later, to be a unity, were only too often enormously extended. Sober writers of this period have been able to describe the English factory hand as crushed to a lower level than that of West Indian slaves. But not even this modest existence was permanently secured to the worker; for without any fault of his own the workman found himself out of employment, and was reduced to distress, and perhaps finally to crime. There have been, of course, at all times in the history of every civilised country cases where men, willing and able to work, are out of employment; but only since the modern economico-technical development, and since the introduction of the corresponding legislation, has this evil, temporarily at least, assumed unsuspected dimensions. It is connected with the frequency of the occurrence of unfavourable turns of the market and of commercial crises. These consist mainly in the impossibility of either selling the goods produced wholesale at any price approximate to the old prices, or of profitably continuing the business generally on the old extensive scale. The vendors, manufacturers, and merchants suffer heavy losses, and perhaps become bankrupt. In any case the production must be restricted, and thousands of workmen, from no fault of their own, lose their situations.

A crisis as a typical phenomenon has only become possible in modern times, when, as a rule, production is usually for the world market or for unknown purchasers, and not, as formerly, for the known and permanent wants of definite buyers. Every cause, then, which makes the demand in any industry rapidly diminish, or causes the production to increase rapidly beyond the demand required for covering the costs (including a reasonable profit), must bring about a fall in prices and a crisis in the market. There are therefore absolutely innumerable causes which may effect this, since simply everything which shakes the ordinary system of production, consumption, distribution, and the conditions of intercourse, money, or credit, can give rise to a crisis. Such crises are then partly special, which affect particular branches, partly universal, which ruin commerce, trade, and industry in their combined functions, and often appear as international calamities. The last-mentioned crises are preceded by a general rise in prices, which creates universal confidence in the favourable turns of the market and thus induces a feverish excitement in production. At a definite moment, then, finally the accumulated masses of products become so great that they can no longer be sold at good prices, and thus the storm bursts; and now the panic becomes as universal as the confidence was before. This is the characteristic of the acute crises.

But the slow crises are of equal importance for our century. These are developed principally in connection with the ousting of handwork and domestic industry by factory industry, which occurs in many departments of business. The technically less perfect method of work becomes unprofitable, and some only of those who practise it are usually accepted by the industries which have emerged triumphantly from the competition. A similar danger of slow crises exists for all
export industries of a country in the possibility that the competition of foreign countries will gradually increase. In the first third of our century there was a tendency to set labour free, since the new mechanical inventions followed in rapid succession, and often rendered handwork superfluous; so that "now the conditions, after the machine system has on the whole completely conquered the domain belonging to it, and the working population has adapted itself to the new method of production, are far more favourable for the employment of the worker than they were in the transition period, when the machine had just begun its triumphal progress and handwork was still attempting a useless and despairing struggle against it." — Wilhelm Lexis.

At any rate we cannot feel surprise after all this that, at a time when the evils of the new industrial system were so vividly conspicuous, the complaint was raised in a report to Parliament, furnished by Robert Peel the elder (1750–1830), the "royal merchant," that "those great achievements of British ingenuity, by which the machine system has reached such perfection in our factories, threaten to prove no blessing but rather the most terrible curse to the nation."

2. THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN ENGLAND

A. THE NON-POLITICAL SOCIALISM OF ROBERT OWEN

The labour class revolted against the evils of the factory system at first in a quite barbarous fashion, by riotously attacking the manufacturers and by destroying the factories, and especially the machines, which were frequently regarded as the source of all disaster. It was only gradually that this involuntary opposition of the proletarian to the manufacturing capitalist took the form of a strike. But before the workers arrived at a full knowledge of the power of this weapon, if properly used, and acted accordingly, a movement arose which, starting from a philanthropic point of view, undertook to cure the social ills by radical proposals of reform.

Robert Owen (1771–1858: see his portrait in the plate on p. 387), a self-made man, who had risen while still young to be co-proprietor of a great cotton mill in New Lanark (Scotland), first made the attempt there on a limited scale after 1801 to remedy the evils which have been described by a thoughtful solicitude for the workers. He removed the children under ten years of age from the factory, limited the daily hours of labour for the adults to ten hours, constructed healthy dwellings as well as pleasure grounds for the workmen, arranged for the cooperative supply of provisions and other commodities, provided gratuitous attendance for the sick, and finally paid full wages to the operatives of his factory when, on account of the failure of cotton, they were obliged, from no fault of their own, to remain idle.

But although Owen's factory, which in spite of the great outlay for the welfare of the workers had also material success, was famed throughout all Europe, and became the goal of philanthropists, statesmen, and kings on their tours, yet the example set by it was only occasionally followed by other factory owners. Owen was led by this fact to the conclusion that the deep-rooted evils could only be ended by universally binding legislation. Thus he was the first to raise the
demand for factory laws (1813), and soon initiated a vigorous agitation with that object. After 1817 he devoted himself with peculiar energy to the problem of remedying the want of employment, which at that time, just when the first commercial crisis was appearing on English soil, occupied all thoughtful minds. His proposal, which was based on earlier ones of John Bellers, required the State to provide quarters for all persons, capable of work but fallen out of employment, in special rural establishments, where they might be engaged in systematic productive work, either agricultural or industrial. By following out these thoughts he came to the conception of his socialistic system, but from that time his interest in the direct amelioration of the lot of the operative by “small means” began to wane.

The fundamental principle of the system of Owen, which was supported by copious arguments in two books, “A New View of Society” (1813) and “A Book of the New Moral World” (1836–1844), assumes that the character of every man is mainly determined by appropriate education and a corresponding form of environment; indeed, Owen thinks that “children can be educated to adopt any habits and ideas that may be wished, so long as they are not absolutely contrary to human nature.” Nowadays nothing, unfortunately, is done to restrain the people from the inconsiderate pursuit of their desires; the consequence is the perverted condition of the world at present, shown by the misery of the industrial proletariat. The reason why no steps have been taken in this matter is found in the defective insight of our rulers: they did not even know the appropriate means to perfect men’s characters. But now, so Owen declares, the means are obvious to all, since the attempt has been successfully made in New Lanark to raise the employees by moral education to a higher level of morality. It is merely necessary to guide men toward a correct comprehension of that personal happiness at which they all aim; that is to say, every one should adopt that line of conduct which must promote the happiness of the community. Formerly men did not know this supreme law which governs the world; but now it is revealed, and can easily be made clear to all, that the personal happiness of the individual can only be increased in proportion as he exerts himself to promote the happiness of his neighbours. As soon as these fundamental propositions are part and parcel of every man, the separate means are not far to seek which can procure the greatest sum of happiness for the individual as well as for all mankind. This proposition shows quite clearly that Owen must be regarded as a genuine scion of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, who shares its rationalistic and utilitarian ideas as well as its incorrigible and ambitious optimism. He believes with all sincerity that these bald propositions might renew the religion and morality of the world. “Here,” he announces, “we have a firm foundation, on which a pure unstained religion instinct with life may be constructed, and this the only one which can grant to mankind peace and happiness without any counteracting evil.”

Owen was, however, far too well acquainted with practical life and its needs to content himself, like the theorists of the eighteenth century, with ethical and educational suggestions. On the contrary, he completely realised that even the moral man, if he has not the opportunity offered him of earning his living by labour, must succumb to temptation. He was therefore led to establish, by the side of his educational system, a system of State-organised labour. This culminated in the general application of the scheme, which we have already mentioned, for the aid of the unemployed. The whole work of production was to be carried out in
communities of two, three, or four thousand souls, where the adults, by eight hours’
common work daily, were to obtain most of the products, industrial and agricultural,
required for their own use, and were to acquire the rest by exchanging their surplus
products for the surplus products of the other communities. The leading thought
in this is distinctly “that each one of these communities shall be self-supporting,
and shall be held responsible for its deficiencies.” No special fundamental pro-
positions for the distribution of goods—certainly the most difficult question in any
communistic organisation of society—were advanced by Owen. How could any
dispute arise when all were filled with deep morality, and where, in consequence of
the immense increase in production, there were goods in abundance for every one?
It was possible therefore to determine the individual needs, and then to allot to
each person his share in the goods of this life.

In order to start his plans, Owen, himself self-sacrificing to the highest degree,
turned to the upper classes, where he anticipated to find equally great philanthropy.
It was not until this appeal to the humanity of the nobility and gentry met with
no response that he began to agitate among the workers, but without fostering
class hatred or generally abandoning strictly legal methods. At the same time he
did not cease to apply once more to the ruling classes, and even to the crowned
heads, for sanction and support to his efforts, true to his principle that “rich and
poor, monarchs and subjects, had at bottom but one interest.” This agitation,
which at times had been conducted with great spirit (Owen, between 1826-1837,
had issued five hundred addresses, made one thousand public speeches, and written
two thousand newspaper articles), met with the most vigorous opposition from the
clergy, who, bitterly incensed at Owen’s attacks on the Church, organised a counter
movement. Even the regular popular party of the time, the Radicals, emphatically
opposed Owen; for their goal was at first purely political, namely, the extension of
the franchise. Owen had, however, declared the dispute for this political privilege
unimportant, since all true popular interests could only be advanced by educational
and economic reforms.

The total failure of Owen’s communistic agitation was decided by the lament-
able collapse of his communistic settlements, which he determined must be founded,
since the English worker could not be convinced by doctrinaire arguments but only
by practical trial. So little was ever produced in these settlements that the
rations of the colonists had to be reduced to the barest limits. Thus discontent
was developed, which finally led to the abandonment of the settlements, naturally
not without considerable financial loss to Owen.

He did not fare better with the Labour Exchange Bank started in 1832. This
was intended to apply practically the ideal principle of all exchange, the equality
between the products and the profits of labour; a scheme which, if successful,
would have led to the establishment of a socialistic community in the middle of
capitalistic political economy. Every member of the bank could display goods in his
shop, for which he at once received “labour notes,” paper money issued by the bank.
The amount of the labour notes paid was decided by the value of the raw material
and the extent of labour required for the production of the goods in question on
the average (not by the depositor himself only). With the labour note the
depositor could then purchase for himself the corresponding amount of other goods
in the stores of the bank. But since the sharers in the scheme supplied products
which were little in demand,—such as picture-frames, fire-screens, tongs, etc.,—
but wished to purchase from the bank with the labour notes received, bread, meat, and clothing, which were not actually in stock, the result was the same as before. The undertaking went into liquidation and the deficiency was made up by Owen.

Owen’s plans were therefore exposed to the ridicule whose shafts always inflict deadly wounds. The downfall of the communistic school in England was thus sealed. The factory population now fell under the influence of the politically revolutionary “Chartism,” and Owen, could not support its illegal excesses and struggles for political privileges; and later, after Chartism, came the reign of trades unions and co-operative societies.

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY LABOUR MOVEMENT (“CHARTISM”)

While Owen’s propaganda, in spite of exertions for many decades, only affected a small part of the working class,—precisely its most moral and self-sacrificing members,—toward the end of the “thirties” a powerful labour party was suddenly formed in England. It happened as follows:

During the violent popular movement which had carried the reform of the franchise in 1832, the working classes had been brought forward as auxiliaries by the liberal citizens. Although the reform in the nature of things (the immediate question was the grant of the franchise to the owners of houses of at least £10 sterling in value;) could only enfranchise the middle class, yet it was assumed that the interests of the working classes were to be subsequently better considered by the legislature than heretofore. But how greatly the working classes had been deceived in the confidence which they placed in the citizen class was shown by the circumstance that the latter, which had just come to the helm, immediately set about to reform the old philanthropic poor laws. These, since the end of the eighteenth century, had regulated the support not merely of workers unable to earn their living, but also of such as had employment in cases where their wages were insufficient for the decent maintenance of themselves and their families. The poor law accounts had in consequence of this reached the enormous sum of £3,000,000 sterling in a population of eleven millions. Mechanical inventions had followed in rapid succession, and regularly set a number of “hands” free. The claims, therefore, on the relief funds were bound to increase continually, and the new Liberal government resolved to repeal that law and to replace it by a harsh poor law enactment which banished able-bodied recipients of relief into strictly regulated workhouses (1834). The discontent of the lower classes at this “achievement” of the new era was necessarily increased, since the workhouses soon fell into disfavour with the people owing to their harsh restrictions and bad administration.

Since, in addition to all this, a bill of the Radicals to extend the circle of the franchise was rejected by a crushing majority and the reform was declared by Lord John Russell, the leader of the Liberals, to be definitely concluded, the workmen formed unions of their own. These were intended to bring about, by a fresh popular agitation, a renewed reform of the franchise which should this time really consider the interests of the people. At the head of these unions stood the “London Workmen Association” (founded 1836), which proposed the following programme, originally drawn up by the Liberals; namely, universal suffrage, secret
voting, equal electoral districts, annual elections of Parliament, abolition of property qualifications for parliamentary candidates, and salaries for the members. This programme was proclaimed as the "People's Charter," because it was to serve the interests of the lower classes, just as, centuries before, the Magna Carta had served the interest of the aristocracy and middle classes, and therefore the supporters of this programme were termed "Chartists."

Their intention was to alter social legislation in favour of the masses by help of their political demands, which were intended to be realised at once. It was therefore expressly stated in the first appeal which the London Workmen Association in 1838 addressed to workmen of the whole kingdom: "If we are fighting for an equality of political rights, this is not done in order to shake off an unjust tax or to effect a transference of wealth, power, and influence in favour of any one party. We do so in order to be able to cut off the source of our social misery, and by successful methods of prevention to avoid the infliction of penalties under unrighteous laws." J. Stephens, a Methodist preacher, one of the most influential Chartist agitators of this first period, expressed himself still more distinctly: "Chartism, my friends, is no political question, affecting the extension of the franchise to you: Chartism is a knife-and-fork question; the charter means good houses, good food and drink, a good livelihood, and short hours of work." In all manufacturing towns, which had long been roused to violent excitement by systematic agitations against the poor law and the deplorable condition of the workmen, the Chartist programme was received as a joyful message, and the small tradesmen and artisans, being hard pressed by capitalistic competition, joined the ranks of the discontented workmen. Within a few months the new party had spread over all England. Wherever factory chimneys smoked Chartist unions were sure to be found.

But this rapid success was only attained because the agitators had held out false hopes of immediate victory to themselves and their followers from among the working and middle classes. They calculated that, as in the reform movement of 1832, the ruling powers would once more yield to a vigorous popular movement. This was the fundamental error which was to prove disastrous to the party. When, indeed, in February, 1839, at a meeting of the "National Convention," the question of their subsequent course was raised, the inevitable result of that delusive agitation was that the party of "moral right," led by the Owenite, William Lovett (1800-1877), with its programme of peaceful propaganda and a monster petition to Parliament, only represented the minority.

The majority was composed of the party of "physical force," which took its battle-cry from Feargus O'Connor (1796-1855), and was so intoxicated with the thought of the immediate realisation of their demands, that, in extraordinary infatuation, they thought themselves powerful enough to break down the strong fabric of the old system. It was resolved, in the event that the charter was refused by Parliament, to proclaim a "holy month," to strike work simultaneously in every industry. A petition for the introduction of the charter, supposed to contain more than a million signatures, was rejected, and riots immediately broke out. At Birmingham the combined workmen and petty tradesmen took possession of the town, which had to be won back from them by armed force; and the "National Convention" actually announced the resolution that the whole nation was to suspend work for a month from August 5, 1839. But this was a bolt that
recoiled on the archer himself, for there was no feeling in favour of it among the labour class. The few labour unions of workmen that were already formed actually took up an attitude of hostility to the decree. It had therefore in the end to be recalled, since the complete failure of the strike seemed inevitable. The National Convention had by this forfeited all the confidence of the working classes; it saw indeed that the game was definitely lost. There was no course finally left to it but to dissolve. In the meantime the government had intervened. All those who had made seditious speeches were brought to trial, and by the close of 1839 some three hundred Chartists found themselves behind bolt and bar for various terms of imprisonment.

For a time the doctrine was quiescent. But in July, 1840, the party was reorganised, on the basis of the principle that the charter was to be introduced by legal means. When, however, in the year 1842, a new monster petition was absolutely rejected by the Lower House, the "party of physical force" again came to the surface, and once more a universal strike was proclaimed. This time the demand was obeyed, at least in a part of Lancashire; but as the country otherwise remained quiet, the Chartists saw the uselessness of their action and concluded the strike after half the month had expired. Chartism then lingered on, until finally in 1848, after the February revolution in Paris, it roused itself for a last trial of strength. Once more a petition, nominally with 5,700,000 signatures, was to be presented, and O'Connor boasted that he was willing to offer it to Parliament at the head of an army of malcontents. But the revolutionary march was prohibited, and, in view of the precautionary measures adopted by the government, O'Connor contented himself with driving to Parliament with the petition in a cab. An examination made there showed that the petition contained not quite two million signatures, and that hundreds of thousands of these were forged. Chartism had thus become ridiculous. Revolutionary socialism in England had had its day. Nevertheless this movement had not passed away without leaving a trace, for it had produced one great result: it had roused the English working classes to the most outlying corners of the land from their traditional ideas of subjection, and made them realise their separate interests as a class." — Lujo Brentano.

C. The Trades Unions

The movements which we have hitherto considered had met with no practical results. A better fate was reserved for a movement which, originating with the working classes themselves, endeavoured to attend to their interests on the basis of self-help, the movement of labour associations.

(a) Trades Unions in the Period of Strikes. — Trades unions are workmen's self-defence associations for the purpose of improving the conditions of labour as well as for the protection of their professional interests generally. They were started in England, partly in connection with older journeymen's unions, in considerable numbers as early as the eighteenth century, when the first waves of the victoriously advancing capitalistic production burst on the working classes. But they were immediately resisted by legislature and heavy judicial sentences. English law extended the idea of conspiracy, which properly ought to be applied only
to combinations for the commission of crimes or for the production of false evidence against third persons, to all combinations of workmen who wished to obtain higher wages. A long list of special enactments forbidding coalitions in various trades had been issued throughout the whole eighteenth century. Finally, at the close of the century a strict general act was passed which made all agreements between workmen, with the object of raising wages or lessening the hours or quantity of labour, punishable with imprisonment, and inflicted similar penalties on all who deterred a workman from accepting definite posts or caused him to leave them. The complete onesidedness of these enactments is clearly seen in the fact that combinations of the employers, in order to influence wages, were only punishable by fines.

The consequence of this was that at the beginning of the nineteenth century secret trades unions had been formed everywhere, which, since all their demonstrations were treated with equal severity, employed the most reckless and reprehensible means for the attainment of their objects. Workmen who refused all complicity with their comrades, especially in strikes (the so-called “black-legs”), were actually attacked and sometimes fell victims to murderous onslaughts. The authorities naturally lost no time in proceeding to the severest counter measures. Labour coalitions could not, however, be suppressed, a sure proof that these represented in the age of capitalist production a purely instinctive movement.

The prohibition of coalitions of workmen must have seemed to every impartial observer the more unjust, since coalitions of employers for the purpose of lowering wages were, thanks to the class justice of the English magistrates, always unpunished. A parliamentary report (1824) states, “A number of cases have been communicated to us, in which employers of labour have been charged with combining together in order to lower the wages or to lengthen the hours of labour; but a case could never be adduced in which any employer had been punished for this misdemeanour.” Owing to the effect produced by a parliamentary enquiry proving the injustice and futility of the laws in question, a bill of the Radical, Joseph Hume, was carried, which expunged from the statute book the prohibition on coalition, and threatened with imprisonment only cases of violence, menaces, or intimidation used for the purpose of forcing workmen to join a coalition, or of compelling employers to grant concessions to the workmen (1824). These privileges were indeed considerably restricted in the very next year, when the combinations suddenly spread over the whole country, and seemed to threaten seriously all the proprietary interests of the citizen class; for it was now fixed by a new statute that conspiracies should include “all meetings about the labour conditions of absent persons, as well as those about the persons whom a master is to employ or not to employ, and about the machines which he is to use, and further, all agreements not to work with a definite person, or to induce other persons to suspend or refuse to accept work.”

Notwithstanding that these provisions threatened with penalties many proceedings which proved to be inseparable from an effective employment of labour associations, and actually gave cause to a number of convictions, they have not been able to check the victorious career of the trades unions. It was after 1825 that the labour associations assumed the form typical of their policy and their importance in the history of the world. Up to about 1830 they were strictly local combinations of workers in similar trades. But since in this way, owing to the
weakness of the union, they could not adequately meet their duties, namely, to
give relief in the case of strikes, want of employment, sickness, or incapacity, they
saw themselves compelled spontaneously to start national unions in the separate
branches.

Their organisation is as follows: The conduct of all affairs rests in the hands
of the executive committee, which is elected by the members of the place where
it holds its sittings (by custom always the centre of the branch of industry in
question) for definite short periods. The leading person is, however, the general
secretary assigned to this committee, who is chosen for ten years by the members
of the entire trade union and receives a salary. The expenses are met by the
entrance fees and the regular subscriptions of the members, but sometimes also by
extraordinary imposts, which are exacted in case of a very important emergency.

The following details, given as typical by Brentano, the best authority on the
conditions of labour in England, are of peculiar importance. Not every workman
is accepted as a member, but only such as can prove his ability as a worker, while
two members vouch for the fact that he is in a position to earn the general rate
of wages prevailing in that district. A minimum wage is therefore demanded, not
from the manufacturer, but from the worker, since experience has taught that the
offer of incompetent workers to work at a lower wage can be used by the manufac-
turer as a plea for reducing the wages of the competent. If, then, a member
believes that he is not receiving the pay due to his work, he can bring his griev-
ance before the local group of his trade union. If this is found by the local group
to be justified, and if, nevertheless, his demand for a rise in wages is rejected by
the employer, he stops work and receives the "donation" until he has found fresh
work. If a local group wishes for a general rise in the wages of the workmen
of the union in question, or some other general improvement of the labour condi-
tions, it has to furnish a report to the executive committee of the national union.
Should this sanction the proposal, members of the local group, in case they put
forward their demands ineffectually and then strike, are supported by the execu-
tive committee, that is to say, out of the coffers of the national trades union.
Apart from all struggles for the regulation of the terms of labour, and from the
provisions made for sickness, incapacity, and old age, the trades unions in England
serve as an important auxiliary organisation for the enforcement of the factory laws.
They are "instruments, by means of which the workers give expression to their
wishes, wherever there is a question of political measures for the benefit of the
workmen; they thus, like the old guilds, influence the whole man." — Brentano.

Since the trades unions, safeguarding the interests of the labour class with
tenacious energy, frequently caused prolonged strikes, public opinion, influenced
by the daily press, which served the middle class, was long unfavourable to them.
The courts thus treated trades unions as "unlawful" combinations, and therefore,
according to the old English law, refused them legal protection. Thus, for example,
thefts of the property of trades unions were not liable to prosecution. Thus, again,
after excesses had been committed by members of trades unions during riots, vari-
ous steps were taken to suppress the organisations. The last attempt of this kind
occurred in 1866. But a royal commission then appointed to investigate the nature
of trades unions served to destroy many popular prejudices. The official recogni-
tion of the trades unions dates from that time. It was announced by special
laws of 1871 and 1876, passed under the conservative cabinet of Disraeli, which
was friendly to the labour party, that trades unions could not be regarded as unlawful unions. So far as no direct compulsion was used, liberty to strike was permitted to the fullest extent; since, for example, the posting of "pickets" in the vicinity of factories or dwelling-houses was expressly allowed. Besides this, the privileges of a "legal entity" were granted to those trades unions which had their regulations enrolled. "They may sue and be sued, hold personal and real property, and take summary proceedings against their officials for dishonesty." For this reason the Congress of the Trades Unions at Glasgow expressed to the Conservative party their "fullest acknowledgment of the greatest benefit that had ever been granted to the sons of toil."

From that time the formerly prosecuted unions, which comprise at the present day some 1,400,000 members, are considered in England "respectable," and have a certain share in the government; secretaries of trades unions are promoted to be factory inspectors, justices of the peace, or even members of the ministry. But a more important point is that the public opinion of the country sees in trades unions a necessary institution, and often in disputes with employers takes the side of the workmen's combination. The government, when preparing labour laws, always applies for the advice of the trades unions. In the contracts of the government and of many communities the observance of the terms of labour required by the trades unions ("fair wages") is a preliminary stipulation. And, in places, a sort of constitutional management has been developed, since the manager of the factory usually consults with the union about any circumstances which can at all affect the interests of the workmen.

If we make it clear to ourselves what trades unionism has done, we cannot refuse to acknowledge it as a splendid proof of the practical sense and great political capacity of the English working classes. It is a special characteristic of the "bon sens" of this people that the Utopian ideas prevalent only largely contributed to strengthen the power of the current of reform. The leaders of the trades union movement were thorough-going followers of Owen, but they derived from the teaching of the great optimist merely the distant ideal of the future, while they devoted all their energies in the present to the very slightest improvement of the lot of the workman. The best leaders of the trades unions, so Brentano writes, professed Communism, "but such ideas had assumed the character of ideals, of 'holiday ideals,' in which a man indulged as in sweet dreams of a better world hereafter, while on working days he most prudently suited his politics to the given conditions of the moment."

(b) Trades unions at the period of arbitration. — Trades unions, in pursuing this policy, recognised for decades no alternative in the event of the refusal of their demands except a strike. When, however, the workmen had become wiser and their unions had collected large sums, the next step was that they looked for means which led to this goal without the employment of this two-edged sword. The employers also would naturally welcome, from the standpoint of their interests, any possibility of avoiding open war. "As soon as both parties merely consult their interests, they will ask themselves whether the object of the struggle, namely, to measure their strength, cannot be equally well attained by human judgment, just as the pressure of steam is ascertained by the application of some mechanism, instead of being learnt from the bursting of the boiler." — Schulze-Geaeveritz. From
these considerations the system of "arbitration boards" grew up in England; these were intended to settle the disputes between labour and capital in a peaceful way, and thus to produce social peace.

The type of many boards of this kind is the "board of arbitration" (1860) established by the manufacturer, Anthony John Mundells, at Nottingham, the centre of the manufacturing industries. This board consists of ten representatives of the workmen and employers respectively, who elect a president, and give him the casting vote. But every proposal—which has to be submitted in writing—as to the interpretation of the old, or the introduction of the new, labour conditions is first brought before the so-called committee of inquiry, composed of two representatives of the workmen and the employers respectively. These endeavour to come to an agreement by a general verbal discussion of the case, and only if this attempt fails is the case brought before the general meeting. The decision adopted there has an absolute binding force on the disputing parties for a definite time, since the contract for work must contain the declaration of all parties thereto, that in the points at issue they will submit, without protest, to the decisions of the arbitration boards. The favourable experiences of this system, and of the system of Rupert Kettle, a county court judge, which was first tested in the building industry at Wolverhampton, led to the result that it was imitated in a number of industrial towns, and was soon sanctioned by the legislature through the granting of appeals to the courts against the decisions of the chambers of arbitration (Arbitration Act of August 6, 1872).

This system has been finally perfected even in places where strong trades unions oppose equally close combinations of employers. Thus, in the coal industry of the counties of Durham and Northumberland, a permanent committee of six representatives of each party, with a neutral president, settles all separate disputes resulting from the application of the labour contract, which holds uniformly good for the entire district. On the other hand, disputes as to the constitution of the labour contracts themselves, that is to say, as to the general principles of hours of labour and pay, are, so far as possible, settled by the full meeting of the employers, in combination with the delegates of the trades unions. If no agreement results, the matter is referred to the court of arbitration. Each party is here represented by two arbitrators, who, for their part, choose the umpire, who delivers the final decision. A regular trial takes place before him, as before a court; evidence is tendered, witnesses are cross-examined, speeches made on both sides by the aforesaid arbitrators, who in reality are counsel. "The complete technical knowledge of the parties engaged, as well as the strength of the organisations backing them up, produce the result that these proceedings are carried out with the same acuteness, and are as smoothly transacted as dealings between the largest business houses." — Schulze-Gaevernitz.

The award is unconditionally carried out by the two interested groups. The existence of the trades unions presupposes this, since otherwise no one would accept the responsibility beforehand of ensuring that many thousand workmen would really submit to the award. This is, of course, valid only for a definite number of months; after that there must be a renewal of the old agreements, or a fresh examination of them. If the arbitrator were to give his decision merely in accordance with his sympathies, this could have no lasting validity, but rather would only conceal in itself the germ for later conflicts. For this very reason "the
arbitrator, like any third person called in to settle prices between two independent parties, has merely to ascertain that which, if he did not intervene, would be established as the natural limit of the price. Since he is called in to avoid conflict, he has to accomplish the same result as a conflict, namely, the reasonable settlement of the mutual conditions of power. Only when he has done that is he sure that his verdict will be lasting." — Schulze-Gaevernitz, in his treatise, "Zum sozialen Frieden."

A case in the year 1877 shows how little any awards, which attempt to settle matters by moral considerations, are able to arrange a dispute permanently. Sir Farrer Herschell, as arbitrator, rejected the request of the colliery owners of Northumberland for a reduction in the wages of the miners. The owners submitted for the three months, during which the award was to have validity, but immediately afterward they renewed their demand, with the declaration that this time they must put the award out of the question, and, when the miners afterward went on strike, they proved victorious.

Parliament and government have exerted themselves to support this development as much as possible. Thus the Act for Conciliation and Arbitration of the year 1895 was passed, which gives to the Board of Trade the right of interfering in labour disputes. The most important proviso is that the Board of Trade may itself order the parties to nominate delegates in order to settle the dispute by mutual negotiations; on some occasions, under the presidency of a competent person designated by the Board. The Board may also, on its own responsibility, send persons to investigate the matters in dispute, and to furnish a report on the subject; finally, it may urge the establishment of a chamber of arbitration in districts and industries which are still without one.

The chambers of arbitration have since then become more numerous, and have frequently displayed a profitable activity; but their actual results must not be overestimated. There is hardly any institution in the social-political field, which all political and social parties so combine to recommend, as these very chambers of arbitration. Nevertheless, in forty years they have not been universally adopted; in fact, very often they have been prohibited even in the limited field where their introduction was a success. This experience has clearly shown that the arbitration boards are, contrary to expectation, unable to produce social peace. If one of two parties believes that it really has the requisite strength to enforce its demands, it regards the process of arbitration as a clog, and wishes for no mediation. Finally, even if the arbitration boards have worked successfully, the employers some day, from reasons easily explicable psychologically, will try whether they cannot once more become masters in their operations; and the workmen will once more venture to extort from the owners still more favourable conditions of labour by a unanimous combination. For this reason, hitherto every arbitration board has been broken up some time or other. Economic struggles seem, to a certain extent, inevitable in a community of free competition. Nothing, then, ought to be said against trades unions and arbitration boards, since it can only be for the advantage of the general community that the forces, which on occasion have to fight, should be systematically organised.
D. CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES

The transition from communism to social reform, seen in the trades union movement, is more conspicuously prominent in the movement toward co-operation, which was the immediate result of Owen's teaching and agitation, after the clouds of illusion had lifted. Owen had encouraged the workmen to found communities in order to provide themselves with the necessaries of life by co-operative production. After many unsuccessful attempts the fact was established that co-operative stores represented the only form of community of which the labourer was at the time capable. And when this was once known, such societies and their shops sprung up like mushrooms from the soil after warm summer rain.

Thus a movement originated in 1826 which, in the words of its historian, Mrs. Sidney Webb, "represents the first real attempt of the British labouring classes to embody in a practical form the ideas of Owen." The spirit which animated these true pioneers of social reform is aptly described by the motto with which the regulations of the society at Warrington were introduced, running as follows: "They helped one another, each his own brother, and each said to his brother, 'Be of good cheer!" But the young plant which blossomed so quickly and so luxuriantly (in 1832 nearly five hundred co-operative stores were already in existence) faded again rapidly, and only a few years later there was hardly a trace of the whole movement, while the labour world was intensely excited by the storms of the Chartist propaganda. Its overthrow coincides with the new impetus given to the co-operative movement, which has since lasted almost uninterruptedly to the present day.

The men who then took the lead were the "Rochdale Equitable Pioneers," as twenty-eight poor flannel weavers called themselves, who, on the day after Christmas, 1844, opened the "Old Weaver's Shop" in a back street of Rochdale, with a capital of £28 in all. The rules show that the "Pioneers" hoisted once more the flag of the "communities" of Owen, and in this way combined practical wisdom, as shown in starting a shop, with a lofty moral ideal. The statutes announced as their object "the erection of a shop for the sale of provisions, articles of clothing, etc.; the building, purchase, and fitting up of a number of houses in which the members can live who wish to help each other in the improvement of their domestic and social position; the production of such wares as the society shall determine to make, in order to provide work for unemployed, or, especially, badly paid members; the purchase or renting of plots of ground for the same purpose; lastly, the establishment by this society so soon as possible of a self-supporting colony in the country, with a co-operative system of production and distribution, or the furtherance of other attempts to found similar societies."

It is clearly seen here how illusions can largely contribute to the success of a cause, for they gave to those poor weavers, and the many thousands who followed their example, the proud consciousness that they were the disciples of a lofty ideal and the pioneers of mankind, and inspired them with that feeling of exuberant strength which made them capable of bold action and persistent effort. This social prospect could not, however, again dim the view of practical life, as was shown from the typical constitution, so often imitated, which the Rochdale
Pioneers drew up for themselves. According to it their shop made the ordinary retail prices the basis of the sales, and then divided the profits obtained from the business among the members in proportion to the extent of the purchases effected. The purchaser received a receipt (usually a tin counter) for the amount of his purchases. At the end of every quarter the counters were given back, in order that the profits might be distributed accordingly. They usually amounted in English co-operative stores to between 5 per cent and 15 per cent in the three months. Any one could be a member on payment of one shilling entrance fee. Members, therefore, practically were only customers. Of course, under this arrangement every member had an interest in the extension of the body of members, because the turnover then increased, and with it the business expenses were lessened, and so the dividend became larger.

The co-operative stores were soon combined into a sort of unity by congresses, and afterward two wholesale societies were founded, which were intended to supply their goods to the separate associations at market prices, but to hand over to them the profits in proportion to the purchases. After 1872 the practice began of supplying the requirements of the wholesale societies from their own factories. Thus there was "the moral triumph of making further progress in the development of co-operation, since a co-operative system of production was started for the supply of the federated co-operative stores" (from the "Co-operative News"). Those manufactories are not, therefore, productive co-operative societies, — such have never been able to be permanently established either in England or elsewhere, — but are manufactories which belong to co-operative stores, are conducted by managers appointed by them, and pay their workmen "fair wages." The extent of the co-operative system is seen from the following figures: The co-operative stores had in 1897 1,520,000 members; a turnover of £65,000,000, and a net profit of over £5,500,000; they provided work for 73,000 employees, of whom 30,000 were operatives in workshops and manufactories with directly productive labour. These are the successes which have given such a stimulus to the movement, so that many theorists, especially on German soil, have come to see in co-operative stores the panacea with which the social question is to be remedied.

Co-operative societies, as opposed to trades unions, were soon favoured by the legislature. Here, too, it was Disraeli who most prominently came to their aid, and procured for them (by a series of statutes, 1852 to 1876) the rights of corporations, after formal registration, together with all other desirable privileges, and limited the liability of members to their subscribed shares in the business.

E. SOCIAL REFORM AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE WORKING CLASSES

The factory system, with its various branches, had brought with it an unprecedented increase in the labour exacted from the workers, especially from the women and children. Owen, at the beginning of his social reforms, had already abolished these evils in New Lanark, where he was master. But since he saw that such an example was only exceptionally imitated by other owners of factories, he came to the conclusion that the deep-seated distress could only be ended by legislation binding on all alike. Thus Owen was the first who raised the cry for factory laws, and soon afterward commenced a violent agitation for this object (1813—
1817). The programme which he now developed contained, first, the prohibition of the industrial labour of children under ten years, as well as of all such children who could not show a certain minimum of learning; and, secondly, the maximum working day of six hours for children from ten to twelve years, and of ten and a half hours for all adult factory workers. Owen in this way, although he afterward devoted his attention almost exclusively to his Utopian schemes, introduced the idea of the protection of workers into the modern social movement.

If merely the interests of one class were authoritative, as the materialistic theory of history asserts, the protection of the worker would never have been introduced, so long, at least, as the labouring classes possessed no influence in Parliament. As a matter of fact, this measure was proposed and passed, thanks to moral, religious, and philanthropic reasons, aided by the far-sighted deliberations of wise statesmen. The first comprehensive factory law was enacted in 1819 at the instance of Robert Peel the elder, himself a manufacturer. This prohibited the employment of children under nine years in cotton mills, and limited the working day of young persons up to sixteen years of age to twelve hours. But the law had no effective results, since the local police authorities were far too subservient to the wholesale manufacturers. A new factory act was passed in 1833, which appointed special officials to superintend the protection of the workmen,—namely, factory inspectors,—an institution which has been copied by all civilised States, and fixed for all textile factories a working day of eight hours for children from nine to thirteen years, and of twelve hours for young persons from thirteen to eighteen years.

Even before this, in the "twenties" of the nineteenth century, a great popular movement in favour of a ten-hour working day had commenced, which was led by a philanthropic politician, Richard Oastler, a Tory, "the manufacturing king"; John Fielden, a Liberal member of Parliament, and the Tories Thomas Sadler and Lord Anthony Ashley (afterward Earl of Shaftesbury, 1801–1885), were also conspicuous. This movement, which lasted almost twenty years, roused great enthusiasm amongst the working classes, and, in view of the want of employment which prevailed toward the end of the "thirties" and the high price of bread, assumed locally forms which alarmed the governing and wealthy classes. Thus Sir Robert Peel, the statesman, a son of the above mentioned, declared, "The misery and the uncertainty in the position of the labouring classes is too great. It is a disgrace and a danger to our civilisation; it is absolutely necessary to make their position less hard and less precarious. If we cannot do everything, we can at least do something, and it is our duty to do what we are able." The Chartist agitation which was exciting all England served finally to make people understand the state of affairs. Chartist, indeed, which had already (1839) failed in its main point, had been able to effect very little direct change in the social conditions; but its indirect results were all the greater, for its abrupt ending made the labour classes understand that it is impossible to break the strong framework of the old constitution by the employment of force. They tried, therefore, henceforth to serve their aims by conformity to the existing institutions. On the other hand, Chartist made it clear to wide circles of the ruling classes that things could no longer go on as hitherto, that the familiar laissez-faire policy in social matters must be abandoned. Thus there arose in the wealthy and educated class intellectual currents which were favourable to the concession of the reasonable demands of the Fourth Estate.
FOUR SOCIAL THEORISTS: CARLYLE AND OWEN,
FOURIER AND PROUDHON
EXPLANATION OF PORTRAITS ON THE OTHER SIDE

Right-hand top: Robert Owen, born May 14, 1771, at Newton, in North-Wales, the son of an artisan, was in 1781 apprentice to a draper in Stasmford, afterwards a clerk in London and Manchester, in 1790 director of a cotton mill with 500 hands in Lancashire, and founder with others of a spinning mill in Manchester, which he soon afterwards gave up. He bought the cotton mills of Mr. Dale at New-Lanark and married Miss Dale. After 1800 he was director of the mills and a philanthropist on a great scale. In 1813 he changed his undertaking into a company, bought New-Harmony in Indiana (1824) and founded a social community; in 1827 he returned to London; he died at his own home, November 12, 1858.

Left-hand top: Thomas Carlyle, born December 4, 1795, at Ecclefechan in the county of Dumfries, Scotland, the son of a small farmer, was after 1800 student of Theology, Mathematics, and Literature at Edinburgh, and subsequently teacher. He married Jane Baillie Welsh, and after 1828 devoted himself to writing, residing on a little property in Scotland or (after 1834) at Chelsea in London. He was elected to succeed Gladstone as Rector of Edinburgh University in opposition to Disraeli in 1865. He died in London on February 5, 1881.

Right-hand bottom: François Marie Charles Fourier, born April 7, 1772, at Besançon, the son of a merchant, was originally a commercial traveller; in 1793 he was a grocer at Lyon, and lost his property as being an opponent of the Jacobins; after two years as a soldier he was a tradesman in Marseilles in 1797, then a broker in Lyon; between 1808-1826 he was alternately in Besançon and Paris. In 1826 he found his first pupil, Just Mülron. After 1826 he was permanently in Paris where he founded his school. He died October 10, 1837, at Paris. The portrait here given is after the frontispiece to Bebel's Memoir of Fourier.

Left-hand bottom: Pierre Joseph Proudhon, born July 15, 1809, at Besançon, the son of an artisan, was a compositor; in 1837 he won a scholarship at the Academy of Besançon; was the owner of a printing business 1839, and was elected representative for the department of the Seine in 1848. He was condemned for offences against the Press-laws in 1850, and again soon afterwards; was a political fugitive in Belgium, received an amnesty in 1860 and afterwards resided in Paris; he died at Passy, near Paris, on January 19, 1866.
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Thomas Carlyle (1795–1881; see his portrait on the plate representing "Two English Socialists") signalised himself as the most mighty preacher of a healthy inner life, and to him above all the credit is due of having roused the social conscience of his time. He is distinguished from the Socialists and Radicals in the principle that he considers that human society necessarily involves some notion of rule, otherwise the society could not last. But he assumes two points,—that the ruling party protects and safeguards the ruled and weaker class, and that this latter is loyal and well behaved toward its leader and protector. Both, however, only thrive on the soil of the faith and the work of all concerned. Work is necessary in order to justify our existence on earth, and faith in the ideal beyond the grave is needed in order to make the severity of labour and the miseries of our existence endurable by us.

The evils of the present day, according to Carlyle's conception, have their root in the fact that all these assumed conditions of a really human existence are not forthcoming. The old relations and ties between the feudal lords and their vassals have ceased, to give place to the unsympathetic payment of ready money as the only bond, "the sole nexus," between capitalist and workman. The poor man no longer finds any protection, but remains left to himself; the result is that he has no loyal feelings for the ruling classes, but thinks only of rebellion and revolution. Faith is tottering everywhere, even if it be not lost; and finally work has become irksome to all, so that the proletarian does it only with reluctance, while the aristocrat tries completely to avoid it. Thus men think "this universe is a large, capacious cattle-stall and a workhouse with an enormous kitchen and long diners, and that he alone is wise who can find his place at it."

The actual circumstance that at the present time, under the rule of selfishness, the signs of the dissolution, the transitoriness, and the unendurable burden of the existing conditions are noticeable, is for Carlyle a reassuring symptom. For now only two courses are left: either the nations, eaten up by the worship of Mammon, succumb, fall the prey to foreign conquerors, and then receive, as is right, a new faith and a new aristocracy forced on them from without; or they develop for themselves new ideals and a new social fabric, in which all sections will be knit together by the bond of mutual loyalty.

It is comprehensible that in England especially no contentment is found, since the prevailing doctrines and institutions are unsuitable. Carlyle heaps deadly scorn on them, one after the other. Look now at the utilitarian philosophy and the corresponding national economy; they start with a world of knaves, and wish that something honest should result! Look again at the Malthusians! They imagine that the labouring class by sexual restraint has it in its power to diminish the number of "hands" and to improve its position. They believe in a golden age, when twenty million workers strike simultaneously in the same domain. They needed, indeed, only to pass in an all-embracing trades union the resolution not to marry until the state of the labour market was again completely satisfactory! Or look at the constitution of Parliament! "There no British subject can become a statesman, the leader in deeds, unless he has first shown himself the leader in words! Surely this is the very worst method of election that could be devised!"

Or, lastly, consider the government of the existing majority! It provides neither help nor guidance to the people, but is a thing which bobs up and down on the waves of popular favour like the body of a drowned jackass. The end is that a
revolt of the people gathers, and some day bursts with fury and dashes the dead
body down into the mud at the bottom.

All this must be changed, but how? Carlyle promised himself but little from
Socialism. He did not wish for an Utopia, even if its realisation were possible. He
wished hard work for all, since that is the destiny of mankind, and a system of
subordination under the most efficient, since in no other way can the continuance
and advancement of human society be ensured. The old principles of government
must be revived. Formerly the lower classes stood in countless different relations
to the upper classes beyond those of buyer and seller as now,—in the relation
of soldier and general, tribesman and chief, loyal subject and ruling monarch.
"With the complete triumph of hard cash another age has come, and thus a new
aristocracy must come." This is to be the "nobility of industry," which organises
and conducts a noble government, and must be responded to by the subjects with
loyalty and obedience. At the time there will be a few leaders of industrial un-
dertakings who will realise this ideal; but soon there will be more and more of
them, until we, at last, shall have a noble and upright country of industry under
the rule of the wisest. The motto of the nobleman of the future is "Honorable
conduct in business and warm-hearted interest in the welfare of all whom he may
employ." This is the theme of Carlyle's positive social policy, which he varies
from time to time with new illustrations and historical parallels, now patheticly,
now sadly, now with the bold fights of idealist prophecy, now with the thundering
denunciations of an Old Testament prophet.

Carlyle is thus the first to announce an order of things in which the philan-
thropic manufacturers filled with sympathy for the community are to form the
ruling class, the social aristocracy. From this point of view all else seems inci-
dental, if only the leading sections of the community rise, as is anticipated, of
their own impulse to the realisation of a new code of duties. If Carlyle is there-
fore no political Socialist, he is, however, always sufficiently a friend to the working
classes to advocate the State support of the lower orders; on the other hand, he is an
outspoken opponent of the democratic development, which appears to him
necessary only so long as the ruling classes cannot remember their duty.

If we wish to form a correct estimate of Carlyle, we must not conceive him to
be a scientific philosopher or a national economist; he would have been no more
able to explain the principles of modern political economy than he was capable
of abstruse meditations on the last problems of willing and being. His greatness
rather consisted in the fact that he was a powerful writer, who knew how to
awaken enthusiasm in the social policy of the nation. All his individual ideas,
on account of this defective knowledge of political economy, were of no practical
use, and were far too hastily sketched to be capable of application in real life; but
they were the most powerful literary means for spreading among the higher classes
of the nation the feeling that the workers were unjustly suffering, and that this
condition must be remedied by reforms. Carlyle himself indeed believed in a
future when England would be ruled by a nobility of industry, and all England
soon echoed with this new rallying cry. This was an idea which, as such, repre-
ented only an illusion of the ruling classes; but an illusion whose influence led
to the rejection of the Manchester dogma in labour questions by the leading
circles, and to the adoption by them of a friendly attitude toward the efforts of
the workers in the direction of co-operation and coalition.
Next to Carlyle must be mentioned Benjamin Disraeli (afterward Earl of Beaconsfield, 1804-1881), the founder of the first "Social-Conservative group" in Parliament, that of the so-called "Young England." He adopts the essential points of Carlyle. But we find also much that is original in his ideas; above all, the thought of the social kingdom comes for the first time prominently forward. In recent years, he explains, definite classes have ruled in England, and the result is that struggle between those who possess property and those that have none, which, under the dominion of free competition, has produced the unhappy condition of the people. This calamity must be ended by abolishing the dominion of the classes and therefore all class legislation. The power must rather be given to the king, as the only constitutional authority which represents no class interests. Under monarchical government morality and religion will once more be established in the land. And the most powerful agent is the true nobility which embraces all that has been conspicuous in the State, whether from high birth or from talent, virtues, office, or wealth.

Disraeli, in his novels "Coningsby, or the New Generation" (1844), and "Sybil, or the Two Nations" (1845), has clearly described the results of this doctrine in practical life. In them he instances the model factories, where nothing but love and concord prevail between capitalist and worker. The manufacturer also does his best in this direction, since he takes the most comprehensive measures for the prosperity of his employees, shortens their hours of labour, prepares for them good dwelling-houses, gardens, baths, schools, reading-rooms, and churches, and provides for their pleasures by musical societies, games, festivals, and dancing. Many workmen, through their master's aid, actually come to be the owners of their own houses, gardens, and small farms. This philanthropy finds its earthly reward in the efficiency and willingness of the workers, so that Disraeli's model manufacturer declares that from the point of view of profits this investment of capital has been one of the best he has ever made. It is the duty of the young aristocratic politicians, to whom Disraeli also directly appealed, to make such a state of affairs universal. His appeal actually fired men's enthusiasm. A number of young members of the nobility, who were fresh from the university and filled with the romantic spirit of the time, formed themselves into the "Young England" party, which honoured Disraeli as its head and teacher, and was eager for social reforms.

Another movement tried to revive the old religious feeling and to lay the only true foundation of economic reform by filling all men with a genuinely Christian spirit. The leader in it was Frederic Denison Maurice, chaplain to Lincoln's Inn (1805-1872), who taught "our interests are common, and every man is full of duties toward his neighbour." For this reason the opposite, and unchristian, idea of the constitution of society was to be refuted, and the coincidence of the interests of all men to be expressed in practical action. Maurice thus founded the modern "Christian Socialism." He was soon joined by other men of equal sincerity of character and of unwearying solicitude for the welfare of the workers, above all by Charles Kingsley, John Malcolm Ludlow, and Vansittart Neale, "a body of friends, chiefly clergymen and barristers, to whose noble exertions hardly enough praise can be awarded." — Mill. Without serving any party, they were always ready to help the workers to obtain the object of their peaceful reforms, especially so far as they rested on the idea of co-operation, and made the greatest sacrifices on their behalf. In the event of strikes they publicly represented the interests of the
workmen, directed, without any remuneration, productive associations of workmen, and rendered the most valuable services to their co-operative societies.

Since the masses of workmen in crowded meetings joined enthusiastically this crusade against the abuses of the new order of things, the reform movement of the "forties" was bound in the end to become irresistible, especially since parliamentary inquiries and official reports had proved the enormous extent to which the "sweated" labouring classes were overworked, and had revealed pictures of the conditions of labour which, according to Moritz Brosch, rivalled Dante's description of hell in horror, and even surpassed it in realistic fidelity.

In vain the supporters of the prevailing doctrine of "laissez-faire" (Cobden and Bright, the acknowledged leaders of the school, at their head) resisted with all their might the agitation which struck such a blow at the fundamental propositions of Saint Manchester and was consequently decried as harmful; in vain the great employers of labour, under the leadership of the powerful iron-master, Lord Londonderry, took the field against "the hypocritical philanthropy which now prevails;" in vain the employers of the textile industry raised heartbreaking complaints over the threatening ruin of their trade; in vain the learned Oxford professor, Senior, "proved" minutely by the so-called "analysis of the manufacturing process" — in reality by incorrect calculations of the costs of production and prices of manufactured wares — that the whole net profit of the capital sunk in factories came from the twelfth hour of labour, and that therefore that hour could not possibly be curtailed. Dr. Andrew Ure, the panegyrist of the factory system, tried in vain to lay stress on the interests and the morals of the protected young persons themselves, who, if too early released from the discipline of the factory, would be driven into the arms of idleness and vice. All these forms of opposition (besides the opinion of the head of the government, Sir Robert Peel, which, being unfavourable to reform, weighed heavily in the scale) were defeated by the force of the movement supported by popular feeling. At the decisive voting in Parliament a part of the Whigs under the leadership of Macaulay, who, in spirited words recommended the protection of workmen as a means of retaining in the nation all those high qualities which had made the country great, allied themselves with the majority of the Tories and with the Radicals, in order to decree the ten-hour working day for persons from thirteen to eighteen years and for all female workers, at first only in the textile industry (1847). After the ten-hour working day had become law, the task remained of practically enforcing it. Obscurities in the law and the sympathy of the justices of the peace — men of the same social position as the manufacturers — with the employers who contravened the law, and finally the deference for the interested capitalistic circles shown by the government in the instructions given to the factory inspectors, seemed to favour a lax application of the law. But a supplementary law quickly limited the possibility of evading the ten-hour bill; the trades unions took minute pains to announce any contravention, and finally many factory inspectors exercised their vigilance in the matter with all their energy, so that Marx himself designates these years as the heroic age of the English factory inspection, and raises this memorial to a member of it, Leonard Horner, in "Capital:" "He had won immortal fame from the labour classes, since he had waged a lifelong war not only with the infuriated manufacturers, but with the ministers, for whom it had been far more important to count the votes of the factory owners in the Lower House, than the working hours of the 'hands' in the factory."
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Although this law, in fact, reduced the working day to ten hours not only for the protected persons, but generally for all employees (since the protected classes composed sixty per cent of all operatives), yet none of the consequences feared by interested or learned antagonists have ensued. The value of the British exports, reckoned before the passing of the law in 1846 at 57.7 million pounds sterling, had a few years later, in the year 1852, risen to 78 millions, an increase of thirty-five per cent. "If the shrewd calculation of Professor Senior had been correct," so a factory inspector remarked in his report with pointed irony, "every cotton mill in the United Kingdom would have worked for years at a loss." And with reference to the supposed degeneration of the children in consequence of too short a working day, a report of the factory inspection of the year 1848 noted that "such uncharitable talk about idleness and vice must be stigmatised as the purest cant and the most shameless hypocrisy." The protected persons were, on the contrary, saved from absolute degeneration, as was officially stated, and their physical health was considerably improved.

Thus, to use Marx's words, the marvellous development of industry, hand in hand with the moral and physical renascence of the factory worker, struck the dullest eye. The laws were gradually extended to the other great industries, and in 1867, under Disraeli's ministry, partly also to the workshops; and in 1868, at the instigation of this same minister, the whole of this legislation, which had already become somewhat confused, was consolidated and completed in the "Factory and Workshop Act."

The manufacturers, even before this, had completely reconciled themselves to the thought of the protection of workmen. Henceforth they offered no more resistance either on principle (by means of political agitation) or in practical life (by infringement of the factory laws). On this head a committee appointed by Parliament to examine the working of the existing factory laws reported (1876): "The numerous former enquiries into the position of the children and women engaged in the various industries of the country have disclosed conditions which produced a great outburst of public sympathy, and imperatively called for the intervention of the legislature. A striking contrast to the circumstances disclosed in these reports is afforded by the present position of the persons in whose favour the various factory and workshop acts have been passed. Some employments are still undoubtedly unhealthy in spite of the sanitary provisions of these acts, and in other industries there is still occasionally a pressure of work beyond the limits defined by law, which is prejudicial to the health of the operatives. But such cases, we are glad to say, are exceptional. At the same time we have no cause for assuming that the legislation which has shown itself so strikingly beneficial to the workers engaged has caused any considerable damage to the industries to which it applied. On the contrary, industrial progress was clearly not checked by the factory laws; and there are only few, even among the employers, who now wish for a repeal of the chief provisions of this act or deny the benefits produced by this legislation."
F. The Sympathy of the Upper Classes with the Life of the Lower Classes

At the time when the class-war divided England into two nations which hardly understood each other any more, Carlyle had taught that the factory system might find a new sort of independent relations, which would presuppose the charitable solicitude of the employer for his workmen. In a large number of industrial undertakings during the "forties" and the "fifties" more or less extensive arrangements had actually been made for the benefit of the workman, such as sick or disablement funds, dwelling-houses, bathing establishments, etc. But experience showed that these frequently well-meant institutions only flourished so long as their founders took a keen interest in them, and that they afterward fell into disuse. The fact also was disclosed that the modern workman is not permanently satisfied with such paternal solicitude: he does not choose to be kept in leading-strings or even to be superintended, but he desires complete liberty of movement out of working hours; and this was chiefly encroached upon in most cases of that solicitude. Not unfrequently the supremacy which the manufacturer obtained under such circumstances was directly used to reduce the wages of the workmen, to make their association with industrial or political movements impossible, and to bind them permanently to the undertaking in question by payment of contributions to benevolent funds, which are not recoverable on leaving the factory.

Such defects have finally very much lowered the value of the most celebrated example of solicitude for public prosperity, the workmen town, Saltaire, built by Sir Titus Salt for his factory. Here, where only his employees lived, there were at their disposal a theatre, a museum, a steamboat, a large park with play-grounds, a covered swimming-bath, and a secondary school. "From the outward brilliancy," Schulze-Gävernitz, the most recent visitor to Saltaire, tells us, "the dark side of the institution escapes the notice of the cursory observer; we only learnt from conversations with the inhabitants that this was an institution where benefits were obtained at the price of freedom. The position of the workmen in Saltaire is so regulated that all the workmen's houses are owned by the employer. The result of this is, that the firm can expel from Saltaire any person who is disliked, and that any attempts whatever at organisation on the part of the workmen are precluded. So long as Sir Titus, the benevolent patriarch of the factory, stood at the head of the business the workmen hardly felt their want of independence, both economic and political. His less benevolent successors in the business could not resist the temptation of turning the dependent position of the workmen to their own advantage. This was done by a reduction of wages, which are lower than those in the vicinity. The workmen were helpless; only the younger among them attempted to resist, and not without the approval of their fellows. Saltaire has therefore not been spared strikes, which have always ended in the submission of the workmen to the conditions of labour proposed by the one side only. The leaders of these movements were simply expelled from the town. These institutions of Sir Titus Salt, which scorn any self-government by the workmen, are even now beginning to decay, since the personal interest in the management of the works has
disappeared. The bath-house is already shut and disused, and the school is choked by a weight of debt and is hastening toward the same fate." Philanthropic efforts which lead to loss of independence have therefore fallen into disrepute among English workmen, although they were undoubtedly suitable at that time when capitalism was in the heyday of its sins; but the proletariat did not yet possess enough strength and foresight for a sufficiently powerful agitation in self-defence.

The conditions were different when manufacturers or other members of the upper classes aided the efforts of the workmen purely as private persons, and on their part did not claim any particular influence on the institutions founded by their assistance. In one place they started a workmen's bank, the management of which was in the hands of the workmen; in another they took every precaution for the protection of the health of the operatives; or they assisted the workmen in their efforts to devote their free time to suitable social amusements or definite educating pursuits. It was, of course, not manufacturers necessarily who thus interested themselves for the welfare of the workmen; very often persons who were outside the arena of commercial interests were better adapted for such efforts and more easily won the confidence of the workmen. The influence of Arnold Toynbee, a prematurely deceased philanthropist, has been of the first importance in this field. He organised, on a large scale, courses of lectures on popular science for the working classes, and in other respects, without the slightest party bias, lived entirely for the interests of the workmen. His great-hearted example fired others. Young men of the best ranks in society came by hundreds from the university to spend some time among the people, in order to accustom them to a suitable social life and physical exercise, to lecture to them and debate with them. And soon the universities met the popular demand for culture on the widest scale, since they established well-arranged courses of lectures on all subjects worth learning by the people, especially on English history and national economy, as the foundation of political training. Thus, indeed, something of the spirit of Carlyle has revived in the higher classes of England; his teaching, in spite of its fantastic elements, has had the power of drawing thousands upon thousands into its enchanted circle and of inducing them, out of pure love, to enter into and to appreciate the life of the people.

A similar success was attained recently by John Ruskin (1819–1899), who originally came into public notice as a writer on art, when he put forward with marvellous force kindred ideas of the constitution and life of society. The social hierarchy, Ruskin preached, must continue to exist; but it must find its moral justification in the spirit of equity and of love, which must prevail in place of the commercial spirit. Although already called from the scene of his labours, he is still England's most influential writer. Thousands of young men and women are endeavouring, in the spirit of his thoughts, to bridge over the gulf between class and class.

The final result of the social-political development of England in the nineteenth century is therefore this: there is no question of menacing feuds in the heart of the country; the working classes as a whole have increased their influence, their importance for the legislature and the administration, and their strength in organisation, and have permanently improved their conditions of life. The economic struggle between the classes is not yet done away with, even in England. On the contrary, the workmen class and the capitalist class nowhere in the world struggle so widely
and so deeply in the exchange of their reciprocal functions as in England; but the struggle has assumed legal forms, and in no country of the Old World is social constitutionalism so nearly realised as in England itself.

G. THE POLICY OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES IN GREAT BRITAIN: THE IRISH LAND QUESTION

There has been no commercial middle-class movement in England in the nineteenth century, but there has been an agricultural middle-class movement in one part of the United Kingdom, namely, in Ireland. The political and social conditions of the country where this movement occurred were peculiar, and the development of the movement and the solution which has hitherto been offered to the grievances of the Irish farmers are equally remarkable. Our account of them will be based on the investigations of Moritz Jaffé.

In Ireland, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, almost the whole soil had been transferred, by a long series of confiscations, to Protestant English landlords, who did not contemplate living on their estates, but had them managed by agents and broken up into small farms. The growth of the population and the steady increase of the competition among the Irish farmers finally led to a very extensive subdivision of the farms and at the same time to the exaction of higher rents. Since, in addition to this, England in the eighteenth century, from a narrow mercantile policy, had suppressed the industries of Ireland, just as those of her colonial possessions, the population of Ireland, which had reached eight millions in 1840, was dependent on the products of the soil, and chiefly on one single crop, that of the potato. The failure therefore of the potato harvest in the years 1845 and 1846 was bound to produce a terrible catastrophe for Ireland. A quarter of a million persons, according to the lowest estimate, perished from starvation and plague, and three millions were in receipt of relief. "Those two years of famine struck the population with that dread of their home which has resulted in the never-ceasing emigration and the perpetual diminution of the number of the inhabitants." — Moritz Jaffé. The English Parliament was for a long time unceasingly occupied with the circumstances of the Irish farmer, so that a member appropriately termed "Ireland" one "continually adjourned debate." Since, in virtue of the emancipation, the Irish Catholics under the leadership of Daniel O'Connell (1775–1847) had entered the House of Commons, they continually put their hand on that sore, so that the feeling spread more and more in the ranks of English politicians that the State must interfere in Ireland, where, according to a remark let fall in the House of Lords in 1844, "the landlord possessed the monopoly of the means of existence, and a power to enforce the contract dictated by him which was found nowhere else, namely, the power of hunger."

The Irish movement had in the first place aimed at a political object, the creation of Irish political rights. If they only obtained this, so they thought, it would be easy to get rid of the foreign landlords by some means or other. For two centuries the struggle had gone on. The people, debarred from all civic life, "outlaws," as Burke said, could only maintain themselves by lawless methods, and so Ireland has had secret societies formed against the oppressive Protestant landlords. Shut out from education, commerce, and religious worship for more than a
century, these fierce societies had little restraint, and were not squeamish about their methods. Fenianism among the emigrated Irish in the United States worked for a higher object. Modelled on national movements abroad, it aimed at the separation of Ireland from England, and trusted solely to honourable warfare. This having come to nothing, other associations arose, like the Invincibles, who resorted to assassination in the case of representatives of the ruling government or hated tools of the landowners.

It was at this time that the leader of the Irish parliamentary party, Isaac Butt (1813 to 1879), the author of the Home Rule programme, pointed out very clearly the way which would lead out of this confusion. Butt advocated a legal reform, which would confer "on the present tenants a fixed right of fair rent," by which means naturally a part of their property was won from the hands of the landlords. He here pointed to the precedent of the tenant custom which obtained in a part of Ireland. This "Ulster custom" — not legally valid, but actually maintained by a vigorous peasantry mostly of Scottish descent — contained the following three principles: Firstly, the rent can only be raised for quite exceptional reasons, and under no circumstances merely because rival candidates for the farm offer higher prices (therefore "fair rent"); secondly, the tenant has an admitted right to his farm, notice to quit can therefore only be given him on account of inferior husbandry or for similar reasons, and any improvements on the farm must be made good to him by the landlord on quitting (hence "fixity of tenure"); lastly, the tenant may on quitting appoint his successor, who pays him a price for the privilege (thus "free sale"). These are the famous three Fs, which since the "sixties" have become the battle cry of the Irish movement, and afterward the pivot of legal reform. In Ulster, where, owing to the fact that the farmers were able to insist on their rights, they had been observed for decades without discussion, they had an influence comparable to that of the existence of trades unions in the English working class. The industrious farmers, Protestants with the right to carry arms, equipped with some means, flourished amazingly under the protection of the custom, while the tenants in the Roman Catholic provinces led a miserable existence. No doubt, all disputes naturally between landlords and tenants were not abolished, since the conception of fair rent was not clearly defined, and therefore in practice gave rise to numerous varieties of opinion. But all the more easily the tenant right, the Ulster custom, was bound to be considered by the Irish country people as their legal prerogative, since "in its essential point it was nothing exceptional; for it only embodied and carried out the unwritten farming law of the Irish tenantry, those ideas which prevailed amongst the people in contradistinction from the English law (which had abolished the old British code of tribal ownership), but which, outside Ulster, could only be enforced in those parts where they were helped by crime and panic, threats and intimidation." — M. Jaffé.

This was, then, the direction taken by the Land Act of 1870, passed by William Ewart Gladstone (1809–1898); but further legislation was accelerated by the movement headed since 1880 by Charles Stewart Parnell (1846–1891), and by the founding of the "Land League;" this latter theoretically aimed at changing the tenants into owners, and practically adopted an extensive method of boycotting willing agents and tenants of the landlords. The preliminary Land Act of 1870 had only made a timid start in the intended direction; a sweeping land act was passed in 1881, at the instance of Gladstone, whose greatest achievement as a states-
man is to be found in this field. The act admits first the claim of the tenant to sell or to bequeath his tenant rights; the landlord has a veto only on reasonable grounds. If he wishes to exercise the right of pre-emption, which is expressly reserved to him, he must satisfy the tenant by a sum of money, which, in default of mutual agreement, is to be settled by the court. The law further provides that, at the request of one of the parties only, the rent shall be fixed by an order of the court for a period of fifteen years. During this time the landlord is not allowed to raise the rent or to give notice to quit. It throws light on the difference between the relations of landlords and tenants in England and in Ireland when we find in the fifty-eighth section of the act that all estates managed as English estates (namely, when the landlords make and maintain improvements) are exempted from the provisions of the act.

The Land Act of 1881 was followed by a series of supplementary laws, of which the most important is that of the year 1885; by it the Land Commission in Dublin, the court for the administration of the land acts, was empowered to effect the change of tenants into landlords where it was feasible. In such cases the purchasing tenant was to receive an advance of the whole purchase money, in return for which he was bound to pay to the Land Commission for forty-nine years four per cent on the sum advanced as interest and contribution to the sinking fund. The commission had for this purpose the immense sum of forty-three million pounds sterling placed at its disposal.

This agrarian legislation implied, as is seen, deep encroachments on legal rights as well as on economic liberty. But it put an end to an anachronistic state of things, the like of which has not existed in any European country since the fifteenth century, by giving some protection to the great bulk of the population previously at the mercy of landlords differing from them in race, politics, and creed.

A part of the agrarian difficulties is not caused indeed by the conditions of tenancy, but by the diminutive farms, which are also worked with the most primitive means. In fact, M. J. Bonn in his "Studies on the West of Ireland" has stated that on thousands of these small farms such trifling profits can be extracted that even the complete remission of the rent will not do away with the distress. On these holdings no "economic rent" can be made. This is, of course, no argument against the abatement of rent on such holdings on the ground that the rent is so small that it does not matter, as even the reduction does something to mitigate evils oppressing a nation ruined by centuries of oppression and misery, where industries as well as civilisation have been retarded and even crushed out, so far as law could do so.

The Land Act of 1881 was originally not even regarded as an instalment by the Irish parliamentary party, which represented the discontented peasantry; on the contrary, Parnell conjured the peasants in a manifesto not to claim the benefits of the Act, but to reduce rents as they liked. The agitation thus lasted for some time longer, and occasionally violent action and even murders followed its wake. But after the death of Parnell (1891) the section split up and lost its influence in Parliament; and in Ireland itself, where the agrarian reform had meanwhile gained an opportunity to work and to remedy much injustice and distress, the agitation found far less inflammatory material than before. Since then the country has quieted down. The rents come in satisfactorily, and the relations between landowner and tenant have now assumed a fairly peaceful aspect.
English public men had in this generation to attempt the solution of the social question in Ireland, as they had a generation before to attempt the removal of the difficulties created by the industrial problem of the workmen in England. Both times it was necessary for the discontented to advance in serried masses, before the ruling party could be convinced how precarious the existing state of things was. In Ireland, violence has always been the necessary precursor of reform. British politicians have applied themselves to the amelioration of the oppressed classes. With a freedom from prejudice which was absolutely splendid when compared with the prevalent economic teaching, men like Gladstone and Bright tested from time to time the limits and possibilities of State aid, and always in the first place, with sober common sense, supported the honest efforts made by men to help themselves. Finally, they never hesitated to inflict on the interests of the hitherto favoured classes that loss which is inseparable from every great reform.

3. THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN FRANCE

A. THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT UP TO 1848

In France the first social movement, in the modern sense, was in connection with the great Revolution. This had tried to put into practice the ideas of Rousseau as to the law of nature. Man is by nature good, so Rousseau taught. This good, uncorrupted man, so Robespierre added, was now personified by the lower orders only, who had remained untouched by luxury and vice. The government was, therefore, to be transferred to the lower orders by the grant of equal political privileges to all citizens, and thus the reign of everlasting equality, virtue, and happiness would dawn. The new Constitution of 1793 adopted as its principle, "All men are equal by nature and by law," and "The object of society is the welfare of all." Thus, Robespierre declared, "We wish that in our country selfishness be replaced by morality, ambition by honesty, decency by the sense of duty, contempt of misfortune by contempt of vice."

But the reality showed a quite different picture, and these beautiful ideals remained unattained. Then the scales fell from the eyes of many Republicans. Not merely political inequality, but also economic inequality ought to have disappeared, if that goal were to be reached. Private property was, however, held responsible for that, therefore it also must be destroyed. The most radical of the Republicans had long looked somewhat suspiciously on the capitalist class. Marat, in his "Ami du Peuple," had written, "It would be a sorry advantage to conquer the nobility of birth, in order to yield to the nobility of wealth." And in 1791, when the day labourers were excluded from the franchise, he had threatened that the "favourites of fortune" should tremble, lest the moneyless, to whom they refused the active citizenship because they were too poor, should finally, perhaps, end their poverty by taking away the surplus from the rich. He had even hinted clearly, without estimating the whole extent of the idea, that "equality of rights must lead to equality of enjoyments, and that the thought could not otherwise be satisfied."

But men had not yet arrived at clear ideas of a new distribution of property. On the contrary, this result was not attained until the Directory, after the Demo-
cratic Constitution of 1793 had been set aside, owing to François Noël Babeuf (1764–1797), a former partisan of Robespierre. Starting with the precepts of the law of nature, Babeuf pictured to himself the ideal society based on the following precepts: the duty of all to work; statutory settlement of the number of working hours; regulation of production by a supreme board elected by the people; division of the necessary work among the individual citizens; the right of all citizens to all enjoyments; and a corresponding distribution of property among individuals, according to the standard of equality.

Since even the boldest imagination hesitated to hope from one day to another for the realisation of this ideal, Babeuf had planned a series of appropriately devised measures as a connecting link between the present and the social regeneration of the future. Since these have played a great part in the history of the revolutionary social movement, they cannot be passed over here. In the first place, a “great national community of property” was to be established, to which all State property, all property of the “enemies of the popular cause,” as well as all estates which were left uncultivated, were to be attached. Every Frenchman could join the community if he gave up his property and placed his working powers at its disposal. Besides that, the community would inherit all private estates. The members were to work in common; in return they would receive all the food “which composed a moderate and frugal cuisine,” and other necessaries of life. Any one who entered the community burdened with debt became exempt from all liabilities.

On the basis of this programme, Babeuf, favoured by the circumstances described, succeeded in collecting round him many thousand followers, chiefly old supporters of the Jacobin doctrines, discontented members of the middle class, and political theorists of every rank, but only a very small proportion of journeymen and artisans. The government interfered, alarmed at the threatening character of the movement. A secret association (the Club of the Pantheon) was therefore formed, which took steps to prepare a decisive blow. It was proposed to capture the capital by a coup-de-maître, in order to plant side by side the banners of economic and political equality; although the prepared manifesto to the people cautiously spoke only of the restoration of the overthrown Constitution of 1793, in order that all who held Jacobin views might join the agitators. While the rebellion was still being secretly discussed, Babeuf and his colleagues, who had long been betrayed and watched by the police, were arrested (May, 1796). Being brought before the National Tribunal, Babeuf and his friend Dantès, although acquitted on the charge of conspiracy, were condemned to death for inciting men to divide private property (guillotined May 27, 1797), and seven fellow-conspirators, among them the future historian of the movement, Filippo Buonarroti (1761–1837), were sentenced to banishment. The young communistic movement thus become leaderless was doomed to rapid extinction. But the French nation, which longed for rest, order, security for the new conditions of property created by the Revolution, and undisturbed economic activity, was only the more incited by the discovery of the communistic plots to welcome any power which promised to grant its wishes. Thus soon “a new act in the tragedy of the Revolution was ended, in order to make way for the personality of a man who soon, by the brilliance of his victories, silenced Republicans, Freethinkers, Communists, and Democrats.”—Lorenz von Stein.
It was not until the third decade of the nineteenth century that a large socialist movement was again started in France, at a time when the industrial development had not yet created an enormous proletariat. This explains why it found its followers mainly among the sections of the middle and upper classes, which were steeped in idealism. Here "the young men had heard in their childhood of the portentous events of the Revolution, had lived through the empire, and were sons of heroes or victims; their mothers had conceived them between two battles, and the thunder of cannon had ushered them into the world." — G. Brandes. These youths, passionate and romantic in spirit, full of an instinctive dislike of the unscrupulous egotism and the prosaic dulness of the bourgeoisie society around them, were forced to offer strong opposition to the prevailing utilitarianism, and to welcome rapturously the first prophet who undertook an attack on selfishness, narrow-mindedness, and the aristocracy of wealth. Such a man was Bazin in 1828, who enlisted supporters for socialism in connection with the teaching of Saint-Simon.

Count Claude Henri de Saint-Simon (1760–1825), who, while able to found a school, could never produce a regular movement, had stopped short of socialism. He had never clearly understood the war between capital and proletariat. On the contrary, he included both classes under the category of "industrials" (that is, as the body of those who work at the production of material enjoyments), who, as the most numerous and productive class, ought properly to govern the State, while, as a matter of fact, the great landowners, the clergy, and the high officials possessed the power. The political background of the time favoured these ideas. At that period (1815–1830) the decisive war in France between the adherents to the ancien régime and the bourgeoisie supported by the people was being waged, while the class dispute between the property-owning orders and the proletariat, which was now first developing, had not yet appeared.

The teaching of Saint-Simon was the theoretical expression of the aspiring classes generally. The supremacy of the "industrials," which he advocated, began to assert itself in the actual economic development as the supremacy of capital. If a socialist doctrine was developed in connection with his ideas, it was due to his unscrupulous accentuation of the principle of equality, which recognised no privileges of birth but only a capacity for work, to his steady regard for the welfare of the masses, and to his demand that practical life should be impregnated with a more complete system of morality. This demand was in harmony with the tendency of the time, which was characterised by romanticism and the movement toward religious reform. The spirit of the age no less than the essence of Saint-Simon's nature, which was wrapped up in mysticism, required that his system should be first and foremost a religious and moral one. He therefore expressly termed it "a new Christianity." His object was to accustom mankind to a new code of ethics, in order to raise on this foundation a new political and social fabric. "In the new Christianity," he wrote, "all morality will be directly derived from the principle that men are to regard each other as brothers. This principle, which was held by primitive Christianity, will be explained, and in its new form will lay down the fundamental proposition that religion must direct society toward the one great end, the immediate amelioration of the lot of the poorest class." Thus it was Saint-Simon's intention to perfect the material side of Christianity, and so to bring about complete earthly happiness.
Saint-Simon had not contemplated a property reform. This was first planned
by Saint-Amand Bazard (1791–1832), who also, in connection with the historic-
social ideas of his master, had elaborated a special doctrine of the historical de-
velopment. According to this, there are two fundamental social ideas, that
of selfishness (or of individualism) and that of unity (or of association). According
as the latter or the former principle predominates, organic or critical periods in the
history of nations may be distinguished. The organic epoch is characterised by
the universally recognised authority of definite ideas, by the prevalence of the
same thoughts in the minds of all, and by a united effort toward the same ends.
Mankind here felt itself conscious of some definite purpose, and therefore proceeded
to raise permanent social structures. The critical epoch was marked by criticism
of the traditional principles, which were deprived of their influence over men's
minds by the disappearance of public spirit and by the reign of individualism.
Existing institutions were undermined, until finally the edifice, which earlier times
had reared, crashed down.

Hitherto the history of the world had seen two great organic and two great
critical periods. The organic epoch of classical antiquity produced the glory of
Hellas and the greatness of Rome; the critical epoch started with the beginning
of the Greek philosophy, which undermined the old religion and the old Hellenic
world of ideas, and with the advance of the destructive individualism into the
Roman Empire. After the breaking up of the old world, the second organic period
began with Christianity. It produced new and vigorous political constitutions
and a new culture. But after the fifteenth century criticism again asserted itself;
scepticism was everywhere triumphant, the world was torn in pieces, and nowhere
was a common bond to be found. But this new critical period, which brought
in unspeakable misery, approached its end. On every side the need was felt of a
new organic age, which clearly was near enough, for its herald was there already in
the person of Saint-Simon.

In this new epoch the material organisation would be reformed, since thus only
could each individual find his true place in society. Originally, when the war of
individuals against each other still showed its most savage aspect, the vanquished
was killed. But the victor soon recognised that it was more profitable for him to
give his enemy his life, so that he might make him his subject. Thus there fol-
lowed, as a consequence of power, the exploitation of man by man (“exploitation de
l'homme par l'homme”), which became the fundamental characteristic of society.
In antiquity, the subject was a slave; in the Middle Ages, under the influence of
Christianity, a serf; in modern times he has become a worker (ouvrier), — free in
the eye of the law, but deprived of all property and subject to the dictates of the
rich he is “the slave of his misery and his poverty, which he can no more end
voluntarily than the serf could.”

The problem, then, is to abolish the prerogative of wealth, just as the Revolu-
tion broke down all other privileges. For this reason the right of succession, by
which any one without proof of his merit is put into a favoured position, must be
abolished. The community shall be heir, and shall proceed to distribute the
money which accrues to it, among the individuals in proportion to their capabili-
ties. The management of the properties, on the other hand, is to remain private,
as before. Hence the simple rule, — to each according to his capabilities, and capa-
bilities to be judged by works; or, as it is put more clearly by Enfantin (cf. below).
"To every man work according to his capacities, and pay according to results." In this way the union between individualism and communism, which is so important for new social structures, is finally established; the individual produces, in the first place, for himself, but since at his death his property reverts to society, he is producing also for the community. And so the followers of the new doctrine announced "to the astonished world an age so full of fame and magnificence, such glorious times, such golden crops and rich harvests, such happy people, so much wealth and pleasure, so much greatness, enjoyment, and harmony, that the most indifferent opened eyes and ears and were intoxicated with these prophetic visions."

— Louis Reybaud.

The elaboration of this doctrine in detail was chiefly due to Barthélémy Prosper Enfantin (1796–1864), who represented all profits, rents, and dividends as a species of income which did not depend on the labour of the possessor, but on the "exploitation" of the workman. The fundamental principles which were to put an end to all this had to be carried out by a hierarchical organisation of society, and for this reason the contesting Saint-Simonian party had already been organised on a strict system of hierarchy, and its guidance entrusted to two high priests (pères suprêmes), Bazard and Enfantin (1829). But when Enfantin, becoming arrogant from the number of his followers, who were reckoned by thousands, demanded the "emancipation of the flesh," since he preached that the marriage tie should not be binding if affections grow cool, because society ought to be just to all natures, even to flirts and coquettes, then Bazard seceded, disgusted at such a travesty of the true teaching (1831). The "Globe," the organ of the school, soon preached without any further shame the bold doctrine of free love. Such a foolish and immoral deterioration could not fail to alienate the people from a doctrine stained with the twofold blemish of extravagance and indecency. Enfantin could only find forty loyal followers, when he withdrew to his property at Ménilmontant, near Paris, with the fragments of what had been shortly before so flourishing a school (1832). "Enfantin," the last number of the "Globe" declared, "is the messiah of God, the king of the nations. The world sees its Christ, and recognises him not; therefore, he withdraws himself from you with his apostles." The last survivors of the school (Olinde Rodrigues, Michel Chevalier, Charles Duveyrier) were finally dispersed by legal intervention, since a charge of immorality was brought against them (August, 1832). So rapidly was the movement past, and so violent was the disenchantedment of the public, that "nothing was left of the whole incident except a feeling of astonishment that men could ever have paid attention to it, and a new ground for distrust of innovations. Before a year elapsed people spoke of Saint-Simonism as of a long-forgotten matter." — Lorenz von Stein.

Charles Fourier (1772–1837; see his portrait on p. 386) elaborated his social theory independently of Saint-Simon. Its starting point was strictly individualistic. His aim was not the happiness of the community nor the equality of all, but the satisfaction of the impulses of the individuals, the most enjoyable life for each separate person. All individual impulses, according to Fourier, come from God, as necessarily follows from their existence, and are therefore good. It is only necessary to give them free play on a profitable field; the result is then obtained that men can always have wishes and desires, and that the earth can readily satisfy all their wishes. If at the present time men have longings which remain unsatisfied, and impulses which must be suppressed, this, in view of the harmony between

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wish and enjoyment which God wills, is an evil which must exclusively be attributed to the deficient organisation of human society.

Fourier criticised with appropriate severity all the historical forms of society, but none so bitterly as the modern social system, which he called "civilisation" only in scorn. Small industries, so Fourier predicted in 1808, must disappear before competition. Great undertakings alone can exist, and a small number of powerful capitalists will finally determine the destiny of the world. Trade, which ought only to mediate between production and consumption, has made itself the master of the producers, amasses inordinately large gains, and occupies far too many persons. The efficiency of labour, as at present organised, falls equally short of the demands that can justly be made upon it; for labour ought to be a pleasure to the worker, instead of which it is a burden, and naturally returns only poor results. And it is obvious that agriculture must be unproductive if we think that the ground is parcelled out, and that the cultivation of the soil is the work of poor, stupid peasants.

But far better than "civilisation" is the age of the "guarantee," to which the former is really tending. In this the individual has his existence at least guaranteed; the middle classes will obtain better credit, and the labouring classes will be aided by insurance against certain vicissitudes of life. If in the meantime mankind is organised into "phalanstries," which is directly possible, it will at once share in a rapturous happiness. Each "phalanstery" is an association of two thousand persons who live together, work and eat — that is to say, as far as suits them. Each performs at any moment the work which actually affords him pleasure, by which presumably the productivity of the labour is enormously increased. The incoming profits are distributed among the members according to the work done, the ability shown, and the capital contributed. The private family is abolished; in its place a peculiar free love is introduced, which gives different privileges to the various lovers of the woman.

The system of Fourier only attained considerable importance after the dissolution of the Saint-Simonian school. Victor Considérant (1808–1897) had great influence on it, as he freed the master's teaching from all kinds of fantastic additions, and at the same time brought prominently forward certain vigorous ideas which could be turned to account in the popular agitation, such as the right to work and the insurance of the worker.

Both these movements, Saint-Simonism as well as Fourierism, had on the whole found supporters only among the "intellectuels," and those members of the middle class who were theorists. The real mass of workers kept aloof from them as a rule. The first interference of the French workmen in politics followed rather in connection with the secret societies of the Republicans. In the middle of the "twenties" a new secret society, the "Société des Amis du Peuple," had formed itself out of the ruins of the overthrown Carbonari conspiracy, with a Jacobin programme. Its management was in the hands of a number of young men, mostly students, who succeeded in carrying their agitation into the ranks of the workmen. Out of this society, which made various attempts to effect the establishment of the republic by concerted risings, was developed, after various intermediate steps, the "Société des Familles," the views of which advocated communism.

Filippo Buonarroti, an Italian, one of the banished members of Babeuf's party (cf. above), had received an amnesty, and on his return had plunged once
more headlong into the whirlpool of conspiracy. Thus he had become a Carbonaro, and had afterward joined that republican body of conspirators. True to his old ideals, he had tried to introduce communism into these associations. But that which the speeches of the feeble old man failed to effect was accomplished by his spirited narrative of Babeuf's teaching, heroism, and martyrdom ("Conspiration de Babeuf," Brussels, 1828). The members of the secret clubs—the "inteleculteux," the middle class, and the workers—recognized that the only true result of equality for them was communism.

Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881) and Armand Barbès (1809–1870), two ex-students who had played a part in all republican plots, and had been in the forefront of every disturbance, were the leaders of these communists. Disheartened by no failures, and crushed by no penalties, these past masters of conspiracy used every release from prison as an opportunity to plan at once fresh murderous schemes and assassinations. These men, who wanted rather the fiendish delight of conspiracy than any object for conspiracy, did not attempt to initiate any such tangible schemes of reform as even Babeuf had already started. The tactics of the secret society guided by them were to make the ruling power incapable of resistance by a skilful and bold coup-de-main at the appropriate moment, and to rouse the people to revolt. An attempt on the life of the king was advised as a preliminary skirmish before the pitched battle. The method of this political warfare is what the Socialists have since usually called "Blanquist tactics." On May 12, 1839, the preconcerted insurrection of the Blanquists, eight hundred and fifty in number, took place; but since at that moment no political or economic crisis was felt, the expected response was not forthcoming, and the rising was soon quelled.

While the difficulties of association were so great, the natural disinclination of the French to form strong and permanent party combinations could not fail to produce a large variety of sects, corresponding to the many socialist schemes of the time. The exaggerated doctrine of Babeuf as to equality was continued by the school of Etienne Cabet (1788–1856), which wished to attain its object by strictly legal methods, and in other points made an advantageous departure from the crudities of Babeuf's scheme. The Fourierists have been already mentioned. Next came the school of Philippe Buchez (1796–1865), who had given a more distinct character to the shapeless propositions of the Fourierists by the effective remedy of union. Buchez insisted from 1831 onward that the workmen ought to economise until they could form themselves into a productive association. A part of the profits of the business ought then to be applied either to the extension of the old association or to the founding of a new one, until finally all the workmen in France were owners of the capital necessary for production. This train of thought led, as Lexis pointed out, to a series of actual attempts, and certain sections of the Parian working classes clung tenaciously to the idea.

The plan developed by Louis Blanc (1811–1882) of founding such "productive" associations by State-given aid could not fail to meet with more support from the proletariat. For then the workman did not require to save out of his small wages; and besides this, the Fourth Estate was liberated at a blow. The scheme of Blanc culminated in the special point that the State should organise the workmen, so far as they wished, into workshops, which, during the first year, were to be directed by the State, but afterward by the workmen themselves. These "ateliers sociaux" were to be associated, to agree as to the method and extent of the production, to
provide for the sick and incapable, and to help those undertakings which were depressed by crises. Since it was expected that the industries conducted by capitalists would soon be brought to a standstill by this competition, this system of associations only presented a transition stage toward pure communism, of which the principles were to be, "Production according to capabilities, consumption according to requirements."

All these schools — and this point must be strongly emphasised, for it is often overlooked — must not be considered as merely representative of the working classes; on the contrary, they felt that they represented all classes suffering from capricious methods of production, the lower middle class as much as the proletariat.

This is still more the case with the radical Christian Socialists of that time, such as Pierre Leroux (1797–1871), the Abbé Hugues Félicité Robert de Lamennais (1782–1854) and Henri Benjamin Constant de Rebecque (1767–1830). Constantin Pecqueur (1801–1887). These, consciously or unconsciously, renewed the idea of Saint-Simon, that a purification of mankind by religion and morality was alone able to pave the way for future social reform; for then only would all men regard each other as brothers, and therefore could establish a new organisation, in which the possessors of wealth would consent to equalise the differences in property.

Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865; see his picture on p. 386), a contemporary, appreciated more fully the interests of the middle and the lower classes, since in an ingenious but thoroughly idealist scheme he aimed at a realisation of the three main principles of the great Revolution, justice, equality, and liberty, in the economic world. He took up a position, in the interests of individual freedom, distinctly opposed to communism, against which he brought the charges that it obliterates the distinctions between individuals, fosters the indolence of all, and extinguishes personality. His intention was to preserve the improvements due to the economic system of individualism, but on the other hand to remove the distress and unhappiness introduced by it. For this reason competition is to be maintained; but opposition and isolation are, within certain limits, to be obviated by reciprocal support and combination. For "competition and association," so he said, "support each other. Far from excluding each other, they do not even diverge. Whoever speaks of competition assumes a common goal; competition is therefore not egoism, and it is the most lamentable error of socialism to see in it the overthrow of society." He only attacked the unrestrained competition, where the possession of capital, as the privilege of a favoured minority, "exploits" the large, hard-working majority of the people; where the small man, from want of credit, cannot keep his footing; and where the social disorder leads to a crisis, to the bankruptcy of employers, and to want of employment among many thousand workers. Proudhon necessarily demanded a condition of society which retains competition, and therefore private property, but at the same time checks them by social rules. This is done by the "constituted value," that is, by a standard which regulates all prices according to the scale of fairness, and thus "constitutes" them, and by institutions which are to place the necessary capital, without any interest, at the disposal of all workingmen of respectable credit. Society, so Proudhon claimed, simply places the requisite means by way of loan at the disposal of the individuals and associations which undertake production; for neither is independent of the other, and so all
barter and commercial intercourse (in contrast to the conditions now obtaining between capitalist and workman or artisan) take place without violence done to one party. Henceforth only products of equal value are exchanged one for the other, that is, products which can be prepared in equal time and with equal expenditure.

In this way it follows that only work actually done is valued and fully paid for, so that the fair selling price is the automatic result of the true liberty of exchange rendered practicable by the loan of the capital without any interest. Proudhon therefore imagined that the desired organisation of the future would not be central, but, in the widest sense, federal. The peasants will not be organised in associations, since agricultural labour is incompatible with any form of partnership. Every peasant will rather manage his plot in complete independence. The case is different in those industries the prosecution of which assumes an extensive division of labour. Since association appears to be imperatively necessary there, the only question is to give it a form compatible with the dignity of each separate person concerned. Such a form is that where every worker is also a partner. Every association further is pledged, as regards the management, to supply all the desired products and results regularly, almost at cost price. The societies compete against each other, and are not allowed to form a combination for the purpose of influencing the prices in any way. Their books are, if so wished, at the disposal of the management, which is to have the right of checking the accounts. In event of any contravention of these principles the management can pronounce the dissolution of the association. Any one can leave it when he will, and have his accounts settled; on the other hand, the association can admit as member any one it wishes. Besides this, no one who can carry on a business for himself is to be prevented from opening his own workshops and setting up any industry he chooses. And if any one is prepared to work for daily wages in these workshops, nothing shall stand in his path.

It was thus a remarkable social ideal which Proudhon had formed. But the peculiar blending of socialism and individualism which it put forward, the refusal of all centralisation, not merely in politics, but also in economic life, and finally the concession of loans without interest, could not fail to make it acceptable to the small masters, without diminishing its attractiveness for the proletarians.

The lower classes naturally, on whom this shower of systems and ideas fell, could not make subtle distinctions. On the contrary, the brains of those who were not committed to any definite doctrines evolved a sort of "average socialism," out of all kinds of objections to property, complaints against the prosperous middle class, sympathy for the distress of the working class, hopes for a better future, claims on the State, and illusions as to the remedial force of associations. Thus catchwords were common among the people, which possessed no precise meaning, but, for the very reason that every one could attach what significance to them he wished, seemed to all alike a panacea for the social calamities of the time. The most important part was played by the phrase "organisation of labour." "This expression," a deputy explained in the chamber subsequently, "has exercised an absolutely magic influence. It has passed from mouth to mouth, from journal to journal, and has found a universal echo in the public. Its success has been increased by the very vagueness of the formula. On every bankruptcy, on every suspension of work, every time that a machine has been invented, and therefore the number of hands employed has been lessened, it is always the same cry, 'labour must be organised.'"
Since this was the mood of the people, the party of the democratic middle class led by Alexandre Auguste Ledru-Rollin (1807–1874) saw itself compelled to make advances to socialism. Its chief organ, the "Réforme," willingly opened its columns to Louis Blanc's social and political articles, and even its official programme clearly showed the influence of the new socialist doctrines. "The workers," so it ran, "have been slaves and serfs; they are now labourers; our aim must be to elevate them to the position of sharers. The State must take the initiative in industrial successes in order to introduce such organisation of labour as will raise the workers to the position of sharers. The State must provide work for the stalwart and healthy citizen, and help and protection for the old and weak."

Notwithstanding this strong socialist current, there were at first only slight waves visible on the surface of political life; the strict law of meetings and associations, and the franchise which depended on a large income and was granted only to the two hundred thousand richest citizens in the whole of France, prevented the new ideas from being asserted with irresistible weight in ordinary times.

In the "thirties" and "forties," when socialism and the emancipation of the lower orders were so prominent in the world of thought, the governing powers were quite unconcerned by them. At no period of the nineteenth century had the large industries and "haute finance" so ruled the governing powers as at that time, which Treitschke called "the golden age of the bourgeoisie." Indeed the labour legislation in no way served to protect the worker, but was purely directed toward the interests of the bourgeoisie. The associations of workers in the same craft for the promotion of their "presumed" common interests, as it was very significantly termed in the law, which dated from the year 1791, were still prohibited; and this law, under the government of Louis Philippe, was still enforced merely against coalitions of the workers, and never against the employers. The prefects were instructed, in the event of strikes, to forbid meetings and to put foreigners who took part in them at once across the frontier. The labour book was obligatory on the workmen, and in the commercial courts the employers had a secured majority. Only a feeble protective law was passed in favour of the workmen, which established a twelve hours' maximum working day for children; and even then the official instructions for carrying it out explained that it could not be strictly observed. The ruling class in France was not at all disturbed, either by the misery of certain sections of the proletarians in the large towns, or by riots of starving workmen or risings of communistic conspirators.

This misgovernment was crowned by the insolent ignorance with which the official representatives of this rule of the great bourgeoisie flatly denied the existence of abuses and declared their world to be the best of all possible worlds. Although facing a condition of things which concealed in it most bitter class disputes, that section of society asserted that neither disabilities nor privileges existed, since every one could become rich, and then acquire the highest political rights.

"There are no more class disputes," announced François Pierre Guillaume Guizot (1787–1874), as president of the council, a short time before the February Revolution, "for there are no longer any conflicting interests." And when reference was made to the agitation among the people, he arrogantly thought that "we, the three powers, the crown and the chambers, are the only legal organs of the sovereignty of the people; beside us there is only usurpation and revolution." And thus the
demand for the extension of the franchise, which in the whole country was granted only to a bare quarter of a million of the most highly taxed, was flatly refused. No class which so obstinately asserted its privileges could rule for long; and in fact the monarchy of July, 1830, was overturned like a house of cards by the revolutionary hurricane of the year 1848.

The upper bourgeoisie was, however, still the politically most matured class at that time. The real middle class, the poorer citizens of the towns, had, under the July kingdom, abandoned the radical opposition, which politically supported the traditions of the great Revolution. In other points it fluctuated vaguely between the maintenance of all ownership and a socialist altruism, and had never been able to effect a union with the peasants, by far the most numerous class in the country. The political immaturity of the middle class was exceeded by that of the working classes, who thought they could come with one mighty leap into that land of promise called socialism. Under such circumstances the provisional government which, put at the head of affairs by the Revolution of February, 1848, embodied primarily the middle class, and secondarily the working orders, was not able to produce any considerable results. The maximum working day, which had been fixed for all industrial undertakings, was not carried out, and the prohibition to appoint "middlemen" (who overworked the men) was not observed. The gift of three million francs to the labour associations was unable to effect any increase in co-operative systems, and the reluctant attempt to put into practice the right to work finally, when the "national workshops" established for the purpose were discontinued, led to riots.

B. THE "IMPERIALIST" SOCIAL POLICY OF NAPOLEON III

Thus the French ship of state drifted aimlessly, without a compass, on the ocean of politics, and was at the mercy of the first man who knew how to take the helm and steer her into a safe harbour. The direction of the official social policy under Napoleon III was determined by the fact that the sovereign himself, while still a young prince, had developed his own programme of social reform, which culminated in the creation of a nobility of manufacturers in Carlyle's sense, and in an attempt by the State to solve the labour problem by the cultivation of untilled lands. What was done, then, toward putting this project into practice, when its originator mounted the throne of France? If we wish to answer this question correctly we must not forget that Napoleon had paved the way to his position by perjury and crime, and that therefore he had to be on his guard against revenge. This system therefore began with a campaign against all associations, however constituted, of workmen, who were considered the most active disseminators of revolutionary ideas. Thus not only all their political unions but also their purely economic societies, including many flourishing co-operative stores and similar societies, fell victims to the dictatorship which "saved society."

But after the first zeal to found the new empire had abated, a careful distinction was made between the political and the economic organisations of the proletariat, and while the former were ruthlessly nipped in the bud, no obstacles were placed in the way of the latter. Thus there arose under the empire a very vigorous labour agitation, of which the centre of gravity lay in the combinations for obtaining higher wages and generally improved conditions of labour. Now it
is true that such coalitions were forbidden according to the already mentioned law of 1791; but they were still tacitly allowed. "Striking" workmen were pardoned, and complete neutrality was enjoined on the prefects in event of suspension of work. Finally (1864) the prohibition on coalition itself was removed.

But beyond this the empire undertook to support the working classes by a long series of tangible measures. At one time it tried to guarantee to the metropolis cheap prices for necessary provisions. This was done especially by the establishment of the "Caisse de la boulangerie" endowed by the bakers, from which the individual masters received advances in times of high prices for corn in order to be able to maintain the low price of bread. Then an energetic attempt was made to face the labour question, not indeed in the vague form of the royal pamphlet, but by a system of public building operations. Within fifteen years more than fifteen milliards of francs were spent in Paris alone on public edifices. The same thing happened in Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. This measure had various important consequences from the magnificent scale on which it was carried out. Permanent and profitable employment was given to a large number of "hands," wages had an upward tendency, and the spirit of enterprise was everywhere aroused by the excitement proceeding from the building industry.

All else that happened was of subordinate significance. The remaining point most worthy of mention is the legislation on mutual help societies, which supported their members in case of sickness or, under certain circumstances, of incapacity to work. These possessed an income of ten million francs and various privileges; and their number actually increased from two thousand in 1852 to four thousand in 1859. The workmen in the State workshops were compelled to insure their old age, and at the same time their wages were increased by the amount of the premiums. Besides this, State funds were available for the construction of workmen's dwellings and the erection of benevolent institutions (crèches for the children of workmen, asylums for crippled workmen). It is strange that the empire never thought about real legislation for the protection of workmen.

The most appropriate estimate of all this social policy is given by Lexis in his book on trades unions in France. "Louis Napoleon as emperor did not really need to fear that he would be reminded by the working classes of his brochure on pauperism. The social policy of the empire is by no means opposed to the spirit of it. Discipline and superintendence of the workmen on the one side, amelioration of their material position on the other: that is an idea which is always upheld in the home policy of Louis Napoleon." In fact the working class undoubtedly gained much from the new order of things; its position was incomparably improved during the years 1850-1870. Even the development of capital in the age of joint-stock companies was, on account of the number of new undertakings, not without profit to the lowest classes. For "even if one part of the shifted millions was concentrated in the coffers of the capitalistic body, another part was scattered over the mass of the wage-earning class." — Lexis.

Notwithstanding this, the proletariat was proof against all the allurements of the second empire. It was dumb to all gifts, deaf to all promises, cold to all flatteries; indeed, "the current of republican feeling, like a mighty river, swept away with it continually larger masses of the people." — Lexis. The lower middle class was at first furious, since, at the era of wild speculation and company promotion, when the bearers of the most renowned Bonapartist names joined in the
worship of the golden calf, it had to bear the brunt of the costs. It knew nothing of the black art of gambling on the stock exchange, and would gladly make money without trouble, and therefore was caught by enticing promises and invested its hard-earned savings in rash or swindling undertakings.

The middle class therefore, and the proletariat, to whom the illusions created by Proudhon's theories had given common ideals and with them the possibility of common action, united, especially in Paris, for the overthrow of the empire. When this was accomplished under the influence of the defeat to the imperial armies in 1870, those classes combined against the republic of the bourgeoisie and actually brought the Paris commune, in which the National Guard, mostly recruited from their order, held sway for some time (March to May, 1871) under their power. Since neither Paris nor the government wished to yield, the result was civil war, which naturally ended with the suppression of the insurgent population of the capital. In that short time, however, the government of the besieged city, whose programme of social policy was indistinct in other respects, had not been able to exhibit any comprehensive measures of reform.

C. THE SOCIAL POLICY OF THE THIRD REPUBLIC

Under the Third Republic, which for the first time secured to the French working class permanent and full liberty in every direction, important political labour agitations as well as powerful economic organizations of the Fourth Estate were instituted. Politically, the most noteworthy event was the complete separation of the proletariat from the lower middle class. The proletariat followed out its own aims exclusively in politics and economics, and thus acted according to the programme of class warfare.

(a) The Proletariate.—The movement of the working class had no uniformity, but was split up into a number of socialistic parties, just as revolution or reform was the leading idea, or as the leaders of the separate parties endeavoured to make their personality felt. There are therefore parties with a Blanquist, a Marxist, and a so-called "Possibilist" programme (that is, one favourable to reform).

Regard for the political influence of the masses of workmen compelled the government to make social reforms which in the first instance dealt with the continuation of the protection to workmen — by the introduction of the ten-hours maximum working day for young persons under eighteen years and for all female workers in factories — and the concession of full liberty of coalition (since 1884). Besides this, the workmen have, in a number of towns, particularly in Paris, enforced various arrangements which are conducive to their interests, such as the establishment of labour exchanges at the cost of the community, as also regulations for the minimum wage and maximum working day for all men employed by the town on public works.

The movement in favour of trades unions and co-operative societies has lately received a great stimulus in France; the number of workmen united in trade associations already reaches half a million. We may assume that the social and economic organisations of the French working classes, although they are still far from reaching the English standard, will, if given undisturbed development, attain in a few decades some such importance as the English.
It is, lastly, worthy of remark that the Socialists have succeeded in influencing
the administration of the Board of Trade, so valuable for social interests, in favour
of the workmen, since the Socialists have united with the democratic sections for
the protection of the republic against the attacks of the military and clerical
parties.

(5) The Inferior Bourgeoisie. — The more the working class in this way prac-
tically arrived at a comprehension of its immediate economic interests, in contradist-
tinction to those of the richer class and without regard to any collision with those
of the inferior bourgeoisie, the less satisfied could this latter class feel by the alli-
ance with the proletariat. Thus it resulted that after the “seventies” the pre-
dominance of Proudhon’s views, which earlier had effected the spiritual union
between the two orders, grew less and less, and that the inferior bourgeoisie now
worked for their salvation outside the socialist organisations. But the lower
middle class did not succeed in making an organisation with a special programme
of its own; and therefore hundreds of thousands of its members cordially welcomed
the demagogues, who promised them that they would oppose the great capitalists
as well as the socialist tendencies. This is the explanation of the transitory
success of “Boulangism” (in 1889) and lately of the great prospects of the “na-
tionalistic” groups, who anticipated a revival of the French middle class from the
campaign against the world of Jewish trade and finance. But this movement was
so short-lived, that no elucidation of its confused economic scheme was forthcoming.

4. THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN GERMANY

A. The First Socialistic Agitations. The System of Marx

The first labour agitation in Germany was noticeable in the “forties.” It then,
owing to the strict police regulations of the German Confederation, chiefly affected
the German journeymen who lived by thousands in foreign countries. Its leader
was a tailor, Wilhelm Weitling (1808–1871), who, as an emissary of the secret
“Bund der Gerechten” (League of the Just) at Paris, transplanted the communistic
agitation to Switzerland. He organised the movement in such a way that public
workmen’s unions were founded under harmless designations, in which recruits
were obtained for the “League of the Just.” The object was to establish by revo-
lutionary methods the communistic society, for which Weitling, in connection
with the French Utopians, had drawn up a special system.

At the same time interest in communism had been roused even in the Ger-
man middle classes, where the half doctrinaire, half idealist tendencies of the
age had found a receptive soil in the students of philosophy and literature. In the
mystic circle of the “humanistic philosophy” of Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804–
1872) efforts were made to produce “humane” conditions even in social life, and
the heartless capitalistic methods of business were condemned in accordance with the
criticism of the French Socialists. The positive ideal of this party, headed by
the writers Moses Hess (1812–1875) and Karl Grün (1813–1887), was the most
complete freedom of man, conceived by nature as noble, in actions and conduct, in
production and consumption. This school must therefore be termed anarchist, since
it preached the unqualified self-glorification of the individual and the exclusion of
any compulsion. This philosophic socialism found favour first with the educated middle class, and then also with the secret "League of the Just."

But since the arguments of this kind of socialism were necessarily unfamiliar to the workmen, Karl Marx (1818–1883; see his picture on p. 412) succeeded at last in preventing this system from doing any harm in that league. Through his efforts the league, which henceforth was styled "Bund der Kommunisten," adopted his principles, a change which practically produced no further results then, since his success coincided with the outbreak of the revolution of February, 1848, which dispersed the members of the league in all directions.

The only independent labour movement was made quite apart from the communistic league, under the organisation of Stephan Born, a composer (1825–1897). By vigorous agitation he succeeded in founding a labour party, which came forward under the name of "Arbeiterverbrüderung" (Labour Confraternity), and had as its immediate aim universal suffrage for all representative bodies and a ten hours' working day. The activity of the "Labour Confraternity" at that time consisted chiefly in the support of the war of the democracy against the counter revolution; and thus the league was necessarily involved in the overthrow of the democracy. It was dissolved (1850), and all attempts to call new workmen's unions into existence were nipped in the bud. (Cf. Georg Adler's "Geschichte der ersten sozial-politischen Arbeiterbewegung in Deutschland").

Some attempts of Marx and others to resume the agitation in foreign countries by the revival of the old communistic league miscarried, owing to the vigilance of the police; and thus this association also soon disappeared for ever (1853). During the whole of this decade the reaction allowed no organised labour movement to take place. This period was used by Marx for the further development of his system, which he had already sketched in the "Communist Manifesto." His original works, which secure him a position among the first thinkers of all time, reach their highest level in his "Materialistische Geschichteauffassung" and in his "Untersuchung der kapitalistischen Produktionsweise."

From the study of Hegel Marx had formed the fundamental conception that history depicts a ceaseless process of life, decay, and progress, in which each separate stage is absolutely necessary and relatively justified, however much it conflicts with all the accepted notions of politics or ethics. But while Hegel deduced the laws of historical movement from the "self-development of the absolute notion," Marx was converted by the philosophy of Feuerbach (cf. above) to the view that the man creates the ideas, and that the "idea" does not determine the history of the man. At the same time his whole mental attitude rested on a materialistic basis, since he adopted the results of Feuerbach's investigations, that the higher beings whom our religious fancy has created are only the fanciful reflections of our own being. If man thus, unconsciously, created religion, why not all political, legal, artistic, and scientific existence? And here Marx believes that he can discover the secret connection of all historical development, since he assumes that, in the first instance, politics, but more remotely all other manifestations of the spiritual, social, and intellectual life are to be referred to the economic conditions and their development as the one ultimate cause.

The economic formation of society since the abandonment of the primitive common ownership of the soil is determined in all its previous history by the contrast between the classes, especially that between the ruled and ruling classes.
But this is changed in the course of time. For each economic constitution develops from itself productive forces which are finally incompatible with the old form of production and the old form of class supremacy. As a consequence of this the contrast between the classes culminates in a class warfare, in such a way that a crisis must follow, the result of which must be one of two alternatives: either the disruption of the existing social constitution and its change into a higher system, since the suppressed classes have overthrown the hitherto ruling classes, or the common ruin of the warring classes.

This keen enquiry into our economic system shows how conditions are at the present moment. According to it, the value of all commodities is determined by the amount of combined necessary (that is, normal) working time requisite for their production. A commodity which has cost twelve hours of combined necessary labour is worth double as much as a commodity which has cost six hours. But now in the capitalistic social system only the owners of means of production and livelihood produce commodities; and therefore the great majority of the non-propertied class sell their only commodity, their power of work, to the propertied, that is, they employ it in their service. "The worker," so it is said in the account of Marx's teaching by Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), which is to be regarded as an authentic representation, "sells his power of work to the capitalist for a certain daily sum. After a few hours' labour he has reproduced the value of that sum. But his contract of work runs to the effect that he must drudge for a further round of hours, in order to complete his labour for the day. The value which he produces in these additional hours of excess labour is excess value, which costs the capitalist nothing, but nevertheless goes into his pockets." The appropriation of unpaid labour is the fundamental law of the capitalistic method of production, the existence of which is inseparable from the "sweating" of the workman. Since now, according to Karl Marx, the excess value is the only thing which interests the capitalist in the process of production, his economic transactions will always be directed toward the increase of this excess value.

The evident results of this desire for extra profits are as follows. In the first place, the daily hours of labour will be immoderately prolonged. Then the cheap labour of women and children will be employed on an immense scale. Finally, the anarchy in co-operative production, which is so significant of the modern economic methods, will be more and more carried to extreme lengths. "The chief tool," so Engels explains Marx's views, "with which the capitalistic method of production increased this anarchy in co-operative production was the precise opposite of the anarchy; that is, the increasing organisation of production as co-operative in every productive establishment. With this lever it destroyed the old peaceful stability. When it was introduced into a branch of industry, it allowed no other method of work besides. When it took possession of hand work, it destroyed the old hand work. The field of labour became a battle-ground. Not merely did war break out between the individual local producers, but the local wars in turn became national, the commercial wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Wholesale industries and the establishment of the world market have made the war universal, and at the same time given it an unprecedented bitterness. Among individual capitalists, as among entire industries and whole countries, the favourableness of the natural or created conditions of production decide the question of existence. The defeated is remorselessly disregarded. The opposition between co-operative production and
EXPLANATION OF PORTRAITS ON THE OTHER SIDE

Left-hand top: Karl Marx, born May 5, 1818, in Trèves, the son of a baptised Jewish lawyer, studied Jurisprudence and Philosophy at Bonn and Berlin. He became, in 1842, editor of the radical "Rheinische Zeitung"; in 1843 edited (with Arnold Ruge) the "Franco-German Annals," and was contributor to the Parisian "Vorwärts" in 1844. He was expelled from Paris in January, 1845, was Vice-president of the Germans in the International Democratic Society at Brussels, and member of the secret "League of the Communists"; he issued, in 1848, with Frederich Engels, "The Communist Manifesto," and was after June 1, 1848, editor of the "Neue Rheinische Zeitung" at Cologne. On May 16, 1849, he was expelled from the Rhine Province and later from Paris; afterwards in London he succeeded in founding the International Labour Association on September 29, 1864, of which he was the head until its dissolution (1873). He died March 14, 1883, at London. The portrait here given is after a photograph of the Vorwärts Book Company, in Berlin.

Right-hand top: Ferdinand Lassalle, born April 11, 1825, at Breslau, the son of the Jewish silk-dealer Lassal, went to a commercial school in Leipzig which he secretly left in the summer of 1841, and studied Philology and Archaeology in Breslau and Berlin; he was travelling in 1844 (Paris), and in the winter of 1845 made the acquaintance of the Countess Sophie von Hatzfeldt, a woman twenty years his senior, whose actions for divorce against Count Edmund von Hatzfeldt-Wildenburg he conducted with success while living in the Rhine Province up to 1854. On November 22, 1848, he made a socialistische speech at Neuss, but, after five months' imprisonment on remand, he was acquitted by the jury at Düsseldorf but was not released. He was accused once more and condemned by the Tribunal de Correction to six months' imprisonment (July 5, 1849). After 1857 he was in Berlin, he unfolded his socialistische programme in a letter to a Leipzig committee, which wished to call a general meeting of German workmen, in March, 1862, and on May 23 of that year, was President of the newly founded Universal German Workmen's Union; he was acquitted of high treason on March 12, 1864, but was repeatedly condemned on other occasions; in June, 1864, he was in Switzerland for his health, and on August 28, 1864, he was mortally wounded by a pistol-shot in a duel fought at Geneva with the Wallachian Janko von Rakowitsa, the fiancé of Helene von Dönniges, a girl of 18, with whom he was in love. He died August 31, 1864. The portrait here given is after a photograph of the Vorwärts Book Company, in Berlin.

Right-hand bottom: Wilhelm Liebknecht, born March 29, 1826, at Giessen, studied Philology and Philosophy there, and at Berlin and Marburg. He took part in the Baden insurrection (1848), was in prison September, 1848, to May, 1849, then a political fugitive in Switzerland and England, and after 1862 was again writing in Germany: in 1865 he was banished from Russia, was next in Leipzig, and from January 1, 1868, was editor of the "Demokratisches Wochenblatt." He founded in 1869 the Social Democratic Labour party, based on the teaching of Marx; in 1872 was condemned with August Bebel to two years' confinement in a fortress (Hubertusberg) for high treason; in 1874 was elected by Saxony to the Reichstag, and after 1890 was in Charlottenberg as editor of the "Vorwärts." Died August 7, 1900.

Left-hand bottom: Eduard Bernstein, born January 6, 1850, in Berlin, son of a Jewish engine-driver, was a scholar of the Friedrichswerder Gymnasium; he was then occupied with banking business for 12 years; joined the Social-democratic party in 1872; after 1878 was private secretary of Karl Hirschberg, a private literary gentleman of socialistic views. From 1881-1890 he was editor of the "Sozial demokrat." He was banished from Zürich in 1888; from 1891-1894, edited the "speeches and writings" of Ferdinand Lassalle, and since 1899 has been permanently on the staff of the "Socialist Monthly"; lives in London. The portrait here given is after a photograph by Robert Schuch in Zürich.
capitalistic appropriation now appears as the contrast between the organisation of production in the single factory and the anarchy of production in the whole society." The consequences of this are suspensions of business and work, partly local, partly universal, which lead to the formation of an army of unemployed, the so-called "industrial reserve army." This must grow larger as time elapses. For the "bourgeoisie" surmounts the crises by two measures only: on the one side by the forced annihilation of a mass of productive forces (factories which are not working, etc.), on the other side by the conquest of new markets. The crises, then, are surmounted only by preparing more widely extended and more violent crises, and the means of avoiding the crises are lessened.

The crises now afford a means of concentrating various amounts of capital in one hand. Every capitalist ruins many other capitalists. Hand in hand with this destruction of many capitalists by a few, the co-operative form of the process of labour is developed on a continually growing scale. There is the change of the old instruments of labour suited to use by the individual into instruments adapted only for combined use, the entanglement of all nations in the net of the world market, and with this the international character of the supremacy of capital. The mass of misery grows with the continually diminishing number of great capitalists, who secure exclusively for themselves all the advantages of this change; but at the same time sedition grows rife among the working classes, who are always swelling in numbers, and are organised by the mechanism of the capitalist system of production. The monopoly of capital becomes a clog on the method of production, which has flourished with it and under it. It is removed, and its place is taken by the communistic social system, the principles of which are only suggested by Marx.

B. THE FOUNDING AND DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY

While Marx was developing his system in London, an attempt had been made in Germany, after the end of the "fifties" in the nineteenth century, to win over the workmen to the liberal movement which was assuming new importance. This was done first by founding associations for the education of workmen, and by the self-help movement initiated by a former judge of the patrimonial court, Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch (1808–1883). The educational societies could, from their nature, only have a restricted sphere of influence. The case would have been otherwise with the self-help movement, if it had been connected with the real interests of the working class, above all with the organisation of trade unions. Instead of this, Schulze contemplated in the first instance the establishment of money-lending banks, of societies for supply of raw materials, of co-operative shops and similar associations which considered especially the interests of the small master-workmen, while the proletarians were attracted merely to the co-operative stores which were then also founded.

The result could only be that the workmen themselves felt this representation of their class interests to be insufficient, and looked round for men to help them. The man who came forward now as their leader was a friend of Marx, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864; see his portrait on the inserted plate, "Four German Socialists"), who had won the confidence of the Fourth Estate by his socialistic and
revolutionary antecedents. The labour agitation of the present day, and with it the 
“Social Democracy,” were the fruits of his political activity.

Lassalle began his agitation in March, 1863, with the “Open Answer” to a 
deputation of workmen from Leipzig, who wished to learn his views on the social 
question and the means of reform. This pamphlet contained also the fundamental 
principles of Lassalle’s social programme, which are only explained, supported, 
strengthened, and defended in all his later writings. It was shown first of all that 
the average wages in a national industry depending on private capital and free 
competition always remain limited to the bare livelihood which is ordinarily 
necessary among a people for the support and continuance of life (the “iron law of 
wages.” This was the inevitable destiny of the workmen so soon as they were in 
any man’s pay. The workers must, therefore, Lassalle concluded, become their 
own masters, the house for which they work must be their own property, a “pro-
ductive association;” then that distinction between the wages of labour and the 
profit of owners would disappear, and in its place the proceeds of the labour would 
form remuneration for the labour. Organisation in productive associations could 
only be feasible under the existing conditions, if the State advanced to the workers 
the money for the purchase of the firms and of everything else which belonged to 
the management of factories and business. The means by which this State credit 
was to be won was the introduction of universal, uniform, and direct franchise, 
which would presumably secure to the Fourth Estate the majority in Parliament. 
This was the solution propounded by the “Open Answer.”

Lassalle, in order to propagate this doctrine, founded the “Universal German 
Workmen’s Union,” of which he became the president, with absolute powers.

The older German communists, with Marx at their head, naturally could not 
approve of Lassalle’s teaching or his tactics. The proposition of the “iron law 
of wages” could not but greatly offend Marx; but still more was the proposal 
of the productive association as a remedy for all social misery bound to call forth 
all the indignation of the communistic thinker, who, in 1852, had declared that 
the proletariat ought not to meddle with doctrinaire attempts such as exchange 
banks and associations, but “should try to revolutionise the Old World with their 
own great combined means.” The communists viewed with equal suspicion the 
exaggerated value attached by the followers of Lassalle to universal suffrage; for 
Marx did not expect to lead communism to victory by parliamentary majorities, 
but expected all success from the continuously growing impoverishment of the 
masses and of the thus inevitable self-annihilation of the civil society. In accord-
ance with this view he openly announced to the German workmen by the mouth 
of his most loyal disciple, Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826–1900; see his portrait on 
the inserted plate), that socialism was merely a question of power, which for that 
reason could not be solved in any parliament of the world.

During the lifetime of Lassalle these opponents could accomplish nothing, but 
soon after his early death (1864) they began to undermine his system. The In-
ternational Association of Workmen (the Red International), founded in the autumn 
of 1864, acted as their champion. This never indeed counted more than one thou-
sand members in Germany, but afforded a base of operations from which the attack 
against the followers of Lassalle might be made. The regular troops of Marx’s 
following were, however, first furnished by the “Federation of German Workmen’s 
Unions.” This was a labour league which, founded in 1863 by the party of pro-
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gress, had gradually been piloted to complete communism by the influence of Liebknecht on its chairman Ferdinand August Bebel (born 1840). In 1868 the federation declared openly for the principles of the Internationals, and in 1869 established itself, in combination with seceded members of the Universal German Workmen’s Union and with other socialists, as the Social Democratic Labour Party.

The programme of this Social Democratic party, drawn up at Eisenach toward the end of 1869, was conceived in the spirit of Marx, and only slightly corresponded with the ideas circulated by Lassalle’s vigorous agitation, in order not to preclude the possibility of a future reconciliation with the powerful party of Lassalle’s followers. The programme declared expressly that the Social Democratic party regarded itself as a branch of the International Workmen’s Association. Their ideal was the free republic, which alone was able to replace the wage system of the existing industrial régime by co-operative labour, which should guarantee to each worker the full proceeds of his labour. The Eisenach programme laid down, as the immediate objects of the efforts of the party, a series of social and political requirements, which were borrowed partly from the principles of the political radicals, partly from the doctrines of Marx and Lassalle.

The social democracy had begun, shortly before, to take active steps. The immediate impulse to practical action was given by an attempt, made by the party of progress in 1868, to found trades unions. Jean Baptista von Schweitzer (1833–1875) and Friedrich Wilhelm Fritzche, the leaders at the time of the “Universal German Labour Union,” which was always influenced by the glorification of Lassalle, took immediate steps to establish industrial unions in order to forestall the detested bourgeoisie party. Finally, as the third member of the league, the “Social Democratic Labour Party” of Marx appeared on the scene in order to secure its share. After this organisation of trades unions the Social Democratic party in Germany ceased to content itself with bare criticism of the existing society, and to aim only at the final goal of their efforts, the state of the future. Henceforward it endeavoured to interfere directly with life, since it put clearly before the workers the great advantages they could at once gain if they combined in masses according to their respective trades.

The result of the elections for the Reichstag in 1874 show how effective the trade organisation was. Although the split of the social democracy into the two camps of the Lassalle party and the Eisenach party still continued, socialism was already able to show a splendid army; not less than three hundred and forty thousand votes were cast for it. Soon afterward the social democracy entered upon the era of persecution by the courts and the police, and this among other causes led both parties to end the organisation of unions.

The instinct of self-preservation now impelled both sections to unite and to apply all their forces exclusively to the struggle against the common foe. The amalgamation was carried out at the Congress at Gotha (1875), where, as usually happens, the more radical party gained the ascendancy over the more moderate. The new programme showed in essential points the communistic stamp of Marx’s doctrines, and only slight concessions were made to the followers of Lassalle. In fact “Lassalleanism” ceased from that time to play any independent role in the history of the party. In other respects it is a marked feature of the Gotha programme that it pays far more attention to the protection of the workers than the earlier programmes. Unrestricted right of coalition, ordinary length of working
day, prohibition of Sunday labour, of child labour, and of all forms of female labour injurious to the health, laws for the protection of the life and health of the workers, legal liability and independent administration for all charitable funds belonging to the workers; this was the list of requirements which the German working classes continuously put before the government of the day. Men began, therefore, to attach far more weight than before to an immediate and practical social reform. This change in tactics proved to be a factor of enormous significance, which was calculated to bring continuous reinforcement to the party. In the election of the Reichstag of the year 1877, the Socialist Labour party, as the official title now was, could unite 493,000 votes in the names of their candidates.

Shortly afterward (May 11 and June 2, 1878) followed the two attempts on the life of the German emperor. Public opinion falsely made the social democrat responsible for this, and so the emergency law “against the common danger threatened by the social democracy” was passed October, 1878. After the party seemed at first to be really quite broken, it recovered gradually and effected some secret and some harmless public organisations. When, then, in 1881, the “trade associations” of the workmen were allowed by the police, the social democracy won back their complete freedom of action; for the trade associations afforded excellent rallying points and recruiting grounds for the active army of the social democracy, although in their meetings hardly any party politics were discussed.

It is not astonishing, therefore, that the law as to the socialists did not fulfil its primary object, the annihilation of the party. When the social democracy had recovered from the first shock, it advanced in an uninterrupted victorious career, until in the elections of the Reichstag of 1890 it received more than 1,400,000 votes, so it became clearer from day to day that the emergency law lacked any permanently effective result, and offered no compensation for the tainting of political morality which the police espionage required by the law greatly promoted. The German emperor, William II, recognising this, determined to renounce the use of this two-edged sword (September 30, 1890).

C. BISMARCK AND THE SYSTEM OF COMPELLARY INSURANCE OF WORKMEN

Prince Bismarck, simultaneously with the suppression of the social-democratic labour agitation, had inaugurated a system of social policy that was intended to put into practice all the best points of the modern labour movement.

German legislature had hitherto occupied itself but little with the workingmen. In 1869 it had granted to them the right of coalition, and for the rest had been satisfied with the prohibition of the labour of children under twelve years, and with the limitation of the labour of young persons under sixteen years in factories. It was a consequence of the fundamental notions of the imperial chancellor that no further steps were taken in this direction, although the school of socialist professors, of whom the most important intellects were Albert Schäffle, Gustav Schmoller, Adolph Wagner, Wilhelm Lexis, and Lujo Brentano, advocated this particular reform before all others. The chancellor wished at one time that the manufacturer should be master in his own house, and be able to conduct the business entirely at his own discretion. But then Bismarck did not abandon the view that the factory law as to the maximum working day, Sunday rest, etc., lowered the profits of the
owner too greatly, and also diminished the wage-earning of the workman, even if it did not altogether render his employment precarious. Besides this, he believed that there were only local complaints of excessive duration of labour, so that any interference was the less imperative.

Bismarck considered uncertainty of existence to be the real misfortune of the modern proletariat. His programme, therefore, announced that the worker, when sick, ill, or disabled, should be cared for, and that work should be found him when out of place. He imagined that the first requirement could be realized by the plan that millions of workers should be insured in State-organized offices against the economic results of sickness, accidents, infirmity, and old age; the necessary costs were to be paid partly by the workmen themselves, partly by the owners of the business, partly by the empire, which was to be enabled to make ampler advances by the introduction of the tobacco monopoly and profitable taxes on spirits. The second requirement he wished to fulfil by recognition of the “right of labour,” which could be put into practice by the carrying out of appropriate works, such as construction of canals and roads at the public cost in times of great scarcity of employment.

With these views of the necessity of State solicitude for workingmen, Bismarck combined the conviction, which had been strengthened in him by the development of the social democracy, that this party was in the highest degree dangerous to the State, and that, in the event of further unchecked development, it would certainly produce, sooner or later, a bloody social catastrophe. The result of this view was his campaign of extermination against the social democracy, which, however, as has been described above, completely miscarried. On the other hand, his constructive social policy has been unusually successful. The German workingmen’s insurance, which was announced in an imperial message (1881) and was completed by 1889, must be termed a magnificent organizing structure, unique of its kind in the history of the world. We see from the numbers of the workingmen affected how immense a service was rendered.

In the year 1900 nine millions of workers were insured against sickness, thirteen millions against old age and infirmity, seventeen millions against accidents. The sums which on the basis of the legal claim thus established are paid to the workers merely out of the means of the employers and the empire amount at the present day to more than £1,000,000 sterling annually, and are certain soon to be increased. The only point of that programme which Bismarck did not insist in carrying out is the solution of the problem of “unemployment.” But, notwithstanding this deficiency, the achievements of the first chancellor in the field of social policy stand as a “monument more lasting than brass.”

D. The Social Movement in the Last Decade of the Nineteenth Century

The new régime which commenced with the retirement of Bismarck started very favourably for the workingmen. The socialist laws were not renewed; and William II unfolded his programme of social policy in two public statements. According to them, “the time, duration, and nature of labour were to be so regulated by the authority of the State that the preservation of the health, the laws of decency, the economic requirements of the workers, and their claim to legal
privileges should be permanently upheld." Legal enactments for the adequate representation of workers were to be passed in order to preserve peace between employers and employed. The protection of workmen was soon considerably extended, since by a law of the year 1891 Sunday labour, as well as the labour of children under thirteen years, was prohibited, and a maximum working day of eleven hours for adult female workers in factories was introduced. In other respects also, in spite of a strong current of opposition which set in among the wealthy citizen class, social reform has been distinctly advanced by the introduction of a maximum working day of twelve hours for all journeymen bakers, the closing of shops at nine o'clock in the evening, commercial courts for labour disputes between masters and employees, and, finally, by continual improvements to the system of statutory insurance of workmen.

During these years the social democracy has slowly but surely increased in extent; at the same time, however, a distinct disintegration is perceptible in the party. The Congress at Erfurt in 1891, which drew up a new programme, showed the party still united round the banner of Marx; but since then the main principles of Marx have been the centre of a heated controversy.

The leader of the opposition against Marxism, which is temporarily still found in the minority, is Eduard Bernstein (born January 6, 1850; see his picture on the plate opposite p. 412), who on account of earlier offences under the press laws is forced to live out of Germany; a writer equally remarkable for his wide learning, his grasp of facts, and his graceful style. Bernstein first opposed the party view that the disruption of the bourgeois society was soon to be anticipated, and that the tactics of the party must be determined by this prospect. Social conditions, he thought, had not come to a crisis in the way assumed by Marx. "The number of property owners has not become less, but greater. The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a dwindling number of capitalistic magnates, but by a growing number of capitalists of all grades. The middle classes change their character, but do not disappear from the social scale." Even in the industrial world the concentration of production, according to Bernstein, confirms in some branches only the prophecies of socialististic criticism; in others it falls far short of them; and in agriculture concentration proceeds still more slowly. Politically the privilege of the capitalistic class gives way to democratic institutions, and the purely selfish tendencies of capital are more and more limited by society itself. And in this way there will be less necessity and opportunity for the great political crashes, which the working class moreover would not be able, at present or for a long time, to surmount. The social democracy therefore may not reckon any more on the great catastrophe, but it ought to politically organise the working class, develop it into democracy, and fight for all reforms in the State which are calculated to elevate the working class and develop the constitution in the spirit of democracy. The most important question of tactics in this sense is, which is the best way to extend the political and industrial rights of the German workingmen? (cf. Bernstein's treatise on "The Principles of Socialism and the Duties of the Social Democracy"). The theoretical foundation on which Bernstein bases these conclusions is a scientific criticism of Marx's system, which is not indeed peculiar to Bernstein, but had been already prepared by middle-class economists (Julius Wolf, Georg Adler, and others).

The circumstance that Bernstein, in spite of the intense hostility which he
encountered, remained in the ranks of the party, and the further fact that many "men of intellect" in it had already made themselves more or less known to him, opened a reassuring prospect for the future of the German workingmen's movement. If in the course of time the great mass of the social democracy should really abandon the sterile doctrines of Marx, and aim at an honourable social reform on national soil, nothing would remain of the old social democracy beyond the name, and the cult of the "constitution of the future" would sink into a harmless amusement.

E. THE MOVEMENT OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN GERMANY

It had been the custom for many years in Germany to regard the economic needs and requirements of the working class simply as the "social question," which was the outcome of the development of the capitalistic conditions relating to production, exchange, and competition. When this development had brought to light unfavourable results and new needs in other professional classes also, there could no longer be any doubt that the social question covered a much wider field. The most distinct expression of this is the fact that these professional classes begin to organise themselves in a similar way to the working class, and noisily demand — as little disinterestedly as the Fourth Estate — that the State should intervene with its authority on their behalf in the existing economic conditions. The master tradesmen did this first, and recently the small dealers. These two classes are generally kept in view when mention is made of the movement of the middle class in Germany; a movement which, moreover, has been of incalculably less importance than that of the workingmen.

(a) The Tradesmen. — The movement of the tradesmen is mainly represented by two associations: the United Trading Associations and the Universal German "Handwerkerbund." The political representation of their demands is effected by the conservative and the clerical party, and in an especially partial way by the "German Social Reformers" (the section of the regular anti-Semites). There are two prominent postulates, from which, if granted, the tradesman class, oppressed by the modern development of factories, trade and demand, hope to gain renewed power; first, that a proof of qualification be demanded from every man who in the future intends to set up as a master, and, secondly, that it be obligatory on every master to join the guild of his calling. The proof of qualification is intended primarily to guarantee the quality of the work done by the tradesman; secondarily, to limit the competition in favour of those who are already in the business. The obligation to join a guild is intended to combine all masters in the common defence of their interests, and to make every individual master share the burden of the suggested methods of promoting trade (credit departments, courses of lectures, etc.), since experience has shown that when entrance is voluntary only a minority are enrolled in the guilds. At the same time the following measures are proposed: the institution of chambers of tradesmen, in order to serve as a special board of control over the guilds and to represent duly the interests of the trade in all legislative matters; also, restriction of military workshops, prison labour, and hawking; further, prohibition of co-operative stores, travelling booths, public auction of tradesmen's goods, and of branch establishments; finally, regulation of the
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system of tender in the interest of the tradesman class, and preferential rights for the claims of tradesmen in cases of bankruptcy.

The proposal as to the proof of qualification has already found a majority in the German Reichstag. On January 20, 1890, a motion in its favour was passed by 130 votes against 92. But the government emphatically declined to accede to this wish.

The Prussian government showed itself far more friendly to the second chief demand of the tradesmen, that of compulsory membership of a guild, since it proposed in the Bundesrat the introduction of this regulation for most smaller industries within a legally determined limit (1896). The Bundesrat altered the proposal in a liberal sense; the principle of universal compulsory membership was allowed to drop, on the contrary the formation of a compulsory guild was made dependent on the resolution formed by the majority of the tradesmen concerned. In this form the proposal has been law since July, 1897. Stress must be laid on the point that the compulsory guilds may not establish common branches of business in order to promote the industrial undertakings of the members of the guild, and are therefore restricted in their field of activity; also that the law realises another demand of the tradesman party, since it institutes chambers of tradesmen with a number of legal privileges.

Besides this the German governments have endeavoured, by the enactment of a special law, to protect those engaged in the building trade more efficiently than before.

The government for the present is very cool toward the increasing demands of the tradesmen, who aim at a sort of guild privilege. They had the following propositions announced, as their own programme, by representatives of the Prussian Board of Trade. First, the assistants who wish to become masters are to have an opportunity of educating themselves both in the technicalities of their business and also in arithmetic and bookkeeping; next there are to be permanent exhibitions of all the power machines, apparatus, and tools employed in the smaller industries; finally, the formation of societies of the masters for common economic objects (societies for raw materials, for shops, etc.) was to be supported when possible. How much of this will be passed depends to a considerable extent on the good will of the tradesmen themselves, whose corporate action is far from becoming as prominent as the political middle-class movement, which demands State coercion for the exclusion of harassing competition.

(b) The Small Dealers.—After the trades agitation came the movement of the middle-class shopkeepers, which has hitherto been less important. The agitation started here with the “Zentralverband deutscher Kaufleute,” in addition to which, in the year 1898, a “Bund der Handel-und Gewerbetreibenden” was formed. So far as this movement is directed against sordid competition, it has chosen a thoroughly justifiable object, which the German governments have supported by providing special legislation to check this evil which manifested itself under the most various forms. On the other hand, their agitation against the large warehouses has overshoot the mark, and their intemperate opposition to such useful institutions as co-operative stores is emphatically to be condemned. Since 1899 a regular campaign has been organised against the warehouses, which met with considerable success. In Saxony a number of towns have introduced a pro-
gressive tax on the profits of the large business houses. In Bavaria the tax on trades has been modified in the same sense, and in Prussia since 1900 a bill with a similar object has been introduced by the government and accepted by the Landtag.

5. THE SOCIAL MOVEMENT IN THE REST OF CENTRAL AND WESTERN EUROPE

A. AUSTRIA

In Austria the prospects of the social democracy were more unfavourable than in Germany, since the heated struggle among the nationalities for years repressed any interest in other questions, and the government by unscrupulous exercise of their powers against the press and the rights of association and assembly took away all air and light from the budding plant of the social democracy. The agitation of Lassalle had found but a faint echo in Austria. On the other hand, after the concession of the right of assembly in 1867, the new social democratic labour party received for the moment a great stimulus; this, however, soon died away when, after its assent to the German "Eisenach programme," that privilege was again withdrawn from it by the minister Giskra. A revival of the party was the consequence of the milder interpretation of the laws as to associations under the Hohenwart ministry (1871). The stricter policy of the ministry of Adolf Auersperg (1871–1879) produced, however, a second decline. Under the succeeding ministry of Taaffe, which introduced milder measures, the social democracy was once more in the ascendant, and for the first time gathered followers from among the Czechist workmen.

At this epoch anarchism found its way into Austria through the "Freiheit" of Möst, and in a few years the whole workingmen contingent of the social democracy had wheeled into the anarchist camp. When, however, the anarchist party had dug their own grave (1885), by plots of assassination which led to a stupendous reaction, the social democracy slowly revived. Since then, being led by Victor Adler in a strict Marxist spirit, it was able to gain an increasing body of followers, and finally under the ministry of Badeni it won the reform of the franchise, by which a fifth group, composed of electors qualified on the basis of universal and uniform suffrage, and electing seventy-two members, was added to the existing four electoral groups (1895). Out of these the social democrats, in the election of the Reichsrat of 1897, secured fourteen members.

The trades movement has also received a stimulus since 1893, although up to the present little more than 100,000 workmen share in it. Much progress was made in legislation as to the protection and the insurance of workmen, especially under Taaffe, when trenchant factory laws, among them the maximum twelve hours' working day for men, as well as compulsory insurance against sickness and accidents, were introduced.

In Austria especially the movement of the middle class has attained great importance, which — under the protection of clerical members of the high nobility and many Catholic priests — represented there at the same time the anti-Semitic party. But before a strong party showed itself, as early as 1883, the two chief demands of the tradesmen class, the enforcement of which is their foremost
object, namely, the proof of qualification and compulsory association, were realised in Austria. The proof of qualification was, in the words of Count Richard Belcredi, who helped this agitation to a successful issue, designed to be "a most necessary protection of honest work and of existing industries against competition and production at ruinous under prices; a protection against inexperience, insufficient knowledge and means, as well as indiscretion on entering into business; a protection of consumers and purchasers against inferior commodities."

The compulsory association was to organise trade, and to promote esprit de corps, thoroughness, and honesty in all its branches. The result of these experiments in Austria, however, have shown that the proof of qualification has nowhere helped the tradesman, but in places has rather hindered him by the separation of trades; and the compulsory associations have certainly not become practically efficient on any considerable scale. The direction of the middle-class movement toward political goals has not only failed in attaining the expected result, but has momentarily hindered the co-operative self-aid movement which was benefitting the more efficient among the small shopkeepers.

B. HUNGARY

In Hungary the backward condition of industrial development, and the strength of the purely national movements, have for many years presented insuperable obstacles to an extension of the social democratic party. In 1868 a labour party was founded there with the programme of Lasalle. After the beginning of the "seventies" this party also adopted a more Marxist creed, but did not long strictly maintain it. At the beginning of the "eighties" anarchism brought confusion into the small group, and, on the other hand, subsequently a part of the social democrats often made extensive compromises with the middle-class parties. On the whole, the party remained limited to the few industrial districts, especially the capital Buda-Pesth, until at the beginning of the "nineties" the agitation was suddenly carried with great success into the ranks of the labourers on the estates of the Magyar nobility. Since then the authorities, who had already been obliged to crush some risings with armed force, have prosecuted it with the utmost severity of the law. This party can hardly take part in the parliamentary elections, since the franchise is dependent on a payment of ten gulden (sixteen shillings) in taxes.

The organisation of trades unions is still in an early stage, and, especially in the country, has to contend with the authorities. Altogether there are some fifty thousand workmen united in the trade associations. The legislation as to the protection of workmen is still quite undeveloped. The only real progress which can be recorded in recent times is the introduction of compulsory insurance against sickness.

C. SWITZERLAND

In Switzerland the social democracy, notwithstanding the most complete liberty of movement at all times, and notwithstanding the shelter afforded to so many persecuted foreign socialists, has never been able to attain real importance. The reasons for this are to be found in the difficulties of agitation, owing to the defective concentration of industry, in the steady political and social
development of the country, and, finally, in the sober, practical character of the people. The social democracy, founded in 1865 by partisans of the International Labour Association, has very slowly increased, so that its party organisation now numbers only six thousand members. The "Grütliverein," which is composed exclusively of Swiss citizens, and goes hand in hand with the social democracy, is more important; it has at the present day fifteen thousand members. The social democracy carried four candidates in the election to the Federal National Council (1899). Its representation in the cantonal parliaments and in the town councils is equally weak.

The trade-association movement is, apart from callings such as those of printers and railway employees, not very strongly developed; but locally, for example, in Basle, co-operative stores have become important. Social legislation would have been very weighty if the vote of the people had not rejected the most far-reaching bills (the federal insurance against accidents and sickness, the compulsory insurance of the unemployed, planned at Basle according to the schemes of G. Adler). The federal States had instituted the eleven hours' maximum working day for men as far back as 1877. Valuable cantonal measures have also been carried; for instance, in Basle the State certificate of competency to work, and the abolition of all payment for instruction, appliances for teaching, burial, and attendance on the sick.

D. Denmark

In Denmark the social movement stood from the first in close sympathy with the German social democracy, and therefore the social democratic party there adopted a programme which in its main features corresponded to the German. It was much in favour of the agitation that almost all the great industries in and around Copenhagen were united, and that in the country the economic antagonism of the wealthy landowners and their labourers had in places become very acute. The agitation began in the year 1871, and at once met with great success, since thousands enrolled themselves in the party organisations. But after an illegal demonstration, which ended in a riot, for extension of the franchise and social demands (1872), the union was broken up and its leaders were condemned to long terms of imprisonment. The party did not recover from this blow for years. In the course of the "eighties" it once more revived, chiefly through the prosperity of the trade associations, which were entirely in the hands of the social democrats, and finally gained a large following among the country labourers. The party organisation now numbers thirty-five thousand members; at the last elections to the Folketingh (1898) the party, after making an astute agreement as to voting with the radical-liberal party, carried twelve candidates.

The trade-union organisation of the Danish workmen is of still greater significance; up to the present some eighty thousand industrial workers have joined it, and have greatly improved the conditions of their labour by energetic combination. In opposition to this the employers have finally formed large organisations, with the expressed object of firmly checking the ever-increasing claims of the workmen. The two organisations measured their strength in 1899; the employers required from the trades unions the acknowledgment in principle of their right to allot work at their discretion, and replied to the refusal of this demand by a lock-out,
at first in the building industry. After a struggle which lasted many months, a compromise was made, which on the whole emphasized the superior power of the employers, while at the same time it acknowledged the associations.

The statutory protection of workmen has not been much developed in Denmark; it is mainly restricted to the ten hours’ working day for young persons.

**E. Holland**

In Holland the large industries have been little developed; the economic conditions of the country are determined by the flourishing agriculture and extensive wholesale trade. If, in addition to this, we take into account the religious spirit of the people and their phlegmatic nature, it is easy to understand that no rich harvest could be reaped by an extravagant propaganda. In fact, the social democracy, which had been brought into Holland in the year 1868 by the “International,” remained absolutely without significance; and, beside this, it has been again split up into a more moderate and a social-revolutionary section.

The trades-union movement is of greater importance, and some thirty thousand organised workmen now take part in it. The legislation on social politics has culminated in the institution of an eleven hours’ maximum working day for young persons and female workers.

**F. Belgium**

In Belgium, where the already existing germs of large industries had attained an enormous development in the second half of the nineteenth century, a Social-Democratic Labour Party of some importance was eventually founded, after various useless attempts, toward the middle of the “seventies.” Its programme was modelled in all essential points on the German one. After the second half of the “eighties” the party received considerable additions of strength, since it used its utmost endeavours at the same time to form and to promote trades unions and industrial associations. “In Belgium,” Jean Volders, one of the leaders of the party, explained, “it is impossible to calculate on the political group-formation. At the slightest storm these groups, which have no other basis, are dispersed. On the other hand, the organisations connected by common economic interests are permanent. For example, the unions of special trades, which have as their object the maintenance of fixed tariffs and the improvement of wages, so also the co-operative societies, which afford a secure basis for the union of the organisations and the members. It is more difficult to dissolve them, since these members continue united in order to preserve the common property.” Several of these Belgian industrial societies are well known for their excellent management and their wide sphere of influence, as for example the “Vooruit” at Ghent and the “Volkshaus” at Brussels.

In the year 1893 the workmen, in combination with the radicals, exerted by monster demonstrations and a general strike universal suffrage, which was not indeed granted in a direct form, but under that of the so-called franchise by “majority of votes.” At the first elections, which took place on that system in 1894, three hundred and fifty thousand votes were polled for socialist candidates, of whom thirty-two were able to enter the Belgian chamber. Since that date socialism
has continually won new adherents, so that it was in a position at the later elections to unite five hundred and thirty thousand votes on its candidates, and to effect the election of forty-one deputies.

Legislation for the protection of workmen is restricted in Belgium chiefly to the twelve hours' maximum working day for young persons.

G. ITALY

In Italy, where until recently there have not yet been any noteworthy industries, the relations of the employers to their workmen in town and country were by no means patriarchal; on the contrary, the workmen, since they were not sufficiently organised, were “sweated” to the greatest extent. The excess of poverty, the want of education among the people, and finally the Roman national character, which is inclined toward a passionate and impetuous attack, however dangerous it may be, rather than to a persevering, systematic work of organisation, with slowly and gradually maturing results, could not fail to present for a long time great difficulties to the social democratic movement, while anarchy could flourish periodically. This latter could also derive benefit from another peculiarity of Italian conditions, namely, from the presence to hand of a number of déclassés out of the bourgeoisie, whose last sheet-anchor is politics.

It was only since the beginning of the “eighties” of the nineteenth century, when the anarchists, after various riots, had finally been defeated by the stringent measures of the government, that the social democracy began to come into prominence. Since the great industries of Italy have considerably developed, after 1890 or so, the labour movement in the country has displayed a certain power. The trades unions have become comprehensive organisations, and the social democracy has also numerous followers, especially in North Italy, the real centre of industry, although associations of country workers have declared their adhesion to the party. The programme, stated in 1892, repeats the usual views of the social democrats, showing that it is naturally impossible yet to represent to the workmen of Italy in the same way as to the theoretically more advanced German proletarians the demand for a socialistic state as a natural and necessary consequence of further social development (in Marx's sense), but only as a demand for justice. Social riots, which occurred in Sicily (1894) and at Milan (1898), gave cause each time to harsh prosecutions of the social-democratic associations, and of the trades unions going hand in hand with them. At the elections of the year 1895 eight socialist popular representatives were chosen; at those of 1897, notwithstanding the narrowing of the franchise, the socialists received one hundred and forty thousand votes, and carried sixteen deputies.

Labour legislation in Italy is chiefly restricted to the compulsory insurance against accidents.

H. SPAIN

Spain, in her industrial development, stands appreciably behind Italy. In other respects the politico-social life of Spain presents in important points practically the same peculiarities as that of Italy, namely, distress among the lower orders, a lamentable want of education among the people, and the intrusion into politics of numerous disreputable scions of the “higher” classes. Anarchism has, therefore,
rapidly spread here since the end of the "eighties," while the social democrats could not make any way. After the defeat of the revolutionary federal movement (1872–1873), which had been vigorously supported by the anarchists, equal severity was shown to anarchists and socialists. Then, in the words of their leader, Pablo Iglesias, a compositor, "they adopted the plan of impressing on their comrades, by means of associations, the complete antagonism between the interests of the capitalists and those of the workers." It was only after the "eighties" that a social democratic organisation, with a Marxist programme, could be successfully established under the direction of Iglesias; but, so long as the anarchist labour party existed as well, it was impossible for it to attain any significance. When finally the organisation of the anarchists, which in places had attacked the existing order of things with assassination and riots, had been broken up by the authorities with rigorous severity, the social democracy was enabled to gain some influence over the labour world. At the elections of 1898 it was thus able, in spite of the restricted suffrage, to poll some twenty thousand votes.

The associations, which are directed by the socialists, comprise at present fifteen thousand members. Labour legislation has been very slightly developed, and the few measures that the law does prescribe are not carried out.

6. GENERAL RESULTS

A. THE RESULTS OF THE MORE RECENT SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The introduction of machinery into the industrial world and the establishment of the first factories undoubtedly produced much distress and discomfort among the lowest classes of the people. This fact has been proved by a mass of evidence from the first epoch of the method of capitalistic production, which mainly falls in the first half of the nineteenth century. Since that time the civilized world has accommodated itself to capitalism; and now the social mechanism of the existing political economy, as Julius Wolf first discovered, clearly works spontaneously in the direction of a continuously improving method of life for the lower classes. The increasing amount of capital which is looking for productive investment makes the demand for labour so much keener that wages must rise automatically; a tendency which must naturally be considerably assisted by the trades unions. On the other hand, the prices of many provisions, and more especially those of articles produced by wholesale industries, have a strong downward movement, owing to the reduction of the cost of manufacture; the rents of dwelling-houses alone show an opposite tendency, owing to the land in the towns being the monopoly of private owners.

Some figures out of the statistics of incomes will clearly show the results of this capitalistic method of production. In Saxony, the most important manufacturing district of Germany, between 1874–1894 (that is to say, in the most unfavourable period of German industrial development since 1850), the number of incomes up to 800 marks (£40) has very distinctly become less per cent on the whole, falling indeed from seventy-six per cent to sixty-five per cent. While the poorest section of the population has thus greatly diminished, the somewhat more well-to-do section, which possesses incomes between 800 marks and 2,500 marks (£40
to £110), has considerably increased; for, while in 1879 only eighteen per cent of the assessed persons had such an income at their disposal, this was the case in 1894 with twenty-eight per cent. Even the lower middle class, which comprises the section of the population with incomes between 2,200–4,800 marks (£110 to £240), has by no means decreased, as pessimists predicted, but, on the contrary, has distinctly grown larger. For in the year 1879 three three-fourths per cent of assessed persons belonged to it, but in 1894 four two-thirds per cent, that is, roughly, one-quarter more, making allowance for the increase in the population which had taken place in the interval. With regard finally to the rich, the theory so often propounded by the socialists and others as to a shrinkage in the number of capitalists is equally mistaken. We see, in fact, that in Saxony in the year 1879 there were 930 wealthy people, that is to say, with an income of over 26,000 marks (£1,300), but in the year 1894 there were 2,547, namely, more than three times as many. These figures show, then, in Julius Wolff's words, "no concentration but an expansion of capital."

Still more striking are the figures in other countries, especially in England, the classic land of industry. It will be sufficient to give a few figures. The number of families with an income of £150 to £1,000, which embraces the labour aristocracy and the entire middle class, amounted in 1851 to 300,000; in the year 1881 it reached 990,000; thus, while the population in these thirty years increased by thirty per cent, the number of well-to-do people has risen by two hundred and thirty per cent.

At the same time, when wages have considerably risen, the length of the working day has been much shortened throughout manufactories and workshops; partly owing to the competition of the manufacturers among themselves, which leads them to consider the workmen, partly to the pertinacious efforts of the workmen in their own behalf, partly to State legislation, which has shown itself peculiarly effective in this field. If we further bear in mind that at the present day the workman in his own person is altogether more independent and actually more self-reliant than he was fifty years ago, we cannot but admit that the improvement in the position of the ordinary workingman is universal.

There is certainly in particular cases, for special individuals, localities, and branches of industry, some misery to be found, chiefly as the result of unfavourable markets, economic depression, and a long period of crises. In this connection the case must be borne in mind where the peculiarity of modern conditions of competition reduces certain branches of industry, especially handicrafts and domestic industries, permanently or temporarily, to great distress; this, then, naturally presses with a double burden on the back of the worker. A stupendous task is here presented for the activity of the State, either by the institution of insurance against want of work, or by the technical training of unfortunately situated sections of the people with a view to more remunerative branches of industry. But, even if the State in the future were to carry out on this head every reform that was possible, still the case that economic competition sometimes ruins a number of livelihoods must be regarded as inevitable; a fact that must not be regretted, since the economic overthrow of persons of a low standard in intellect and morals is necessary if civilised humanity is not to relapse into mediocrity.
Chapter IV

B. Socialism as an Historically Necessary Illusion

If the state of the lower classes has thus on the whole steadily improved, the question suggests itself, how are we to explain the fact that the workers in most countries, instead of directing all their efforts to attainable social and political reforms, have obstinately pursued impossible socialistic plans for the future? This is closely connected with the universal historical law that the masses, as a rule, cannot be aroused from their sleep unless they are filled with great ideals.

A popular movement which is directed against some existing institution must, in order to rouse the masses from their tranquillity and indifference, appeal to their imagination and wave an enticing picture before their eyes. Let us suppose that it despises such means, that it merely exhibits the tangible and attainable objects of its aim, that it therefore conscientiously acknowledges the necessary deficiencies and imperfections of it, and admits all sorts of possible objections to revolution; such a movement must soon subside. It will see its followers continually diminish instead of increasing, since its colourless and feeble ideal does not possess sufficient powers of attraction to induce the lethargic average man to give up his ease, to take the matter to heart, or to make any sacrifices. Thoughts which appeal merely to the cool, calculating reason cannot create any movement of the masses; they rebound ineffectually from the human breast, clad in its triple-mail of self-interest. The masses, in order to organise themselves, must voluntarily surrender to illusions. This as a rule happens only when extraordinarily vivid expectations of a new heaven and a new earth can be aroused, and formulas are coined which enchain the masses with irresistible power and force them onwards to a mighty combined forward movement. This is the genesis of illusion with its myriad influences; thousands, nay, millions, of heads are filled with visionary fancies, and are then ready to break off a corner of their egoism in order to help the idea to victory; the apparently impossible task of letting the countless rivulets of conflicting private interests flow out into one surging sea has been accomplished.

If matters have gone so far, all attempts to really dam the flood are impossible. According to the particular nature of the movement, governments or other authorities are, on the contrary, compelled to attend to it by the alteration of existing or the creation of new institutions, which may indeed have a very faint resemblance to the ideals of the masses. If that is done, if by this the real requirements of the masses which had been the ultimate motive for those agitations are met, the magic rallying cries which formerly were able to arouse the masses will lose much of their effective power. Finally they will have been reduced by the fire of criticism to fused dross, from which all that was useful or valuable has been taken. Thus the conclusion to be drawn from a contemplation of the development of social policy is, that progress is effected only by illusion and deception; and such a deception is socialism. It has been necessary, in order directly to organise the masses and indirectly to promote the elevation of the working class. The most wide movement of the dependent classes in the direction of self-defence which the world has yet to chronicle has, as our account shows, occurred directly under and in conjunction with communism. In the same way the State protection of the workman — and especially also the German social reform, according to Bismarck’s admission — would never have been put into operation had not the social democracy already been in the field.
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

But, while in England socialism has long been defeated, the system of Marx has exercised at the present time the greatest influence on the proletariat of the continent of Western Europe. Its great historical importance lies in the fact that it supplied the industrial workmen class, which alone of the lower orders was able for the time being to enter the arena of politics, with its creed, its rallying cry, and the necessary indestructible self-confidence, simply because it exclusively flattered its class interests, and ascribed to it both for the time being and in the future the chief rôle on the stage of the world. The "survival of the fittest" holds good also in the history of dogmas. Out of all the rival tendencies in socialism that one was certain finally to win which most inspired the chief supporters of the socialistic movement, namely, the industrial proletariat of the towns. Marxism was first able to do this, since it actually ascribed to the proletariat the rôle of bearing the destinies of the world. The Marxist system, regarded objectively, is only one gigantic abortion. And, if the civilised nations of Western Europe are still in a stage of progressive development, one day they will shake off Marxism, like all socialistic ideas which have long discharged their part in the history of the world, namely, the organisation of the proletariat, and will restrict themselves to the aims of a practical social policy. In truth, all indications point to the conclusion that in the course of time (as Wilhelm Lexis already explained in his book on the French trades unions in 1879) "the workers, by their organisation, will be able to take up a really business-like standpoint towards capital, which, free from hatred and passion, rests on a reasonable calculation of what is practically attainable."

C. THE FUTURE OF THE SOCIAL QUESTION

An analysis of the modern social system thus clearly shows the true goal towards which the whole social movement is hastening, whatever its imaginary goal may be. It is a sort of social constitutionalism which produces in the economic sphere the same results as political constitutionalism in the domain of public rights. The masses are everywhere organised, their unions become closer, and new circles of the lower classes are continually drawn into the movement. The attempts to gag them have been everywhere unsuccessful, and each time the weapons forged against the aspiring labour movement have soon been blunted. And, since ever-widening sections of the educated and propertied classes display undisguised sympathy with the advancement of the working classes, it will soon be universally admitted as a fact that the agitations of the workingmen, like all other class organisations, enjoy liberty of speech, liberty of the press, and the right of association. Thus, finally, the working class takes its proper place in modern political and social life. It will receive a permanent share in the government and the administration on the understanding that it entirely renounces its revolutionary visions, and upholds the existing social order and the prevailing political constitution.

From the example of England, where this development has made the greatest advance, it can at once be seen how, in that way, the social question one day, although not finally solved, will certainly be stripped of its dangerous character.

In England the social question, while still regarded as very grave, no longer at the present time dominates the order of the day at public debates; the first place, on the contrary, is taken by the problem of national expansion and economic
supremacy. That is simply the result of the modern economic development of England; it has more and more become an industrial country, and finds itself compelled unceasingly to enlarge its market for the sale of goods, in order that production, from reasons of cheapness, may be arranged on a continually increasing scale. The conditions for the existence of wholesale industrial production are such that they are a stimulus to an ever-growing export of wholesale articles, and to an increasing economic command of foreign trade. For this reason the English nation to-day, including the working class, is agreed that its present and future prospects depend on the maintenance and the bold prosecution of the imperialist policy, and that, therefore, all other questions, including the social question, have to give way to the problem of economic world-power.

The fulfilment of the duties which the social problem imposes, and first of all, therefore, the necessary regard for the interests of the worker, are taken for granted; and where such duties are viewed in a different light by the body of employers, they are enforced by the working class, owing to their wide organisation and the support of public opinion. These, then, are conditions to which the great world powers and civilised nations of the mainland of Western Europe, with Germany at their head, are visibly approaching. Thus the words will be fulfilled which were uttered at the time when the social question still appeared to all as a formidable problem by the foremost realist of the time, Prussia's greatest son, Bismarck. His words ran as follows: "No political question admits of a complete mathematical conclusion, so that a balance can be struck according to the books; they arise, have their day, and disappear at last among other questions of history. This is the way with every organic development."
THE RISE OF THE GREAT POWERS

By PROFESSOR DR. HANS VON ZWIEDINECK-SÜDENHORST

1. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE PERIOD FROM 1650 TO 1780

THE conclusion of the peace of Westphalia is an important point of departure in the political and economic development of Europe; it is marked both by the firm establishment of the monarchical principle, and also by the rising predominance of the mercantile system. Moreover, it marks the end of feudalism, on which the powers and functions of the medieval body politic had been founded. Survivals of the feudal system may, no doubt, be noted even now; but its spirit ceased to be a moving force in European civilisation from that time, and the personal ties which held it together had lost their strength.

The struggles of individualism for recognition had been checked by the corporate character of medieval life, but are of much earlier origin. Individualism came to birth with the revival of learning and the Renaissance, and had wholly won its way in the departments of science and art even during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. But it was not before its victory had been decisive there that the underlying principle, now sure of recognition, could be developed in another direction, that of the individuality of the State. New forces were brought into being by this movement, essentially opposed to the forces which had produced the feudal system. The more the powers of the corporations were restricted, the wider became the field for individual activity, and rulers were encouraged to grapple with those duties and responsibilities which had been previously undertaken by numerous corporations working to a common end.

The assault delivered by the Reformation upon the greatest and the most powerful of all international corporations, the papacy, had not been finally decisive during the sixteenth century. This success was only attained in the Thirty Years' War, where the efforts of Catholicism to secure universal supremacy were proved incapable of realisation. The recognition of the equality of all Christian creeds in the Romano-German Empire, the political rise of the Protestant States England, Sweden, and Holland to the level of others which had remained Catholic, the sanction of the Pope given to "Christian," "Catholic," and "apostolic" kingdoms,—these were facts which nullified once and for all that possibility of a universal Christian community upon which the greatest minds and the boldest politicians had once speculated. The results of these facts became manifest as well in Catholic as in Evangelical States. Catholicism became a political force, but States were no longer founded with the object of realising the Catholic idea. The House of
Hapsburg gained great advantages from an alliance with the papacy, but it had, and has, no hesitation in renouncing the alliance, if by so doing it could further its political ends. Of this we have instances in the nineteenth century as well as in the eighteenth. In the policy of the French Bourbon and Napoleonic governments such instances are even more striking. The chief task of every government is to unify the powers under its control, and to turn them to account with a view to throwing off any external yoke and to consolidating the internal relations between the territories composing the State.

For the accomplishment of this purpose a change in the military system was imperatively demanded. During the fifteenth century the vassal's duties were by no means coextensive with the mere defence of the country. Feudal armies were no longer equal to the demands made upon them by their overlords, who were anxious to increase their dominions, though the great city corporations of Italy were able to cope with the increasing difficulties of their policy, using only the military strength of their own citizens. Pay and recruiting became the sole methods of creating an army. Professional soldiers fought for dynasties and towns, overthrew and founded States. The German military orders were profoundly national in their rules and regulations; but they were of no service to the national welfare, as there existed no general authority or political bond. War became a business, in which the man who invested his capital was most likely to succeed. During the sixteenth century, dynasties and political parties, such as the League in France, were content with this military instrument, which was passed from hand to hand, and came into the service of hostile lords for so long a time as their operations should continue. But the great convulsion of the Thirty Years' War opened the way for a new military organisation. It enabled the formation into standing armies of the yeomen who had been enlisted as occasion arose, and with these the State sought to advance its own political aims. It was only in the second half of the seventeenth century that the idea gained ground in Germany and in France that the several territorial districts, and not the feudal vassals, had to undertake the responsibility of providing material for the war power of the overlord. First of all, special districts became responsible for the enlistment of particular bodies of troops,—regiments, in fact; then, if the numbers were too scanty, a further enlistment might be demanded; and, finally, the ruling power grew strong enough to grasp the right of calling out soldiers or recruiting, an arrangement which would have been impossible before 1500, because it was incompatible with the conception of feudal sovereignty. This is a conception that has disappeared in modern States. The constitutional system of the nineteenth century would replace it with the conception of "personal freedom," but it is an idea which has been greatly limited by the respect demanded for "State necessities" and "State welfare."

In domestic administration, bureaucratic influences constantly grew stronger. The ruling power gradually claimed for itself those rights which had hitherto been bound up with territorial possession, or had formed part of municipal privileges. Such rights were exercised by individuals exclusively dependent upon the ruler or his representatives. The arrangement and subordination of these executive powers was carried out wholly upon the basis of sovereignty, and the creation of this bureaucratic hierarchy occupied attention even during the eighteenth century, until it degenerated and was found incapable of completing the domestic organisation of the State, when it became obviously necessary to admit the co-operation of
the people, who had been temporarily excluded from all share in administrative functions. However, standing armies and the bureaucracy are the distinguishing features of that political system which succeeded feudalism,—a system of which we cannot even now observe the development in its totality, and the duration of which it is impossible to estimate.

It also became necessary to support the newly organised State by reconstituting its domestic economy, a process which was carried out upon the principle of separating districts and centralising the productive forces within them. In the second half of the seventeenth century the mercantile system spread in every direction. Its essential feature consists in the fact that the ruling power proposed to make the work of all the members of the State useful to the State itself, to put pressure upon them, in order that as large a share as possible of their profits might become available for State purposes. Of State necessities, the chief were the army and the fleet, which implied vital power and the possibility of self-aggrandisement. The territorial community therefore now takes the place of the municipal. The aim of governments is now to increase the productive powers of their peoples, not only because individual producers and civic corporations are thereby benefited, but also because the capacity for bearing taxation is thereby increased. Governments struggle for colonial possessions, support the formation of great trading companies, which are not now independent corporations, but must submit to State control and accommodate themselves to the political relations of their rulers with other powers. There we have the real origin of the conception of the national strength as a uniform activity, directed by the sovereign in power. It is when domestic economy takes a commercial direction that the distinguishing features of political economy are plainly seen, and hence arises an entirely new set of ideas concerning the nature and extent of national power.

The importance of this revolution was first recognised by Ranke, and has been constantly emphasised in later times. The historical importance of the mercantile system and its influence upon State growth has occupied the attention of political economists, and induced the undertaking of a complete examination of the relations between the State and trade. This change in the conceptions of the western nations, which was completed at the time of the peace of Westphalia, has been fully stated by Leopold von Ranke in his proposition "that in the second half of the seventeenth century man's powers began to be directed toward the State, after the religious side of human nature had gained a due degree of development." Carl Bücher, in writing the history of "The Rise of Political Economy," thus characterises the mercantile system: "It is no dead dogma, but the living rule and guide of every statesman of importance, from Charles V to Frederick the Great. Its typical form may be seen in the economic policy of Colbert: his object was to create a system of foreign trade, whereby the national labour should be made capable of supplying every need of the individuals composing the State." Gustav Schmoller exhaustively explains the connection of the new economic organisation with the growth of a territorial supremacy, traces from that point the gradual recognition of a territorial legislature and the struggle of the knightly and provincial orders against the independent economic policy of the towns, and makes it plain that the territorial system of taxation materially contributed to bring about the economic connection of city and country and of individual districts. During the period of the growth of the ruling powers toward absolutism, "States arose, no
longer modelled upon previous formations, but uniform, and therefore strong, rich, and powerful economic bodies, where the civil organisation furthered economic development, which reacted in turn upon the civil administration. The financial purpose occupied alike political and economic energies, and these were movements unexampled in older States. It was a change which did not merely consist in the creation of State's armies, fleets, and officials, but also in the creation of a uniform financial and economic system, which was to comprehend whole countries and their domestic life."

This process did not come to fulfilment at the same time in every European nation: it was most quickly carried out in cases where political unity had been already attained, and where the central power had emerged victorious from the struggle with the independent corporations. It is the historian's task to explain those circumstances which exercised a retarding or an accelerating influence upon State formation. Economic life is wholly dependent upon external circumstances and the political situation, and therefore it is necessary first to examine the political history, and to expound the most important series of related facts, before entering upon an examination of national progress. A history of civilisation, which would examine the immediate condition of peoples living under similar circumstances, and not merely confine itself to the intellectual side of development, to art and science, can only be written upon the basis of political history. Alone and unaided, it can gain no insight into the motive forces of civil and political life, for this is information which the science of political history alone can provide.

Even at the present day we have no answer to the question, What form of political and economic constitution will have that permanent importance for mankind which the forms of feudalism had for a thousand years? We do not know whether any grade of development yet remains for our entry which is likely to last so long, whether the rapid change of productive conditions is likely to influence conceptions of rights, and thereby to produce more rapid changes in the social organism. But the firm conviction is borne in upon us that the rise of those marvellously complex political organisms, which we call Great Powers, has exercised the highest degree of influence upon the historical life, not only of Europe, but of the whole world. Nationalism is not sufficiently intellectual to give an impulse to the creation of fresh bodies politic differing in essentials from those now existing, and thus far has merely contributed to assure the position of the Great Powers; and it seems at the moment as if the great problems which mankind will have to solve in the near future could only be taken in hand with the help of the powerful machinery of the great States.

To utter further conjectures upon future developments is not the business of history, which should avoid political hypotheses to the utmost of its power; but it is the duty of the historian to examine into the rise of those great political organisms with which lies the ultimate decision of all questions now involving the exercise of force. It is from this point of view that we propose to follow the course of history and to pursue our investigations, giving special prominence to every point which may illustrate that remarkable and most important subject, the position of the Great Powers in the nineteenth century.
2. THE FRENCH KINGDOM

A. THE VICTORY OVER THE FRONDE

"The dreams and longings of Philippe Auguste, the aims and intentions of Philip the Fair, the traditions of Henry IV," were almost, though not entirely, realised by the peace of Westphalia (see the map facing p. 300). As Albert Sorel has attempted to show, that peace merely gave France and the French their due, and made valid their natural right of inheritance to the Frankish kingdom of Charlemagne. Much was still wanting to complete the "reindications," of which the French nation had apparently never lost sight. The programme of Guibert of Metz, of 1434, had not yet been completed. He had laid upon the French king the duty of acquiring Liège, Flanders, Hainault, Brabant, Guelders, Juliers, Upper and Lower Burgundy, Provence, Savoy, Lorraine, Luxemburg, Metz, Toul, Verdun, Trèves, Cologne, Mayence, and Strassburg; but some part of this project had been realised,—the districts included in the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which had been French possessions for all practical purposes for the last hundred years (from 1552), were now formally separated from the German confederacy, and the old Hapsburg possessions and rights in Alsace and Sundgau, the town of Breisach, and the jurisdiction over the Alsatian imperial towns, now devolved upon the crown of France. The boundary of the Rhine was attained. The disputed boundaries upon the north, the Pyrenees, and the Western Alpes still prolonged the struggle with Spain, and war went on for years on these great issues.

The great cardinal, who had clung with wonderful tenacity to the acquisitions which Henry IV had handed down, had not been so fortunate as to live to see the recognition of the "national rights," for which he spent the resources of his country; but at the time when he laid down his life's work the victory of France had been certainly assured. Mazarin never wavered in this policy, a policy which was eminently national. As Sorel observes, it was the natural outcome of the just claims of the French, the successors and heirs of the Gauls, who created the old Austria. It is, however, not so easy to retrace the conditions which made the "reindications" possible, to an origin in the force of public opinion in France. It is difficult to see the connection between the people's desires and the circumstances which led to the imperial concentration of the original dukedoms and counties composing the whole of France. The extinction of the House of Burgundy in the fourth generation; the acquisition of Brittany and Berry, Anjou and Provence, by the French kings through marriage and inheritance; the death, without heirs, of the three royal brothers, Francis II, Charles IX, and Henry III,—were the reasons which made it possible for Henry of Navarre to accept the call to the empty throne, the splendour of which had begun to wane appreciably during the Huguenot wars. If the religious wars of the powerful princely families had been carried on, whose temporal interests would have been largely furthered by a territorial separation of creeds, how could the "Gallic idea" have become a political force, how could antiquarian discussion upon the boundaries of Austria have checked the inordinate ambition of the princely houses? The Germans must be recognised as coheirs with the French to the empire of Charlemagne, and can we say that the French had any inherent rights in the fact that German political development
took an exactly opposite course to theirs? Would the theory of the natural
boundaries of the Gallic nation have entered the sphere of practical politics if the
transition from feudalism to absolute monarchy had been carried out in Germany
under the favourable circumstances which attended its progress in France?

How weak are the foundations which support the so-called logical and inevi-
table character of national development France had to learn from her own experi-
ence at the very moment when she took that first step toward the acquisition of
the European supremacy for which she was striving, a step most important and
most pregnant of results. The couriers saddled their horses in Münster on the
24th of October, 1648, to carry to the world the news that Germany had at last
complied with all the demands of the foreign mediators, and had saved, at any
rate, the sovereignty of her princes from general ruin and misery. None the
less it was by no means certain that the young king, in whose name the Cardinal
Jules Mazarin tried to save France from her fate, would enjoy all those advan-
tages which had been won for him by German regiments in French pay during
the war now ended. The State power, the centralisation of which Richelieu
had successfully initiated, now found obstacles before it which had been entirely
underestimated.

The feudal lords and the bureaucracy, which had an independence of its own,
saw that the moment had arrived for the assertion of their rights and privileges
as against the power of the crown, and that now was their opportunity to lay
such restrictions upon the regency of the queen as the crown had not brooked for
the last half-century. The four courts of judicial and administrative officials
united in the chamber of Saint-Louis, demanded a law for the protection of the
freedom of the individual; government prisoners, as in England, were to be brought
before the court concerned with the case within twenty-four hours after their
arrest. Moreover, demands for taxation were not to be valid until authorised by
the Parliament, which guarded justice and the execution of law. The government
found that its financial resources, and therefore its military powers, were consider-
ably restricted. It imprisoned two members of the Grand Conseil, hoping thereby
to put a stop to the movement of reform; but it was speedily convinced that the
result of this action was merely to provoke a vigorous resistance, and to excite the
population of Paris in favour of the demands of the official spokesmen. The gov-

However, the government did not attain its object. The landed nobility, whom
Richelieu had stripped of almost all their privileges, were excited with the hope of
regaining their old dominant position in the State, and this through an alliance
with the "Noblesse des robes," which had gained possession of the highest official
positions by purchase and inheritance. Jean François Paul de Gondi, Duke of
Metz and coadjutor to his uncle Henry, the Archbishop of Paris, gathered round
himself some of the most distinguished peers, who demanded the dismissal of
Mazarin and the creation of a council of regency, in which they were themselves to
have place and voice. The royal family and the cardinal had to leave the capital,
where the Fronds, as the opposition called themselves, seized the power. How-
ever, the Duke of Orleans remained on the side of the government, as also did the
Duke Louis of Condé, who had already won a great military reputation as Prince
Enghien, and had beaten the Spaniards at Lens a short time before (August 20,
1648). But Condé's younger brother, Armand Conti, his sister Anne Geneviève, Duchess of Longueville, the Vendôme, Beaufort, Bouillon, had become allies of Condé. The brother of Bouillon, Henri de Latour d'Auvergne, Viscount of Turenne, placed his sword at their service, and would have marched on Paris with an army from the Rhine, had he not been utterly lacking in every diplomatic quality; but he had allowed Mazarin to deceive him, and had not observed that the cardinal had secretly secured the services of his subordinate, the Swiss, John Louis of Erlach, who won over the troops to the government side by a timely cash payment. Turenne, however, was thought to be the greatest French general next to Condé, and his name alone was a power, which was to increase considerably when the already proposed alliance of the Fronde with Spain should be completed, and the idea of raising an army in common could be realised.

Mazarin was unable to overthrow these enemies to his policy with one blow, as his predecessors had so often done; he required time to separate them and to conquer them in detail. He reconciled himself to the Parliament, which withdrew the proscription issued against him, and brought the court back to Paris. But the spirit of opposition to an absolute monarchy was not immediately broken. It manifested itself among the manufacturing citizens of the capital, in the provincial Parliaments, and in the great families which considered that the foundation of a political power lay in the government of the old duchies entrusted to their own chiefs. The great Condé himself, who did not succeed in pushing Mazarin aside and ruling his royal cousin alone, placed himself at the head of the relatives of the royal house, who were not inclined to see themselves reduced to the position of mere officials. The preponderance of the princes of royal blood threatened danger to the opposing alliance, inasmuch as it implied a loss of prestige to the other great feudal lords. Mazarin recognised this fact, and made overtures to the party of the coadjutor Retz, with the view of dividing them from the Fronde. As he had succeeded with the leaders of the Parisian Parliament, so here he brought their old allies to obedience; and when he had come to an understanding with both parties, he proceeded to take in hand the task of arresting Condé, Conti, and Longueville.

By these acts Mazarin himself gave the impulse to the formation of the new Fronde. Women were the soul of this movement, for they then played a brilliant part in the social life of the period in France, and were centres of far greater force than their less intellectual husbands. The Duchesses of Condé and Longueville gathered together in the south the defendants of the imprisoned princes, secured the town of Bordeaux and the fortresses on the Spanish and Netherland frontiers, and again entered into serious negotiations with Spain. There the opinion was strongly held that individual advantages could be furthered by nothing so much as by the permanent debilitation of the French royal power, which was to be brought about by factions and divisions within France itself. In spite of that close connection with the priesthood, which had always been a cardinal point in the foreign policy of Spain, the party speculated upon the revival of Huguenot traditions and looked for a military organisation of the evangelical nobility by Turenne. Even after his defeat at Compy (December 15, 1650) the greatest danger to France consisted in the union of the two most capable and popular generals, and in their co-operation with the foreign enemy Mazarin lost control of the forces which he had hoped to guide. The Duke of Orleans declared him to be the one great enemy of France, and declined to attend a sitting of the Regency Council if he was
present. The members of the old Fronde deserted him almost as soon as he had
won them over, and the Parliament of Paris demanded that the princes should be
set free and the cardinal dismissed. He thought it advisable to bow before the
rising storm, left Paris in February, 1651, and took refuge with the Elector of
Cologne.

The retrogression of the French kingdom to the pattern of the medieval feudal
system, the restriction of the royal power by the separation of large districts into
principalities, might now have taken place if Condé had been capable of conceiving
and executing a political programme. He was, however, nothing more than an am-
bitious plotting prince, and had not the powers or experience of a ruler accustomed
to take upon himself the manifold responsibilities of administration in his own
territory. The relations of the high nobles about his person to the country and its
people had as little closeness or reality as his own. To the nobles the people were
the means to the maintenance of their own splendid establishments. These nobles
possessed villages and towns, fortresses and harbours. They could call out a levy
of their vassals, and gather them for an armed expedition; but the feeling that
they were all people of a common country, which bound lord and vassal together
in the German States, was here wholly wanting. At that time there were in France
too many official bodies whose sphere of action was not coincident with the terri-
torial departments, too many forces subserving the central power, too many inter-
ests which could be forwarded by bureaucratic government, and very few which
rested on the foundation of territorial rule.

Consequently the state of parties during the military period was continually
changing; every week new groups were formed, fresh conditions were arranged for
convenience of participation in this or the other undertaking. Condé nearly suc-
ceded in coming to an arrangement with the queen and uniting the position of
prime minister to that of first prince of the blood royal; but Mazarin threw his
influence into the opposite scale, and warned the queen from Bonn that a compact
with Condé would imperil the future of her son, who had just attained his majority.
The negotiations then came to a point at which open war against Condé was the only
remaining alternative. The members of the old Fronde left him, agreed to the
recall of Mazarin and to the removal of the court from Paris, where it could have
been best watched and influenced.

Condé's greatest loss, which perhaps decided the result of the now unavoidable
civil war, was the desertion of Turenne, whose action was determined by personal
desires and hopes rather than by political considerations. The beautiful Duchess
of Longueville might have succeeded in keeping him under her brother's standard;
but she rejected the advances of the only dependant who was capable of success-
fully upholding her own and her brother's cause. Turenne's talents decided the
appeal to arms in favour of the king. Neither by the mercenaries of Lorraine nor
by the boldness of the Grande Mademoiselle of Orleans could the defeat of the
great Condé be averted. When Paris opened her gates to him after his defeat at
Saint-Antoine and saved him from annihilation his fate was sealed, for the citizens
of the capital were tired of the war and showed no hesitation in concluding peace
with the king, who had approached the town, accompanied by Turenne. Once
again (August, 1652) Mazarin retired from the court in order not to stand in the
way of a pacification; a few months later Louis XIV, who had marched into Paris
at the head of his guards, brought him back with the greatest splendour, and
received him on the 3d of February, 1653, into the town by which he had been so passionately hated and persecuted.

B. THE CENTRALISATION OF THE GOVERNMENT

(a) The Peace of the Pyrenees and Mazarin’s Retirement. — The unity of the kingdom was saved. The royal government could not look forward without anxiety to the future, as long as the war with Spain continued and Condé was fighting on the enemy's side. They were obliged to keep a careful eye on the individualist movements in Normandy, Guienne, and Burgundy, and upon the fresh intrigues of Retz, who was laying claims to the archbishopric of Paris after his uncle's death. But there was no longer any necessity to fear that the unity of the provinces composing the kingdom was liable to dissolution. Condé had gone over to the side of Spain; but his defection did not imply that of some province of the kingdom bound to himself, as was the case when Bavaria or Brandenburg allied themselves with France against the Holy Roman emperor. Foreign powers had received the most striking proofs that the royal government was again in full consciousness of its strength. Upon the death of Ferdinand III, Mazarin was able to propose the candidature of Louis XIV to the German electors, and to reply to the choice of the Hapsburgs with the foundation of the first Rhine confederacy under a French protectorate. Moreover, the killing of her king decided England upon the side of France in the quarrel of the two Romance kingdoms of western Europe, and she helped the impoverished resources of the court with the gratuitous offer of some brigades of English infantry. The price paid for this assistance — Dunkirk — was certainly very high; but after this undertaking the military resistance of the Spanish monarchy might be considered as entirely crushed, and recompense could then be taken.

The peace of the Pyrenees, which was brought about after long negotiations on the 7th November, 1659, was the outcome of the defenceless position into which the monarchy of Philip II had fallen in the course of two generations. France gained a number of fortresses and districts, which materially improved her strategic position, and gave increased importance to the places acquired under the peace of Westphalia. In particular, a commencement was made of the strengthening of the northern boundary of the kingdom, by the incorporation of Artois with Arras; for, in the event of a defensive war, France’s chief danger lay in the fact that the Belgian frontier was but a short distance from the capital. Stenay and Thionville were important outposts of the dioceses of Metz and Verdun, as was Avesnes of Champagne. The possession of Roussillon made it difficult for Spain to take the offensive against the lower Aude, and Pignerol secured at the same time the approaches to Piedmont. The young king overcame his preference for Maria Mancini, Mazarin’s niece, and consented to marry the Infanta Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV, the payment of whose dowry of five hundred thousand golden guildens was conditional upon her renunciation of her rights of succession to the Spanish-Hapsburg territories.

To Mazarin, the Florentine, France is no less indebted than to the national leader, who had taken up the inheritance of Henry IV; he had left the affairs of the State which he served in an admirable position before his death on the 9th March, 1661. His family possessions had increased considerably during his term
of office, and the State benefited by the care he expended in this department, as Mazarin brought over great families to the court interests through the marriages which he arranged for his nieces. Such families were the Conti (by marriage with Anna Maria Martinozzi), the Mercœur of the house of Vendôme (by marriage with Laura Mancini), the De la Porte-Meilleraye of the house of Richelieu (with Hortensia Mancini), and the Savoyard-Carignan (with Olympia Mancini). The greatest proof that the royal family could have had of the subordination of his personal ambition to the welfare of the State is the fact that he opposed the marriage of the king with Maria Mancini, who afterward became Princess of Castiglione-Colonna. The moral victory which Louis won over his passion under Mazarin’s guidance is of no slight importance in the development of the king’s character. And now this true servant voluntarily retired, and left the young king alone in his place, so soon as it became apparent that his presence might have interfered with the king’s progress to the position of independent ruler.

(b) Louis XIV as Sole Ruler.—When Louis XIV began to extend and to build upon the foundations which the two cardinals had laid, his government attained in every department of public business a degree of independence and influence of which none of his confidential advisers could ever have dreamed. How could anyone have expected that the means which might have been successfully employed to set up a tyranny in some humble little principality would be set in operation in a kingdom which was the home of the proudest nobility in Europe, and where the highest law courts could insist upon the enforcement of law and custom as against the crown? Louis was convinced of the fact that a monarch who could make all the forces of the State subservient to himself, and could turn them to the State advantage at his will and pleasure, was in a position to undertake far heavier tasks than any minister, however gifted. The effort to realise his theory was a real pleasure to him, and he had sufficient ambition and also intellectual power to enable him to devote his life to this great task. A royal task it was in very truth, and he brought it to completion; for his was a royal nature through and through, eminently chosen and adapted to show mankind to what height of power and of purely personal influence a strong character can attain when supported by great traditions, inspired with the spirit of a highly gifted people, and devoting for half a century its every effort and exertion to increase and to extend the national possessions.

The extraordinary political talent of the king became apparent at the outset of his reign in the security with which he proceeded to organise his government. He was himself his first and only minister, assisted by several admirable intellects, for whom he, as master, appointed the several departments in which their activity was to be operative; these were Colbert, Le Tellier, father and son (Louvois), and Lionne. In cases of necessity others were called in from time to time to the State councils, which were invariably held under the king’s presidency. At first Turenne was often one of these, as was Villeroi and several secretaries of state at a later period. Special knowledge, capacity for some particular business, alone decided the king’s choice: birth and wealth no longer constituted a right to a place in the royal council. The king was the sole representative of the royal family, the House of Bourbon with its different branches. In him were conjoined both the will of the nation and the interests of the dynasty. By the side of the young
monarch the great Condé was but a poor figure; he never rose above the position of governor and general, and after him no other prince of the blood attempted to lay claim to a share in the government.

However, where there was the will to govern, it was also necessary that there should be a way. Louis XIV directed his particular care to this end: he looked carefully into the business of the “Partisans,” the tax-farmers and public creditors, for it was above all things necessary to protect the State from these vampires. He made a beginning with Nicolas Fouquet, the procureur-général and minister of finance, who had conducted this department of the State with great adroitness under Mazarin, but had also gained unbounded wealth for himself. Colbert had made the king acquainted with all the underhand dealings and falsifications of Fouquet, and the king had definitely decided upon his dismissal at the moment when Fouquet was under the impression that he could take Mazarin’s place, and rule both king and country as prime minister. He based his calculations upon the young man’s love of pleasure, which had already become obvious, so much so as to convince the court that the society of the Fronde, which had laid no restraint upon the freedom of intercourse between ladies and their cavaliers, would here also be thrown into the shade. But a peculiar feature in Louis’s character, a mark both of his royal and tyrannical nature, was the fact that he never allowed his personal desires to influence his political judgment, that his interests in official life and government were never thrust out of their place by conversation and love affairs, and that he always found time for everything which could busy a mind with so wide an outlook over human life as his. Fouquet was arrested on the 5th September, 1661, a short time after he had enchanted the king with an extraordinarily brilliant and expensive entertainment in his castle of Vaux (at Melun), and thought that he had won him over entirely. The king placed him on his trial, and insisted upon a heavy punishment, although public opinion was in favour of the clever financier who had been adroit enough to circulate the guldens, which he had extorted by his oppression, among a wide circle of dependants and parasites, and also to reward therewith good and useful services. Colbert, as ministerial official, who had undertaken the business of working up the most varied “cases” with inexhaustible zeal, was very well acquainted with the methods by which the Partisans had gained their great wealth, and supported the king in his resolve to demand restitution to the State of the gold that had been unjustly extorted. A special court of justice was entrusted with the examination of the defalcations, and ordered confiscations in the case of five hundred persons to the amount of one hundred and ten millions of livres, which was poured into the State chest.

By means of this influx and also by lowering the rate of interest which the State paid to its creditors, Jean Baptiste Colbert (see his picture on the plate facing p. 108) was enabled to maintain the national credit without further impositions, although the revenues had been pledged from the beginning of his administration until 1663. He entirely removed the poll tax, “teille,” which was a burden only upon peasants and citizens, for the clergy, the nobility, and the upper-class citizens, in fact every one who bore a title, had been exempted. On the other hand, he raised the indirect taxes, especially that upon salt, “gabelle,” which was only remitted in exceptional cases, and bore more heavily upon large establishments than upon small.

With the reform of taxation began that great economic centralisation of the
mercantile system, which, as Gustav Schmoller has made clear, is of no less importance than the formation of the State. Colbert had no precedent for his guidance, but none the less he formed the successive economic developments of previous reigns into a firm and sound national system, even as his lord and king followed the steps of Henry IV and Richelieu in his foreign policy. The regulations by which Louis XI had opposed the entrance of foreign manufacturers into the kingdom, the institution of free trade in corn within the limits of the kingdom by the edict of 1539, the bestowal of special rights upon the commercial and manufacturing classes by the government after 1577 and 1581, the creation of a French fleet under Richelieu,—these measures were first necessary before the policy of economic protection, the removal of the customs duties of the provinces, could enable the general interests of the State to gain the victory over the individual aspirations of separate provinces and towns. The "États-généraux" could no longer be summoned, because such a measure would have renewed the struggle between the orders and the central power, and have taxed the entire strength of the government. It became necessary to place limits to the operation of the provincial assemblies, as no consideration for the general necessities could be expected from them. There was also the danger to be reckoned with, as the event proved, that these assemblies would use their privileges to secure their putative advantages within the narrow limits of their local administration, and would place every possible obstacle in the way of the government, which invaded the rights of the individual in its zeal to further the aims of the public economy. In the course of only six years (1667–1673) successive royal edicts had laid the foundations of a uniform administration throughout France, without which the country could never have provided the government with the enormous amount of military material required for the war against neighbouring States, whereby the "natural" boundaries of France were to be reached. Before the State could exert its power as a whole, the national resources had to be centralised. Economic progress became the foundation of political power.

There was but one method of increasing the prosperity of the citizens, and so making it possible for them to bear the burden of national undertakings, and this method consisted in attracting them to the production of staple articles of consumption, in persuading them to trade on their own account and so to reserve to themselves the profits which foreigners had previously appropriated, in putting all the available money in the country into circulation, and by a steady reduction of the influx of foreigners excluding foreign countries from all participation in the advantages gained through trade and manufactures. This change in industrial concerns had almost to be enforced upon the citizens of France by the government: of themselves, they contributed but little to that result. Not only did Colbert exercise his influence to bring about the erection of new manufactories, not only did he procure foreign experts and place them as instructors in the workshops, but even the smallest technical details were carefully examined by the authorities. Directions upon the weaving and dyeing of hundreds of fabrics were issued by them, and disregard of their regulations was punished. In the department of manufactures the energy of the government was rewarded by brilliant success. The dexterity and the good taste of the population displayed itself in their manufactures, which were, in part, new creations (see the plate opposite "The Audience of the Papal Ambassador, Chigi, by Louis XIV, 1664"), or were modified to meet an existing demand, as in the case of the lace manufacture.
KING LOUIS XIV'S AUDIENCE TO THE PAPAL AMBASSADOR
SIGISMONDO CHIGI AT FONTAINEBLEAU, JULY 29TH, 1664

The French ambassador, the Duke of Créqui had been insulted at Rome on the 22d August, 1668, by the papal Corsican guard, and Pope Alexander VII (Fabio Chigi before his election) found himself obliged in consequence to offer his apologies to King Louis XIV. For the accomplishment of this delicate task, he chose his nephew, Sigismondo Chigi (afterwards Cardinal Legate of Ferrara) who was despatched as ambassador a latere to the residence of the French king. The audience which Louis XIV granted to this legate, July 29, 1664, has an importance impossible to overestimate in the history of the relations between France and the Papacy; by the command of the sunny monarch, the artist Charles Lebrun made it the subject of piece No. 6 in a series of tapestries representing historical events. The design of the valuable Gobelin reproduced over-leaf (now in the Louvre at Paris) is by Lebrun himself; the tapestry is based on the picture by Antoine Matthias, and was made in the years 1671-1676.

The piquant character of the French court ceremonial under Louis XIV, its dispositions, appearance, and the immense luxury of that period are nowhere better displayed than in this Gobelin. The inscription in the centre of the frame at the bottom runs as follows:

“Audience donnée par le Roy Louis XIV à Fontainebleau au Cardinal Légit Chigi, Neveu et Légit a latere du Pape Alexandre VII, le XXIX juillet MDCLXIV pour la satisfaction de l'injure faite dans Rome à son Ambassadeur.”

This beautiful piece of work now belongs to the Mobiliere National and is preserved in the Manufacture des Gobelins at Paris; it has also been reproduced in a photochromo, which is unfortunately not a success, by Guifrey, Münts, and Pinchart in their “Histoire générale de la tapisserie” (Paris, 1878-1884); Münts calls it, “the most famous of all the productions of the Gobelin manufacture during the reign of Louis XIV.” We may well remember that Charles Lebrun, the first of the royal painters and director of the Manufacture Royale des Gobelins from 1683-1690, had nearly 50 painters, architects, and designers under his orders, among them such artists as Yvert père, Augier, Baptiste Monnoyer, Nicolas Bernaert, Boulle, Genoels and Baudoin, Noël Coypel, the two Boullonge and others. It was the gifted Colbert who gave the first impulse to this great artistic development, as also to many other sides of French culture in the 17th century.
SIGISMONDO CHIGI AT FONTAINEBLEAU, JULY 29th 1664.

[now in the "Manufacture des Gobelins" Paris]
The trade, however, which it was hoped that the West India, East Africa, East India, Northern, and Levant companies would establish by no means fulfilled the general expectations. The French were not capable of world-wide commercial undertakings. They rarely desired to push their influence in far distant countries; they were not fitted, as their king had supposed, to enter into commercial rivalry with Holland. Several times France gained a footing in North America, and each attempt proved her want of capacity for the task of colonisation. At the present day France has neither influence nor colonists in the northern continent of the New World: these have passed to the Teutonic race. The capital of these companies was provided by private subscription, in which the higher officials had to take a share "at the king's desire." The best business of all was done by the Levantine company, which gradually monopolised the trade between the western Mediterranean and ports of the Osman kingdom, after numerous attempts at intervention by the Dutch merchants. Great hopes had rested upon the completion of the Canal du Midi, as it was thought that merchantmen of heavy tonnage could avail themselves of this new route from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean; at any rate, it made manifest the talents of the French for engineering work, and gave flatterers—among whom Pierre Corneille was conspicuous—the opportunity of magnifying the king above Charlemagne and all his predecessors. But the new passage did not become an important trade route: the canal affected the trade merely of the surrounding districts, that is to say, of Languedoc.

The rearrangement of financial affairs, wherein, according to the report of the Venetian envoys, material improvement would be rapidly brought about by the influx of bullion from abroad, enabled the king to reorganise the army, which was hardly equal to any enterprise of difficulty in its present form, under which it had emerged from the most recent wars. The system of yeomanry enlistment, the swindling practised by the authorities, whose returns invariably claimed pay for a larger number of men than were actually under arms, the small number of real fighting troops as compared with the growing train of camp followers, the entire dependence of military operations upon the exigencies of winter quarters and harvesting,—these and many other causes of weakness could only be swept away, when the king took the material interests of the officers and men directly under his control, when the middleman was no longer responsible for their equipment, and when pay could be regularly disbursed as it fell due.

Hitherto the governors of the provinces had been a serious check to the power of the king over the army, since they had command of the fortress garrisons, and could call out the "arrière ban" of the nobles and levy the militia. Standing cavalry regiments had never been kept up, as they were found to be unavailable for purposes of regular warfare. François Michel Le Tellier, Marquis de Louvois, was the first to make use of the militia (with some reluctance) during the war of the Spanish succession, when lack of men became a serious problem. For this purpose contributions were exacted from the nobility and the towns, which were employed for purposes of recruiting (racolage). It was not a national army that Louis XIV employed to secure his predominance in Europe, but an army of professional soldiers, of which scarce two-thirds were Frenchmen. The infantry of the "Maison du Roi," which was six thousand strong, was half foreign; in the life guards, eight hundred mounted troops of noble origin, Frenchmen were in the majority. The "infantry of the line" counted forty-six regiments, of which fourteen, including
fifty so-called free companies, were composed of Swiss, Germans, Irishmen, Italians, and Walloons. The cavalry amounted to eighty-two regiments, with twelve thousand horses; in their case foreigners made up an eighth part of the whole, and were looked upon as the flower of the service, and received higher pay than the native-born soldiers.

The rise of the French nation to the position of a great power was not the result of any great national movement, but was solely due to the victory of the system of centralisation and monarchical absolutism, which lofty aims were prosecuted by capable statesmen and a monarch of first-rate capacity. These aims were national. They corresponded to that inner consciousness of power with which the nation was inspired; but they were not laid down as being the direct expression of the national will. The kingly policy had to undertake the task of accustoming the nation to that point of view. In the German Empire exactly the contrary was the case. There the necessities and the just demands of the nation were discussed in tracts and essays, which went the round of the educated classes. But the movement gained no consideration; neither the emperor nor the diet were able to unite the German forces, either for defence against attack, or for the enforcement of justice or contractual obligations, or for a stand against oppression. Had not this dissimilarity of conditions existed in her neighbour, France would never have been able, even under the strongest absolutism, to attain a position wholly out of proportion to her natural resources and to the just claims of her people.

C. THE WAR FOR THE RIGHTS OF REVERSION

Centralisation at home was followed by extension abroad, by conquest, the unlimited extent of which could not fail to become a source of danger to the nation. There can be no doubt that Louis XIV was induced to undertake his wars of spoliation by the legend of Austrasia and the so-called right of natural boundaries, which were to include the Rhine; but it is equally certain that after his marriage with the Infanta of Spain he had entertained the hope of winning the Spanish kingdom, or at least a large portion of its territory. In so doing he transgressed to eventual ruin the limits of the classical system of French policy which had been founded by Henry IV and built up by the cardinals. He excited the greed for possession in the French, and fostered their political pride; but he failed to inspire them with that sense of unconditional devotion to the State, with that spirit of cheerful obedience to the ruling house, which is alone able to sustain the shock of severe repulse. Lack of self-restraint may be a characteristic of Gallic or of west Frankish origin, but it has manifested itself as plainly in French politics as in French erotic and fashionable life, and the action of Louis XIV greatly contributed to increase its influence. The excess to which the centralisation of the State was carried brought about consequences so disastrous to the nation that all the cruel blood-letting of the Revolution could not effect a permanent cure.

1 "There was a certain limit to foreign enterprise which could not be transgressed, an extreme which Europe would not endure, and to which the French themselves would have been unequal. Herein lay the essential point of the classical system, which Louis XIV distorted." — Albert Sorel, "L'Europe et la Révolution française."
The first step which betrayed the young king's intentions was directed against Lorraine. This province had already passed into the French sphere of influence, as a result of the rights acquired in 1659 to a military road which crossed the province in the direction of the Rhine. Diplomatic quibbles and finally the employment of force gained the whole district with the exception of one fortress, Marsal. The ducal family of the House of Guise were again obliged to attempt to protect their property by joining hands with the Hapsburg policy; but they were unable to obtain any material support from the emperor.

The second step had for its object the acquisition of the Spanish dominions. Louis XIV was ready to support his father-in-law Philip against Portugal, — for Philip had designs of uniting Portugal with the country of its origin, — provided that he would agree to declare that the renunciation made by his elder daughter, Louis's wife, was invalid, and that she might accordingly lay claim to the inheritance of Franche-Comté and some Netherland territory. Louis's intentions were helped by the fact that the Netherland jurists established the fact of the existence of so-called rights of escheatage as regards Brabant, whereby Maria Theresa could lay definite claim to an important part of Great Burgundy. When Philip died in 1665, before he had been placed in the embarrassing position of having to decide this difficult question, Louis came to an understanding with Charles II of England upon certain acquisitions which Charles was to obtain, concluded a compact with the Rhenish princes for the security of the passage of the Rhine against any contingents of the imperial troops, and then ordered the Marshals Antoine d' Armont and Turenne, who had concentrated the armies on the northern frontiers, to advance into Flanders and push on to Brabant.

The Spaniards were not so completely taken by surprise as had been hoped in Paris. Brussels was too well prepared to be captured by any sudden attack. Dendermonde, the most important strategical point on the Scheldt, was in an excellent posture of defence, and could have withstood a siege, which, however, the king, who led a division of the army in person, was not prepared to undertake. But Charleroi, Douai, Courtrai, and Lille were seized before the powers who had been surprised by this unexpected breach of the peace on the part of France could agree upon any common action. Louis issued the information that he desired to gain the Franche-Comté, Luxemburg, and certain places on the Netherland frontier, and that if these were left to him he would renounce all claims to any further rights which his wife might acquire by inheritance. Condé, who was entrusted with the conquest of the Franche-Comté, succeeded in this task with surprising rapidity; but this was the sole success which fell to the king as a result of this first act of aggression. Sweden joined the convention which had been brought about between England and the States of Holland, resulting in the Triple Alliance (23d January, 1668), which recognised the claims of Louis to what he had already seized, on the condition that he should renounce all future attempts at aggrandisement.

The king agreed; he restored the Franche-Comté to Spain, and retained his Netherland conquests. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to which Spain was obliged to conform, confirmed this settlement on May the 2d, 1668, without raising any discussion as to Maria Theresa's rights of inheritance. Louis's ministers had urgently advised him not to entangle the finances of the country, which were not as yet in a satisfactory condition, by prosecuting a war, in which Spain would undoubtedly have found allies against him. The warning was also justified by the
fact that in this war of escheatage France had not exhibited such great military capacity as to inspire the idea that her armies were irresistible. Before it was possible to resume the policy of conquest, the work of centralising the forces of the State must be vigorously prosecuted. Meanwhile, the task before French diplomacy was to split up the Triple Alliance and to prevent any future union of the so-called “sea powers.”

3. ENGLAND AND THE NETHERLAND STATES

A. The Aristocratic Rule in Holland

During their eighty years' war of liberation against Spain the Protestant people of the Netherlands had not only struggled for religious freedom and political independence, but they had also become the greatest merchants and capitalists of the world. The struggle between the Romance and Teutonic races had lasted a thousand years, and after the seventeenth century it was not only a leading feature in European history, but was also an important factor in the political changes which took place in every habitable part of the globe; and during that struggle there is no more brilliant example of Teutonic superiority in the spirit of business enterprise, in boldness of commercial designs, and in determination to make the most of any advantage, however small, than is presented by the rise of Dutch commercial life. After Spain and Portugal had begun the era of geographical discovery, it was the merchants of Holland who were the first to grasp the commercial advantages opened by the discovery of the ocean routes to both Indies, and to draw full profit from them; for the great influx of precious metal, which had given Spain so long a period of political power, was to be proved by no means a necessity, and very possibly a danger, to national prosperity.

It is possible that the Germans would have anticipated Holland by absorbing a large portion of the world's trade, or have become a commercial power contemporary with her; but German relations with Portugal, who had begun her East Indian commercial career upon capital borrowed from the Fugger, Welser, Vöhlin, Höchstetter, and others, had been interrupted by the opposition of Hapsburg interests and the first religious wars, which had exercised a destructive influence upon commercial activity in southern Germany. The political condition of the German Empire after Charles V was totally incompatible with mercantile development, and the Netherlands had, therefore, no competition to fear in this direction. On the other hand, they were utterly beaten by the Hanseatics in the competition for the Baltic trade. The latter obtained their imports at so cheap a rate that they could afford to underbid any middleman; they supported Russia in her wars with Poland by shipments of guns and military stores, in return for which they exacted enormous quantities of raw material at ridiculously low prices. As they were always ready to pay cash down, they easily outstripped all competitors in the Baltic corn-markets; they monopolised the herring fisheries on the Scotch coasts by their greater cleverness in the curing of the fish, their methods being unknown to the English. In 1642 a special board was appointed for the development of trade in the Levant. Venice and Genoa, who had been working for that trade for centuries, now had to put a good face on the matter and try to secure their retail trade in dried fish and colonial produce by means of special conventions. Venetian
textile goods, which had been so famous, and for which Smyrna was a special market, were now entirely ousted by Dutch and French productions. French goods were carried in Dutch vessels to every European coast; in the year 1658 their value was estimated at forty-two million pounds. The discoveries on the coast of the Australian continent, in New Guinea, and New Zealand must not be forgotten, together with the settlements in North America, where corn-growing and horse-breeding made great progress in a short time.

The brilliancy of the life of the aristocracy, the self-confidence of the citizens, have been immortalized in the Dutch school of painters, who attained to a higher pitch of artistic power during those days of commercial and political ascendancy than any of their contemporaries. The admirable likenesses of their councillors and merchants bring before our eyes those men who exercised for half a century a domination which extended over every part of the world.

However, their power was but short-lived; at the moment when they seemed to have reached the highest point they were already tottering to their fall. The settlements, which their sea-power had enabled the Dutch to found after a hard struggle, lay open on the landward side to any attack, and extraordinary efforts were demanded to make their defence secure; but the nation of whom these efforts were demanded was incapable of any further development. They had brought their carrying-trade to the highest possible pitch; but they were not sufficiently populous to become a producing people, and to add to the body of calculating, speculating merchants a creative, manufacturing class, which might have given the State a reserve of power; for no such reserve was to be found among the clever but narrow-minded individuals who sat in the council chambers of the "Staden."

The unbounded pride displayed by the capitalists toward the landed proprietors who took no share in commerce eventually deprived the city aristocracy of all co-operation on the part of the nobles in the further development of the State; the House of Orange, which had raised the standard of freedom and independence during the hardest periods of the fight, was thereby deprived of that position in which it had been able to render the greatest services to the common fatherland. The young stadtholder and captain-general, William II, was carried off by an untimely death (6th November, 1650); and it was not till a week after his funeral that his heir was born to the English princess Mary, on the 14th November, 1650. This event gave the "aristocracy of wealth," as the regents of the State of Holland called themselves, the opportunity they had desired for establishing their sole supremacy, which rested upon two main principles; first, that the Orange party should be excluded from any share in the government, and, secondly, that the freedom of the small towns and the poorer classes of the population should be withdrawn. There is no pride like the pride of the business man who has made his own way in the world, and there is no administration so selfish and oppressive as that, which would provide for the good of individuals and the welfare of the State upon the principles demanded for the working of a counting-house. With the hypocrisy of priestcraft, the members of the new republic compared their State to the Jewish kingdom of antiquity. But when, in order to find some cogent reason for the abolition of the hereditary office of stadtholder, the republicans began to add up the account of what the House of Orange had cost the State, not forgetting the presents made to the children of their generals and statesmen, then
it was that the peddling soul of the Dutchman showed all the characteristics of
the degraded Jewish usurers who had increased abundantly in previous centuries,
and proved that their political ideas were absolutely devoid of that element of
greatness which was always a feature of the home and foreign policy of the chosen
people during their period of prosperity.

During the wars with England, which were the natural result of commercial
rivalry, the Dutch fleet had in no way tarnished the reputation of the Low German
seafarers; the final triumph of the heroic spirit of the great Orange period took
place when Michæl Adriaanszoon De Ruyter, 1667, made a final descent upon the
Thames, and burned or carried off the first vessels of the astounded British under
the very guns of the Tower. The fortresses on the frontier were in a sad condition
by contrast with this display of vigour. The internal dissensions and jealousies
of the two parties ruined the spirit of the army, and destroyed the zeal of the
officers, whom the government refused to pay because they were suspected of
Orange inclinations.

However, the chief councillor of Holland, Jan De Witt, a dry, calculating
machine, a man of some common sense but with all the passionate narrow-minded-
ness of the republican citizen, was of the opinion that his lofty wisdom had
saved the State from all danger when he had succeeded in forming the Triple
Alliance with England and Sweden against Louis XIV. His mathematical
knowledge had brought him the reputation of a savant, but had not enabled
him to grasp the political combinations which the king of France set on foot
when he found it necessary to break up this confederation of the maritime powers.
De Witt thought that he had firmly bound the interests of England to those of
his own country, and that he would be able to execute that great political design
which was reserved for the powers of the Prince of Orange, whom he bitterly per-
secuted, and whom he was anxious to reduce to the position of a mere dependent
upon the “aristocracy of wealth.” But the design only became possible when the
positions of the actors had been reversed, when the English people had come to a
full development of their political power, and were able to take the lead in the
movement to save the Teutonic world from subjection to the great king of France.

B. THE NEW STUART MONARCHY

At the moment when Louis XIV was making trial of his diplomatic skill in
his preparations to deal a crushing blow against the Netherlands, the condition of
affairs in the British Isles was not such as to justify any expectation that the sal-
vation of European freedom might be expected from that source.

England had speedily recovered from her attack of republicanism, which was
short though sharp; for the population which was represented in the two Houses
of Parliament was composed of far happier elements than that of the “Seven
Provinces.” But when she restored the monarchy which Cromwell had removed
(cf. Vol. VI) she had been unfortunate in setting up an utterly incapable ruler,
and was consequently not in a position to take that place in the political world
which belonged to her of right. One of the hardest trials of a people to whom
monarchy is a necessity, and who are inspired with the sense of its dignity, is to
see a worthless ruler upon the throne, a man who is personally incapable of dealing
with the responsibilities of his office. The Stuart Charles II had no conception of
the relations that should subsist between the State and its ruler, between the
monarchy and the representatives of the people; in his opinion, the government of
England was a possession that was naturally his, which might afford him the oppor-
tunity of leading a life of debauchery. Of national pride or of political ambition
he had nothing. So it was not difficult for Louis XIV to bend and turn him to
his own purposes, the more so as Charles soon found himself unable to dispense
with the money with which Louis supplied him. The royal civil list had been
drawn up by the Convention Parliament, which had made its stipulations with the
Stuart before the Restoration, and the king's allowance did not err on the side of
generosity; however, though £1,200,000 would have been quite enough to keep up
all the necessary splendour of the court, it would not suffice to satisfy the excessive
demands of the king's mistresses, who surpassed each other in the extravagance
of their requests. Business between Charles II and Louis XIV began with the
sale of Dunkirk (cf. above), for which France paid £400,000, partly in cash,
partly in bills, from the discounting of which King Louis probably made some
profit.

The so-called Cavalier Parliament, which had been returned in 1661, was as
loyal and devoted as any monarch could desire; but it held tenaciously to the
important powers of voting supplies and controlling expenditure, and by voting
separately the amounts required for special purposes it was able to preserve a due
proportion of authority in the several departments of public business. The vicious
and unscrupulous character of the king enabled the Parliament to exercise its legisla-
tive powers without restraint, and to mould the growing kingdom as it pleased.
As regards the centralisation of power, the strong hand of the Puritan dictator
Cromwell had accomplished a great deal, and his place was now taken by the Par-
liament, which looked into religious as well as economic affairs, and also worked
carefully to maintain the relations of Britain with foreign powers and to raise her
prestige in Europe, for which task the house of Stuart had shown itself wholly
incapable.

The religious policy of the Parliament was intolerant to the point of cruelty.
It resulted in crime and constant judicial murders; dissent was persecuted with a
severity almost unprecedented even during the fiercest struggles of the Reformation.
The supremacy of the Anglican Church was considered as inseparable from the
unity of the State and the uniform subjection of every citizen to the civil author-
ity; that ecclesiastical supremacy was therefore especially protected by legislation,
and any attempt on the part of Papists or Presbyterians to overthrow it was im-
mediately checked by the enforcement of the severest penalties. By the Act of
Uniformity in the year 1662 every form of worship was forbidden which differed
from that of the established Episcopal Church, holders of livings were dispossessed
if they refused compliance, and eighteen hundred dissenting clergy were driven
into poverty. The king, who had leanings to Catholicism, did his best to check
the Papist persecutions; but terrifying rumours of conspiracies, which readily
found credence among the people, kindled the fire anew; death-warrants were
issued against members of the nobility, against whom the most groundless sus-
picions were entertained. Religious conviction in England seems almost insepa-
rable from fanaticism, so that the worst deeds of arbitrary oppression were crowned
with the halo of religious zeal; in reality, these acts were the phenomena marking
the rapid growth of the centralisation of the civil power.
At the same time the spirit of commercial enterprise began to make itself apparent. The example of the Netherlands had exercised a reviving and stimulating influence upon English commercial activity, which had progressed but little since the voyages of Walter Raleigh in the time of Queen Elizabeth (cf. Vol. I, pp. 417 and 434). With the exception of London there was but one seaport with any extensive trade, namely, Bristol, which was in constant communication with Virginia and the Antilles. Manchester imported only two million pounds of raw wool every year for her textile industries, which was brought from Cyprus and Smyrna; among the largest imports were the wines of Spain and Portugal, for the wine trade became important by reason of the reaction to luxury which followed upon the stern morality of the Puritan government. In no case had manufacture risen to a higher level; British products could not compete with those of France or Belgium either in quantity or quality. Even the best hardware was then imported from abroad. The output of iron was restricted by the scarcity of coal, and amounted to little more than ten thousand tons. In the North American colonies were some thirty thousand settlers, who were working with energy and forethought for the development of their community, without concern for the party conflicts of the mother country; but their economic development had not sufficiently advanced for the mother country to derive any advantage from them.

At the period of the Restoration the landed nobility were still the ruling class in England; they were but seldom in communication with the capital, as the badness of the roads made travelling both expensive and dangerous. As regards education and culture, they were probably on the same level as the petty nobles of Auvergne or Limousin; even in the remotest districts of Germany men might be found of greater experience of the world and with better knowledge of the manners of the best European society than any of the nobility in Somersetshire or Yorkshire. Scarcely more than half of the level land of the kingdom was under agriculture, but the products were valuable, and were sufficient to maintain the middle-class farmers, whose requirements were generally of a very moderate nature. However, even the richest barons had but a very modest capital at their disposal; incomes of £20,000 sterling were the exception rather than the rule.

After the fall of the Puritan tyranny and the disbanding of the Parliamentary army, with which Cromwell had maintained his power, it became possible to make special efforts to increase the prosperity of the country. The lords and city aristocracy combined to form business companies, which were to develop commercial and carrying trade upon the principles which had been successful in Holland. The East India Company was already in existence, and an African Company was now formed with the object of providing the Antilles with negro slaves. Gold dust was imported from Guinea, with which the first guineas were coined.

But wherever the English ships appeared they found jealous enemies in the Dutch, who did their utmost to spoil the English trade. In 1664 surprises and attacks had occurred in the distant seas, though no open declaration of war between the two States had yet been made. The interruption of friendly relations and the formal declaration of war in the year 1665 was only the inevitable recognition of that hostility which had originated in State rivalry and had long ago broken out in the colonies. Upon several occasions during the war the English fleet was able to display its excellence in brilliant and successful actions; but it was unable to maintain a permanent predominance over the Dutch. The efficiency
of the navy declined considerably during the war, although Parliament showed no parsimony in voting naval supplies, however little inclined it might be to improve the land forces or to take in hand the organisation of a standing army. But of the £1,250,000 which was voted for purposes of the war, £400,000 went into the king's private purse, and money was lacking to provide the shipwrights with proper timber and materials for building. The favourites of the king's mistresses became naval commanders, capacity or experience being wholly disregarded. After De Ruyter's last attack on Gravesend and Chatham, the hope of inflicting a humiliation on their bold rivals was abandoned. It was recognised with bitter disappointment that a man had been chosen for king who had no particular interest in the fate of the country. "On the night when our ships were burned by the Dutch," writes the good royalist admiralty official Pepys in his diary, "the king did sup with my Lady Castlemaine at the Duchesse of Monmouth's (the wife of his natural son, whom he had legitimised), and there were all mad in hunting of a poor moth" (Diary, June 21, 1667).

After the conclusion of the peace of Breda (1667), which was by no means unfavourable to England, the chief sufferer in the war which had just been ended seemed to have been the Stuart dynasty, the reputation of which had been greatly lowered in the eyes of the true and devoted English nobility; for the nobles had restored the Stuarts in the conviction of their uprightness and out of hatred for the hypocrisy of the Puritans. England made peace with the Dutch and determined to limit rivalry with Holland to the sphere of commerce; she recognised the common danger which France was threatening, who had now freed herself from the anxiety of the war with Spain, and therefore she readily agreed to the conclusion of the Triple Alliance. Charles II cared nothing whatever for the political and moral forces which were working within the people. The direction of party movements which might happen to be popular with the city magnates or the county members was nothing to him, except in so far as he might be able to use it to increase his income. He and his brother York contributed, it is true, to the capital which was raised for the reorganisation of the African Company, which had become bankrupt during the war; but this action was not the result of the desire to set a good example and to promote the spirit of enterprise among the moneyed classes; it was impelled by covetousness and the instinct of speculation. The investment of £5,000 in the African Company was a very small deposit for a king one of whose mistresses lost £25,000 in one night at cards. Such insignificant sums went for nothing in his financial plans, even though there were times when he had not money enough to buy himself new underclothing.

C. THE ATTACK OF FRANCE UPON HOLLAND

The Stuart king's respect for the new-made Triple Alliance and for the constitution of his country was not strong enough to prevent him from entering upon the course of political dealing proposed to him by Louis XIV, by which he was the more attracted as the propositions of Louis promised him a far greater and surer reward than did the trade in spices and negro children. The royal brother of France also displayed considerable politeness and prudence in entrusting the final conclusion of this piece of business to the hands of two ladies, Henrietta of Orleans, Charles's sister, and her companion, Louise of Querouaille, who became
Duchess of Portsmouth, and gained an influence upon the king nearly as strong as that which the Countess of Castlemaine had up to that time exercised. In the convention of Dover (May 22, 1670), Charles II promised to go over to the Roman Catholic Church, to dissolve the Triple Alliance, and to form a confederacy with France against Holland; in return for this, Louis promised him an immediate present of £200,000, and further support by way of so-called yearly war subsidies to the amount of £300,000. Six thousand French troops were also to proceed to England should the king find it necessary to defend his royal prerogatives against the Parliament. Moreover, Louis did not merely confine his operations to securing the king's adhesion; he gave large sums of money to be spent in bribery, the division of which among ministers and members of Parliament was entrusted to Colbert's brother.

In England the king had dismissed the generally hated chancellor Clarendon, and so stifled criticism upon the increasing immorality of court life; public opinion was entirely at fault concerning the intentions of the government, which was now carried on by the so-called Cabal ministry (Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, Lauderdale). The Cabal obtained two and a half millions of pounds from the Parliament for purposes of coast defence in the event of a war between Holland and France, and then dissolved the assembly. As there was then no Parliament in existence, they seized the opportunity of defrauding the creditors of the treasury, in particular the London goldsmiths, who then undertook banking business; to these they refused repayment of the capital which they had borrowed; they also issued a decree removing the penalties to which Papists and Presbyterians were liable. By these acts the limits of the constitution were transgressed, and the numerous parties in the country who considered the recognition of the Anglican Church as the State religion to be the most important part of their programme were shaken in their allegiance to the House of Stuart. The seed of further discord had thus been sown and was rapidly germinating when Louis XIV raised his hand to deliver the blow which he had long prepared against the Netherland States, in order that he might destroy the opposition of the most dangerous enemy to his plans of expansion.

Sweden had also been bought by France; she had undertaken to enter into the war with sixteen thousand men on the side of France if the emperor or the empire should espouse the cause of Holland; the price for this promise was four hundred thousand thalers in the event of peace, six hundred thousand in case of war. The emperor Leopold I had already come to an agreement with Louis XIV in the year 1668 concerning the future division of the Spanish monarchy, by means of his ministers Johann Weikhard, Prince of Auersperg, and Wenzel, Prince of Lobkowitz. Auersperg was possessed with the idea that if he were made cardinal he would be a statesman not inferior to Richelieu and Mazarin, and he required the support of the King of France to obtain his preferment at Rome; Lobkowitz hated the Spaniards, who lorded it over himself at the court of Vienna, although they no longer had at their disposal the money with which some thirty or forty years previously they had brought over privy councillors, princes of the Church, and generals to their interests.

The German House of Hapsburg had acquiesced in the gains which France had made during the war of eschatage. It had, moreover, concluded a secret convention with France, which is first mentioned by Grimoard in the "Œuvres de Louis
XIV" (published 1806); this convention was to the effect that when the Spanish line became extinct France should have the Franche-Comté, Navarre, Naples and Sicily, the Philippines and the fortresses on the African coast, while the emperor was to receive Spain, the West Indies, Milan, Sardinia, the Balearic and Canary Islands. Louis XIV never had any intention of holding to the conditions of this convention; but he had obtained a general recognition of the possibility of dividing the Spanish possessions, the throne of which was likely to become vacant, and he had obviated for a long time to come any opposition on the part of the Vienna court to his undertakings against Holland. On the 1st November, 1671, a compact was signed for the emperor by the Prince of Lobkowitz, in which the emperor promised to take no part in any war of France which should be waged outside the Spanish and German kingdoms, and to afford no other assistance to the powers attacked by France than the continuance of friendly relations with them. Consequently the efforts of the Austrian ambassador to the Dutch States, the Freiherr Franz von L'Isola, to persuade the emperor to intervene on behalf of Holland, remained without result for the moment. The occupation of Lorraine by French troops and the expulsion of the duke from his territory occasioned no change in the emperor's attitude, though it increased the opposition of the Spanish party at the Vienna court.

Of the German States whose attitude toward the French army in its operations against Holland might have been of importance, Cologne, Bavaria, the Palatinate, and the warlike Bishop of Münster had been won over to the side of France; of the Guelphs, John Frederick of Hanover was induced to enter into a compact of neutrality at the price of a monthly subsidy of ten thousand thalers. Celle and Osnabrück stood aside and waited; Mayence declared that all resistance to the French military power was hopeless.

The Elector of Brandenburg, Frederick William, who had always been regarded with mistrust by the State regents as being the uncle and guardian of the young Prince of Orange, and had been stinted in money and land, perceived the serious complications which the victory of France over Holland would produce in the kingdom; he declared that "in the eyes of the present and future generations it would appear an eternal disgrace to surrender the freedom not only of Germany but of the whole of Christendom." He would neither comply with the requests made to him by the French ambassadors, nor would he shrink before any threats. He was very anxious to form a confederation with the States-General; but, dazzled by the power and financial resources of Louis, they hesitated for a long time to accept the conditions which Frederick William was obliged to impose in view of the resources of his territory and the many-sidedness of his policy. But in February, 1672, the Netherland ambassadors requested to know the meaning of the French preparations, and received the short answer from the king that he would complete his preparations and use them as he thought proper; then at length they made an agreement for the putting of twenty-four thousand men into the field; but for their maintenance they paid only eighty thousand thalers a month, and not the one hundred thousand demanded by the elector.

Two months later Louis took the field with one hundred and forty thousand men. After a short halt before Maastricht, two armies under Turenne and Condé diverged toward the Rhine, marched through the territory of Cologne, and took possession of the fortresses on the Holland frontier, which were in the worst pos-
sible condition and garrisoned with helpless, cowardly troops. At the custom-
house on the Schenkenschanze the passage of the Rhine was forced by the French
cavalry, who were anxious to give proof of their old prowess under the eyes of
the king; meanwhile the bishops of Cologne and Münster made the most cowardly
excuses for withdrawing their troops into Friesland and Overyssel, and permitted
the occupation of a number of towns, among them Deventer, Zwolle, Harderwijk;
the province of Overyssel readily submitted to the protectorate of the Bishop of
Münster. The English fleet under the Duke of York, with very insufficient sup-
port from the French, had meanwhile (June 7, 1672) fought an action with De
Ruyter in the roadstead at Southold, the result of which was indecisive; the pro-
posed landing of the English in Zealand was fortunately frustrated by an unusually
low tide and a violent storm. None the less affairs in the seven provinces were
in an unsettled condition. The rich merchants with their families and treasures,
jewels and works of art, fled to Hamburg, Denmark, or even into hostile England;
after the flight of the garrisons the citizens seized the power in the towns, in order
to save their property by capitulating with the enemy, even at the loss of their
freedom. “Thus terribly,” cries Henry von Treitschke, when describing these
events, “was the curse of mammon fulfilled upon the heroic people of the eighty
years’ war of independence; to such nameless shame leads the cowardly delusion
which counts peace the greatest of all goods!”

D. WILLIAM OF ORANGE

The government of the aristocratic republicans had ended in anarchy; destruc-
tion menaced the existence of the State, the constitution of which was not national,
and was, moreover, entirely subversive of freedom, being intended solely to secure
the domination of the insolent Mynheer. But the deep feeling of the unspoiled
classes, who still clung to the old faith and the old traditions, found expression in
the cry for the strong guidance of a royal personality, and for the reinstatement
of the last survivor of the House of Orange in the hereditary office of stadholder and
captain-general. To the great historical events which contributed to strengthen
the belief in the importance of the individual an addition has now to be made;
the assurance and the hope which impelled that cry for guidance were addressed
to a personality worthy of the confidence reposed in him. In the towns and
marshes of the Low German mariners there was but one man who possessed the
special qualities of which the fatherland had need,—firm conviction, unshaken
courage, strong faith, devotion to the idea of German independence; and this man
was none other than the young Prince William of Orange, now twenty-two years
of age, whose princely heart and nature had not been spoiled, despite the earnest
endeavours to that end of his republican guardians.

As is invariably the case when the passions of the masses have been aroused
by some unexpected calamity, the manifestations of love for their national leader
were accompanied by outbursts of hatred against the enemy and the oppressor. In
a few weeks after the States-General had removed the Permanent Edict by which
the brothers De Witt in the year 1668 hoped to have made the restoration of the
House of Orange forever impossible, this feeling broke out in wild rage against the
brothers, who were tortured and murdered by a furious mob (August 20, 1672).
Historians with leanings to republicanism, as Van Kampen, reproach the Prince of Orange for not having used his popularity to save the councillors Jan and Ruwaard Cornelis, the latter of whom had certainly deserved well of the fleet; but they forget that at that moment the stadtholder had to unite all the forces which were then freely offered for resistance against the enemy, that at no price could he have afforded to permit the growth of discord among those men who were ready to sacrifice person and purse to save their country. If the teaching of liberal doctrinaires is in opposition to the national welfare, as was the case in Holland, it cannot but suffer the fate of radicalism; it must feel the power of the conqueror, of the saviour of the community.

Thus in Holland the impression made by the resolution of the prince restored the confidence of the nation in its own power; inundations caused by breaking down the dykes put a stop to the advance of the French army, which had already gained possession of Utrecht. Meanwhile the opinion began to gain ground among the European powers that it was not wholly wise on their part to remain passive spectators of the conquest of the republican States and the victory of France. In Spain the war party gained the upper hand, and used all possible leverage to induce the emperor to break with France. In the German Empire the Elector of Brandenburg consulted the general feeling in the Protestant countries, and also his own inclinations and political principles, when he determined to take up arms in favour of his nephew. However, he considered that it would be useless for him to take the field alone with his own troops, as the French armies would be able to prevent his junction or even his co-operation with the forces which the Prince of Orange had collected; from the other princes of north Germany he could expect no assistance worth mentioning. Thus the only remaining resource was to remind the head of the empire of his duties, and to induce him to lead a general military operation of the German people. The elector desired an alliance between Brandenburg-Prussia and Austria, on condition that the former should be recognised as the ruling power in evangelical north Germany, the latter in south and west Germany, which were Catholic; but the plan proved to be wholly premature, and was impossible of discussion with men like Lobkowitz and Hocher, the vice-chancellor of the empire, who considered it impossible to renounce all hope of resuming the struggle against Protestantism.

None the less Frederick William thought that he ought to lay great stress upon the importance of the emperor's co-operation in the campaign against France; through John George of Anhalt in Vienna he vigorously pushed the proposal for an offensive alliance. On the 12th June, 1672, it was agreed that each party should march with twelve thousand men to protect the boundary of the kingdom and repel the French from German soil; also that the provinces of the empire and the kings of Spain and Denmark should be invited to join the alliance. But both parties approached the subject with intentions and from points of view exactly contrary. The French party at the Vienna court was convinced that they would gain far greater gratitude from the King of France if Austria joined the alliance, and thereby obtained the right and the opportunity to place obstacles in the path of the Elector of Brandenburg, than if she were to decline alliance with the elector and thereby force him to act upon his own initiative. Frederick William, however, considered that he would be able to induce the Austrian forces to make some sort
of strategical movement, that he would thereby draw off the attention of the larger part of the French army, and so gain a breathing-space for the Netherlands.

The imperial marshal Raymond, Count of Montecuccoli, was at first by no means disinclined to fall in with the elector's plans and to operate on his side against the French upon the Rhine; however, even during the march to the proposed scene of action he was obliged to observe the instructions which he had received from Vienna, namely, to avoid any possible collision with the enemy whom it was intended to befriend. The duty imposed on him was to await the attack of Turenne, to whom the defence of the Lower Rhine had been entrusted, and on no account to begin hostilities on his side. Although Frederick William could not induce Montecuccoli to advance with him even as far as Coblenz, a movement which he had especially recommended to the Prince of Orange, he insisted upon the union of the two armies. But it became impossible to join hands with the Dutch and Spanish troops which were stationed at Maastricht, as Montecuccoli declined to cross the Rhine with the elector. When toward the end of the year 1672 the allies marched to Westphalia, Turenne followed them and cut off their union with the Netherland troops, which had gained a position in east Friesland.

The elector was no longer in receipt of subsidies from the States-General, as he had not fulfilled his obligations at the seat of war; he did not venture to make any attack on Turenne's strong position at Soest, and, lest he should find himself the object of an overwhelming assault, determined to conclude an armistice with France. In view of the emperor's wavering policy and the weakness of the contingents furnished by him (Montecuccoli's successor, Bouronville, had scarcely ten thousand men all told) this step was for the moment the best that could have been taken, for in no other way was it possible to avoid defeat. By the peace of Saint-Germain (10th April, 1673) Frederick William engaged to enter into hostilities neither against France nor against her allies, England, Cologne, and Münster; in the convention of Vossem (16th June) the king of France promised him £800,000 by way of compensation for the loss of the payments from Holland; there was, however, no stipulation against his fulfilling his duties to the empire in the event of an imperial war. When the Dutch ambassadors made reproaches to Frederick William for his secession, he plainly informed them that his retirement was entirely due to the premature cessation of the war subsidies which they had been paying; that, should they fail to bring about a general peace, he would be ready to renew his action on behalf of the States. The fact that it was his action and his influence upon the emperor which had alone prevented the destruction of the Dutch republic is in no way affected by the peace of Saint-Germain. The retirement of Brandenburg from the scene of operations, though but temporary, was unavoidable in view of events in Poland; it implied only a momentary interruption in the foreign policy of the elector, and inflicted no permanent damage upon the cause of the Netherlands. On the contrary, it obliged the emperor to give up his temporising policy, and to show greater decision in defending the independence of his empire and in preserving the security of his frontiers, if he did not wish to run the risk of entirely losing in the eyes of the empire a prestige which was in any case greatly impaired.

Through the instrumentality of the Freiherr of L'Isola a convention was arranged on the 30th August, 1673, between the States-General, the emperor,
and Spain, whereby a monthly subsidy of ninety-five thousand thalers for the army was assured to the emperor. Montecuccoli again took the command, and Turenne, who had penetrated to Rotenburg on the Tauber, was forced back to the Rhine by a series of strategical movements. William of Orange besieged and took Bonn, after obliging the marshal François Henry of Luxemburg to abandon the right bank of the Rhine. When the winter brought operations to a close, France had lost her advantage and was acting upon the defensive. She was, moreover, unable to prevent the secession of her allies; England, who had not added to her reputation in the maritime war with the Dutch, was obliged to conclude the peace of Westminster on the 19th February, 1674, for she would otherwise have lost her Spanish trade; her example was followed by Münster and the electorates of Cologne and Mayence.

The campaigns of the year 1674 were fraught with great dangers to Louis XIV, who was now confronted by a strong confederation of European powers, and heavy subsidies had to be paid to keep England from joining their number. Condé defended the northern frontier of the kingdom from a foreign invasion in the bloody battle of Senneffe in the Hennegau (11th August, 1674), which was fought against the Dutch, Spanish, and imperial troops. Turenne's military powers had never been displayed to greater advantage, but all that he could do was to preserve Alsace, upon which the main attack of the imperial army had been directed. The Elector of Brandenburg had also appeared in that direction with sixteen thousand men under the general field-marshal George of Derfflinger; for Louis XIV had delayed the payment of his subsidy, and the elector had gladly seized the opportunity of treating the convention of Vossem as dissolved.

The German troops, among which those of Lüneburg and Brunswick were distinguished by the excellence of their equipment and by their bravery, were unable to inflict any decisive defeat upon the enemy; the miserable cowardice of their leader Alexander, Duke of Bouronville (see above), who was thought to be treacherous as well as incapable, entirely neutralised the excellence of the forces at his disposal. In November, 1674, Turenne was forced by the superior strength of his opponents to retreat from Alsace to Lorraine. There he obtained reinforcements to the extent of thirteen thousand men, which brought his army to the number of thirty thousand, and by dividing it into several columns he succeeded in reaching Belfort unobserved; from that point he suddenly swooped down upon Mülhausen toward the end of the year 1674, and, surprising the allies who had gone into winter quarters, he scattered and drove them back. After the indecisive battle of Turkheim (5th January, 1675), the allies were forced to give up Alsace and retreat once more to the right bank of the Rhine.

Disputes had broken out between the imperial generals and those of Brandenburg, as a consequence of the constant failures in the handling of the army. The elector's son Emil had succumbed to typhus fever in Strassburg during the campaign. The elector himself withdrew his troops no farther than Franconia, in order that he might be able to take his share in the general plan of campaign upon the resumption of hostilities. During the winter he was hard at work at Cleves with the Prince of Orange, arranging plans, and inducing the emperor to place a proper proportion of fresh troops in the field. But, though the minister, Lobkowitz had fallen, there was no inclination in Vienna to great sacrifices or vigorous measures; the government hesitated even to make fitting preparations to protect Brandenburg
and Pomerania against the attack of the Swedes, who had again become allies of France. On the 30th May, 1675, these restless neighbours actually began the campaign against Brandenburg by invading the Mark, and the only course of action open to the elector was to withdraw his contingent and its reinforcements from its position in Franconia, to return to his own country by way of Magdeburg, and to concentrate his efforts upon the task of defending his frontier.

After the departure of the Brandenburg forces, the imperial army on the Rhine would have been reduced to the worst extremities had not Turenne, whose strategic talent, experience, and daring made him a host in himself, been killed in the fight of Saabach in Baden (27th July, 1675). From that time onward the progress of the war in the Palatinate and in the Breissgau was marked by no special occurrence; however, Marshal Franz, Duke of Créquy, who had already been fighting on the Moselle with varied success, finally captured the important fortress of Breisach. In the Spanish Netherlands, the French under Luxembourg made great progress, defeating the Prince of Orange at Saint Omer, and capturing Ghent and Ypern. The king ordered Vauban to extend and complete the fortifications of Condé, Valenciennes, and Cambrai, and in his hands these places became first-class strongholds; it was plain that the king had no intention of surrendering them. But the greatest surprise was excited by the appearance of France as a great naval power; her gifted admiral Abraham, Marquis du Quesne, beat the united fleet of the Dutch and Spaniards at the Lipari Islands and at Catania; in a previous conflict, the battle at Agosta (29th April, 1676), in which they were victorious, the Dutch had lost their famous naval hero De Ruyter (1676). The preponderance thus gained by France in the Mediterranean, and her acquisitions in the Spanish Netherlands, created a most painful impression in England. After a lapse of fifteen months, Parliament was again summoned in the year 1677, and obliged the king, whom Louis XIV was still subsidising, to form a new alliance with the States-General, and to agree to the marriage of the daughter of the Duke of York, who had been brought up in the Protestant faith, with William of Orange.

The reserve funds of the French State had now been expended, its credit was strained to the utmost, and Colbert was most earnestly urging upon the king the necessity of putting an end to the war; Louis therefore, after protracted negotiations at Nimwegen, came to an understanding with the republican party and the leaders of the English Parliament as to the principles which should form the basis of a pacific settlement. Louis's aims were, on the one hand, to relax the close union existing between the Prince of Orange and the "States," and, on the other, to put an end to the highly inconvenient demands of the insatiable Stuart for further subsidies. In these objects he was successful, for he induced the Dutch to abandon Spain, and to allow France to indemnify herself at the expense of Spain in the Spanish Netherlands and in the Franche-Comté. On the 10th of August, 1678, the treaty between France and the Republic was concluded; on the 17th of September, Spain was forced to agree to the disadvantageous conditions imposed upon her; in February of the following year the German emperor also accepted the peace.

The Elector of Brandenburg, with the support of Denmark, had won victory after victory in the war with Sweden; he had now to bear alone the full brunt of the attack of the whole French army, which advanced to Minden in June and proceeded to march upon Berlin. Brandenburg was obliged to give up her conquests
in Pomerania, and to agree to the distribution of territory settled by the peace of Westphalia. Louis XIV had gained his desire; but it was easy to perceive that of all his adversaries he had the greatest respect for Frederick William, and before the year 1679 had expired he had won him over to alliance.

As the ruler of Brandenburg had been abandoned by the emperor and the empire, and above all by his dear Guelph neighbours, so was the Prince of Orange abandoned by the States-General, and by the regents of the States, which he had preserved from disruption and loss. Among the political powers of that time, one of the most pitiable figures is the royal libertine of the House of Stuart, a dynasty which had never been of great importance and was now upon the point of collapse; but an impression almost equally sad is that made by the Dutch republic, which readily exposed itself to the humiliations inflicted by the enemy who had destroyed its power and splendour, in order that it might be able to embarrass and to belittle the heroic prince who alone had clung to his country in the hour of its tribulation and of its almost inevitable overthrow. If the Prince of Orange had been inspired by the spirit of an Amsterdam merchant he would have come to an agreement with King Louis at the outset of the war, and have been made sovereign count of Holland and Zealand; but he was a German prince, a worthy descendant of his noble ancestors, and one of those rare men who can consecrate a whole lifetime to the prosecution of a great idea. When once he had recognised that the rich merchants of the Zuyder Zee could never be capable of helping him to realise his conception, he turned to a sounder and a more courageous nation of the Teutonic race, whose future greatness had as yet not been foreseen, and then came victory.

In the days of Nimwegen, Europe bowed to the will of the monarch who purposed to restore to the French the position that the Franks had held under Charlemagne. It seemed that with the exception of the Padishah of Stamboul there was to be but one great power in Europe — the French kingdom.

4. THE GERMAN EMPIRE AFTER THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA

A. THE DISSOLUTION OF THE FEUDAL STATE

The German Empire, the old Holy Roman empire of the German nation, once the greatest power of western Christendom, had renounced its position as a great power by the peace of Westphalia. It had been deprived of territory, population, and wealth, its economic resources were inadequate, and its moral strength proportionately weakened. Moreover, its constitution had undergone changes, which entirely removed the possibility of that union of national force, that civil centralisation, by which alone national strength can manifest itself in action. The feudal system had in this case run a course entirely different from that which it had taken in England and France. The throne was based upon election by the freemen; and though the power of election was limited to a constantly diminishing body, yet it could not be entirely set aside by any member of the royal house, which both on the nearer and farther side of the Alps maintained the exercise of the royal prerogatives with the consent and the support owed by law from the great vassals. When finally the princes who had the right of choice — that is, the electors — received the commission to place a ruler on the throne under conditions contractual
in their nature, then their rights and their peculiar position gained a constitutional sanction, and the power of the monarch was so far limited that he could never attain to absolute sovereignty. The classes excluded from the electorate were also protected from oppression, for on the one hand they were indispensable to the bearer of the crown as a counterpoise to the electors, and the latter might, on the other hand, find their help useful should the sovereign meditate any attack upon their own political existence. The many-sided interests which king and emperor were bound or found occasion to represent claimed their whole power and attention; the inadequacy of the revenue which the head of the empire as such had at his command made them dependent upon the good-will of their vassals; and whenever the latter gave their assistance they found opportunity to increase their rights and to strengthen their influence upon the life of the nation.

Nowhere was the position of the Church so independent or endowed with such high temporal powers as in Germany; nowhere without the German Empire could ecclesiastical princes be found with the position of an archbishop of Mayence or Cologne, a bishop of Würzburg or Münster, who could style themselves dukes of Franconia or Westphalia. The Reformation had diminished their number, but the property of the dispossessed had not accrued to the crown, as might very well have been the case if the head of the empire had been able to guide the movement directed against the constitution of the Church. An evangelical emperor who could have been a national emperor at the same time might have emerged in triumph from the battle with the feudal powers, which apparently fled for protection behind the sheltering bulwarks of the old belief; the ally and voluntary steward of the papacy handed over the portion of the empire which had been torn from the old Church to the princely houses, which thereby enriched themselves and assured their political position. The Thirty Years' War had shown that this state of affairs was impossible. It should, however, be observed that the German religious wars might have had a different result if a tax-gatherer had held the throne in place of Charles V, or if Ferdinand II had been inspired with the spirit of a Henry of Navarre, or even if this weak-minded pupil of the Jesuits of the Innsbruck had had at least the moral strength to use the talent and the mercilessness of a Wallenstein in the interests of a ruling imperialism based upon force of arms. As a matter of fact that strong personality, which might have changed the semblance of imperial power into the reality, was not forthcoming from the House of Hapsburg; in spite of the divine assistance officially promised by the successors of St. Peter, it was equally incapable of performing the task laid upon it by the papacy, — the subjection of the schismatics in the empire to the Roman Church.

Indeed, the ecclesiastical princes themselves contributed not a little to retard the progress of the army of the Catholic emperor; they went over to the side of Maximilian of Wittelsbach, when on a certain day at Regensburg he had wrested the order for the release of the Friedländer from the emperor. The certainty was then made absolute that Germany could not be a monarchy. And Philip Boguslaw of Chemnitz was entirely justified in 1640, when in his famous "Dissertatio de ratione status in imperio nostro romano-germanico" he described the form of the German monarchy as essentially aristocratical, entrusting certain departments of administration to the supervision of a monarch; the monarch, however, had no special rights appertaining to him as princeps, except such as his colleagues in the administration were willing to concede to him. "This person of supreme rank
bears the old Roman title of 'Kaiser,' but the title does not express the position which a monarch holds in other States. Sovereignty or majesty is not to be found with the Kaiser, but only with the general assembly of the members of the empire crowned in the Reichstag." In accordance with this conception of the State, representatives of the German Reichstag carried on negotiations for Münster and Osnabrück, and by the peace of Westphalia the sovereignty of every component member of the empire was recognised, from the electors and dukes to such towns as Dinkelsbühl and Bopfingen.

The empire thereupon ceased to be a State. It no longer corresponded to the demands of a feudal State; for in such the vassals were not and could not be equal with the overlord, but must be in personal subjection to and dependence upon their lord. But the empire was also incapable of providing from its own resources for the protection of its people against enemies from without or injustice within, and still more incapable of carrying out the organisation necessary for culture and prosperity. The fulfilment of these obligations belonging to the State devolved upon the orders, the owners of territory, who were forced to develop gradually into separate States or to disappear; as the decision upon the religion to be adopted lay in their hands, they were in possession of the most important of all instruments for moulding the social spirit of their territory. But the German orders differed greatly in extent of dominion, in composition, and in power of action, and in consequence only a small number of them were capable of forming a political unity, there being one hundred and fifty-eight members of the Reichstag, whereas there existed nearly three hundred governors with forms of administration peculiar to each. During the period from the peace of Westphalia to the dissolution of the old kingdom, the history of Germany embraces not only the struggle of the orders to maintain their sovereignty, as against the attempts of the emperor to limit it, but even more, the struggle for means to found a body politic, that is, for extent of territory, increase of the population, and strengthening of internal relations.

A process of centralisation embracing the whole empire was impossible, being excluded by the existing scheme of disunion and disruption; such centralisation was only possible within the narrow boundaries of territorial lords, and was therefore confined to the German principalities. Strong and fortunate dynasties, where vigorous personalities could make their mark, succeeded in founding States with vital force sufficient to enable them to preserve their independence in spite of every collapse or political bankruptcy. The remainder met with the inevitable fate of the weak who oppose the will of the strong, namely, destruction; or else they maintained a very modest existence, having no greater extent or power than the estates of a private landowner, and owing their continuance to the silent forbearance of their neighbours, and to a respect for tradition, which had long since been void of all political content, and had no meaning save for the historical antiquarian.

Of all the royal houses of Germany, that of Hapsburg stood first in importance and external power; but its possessions and interests had come to it from without the boundaries of the empire; the Casa d'Austria had been of and by itself a world power. It is true that Charles V was the only ruler to govern the whole of the immense territory which he had inherited; the division into the Spanish and German lines resulted from the fact that the two geographical groups were inevi-
tably forced asunder by the necessities of their very existence, and the immediate cause of the separation was the exercise of those family rights which had brought the union to pass in the face of every political and economic law. The Spanish State with its Italian and Burgundian dependencies and its American colonies had been unable to maintain its position as a great power, and had been forced to yield to Holland and France. The claims of the reigning dynasty, which thought it unnecessary to set any bounds to its ambition, and had frittered its strength away on every battle-field during the Thirty Years' War, diverted attention from home affairs, so that ruin came upon the kingdom of Philip II both from without and from within (cf. Vol. IV, p. 544 ff.). The fact that the brothers Rudolf and Mathias left no children prevented the otherwise unavoidable subdivision of the German line; Spanish influence enabled Ferdinand II to become sole ruler, Spanish money supported the army with which the descendant of the interior Austrian line was able to defend his territory. But the consequence was that the German Hapsburgs found themselves obliged to take up the heavy and embarrassing burden of the emperor's crown.

The looseness of connection between the different members of the Roman Empire of the German nation must have proved a help to a reigning dynasty which attempted to unify the subject States by means of personal government and a uniform administration; especially was this true of the House of Hapsburg, which had been able to reinforce its rights of possession with the further influence resulting from uniformity of religion. The spiritual bond of union between the Hapsburg territories, which now began to receive the general name of Austria, and the chief centres of culture in the rest of Germany had been almost entirely destroyed by the counter-reformation in the Alpine territories, by the victory over the Bohemian disturbances, and the consequent subjection of intellectual and moral education to the control of the Jesuit orders. Economic relations between the two countries were also cut off at their very source by the stoppage of trade and intercommunication, consequent upon the poverty in which the Thirty Years' War had left the country. Thus Samuel Pufendorf, writing in 1667, under the pseudonym of Severinus de Mozambano, "De statu imperii Germanici," had spoken of the constitution of the Roman Empire as irregular and monstrous, and instanced a State of the Casa d'Austria, which had been able to separate from the empire without difficulty and to set up as independent on its own account. Upon this fact he founded the opinion that the House of Hapsburg must be supported in its imperial position, because, if the crown went to another family of princely rank, the Hapsburg territories would inevitably be separated from the empire, which would thus be weakened and risk suffering the fate which had come upon Italy. Moreover, no other house was then in a position to bear the expense of keeping up the imperial court and ceremonial in proper form. The inference was so inevitable that no other prince of the empire was found who would have accepted the crown when Louis XIV was looking out for a fresh candidate after the death of Ferdinand III (1657). When Count Egon of Fürstenberg made the proposal in the name of the French government to the Elector Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria, he declined it with the remark that he was not disposed to receive the imperial position as a favour from France, and that he did not care to endanger the security and permanence of his young electorate for the sake of the unstable and transitory dignity of the emperor's crown.
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

It was Brandenburg that finally decided the choice of Leopold I, an election vigorously opposed by France. With the exception of this elector and Bavaria, all the electors and their ministers were silent. The ambassadors Gramont and Lionne, who were sent out to attend the election, had received credit from Mazarin to the amount of three millions of pounds, and considerable sums from this source found their way into the pockets of influential personages at the courts of Cologne, Mayence, Trèves, and Heidelberg. Austrian and Spanish money was also readily accepted, and the latter commanded great influence in Dresden. In any case, to take presents from both sides was to be under obligations to neither. The Elector of Brandenburg (cf. below) then enjoyed a reputation greater than any that his forefathers had possessed. When Sweden, Poland, and Austria were struggling for the supremacy in eastern Europe they could not afford to leave his power out of their calculations; within the empire his neighbours had to be careful how they opposed a coalition of which he was a member. Before the meeting of the electors Frederick William plainly declared his opinion in a despatch to the Elector of Cologne, and spoke in favour of the Austrian candidate, for he was of Pufendorf's opinion as to the welfare of the empire, and therefore laid it down as necessary in view of the threatening state of affairs "to again elect such a house as is capable by its own power of upholding the Roman Empire."

However, when it became necessary to draw up the terms of election and to lay down the principles upon which the chosen emperor would have to conduct the policy of his government, then Brandenburg declared decisively for that party which was opposed to any amalgamation of German and Spanish affairs, and was anxious that the emperor should not involve the empire in a quarrel with its Western neighbour on account of the Franco-Spanish war. In brief, the desire of this party was, that, if the House of Hapsburg took the German crown, it should not employ the additional power thus gained to avert the fall of Spain. Co-operation by the courts of Vienna and Madrid invariably favoured Catholicism, a religion which Brandenburg had no inclination to strengthen. The majority in the college of electors was gained by the adherence of the Palatinate under the influence of the ecclesiastical princes of Cologne and Mayence, who were brought over to his side by their dependence upon France, whereas evangelical Saxony seceded through her jealousy of the Catholic parties (Bavaria and Trèves); however, the fact remains that the position assumed by Brandenburg materially helped to secure the safety of Protestantism. Leopold was obliged to undertake to abstain from any interference in the wars which France was waging in Italy and Burgundy, to give no help to her opponents, and further to work in the interests of peace between France and Spain. If the emperor as head of the empire desired to enter into alliance with foreign powers, the consent of the electors must first be obtained, and this not by writing, but after full discussion in the electoral assembly. For the execution of an imperial decree in the case of any one State of the empire the general consent was also necessary. The electoral character of the empire was thus most strongly emphasized by the election of Leopold I, and the terms of election which explained the main features of the constitution were practically an amplification of the Golden Bull of the year 1356.
B. THE RHINE CONFEDERATION OF 1658 AND THE REICHSTAG

The election of the House of Hapsburg had been a concession to the necessities of the general policy of the empire; it implied no greater coherence in the relations of the imperial princes to the emperor and his house. The republic of princes had chosen a wealthy and excellent representative, and had laid additional obligations upon the State, which was desirous of preserving the balance between the powers influential in the southeast of Europe; but the several members of the empire were entirely convinced that the imperial dominions and the voluntary union of the German rulers did not together constitute any political unity, and that they were severally at liberty to pursue their own course of policy regardless of the emperor. This idea found open expression in the formation of a confederacy of the princes on the Rhine, a movement which followed almost immediately upon the election. If we consider merely the formal wording of the convention concluded upon the 14th August, 1658, we may call the confederation a movement of the friends of peace, with such emphasis is the statement made that "the confederates, whether differing in religion or not, will prove no foreign power to hostilities, but will preserve the friendship now subsisting among themselves, and will use the remedies of law to remove any causes of quarrel that may occur." However, this organisation could not be considered as remarkably formidable, inasmuch as the whole of the standing forces which the members were able to provide only amounted to 4,700 infantry and 2,370 cavalry.

Beside the electorates of Mayence, Cologne, and the Palatinate of Neuburg, the Lüneburgers of Brunswick and the Landgrave of Hesse also joined the confederation, which was modified conformably to its convention with France. France undertook to protect the rights and possessions of the confederates, who on their part promised to maintain the peace of Westphalia together with the concessions made to France, and held themselves in readiness to help the king with their military contingents if he should be attacked in any of the territories which had been assured to him by the peace. The estimate of troops mentioned in the French proposals was sufficiently modest, amounting to 1,600 infantry and 800 cavalry; the political confederates were only bound to act in cases when the German princes reckoned upon French help; they were not concerned with the rights of France to represent her own interests with such means as might seem necessary to her within the territory of the confederates. In the war against Spain and the States-General, Louis XIV had gained considerable advantage by making practical use of these rights, which had been established in theory by the dexterous diplomacy of Mazarin. Brandenburg also took part in the early stages of the negotiations; but she abstained from joining in the compact; she made many changes of front which were not compatible with the policy of reassurance against the growing power of the empire adopted by a number of petty German States. Brandenburg-Prussia had already become a body politic which was quite capable of leading an alliance, but could never have been an earnest, loyal member of a confederation under French guidance.

The imperial court fully recognised that the formation of the Rhine confederation was directed immediately against its position in the empire, and foreboded an interference on the part of France in the affairs of the empire which might
become extremely serious. The emperor therefore did his utmost to sever the constitutional representatives of the provinces, who made up the assembly of deputies when the Reichstag was not sitting, from such influence as the Rhine princes might exert. There was some dispute upon the question whether the assembly of deputies should be held in Frankfort or in Regensburg; and the Rhine confederates demanded the summoning of the Reichstag, which had been prorogued for two years in 1654.

The German Reichstag, which was in correspondence with the assembly for maintaining the peace at Nürnberg, might have extended its activity in an unusual degree. It might have dealt with the means of realising the principles of the imperial constitution as laid down in the peace of Westphalia, with measures necessary for securing the frontiers, with the organisation of the imperial army, with the means desirable for increasing the prosperity of the country, for reviving trade and industry.

However, one of the most remarkable phenomena among the consequences of the Thirty Years' War is the fact that all the misery and all the losses which had befallen Germany during that period could not arouse the people to the absolute necessity of co-operation for the protection of their real interests. In wide sections of the population some dull sense of that necessity may have remained, millions of sufferers may have hoped that help would come from the emperor and the empire, but of these desires no outward manifestation ever came to be expressed in political action. The truth of the saying that "poverty brings weakness" was never so strikingly illustrated as in the case of the German Empire, which the great war had deprived of half its inhabitants, four-fifths of all its domestic animals, and of building materials, precious metals, and articles of daily use to an incalculable extent. Starving men, in whom all feeling for the benefits of society is dead, who have sunk to the degradation of cannibalism, as was constantly the case toward the end of the war, cannot be expected to fight for political rights; they are utterly incapable of grasping the connection between political rights and their own struggle with the stern necessities of nature. The misery of the masses merely promotes the wealth and the power of a few self-aggrandising selfish natures, who know how to possess themselves of those means by which political power can be grasped and held. In the sixteenth century, when the demand for the Christian community of property arose over a great part of Germany, and became almost a war cry, the German peasants were generally in a state of prosperity which amounted almost to luxury, and were thus capable of striving for social equality with the territorial lords; even after the subjection of the bloody revolt in Thüringen and Susbia they did not lose so much in point of political rights as they lost during the two decades in which the German lands were under the rule of soldiers and suffered alike from friend and foe.

Within the land-owning class great changes had taken place; many ancient families had been extinguished, had been driven out from castle and court, or had found themselves unable to keep up their establishments, owing to want of capital and scarcity of labour; their place had been taken by the military aristocracy, which had appropriated to itself most of the hard cash in the country. The new masters had no mercy upon the poor dependents, for they had not learned to know them by centuries of life among them. The rights and privileges which the old families had left undisturbed were now altered, and altered in favour of the mas-
ters, with the help of adroit masters of Roman jurisprudence, who were always ready to lend a hand in any doubtful business or cash payment; free courts were broken up or suppressed." But the men who had in this manner become great landowners could not forthwith give up the habits and vices which they had indulged during the long period of war; in the castles which were restored and splendidly furnished with foreign money a wild life went on, drunkenness and gaming were unbounded, and were only interrupted by the rough pleasures of the chase. In the villages the disbanded soldiers who tramped the country took from the peasants the little which they had been able to wring from the soil with their inadequate appliances. In many places there was neither priest nor schoolmaster; the rich intellectual treasure which scholars had spread abroad throughout the heartths and homes of the people had vanished entirely. Ignorance, superstition, the belief in witchcraft dominated their minds; habits of begging had destroyed even their sense of shame.

In consequence of the want of money among the middle and lower classes the prices of raw stuffs and wages were lowered in every part of the country; industrial activity was limited to the production of such articles as were absolutely necessary, capital was wanting for the maintenance of artistic manufactures; capital in the hands of a limited number of rich men went abroad (cf. above) in exchange for an increase of imports, which came in chiefly from France, but also from Amsterdam, London, Lisbon, and Venice. "From the courts great and small, ecclesiastical and civil, in which had been heaped the plunder of the generals and captains of every nation and creed, the taxes paid by the vassals flowed into the coffers of the Parisian manufacturers, who then laid down the fashion of the day for the whole of the Continent. Thus it was that France's economic triumphs increased her political advantage, and thus Germany's misfortunes conduced to the enrichment of her western neighbour." Dutch and English had absorbed the trade which was once the mainstay of the Hanseatic houses; trade in south Germany was absolutely dead. Many of the powerful patrician families had become counts and landed lords, others took official posts as a possible sop to their ambition, most had disappeared altogether. There was no incitement to the spirit of enterprise; in trade over seas the name of Germany was almost unknown.

This state of affairs did not, however, weigh heavily upon the councillors and syndics who represented their rulers in Regensburg and spent most of their time in the presentation of extensive reports upon fruitless negotiations and in the study of injunctions which generally contained occasion for setting aside any proposition which might have been generally beneficial. The "recess of the imperial diet," which was the name given to the collective report of the resolutions passed, contains the text of the peace of Westphalia and the practical resolutions of the Nürnberg assembly, a decree concerning the reform of the imperial chamber court, some proposals for improvement in the division of the empire into circles, and unimportant regulations upon the payment of outstanding debts. The parties had been fighting under arms for thirty years, and continued to regard one another with mutual distrust; the general welfare of the nation was neglected in spite of the fact that public opinion, as shown by a stream of political pamphlets, had set in steadily in the direction of a more enlarged and enlightened policy. The fear that the emperor would attempt to extend his powers was so overpowering that none could recognise the unifying force of resolutions by the majority in the college of
electors. Count George Frederick of Waldeck, who obtained at that time greater influence upon the imperial policy of the Elector of Brandenburg (cf. below), warned him not to submit in any way to the decrees concerning imperial taxation, upon the regular payment of which the imperial party rightly laid great stress; should the elector submit, "instead of being a king's equal, he would become a dependent, a treasure-bringing (that is, a tributary) lord, of less power and resource than a landed proprietor of Bohemia or Poland."

C. THE POSITION OF THE HOUSE OF HAPSBURG

In view of the experience which Ferdinand III had had of the Reichstag, Leopold could not expect to gain very much by reopening negotiations with the States of the empire, for he could hardly expect any great support of his own interests from them. It was only the recurrence of the danger of an attack by the Turks upon the territory which he had inherited which had induced him to summon the Reichstag. The territory of the House of Hapsburg, great though it was, had not yet been organised as a State, and lacked the internal strength which would have enabled it successfully to resist the powerful force which the Padisah could bring against it; German money and German troops were necessary for its defence, for it was justly to be considered as a bulwark of the kingdom against the East. The kingdom of the Magyar nationality had proved unequal to this task; since the disaster of Mohács it had fallen into disruption and had become the scene of party conflicts, which considerably facilitated the Osman advance.

It is possible that affairs in Hungary would have run a different course if the powerful dynasty of the Hunyads had remained in power; but even then it would have been impossible to say with any certainty that the Magyar feudal nobility would have been ready as a whole to make the heavy sacrifices demanded for a long war with the Turks. Since the Osmans had possessed themselves of the Balkan peninsula, thoughtful Magyars were no longer set upon preserving the complete independence of their kingdom; they recognised the advisability of forming a close alliance with neighbours who were powerful and considered personal union to be the surest guarantee of confederations. This opinion came to open expression in the compacts with Hapsburg, 1463 and 1491, and also in the election of the Bohemian king Wladislaw; the Reichstag at Ofen, 1527, also took the same point of view, after the terrorism of Johann Zápolyas and his dependents had been crushed. The nationalists, who passed the resolution in 1505 that no foreigner should be elected king, never seriously hoped for the absolute independence of Hungary. Having to choose between evils, they preferred dependence upon the House of Hapsburg to dependence upon Turkey. The position adopted by Hungary, the centre of the opposition, was largely influenced by the religious policy of the Hapsburgs, whose permanent union with the Papacy and the Jesuits formed a continual danger to the freedom of evangelicalism which had taken root both in the Carpathian highlands and in the plains of the Theiss. The national movements under Booskay, Bethlen, and the Rákóczi were in each case attempts to protect Protestantism, and gained strength from union with the corresponding religious parties in Germany. The House of Hapsburg had hoped to be able to make its territories coherent by the maintenance of religious unity. But its stern opposition to the fundamental principle of religious freedom hindered the internal
coherence of the population, shattered all confidence in the respect for justice which had been attributed to the dynasty, and secured the adhesion of the religious fanaticism, which was very strongly developed among the Magyar Calvinists, to the political parties.

The policy of the Hapsburgs was not founded on religious intolerance in itself; the grandsons of Maximilian I regarded the Reformation from a political point of view. Resistance to the Reformation was a matter that touched neither heart nor conscience in their case; they thought that they could not afford to lose the support of the ecclesiastical princes and the clergy against the encroachments of the secular orders of the empire. However, political views are unstable; they have to be adapted to change of circumstances; and a proof of this fact is to be seen in the altered attitude of Ferdinand I and Maximilian II, and even in the case of Rudolf and Matthias. The fate of Austria largely depended upon the supremacy of the inner Austrian line, in which the Bavarian-Wittelsbach blood and temperament of the Archduchess Maria had become preponderant. We must leave the investigators of the psychology of families and races to decide why it was that Jesuit Catholicism should have gained so strong a hold upon the Bavarians in particular; at any rate, its influence during a period of four hundred years is unmistakable, and cannot be neglected if we would understand the history of Austria. The Jesuits were the primary founders of that system of centralisation which impeded the different countries possessed by the Hapsburgs in their natural development to a strongly organised federal State, brought about hostility between the several populations, and set their interests in opposition to the interests of the State. In the countries of the Bohemian crown the Jesuits exercised a Germanising influence; on the other hand, in the duchies of the Alpine districts, the acquisition and the union of which had formed the kernel of the power of the Hapsburg family, Jesuit influence prevented any close feeling on the part of the people with their blood relations in the evangelical territories. The consequence was the almost entire destruction in those countries of that intellectual culture which had been a splendid characteristic of the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. Phrase-making, empty and superficial, was the dominant feature in literature; in countless cases the spirit of intellectual society was broken, subservience was praised as a virtue, sycophancy and jealousy became habitual.

At the instance of his Bavarian relatives and with the help of Jesuit advice, Ferdinand II proceeded to oppress the evangelical orders, and was resisted with empty words instead of strong action; in cowardice and hesitation the Protestant landowners retired within their castle walls before a few gangs of peasants, and quietly looked on at the process of turning shopkeepers and peasants into Catholics. Until the edict of restitution (1629) they had at least succeeded in preserving the right of freedom of worship in their own homes; but after that period their liberties were nearly blotted out. The Roman clerics advanced, secure of victory, and with them the overbearing bands of Friedlander soldiers; while distinguished families who would not renounce their faith retreated before them, left their houses, courts, and country, to await the time when the German Empire and their Christian fellows could assure them religious freedom and enable them to return to the possession of their ancient inheritances. With unparalleled obstinacy the Emperor Ferdinand III fought against the attempt, during six years of negotiation at Münster and Osnabrück, to extend the conditions of religious toleration
to his own territories; during that period he failed to avail himself of many favourable opportunities, as he was employed in offering an obstinate opposition to the attack made by Sweden in favour of the Austrian Protestants. After the peace the chief power in the empire was concentrated, it is true, in the person of an emperor who was chief only in name; but the religious unity of the territories of the House of Austria had been preserved. The evangelical orders made further attempts to remove or to lighten the heavy yoke laid upon their Austrian co-religionists; but these efforts were unsuccessful, the more so as they were never seriously prosecuted.

The Reichstag and the election of Leopold as emperor would have provided opportunity for the exertion of greater pressure; but no one took the trouble to seize the occasion, because no one took any permanent interest in the fate of the Austrian territories. Nowhere was the weakness of the empire more conspicuous than it was at that point where the emperor was also a territorial prince; the imperial support, which had been so earnestly requested and desired, about which so many words and documents in the Reichstag had been spent in vain, bore a miserable appearance upon the frontiers and could make no impression upon the landowners, who were alarmed at the incursion of the Turks, from which they had suffered loss. The custom grew of considering the title of emperor as one attaching ipso facto to the local prince, and no special stress was ever laid upon the fact that the prince's lords were part of the Roman Empire of the German nation. The only people to take any real part in imperial affairs was the high nobility, who were aiming at paid official posts under the empire, or whose social position would be improved by admission into the colleges of imperial princes and counts. The Austrian could no longer entertain the idea that he was himself "within the empire;" the phrase "beyond the empire" began to grow more and more habitual. The separation of the Hapsburg possessions from the rest of Germany has been a steadily growing fact since the peace of Westphalia, so much so that the legalisation of their separate existence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was brought about without difficulty, and the full significance of the step was probably never realised by the majority of the population.

The common action necessary to meet the attack of the Turks was no check upon this process of alienation; the German princes, with whom the emperor negotiated in the Reichstag for some means of support, had no intention of demanding that the ties uniting the empire should be further strengthened by way of recompense for their aid; nor did they attempt to insist that the Reichstag should have more power to deal with affairs, and especially religious affairs, within the Hapsburg territories. On the contrary, their efforts were entirely concentrated upon the task of making themselves more independent of the emperor by their wealth, their troops, and their personal service in war; thus they were in favour rather of weakening the cohesive power of the empire. The more they could free themselves from subjection to a superior power, the less they regarded the efforts of the emperors to make their own territory, by the introduction of all kinds of administrative measures, a self-contained province separate from the empire. Federal relationship was the natural result of the circumstances of the time, imperial federation had no real existence.

However, the manifestations of popular feeling were of a totally different character; the nation had been roused by the reports disseminated concerning the
crueity of the Turks in Transylvania and Upper Hungary, and would gladly have
joined in offering a vigorous resistance to their hereditary foe. The heroic defence
of Grosswardein in the summer of 1660 increased the interest which the people
took in the fate of their co-religionists in Hungary and Transylvania. But the
court of Vienna had no ears for popular outcry, and not the smallest desire to turn
the crusading spirit to account, as it might only lead to the further strengthening
of Protestantism.

In spite of the many difficulties in the way, the diplomacy of the time con-
tinued to discuss the questions of equipment and defence. For six months had
the Archbishop of Salzburg, as the emperor’s chief commissioner, awaited the arrival
of the provincial ambassadors in Regensburg; in January, 1663, when the session of
the Reichstag could be opened, it became plain that not only the special desires
of the electors would require consideration, but that an opposition to the princely
houses had been set on foot, and an opposition which offered its assistance on con-
ditions impossible to accept. It was due to the concurrence of France, ready to
pull the strings of any number of intrigues, that William Philip of the Neuburg
Palatinate, together with Brunswick, Hesse, and Würtemberg, had founded the
“union of princes,” which was directed against the preponderance of the electoral
families; their chief demand was that the council of princes should be allowed to
partake in the election of the emperors, a privilege which had hitherto been
claimed by the electors alone. So this party desired to make their help against
the Turks conditional upon an alteration in the constitution, which the emperor
had no power to grant upon his own initiative.

At length the union of princes was overruled, and it was decided to make an
immediate grant of fifty “Römermonate;” there was to be exemption for no one,
and the ten imperial departments were all included in the demand for 6,400,000
guldens,—in reality, only the half of them. The next question was how this sum
should be raised. The imperial towns, which had long been groaning under the
weight of the payments imposed upon them, now demanded a revision of the im-
perial rolls; moreover, the members of the Rhine confederacy, upon the advice of
France, declined to limit their action to a monetary payment, but desired to resume
their original character of imperial auxiliaries by sending contingents of troops.
France considered that such pecuniary sources would always be entirely at the
emperor’s disposal when once they had been tapped; whereas the co-operation of
troops in the campaigns proposed would be contingent upon conditions constantly
changing, and in the last resort excuses might always be found for the recall of
the troops. During the debates on the subject of “emergency help,” a proposal
emanated from the court of Brunswick, to the effect that in future special provision
should be made for the security of the empire; this business occupied the atten-
tion of the Reichstag to the end of the session, and many well-meaning proposals
were brought forward; however, no definite military scheme was evolved, as it was
found impossible to guarantee the measure of support necessary for this purpose.

D. The Turkish War

In the course of the summer of 1663 the Turkish intentions became plain;
they had invaded Transylvania, and proposed to use the party struggles brought
about by the Rákóczy family for the purposes of a great campaign, and to secure
their power on the central Danube by a crushing blow to be directed against the Austrian territory. The Grand Vizier Ahmed Köprüllü led one hundred and twenty thousand men to the Waag, giving out that he proposed to march directly upon Vienna. Fortunately for that town, his military incapacity was only equaled by his pride; instead of advancing straight upon his mark, he halted until the 27th September, 1663, to besiege the fortress of Neuhausel, which made a heroic defence under Adam Forgách; upon the capitulation of the place he retired to Gran, and there sent his troops into winter quarters.

The imperial field-marshal, Count Raimund Montecuccoli, was one of the foremost strategists of the age (cf. above); he was careful and cunning as well, and he had so cleverly manoeuvred his scanty forces as to give the Grand Vizier a wholly erroneous impression of their numbers, and the Turks accordingly hesitated to attack the imperial position at Altenburg. Hungary herself took but little share in the defence of her own territory. The militia, the levies of the nobles and comitati, amounted to eleven thousand men, who were of use only in guerrilla operations, and would not stand firm in the open field. Not only were the operations of the imperial field-marshal most inadequately supported, but supplies of provisions and men for the auxiliary forces were diminished by the self-seeking of individuals. The town of Pressburg declined to admit Montecuccoli within its gates, and only garrisoned the walls when the enemy were in sight of them. The Landtag declined to permit the imperial army to enter Hungarian territory before the militia had assembled, and the authorities were obliged to transport their reinforcements from Vienna by way of the Danube to the points threatened by the enemy.

The emperor was convinced that Ahmed Köprüllü would renew his attack in the following year, and appeared in person at Regensburg in December, 1663, being most anxious to secure the vigorous support of the imperial provinces. He found a zealous partisan in the Elector of Brandenburg, who further placed at the emperor’s disposal such of his own troops as he could spare from the forces in preparation against Sweden and Poland, an undertaking from which it was impossible for him to withdraw; ten companies of cavalry and one thousand infantry marched to Moravia, to enable the emperor to withdraw his own troops, which were garrisoning the town, and employ them on service in Hungary. Bavaria also sent one thousand infantry and one hundred and fifty cavalry; Saxony, one thousand two hundred; Mayence, nine hundred infantry. The Rhine confederation contributed a body of seven thousand two hundred men under the command of Count Wolf Julius of Hohenlohe, who was not, however, permitted to join in any operation until the emperor should have consented to the junction with the French division. Brandenburg brought forward a proposition in the Reichstag that an imperial army should be raised amounting to sixty thousand men. But the other provinces would not pledge themselves to any special number of troops, the equipment and maintenance of which would have been necessarily provided at the general expense; they agreed to the so-called Triplum, that is, the triple computation of the rolls of Maximilian or of Worms, which would theoretically have produced an effective force, but had never yet done so, for numerous exemptions from service had become usual, and the prescribed contingents never came up at the proper time. The result was that in the early summer of 1664 an imperial field-marshal, a lieutenant-general, a cavalry general, a chief engineer, and a general of
infantry, together with two sergeants-general and two directors of commissariat, were at work, but that under their collective command they had only seven cavalry and eight infantry regiments; that is to say, from nine to ten thousand men.

During the winter of 1663–1664 the Rhine confederates had marched on their own initiative to the Drave, and had undertaken an aimless attack upon Essek, which had ended in heavy loss to themselves. Naturally, the emperor, in spite of his disinclination, could no longer refuse the help of the French contingent, and in view of the approach of the numerous bodies of the enemy was forced to accept any help which offered itself. Montecuccoli would have been very glad to form a central force of fifty thousand men and one hundred and twenty-four guns on the Danube. But the council of war at Regensburg demanded the formation of three armies; one for Upper Hungary and Transylvania, under Louis Rattwich, Count of Souches, another on the Drave under Strozzi and Nicholas Zrinyi for the conquest of Kaniza, and a third under Montecuccoli on the Danube and Lake Platten with no special object in view. The Turks left their real line of attack to relieve Kaniza, and Montecuccoli found time to effect a junction of his own army with the Rhine confederates and the French troops on the Raab, and gave battle on August 1, 1664, at Sankt Gotthard, which ended in the defeat of the Turks with the loss of fourteen thousand of their best troops, and must therefore be regarded as an important victory. The Grand Vizier was obliged to give up the attack, as the condition of his troops was not such as to inspire confidence. At Altenburg, Montecuccoli brought forty thousand men and sixty guns against him, and might have been able to take the offensive had the imperial troops and the French been willing to place themselves unconditionally under his command. But this could not be brought about. Councils of war claimed far more attention than the war itself, and the advantages gained were not followed up.

For this unsatisfactory state of affairs the uncertainty and distraction of the Hapsburg policy was largely to blame. In order to bring the Turkish war to a victorious conclusion and to make a permanent conquest of Hungary, French and Spanish affairs should have been left temporarily to themselves, and Brandenburg, the best armed of the German States, should have been brought over by co-operation in Silesia. Eastern Hungary and Transylvania would have had to be propitiated with the full recognition of religious freedom. The towns and the small landed nobility were not disinclined to stand by the Hapsburg kingdom, provided that protection was afforded them against the oppression which the great magnates and the ecclesiastical princes sought to exercise. But such energetic measures proved too extreme for the authorities, and it seemed preferable to conclude the peace of Vasvár (Eisenberg) with Turkey, on the 10th August, 1664; a dishonourable peace which was really no more than an armistice of long duration. It brought contentment neither to the empire nor to Hungary. A few years after the conclusion of peace the conspiracy of Zrinyi, Nádasdy, Frangi, and Tattenbach broke out, the object of which was the disruption of Hungary from Hapsburg; this movement might have proved extremely dangerous if Louis XIV had not at that moment been occupied with his preparations for the war with Holland. The conspiracy was discovered and the leaders punished with death, but dissatisfaction in Hungary only increased in consequence. Turkey could count now as previously upon the adhesion of the magnates. It was for her to say when the war should be renewed.
The development of Brandenburg to a Prussian Power.
5. CHANGES UPON THE BALTIC

A. THE GREAT ELECTOR

After the constitution of the Holy Roman Empire had become "monstrous," and the German State had been fully recognised as "unmanageable," the principalities inevitably became the centres of political development; for the reform of the empire, though constantly demanded and several times attempted, had been proved impossible owing to internal causes. Upon the course of that development depended the political fate of the German nation; and it could only take a favourable turn upon the condition that a body politic should arise in Germany comprising a considerable portion of the nation and capable of rousing the forces slumbering within them to independent energy. The idea of a vigorous living confederacy was in direct opposition to the dynastic interests, which were supported in many ways by religious differences, and coincided with the separatist tendencies of the population. A voluntary renunciation of individual rights in favour of the central power was not to be expected of the several States, whose existence was even yet extremely doubtful and insecure. To bring about a concentration of the national strength a German great power was needed capable of brushing away the influences which worked in opposition to every movement toward unity. The interests of the House of Austria did not coincide with those of the German nation, and its possessions lay for the most part beyond the boundaries of the German Empire. Austria desired the imperial crown as a means of increasing her own dignity, and was obliged to rely upon German troops to secure her territories and to enable her to take advantage of such opportunities as came in her way. She had neither inclination nor capacity to found a German State.

The rise of a German great power was, however, not one of the pressing problems of the seventeenth century; that from one of those imperial provinces which were struggling for a share in the privilege of the electorate a State should arise which should one day vie with the great monarchies of the world was an idea which had never yet presented itself to the imagination of the boldest of political speculators. Yet in the course of that century the foundation of this State had been completed, though the contemporary world was very far from appreciating the importance of the fact. From the conclusion of the peace of Westphalia to the outbreak of the French Revolution, Europe had seen no event of greater importance than the growth of that Prussian monarchy (see the map facing this page, "The Development of Brandenburg to a Prussian Great Power") which was called to take over the inheritance of the German monarchy when it had been freed from the burden of international family interests, and was destined to apply its youthful strength to the task of restoring German influence to its high place in the councils of European States and peoples.

The foundation of this Prussian monarchy is the work of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg (1640–1688), who entered upon the government of the marches upon the Elbe, Havel, and Spree at a time when the economic value and the political importance of the whole territory had sunk to a lower depth than it had reached even upon its acquisition by the Zollerns. During the latter stages of the war the land had been cruelly devastated. Swedish and imperial governors
had assumed the position of masters of the land, while the Elector George William had resided without the limits of the kingdom, in his duchy of Prussia, that he might be left free to pursue his own pleasure in his own way at Königsberg. Upon the death of the last Duke of Pomerania, George William had been called to succeed him by inheritance. He had thrown himself wholly into the emperor’s arms in the hope of getting his rights, while Sweden had remained for a long period in possession of Pomerania, and had laughed the claims of the House of Brandenburg to scorn. The Catholic count, John of Schwarzenberg, governed the electoral district, and the garrisons sent out by the emperor robbed the barns and stables of the inhabitants of such poor property as yet remained to them.

Frederick William’s special talents had been highly developed by a stay of four years in Holland, and by intercourse with his relations of the House of Orange. He immediately perceived the dangers involved in a connection resting upon so inadequate a basis, and he attempted to take up a neutral position which allowed him to fulfil the duties of a territorial prince without pledging himself to the fulfilment of earlier duties. The very first steps of his varied career as a ruler show the clearness of his political insight and the strength of his will. The several orders of the duchy of Prussia, like all other feudal lords, found it expedient to limit the powers of their overlord as far as possible. They acted with the Polish malcontents, who wished for a republic with the intention of making the position of the Hohenzollern, who as Duke of Prussia was vassal of the King of Poland, one of entire dependency and wholly powerless against themselves. Frederick William dealt vigorously with this confederation, which was united by a common spirit of hostility to orderly administration. In 1641 he held the enfeoffment in Warsaw, prescribing tolerably mild conditions, and met the nobility of his duchy in the character of a prince who was anxious for their welfare but was convinced of his own rights and determined to exercise them.

After the affairs of Russia had been reduced to order and his position at home had been secured, he devoted himself to the care of the marches and to his possessions on the Rhine, which had come down to him from the Dukes of Julich and Cleves. The conclusion of an armistice with Sweden brought nearly all the Brandenburg towns and fortresses into his power. By a compact with the States-General he was enabled to make a temporary arrangement of the financial relations of the House of Brandenburg with them, a measure rendered necessary by the involved state of those finances. So badly had they been managed by his predecessors that the accumulations of simple and compound interest upon a debt of 100,000 thalers incurred in 1614 had already led to the mortgage of all the Cleves district and to distraint upon the ducal chest.

At the peace negotiations in Osnabrück the ambassadors of Brandenburg laid claim to every right which could be deduced from the elector’s privileged position. They offered a most vigorous opposition to the Swedes and the imperial party, who considered that the Swedish claims should be compensated with Pomerania. The young elector was a zealous adherent of the reformed faith, and he could not reconcile his conscience to becoming the cat’s-paw of the Catholic princes, who, as their enemies said, did not consider themselves bound “to keep faith with a heretic.” Thus he could find no place in the Swedish, imperial, or French parties, and therefore turned for support to the States-General, where the House of Orange was still at the head of the government. European diplomatists were
long busied with the project of his marriage with Christine, the heiress to Sweden, but on December 7, 1646, he married Louise Henrietta, the daughter of Prince Frederick Henry, and gained security for a part of Pomerania and for his territory of Julich and Cleves.

After the death of the hereditary stadtholder (14th March, 1647), and the rapidly following decease of his son William II (6th November, 1650), the government of Holland by the plutocracy began, and France then sought alliance with Brandenburg; but the elector declined any union with a foreign power, and worked zealously to bring about an understanding between the reformed States or the empire and to unite them into a “third” party. Of this policy a partisan was found in the patriotic elector of Mayence, John Philip of Schönborn. The self-seeking attitude adopted by Saxony, which had so often hindered the solution of religious differences in Germany, proved an obstacle to this undertaking. By the terms of peace Sweden gained all Further Pomerania, including Stettin, and after weary negotiations a strip of coast line was cut off for her from Hither Pomerania, including Kolberg was the only available harbour remaining to the Brandenburg territory. The compensation for Further Pomerania was the dioceses of Halberstadt, Minden, and Kammin, and the reversion of the archbishopric of Magdeburg upon the death of its administrator, the Duke August of Saxony (4th June, 1650). It became necessary to wage war with the Palatinate of Neuburg for the possession of Cleves (1651). The several orders of that district desired to escape the electoral government, and threatened to become Dutch in preference to belonging to Brandenburg. They were only deterred from open revolt by the timely arrest of their spokesman, Herr Wyliech of Winnenthal.

Between the Memel and the Rhine there were a number of splendid districts, destined to form the basis of the elector’s political power. But there was no interdependence among them, and an entire lack of the sense of political unity. There was not even the personal dependence of the self-seeking nobility upon their feudal lord. To the Prussians imperial affairs were a matter of indifference. They were anxious to obtain the freedom and the privileges of the Polish magnates. The margraves demanded additional rights over their vassals and serfs in return for the smallest additional impost. In Cleves the people insisted upon the terms of their contract with the late ruling house, and looked upon the Brandenburger as an usurper of whom they would gladly be rid at the earliest possible opportunity. Never for a moment was the thought entertained that the union of the Hohenzollern possessions under an energetic prince was an event of importance to any nation of evangelical faith.

Frederick William created the bureaucracy, which for a long period was the only visible sign of the political unity of his dominions. He brought into order the financial chaos then prevailing, relieved the demesnes of their oppressive burdens, and stopped the squandering of their produce, while facilitating the lease of them. Wherever he could he introduced monetary exchange in place of barter, and assured a revenue to himself with which he could free his household from the disgrace of debt and pay for some military force which might at any rate be able to repel a sudden attack on the part of one of his envious neighbours. The direction of the Brandenburg military powers was handed over to Count George Frederick of Waldegg (cf. above), who was the elector’s faithful and sagacious adviser in all diplomatic controversies and also throughout the Augean task which was
the necessary prelude to any internal reform. He was, perhaps, the first man in Germany who had any suspicion that the Hohenzollern kingdom was capable of becoming a great power of Germany and of Europe.

B. ATTEMPTS OF SWEDEN TO BECOME A GREAT POWER

At an early period Sweden had obtained a position upon the North Sea and the Baltic. It was eminently fitted for the foundation of a dominant power which would entirely overshadow the efforts of the neighbouring Germans. Sweden possessed the duchies of Bremen and Verden at the mouth of the Weser, and the coasts of Pomerania and Rügen with their admirable harbours; and thus this maritime and commercial nation had found means and opportunity to monopolise the entire carrying trade of the Baltic Sea, and the commerce with England and Holland on the one hand and North Germany on the other. It is only from this point of view that the acquisitions of Sweden under the peace of Westphalia can be considered as important gains and a veritable extension of power. However, the Swedish nationality was not capable of carrying on trade or maritime pursuits upon any large scale; they are a peasant people, clinging closely to that soil which nature has adorned and richly dowered, and desiring nothing more than to be left in possession of it in freedom and in moderate prosperity. There was no superfluity of national strength forcing them voluntarily or involuntarily to emigrate and throw out branches; nor is there now.

The long war had shaken the social system of Sweden to its very foundations; but social status remained unchanged. No attempts at industrial enterprise upon a large scale were evoked; there was no formation of trade guilds; the sole result was increased friction between great and small landowners, a deterioration of morality, and a decrease in the power of the crown. The nobility had enriched themselves in the course of the war, for those of them who commanded regiments and fortresses had found occasion to enter into business relations with friend and foe alike; they had also gained possession of many of the crown lands (demesnes), which were given to them instead of pay when they presented their endless accounts of arrears, in the composition of which the regimental clerks and quartermasters of the seventeenth century were extraordinarily clever. The retired infantry and cavalry leaders and officials wasted their Pomeranian estates in riotous living, or squandered such treasure as they had brought home in extravagant feasts and drinking bouts with their friends, while they regarded with coarse scorn the evangelical piety and self-restraint which King Gustavus Adolphus had successfully maintained among his warriors.

All that Sweden had taken from Germany disappeared in gluttony and drunkenness. As regards the increase of prosperity and national wealth, it was of no service to the northern kingdom. The ability and the experience of Sweden's diplomats, the bravery of her officers and admirable soldiers was unable to spur the nation to reach a higher stage of economic development, or to suggest new objects for the efforts of far-sighted individuals. Queen Christine (1632–1654; d. 1689) was totally unfitted to exercise a beneficent influence in this direction. Government, in her opinion, was a crushing burden, and practical views of life had no attraction for her. The generosity of her caprices proved a serious detriment to the State exchequer, which was constantly in low water, and as con-
stantly replenished by additional sacrifices of State property. This treatment of the State land dealt a heavy blow to the freedom of the peasants (Odalbonde), for they passed with the lands which they had cultivated into the possession of the noble families whose money had been poured into the royal exchequer.

The whole population of the country was thoroughly roused. The small landed nobility, the free peasantry, and the clergy made common cause against the great families and the bishops, who had got possession of all the lands and were forcing the serfs to till them for their benefit. A manifesto to the people of central Sweden of the year 1649 complains that the queen's mildness was abused, and that the daughter of Gustavus Adolphus would soon have nothing but the title to the crown and the kingdom to call her own. "The grants of land upon feudal tenure were often fraudulently obtained, the recipients being undeserving of any such reward; subordinate officials distributed such grants in return for pecuniary considerations, and in the exercise of their rights would rob the poor widow of her calves and butter." In the Reichstag of 1650 it was stated that the territories which the people had made the greatest sacrifices to acquire benefited a few individuals and were of no advantage to the State; that, on the contrary, the crown and the kingdom had been weakened and diminished by these illegal grants. The queen had every sympathy with the oppressed who had lost their rights; she recognised that the State was in its decline; but she was of too weak a character to make a stand against the nobles, whom she had herself permitted to grow too powerful. However, her resolution to abdicate and to hand over the kingdom to her cousin, Charles Gustavus of the Palatinate Zweibrücken, who had in vain solicited her hand in marriage, brought no decisive change in the circumstances of the country.

Charles Gustavus X (1654–1660) was a capable soldier. He was well aware of the forces which were at work among the European powers, and he was prepared to devote his entire knowledge and power to the welfare of the State. But the qualities which Sweden stood in need of were exactly those which the king did not possess. She yearned for peace and healing statesmanship, — not for conquests and glory. But Charles Gustavus thought he could restore the power of the crown by fresh acquisitions of power and wealth. He turned his attention to that portion of the Baltic coast which was under Polish rule; its highly developed commerce afforded an opportunity for the imposition of those "licenses" (harbour duties and import customs) which had already proved so productive in Pomerania.

C. WARSzAW AND FEBRBELIN

The warlike intentions of Charles Gustavus X left the Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia in such a position that he politically held the casting vote, and no one knew better than he how to turn that advantage to account. A campaign against Poland was a practical impossibility for Sweden, if her troops were to be continually outflanked and her lines of communication broken from the marches or from the principality. If she could not ensure the co-operation of the elector, she must at least ensure his neutrality, and for this she had to offer him certain advantages in return. On the other hand, it was to be expected that when Poland found herself hard pressed she would attempt to bring over her neighbour to her side, and offer political concessions by way of remuneration. Therefore the
characteristic course of policy was for Prussia to join Sweden at the outset of the struggle, to inspire her Polish overlord with the fear of her power, and then to give him the opportunity of a reconciliation, in return for certain corresponding advantages. Frederick William now had the opportunity of showing his appreciation of these circumstances, whether right or wrong; to a man of his clear insight into the state of affairs there could be no doubt as to the proper course to pursue; given his personality, and the result was a foregone conclusion. There have been too many statesmen whose powers of reasoning failed before even the simplest of problems. Brandenburg-Prussia had also this further advantage, that she was not bound by alliance in any direction, and in particular that she was entirely independent of imperial policy. Had the fate of Prussia been in the hands of George William or of a Schwarzenburg, the war between Poland and Sweden would only have caused loss to the north of Germany, and certainly would not have brought liberation from a crushing and degrading subjection or aggrandisement to Brandenburg. At the outset of the war between Sweden and Poland the elector’s success was very unimportant and hardly appreciable to contemporaries. In November, 1655, the Swedish troops occupied a large portion of the duchy of Prussia, meeting with little or no opposition from the elector. In the compact of Königsberg (17th January, 1656), Charles Gustavus X undertook to evacuate the duchy, which the Brandenburger now held as a fief from Sweden. Poland had surrendered her feudal territory and had consequently given up her right to it; the victor seized the position of the conquered. However, the military position soon underwent a change. Charles Gustavus began to find that he could only remain in the Polish lands which he had conquered under very dangerous conditions. He was more than ever dependent upon the support of his new vassal, who was not bound to furnish more than one thousand infantry and five hundred cavalry as auxiliary troops. A new compact was arranged at Marienburg on the 25th of June, wherein the objects desired by the two parties were more clearly and distinctly specified. The elector promised to help the king during this summer with the whole of his military power, in return for which the king promised him full sovereignty over the Palatinate, Posen, Kalisch, Sjeradz, and Lentschiza. The Brandenburg forces had never yet been employed for any great undertaking, and their value was now to be proved. In the battle of Warsaw, which lasted for three days (July 28–30, 1656), nine thousand Brandenburg troops and nine thousand Swedes defeated eighty thousand to ninety thousand Poles, Lithuanians, and Tartars, drove them across the Vistula in terrible confusion, and became masters of the imperial capital. And Prussia rose on the ruins of Poland.

The battle of Warsaw had proved that the warlike prowess and the military leadership of Brandenburg was fully equal to the power of Sweden. The two powers were of equal numerical strength, and had severally carried through a task of equal magnitude and difficulty; the advance of the Brandenburg infantry brigade under the brigadier Otto Christof of Sparr on the last day’s fighting was so irresistible, the charge of the cavalry led by the elector in person was so decisive, that Charles Gustavus stopped the pursuit out of Prussian astuteness, lest his allies should reap too rich a harvest of trophies. The compilers of the official Swedish reports have done their best to minimise Frederick William’s services in gaining the victory, and the elector himself modestly refrained from proffering any correction of their misstatements, caring only for material gains. But, none the less,
his allies could not shut their eyes to the facts, and the whole world was profoundly surprised to learn how quickly a German electorate of no previous reputation had acquired so admirable an army. This army is indissolubly bound up with the foundation of the State of Prussia; this army, the special creation of its general, has henceforward nothing in common with the composite forces of feudal and knightly times. On the contrary, it is a State army, not a militia, but none the less a national power, in which was fully displayed the admirable capabilities of the north German for warfare, when incorporated in well trained and disciplined troops.

Frederick William had shown what he could do when he put out his full strength, but he had no inclination to place that strength gratuitously at Sweden's disposal. He was obliged to retire to protect his duchy against a possible invasion by Russia, and to guard his own territory against the attack of a Lithuanian-Polish army. In his absence the Swedes were defeated by the Poles, and on the 15th November, 1656, King John Casimir marched into Dantzig with twelve thousand men. The elector received proposals from both parties; he accepted that which promised him the freedom of Prussia from feudal subjection, a concession which brought with it no increase of territory, but was of importance for his position in the political world. In the convention of Labeau (20th November, 1656), Charles Gustavus recognised his ally as sovereign Duke of Prussia, with the sole limitation that as such he was to keep no ships of war.

Shortly afterward relations with Sweden were broken off, because Charles Gustavus X was devoting his entire power to the war with Denmark and had temporarily given up his designs upon Poland; a reconciliation with Poland was then brought about through the mediation of Holland. The price which Poland had to pay was the recognition of Prussian independence in the convention of Wehlau (29th September, 1657), and the feudal relations which had subsisted between the countries since the unhappy day of Tannenberg were dissolved.

It now became necessary to break down the resistance of the Prussian orders and of the Königsberg patriciate, which exercised an almost unlimited domination over the town in the so-called "Kneiplöf." The opposition which had almost broken out into open revolt against the elector lost power so soon as Frederick William arrived in person in the duchy in the autumn of 1662, with the object of restoring order. "The mildness and clemency which marked his arrival was as impressive as the appearance of his dragoons, calmed the heated spirits of the citizen heroes, who had been vainly expecting the invasion of Prussia by their Polish confederates." Poland had observed with great satisfaction the difficulties which the unrightness of the Prussians had placed in the way of the elector, had supported the Prussians in their attitude of hostility to the electoral government, and had praised their fidelity to their old feudal lord. But neither the king nor the Reichstag had any thought of beginning war with Frederick William, who was more than their superior, even without the help of Sweden. In 1663 the dissolution of the Landtag was decided and the sovereignty of Prussia was recognised, the oath of allegiance being taken on the 18th October, 1663; the Polish emissaries also took the oath, and contented themselves with the stipulation that the duchy should revert to the Polish crown in the event of the House of Hohenzollern becoming extinct.
After the elector had established his supremacy in the State he was confronted with the more difficult task of reorganising the civil administration and the economic conditions of the duchy and also of the electorate and of Cleves. He was obliged to make numerous concessions in the matter of taxation before he could obtain the rights of enlistment and free passage for his troops, which were points of supreme importance to him, as may easily be conceived. His timely realisation of the royal demesnes brought an increasing annual income to the electoral exchequer, and enabled Brandenburg-Prussia to keep an army in constant readiness which commanded the respect of the powers at every European crisis. France was speedily obliged to recognise the existence of this force (cf. above); Sweden, in particular, felt that her sphere of operations was largely contracted by the military power of the energetic Brandenburger.

Not only had Frederick William made peace with Poland; at the imperial election he had espoused the cause of Austria, and had thus freed himself from the difficulties of his isolated position. Charles Gustavus X had already humiliated Denmark (8th March, 1658), and had almost reduced her to total impotency by the peace of Roskilde; he proposed to administer a second blow, with the intention of leaving her entirely defenceless and preventing any alliance between Brandenburg and Denmark, when the elector averted the blow by placing himself at the head of the "cavalade to Holstein," for which undertaking he put into the field sixteen thousand men and forty-two guns, while Austria sent ten thousand to twelve thousand men and twenty guns, and Poland four thousand to five thousand men. Frederick William penetrated as far as Alsen, and said he was ready to give battle to the Swedish troops blockading Copenhagen, if the Dutch admiral, De Ruyter, who was entrusted with the defence of the Danish capital on the sea, had been able to place at his disposal the ships requested for the transport of his troops, which De Ruyter could not do.

The connection of this entanglement upon the north with the struggle between France and Hapsburg is seen in the share taken by Louis XIV in the attempt to free Charles Gustavus from his encircling toils. Sweden was still considered as the great opponent of Catholic imperialism, and as the chief support of Protestantism against Catholicism. Frederick William declined to join the "Concert of the Hague," which was set on foot by Mazarin, unless a universal peace was thereby to be assured; for he would have to expect a further attack from Sweden as soon as the intervention of France and England had freed her from her desperate position on the Danish islands and the Jutland continent. This danger, which had become the more imminent owing to the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from the Baltic coast after the conclusion of the peace of the Pyrenees (1649), was lessened by the sudden and unexpected death of Charles Gustavus (23d February, 1660). A deadly struggle between Sweden and Brandenburg would have been no unpleasing prospect to Austria; she would have merely looked quietly on until the opportunity arrived for her to give the casting vote to her own advantage.

The peace of Oliva (3d May, 1660) marks an important point in the history of the development of the maritime powers upon and within the Baltic. Sweden's power had risen and fallen, leaving no permanent results; she was obliged to relinquish her idea of founding a great power based upon the possession of the most important of the Baltic coasts, and upon a naval force which should upon any occasion be more than the equal of all the other maritime States. In any appreciation of
the value of a vigorous and ambitious prince to the development of the State, the fact that both Gustavus Adolphus II and Charles Gustavus X were carried off in the midst of important political undertakings must not be considered as matters of decisive importance in the struggle for Baltic supremacy. In the nature of things there was no sufficient reason for a Swedish hegemony in north Germany, which would not in any case have lasted beyond the reign of Gustavus Adolphus. Equally impossible was it, even by the strongest efforts of a dominating personality, to make Sweden a maritime power, because the Swedes have no inclination for maritime pursuits, and are never likely to be driven by lack of suitable land to get a living from the sea. Nor can it be affirmed with any certainty that German supremacy on the Baltic would have been established, or the rise of Brandenburg power have been accelerated, by the marriage of Frederick William with Christine, and the long discussed, desired, and dreaded union of Brandenburg and Sweden. Certainly the Poles would have been driven from the coast forthwith, and Danzig would have been made a Brandenburg-Prussian harbour town in the seventeenth century, but we have no certain grounds upon which to base an answer to the question whether any constitutional form could have been devised for the equalisation of Swedish and north German interests, and for the unification of the sources of strength possessed by the two parties. The advance of Sweden under Charles Gustavus was a serious matter for Brandenburg, and the death of Charles can therefore only be considered as a fortunate occurrence in view of the task which lay before the Great Elector.

Every future attempt of the Swedish government to aggrandise itself at the expense of Brandenburg was bound to fail because there was no personality at the head of the government combining, as did Charles Gustavus, admitted political talent with military experience, capacity, and boldness. The attack made by Sweden as the ally of Louis XIV during the second war against Brandenburg was the occasion for the Great Elector's most brilliant and most popular exploit—the battle of Fehrbellin. "It was not a cheerful moment in the prince's life, a life that was a constant succession of care and struggle, disappointment and danger: his eldest son had just died; one of his campaigns had come to a disgraceful termination, and his every opponent was pointing to him as the cause of the disaster; he was tormented by the gout and could not leave his bed; his wife was nearing her confinement; the subsidies had not come in which he required for the pay of his brave troops, upon whom as ever depended the future of his house and his position in the councils of the German princes, — yet, in spite of all, there was no weakness and no timidity." Frederick William relied so firmly upon himself and his comrades that he must have seen that the Swedes had delivered themselves into his hands. It was soon clear to him that he could expect but little help from the imperial court. Negotiations with the States-General were protracted to a wearisome length, although William of Orange kept true faith with the elector. Denmark was ready to help, but wanted money; only Brunswick was ready and willing to bring up help at once. Frederick William did not wait. With five thousand horses, eight thousand dragoons, one thousand two hundred infantry, and fourteen guns he hastened into the territory occupied by Sweden, surprised Colonel von Wangelin in Rathenow, and pressed so hard upon General Waldemar Wrangel, the brother of the field-marshall of Charles Gustavus, that he was obliged to give battle at the Ferry of Bellin. The battle opened with a splendid cavalry charge.
led by Prince Frederick of Hesse-Homburg, with an impetuosity perhaps excessive, but, fortunately for the elector, successful in its purpose, for the Swedes, though they made a brave defence, were no match for the troops of Brandenburg. The old Marshal der Flatterer, whose Upper Austrian origin did not prevent him from showing the utmost fidelity to the Margrave of Brandenburg, completed the defeat of Wrangel by his clever tactical dispositions, and so overwhelming was that defeat that the marches were freed from the enemy by this one blow.

The German people felt that this victory of the Brandenburger was a national exploit, a relief from the weight of a foreign domination which had been borne with growing discontent even by the strongest partisans of the evangelical faith. Brandenburg was considered for the first time as an integral part of the nation, and its elector was looked upon as the man and the prince for whom the heart of Germany had long been yearning. In numerous pamphlets Protestant writers defended his action in defeating the Swedes, who were no longer the champions of the evangelical faith. A ballad upon the battle runs as follows:

"The Swede swept down from northern cold,
With Finns and Lapps in might,
Hired by France’s venal gold,
And plundered left and right.

"Through Brandenburg and through the mark
He swept with fire and wrath.
Before his frown the land grew dark,
And none could bar his path.

"At length the mighty hero came,
Knowing what he might be,
And set on high his glorious name,
For all the world to see."

For three successive years the Swedes suffered disaster upon disaster. At the battle of Bornholm (11th June, 1676) their fleet was almost entirely destroyed by the allied Dutch and Danish, among whom a few Brandenburg ships were to be found; a Danish army occupied Schonen; the elector penetrated to the coast line, and at length took Stettin after a siege which was carried on with splendid tenacity by both sides (22d December, 1677). The Swedish kingdom was only saved from destruction by the battle of Lund, which the young but discreet King Charles XI won against the Danes. However, the whole of Pomerania seemed to be lost to Sweden; Stralsund had to open its gates to the elector. The Livonian army, which had invaded Prussia and had seized a number of places, learned the fury of the Brandenburg onset. By the famous double crossing of the frozen Haff by the elector (end of January, 1679) the Livonians were thrown into complete confusion, and began a retreat, which closely resembled a rout, to Riga, where only one thousand men bearing arms arrived out of an original total of sixteen thousand.

However, all these were but moral victories; the elector did not attain his political object, the acquisition of Swedish Pomerania. In the peace of Nimwegen (5th February, 1679), Brandenburg was abandoned by the emperor and the empire, and the return of Pomerania to Sweden was one of the stipulations of the treaty. The emperor had been roused to anxiety by the sight of this new military and political power which had grown up within the empire; the several provinces of the
empire, both Catholic and Evangelical, spiritual and temporal, felt the existence of this victorious army a constant anxiety to themselves, and desired to see it reduced to the level of the contingents which an electoral State was accustomed to place at the service of the empire. This task was the care of France. Sweden was prepared to continue the war on the side of France, while Brunswick was also ready to send out a few companies, in the hope of being rewarded by Louis XIV with some of the Brandenburg territory. However, the French king was very well able to value German princes at their proper worth; he did not desire to shatter Brandenburg's position in the empire, but to fulfil his promise to Sweden, and to tie the elector's hands as far as he could. Frederick William yielded. At Saint Germain-en-Laye, on June 29th, 1679, he agreed to the French demands, gave back almost the whole of Pomerania to Sweden, and about the 25th of October, 1679, he agreed to receive subsidies from Louis (100,000 livres yearly for ten years) for the purpose of keeping his army on a war footing; he promised free passage through his territories for the French troops, and also promised to give his vote for the French king or the dauphin at the next imperial election!

By these base acts of Brandenburg Prussia took up a position outside the empire, and appeared for the first time as a self-seeking European power. Twenty years previously the Rhine princes and their dependents had acted in the same manner; so too had the elector, Ferdinand Maria of Bavaria, nine years before; but these changes had been quickly forgotten, as the alliance of these princes with France made little difference to the balance of power in Europe. "The Great Elector's action at Saint-Germain is the first step of the House of Hohenzollern toward the position of a great European power, which was to unite the several provinces of the empire into one German State." So Prussia stooped to conquer.

6. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH POWER UNDER LOUIS XIV

A. THE REUNIONS AND THE TURKISH WAR OF 1683

During the two final decades of the seventeenth century, the seeds lying dormant in the historical life of the European peoples gradually came to maturity; the ground had already been cleared for the most important changes in the territorial areas and in the mutual relations of the powers. In this light we must regard the conquests of France and her repeated attacks upon the German Empire, the eastern developments of the German-Hapsburg policy which were brought about by the favourable result of the Turkish war and the recovery of Hungary and its neighbouring territory; the War of the Spanish Succession; the renewal of complications in the East through the rivalry of Sweden and Poland; and finally the rise of Brandenburg-Prussian influence and the recognition of her sovereign position which was marked by the rise of Prussia to the status of a kingdom. The transference of the policy of the House of Orange to England and the permanent connection of that country with the States-General must be regarded as an additional factor in the problems under consideration. A new member entered the European political world in the Russian State, whose mission was to educate healthy and vigorous Slav races to take their share in the struggle for the blessings of civilization in the stead of the Polish Lithuanian kingdom, which was hastening to its inevitable fall.
(a) The Reunion Chambers.—Immediately upon the conclusion of the peace of Nimwegen Louis XIV began to take new steps for the acquisition of that territory which, as he was firmly convinced and as French patriots believed, was indispensable for the completion of his kingdom; he proposed a set of entirely new principles as the basis of his national and historical right to what he claimed. In the name of the bishops of Metz, Toul, and Verdun he advanced his demand that the feudal rights of these bishops to lands and possessions within the German Empire must be revived, though they had lain obsolete for centuries, and that the supremacy of France should extend over the districts in question. Upon the conclusions of the peace of Westphalia concerning the withdrawal of the Austrian wardens from the Alsatian towns, he placed such an interpretation that it was possible for France to claim the whole country, including Strassburg. The representations of the emperor and the Reichstag did not prevent him from annexing, piece by piece, the country which he claimed; at the close of September, 1681, he surprised the old imperial town of Strassburg, and obliged the citizens to do him homage, after he had been informed that the emperor was proposing to garrison the town. It is entirely superfluous to spend time in pointing out the absence of justifiable reason for these “reunions.” Justice is dumb when questions of national interest are at stake; the most brazen injustice, the most outrageous demands, are acclaimed as righteous by patriots so long as they can thence draw food for their vainglory. This is a fact of which the historian as well as the politician must take account, for he will invariably find himself in the wrong if he attempts to account for State policy on principles other than “might is right.” Louis XIV continued to proclaim that his State must be increased just so long as he found himself able to brush aside all resistance to his will; his example has been followed by every succeeding government, whether monarchical or republican, until the neighbours whom she had trampled on, trampled on her in their turn.

Not for a single moment was the imperial court inclined to compliance. Nor did any one imagine that the arts of diplomacy would ever induce Louis XIV to retire from his advantageous position; the only possible course of action was to gain time to prepare for the struggle and to find allies against France. Of alliance, however, the prospect was exceedingly small. It now became clear how fatal had been the mistake committed in neglecting Brandenburg, for without her troops the collective forces of the empire were no match for the French king’s army. It cannot be denied that the change in the Great Elector’s policy after the peace of Nimwegen was largely the cause of the “reunion” movement, but it is equally certain that King Louis would have had far less hesitation in aggrandising himself at the expense of the empire if Brandenburg had exhausted her strength in a hopeless war against Sweden and France, and had sacrificed to no purpose the army which she had just created. The mere fact of her existence as an ally one side or the other was a ground of security for the empire in the last extremity. Moreover, Frederick William would have been quite ready on proper terms to throw in his lot again with the emperor. But he was anxious, first of all, to see for himself that the emperor was capable of taking up the war with France; then he demanded certain compensation in return, the cession of districts in Silesia, where the rights of inheritance possessed by the Hohenzollerns were not wholly secure. The Vienna court did not think it necessary to meet these advances half way; it looked to other sources of help.
The members of that mighty confederation which resisted the foundation of a universal supremacy of France in later years existed side by side, even at that period; but they were not then sufficiently developed and had not the resources necessary to enable them to withstand the energy and the will of the French king. Around William of Orange were grouped a number of Dutch and German statesmen, who were constrained by necessity to thwart the ever-widening plans of Louis XIV; among them was also to be found George William of Waldeck, sometime minister and general of Brandenburg, who had been in the service of the States-General since 1672. He was confident that he could undertake the military organisation of the empire after he had secured the adherence in 1679 of some of his comrades from the central Rhine, from the Wetterau, Westerwald, and Eifel, to a scheme for their mutual defence. This "union" was joined by Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt, Fulda, Bamberg-Würzburg, and the Frankish district, and shortly afterward by Saxony-Gotha.

Waldeck was able to create such a strong impression in Vienna of the importance of his scheme of mutual defence that the emperor on the 10th of June, 1682, concluded the "Lazenburg Alliance" with the "union," and it was hoped that others of the imperial provinces might be induced to join. They were to take up the defence of the empire, of which scheme the main features had been sketched out by the Reichstag at Regensburg, which had now become a permanent assembly. However, their intentions did not issue in practical results. Of more importance was the union of Bavaria and Hapsburg, which was closely cemented by the marriage in July, 1685, of the young Elector Max Emanuel (Ferdinand Maria had died on 26th of May, 1679) with the archduchess Maria Antonie, the daughter of the emperor; important, too, was the secession of the Elector of Saxony, John George III (1680-1691), from the French party, and the readiness of the Duke of Hanover, Ernst August I, to send an army of ten thousand men to the Rhine to support the imperial troops. Leopold and his council, which was then led by the Freiherr von Strattmann, were consequently obliged to admit that the interests of the House of Hapsburg with respect to Spain demanded an unconditional resistance to the encroachments of France; to this opinion they remained firm, even though the danger of a new Turkish war grew more imminent.

(b) The Turks before Vienna. — The Hungarian policy of the Vienna court was invariably unfortunate. The leaders did not appreciate the necessity of smoothing over religious differences by gentle treatment of the non-Catholics; their treatment of personal and family affairs was also ill considered. The claims of the Hákóczy family, to which the Transylvanian magnate Emerich Téküly belonged, had been set aside by timely offers of compensation, bestowal of titles, and opportune marriages; but time had never been found for proper attention to these affairs, and the attitude of rejection that was too often adopted helped to bring powerful adherents to the opposition. Stern and harsh in time of peace, weak and careless in time of war, the Austrian House did not gain either the respect or the confidence of the Magyars.

After their fruitless war with Poland and Russia the Turks thought that they had found a haven of rest upon the Danube, and the state of affairs in Transylvania and upper Hungary seemed eminently suited to further their aims. The Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha required to secure his position by some military success, and,
having persuaded the Sultan to permit the further chastisement of the infidel, he marched in person upon Vienna at the head of an army of two hundred thousand men.

The Vienna statesman had actually brought matters to such a pass that Austria found herself obliged at once and the same time to carry on the war against France on the Rhine and to resist the attack of an enormously superior power upon the hereditary territories of the ruling house. The unprincipled Elector of Brandenburg took the opportunity to advocate the conclusion of an armistice with France, which would imply the temporary abandonment of the “reunion” problem; if some such arrangement could be made with Louis XIV, his ally, he was ready to send sixteen thousand men and more to Hungary. But in the course of these negotiations he again advanced his claims to Jägerndorf, and the emperor declined to accept help from Brandenburg, which appeared the less indispensable as the King of Poland had promised to lead his army against the common enemy without any stipulation of reward. The Pope Innocent XI persuaded Louis XIV to cease for a time the hostilities which he had already begun against the House of Austria, and the king complied with his request in the expectation that in case of necessity his help would be demanded, and that when he had saved the country from the Turks he might, with the assent of Brandenburg, make any terms he pleased for himself.

The magnificent defence of the imperial capital offered by Count Rüdiger of Starhemberg, the endurance of his troops and of the more sensible part of the population of Vienna, and finally the glorious battle which raised the siege (12th September, 1683), in which Kara Mustapha was utterly beaten by the Polish army under John Sobieski, entirely upset Louis’s calculations and raised the emperor’s prestige to an unexpected height. The supreme command had been given by agreement to the Polish king, but the real conduct of the battle was claimed by the Duke Charles of Lorraine; and on this memorable day two German electors, John George II of Saxony and Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria, had voluntarily placed themselves under the orders of the duke, as also had the imperial field-marshal, the Count of Waldeck. This was Poland’s last intervention in European politics. The emperor had not succeeded in raising an imperial army; the empire had not yet found time to take the measures necessary for the fulfilment of military exigencies. The help which had averted the fall of Vienna had been given to the emperor by the allied “armed provinces,” in which the Frankish district was included as well as the electors. Hitherto standing armies had been set on foot only in such north German territories as were forced to protect themselves; beside the Elector of Brandenburg, who was more powerful than any other German prince, the dukes of Brunswick and the Bishop of Münster had troops on a war footing at their disposal, capable of being used for independent operations. The system of individual armament now began to prevail throughout the empire, so that military affairs entered upon a new phase of development.

It was a considerable advantage to the greater territorial princes always to have their own troops ready, and to send them beyond their provinces only upon special occasions of concerted action. But the maintenance of these standing armies was an extraordinary expense, and one which could not be met from their ordinary sources of income; princes were therefore ready to employ their troops without the somewhat narrow sphere of their own interests, and lent them to other powers,
which were armed insufficiently or not at all, in return for corresponding pecuniary returns, which went into their war chests. This was a business which had been carried on by the captains of regiments during the period of vassalage, and during the Thirty Years’ War, by such great “contractors” as Mansfeld, Christian of Brunswick, Wallenstein, Bernhard of Weimar, and others. It now passed into the hands of the princely war lords, who gained far greater profit from it and were less easily exposed to the danger of a conflict of political interests. The complaints concerning the so-called “sale of the country’s children” first arose at a later period, and resulted from the failure to appreciate the close connection between the fundamental idea of “armament” and the arrangements for defence existing in earlier times. In most cases the soldiers who were thus lent out were themselves entirely convinced that in no other manner could the special military qualities which made their services of value be kept at a high level of perfection. The smaller provinces of the empire, which did not possess sufficient territory or population to enable them to embark upon undertakings of the kind, generally came to some arrangement with the “armed” powers, if they were ordered to prepare for war by the empire or their allies; districts in which there was no lord of dominant power formed compacts offensive and defensive and added to the number of the armed powers. But such a movement was for the most part of short duration. As soon as the most pressing war was over, these imperial districts withdrew their contingent, because their maintenance was not imperative upon them as upon their more powerful neighbours, and because the expenses of war had an effect upon their home life more immediate and heavier than in the case of a populous State, where there were many shoulders to bear the burden. From 1670 to 1680 and through the following decades German military strength was represented by the forces of the “armed” provinces. Alliance and convention were the only means of calling great national armies into existence. The policy of the emperor and the state-craft of every dynasty that strove to attain success abroad resolved itself into a series of attempts to effect alliances with the armed provinces of the empire; consequently the threads of the diplomatic history of the period become so tangled, owing to schemes and plots, that during no other epoch have we the same difficulty in unravelling their confused complexity.

B. THE ATTACK OF FRANCE UPON GERMANY

The defeat of the Turks at Vienna induced Louis XV to renew and to increase the pressure upon the two Hapsburg courts and upon the German Empire. In addition to Strassburg he had quickly annexed two other important strategical points, — Casale on the Po (30th September, 1681) and Luxemburg (4th June, 1684). He now demanded an armistice for thirty or at least twenty-five years, the status quo to be maintained. During that period the empire would be able to devote her whole energy to the struggle with her hereditary enemy. The Elector of Brandenburg exerted his influence in Vienna and in Regensburg to secure the acceptance of this proposal, as it offered him personally a possibility of escape from the embarrassing position into which his relations with France had brought him. It was clear to him that he could not safely take up a position of hostility to the emperor at a moment when the majority of the Germans looked upon the continuance of the war with Turkey as a national duty. He had cynically admitted the
difficulty of his position to the French ambassador, the Vicomte de Rébenac, and had appealed through him to the generosity of Louis XVI, asking him not to make capital out of the "desperate necessities of the empire." Rébenac was in full possession of the elector's confidence, and it was through his ready influence that the king was induced to confer a special mark of friendship upon the elector, which consisted in the raising of his subsidy to 100,000 livres per annum; a sum which was to be doubled in the event of war, and did not include personal presents. The elector was ever vigilant when his personal interests were concerned.

The views entertained at the court of Vienna underwent a change during the progress of the campaign. A few weeks after he had marched into his sore-tried capital the emperor's confidence in his Polish ally was seriously shaken. Sobieski, who despised the German time-servers, as he called them, considered that his Polish nobles had suffered disproportionate losses in the battle of Párkány (9th October, 1688). At the storming of Gran (27th October) he allowed them to take no active share in the operations, and afterward marched them home. If the war in Hungary was to be continued it was necessary to procure more and more reliable troops, and such Germany alone could provide. If war were to break out with France in the following spring, there would be very small numbers of German troops, perhaps none at all, at the emperor's disposal. Thus the Emperor Leopold was confronted with the alternative whether he should again conclude an unsatisfactory peace with the Turks, and resume the struggle with France, or whether he should put off the solution of the French question and at once undertake the conquest of Hungary. On the one hand was the position of the whole House of Hapsburg as a European power; on the other hand were the special interests of the German ruling line. Leopold decided in favour of the latter. The Hungarian campaign of the year 1684 was carried on with inadequate forces, and led to no definite result. The mission of an ambassador-extraordinary, Count Lamberg, in February, 1684, to buy off Brandenburg from France, had been a failure, and for these reasons the emperor gave his consent to the conclusion of an armistice for twenty years with France, which was concluded on August 15, 1684, at Regensburg.

This event marks a turning-point in the relations of the two hostile parties, because from that time begins the gradual separation of the Great Elector from Louis XIV. A number of other occurrences in the year 1685 contributed to set him against French policy, and to prepare the way for that great federation which was destined eventually to ruin the far-reaching plans against the freedom of Europe which Louis XIV had conceived. Of these the most important were the abrogation of the Edict of Nantes, the suppression of the Huguenots and of religious toleration in France, and the accession of the Stuart James II in England, who had become a Catholic and openly introduced a counter-reformation into England, so far as his opportunities allowed. Frederick William threw open his territory to his exiled co-religionists, the refugees, and came to a close understanding with William of Orange to the effect that Louis must be conquered, as his obvious intention was to disturb the balance of the different Christian creeds which the peace of Westphalia had determined. Though he was quarrelling with the Pope, the king was none the less considered as the most dangerous opponent of the Protestant powers. His efforts to build up a national French policy had been attended with complete success. But the ruinous dissension which eventually shook France to her very foundations proceeded from the king's fatal opinion that the centralisa-
tion of the constitutional power was incompatible with the existence of different religious creeds, and that universal toleration would impair the strength of the kingdom.

As soon as the Great Elector had made up his mind to dissolve his connection with France, in spite of the subsidies which had been paid to him through Rébenac since the year 1680, he entertained no scruples about rejoining the emperor and supporting him in his undertakings. He could not have failed to recognise that Louis was desirous of keeping him in restraint and even in impotency. He had at one time expected to increase his territory with the aid of France at the expense of Brunswick-Hanover or of Sweden, and this hope he was now obliged to renounce.

None the less the negotiations with the imperial government would have resulted unfavourably had not the Elector Prince Frederick, a declared enemy of France, devoted his energy to removing the chief obstacle. His father insisted upon the fact that an inconsiderable accession of territory was owing to himself in view of his hereditary claims to Jügerndorf and some other Silesian estates—the so-called Schriebus district. What was the loss of twenty-four square miles of territory and a few thousand inhabitants, for the most part Protestants, to the powerful Hapsburg House, which was desirous of conquering the kingdom of Hungary at that very moment? A rigid insistence upon their rights prevented the Vienna statesmen from making a sacrifice which was valueless in comparison with the important alliance it would have bought. Schriebus was formally alienated from the emperor during the lifetime of the elector. The elector prince was obliged to undertake to restore the district upon his accession. For this he received a special subsidy of 10,000 ducats, a not unwelcome addition to his impoverished treasury. This piece of baseness was successfully concealed from the old elector; until his death he firmly believed in the uprightness of the Austrian House and of the prince. The emperor eventually exacted the return of his twenty-four square miles from the elector’s successor; however, he had provided an excuse for Frederick the Great to declare that the promised renunciation of the Silesian principalities by his forbear was not binding upon himself, and so to give a quibble of legality to his conquest of it.

On the 2d of September, 1686, the fortress of Ofen, the central point of the Turkish rule in Hungary, was stormed by the German and imperial troops. In this brilliant feat of arms some share was taken by the Brandenburg contingent of eight thousand two hundred men, and after a lapse of one hundred and forty-five years the emperor was again put in possession of the Hungarian Königsegg. The Brandenburger then undertook the defence of the Lower Rhine, and co-operated with the Dutch against France, their late ally, while Max Emanuel of Bavaria and Karl of Lorraine won the battle of Mohács (12th August, 1687), and took Belgrade (6th September, 1688) for the first time, thus breaking down the resistance which the Turks annually renewed. The Field-Marshal von Barfus rendered important service at the battle of Slankamen (Comitat Sirmia) on the 19th of August, 1691, with the Margrave of Baden, Louis William, and helped to win a brilliant victory, which permanently strengthened the position of the imperial troops in Hungary, who had received a heavy blow in the previous year (8th October, 1690) by the loss of Belgrade.

Meanwhile, an open breach with France had come to pass. Louis XIV could not behold the recovery of the Hapsburg power in the East and the rise of the im-
perial prestige among the imperial princes without raising fresh claims on his side, and attempting to assert his preponderance by interference in German affairs. With the death of Charles, the Elector of the Palatinate (16th May, 1685) the line of Simmern of Wittelsbach became extinct, and Louis seized the opportunity to claim the allodial territory of the Simmern family on behalf of his brother Philip of Orleans, husband of the Princess Elizabeth Charlotte, the sister of the late elector. The possession of this territory would have made the French ruler a prince of the empire. In the contest for the archbishopric of Cologne he had espoused the cause of William Egon of Fürstenberg (1682, Bishop of Strassburg; 7th January, 1688, electoral coadjutor of Cologne) in opposition to Prince Joseph Clemens of Bavaria, and this action had embarrassed the interests of Austria and Bavaria and the rights of the Pope, who had decided in favour of Joseph Clemens. None the less Innocent XI made every possible effort to induce the king to accept some peaceful solution of the questions at issue, and to restrain him from appealing to force of arms. His efforts were not successful. Louis felt himself threatened on two sides, and was determined to anticipate the formation of a confederacy against himself by striking a rapid blow which should deal confusion and fear amongst his enemies. He considered himself as especially threatened by the alliance of Augsburg, whereby the emperor, Spain and Sweden, as allied powers, the Frankish and Bavarian districts, and also certain princes, had pledged themselves to provide a federal army of more than forty-six thousand men for the defence of the empire until its military organisation should have been perfected. Still more serious was the discord which had broken out between the English Parliament and King James II, and the alliance now imminent between the leaders of Protestantism in England and William of Orange, who could now reckon upon the consent of the States-General to such steps as he might consider needful to secure the Protestant character of the government in England.

C. THE FALL OF THE STUARTS AND THE PEACE OF RYSWYK

(a) The Deposition of James II. — The Prince of Orange had been forced for a long time to postpone the execution of his great plans, as he was invariably confronted with the suspicion of the States-General, and of their short-sighted opportunistic politicians; the time was now at hand when he was to gain a powerful position, enabling him to undertake the war with the despot upon the Seine who was threatening the freedom of Europe in general and of the Protestant States in particular. William III had married a daughter of James II, who had been baptised in the evangelical faith of which she was a warm supporter; as her husband he was summoned by England to bring into order the troubled and confused affairs of that country. The Whigs had formed the forefront of the opposition to James II; the majority of the Tories and the whole of the clergy joined them with the object of overthrowing the papal rule, to which the whole nation was resolutely opposed. It was the impenetrable stupidity of James II which brought about this revolution, the extent and the radical consequences of which no one could have foreseen. He made easy martyrs of the bishops, permitted the high church hierarchy to renounce their allegiance to himself unpunished; he destroyed the discipline of his troops by amalgamating the Irish with the English and Scotch regiments, sneered at the well-meant advice of his protector on the French throne,
EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING REPRODUCTION OF THE
LANDING OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE

Prince William of Orange is standing on the shore of Taunton (Tauton) with the Counts of
Solms, Nassau, Bentinck, Macclesfield, and Argyle. Before them are the deputys of the towns of
Dartmouth and Exeter, while those from Cornwall are hurrying forward. On the beach below
are Burnet and Ferguson, on the far left Corshury, Seymour and others. The troops (Lancers)
on the shore immediately behind the Prince are under the command of C. P. de Fagel; farther to
the right are Bentinck’s guard, the footguard and the division of Hagendoorn (beneath the tower
of Brixham, where the dragoons are landing). The standard in the centre of the foreground
belongs to the Orange life-guard; the persons in the foreground on the right are Englishmen, who
desire to enter William’s service. On the left forage and supplies are being brought up. Of the
ships entering the bay from Exeter, those on the far left belong to Sir Herbert and Cornelius
Everts; then appears the noble vessel of the Prince himself. Farther to the right Almonde is
sailing into the harbour from Brixham, which is shut out of view by the Cornish mountains.
IN ENGLAND, NOVEMBER 15-16, 1688

(engraving by Romain de Hooghe.)
and rewarded his liberality with ridiculous displays of haughtiness. Finally his disregard of the prescribed court ceremonial gave rise to the rumour that the Prince of Wales, born on the 10th of August, 1688, was a Jesuit changeling, whose existence was to destroy all possibility of a Protestant successor. A long series of similar provocations forced the opposition to resort finally to resistance, and their decision was only taken with the greatest reluctance, in view of the universal loyalty that the Restoration had at first evoked. The personal stubbornness of the king and of his Catholic followers played a large part in this change of government in England which was so important in its influence upon the destinies of Europe; so far-reaching were its consequences that the historian W. E. H. Lecky, contrary to his purpose to trace “the permanent characteristics of national life,” is obliged to draw the attention of his readers to the fact that “that issue of the complicated drama was brought to pass more by the action of individuals and by chance circumstance than by general causes.”

After the flight of his father-in-law had laid the road open, William III did not place his wife in the position of ruler, but succeeded in getting himself recognised as full sovereign and as the ruler whom the will of the nation had called forward. This was the real occasion upon which the Whig spirit first broke its bonds; the prestige of the Parliament was secured, and the highest intellect of a nation provided with the most admirable political capabilities was called to the management of its own affairs. With the passage of the Prince of Orange from his native land to English soil (cf. the plate opposite, “The Arrival of William III of Orange in England”) the historical importance of Holland was also transferred to England. The States-General had exhausted their ideals and their political strength in the struggle for the victory over Spain, and sank from their former high position in proportion as England rose in the world to a height for which past history affords no precedent and no standard of comparison. It is true that only in the nineteenth century did England take the step from the place of a European power to that of a world power; but it was in the seventeenth century that the foundations for that step were laid. Elizabeth, Cromwell, William form the constellation which has lighted the proudest and the most fortunate of all the Germanic nations upon a path which has progressed upward without interruption for almost two hundred years.

William III himself recognised that England would become the leader of the maritime powers; he devoted his every care and effort and his unusual political capacities to making the United Kingdom equal to the performance of his splendid task. The distrust of the Britons toward their new ruler on account of his presumed leanings to Holland speedily proved as groundless as did those insular suspicions of Coburg influence which our own day has seen. William III was a stranger and a usurper on the throne of England; if he would maintain his position he was obliged to prefer his new country before the old. The heavy English custom duties remained unchanged, the Navigation Act was carried out in the colonies; under the rule of the Dutch king two great financial powers arose, the Bank of England and the new East India Company, which proved ruinous to Dutch trade. In the friendly rivalry between the allied peoples England’s preponderance rapidly became manifest; the name of “sea-power” became a collective noun among diplomats, and soon implied, as Frederick the Great was ill-natured enough to remark, “the English man-of-war with the Dutch jolly boat towing behind” (Heinrich von Treitschke).
(b) The Third War of Aggression by Louis XIV. — The change of rulers in England would not have come to pass so quickly as it did, would perhaps never have been brought about at all, if Louis XIV in September, 1688, just before the landing of William of Orange, had not declared war upon the German Empire, a war generally known as the third war of aggression. He proposed to strike terror into south Germany by delivering a vigorous blow, and to oblige the emperor, whose best generals and troops were perforce employed in the Turkish war, to permit the armistice to be ratified as a definite peace, which would have secured him in the possession of the Reunions. His action was successful from a military point of view. The admirably equipped French armies penetrated into the Palatinate as far as Heilbronn, overran the Württemberg territory, devastated the fertile country on the Rhine, blew up the castle of Heidelberg on the 2d of March, 1689, and by the end of the year collected over two million livres in forced contributions.

But no member of the empire had any intention of being thus bullied into a disgraceful peace. The emperor resolved to undertake the war upon both frontiers simultaneously; his closer allies, Bavaria, Saxony, and Brandenburg, and also Hanover and Hesse, joined the "Concert of Magdeburg," which had been concluded by the armed provinces on the 22d of October, 1688. Moreover, the Regensburg assembly determined to support the imperial war. Twenty thousand Brandenburg troops were speedily before Bonn, which Cardinal Fürstenberg had betrayed to the French; Charles of Lorraine, who commanded the armies of the empire, retook Mayence on the 8th of September, 1689, after eight weeks' fighting, and Bonn fell shortly afterward (13th of October). During the succeeding years the war in Germany made no decisive progress; the further advance of the enemy was repulsed, but nothing more was accomplished. The Margrave Louis William of Baden succeeded Charles, Duke of Lorraine, in the command of the imperial army, after his death (18th April, 1690).

At the seat of war in the Netherlands, Prince George Frederick of Waldeck lost the battle of Fleurus (1st July, 1690), and the French took Mons (April, 1691) and Namur (July, 1692). At the battle of Steenkerke, in Hennegau (3d August, 1692), William of Orange was unable to gain any decisive advantage. On the other hand, at the battle of Staffarda, Catinat won a victory over the Duke of Savoy, Vittorio Amedeo, to whose support Max Emanuel marched across the Alps, but was unable to bring about that change of fortune in upper Italy for which the allies were anxiously longing.

Thus the French armies had the advantage on every side. But on the 29th of May, 1692, at La Hougue (cf. p. 105), their fleet was defeated by the combined English and Dutch navies, under Lord Edward Russell; this was the first of that series of defeats, the almost invariable persistence of which during the next two hundred years seems to prove that the Romance nations are no match for the Germanic in naval warfare. Louis XIV could not flatter himself with the hope of being able totally to overpower the forces opposed to him in the field; he was unable to concentrate his power and to break down the resistance of his enemies at any one point. On the 22d of May, 1693, he laid Heidelberg waste for the second time, and utterly ruined the castle, that wonderful monument of the German Renaissance (see the plate facing p. 292); but this could not be considered a success. The Margrave of Baden drove the devastators back across the Rhine, and
found himself able to renew his plans for establishing himself in Alsace. Moreover, the allies of the Golden Horn did not accomplish as much as Louis had expected; during the years following the departure of Baden from the seat of war in Hungary the imperial troops gained no advantage, but the operations of the Moors were of a slow and dilatory nature.

(c) Ryswyk. — There was nothing to be gained by continuing the war to the point of exhaustion, and a reserve of strength was the more desirable in view of the approaching extinction of the Hapsburg House in Spain. The kingdom of France was prosperous and disturbed by no enemy within, but its resources threatened to decline. The peasants and the petty nobles were groaning under heavy taxation; and the growing want of craftsmen and capital, owing to the emigration of the evangelical citizens, was exercising a disastrous influence upon the domestic economy of the country. As soon as Louis could with any certainty foresee the possibility of dissolving by diplomatic measures the federation of his enemies, without himself making any disproportionate sacrifice, he accepted the intervention of Sweden, which had been repeatedly proffered, and entered upon the negotiations begun at Ryswyk (near Delft, 19th May to 20th September, 1697), from which Spain and the emperor (30th October) were unable to withdraw, after he had secured the consent of the sea-powers. The recognition of the Prince of Orange as King of England was an indispensable preliminary, to which Louis agreed with a heavy heart, after previously assuring himself that there was no possibility of forming a party within the United Kingdom for the later restoration of the Stuarts, in spite of the numerous dissensions among William's supporters. The death of Queen Mary (7th January, 1695) in no way weakened her husband's position — the Whig principle, that the Parliament might bestow the crown outside of the direct line of succession, remained in force. Holland was easily satisfied by the concession of certain commercial privileges. Calculating upon a future understanding, Louis showed himself very accommodating toward Spain, to which Luxemburg and Barcelona, taken during the last stages of the war, were restored. The empire had to bear the cost of the peace. Strassburg, which might have been retaken at the eleventh hour by a rapid assault, had to be abandoned. As a set-off, the Austrian House regained Freiburg and Breisgau, the empire gained Kehl and Philippsburg. The Cologne question was set at rest; the Bavarian prince got his principality; the question as to the Palatinate succession was solved by a moderate payment on the part of the Palatinate Neuburg.

The Catholic Elector of the Palatinate, John William, had introduced a counter-reformation with fanatical zeal into the lands which he had gained by inheritance; it was he who moved the infamous clause in the peace of Ryswyk, that in districts “reunited,” but returned to the empire under the peace, the Catholic religion should remain where it had been introduced by French interference and aggression.

The peace concluded at Ryswyk on the 30th of October, 1697, was but an armistice between France and the House of Hapsburg, which had been struggling for European predominance for two hundred years; the division of the Spanish inheritance, a question which was shortly to demand solution, would bring about a resumption of hostilities all along the line. Louis XIV required time.
and breathing-space in order to arrange the situation to suit his own interests
by means of his unrivalled political insight and diplomatic capacity. The
emperor did not venture, though the peace allowed him to turn the whole of his mili-
tary power against the Turks, to embark upon a wearisome war in the Balkan
States and to make a determined effort to crush his hereditary foe; and yet,
even at that moment, circumstances at the seat of war in Hungary had taken an
unexpectedly favourable turn.

(d) Prince Eugene. — During the years 1695 and 1696 the progress of affairs in
Hungary had been most unsatisfactory. The departure of the Margrave of Baden,
Louis William, had proved almost as disastrous as an actual defeat; his successor,
the Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus I, had been unskilful and unlucky
in every operation which he undertook; the emptiness of the treasury could no
longer be concealed, and the discipline and courage of the troops deteriorated ac-
cordingly. But a rapid and far-reaching change in the state of affairs was brought
about by the nomination (1696) of a commander-in-chief who was only thirty-
three years of age, Prince Francis Eugene of Savoy-Carignan, the youngest son
of Mazarin’s niece, Olympia Marcini, and the Count of Soissons. Since the elec-
tion of the first Rudolf the House of Hapsburg could congratulate itself upon
no more fortunate occurrence, certainly none more opportune or richer in result,
than the fact that the “petit Abbé,” whom Louis XIV with his usual arbitrar-
iness had wished to drive into the cloister, applied to the court of Vienna, fol-
lowing the example of his brother Louis Julius, for a post in the imperial army.
“Who can venture to say,” justly observes Alfred von Arneck, “how the history of
Europe would have been changed if the prince had applied to Spain instead of to
Austria, if he had never fought against the Turks, if he had been, on the side of
Philip of Anjou instead of against him during the War of the Spanish Succession,
if he had fought for instead of against France?” It would be necessary to examine
long periods of military history before we could light upon another leader with so
pronounced a talent for war, conjoined with an equal purity of character, as mod-
est as it was noble, in which personal interests were ever readily subordinated
to the general good. Compared with him Bayard and Trémouille, Lannoy and
Pescara, were but swashbucklers, Wallenstein’s strategy was mere bungling, and
even Gustavus of Sweden and the Great Elector sink into inferiority. There was
but one mind that has affinities with his, and here decision and moral earnestness
were lacking—we refer to Turenne, who may be called the father of the art of
war as practised and perfected by Eugene.

The prince had long enjoyed the full confidence of the imperial veteran troops,
and in a few months had so thoroughly reorganised the army that he was able to
oppose the powerful force with which the Sultan Mustapha II (1695–1703) was
advancing in person during the month of August, 1697, for the delivery of a crushing
blow. On the 11th of September he attacked the Turks at Zenta on the Theiss;
they had been turned back from Peterwardein, and proposed to cross the river and
invade Transylvania. They were so utterly defeated as to be unable to recover
themselves. A large number of their best officers and thirty thousand men were
left on the field of battle or drowned in the Theiss; eighty guns, four hundred and
twenty-three standards, and seven “horse-tails” fell into the hands of the conquerors,
who paid but the moderate price of fifteen hundred dead and wounded for their vic-
HISTORY OF THE WORLD

The Rise of the Great Powers

story. When the larger part of his army had been sent into winter quarters Eugene made his famous incursion to Serajevo with four thousand cavalry, twenty-six hundred infantry, and twelve guns, thus provoking to the Turks that the mountains of the Balkan peninsula, which they had regarded as a sure line of defence against the Western armies, were not inaccessible to Austrian cavalry and even to guns.

In the following year Prince Eugene would gladly have advanced to besiege Belgrade and Temesvár; but the emperor could not afford the cost of the expedition, and seemed inclined to accept the peace proposals offered by the sea-powers. The Porte's strength was now broken; not only Austria, but also Poland, had gained considerable advantages. Moreover Venice under Francesco Morosini (d. 1694) had overrun the whole of the Morea, had taken Athens (when the Parthenon was destroyed on the 26th of September, 1687), and had proved her superiority at sea. After the heroic but unfortunate struggle for Candia (1669) the republic seemed to have lost her dominant position on the Levant, but in 1685 the banner of St. Mark triumphed once more, and the position of Venice as the chief Mediterranean power was vindicated. She would have been quite ready to continue the war, and to reduce the sphere of Turkish power in the Archipelago; but she was sufficiently far-sighted to conform to the resolutions of the continental powers, and not to meet her hereditary foe single-handed. Peace was concluded at Carlowitz on January 26, 1699; Austria obtained the kingdom of Hungary with the exception of the Banat, Transylvania, and Slavonia; Poland was given the Ukraine and Kamenez-Podolak (Kamieniec); Russia obtained the harbour of Asow, and Venice the Morea peninsula, with Ægina and Santa Maura (Lemessus), Cattaro, and some smaller places on the coast of Dalmatia.

Europe seemed to have entered upon a breathing-space for rest and recovery; the duration of which depended upon the life of the last Hapsburg king, which was slowly ebbing away in Madrid.

7. THE END OF SPAIN AS A GREAT POWER. THE BEGINNINGS OF RUSSIA

A. THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

At the outset of the eighteenth century the conception of the State as an entity had not been dissociated from that of the ruling dynasty. National rights were only tentatively brought forward in support of dynastical objects. The surest mode of extending political power remained in the formation of family ties, the creation of hereditary rights, and the enjoyment of them when they fell due. Consequently, upon the extinction of a ruling dynasty of such territorial power as was the Spanish line of the Hapsburgs, a European war was inevitable as being the only way of deciding whether some one European power was to become definitely predominant, or whether the balance of power could be maintained. In the Spanish kingdom women could usually inherit, failing men. In the House of Hapsburg the rights of female succession and of primogeniture were also recognised. The possessions of the Spanish line and also the estates of the Austrian line formed inheritances which had passed undivided to the testator's eldest son or to the male
representative next in succession, so long as any such survived. For the last two
generations the daughters of the Spanish line had intermarried only with Bourbons
and the German Hapsburgs, so that these were the only families affected by the
failure of male heirs. A point in favour of the Bourbon claims was the fact that
the elder Infanta had always married into the French line. Louis XIV's mother,
Anna Maria, was older (born September 22, 1601) than Maria Anna (born 1606),
the mother of the Emperor Leopold. Of the sisters of Charles II, the last of the
Spanish Hapsburgs, the elder, Maria Theresa (born September 10, 1638), was the
wife of Louis; the younger, Margarete Theresa (born July 12, 1651), was the first
of Leopold's three wives. Maria Theresa, however, had solemnly renounced her
right of succession; whereas Margarete Theresa had been specially appointed to
the succession by her father's will, in default of male issue. Consequently at the
court of Vienna there was no doubt whatever that the succession in Spain must
fall to the Emperor Leopold, and that his rights were beyond question. At
the outset of the War of Succession Louis XIV had already found a pretext
for declaring that his wife's renunciation was invalid. In this position he natu-
urally remained firm, declared himself to be the only legitimate successor to
the Spanish throne, and pretended an especial desire to consult the interests of
Europe at large by entering into negotiations for the division of the Spanish
inheritance.

The German House of Hapsburg was at a disadvantage compared with the
policy of the Bourbons, because its efforts to increase its territory rested upon no
national basis and no conception of the State as a whole. The Hapsburgs were
limited to a dynastic policy, and their territorial power had no natural solidarity.
To them the imperial throne of the German kingdom was the summit of their am-
bitious, as it was in fact the most dignified position in the Christian world. But it
was a position which gave no increase of power, and there was no future before it.
The peace of Westphalia had made any union of the several German powers
under a Catholic emperor wholly impossible. No political genius, however power-
ful, could have dreamed of successfully accomplishing the task of imperial reform
with a view to general centralisation. The conception of an Austrian State was
non-existent. Hence neither the ruling dynasty nor the privy council ever
troubled themselves to consider in what direction their territory could and ought
be extended with a view to the gradual formation of a State.

The Hapsburgs had been forced into the practice of a universal policy by the
unexpected reversion to themselves of immense inheritances. They had thus been
unable to devote their attention to the formation of a strong confederacy of the
lands upon the Danube, or to the introduction of a uniform administration through-
out the possessions which had been given into their hands. Their eyes were
invariably fixed upon some possible advantage which might be won upon the out-
skirts of their empire. They frittered away their great resources in fruitless under-
takings, and put off the ordering of their house at home, which would have brought
them wealth and power. The conclusion of the Turkish war, the conquest of
Hungary and Transylvania, had been successfully brought about, and room for
colonial expansion was thus provided for at least a century. The greatest problems
of political economy were awaiting solution; treasures lay ready to hand such as
no other dynasty in Europe possessed. The Balkan territories lay open to the
imperial armies, and never afterward were the conditions so favourable for a
rapid success. The Venetian Republic had recovered its strength, and might have been brought over to alliance; its objects coincided with those of the Hapsburgs in every respect; its growth would have implied no loss, but a great increase of prosperity throughout the inner Austrian domains, for the exchange of products and of labour was necessary, natural, and inevitable. The more harbours the Venetians could have gained upon the coasts of Greece, Macedonia, and Albania, the easier and the more advantageous would have been the realisation of the products of the territories under the Austrian rule. The eastern portion of the Mediterranean might have regained its commercial importance, for, of the thousand threads which had united the Levant to the Adriatic in earlier ages, all had not yet been torn away, and many might have been reunited.

The death of Charles II, the last prince of the blood in possession of Spain, Naples, Milan, the Catholic Netherlands, and "both Indies," was a misfortune for the Hapsburg House, because it again entangled them in the web of European politics, in which they had had but little success since the days of Maximilian and Charles I (V). Moreover, this event averted their attention from very pressing necessities at home, which they would probably have recognised and dealt with had they been allowed the leisure to do so. All these considerations did not affect the Emperor Leopold. He considered the Hapsburg tradition as implying special duties which he must fulfil at all costs. His unshaken confidence in Divine Providence had been increased by his victories over the Infidels. He believed in his rights and in the divine nature of the call which bade him cling to those rights. His determination was in no way influenced by political considerations or practical statecraft. Otherwise it must have dawned upon him that the only successful course open to him was to come to some pacific arrangement with Louis XIV to divide the Spanish inheritance, and to unite with Louis in resisting any foreign interference. Leopold, however, did not take this course, and troubled himself very little about the precautions which other powers were taking in the event of the demise of the crown of Spain.

It had long ago been plain to William of Orange that it would be most conducive to the peace of Europe if neither Bourbon nor Hapsburg should receive so considerable an accession of power, and if the Spanish monarchy could be kept intact and independent. There was, moreover, an heir whose rights could be justified with but little trouble, the Elector Prince Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria, the son of the Elector Max Emanuel's marriage with the Archduchess Maria Antonia, the only daughter of Leopold I and the Infanta Margaret Theresa of Spain. If the female line of succession in the House of Spain was to be maintained, then Joseph Ferdinand was the legal successor of his mother, who had died in 1692. Louis XIV discussed the terms of a compact of division with the Prince of Orange (11th October, 1698) whereby the elector prince was to have Spain, the Catholic Netherlands (Belgium), and the colonies; the French dauphin, Naples and Sicily; the second son of the emperor (Charles), the duchy of Milan, which was in any case a fief of the German crown. But on the 14th November, 1698, Charles II of Spain signed a will wherein he named the elector prince as his successor. Louis then declined to recognise the prince, and waited the course of events, confining himself to putting in a word for the choice of his grandson Philip from among the Spanish grandees.

Once again it would have been highly advantageous for the emperor, who was
supporting the hereditary rights of the elector prince and the testamentary rights of the dying sovereign, to have come to an understanding with Louis XIV on the subject of a division. Such a course of action might have proved extremely profitable, even if they had taken the Elector of Bavaria into their confidence, for he would have been ready to give up Bavaria in return for Belgium. Thus German territory might have been acquired, influence in Germany might have been strengthened, Milan and Naples claimed as a secondary inheritance for the Archduke Charles, and Spain given up to the Bourbons in return. The Austrian House, instead of expending its power in the War of the Spanish Succession, wherein it actually gained a still smaller success, would have been free to take the offensive against the Turks and to plant colonies on the lower Danube and in the north of the Balkans. But before any course of action had been decided upon, or the first step to negotiations with Spain had been taken, the whole position was altered by the sudden death of the Bavarian elector prince, on February 6, 1699, as he was about to take ship from Amsterdam to Spain.

In March, 1700, Louis proceeded to discuss further propositions for division with William of Orange, with the intention of keeping him from union with the emperor. The latter was calculating upon the choice of a Spanish relative, which would have been favourable to his house, of whose recognition by the sea-powers he had no doubt. The Spanish population declined to entertain any proposals for dismembering the kingdom, and for this reason it might have been possible to secure the succession of a German Hapsburg if he had appeared in the kingdom with a force of troops sufficient to offer a vigorous resistance to the invasion of the French army, which was to be expected upon the death of the king. But the Emperor Leopold did not think the expense advisable, and in any case the undertaking would have been difficult. He therefore agreed to Louis's proposal that they should mutually agree not to undertake any military operations in Spain during the king's lifetime. The advantages of this arrangement were entirely upon the side of France, for upon receipt of the news of the king's death she could bring an army to the Ebro in as many days as the emperor would require weeks to land a regiment at any Spanish port. Under these circumstances it was in vain for the dying Hapsburg at Madrid to form the heroic resolve of naming his relative at Vienna as his successor in defiance of his powerful neighbour's desires; for the peace party in his own country, and chief among them Louis Manuel Fernandez Count Porto-Carrero, Archbishop of Toledo, urged upon him that the whole of Spain would be occupied by the French troops long before any German claimant could appear in the field to defend his rights.

Under pressure of these considerations was signed the will of the 3d October, 1700, wherein the hereditary rights of the Infanta Maria Theresa were recognised and her descendants were called to the succession; in the next place was the second son of the dauphin, Philip, Duke of Anjou, and if he should obtain the French throne, his brother Charles of Berry. After the Bourbons the German Hapsburgs were to inherit, and after them the Savoyards, who were descended from a sister of Philip III. The inheritance thus provided for fell vacant on November 1, 1700; on that day Charles II, the last representative of that race which for a century had wielded the greatest power in Europe, sank into his grave.

A fortnight later Louis XIV greeted the Duke of Anjou as Philip V, King of Spain, and gave him immediate possession of all the powers united under that title.
He thought that he now had the game entirely in his own hands, for he knew that neither England nor Holland was inclined to further military undertakings or to great expense. He considered that, if he could succeed in a very short space of time in getting all the Spanish territories into his possession, the sea-powers would have little opportunity of stirring them up against him. As to the emperor’s power, he thought he would not be able to keep in the field the imposing armies which he was able to summon.

B. The Kingdom of Prussia

The Emperor Leopold naturally could not recognize his brother’s will; on the contrary, as head of the kingdom and as representing the rights of his family, he was bound to offer a forcible opposition to the occupation of Spain by the French troops. His eldest son, King Joseph of Rome, with all his dependents at the Vienna court, had long been fully convinced of the necessity for taking some such step; he brought all his influence to bear upon the emperor, urging him to commission Prince Eugene to open the campaign in north Italy with all possible speed. The determination displayed by the German Hapsburgs was due to the consciousness that they could place an important general at the head of troops then marching to attack, but still more to the fact that they had on their side an ally who was ever ready to strike, whose infantry and cavalry squadrons were the admiration of Europe, the Elector of Brandenburg and King of Prussia. Frederick III, the Great Elector’s son and successor, did not possess his father’s moral and intellectual qualities; he was a weak ruler, fond of display, of but scanty political talent; but he added a showy exterior to the edifice which his father had built up, by obtaining a formal recognition of its rank as a second-rate European power. For the moment this action appeared only as an attempt to satisfy personal vanity, but in later times it proved a valuable step on the road to further development. It is a point of some importance that this step was taken at a time when the imperial house had made the greatest sacrifices to the old plans of a universal foreign policy. If Hapsburg had not been on the eve of the decisive struggle with the Bourbon rival, it is certain that consent would never have been given to the foundation of a German kingdom, and without the emperor’s consent such a kingdom would never have obtained recognition.

In another direction there was an attempt to make capital out of the elector’s earnest desires; his electoral colleague, Frederick Augustus I of Saxony, had been elected King of Poland on the 27th of June, 1697, at the price of his evangelical faith (his recantation was made at Baden near Vienna, 1st June, 1697); he would have been glad to see another imitator of his secession, and would have rejoiced if the Brandenburger had requested his advancement to the kingly title from the Pope. For this purpose conversion to Catholicism would have been an indispensable preliminary. The Bishop of Ermland, Andreas Chrysostomus Zaluski, had already arrived at Berlin with a letter from Pope Innocent XII, which unreservedly announced the readiness of the Curia to assent to the bargain. But on this occasion the Elector Frederick showed that he was made of sterner stuff than his usual manner of life appeared to indicate; not for a moment did he entertain any thought of changing his religion, but he allowed the Poles to speculate upon the possibility of such change so long as he thought their opposition might hinder the advancement of Prussia. He saw that as evangelical champion he would give his house a
more assured position while placing his own loyalty to principle in contrast with the facile conduct of the King of Poland.

Frederick had also recognised correctly that he could not ask the crown he desired from the hand of France; not dependence, but independence, was to be the meaning of this crown; it was to oblige the sovereigns of Europe to treat with him as with an equal. The new Prussian kingdom was to rise from the Holy Roman Empire not as its enemy, but as a new expression of the power which was yet dormant in that antiquated organism. For that reason the emperor's consent was the most important preliminary, and was a guarantee of recognition on the part of other powers who would naturally adopt the emperor's attitude. The change might have been brought to pass by wholly different means in the confusion of the approaching wars. Brandenburg might have seized some suitable piece of territory and have been able to adopt the title of kingdom—a method of acting characteristic of the Great Elector. Frederick's was the sure and certain way, and the one proportioned to his capacities. It cost some sacrifice; but this was comparatively small when compared with the benefits which straightforward resulted. On the 24th of July, 1700, the emperor's privy council had practically given its assent to the negotiations upon this matter; on the 16th November the affair was concluded. Brandenburg renounced any obligation of feudal dependency to the emperor as his "creation," in return for the imperial promise to greet the king after every coronation, he undertook to serve the emperor in the war for those parts of the Spanish inheritance situate within the limits of the empire (tacitly including the duchy of Milan), with eight thousand men, for whose maintenance nothing should be paid in time of peace and 100,000 thalers in time of war. The elector further promised to renounce all claim to arrears of subsidy due from Austria, and to transfer from his successors to the Roman emperor the electoral power of an archduke. On the other hand, the emperor promised the new king the inheritance of Orange after William's death.

On the 18th of January, 1701, Frederick and his wife ascended the kingly throne in Königsberg, and the duchy of Prussia, which had been acquitted of all feudal obligations since the compacts of Labiau and Wehlau, was thus raised to the status of a kingdom. The Elector of Brandenburg became King of Prussia, even as the Elector of Saxony became King of Poland, as the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein became King of Denmark, and the Elector of Hanover, a decade later, became King of England. The form of personal union and the constitutional relations of the empire to these independent monarchies was the same in all of these cases; but the actual course of events produced many practical differences. Only the Elector of Brandenburg had become a German king; his royal residence was Berlin, and not Königsberg.

C. THE NORTHERN WAR

The help of Brandenburg-Prussia was all the more important to the emperor, as the Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, who was closely united to him, was now unable to fulfil his promises in the event of a war with France. He was the disturbing cause of a war for the possession of the Baltic territories, which occupied the attention of Europe for a full decade simultaneously with the War for the Spanish Succession—the second or great Northern war (1700–1718). Once again in this struggle the Swedish military success flared up like some brilliant firework. At one time it might have been thought that under a new hero-king the Gothic
peoples were to regain the high prestige which Gustavus II Adolphus and Charles X Gustavus had won for them.

But fate decided otherwise; in Sweden's stead a new great power arose in eastern Europe, a Slav kingdom under the guidance of the Russians, the neighbours of the Poles (cf. Vol. V), a people gifted with admirable political capacities. Having no suspicion of their historical destiny, the Russians, through the agency of a wise prince, were raised in the course of but one generation to a position which enabled them to participate in the constitutional progress which central and western Europe had gradually achieved, and to create a vigorous constitutional organisation for themselves. It is true that, even to the present day, their State is based on the will of the Czar; the limited capacity of the Slavs for constitutional progress is obvious in the case of the mightiest kingdoms of Slavonic nationality. Take away the personality of Peter the Great, and who can conceive the transition from unimportant Muscovy to the Russian Empire? Who can separate the fate of the monarchy which he created from the actions of his successors? Palace revolutions, revolts, military conspiracies, assassinations — these have been the deeds of special parties in particular cases; they were in no case the expression of national will. The progress of an administration, which could have advanced but very slowly during two centuries if it had not served to strengthen dynastical power, has invariably consisted of borrowings from foreign constitutions. It was foreigners who were Peter's teachers and demonstrators; in foreign countries he acquired the ideas upon which he constructed his State; the mingling of Romanow blood with that of Holstein-Oldenburg and Askanien-Thuringen preserved the ruling house from a relapse into the Muscovite character of a Fedor, Ivan, Alexei, etc., and gave it a European stamp. It was its princes that have made Russia the European power in which the Slav nations have become great and strong. The useful qualities of the Russians have been their capacity for subordination, their obedience, and their invincible confidence in the Czar as God's vicegerent upon earth. These characteristics have made them superior to the Poles; by these they have been made equal to their great share in the world's history, which the Czar, Peter I, recognised as theirs, and took upon himself and laid upon his successors.

The immediate result of this recognition, which was matured during Peter's travels in western Europe, was his share in the attack directed against Sweden by Frederick Augustus of Saxony-Poland, which gave him the opportunity of gaining a seaboard on the Baltic. In spite of his victory at Asow in 1696, which his conquest of the Crimea would have enabled him to turn to account by employing means similar to those with which he had to fight the Swedes, he was ready to conclude peace with the Porte (July 2, 1700) in order to have a free hand for his undertakings on the North; for he was well aware that connection with the East was of no use to him, but that the opening up of communication with the West would secure the stability of his internal reforms, and advance the entry of Russia into the ranks of the European powers. The impetuous youth upon the Swedish throne, after overthrowing Denmark (the peace of Trondelag, August 18, 1700), attacked forty thousand Russians on the Narva with eight thousand men on the 30th of November, 1700, and beat them utterly; but Peter was not to be turned from the prosecution of his designs. This defeat taught him the absolute necessity of completing his military organisation, and he understood very well that "his inexperienced youths were bound to yield before an army so
old, so experienced and well equipped." The ridicule of Europe at the Muscovite incompetence, of which the most incredible reports emanated from Sweden, was of no long duration. The Czar was able to reorganise his military administration, to found cannons out of church bells, to devise new sources of income, and in a short time was able to take the offensive again. Meanwhile Charles XII interfered in the affairs of Poland, marshed his army up and down the Vistula valley, and by his partisanship of Stanislaus Leszczynski as opposition king (1704), accentuated the party divisions among the Polish nobility, in which the kingdom expended the remainder of its strength.

**D. THE GREAT ALLIANCE**

These Northern complications considerably increased the emperor's difficulties in obtaining a force of troops from his German allies sufficient in number to protect the Rhine boundary; they did not, however, prevent him from making an appeal to arms to secure his rights. His decision to send an army into upper Italy under the command of Prince Eugene, for the reconquest of the Duchy of Milan, which had now been taken over by the French, was one of the best-advised moves which Leopold I ever made in the course of his long reign. Eugene's success greatly increased the prestige of the House of Austria, and contributed to encourage those States which were hesitating whether to take any part in the struggle or to allow the Spanish kingdom to pass without opposition to Louis XIV's grandson. A general feeling of astonishment was created by the information that Eugene had taken over the army under Marshal Nicolas Catinot, which was waiting in readiness in the fortresses on the Isonzo, that he had arrived in Venetian territory by détours through almost impassable Alpine tracks, and that his attack upon the enemy's flank (battle of Carpi, July 9, 1701) had obliged the French to retreat behind the Oglio. The imperial field-marshal then waited the counter attack of François de Neufville, Duke of Villeroi, at Chiari (1st of September), and inflicted considerable loss upon the French. Then the open and the secret enemies of France rejoiced aloud, and began to consider the possibility of forming a new confederacy against the king, who was striving to become the master of Europe.

Even so, it is doubtful if the sea-powers would have made any advances to the emperor, if Louis had not himself betrayed the danger which threatened them, by taking several imprudent steps, before firmly securing his own advantages.

The Prince of Orange, William III, did not venture to advise the English Parliament to break with France; he knew how important their Spanish trade was to the English merchants and shipowners, and the heavy losses which would be caused if that trade should be interrupted by war. He therefore treated the emperor's proposals with great reserve, and consoled his ambassadors with hints at future possibilities, which might bring about a complete change in the pacific attitude of England and the States-General. He was obliged to exercise additional care, because it would become necessary before long to settle the question of the succession in England, and a breach between the Parliament and the Crown might easily have thwarted William's plans. The death of the last child of his sister-in-law, Anna, who had married Prince George of Denmark, precluded the possibility of securing the succession to the Protestant descendants of Charles I; the restoration of James II, or of his son James III, was within the bounds of possibility, unless
both parties in the English Parliament should enact in favour of the succession of the House of Hanover, that is, in favour of Sophia of the Palatinate, granddaughter of James I, who had married the Elector Ernest Augustus (d. 1698).

The experienced politician's prudence was justified by the event. Louis XIV was by no means anxious for the outbreak of a general conflict, and thought that Holland, which delayed to recognise the position of Philip of Anjou, might be tempted into neutrality, and restrained from any thoughts of hostility which she might have entertained. In February, 1701, he ordered Marshal Louis François de Boufflers to cross the frontier of the Spanish Netherlands, and to demand the surrender of those fortresses in which Dutch garrisons were stationed, in accordance with the terms of a "barrière tractate" with Spain. Max Emanuel of Bavaria, who ruled in Brussels as Spanish stadtholder, had already ordered the commandants to hand over the fortresses to France, and in the result twenty-three Dutch battalions became French prisoners. The States-General were now obliged to recognise Philip whether they would or no, in order to stave off the further advance of the French, against whom they were entirely defenceless for the moment; but their suspicions had been aroused to the highest pitch, and of this fact they made no concealment to the English Parliament. The Parliament determined to send an ambassador to the negotiations which had been opened at the Hague to discuss the conditions necessary to the maintenance of peace. Louis XIV struggled to prevent the protraction of the negotiations which was thereby involved, but at length gave in, whereupon the States and England went a step further, and demanded power to co-opt an ambassador from the emperor. The danger which France now had to face was, lest the execution of the will of Charles II of Spain should be placed in the hands of a European congress.

While the progress of diplomacy between the House of Bourbon and the sea-powers was thus opportunely coming to a head, public opinion in England was gradually swinging to the opposite extreme. The Tories were afraid of losing their influence if they attempted to stem the stream; they therefore withdrew their opposition to the Hanoverian succession. They even took the lead in the discussion of the foreign policy of the country, and passed a declaration in the House of Commons to the king, to the effect that "they were ready to support the king in forming an alliance with the emperor, for the maintenance of the freedom of Europe, and of the peace and prosperity of England, and with the object of curtailing the excessive power of France."

The news from Italy, and the prospect that England would take a vigorous share in the coming war, produced an immediate effect in Holland. William of Orange arrived in his native land in September, 1701, and concluded the Great Alliance, which declared itself unable to acquiesce in the French prince's possession of the Spanish monarchy. To the emperor was guaranteed at least the possession of the Catholic Netherlands, Milan, Naples, and Sicily, as well as the Spanish islands in the Mediterranean. On their side the sea-powers claimed the right to annex such portions of the Spanish West Indian colonies as were most suitable for their commerce and carrying trade. Spain and France were never to be united, and in no case was the King of France to be ruler also of Spain. Until these conditions were guaranteed, no power was to enter upon negotiations for peace upon its own initiative. It remained open to the Archduke Charles, to whom the kingdom had been devised by his father, to secure possession of it, if he could; but the allies were not
bound to support him in his attempts. However, they placed their fleet at his disposal.

The formation of this alliance did not absolutely preclude the possibility of a peaceful solution; if Louis XIV had recognised the critical nature of the situation, and had agreed to the division of possessions which were in any case too extensive to be of use to himself, an equal partition might undoubtedly have been agreed upon. But his political programme was of far too ambitious a character to admit of any demands for the placing of reasonable limits to the French power. The compact that was concluded on the 9th of March, 1701, with Maximilian Emanuel II of Bavaria, whose brother Clemens of Cologne was already dependent upon him, might easily have deceived him with regard to the situation in Germany, and have stipulated the hopes which he entertained of the emperor. Instead of making overtures to the sea-powers, and requesting their mediation with the emperor with a view to settlement, he made the breach with England irreparable by recognising as king the thirteen-year-old James (III) upon the death of his father James II on the 17th of September, 1701; at the same time, he provoked the emperor to the bitterest resistance by giving permission to Philip to assume the title of Count of Hapsburg and Duke of Austria.

William of Orange survived this change in the relations of the European powers only a few months; he died on the 19th of March, 1702, as the result of a fall from his horse, after receiving the news of the capture of Cremona and the capture of Marshal Villeroi (February 1, 1702), a very discouraging event for the French. His great achievement, the alliance against Louis XIV, remained unimpaired. His sister-in-law, Anne, was bound to support it, because her position as ruler was founded upon the general opposition to her relatives who were maintained by France. John Churchill, Earl of Marlborough, the husband of her friend Sarah Jennings, was anxious for a war which promised him wealth and fame, and therefore busied himself in gaining the strong support of the English Parliament, and also in maintaining the policy of the Prince of Orange in the States, where he found an enthusiastic dependent and a loyal supporter of William's actions in the council pensionary, Anthony Heinsius.

Louis XIV's hopes with regard to the German Empire remained unfulfilled. The two Wittelsbachs found no party. The associated armed districts of the empire had certainly fallen into the Bavarian trap, and had concluded an agreement of neutrality with him. But they perceived in due time that they were then entirely without defence against the protector of Max Emanuel, and so rejoined the emperor, on whose behalf the Margrave Louis William of Baden undertook the defence of the Rhine. Hanover and Lüneburg placed 6,000 men at the disposal of the States-General, and 10,000 men at England's service in return for the necessary payments. The King of Prussia gave the sea-powers 6,000 men, besides the auxiliary troops which he was pledged to furnish to the emperor.

In the spring of 1702 the war began upon the Rhine and in the Netherlands. At the same time Max Emanuel openly declared for France, overpowered the imperial town of Ulm, and got possession of Regensburg. His task was to maintain his position on the Danube until a French army could advance through the Schwarzwald and unite with him. Then it was proposed to march upon Vienna. However, it was not until May 12, 1703, that the Bavarian army, in the pay of France, succeeded in joining the Marshal Claude Louis Hector, Duc de Villars,
and even then the leaders did not feel themselves strong enough to march upon Vienna until they were secured against the possibility of a diversion from the Tyrol. Max Emanuel also had a subsidiary plan. He desired to get possession of the land which seemed well suited for his retirement in the event of peace negotiations, or even for exchange against Naples or Belgium. He therefore pressed on to unite with the Duke of Vendôme, Louis Joseph, who was operating in northern Italy. Prince Eugene had been so feebly supported from Vienna that he had only been able to prevent the duke from advancing further north at the bloody battle of Luzara (August 15, 1702), and could not inflict a decisive defeat upon him. The Bavarians got possession of the upper and lower Inn valley, took Innsbruck, and pressed on across the Brenner Pass. Then the Tyrolese brought their militia against them, which they had kept on foot since the Landlibell of 1511, and drove them back to the Brenner after defeating them at Landeck. The elector's attempt was a complete failure, for Vendôme did not press his advance upon the Etsch with sufficient vigour. Louis of Baden had been in position for the Danube for a long time, confronting the French army under Villars with a superior force, and if he had grasped the situation and made the best use of his advantage, Max Emanuel, whose strength had already been broken, would have been in a critical position, and have been forced to make a separate peace with the emperor. However, he and Villars very cleverly extricated themselves from their perilous situation, and on September 20, 1703, they even won a victory at Höchstädt over the imperial troops under the Austrian Count Hermann Otto Stryrum.

The emperor's cause was in a bad way, mainly through lack of money for the pay and equipment of the troops. Prince Eugene was, it is true, summoned to court to preside over the council of war; but his most zealous attempts to make the necessary provision for the armies remained without result from the time that it became necessary to carry on war in Hungary. Leopold's domestic policy of religious intolerance now brought forth its fruit. Religious toleration should have been granted to the kingdom upon its reconquest, and after the hereditary rights of the Hapsburgs had been recognised in the Presburg Reichstag of 1687 a modicum of self-government should have been granted to the country. Instead of spending time upon religious uniformity, the administration should have encouraged colonisation, have built roads and ships, settled German peasants and artisans in the country, supported the Saxons and the Zipfer, and furthered their material interests. Had this been done, the yearning for the old state of things under Turkish administration would not have been hot enough to serve the ambitious plans of the Bethlen and Rákóczi, who were now able to satisfy their desire for insurrection with French money. Government business in Hungary was carried on principally through the "army Jew" Oppenheimer, with such careless and unsound methods that the credit of the Austrian House was absolutely rotten. The pledging of the crown jewels often produced insufficient amounts to cover the expenses of the most necessary diplomatic missions. Any regular payment of troops, any proper commissariat, or recruiting to supply the losses of regiments in the field, was entirely out of the question.

The commander of the Italian army, Count Guido Starhemberg, was so poorly supported from Vienna as to fall into the delusion that his previous commander had purposely and out of jealousy left him in the most difficult circumstances in
the face of an enemy of overpowering strength. However, he provided plenty of occupation for his opponent, who had undertaken to join Max Emanuel at Trient, a movement which proved unsuccessful; and at the outset of the year 1704 he began his famous flanking march along the right bank of the Po, crossing the Apennines and the mountainous country of Montserrat to Turin, where he joined Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, who had gone over to the emperor's side. From this time forward there were two separate seats of war in northern Italy,—one at Mincio, Lake Garda, and in the Brescian Alps; the other on the upper Po, around Chivasso and Crescentino.

Dom Pedro II of Portugal had also joined the Great Alliance. At his request an Anglo-Dutch fleet conveyed to Lisbon the Archduke Charles, in whose favour the emperor had resigned his rights of succession to the Spanish monarchy. Though there were not resources sufficient for a vigorous campaign into the Spanish peninsula, yet an important part of the French army was there held in check. Marshal René de Foulai, Count of Tessa, began a siege (1705) of the rock fortress of Gibraltar, which cost him nearly ten thousand men. The fortress had been seized by the imperial lieutenant field-marshal Prince George of Hesse Darmstadt on August 3, 1704, on behalf of Charles.

E. PRINCE EUGENE AND MARLBOROUGH

Louis XIV still had before him the prospect that the war would turn entirely in his favour, if Max Emanuel with his Bavarian-French army could penetrate to Vienna and seize the imperial capital. He had already obliged Passau to surrender (beginning of 1704), and was advancing toward Linz. The positions of the several contending at that time form a truly remarkable picture, and the surprising union between these army corps thus scattered about with no apparent connection is one of the most interesting features in the history of this war. They were placed as follows: Max Emanuel in Upper Austria, with 16,000 men; Marshal Marsin, with 20,000 to 22,000 French, in Augsburg, between Iller and Lech, to which must be added some 10,000 Bavarians as garrison troops in Munich, Ingolstadt, Ulm, and many smaller places. Opposed to these were about 10,000 Austrians in Upper Austria and on the Tyrol frontier, and an imperial army under Field-Marshal Thüngen and the Dutch General von Goor, in the Bodensee district, with Bregenz as their headquarters; their strength was 21,000 men, but the departure of 9,000 electorate Saxons brought them down to 12,000. In Franconia was an imperial army under the Margrave of Brandenburg-Bayreuth, Christian Ernst (imperial regiments, Frankish troops and Prussians under Leopold of Dessau, not more than 14,000 men altogether). Marsin's troops were in poor condition, and greatly in want of recruits to complete their strength. To get these up was the task of Marshal Camille, Count of Tallart, who was on the Upper Rhine with 30,000 men. In the Moselle district were 14,000 French under François de Franquetot, Duc de Coigny. Against him and Tallart, the Margrave Louis William of Baden, whose headquarters were at Aschaffenburg, could oppose 30,000 men, consisting of troops from the emperor and the empire, and from Hesse-Darmstadt and Lützelburg in Dutch pay. He held the so-called Stollhofen line in the Rhine plains, opposite Strassburg and the Schwarzwald passes. In the Netherlands the English-Dutch army, under the command of Marlborough, had been
standing for a year in almost complete inaction, confronted by the French under Boufflers and Villeroi. The Dutch commissaries, who interfered in all military affairs as soon as a single company paid by them had taken the field, placed insuperable obstacles in the way of any comprehensive plan of campaign. They were accustomed to wage war on the principles of commercial calculation. They were but feeble, nervous merchants opposed to any undertaking requiring purpose; and so, whenever an attack was proposed, they hesitated and discussed until the advantage had slipped through their fingers.

Under these circumstances, it became plain that the respective superiority of the combatants must be decided upon the Danube. Perhaps the most striking proof of Marlborough's strategical powers is the fact that he recognised this necessity, and at once determined to act upon it. As in all great events, personal ambition here also exercised a most fortunate influence, for this it was which drove John Churchill to seek a sphere for his military energies in which success and honours were to be won. To the States-General he left their own troops and no inconsiderable portion of the auxiliaries hired by England to carry on some unimportant sieges and covering movements in the Netherlands, while he himself marched into Germany with twenty thousand English troops.

The imperial court also recognised that Austria must be protected on the Rhine and in the Schwarzwald, and sent Prince Eugene into the empire. He undertook to cover the Upper Rhine, while Louis William, the Margrave of Baden, claimed the personal command of the imperial army which was operating against Max Emanuel and Marsin. The Elector Max retired from Upper Austria to the Lech, on hearing that the Schwarzwald passes were more strongly held and that the army was advancing from Franconia toward the Danube. He was afraid, and with reason, that his junction with Tallart might prove impossible of execution, and saw himself already in a desperate position. If the timid margrave had been in the least degree competent to perform his duties, the elector would most probably have been taken prisoner before the arrival of the French reinforcements which were marching in the direction of Freiburg and had already reached Villingen. On the 20th of May he took over reinforcements from Tallart to the number of ten thousand men, with a long train of supplies, guns, uniforms, and 1,300,000 livres. Tallart then returned to the Rhine. However, thanks to the Margrave of Baden's disinclination to fight, the Franco-Bavarian army escaped from its dangerous position at Stockach, and proceeded to fall back upon Ulm (June 1, 1704).

Shortly afterward, Marlborough's troops passed through Swabia without molestation, joined hands with the margrave's main army, and a plan of campaign became possible. Prince Eugene also took part in the deliberations, and agreed with Marlborough as to the necessity of attacking Max Emanuel, while their forces were still superior to his. Marlborough and the margrave held the command upon alternate days. On the 2d of July Marlborough gave battle with the united Anglo-German army on the Schellenberg at Donauwörth, and in spite of heavy losses (among them Field-Marshal Styrum and General Goor) won a victory over the Franco-Bavarians, who were forced to retire across the Danube and to concentrate upon Augsburg.

The elector's hopes of victory were now dashed to the ground; he showed an inclination to listen to the emperor's proposals for peace. Marsin was greatly annoyed at this, and was forced to throw all kinds of obstacles in the way to prevent
him from negotiating with a view to throwing up the cause of Louis XIV. Tallart and Villeroi were opposing Prince Eugene on the Rhine with three times his strength, but did not venture to attack their dreaded adversary. Tallart, at the call of Marisn, now marched through the Schwarzwald to the help of the elector with twenty-five thousand men and forty-five guns. As soon as Prince Eugene learned this, he collected all the troops which could by any possibility be spared from the defence of the Stollhofer lines, and made his way to that point where the fortunes of the great alliance were to be decided,—to the Danube. He made a secret agreement with Marlborough, that the Margrave of Baden, who was nothing but a hindrance to their operations, should be left behind to carry on the siege of Ingolstadt, while the two generals confronted the enemy in the open field; meanwhile Marisn had induced Maximilian Emanuel to march with him from Augsburg in a northwesterly direction to the Danube, and to cross to the left bank of the river. There they joined hands with Tallart's troops. Marlborough had been covering the retirement of the imperial army at Rain, and now hastened through Donauwörth to the support of the prince, who had been for some days in a very dangerous position, as he was liable to be driven out of his post upon the Kesselbach by the Franco-Bavarians, who were vastly superior in numbers. The careful Frenchmen were anxious to await the arrival of the Bavarian reinforcements, for they thought it highly dangerous to weaken their own forces before the arrival of this accession of strength; however, the Bavarians did not arrive at the proper time.

When Marlborough's squadrons appeared on the Kesselbach, the positions of the respective parties for the battle of Höchstädt were already determined. On the morning of the 13th of August, 1704, the allies advanced: Prince Eugene, with eighteen battalions and seventy-eight squadrons (9,000 infantry, 3,360 cavalry), undertook to make a march on the right wing for the purpose of delivering a flank attack, and at three o'clock in the afternoon advanced upon the position of Maximilian Emanuel and Marisn at Lutzingen. The former had five battalions and twenty-three squadrons under his command, while Marisn had thirty-seven battalions and sixty squadrons. Tallart had thirty-six battalions, forty-four mounted squadrons and sixteen on foot, with which to meet Marlborough, who commanded forty-six battalions, twenty-three thousand men and eighty-three squadrons, with ten thousand five hundred and sixty cavalry. The allied forces, as a whole, numbered fifty-seven thousand men with fifty-two guns, against fifty-six thousand French and Bavarians with ninety guns. The brilliant victory gained by the allies was due to the complete agreement of the two commanders as to the general idea of the battle and the accurate execution of the movements proposed. Marlborough was twice repulsed by Tallart, but was able to rally for a third onset, while Eugene held the enemy's left wing so firmly, that Marisn dared not send a single battalion to Tallart's support. The battle was finally decided by the "indescribable valour" with which the ten Prussian battalions under Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau stormed the position of Lutzingen, after the imperial cavalry had already retreated before the Franco-Bavarian horse. Max Emanuel and Prince Eugene fought in the hottest part of the attacks. Tallart did not understand how to make the best use of his superiority in infantry; the greater part of them he placed in Blenheim to defend the place, and kept only nine battalions and twelve hundred dismounted cavalry for use in the open field. Marlborough made the utmost use of his masses of cavalry; one hundred and nine squadrons were employed in the tremendous charge.
EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING PICTURE

The picture, which was painted and engraved by Jean Huchtenburg at the Hague, gives a view of that part of the battlefield where the day was decided, the left bank of the Danube between Blindheim (Blenheim) and Höchstädt. At the extreme side, on the left of the Danube, is seen Blenheim in flames, and Marlborough attacking it with his 100 squadrons. The French are fleeing along the Danube towards Höchstädt through Sonderheim, where Marshal Tallard was taken prisoner. In the tumult in the foreground is seen Prince Eugen a little to the right, pointing with unsheathed sword, to direct the attack upon Ober-Glauheim (in the middle of the picture); these masses of troops represent the right wing of the allies on the heights of Lutzen, whence a wide view is to be obtained over the plain of the Danube, admirably depicted by the artist.
THE BATTLE OF

After Du Mont, Baron de Careskron: Oorlogskundige Beschrywing van de Veldslagen en Belegge
en Prins van Oranje- en Nass
STADT, AUGUST 13, 1704

en der drie doorluchtige Krygseversten Prins Eugenius van Savoye, Prins en Hertog van Marlborough

Christiaan; In's Gravenhaage 1729.)
at Oberglaueheim in the centre of the line of battle between Lutzingen and Blenheim (see the plate opposite, "The Battle of Höchstädt on the 13th of August, 1704"). Tallart was driven back in such haste by this charge that he had no time to withdraw his infantry from Blenheim. As he was making his way to this threatened point he was taken prisoner by the dragoons of Hesse. The same fate befell the infantry whom he had been hoping to save. At nine o'clock in the evening the allies were masters of the field; they had lost 12,600 men, a quarter of the forces with which they had marched out to battle. The Elector Max and Marsin retreated with half of the Franco-Bavarian forces, having lost 17,000 dead and wounded, and 11,000 prisoners (among whom were 1,500 officers).

The battle of Höchstädt marks the beginning of modern warfare, which seeks to decide the contest by destroying the adversary on the battlefield, and not by merely winning the ground or capturing fortresses. The strategical principles which Prince Eugene was the first to put into practice were further developed by Frederick the Great and Greisenau, and brought to perfection by Moltke. However, at that time the art of following up a success was not understood. A vigorous pursuit, of which the numerous German cavalry would have been quite capable, would have completed the destruction of the French army before Villeroi could have come to their assistance. But it was contrary to the custom of war to refuse the troops a pause for rest at the conclusion of a great action; moreover, it was thought that the objects of the war might be obtained by diplomacy and continued negotiation with Bavaria. These hopes were not fulfilled. The remnant of Marsin and Tallart's army, together with some thousands of Bavarians sent by Villeroi, reached the left bank of the Rhine and went into winter quarters on the Moselle and in Alsace. Max Emanuel resumed his post as stadholder in Brussels, while his troops kept up a guerilla warfare in their native land with the Austrians, until Prince Eugene occupied Bavaria in the emperor's name, brought about the disbandment of the electoral battalions, and came to an agreement with the Electress Therese, who had remained in Munich, whereby she was assured a maintenance, but deprived of all influence upon the government of the country. However, the extortions of the Austrian administration and the conscription of recruits excited a revolt of the peasants in the following year, which was only repressed on Christmas day by the battle of the Sendling Gate.

On the 5th of May, 1705, Leopold died, and Joseph I ascended the throne without hindrance. The Great Alliance was now able to take the offensive, but the war made no great progress during this year (the French lines in the Netherlands were stormed by Marlborough on the 18th of July; on the 16th of August Prince Eugene fought an indecisive battle with Vendôme at Cassano). It was not until the year 1706 that Marlborough's victory over Villeroi at Ramillies in Brabant (23d May) made the occupation of the Spanish Netherlands possible. The corresponding victory of Turin (7th September), where Leopold's Prussians again displayed their admirable military capacities under Eugene's leadership, drove the French out of the north of Italy. On the 27th of June, 1706, Madrid was won for Charles III by an English-Portuguese army under Henri, Marquis de Ruvigny (Lord Galway), and the Marquez Las Minas, but was soon afterward retaken. Valencia now became the seat of the Hapsburgs, until the defeat of Almansa, which Lord Galway suffered on the 25th of April, 1707, at the hands of the French marshal (natural son of James II), James Fitzjames, Duke of Berwick. The southern provinces then fall into the hands of Philip V.
Louis XIV attempted a change of policy by entering into an alliance with Charles XII of Sweden, who had advanced upon Saxony from Poland in 1706, and obliged the Elector Frederic Augustus I to renounce his claims to Poland at Altranstädt on the 24th of September, 1706. This was a serious matter for the allies, because the Swedes had made demands upon the emperor, with which he was not likely to comply, and an adventurous spirit such as Charles might very well have initiated a Swedish attack upon the imperial territory. Had Charles possessed the smallest capacity for diplomacy, the embarrassments of France would have provided him with a splendid opportunity for its exercise. But his action was inspired by the humour in which he happened to be, not by fixed principles; his military success was a surprise for the moment, but it did not contribute to establish the Swedish power, the importance of which was almost everywhere overestimated. Thanks to the personal intervention of Marlborough, Charles was induced to throw in his lot with the allies in April, 1707. His quarrel with the emperor was not successfully patched up until August 30, 1707, when the emperor was led to make certain concessions in favour of the Silesian Protestants. During his stay in Saxony Charles XII had collected an army of forty thousand men and nearly one hundred thousand horse, and with this force he might have imposed any terms upon Germany as the ally of Louis; for the empire had no army capable of resisting him at its disposal. When this army again marched eastward, in September, 1707, it was felt that the terrible suspense of the situation had been relieved. It was marching to its downfall. Charles was persuaded by the revolted Cossack hetman, Ivan Stephanovitch Mazeppa, to make an incursion into the Ukraine, instead of first reconquering the Balkan districts which the Russians had occupied. The battle of Poltawa, on the 8th of July, 1709, resulted in the annihilation of the Swedish army, forced the king to take flight into Turkish territory, and secured Peter the Great in the possession of Ingria (Saint-Petersburg), and so gave him the foundations for his future position as a European power.

F. THE LAST YEAR OF THE WAR AND THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

(a) Oudenarde and Malplaquet: the Concert of the Hague.—It was only at the cost of the greatest efforts that Louis XIV could provide means for the continuation of the war. The defeats of Oudenarde (July 11, 1708: the victory of Prince Eugene and Marlborough over the Duke of Burgundy and Vendôme) and of Malplaquet (September 11, 1709: the victory of the allies over Villars) obliged him to open negotiations for peace, wherein he showed himself disposed to renounce his claims upon Spain, if Philip were to be compensated with Naples. The Hague conference arrogantly demanded guarantees on the part of Philip of Anjou for the evacuation of Spain by the French troops. Louis never proved himself better capable of representing the interests of his people than when he rejected this proposal, and determined to continue the war, relying upon the devotion and the nobility of the French. France was no longer to be feared. In Spain, also, her influence was gone. The national party clung to Philip of Anjou, because he consulted their interests in declaring for the independence of the monarchy. All the advantages which the sea-powers demanded for their trade might have been conceded forthwith. There was no reason why Europe should put herself to further loss on account of the kingdom of Charles III; on the contrary, the ground had
been cleared for a peaceful settlement, which might have led to a universal pacification. But one obstacle to this was the "barrière tractate" (cf. above) which the States-General had concluded with England, October 29, 1709, without informing the other members of the alliance of the agreement. By this convention the States were to receive a number of fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands, together with Liège, Bonn, and Guelders. Thus the division of the Spanish inheritance was affected before the heirs had come to any agreement. As soon as Louis learned this fact, he perceived that the Alliance must split asunder. His new peace proposals were offered merely with the object of initiating negotiation; when once the negotiations had been got under way, he felt confident that the relations of the powers would change in his favour.

This change began in the course of the year 1710, owing to the fall of Marlborough's party in England, and the fact that the Tories gained nearly a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections. Queen Anne had broken with the proud Duchess Sarah and assured the allies of the continuance of her support; but she was anxious to see the conclusion of peace, in order that Marlborough might be removed from his position as commander on the justifiable plea that there was no further need for his services. Affairs in Spain had taken a course which entirely precluded any prospect of Philip's removal. Vendôme, who had taken up the command of his army, was more than a match for any forces which Charles had at his disposal. He had forced Charles to evacuate Madrid which he had occupied (cf. above), and on December 10, 1710, at Villaviciosa, he had defeated the Austrians under the "gran capitán" Guido Starhemberg. Charles was driven back upon Barcelona and some fortresses on the shores of Catalonia. It was not to be supposed that he would ever succeed in getting possession of the kingdom. If, therefore, Philip was left in possession of the country of which he was, in any case, virtual master, favourable conditions in other respects might be expected from France.

(b) The Death of the Emperor Joseph and the Withdrawal of England.—The road to peace was thus cleared when the Emperor Joseph I died (April 17, 1711), leaving no son, so that the Hapsburg claimant to the Spanish throne became heir to the inheritance of the German line and to the imperial crown. This entirely unexpected event — the emperor died of smallpox — sealed the fate of the Great Alliance.

The ministers in charge of English foreign policy, Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, and Lord Raby-Strafford, immediately entered into secret negotiations with Louis XIV, without giving the queen full information as to their intentions. They deceived the emperor's ambassadors and the States-General by a pretended attitude of firm adherence to existing compacts and to the peace proposals of 1709. But they would guarantee no subsidies, and supported no plan of military operations. Prince Eugene himself paid a rapid visit to London to urge the continuance of the war, but was coldly dismissed. The Duke of Marlborough, who could do as he pleased with the army, might have put an end to a situation intolerable to himself had he determined on his own responsibility, in conjunction with Eugene, to invade France, which was now quite defenceless. A special agreement with France on October 8, 1711, made England's withdrawal an accomplished fact. All that was required of Louis was a solemn declaration that Philip of
Anjou renounced his claim to the French throne, and some general promises with regard to the indemnity payable to the combatants. When England invited the States to consider negotiations for peace, the latter did not venture to shake off the Tory yoke and to take up the ideals of the great Prince of Orange. The troops of all the allied princes, the Prussians, Hanoverians, and Danes, marched out of the English encampment. Eugene was at the head of one hundred and twenty-two battalions and two hundred and seventy-three squadrons, and was ready to march upon Paris; but the Amsterdam merchants were no longer inspired with that spirit which, in former times, had raised their maritime State to the position of a European power. They lowered their sails at England's command. And in spite of, or perhaps even by means of, all the political infidelity which has been her profession, and chiefly through her unfearing, ruthless, and, upon occasion, bold and splendid prosecution of her own interests, England has succeeded in maintaining the position of the Germanic sea-power unimpaired and unrivalled to the present day.

(c) Utrecht. — The War of the Spanish Succession was at an end. The few events at the seat of war in Belgium and upon the Rhine are without importance. Louis XIV dictated the conditions of peace, which was concluded on the 11th of April, 1713, in Utrecht without the emperor's concurrence. Louis XIV recognised the succession of the House of Hanover in England, left to England the Hudson Bay territories (the modern British North America), gave Holland a number of “barrière” fortresses on the French-Netherlands frontier, gave the kingdom of Prussia part of the Orange inheritance, the principality of Neuchâtel in Switzerland, the counties of Mörs and Lingen and parts of Guelders. As to Spain and her colonies, a new Bourbon dynasty was founded by Philip V and his descendants. Portugal obtained the land on the Amazon, the Duke of Savoy got the kingdom of Sicily. To the emperor were left Naples, Milan, and the rest of the Spanish Netherlands. Sardinia and Luxemburg with Namur and Charleroi were evacuated in favour of the respected Elector of Bavaria until his native dominions should be restored. It was certainly the hardest and most shameful of all conditions, that the emperor and the kingdom should be obliged to receive into favour the Wittelsbach arch traitor, who had fought in open war on the side of the enemies of the empire, that they should have to restore to him the lands which had been justly confiscated and out of which he had been driven by force of arms. It was not the last condition of the kind which France laid upon Germany. Whenever France had the opportunity of setting up the Caudine yoke, Germany passed under it with every circumstance of infamy.

(d) Rastatt and Baden. — The emperor was unable to continue the war; his pecuniary resources were exhausted. Of this fact Prince Eugene was well aware, and after continuing the war upon the Rhine for a year, he bowed to the will of France, and concluded the peace negotiations of Rastatt and Baden (March 7 and September 8, 1714). Of these, the main points were the recognition of the peace of Utrecht and the reconciliation of Max Emanuel with the emperor. A project of exchange had been seriously considered by these two, — the kingdom of the Netherlands with Luxemburg in return for Bavaria. In spite of the protestations of his brother, Joseph Clemens of Cologne, Max Emanuel would
have been ready to close with the bargain, preferring to stay amid the gaiety and wealth of Brussels to returning to Munich, which was then but a poor township. All that was needed was a little pressure and some pecuniary sacrifice on the part of the Vienna court. And what would have been the advantage to the court and to the House of Hapsburg? We may see, if we will, the working of historical necessity, of a higher Providence in the fact that Charles VI failed to recognise the importance of the question; but it is worth while to remember that affairs in south Germany might have run a different course from that which they actually took. At that time Prussia could never have entertained the remotest idea of thwarting the growth of the Austrian power in south Germany. Fifty years later, when the proposal for exchange was renewed, Frederick the Great was able to prevent its accomplishment by force of protest, without appealing to force of arms.

8. THE STATE OF THE GERMAN HAPSBURGS

A. THE EUROPEAN STATE SYSTEM OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The distribution of territory, which concluded the War of the Spanish Succession, settled the main features of the territorial areas of the European Powers (see the map facing this page, “Western Europe at the Time of the Formation of the Great Powers”). The most important boundaries which were then set up have remained unaltered, although the parties to the division spent many years in trying to overthrow them. By the death of Louis XIV (September 1, 1715), two years after the peace of Utrecht, the age of rapid development in France came to an end; the monarch who had struggled for that European supremacy which he had actually held for a short time, left behind him a weakened State, and no successor capable of reorganising its shattered economy on the principles which he had laid down, and of gaining for France the resources necessary to her further development. This object could only have been attained by steady work, wise discretion, and constant consideration for the general welfare of the people. These characteristics were entirely lacking to the French governments from the regency of Philip of Orleans to the reign of Louis XVI, and still more to the French society which the sun-king had created. Consequently the State which had been raised to such marvellous capacities of action fell as quickly as it had risen. That outward display which the nobility and the Parisian citizens imitated from the court might long deceive the eye as to the real state of affairs; but it was clear to careful observers that empty show had taken the place of practical determination, and that great political aims had been replaced by petitifogging intrigue. Proposals, plans, and even commencements of great undertakings are certainly to be found in the history of French policy during the eighteenth century; but there was no accomplishment of these. That policy lived upon the strength of its past traditions until it had grown antiquated and the Bourbon monarchy became entirely out of harmony with the nation which it governed.

The French dynasty in Spain was unable to realise the fact that it had not been called to govern a world power, but that its duty was to examine the internal condition of the countries under its charge, and to heal the open wounds under which its people were suffering. An excessive influx of gold had led Spain astray
into the mazes of a false political economy, had made her spoil and idle, and even if it had been possible for her to have conquered her weaknesses, if her people could have been turned into the paths leading to prosperity, the Bourbons were certainly not the rulers to accomplish this work of restoration. Spain's territorial possessions were even then far too extensive for the scanty numbers of officials available to carry on the work of administration with any thoroughness; and yet she continued to be anxious for new acquisitions, deceived by the false idea that in politics "numbers are the thing." The Margrave of Brandenburg and King of Prussia, with his budget of 270,000 thalers and his three millions of subjects, had become a more valuable ally than the ruler of both Indies; hence the hunger of the dynasty after territory and population was absolutely unjustifiable—yet it continued.

In Spain, it was the court nobles who clung most firmly to the vain hope of maintaining the position of a European power. They continued to cherish the delusion that they were the masters of the world. These false ideas were encouraged by the second marriage of Philip V, which was solemnised on the 16th of August, 1714, with the royal heiress Elizabeth Farnese of Parma, who had conceived the idea of founding for her posterity an Italian kingdom, into which the Hapsburg possessions were to be absorbed. That keen man of business, Giulio Alberoni, afterward cardinal, supported her with zeal and at times with astuteness in her attempts which threatened the peace of Europe with further disturbance, until, on December 5, 1719, he was abandoned by his Italian protectress, who was as faithless as she was cunning.

A war broke out afresh concerning Sardinia and Sicily. Austria, in spite of her unfavourable position and her dependency upon the maritime nations, fought obstinately, but gained no striking success until the conclusion of the Quadruple Alliance, 1717–1718 (England, France, Hapsburg, and Savoy), obliged the Spaniards to withdraw in May, 1720. The two islands were then exchanged. Sicily and Naples were again united under the Hapsburg rule (the kingdom of the two Sicilies). Sardinia was given to the Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II, who assumed the title of King of Sardinia.

A further shuffling of positions was caused by the peace of Vienna of October 3, 1735 (it came into force on November 18, 1738), which removed the complications ensuing from the so-called War of the Polish Succession. At that time the third Bourbon dynasty was founded in the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily (including Elba), the founder being the Spanish Infant Don Carlos, the eldest son of Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese. Hapsburg received Parma and Piacenza in exchange; the emperor's son-in-law, the Duke of Lorraine, Franz Stephan, gained Toscana, which did not become his until the House of Medici became extinct (July 9, 1737). Sardinia was increased by the addition of the Milan territory on the right bank of the Ticino.

In the Baltic territories peace was assured by a number of treaties after the death of Charles XII of Sweden. In spite of numerous disappointments, this restless king had clung obstinately to the belief that he could reconquer for his country all the provinces which had been lost through his ill-considered expeditions. The bitter experience which he underwent among the Turks, with whom he took refuge after the battle of Poltawa, did not induce him to make peace at a moderate sacrifice. In 1715 he was fighting in Rügen against Prussia; in
1718 in Schonen and Norway, against Denmark, and at length (December 11
1718) a merciful bullet ended his life in the trenches before Fredericshald.
Notwithstanding his inconceivable energy and his endless striving, he was unable
to recover the prestige of his youthful exploits or to protect Sweden from the
heaviest losses. His heroic nature came to its inevitably tragic end as a result
of his lack of self-restraint, even as Sweden had to suffer for her importance
through her constant struggles to attain the place of a great European power.
By the peace of Rystad (September 10, 1721) Sweden surrendered to Russia the
Baltic territories of Livonia, Estonia, and Ingria, of which she had been unable
to make anything, whereas Russia made them the pivot of her European position,
having founded her capital on the Neva in 1703. The duchies of Bremen and
Verden, the gain of the Thirty Years' War, fell to Hanover by the peace of
Stockholm (November 20, 1719). Stettin and Further Pomerania, between the
Oder and Peene, the islands of Wollin and Usedom, came to Prussia as pay-
ment on account for the whole of Pomerania (which Prussia was eventually to
absorb) by the compact of Stockholm (February 1, 1720); while Denmark, under
the peace of Fredericshborg (July 14, 1720), received the Holstein-Gottorp part
of Schleswig and 600,000 thalers. The 2,000,000 thalers which Frederick William
I paid for Further Pomerania to the Peene, and the 1,000,000 which Hanover had
to supply as "key-money," and the 2,000,000 paid by Russia, were unable to raise
the Swedish finances, which Charles had brought very low, from their scandalously
reduced condition.

During the eighteenth century England was preparing, under the new Hano-
verian dynasty, which ascended the throne without any appreciable opposition on
September 20, 1714, to assume the position of a great commercial power, which
she gained and maintained during the nineteenth century. The share taken by
the Parliament in the government was considerably extended. William III of
Orange had been the last king to personally conduct the foreign policy of the
country. He left to Parliament the privilege of taking the initiative, but imposed
his own desires and convictions upon them. Remarkable only for their vices,
utterly unimportant as politicians, ready for any treachery or deception to gain
their ends, with none of the influence which a dominating personality can exert,
the Hanoverians succeeded in interrupting parliamentary government only for
short periods at a time, during which they seized the opportunity of displaying
their own ineptitude. Robert Walpole (October, 1715, to April, 1717; June, 1721,
to February, 1742) and Henry Pelham (August, 1743, to March, 1754) were the
leaders of the aristocratic Whig majority, which continued in power for half a
century. They were the supporters of a peace policy, founded on the principle
of repelling France and Spain. The Stuart invasion, supported by France during the
War of the Austrian Succession, was driven back without any special effort. The
question as to the succession, which involved the existence of the established
evangelical church, intolerant to the last degree, was finally settled by the battle
of Culloden (April 27, 1746), where the bold pretender Charles Edward was
beaten. England was undisturbed by the changes in European policy which fol-
lowed in rapid succession from the peace of Utrecht to that of Hubertusburg.
Those changes never threatened her, and claimed no more of her resources than
such as the country could well spare out of its abundance. Trade increased
under the most favourable conditions, and capital was forthcoming for the set-
ting up of great manufactories and centres of industry, whereby the prosperity of the middle classes grew apace. Hence there was no longer any fear of a continued supremacy of the landed aristocracy, a supremacy intolerable to the modern State, by which we mean the State which takes the place of the feudal organisation. At that time England was gathering the wealth which has secured her maritime supremacy during the nineteenth century.

We have already spoken of Russia's entry into the number of those Powers which must be consulted upon every question of European importance. Apart from this fact, other complications highly important in their consequences took place upon the eastern frontier of western Europe. In the case of Poland we have to note the fact that certain national characteristics can prevent a people from developing into an ordered and permanent body politic. In spite of its territorial area (see the "Map for the History of Poland and Western Russia," in Vol. V), in spite of the luxury in which its kings and nobles were able to live, Poland never attained to that level upon which alone the industry of its population might have been able to found a prosperous majority in the State, able to take a share in the making of their own history.

The ultimate relapse of Turkey from her position as a world power is due to similar causes. The Mohammedan world had lost so much of its great power of expansion that the military system, upon which their conquering raids had been based, was unable to respond to the demands laid upon it. Fanaticism could no longer compensate for the incapacity which was the natural result of unbridled extortion, oppression, and destruction of property on the part of the government. The Turks showed themselves capable of adopting the Arab-Mohammedan civilisation, but they could not succeed in carrying it out to complete development. They could never appreciate the kind of effort that was necessary to harmonise Mohammedan constitutional theory with the necessities of the Balkan and Levant peoples. To their Christian subjects they showed no mercy. In every case their advent betokened an epoch of destruction, never one of restoration or creation. They enriched themselves with the goods of others, until the supply was exhausted.

The reduction of the maritime cities of the Levant to poverty and the cutting off of the products from the interior of Asia Minor, Syriis, and Egypt was largely the result of the overthrow of the Venetian commerce, in place of which the Turks had nothing to offer. Nothing could have been more desirable for them than a peaceful agreement with Venice, for she could no longer be dangerous to themselves, though she was still capable of continuing the trade with further Asia and north Africa, and of providing a ready market for goods from the Levant. The pride and stupidity of the Turks drove them to inflict utter destruction upon the settlements and commercial activities of the Venetians in the few maritime strongholds which they possessed, though they were themselves neither capable nor desirous of possessing this inheritance (cf. Vol. III, p. 376). The peace of Karlovitz (1699) had brought a modus vivendi into being with respect to Greece proper and the islands, which was not only tolerable but eminently suitable for both parties. It should have been the care of the Venetians to firmly secure what they had gained in the Morea by means of adequate garrisons, and above all to unite the interests of their old colonies to the mother city by means of their financial power, which was not as yet entirely exhausted. The Turkish government, on the other hand, should have helped the activity of the republic, since
its own provinces could not have failed to benefit thereby. In any case, a considerable part of the Venetian gains would have flowed into their own treasury, whereas they had nothing to expect in the way of subsidies from the peoples which they had reduced to poverty.

Neither party recognised or proscribed its advantages. The Turks proposed to take advantage of the military weakness which followed the brilliant period of Andrea Morosini and to reconquer the districts which they had lost, the extent of which was of little importance in comparison with the size of their empire. The warlike grand vizier of Ahmed III, Damad Ali, suddenly attacked the Venetians in the Morea in 1714 and quickly drove them out. The embassy of the Signoria to Vienna to demand assistance obtained a favourable hearing, for the government there was convinced that the grand vizier, puffed up by his success in the peninsula, would advance with the purpose of subduing Venice and penetrating again into the lands on the north of the Balkans as far as the Danube. Prince Eugene convinced the emperor that under no conditions could he allow Dalmatia to fall into the hands of the Porte; he considered that the conquest of Bosnia and Servia was a task immediately incumbent on the House of Austria, and urged that the alliance with the republic should be renewed, and that an army should be raised in Hungary. With this army he again made himself famous throughout the world, and inflicted a defeat upon the Turks from which they never recovered.

In the battle of Peterwardein on August 5, 1716, the grand vizier lost his life, and his troops were forced to abandon their camp at an enormous loss of military stores, arms, horses, and other valuable property. This defeat was quickly followed by the capture of Temesvár (October 13, 1716) and the occupation of the Banat, a district of six hundred and fifty square miles in area of surprising fertility. Many noble families connected with the ruling dynasty during the government of Charles VI and Maria Theresa acquired property in that district, which was at that time considered as fit for little more than pasture, and has now developed into exceedingly wealthy estates. In the next year the siege of Belgrade was begun, and another complete defeat inflicted (August 17, 1717) upon the Turkish army which advanced to relieve the town. The day after the battle saw the surrender of this most important Danubian fortress, the key to the northern Balkan district.

The Porte's power was completely broken. The advantages which the Turks had won at the expense of Venice were totally inadequate to counterbalance their terrible losses on the Danube. By the peace of Passarowitz (July 21, 1718), they ceded the Banat, Belgrade, and a broad strip of Servian territory to the Emperor Charles VI, who was now able to secure his conquest of the kingdom of Hungary by a system of military frontier guards and administrators, stretching from Zengg on the Adriatic Sea to the Danube. After the death of Prince Eugene (April 21, 1736), Turkey again found a pretext for war; and during this struggle, which lasted from 1737 to 1739, Austria lost Belgrade and her acquisitions in Bosnia through bad generalship. However, the Banat remained in her hands, and strengthened the connection between Hungary and Transylvania, which was destined eventually to become a part of the empire.
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN-HUNGARIAN MONARCHY

The decision of the question of the Spanish succession, the conquest of Hungary, the fact that since the peace of Westphalia the so-called German inheritance had unceasingly shown a tendency to separation from the empire, made it imperative that there should be some formal constitution of the Hapsburg possessions, a first tentative effort for the formation of a comprehensive State. There was no Austrian State in existence, there was merely a family property, a union of kingdoms and countries, with or without constitutional ties, with or without common interests, brought into mutual relation only through the person of the monarch, possessing the most varied privileges and burdened with the most numerous obligations. The circumstances which had favoured the formation of a great dynastic power proved so many obstacles to the creation of a united kingdom. Many attempts have been made since the first beginnings of that kingdom. The permanent union of Bohemia and Hungary to the German Alpine territory, dating from 1526, has been considered a starting point; so have the attempts made at the end of the seventeenth century to form a general conference of Landtag delegates. The recognition of the hereditary monarchy of the Hapsburgs in the lands of the Hungarian crown (1687) has been indicated as showing the need for closer connection between the several parts of the Hapsburg estate. But all these phenomena are to be explained as results of the growing power of the nobles, and have, moreover, merely proved the general fact, that the formation of independent kingdoms from the several parts of the Hapsburg territory was an impossibility.

The resumption of the plan of uniting Bohemia, Moravia, and the Silesian principalities under a foreign rule split upon the rock of religious discord, and the Catholic powers were obliged to intervene to secure the hereditary rights of Ferdinand II. The battle of Weißenberg put an end to the Bohemian constitution; that is, to the idea of the Bohemian countries as an independent unity, with their own government, their own military and financial system. Bohemia was then closely united to the German Empire through the person of the prince. Had the Palatinate ruler maintained his ground, he would have been reduced to strengthening to the best of his power the ties which united Germany to the empire and to securing the support of the evangelical orders by making concessions to the empire. In that case the Germanisation of the Czechs would have been brought about through the identity of their church with that of the pure German countries. The Catholic reaction had been carried out against the revolutionary Protestant parties without any consideration for the direction taken by the tide of national movements. Catholicism neither needed nor desired assistance from German sources, as its strength was based upon the Romance and Slavonic, not upon the German peoples. The conquest of Hungary would certainly have been impossible without the help of Germany and her armed provinces; but the empire had allowed the House of Hapsburg without protest to grasp the advantages gained, because it was itself unable to extend its supremacy over so large and so

1 White Mountain.
far distant a country, owing to the lack of an organised administration and of a standing imperial army.

The means employed by Brandenburg-Prussia for the amalgamation of its different provinces into one State were impracticable for the House of Hapsburg. It was impossible to introduce a uniform administration for Hungary, Bohemia, and a dozen German duchies and counties with the same rapidity and success as Prussia had attained. The royal House of Austria was involved to a far greater extent than were the Hohenzollerns in every European quarrel and complication. For many decades it could have found no opportunity to turn its attention to domestic organisation, leaving aside questions of European importance and abandoning a foreign policy which made for disunion and disruption. Only critics without historical training, who would judge the past by the alien conceptions of the present, could suppose that a dominating position could ever have been attained by the so-called idea of a constitutional totality in old Austria, conceived from the point of view of a Roman emperor, who was at the same time King of Hungary, and thought it his duty to uphold his claims of succession to Spain and Naples, to Milan and to the Netherlands.

A common unity is to be seen for the first time in the army of Prince Eugene. However, it was not the Austrian, but the “emperor’s” army which he led from victory to victory. This, compared with the “imperial” army, was a uniform whole, whether fighting in Italy or in the Netherlands. Within the empire it was often subdivided. Troops from special provinces and districts were joined to its regiments, and were commanded by generals who were paid by the empire and not by the emperor. The armed provinces of the empire were far readier to protest against the division of their contingents than was the emperor in the case of his own forces; consequently we can speak of the Brandenburg-Prussian, of the Bavarian, even of the Hanoverian army before we can employ the term “Austrian” army. The diplomatic service of the German Hapsburgs acted in the name of the emperor, as more privileges were thus to be enjoyed. As regards revenue, receipts came in from the most varied sources,—feudal aids, grants from the Landtag, subsidies, tithes, general taxes,—so that it would have been impossible to draw up a separate balance sheet for the State revenue of Austria alone.

The creation of a State without national union, or even without a leadership supported by a majority capable of great exertions, could not possibly be the work of a few generations: it is a problem in statecraft which has remained insoluble to the present day. The first steps which brought the solution somewhat nearer could only proceed from the ruling house itself; they consist in the constitutional recognition of the ruling power as a unity and in the securing of the succession, in order to obviate disruption.

Ferdinand I could see no special danger to the power of the ruling house in the disruption and dissolution of his dominion into separate principalities: he considered that the position of the imperial monarch was of overpowering predominance. The master of the inner Austria territories, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, the Count of Tyrol and the possessor of the Suabian and Upper Rhine frontiers, could only pursue the policy marked out by their imperial brother or cousin. The “fraternal quarrel,” the party differences between Rudolf and Matthias, show the possibility of strong opposition between the members of one and the same house. Spanish interest in the strength of the German family, and also the interest which
the Catholic Church had in the maintenance of Catholicism in the Alpine and household territories, were the motive causes of the supremacy of Ferdinand II over the possessions of the German House of Hapsburg. The special position of the Tyrol under his brother Leopold was a concession to personal and private rights of inheritance, an indulgence which left no permanent effect upon the constitution, as the Tyrol branch became extinct in the second generation. Neither Ferdinand II nor Ferdinand III had the opportunity of settling the succession to the collective inheritance according to family regulations, as they only had one successor capable of government. Leopold I, however, contributed to the regulation of the succession when he and his eldest son Joseph renounced the Spanish succession in favour of the second son, the Archduke Charles. The emperor then made an openly expressed agreement with his sons, that the succession in the two lines should go by primogeniture; that is to say, that Charles and his descendants should inherit the undivided German Hapsburg lands upon the extinction of the male line in Joseph's family, and similarly Joseph and his descent were to have the whole Spanish monarchy should the Spanish line now founded by Charles become extinct. Should the male issue fail in both lines simultaneously, that is, before the descendants of either could succeed, then the right of primogeniture was to pass to the females (daughters) in Joseph's line, these also preceding Charles's female issue as regards the Spanish succession.

This "pactum mutuo successionis" (agreement as to the mutual succession) was attested by the three parties concerned on September 12, 1703, and declared by them to be the expression of a custom previously subsisting in the House of Hapsburg. It was further extended by the will of Leopold I, dated April 26, 1705, by which he secured his son Charles in the possession of the Tyrol and the land on its frontier, though "without the right of making alliance or war," in case nothing should come down to him of the whole of the Spanish succession. The Emperor Joseph I died in the prime of life without male issue and without making definite arrangements for his daughters. According to the Pact of 1703, Charles (VI) was sole heir to all the Hapsburg possessions, both German and Spanish. He actually entered into possession of both, inasmuch as he extended his power over a considerable portion of the Spanish monarchy. Joseph's daughters yielded precedence to his own. For the former, the emperor was merely bound to provide according to the custom of his family.

C. The Pragmatic Sanction

Joseph's sudden death had thrown the imperial privy council into some perplexity as to the fate of his kingdom. They sent a request to Charles, who was still in Spain, asking him for a definite explanation. This explanation was not given until April 19, 1713, before an assembly of court dignitaries and of the highest officials of Lower Austria. The emperor had the "pactum mutuo successionis" read aloud, and then delivered a speech, wherein he laid down that by the arrangement just read aloud all kingdoms and territories possessed by the Emperors Leopold and Joseph passed to himself, and that "these territories should remain undivided, passing to the male issue of his body in primogeniture so long as such issue should exist; upon the extinction of the said male issue the succession should pass, undivided in like manner and according to the order and right of primogeniture, to the legitimate surviving daughters." Only upon the failure of such legitimate issue of
the ruling emperor was the right of succession to pass to the daughters of Joseph, also by primogeniture.

This transaction and the emperor's explanation was embodied by order in a protocol drawn up by the notary Hofrat von Schick; this protocol forms the Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles VI, which is to be considered as one of the constitutional foundations of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The comparatively few words which express the contents of the document determine the permanent union of the territory of the German Hapsburgs in the form of a great power, which union is founded upon the exercise of a uniform government throughout the kingdoms and provinces which compose that territory. The uniformity consists not only in the supremacy of the one monarch, but also in his exercise of the governmental powers vested in himself. These powers proceed, it is true, from his relations with individual kingdoms and provinces, but they are conjoined in personal executive power possessed by the monarch, and are expressed in decrees of uniform applicability. "The right of war, of peace and of alliance," that is to say, the entire foreign policy, is subject to the exclusive will of the general ruler of the whole area; he alone has the right to raise an army by means of the supplies granted by the kingdoms and provinces, and with this his army to defend the interests of his house and of all the territories in the possession of that house. The uniformity and universality of the ruling power ceases at this point. Nothing is recognised by the Pragmatic Sanction as common to or binding upon the whole State except that which can be immediately deduced from the sovereignty; hence the dynastic powers of the German Hapsburgs were not constituted as a State by the Pragmatic Sanction, although they did constitute a "great power," in view of the influence which they were able to exercise upon the course of European affairs.

In the solemn declaration of Charles VI no account was taken of the relations of the sovereignty to individual provinces, for this would have implied the raising of constitutional questions and complications; naturally, the destiny of the whole empire could not be made contingent upon the ultimate issue of these. The numerous provincial bodies politic were by no means on an equality in point of strength, and a compacted agreement with them would not have produced a statute of so fundamental a nature as could be brought about by a simple expression of will on the part of a number of kings, dukes, and princes. By far the easier course was to obtain a supplementary consent from the several Landtags to the emperor's declaration which was laid before them. Negotiations for this purpose were begun in the year 1720, after Leopold's death in the same year. He was the emperor's son, born in 1716, and there was no other male issue surviving. When the Pragmatic Sanction was delivered to the Landtags, letters were also sent, speaking for the first time of the "object" of the Sanction. Upon the "union" of the kingdom and provinces (so ran the wording) depended the prosperity of the kingdom and the "peace of the populations, provinces, and vassals." Within the government area the proposal was issued for the calling of a "congress of the provinces." The Landtag of Lower Austria urged the advisability of an "hereditary alliance," whereby the provinces as a whole should mutually guarantee their interdependence. Although Prince Eugene was apparently in favour of this method of introducing the general representation of the provinces, yet the government declined to agree, for fear of encroachment and confusion. Proceedings of this kind might arouse mis-
givings in such cases as that of Hungary, for since 1712 the Croatian provinces had begun to form a closer connection with the provinces of inner Austria, with which they had many political and economic interests in common, particularly the question of resistance to the Turks; and in this way their constitutional ties with Hungary threatened to grow relaxed.

In Bohemia and in the other hereditary provinces assent to the Pragmatic Sanction was given without difficulty, stress only being laid upon the maintenance of “privileges” and of provincial regulations. In Bohemia it was thought unnecessary to make special mention of the peculiar rights of either one of the two nationalities under the empire; but the town of Eger, before which care had been taken to lay the proposals for regulating the succession, associated itself and its territory with the assent given by the Bohemian Landtag, “without detriment to the privileges granted in respect of the Eger pawn-money by the Roman emperors and the kings of Bohemia.” The Tyrol provinces regretted that they were deprived of the prospect of having a resident prince of their own, and demanded that the future reigning lord should be “of German blood.”

In Hungary, provincial representation was a national and constitutional institution, and had lost but little of the power which it had possessed in previous centuries; hence the discussions in the Landtag of 1722–1723 have a greater importance than any which took place elsewhere in the Hapsburg territories. As early as 1712 Hungary had demanded that every province of the empire should enter into a special convention to recognise their common ruler under any circumstances, and to contribute a fixed sum for the maintenance of the military frontier-guards and the garrisons in the Hungarian fortresses, since Hungary was conscious of its position as buffer State between the Turks and the hereditary territories and Bohemia, and therefore desired a guarantee of continued support. Moreover, in the statute, wherein the Landtag formulated its decision upon the question of the succession, the condition was laid down that the heir or heiress of the Hapsburg House, whom they were ready to recognise as monarch, was to enter upon the possession of an “indissoluble whole,” composed of the totality of the Hapsburg territories. No portion of the hereditary territory was to be alienated by division or in any other manner: it was to form a hereditary whole, including the kingdom of Hungary and its adjoining territory.

Thus the Hungarian Landtag of 1722–1723 displayed a dualism in its conclusions, and described its relations to the ruling house and to the non-Hungarian possessions of that house with a clearness and accuracy which gave it an indisputable advantage in all constitutional difficulties over the Germanic-Slavonic-Roman territorial group which had hitherto been heavily burdened by the difficulty of assimilating certain districts. In Hungary, the constitutional value of the Pragmatic Sanction was far more highly estimated than in the other countries, whose representatives had accepted the rules for the succession without being fully informed of the importance of the step they were taking, and had missed the opportunity of anticipating the agreement with Hungary by first procuring a settlement of their own affairs, and mutual rights and duties. In this case they would have been able to propose conditions to the Hungarian State, under which they would have been prepared to guarantee the desired support. In like manner, unfamiliarity with the historical development of the Austrian-Hungarian monarch, an astonishing lack of general political education and of real constitutional knowledge, is the
reason why the German liberals of the nineteenth century have made claims upon the common kingdom, which it can never hope to meet by reason of its origin and organisation.

Charles VI and his council were not inclined to attach too much importance to the expressions of assent received from the Landtags of the hereditary territories. They were by no means penetrated with the idea that the unity of the kingdom and the provinces was wholly indispensable. From the territories over which they ruled they did not think it possible to evolve a State capable of developing sufficient strength to secure its existence against aggression. Only one man believed in this possibility, even as he believed in the high capacity of the imperial army; namely, Prince Eugene, known as the "Savoyard," although he was a true Austrian. It was against his desire that the emperor had subordinated his entire policy to the one object of securing the recognition of his rules for the succession by the European powers. From the peace of Rastatt onwards there was no congress, no treaty, no conclusion of peace—and there was a remarkable number of these during his reign—into which he did not foist some clause upon this point.

The guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the empire was of the highest importance, because the withdrawal of the German-Austrian territory from the empire was thus made possible, and the Hapsburg House gained the right of uniting into a constitutional whole such of its possessions as belonged to the empire, the imperial provinces, and the kingdom of Bohemia, which was "conjoined" to the empire with its neighbouring territory, together with an independent State, such as Hungary. During the negotiations carried on in Regensburg upon this subject, the German Empire declared itself entirely on the side of the imperial house, recognised the necessity for the existence of an Austrian monarchy, and showed the connection of the empire with it. "This declaration of assent may be considered as the first compact of the German Empire with Austria. For the Reichstag treats with the House of Hapsburg as with an independent power, for the maintenance of which the empire came forward in its own clearly recognised interests."

The credit of securing this guarantee belongs to Frederick William I, King of Prussia, who had become the emperor's ally by the compacts of Königswusterhausen (October 12, 1726) and of Berlin (December 23, 1728). It was through his powerful influence that the proposals were carried in the Reichstag in spite of the opposition of Bavaria and Saxony. The tour which he made in 1730, round certain German coasts which had as yet taken no share in the discussions, was undertaken with the object of gaining their support for the emperor and of recommending them to concur in the guarantee. Bavaria and Saxony opposed it in vain. Notwithstanding the wavering attitude of the Palatinate, they were unable to secure a majority in the college of electors; consequently the only course open to them was to protest against the resolution of the Reichstag and to declare that it was not binding upon themselves.

In consequence, the imperial government could certainly conclude that, notwithstanding the numerous arts of diplomacy which they had employed to secure the guarantees, a struggle against the female succession in the House of Hapsburg would inevitably ensue, for the two protesting electors proceeded to lay claim to certain portions of the inheritance upon the strength of their connection with the imperial family (Joseph I's eldest daughter, Maria Josepha, had married Frederick
Augustus II of Saxony on August 20, 1719, and her sister, Maria Amalie, had married Charles Albrecht of Bavaria, October 30, 1722). Hence the obvious course of a clever politician would have been to cleave at all costs to the strongest supporter, Prussia, and to bind that country to the interests of the imperial house even at the price of voluntary concessions. But Austria during the last few years had been slackening the bond betwixt herself and Prussia. Though she had to thank Prussia and no one else for the passing of the guarantees, she declined to continue the support which she had previously promised to the king in the matter of the Juliers-Cleve inheritance. To ask that the Austrian statesmen of the period should have clearly foreseen that the foundation of an independent monarchy was incompatible with a permanent sovereignty of the empire would be to ask too much of them; although we now can see that to break away from the narrow limits of the provinces of the empire and at the same time to claim supremacy among them was impossible. The time had come when it would be necessary to struggle for influence with the rising military power of the north German State. But from the standpoint of practical politics it may be asserted that the neglect of Prussia was inspired by false conceptions of the strength of the respective parties, and that the loss of the Prussian support was not to be counterbalanced by the dearly bought assent of France to the guarantee.

D. MARIA THERESA AND JOSEPH II

(a) Maria Theresa. — With the death of the Emperor Charles VI (October 20, 1740) that royal family became extinct which had been founded by Rudolf I and carried by Charles V to the highest pitch of earthly power. The countries which the Pragmatic Sanction had declared to be a political whole were now obliged to act for the maintenance of that measure. It was now to be decided whether the position of the German Hapsburg House should be assumed by the Hapsburg-Lorraine family, which rested on the alliance (May 13, 1717) of the eldest daughter of Charles VI, Maria Theresa, with the Duke of Lorraine, Franz Stephan; whether that family should continue to hold in connection the territory of the Hapsburgs in all that wide extent which had made it the equal of powers founded upon a national basis.

The division of the territory was demanded by the Elector of Bavaria, Charles Albrecht, over whose youth the Emperors Leopold and Joseph had watched with true paternal care during the proscription of his father Max Emanuel. In 1722 he had been privileged to marry the latter emperor's second daughter (cf. above). He based his claims upon numerous points of relation to the family (cf. the genealogical tree, p. 525), the importance of which seemed to be increased by a falsification in the will of Ferdinand I of Bavaria. He claimed all the family territory, and declared Maria Theresa to be Queen of Hungary only.

The threats of Charles Albrecht would have been of little moment if Bavaria had not had numerous supporters in Austria itself, and if Maria Theresa had had only this opponent to deal with. But a far more dangerous enemy arose in the person of King Frederick II of Prussia, who had succeeded to the throne in the year of Charles VI's death. He denied the validity of the guarantee given by Prussia, as the deceased emperor had not made the return which he had promised. He claimed compensation for the principality of Jügerndorf, which had been lost to his
EXPLANATION OF THE FOLLOWING PLATE

Maria Theresa, Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, is receiving the homage of the orders of lower Austria, November 22, 1740. The picture shows a portion of the procession in the act of passing the "monument"; the procession went from the imperial castle to the cathedral of St. Stephen. Maria Theresa is carried in the sedan chair; the royal coach follows empty. Before the chair go the public officials, the members of the nobility and knightly orders, the seneschal of lower Austria, Raymond, Count von Harrach, the pages, privy councillors, and chamberlains, the hereditary officials of the country with their insignia and ornaments, the equerry, Count von Heyos, the falconer, Count St. Julian, the armourer and shield-bearer, both Counts of Sinzenthur, the master of the mint, Count von Sprinzenstein, the standard bearer, Count Abensberg-Traun, the warden, Count von Pollheim, the master of the kitchen, Freiherr von Hegenmüller, the keeper of the plate, Count Kufstein, the master of the hunt, Count von Sinzenthur, the cupbearer, Count von Hardeg, the court marshal, Count von Starhenberg, the chamberlain, Count Brunner, the Land hofmeister, Prince Trautsohn. In place of the lord high steward, Count Schönborn, who was Bishop of Bamberg and Würzburg, went the Count von Hamilton.

On two sides of the triangular statue (erected under Leopold I, 1682, by Fischer von Erlach as a thankoffering for deliverance from the plague) are drawn up the city guards of Vienna.

Behind the royal chair goes the captain of the imperial horse guards, Count von Daun, and the captain of the life guards, Count von Cardana.

In the foreground, spectators of different classes.
THE OATH OF FEALTY TO MARIA THERESA AS

From Georg Christoph Krogil's “
"DUCHNESS OF AUSTRIA, ON NOVEMBER 22, 1740

The Oath of Felicity," Vienna, 1742.
family owing to the collapse of the Winter kingdom, and also for the Schwiebus
district, which his grandfather, Ferdinand I, had been forced to cede. In either
case the question of the justice of the claim was to him a matter of indifference.
Frederick grasped at the chance of recovering these districts for which there
had been so much strife, for he considered that he required Lower Silesia to
round off his possessions on the Oder, and had no intention of letting slip an
opportunity so favourable for his own aggrandisement. He offered Maria Theresa his
support against Bavaria, and was ready to vote for the election of her husband as
emperor; further, he was prepared to guarantee her German possessions and to pay
a subsidy of two million thalers for military preparations, if Silesia as far as
Breslau was ceded to him. It was not an impossible bargain for Austria, and a
far-sighted politician would probably have recommended it; but Frederick did not
want for any acceptance. In the middle of December, 1740, he poured twenty
thousand men into Silesia. At no matter what cost, the Austrian court declined
to recognise the legality of an act of mere marauding on a grand scale.

The young Archduchess and Queen of Hungary (see the plate facing this page,
"Homage to Maria Theresa as Archduchess of Austria, November 22, 1740"),
with all the warmth of that ardent character which makes her so attractive a per-
sonality, assented to the counsel of the passionate Bartenstein, who declared against
the Prussian proposals. She was actuated by indignation against infidelity, real or
supposed, by a natural dislike to give up land or property, and finally, by the
firm conviction that it was her duty to cling to the heritage which she had taken
up at all costs. The Hapsburgs were never covetous, but were obstinate in their
defence of their rights. Maria Theresa's stand against Prussia is an act rather of
moral worth than of political importance. Her courage and her obstinacy, which
proceeded from an invincible trust in God, enabled her people the more readily to see in
her house the natural continuation of the old royal family whose sorrows and joys
they had shared for the last five hundred years. They shared also in her unjustifi-
able hatred against Frederick, and gave her their genuine sympathy as to one
oppressed and persecuted. German from the crown of her head to the sole of her
foot, with all the virtues of the German wife and mother, a mistress both dignified
and gentle, a stern commander at need, of strong determination, thorough and true
in hate and love alike, endowed with that splendid beauty which stirs enthusiasm,
it was not only in her native land that she won her people's hearts; even by hos-
tile nations she was speedily known as the "Great Empress." Uncertainty and
vacillation, the two deadly enemies to monarchical power, were unknown to her.
She may have been deceived as to the forces which she had at her disposition, but
she was well aware of the special characteristics of her empire. It was plain to her
that Hungary's independent administration must be preserved, whereas the admin-
istrative power was to be centralised in the "German and Bohemian hereditary
land." Though consenting to coronation, she did not permit the Bohemian con-
stitutional privileges to grow larger, and kept a careful watch upon the unifor-
mity and equality of the administration. Her full appreciation of the value
of proper administration fitted her to walk in the ways which lead to the forming
of States. With Maria Theresa begins the difficult transition from dynastic to con-
stitutional power, which has continued to our own time. It should have come to
an earlier conclusion, but the unjustifiable concessions made by liberalism to the
form of the constitution have hindered its consummation.

Under Maria Theresa the relations of the ruling house to Bohemia partook for
the second time of the character of a supremacy based on conquest. The kingdom
had to be conquered by force of arms, after it had already submitted to the imperial
government. In November, 1741, the Elector of Bavaria invaded Bohemia from
Upper Austria, of which he had already gained possession. Prague surrendered
almost without resistance, and there he received homage to himself as king (Novem-
ber 25). The constitutional representatives of Bohemia then surrendered the
rights of the Hapsburg House without scruple. No less than four hundred mem-
ers of the Bohemian orders, among them men who bore honoured names, took the
oath of allegiance in person, although no irresistible pressure was put upon them.
The Bavarian "peoples" would have been considerably embarrassed if the Bohe-
mian nobles, who were ever ready to boast of their dependency upon the imperial
house, had remained in their castles and organised a guerilla warfare, instead of
hastening to Prague to kiss the hand of the Elector of Bavaria.

It was not until Maria Theresa had made peace with Prussia that she found
her power equal to driving the Bavarians out of the country, together with the
French, who were supporting them. These latter felt no pricks of conscience in thus
breaking the guarantee which they had given to the Pragmatic Sanction. Beaten
in the two battles of Mollwitz (April 10, 1741) and Chotusitz (north of Časlau,
May 17, 1742), she agreed to give up Silesia with the exception of the prin-
cipalities of Troppau and Teschen and the larger part of Jägerndorf. On the other
hand, she was also obliged to sacrifice Glatz — of importance as being indispensable
to the agreement with Frederick. However, the treaties of peace concluded at
Breslau (June 11) and at Berlin (June 28, 1742) were not made in an honour-
able spirit. Hardly had Maria enjoyed the benefits of the pacification, re-
conquered Bavaria, and convinced the world that her empire was a living reality,
than she began to make plans for revenge upon Prussia. She was not attracted by
the possibility of gaining Bavaria in place of Silesia, a proposition which might
have been mentioned early in the negotiations, the motive being the utter cowardice
of Charles Albrecht VII, who had been elected and crowned Roman em-
peror on January 24, 1742, although he possessed no territory (Maria Theresa's
husband would have had to cede Tuscany to the Wittelsbachers as his share of the bargain). By the peace of Füssen (April 22, 1745) she gave back Bavaria together with the upper Palatinate to the Elector Maximilian Joseph III, the son of the Emperor Charles VII, who had died on January 20, 1745. She recognised the imperial position of his father, and entered into negotiations with Saxony, Russia, and France. Frederick II had been already convinced that Austria’s alliance with those powers would cost him not only Silesia but also his position in Europe, and made, therefore, his second invasion at the end of August, 1744. At Hohenfriedenberg (June 4) and at Soor (September 30, 1745) he beat the Austrians, and also the Saxons at Kesselsdorf (December 15, 1745), and secured his possession of his acquisitions by the second treaty of peace, which was concluded in Dresden, Christmas, 1745. Austria gained thereby the recognition of the husband of her princess, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Franz Stephan I, as Roman emperor. His election had taken place on October 4, and the consent of the Bohemian electorate was obtained through Brandenburg-Prussia.

The Queen of Hungary and Bohemia thus became empress as the consort of the emperor. In the eyes of posterity the imperial dignity which encircles her is not merely the reflection of the somewhat tarnished crown with which she saw her husband adorned in Frankfort. During her reign a remarkable phenomenon comes to pass, in that her empire gained a title wholly different from that which usually attaches to the word. Maria Theresa really begins the succession of the Austrian emperors, and with her is bound up the conception of an Austrian State.

If, after the second Silesian war, Austria had considered her quarrel with Prussia as terminated, she would have been able to make far greater progress in respect of her internal development than the empress was able to bring about, notwithstanding her sense of the high importance of home administration. Apart from this fact, a renewal of the alliance with Prussia would have brought about the complete downfall of the Bourbons, and possibly have enabled the acquisition of Naples. The minister, Count Wenzel Anton of Kaunitz-Rietberg, upon one occasion (1751) put forward these ideas, but relinquished them in face of the opposition of the empress. However, Maria Theresa might have been persuaded, had the possibility of resuming Prince Eugene’s designs upon the Balkan territories been constantly brought before her notice. The policy of Count Kaunitz was as disastrous as that of Metternich. Not only did Kaunitz fail to advance the development of the Austrian State, but he checked and interrupted it by renewing hostilities with Prussia. How much might have been attained with the resources which were squandered and wasted in the Seven Years’ War, under such adroit and prosperous guidance as Maria Theresa displayed in the regulation of her home affairs! In any case, it would not have been necessary to subordinate every requirement of Hungary to the settlement of constitutional relations with neighbouring countries (Croatia in particular). The commercial undertakings of Charles VI might have been recommenced. Care might have been taken to secure for Austria a share in the commercial intercourse which was proceeding in central and southern Europe. The persecution of the Protestants in the Alpine territories, which were already sufficiently depopulated, whereby valuable productive forces were destroyed, would not have been thought necessary by Maria Theresa had she not thought to discover supporters of the hated Prussian king even among her co-religionists at home. So overpowering was the passion of this hatred that the
empress, though wise in other respects, allowed it to take possession of her to the
detriment of her State.

The Austrian State has no reason whatever to be jealous of Prussia. The
development of Austria into a State could only proceed under the condition
of complete independence of the German Empire, and therefore of the dignity of the
Romano-German emperor. The struggle for supremacy over the whole system of
States united in the German kingdom and afterward in the German federation
has invariably been a barrier in the way of a true Austrian policy. Maria Theresa
and her successors were too conservative in their views upon the general state of
European politics, and laid too much stress upon antiquated forms. Furthermore,
the leaders of Roman Catholic policy drove them into an opposition with
Prussia which bore no proportion to the interests of their dynasty or of their
country, and this because the Roman Church saw in the strong rising State a new domi-
nant power, the natural protector of the evangelical faith.

(b) Joseph II and Leopold II.—Joseph II (1780–1790) certainly rose su-
perior to this influence. He attempted to make his policy introductory to all the
reforms which he tried to carry out in frantic haste. But it was not until too late,
after the death of Frederick II, that he recognised that the huge task of centralising
the administration of all the kingdoms and territories could only be carried through
in peace, after the conclusion of an agreement with Prussia, which should restore
complete confidence. In a despatch to Kaunitz of December 6, 1786, this indis-
penasurable foundation to a sound Austrian policy is described with convincing
enthusiasm, though it failed to gain appreciation. Kaunitz described the task of
Austrian diplomacy as "the careful concealment of our claws, in order to be able
to strike the more certainly should we at any time be challenged. This and no
other must be the ultimate aim of our policy; for to suppose that the real inter-
ests of our State could ever be united permanently with those of Prussia, so as to be
entirely amalgamated, is but to express a pious hope, impossible of realisation."

Joseph II also took up the other side of the Austrian interests — those to the
eastward. His alliance with Russia for the purpose of driving the Turks from the
Danube district, his views upon Albania, Montenegro, and Servia, display the
general tendency of his policy. But in every case, if we except the impulse
given to home industries by the protective system, his plans came to nothing
through lack of means and of preparation. He wished to carry on the govern-
ment by means of a system of officials upon whom the greatest insight, disinter-
estedness, and energy was imperative, and he never succeeded in getting even
a part of this complicated organising machinery to work. By means of the main
features of the physiocratic system, which had been brought into opposition
with the mercantile system by the Quesnay school, his aim was to make agri-
culture bear the main burdens of taxation, to increase production and remove
obstacles in the way of it, to facilitate the exchange of commodities. But in
his country husbandmen were non-existent; with but few exceptions there were
but needy landed proprietors, and uneducated peasants under numerous restric-
tions, who could only get into communication with the State through their over-
lords and their incapable officials. He deprived the provincial corporations of the
last remnants of privileges already closely restricted, without considering that
these were to be the medium for his philanthropic plans, and that among them he
must look for his coadjutors, as their interests were inseparable from those of the State.

Thus at the close of 1787 he began war with the Turks with a badly equipped army, and without generals. The veterans of the Seven Years' War had learnt nothing from the few successes which had been gained, but had conceived exaggerated ideas of their own powers, and were incapable of breaking down the obstinate resistance of the Turks at a moment's notice. The long duration of the war and the deliberate character of the operations gave an opportunity to the Great Powers, who felt the Austro-Russian forward policy disadvantageous to themselves, of intervening in favour of Turkey, and their efforts nullified the effects of the victories of Prince Frederick Josias of Saxe-Coburg, and of the Russian General Alexander Wassilievitch Suwarrow at Fokshani (August 1, 1789), and at Martinestie on the Rimmik (September 22), and also of the taking of Belgrade by the Field-Marshals Gideon Ernst Freiherr von Laudon (October 8, 1789). Peace was concluded at Sistowa (August 4, 1791).

The misgovernment of Joseph II, which was due to lack of statesmanship and of sound information upon the state of the country, brought the Hapsburg monarchy into a state of inconceivable confusion. Its unpractical character, its doctrine tendencies, had roused the opposition of the ecclesiastics and also of the provincial and civic governing bodies in the Netherlands, which culminated in an outbreak in Brussels on the 12th of December, 1789. The constitutional rights of Hungary had been entirely disregarded since 1783. Decrees were promulgated without reference to the Reichstag; new taxes were levied, and in 1786-1787 the imperial officials introduced a new system of rating and of property assessment of a most ruinous nature. The crown of St. Stephan, which was reverenced by every Magyar as the token of his independence, was placed as an historical memento in the Vienna treasury on April 13, 1785. The ruling classes had been so violently exasperated by these ill-considered measures that after 1788 they began to strive after a union with Prussia, and were ready to place a Prussian prince, or the Duke of Weimar, or even a Prince Croy, upon the Hungarian throne in succession to the Arpads.

The system of the so-called "people's emperor," which had degenerated into a tyrannical form of bureaucracy owing to the exaggerated importance given to the "declaration," ended in complete disruption shortly before the death of Joseph II (February 20, 1790). It required all the wise moderation, skill, and ripe intellectual power of his brother, Leopold II, who was penetrated with the teaching of Machiavelli, to preserve the delicate organism of the Hapsburg monarchy from dissolution without giving up the most important privileges of the crown. The agreement with Prussia at Reichenbach (July 27, 1790) paved the way for the Leopold restoration. The two years' government of this admirable prince (d. March 1, 1792) effected so much that Austria-Hungary was able to survive the terrible shock of the Revolution War and the campaigns of Napoleon. But the spirit of distrust aroused by Joseph's destructive rule had rooted itself so deeply in Hungary that the understanding between the nation and the ruling house was troubled by insuperable difficulties during the nineteenth century, and could only be restored after a bitter war of revolution (1848-1849).
9. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRUSSIAN KINGDOM

The fate of a State is entirely dependent upon the individuality of its princes. Even in republics it is impossible for mediocrities to hold the reins of power without inflicting permanent loss upon the nation. Monarchies vary in importance with the capacities of their rulers. Prussia has to thank the Hohenzollerns for the rapidity of her rise. In modern times we look in vain for a family which had produced four important statesmen endowed with creative powers within two centuries. These were the elector Frederick William and the first king of the same name, and the kings Frederick II and William I; and of these four Zollerns, the Great Elector and the Great Fritz (see the plate facing p. 536) were men of genius.

A. FREDERICK WILLIAM I

It was a long time before Frederick William I (1713–1740) gained the reputation of a really great king. The period of the Declaration, with its many false ideas upon the nature of the State, did not point him out for praise. It took his own son a considerable time to appreciate his merits. But we from our point of view can see clearly how much Prussia and the German nation owes to him. We see that he strengthened the State, without which there could have been no German unity, and made it able to struggle for its existence; that his son would never have become "the Great," had he not been educated as he was. If it be true that the German schoolmasters prepared the way for the great victories of the nineteenth century, then Frederick William was their prototype,—the greatest schoolmaster who ever educated a people and made them equal to the tasks of life. Education of this kind he had none. At the court of his parents there was no one to sympathise with the lofty aspirations which rose in him, and what he saw there only filled him with repugnance. The extravagance which he could not curb incited him to habits of economy, which his mother considered miserly, and condemned in no measured terms. In his early youth he had learned to keep an eye upon every department of business, a training which enabled him successfully to track embezzlement to its source. When he returned from the Netherland campaign of 1710, with energy and insight fully matured, he overthrew the system of Augustus, Count of Sayn-Wittgenstein, and John Casimir Kolbe of Wartenberg, whereby the public funds had been irresponsibly squandered. To his action is also to be ascribed the banishment of these two untrustworthy ministers from court and country (end of December, 1710).

When he entered upon his royal office, Frederick William I astounded the whole world by the rapidity and the radical nature of his reforms. The Prussians looked upon him as a tyrant, the outside world laughed at him and considered him as scarce responsible for his actions. A strange kind of court, where the State horses were sold, the silver plate melted down, the highest dignitaries fined or treated as common criminals for inaccuracy in their accounts! Was it seemly for a king to rise betimes and spend hours over deeds and accounts, revise expenditure and drill recruits? Should he walk into the houses of the Berlin citizens at dinner-time, taste the food as it was placed on the table, and inquire how much each dish cost? The valuable results of his energy were lost sight of in the consideration of his
more obvious demerits,—a furious and unbridled temper, bursts of indiscriminating passion, an exasperating suspicion of members of the family as of officials,—demerits concerning which the most sinister rumours went about. His wife, Sophie Dorothea of Hanover, was largely to blame for the false reports of Frederick William which were to be heard at almost every court in Europe. She objected to the primitive manners which the king favoured, and considered the lack of etiquette and the painful stinginess of the court economy as insulting and degrading to herself. The elder children, Frederica Sophia Wilhelmina, born July 3, 1709 (Countess of Bayreuth after 1731), and the crown prince, born January 24, 1712, were materially influenced by the exasperation of their mother at their father's apparent sternness and cruelty.

However, at the end of the first decade of the new government it could not be denied that this extraordinary monarch with his corporal's cane had completed a great task. Debts had been paid, the treasury was full, a standing army was in existence the like of which was not to be seen anywhere in Europe, and a centralised system of government had been introduced, which was invariably reliable and accurate in its working and was equal to any demands upon it. The Prussian king was not confronted with such great difficulties as those which hampered Joseph II in his no less ardent zeal for reform. But it must not be forgotten that the Great Elector had already done away with the claims and privileges of the provinces, that the position of the Hohenzollerns in Prussia was utterly unlike that of the Hapsburgs in Hungary, that the lords of Cleves and of the Mark could be routed with even less expenditure of force than was needed to deal with the Belgian communes, and finally, that a common faith and nationality made a secure foundation for the construction of a uniform system of administration.

In spite of these advantages, Frederick William I's early attempts to introduce this wonderfully organised administration were not entirely successful. He made mistakes, and often saw his hopes frustrated. A separate financial department for civil and for military necessities proved to be an impracticable arrangement. "The fact that the duties of the officials were often coincident or conflicting occasioned confusion, and laid unnecessary burdens upon the subject." The king readily admitted this fact; he brought the causes of distress in the several districts before the notice of the government officials, and on December 20, 1722, he resolved upon the constitution of a General Directory, which should henceforward control the whole of the financial business. The advantages of this centralisation soon became obvious to the taxpayers.

Especially beneficial in its effects was the clearness and simplicity of the administration of justice, and the certainty of obtaining justice, which was felt by every one of the king's subjects, no matter what his position. The confidence of the subject was gained by the keen supervision maintained by the king himself over every official and every department. He knew the needs of his people from his own experience and from his frequent interviews with representatives of the most varied classes of society. No social question was ever overlooked or neglected by him. He provided for the support of the poor, drove gipsies and vagabonds out of the country, opposed the encroachments of the privileged citizen classes in the towns, and freed handicrafts from the restrictions imposed by the guilds. That which the common sense and supervision of one man could do for the discovery and reform of abuses was done by this king; he had no theoretical training to
guide him, but he had an unusual power of appreciating economic conditions, and was therefore able to free the productive forces of his realm from restrictions and to make them in the highest degree serviceable.

Frederick William was not a "soldier king," although he considered himself to be such, as indeed he was called by the numbers of curious visitors who arrived from all parts to see the giant grenadiers at Berlin and to marvel at the complicated manoeuvres which were then practised by every arm of the service. At any rate he attached the highest importance to the Prussian military forces. He knew perfectly well how it was that his grandfather had been able to turn an influential province into a European monarchy. He recognised that the new German kingdom must compensate for the small extent of its territory by the strength of its armament. As he desired a large and powerful army, he concentrated his political talents upon questions of administration, for he saw correctly that a great military power can only be founded by a well-built and carefully administered State. His father had had scarce thirty thousand men under arms, and even with these had been able to play a very considerable part in the great War of Succession. But he dared not pursue his advantages to the uttermost, because he was unable to cope with an alliance of foreign powers. So early as 1725, Frederick William was able to call out an army of sixty-four thousand men at shorter notice than any other power, and his troops were better equipped and trained than the Austrians or the French. At his death, the standing army consisted of sixty-six battalions of infantry, one hundred and fourteen squadrons with eighteen thousand five hundred and sixty horse, six companies of field artillery, four companies of garrison artillery, and forty-three engineer officers. This was the army of a great power.

By the canton regulation of May 1 and September 15, 1733, service in the royal regiments was made compulsory upon the larger part of the population, so that a supply of recruits and of material for further levies was guaranteed. Even in the first year of his reign Frederick II was able to raise the number of battalions from sixty-six to eighty-three. And all these troops were armed on a uniform system, admirably drilled, trained in quick firing, and able to be in marching order within twelve days. When Maria Theresa came to the throne, the effective strength of the Austrian army was one hundred and seven thousand infantry and thirty-two thousand cavalry. But the concentration of these forces was a matter of great difficulty; the various items of equipment were by no means complete, the commissariat was hampered by lack of funds. Hence the Austrian forces were by no means superior to the Prussian.

However, Frederick William's attention was not concentrated solely upon increasing the numbers and improving the efficiency of his army; he was also able to secure a higher social position for his officers than was held by the officers of any other continental army. He was the first officer upon the throne. In the Prussia of his time the officer's uniform became the king's State dress, and gained a high prestige from that custom. Under him the nobility of his territories, especially those east of the Elbe, became permanently connected with the army, as only by military service could they come under the king's special notice or lay claims to special distinction. Notwithstanding the roughness with which Frederick William was pleased to express his sentiments, he raised the standard of honour among his officers, and strictly maintained it at a high level. The officer was obliged to obey his superior without question, but to this obedience the condition was attached
that his "honour should remain intact." Such a spirit was infused into the rank and file, that a soldier upon furlough would parade his connection with the army before his village companions with pride. The military forces which Frederick William left to his son were penetrated by a strong sense of their common unity.

He never himself employed the weapon which he had forged. In 1715, when he began the Pomeranian campaign against Charles XII of Sweden, in which he gained Further Pomerania as far as the Peene, Usedom, and Wollin, the principles of his military organisation had not brought forth their fruit and his great work had hardly been begun. In later years he succumbed to the influence of the diplomacy peculiar to the period, with its restless striving after alliance, its intricate complexity of compacts and guarantees; and even when his claims were entirely justified, he hesitated to throw his power into the political balance. We may well ask what would have been the position of the Great Elector in Europe if he had had money and troops at his disposal to the same extent as his grandson. Frederick William's last days were saddened by a bitter disappointment. He had concluded the convention of Berlin with Austria, which had been brought about by the dexterity of Frederick Henry, Count of Seckendorff, on December 23, 1728, in the conviction that the interests of the Houses of Hohenzollern and Hapsburg were at one. He had fulfilled his promises, and it was through his efforts that the Pragmatic Sanction had been recognised throughout the empire. But the conviction was forced upon him that the emperor would not help him to his rights in the matter of the Juliers' inheritance, the acquisition of Berg and Ravenstein. He was unable to free himself from the network of intrigue with which he was surrounded. However, after long doubts and years of devouring anxiety, he at length became convinced of the inspiring fact that in his son he could behold "his future avenger."

The education of this son, his struggle with his weaknesses, real or imaginary, the painful cure which he imposed for the feeble spirit, the vacillating will of this youth, whose more refined disposition seemed to arouse in his father wishes incapable of accomplishment, even foolish and immoral,—the whole of this story might form the basis for a powerful drama. It was not a cruel amusement in which the father indulged at the expense of a child whom he could not understand: it was the execution of a duty which he felt incumbent upon himself as king, which was forced upon him by his theory and conception of the monarch's position. The tendencies to distraction, to study of current literature and art, the desire for comfort and display, which Frederick William observed in the crown prince, filled him with anger, drove him to abuse and chastise the young man striving for independence, whom he thought it his duty to hate, though he had a warm love for him in the depths of his heart. His father's degrading treatment and the contempt which he showed toward him before all the courtiers and before his military suite drove Frederick to attempt flight at the beginning of August, 1730, in his eighteenth year. Desertion was the king's name for this unfortunate plan, which was nothing more than an effort for self-help. A court-martial was appointed to determine the life or death of the future king. In durance vile, Frederick was obliged to await their decision upon his future. On November 6, 1730, he was forced to behold the execution of his confidential friend, Hans Hermann of Katte, and to have upon his conscience the terrible burden of the death of a true, courageous, and devoted man.

After the inconceivable anguish of these events, it became possible for him to
find consolation and renewed pleasure in life by working at the study of the administration in the Kœstrin military and departmental offices (from November 20, 1730). The king's expectations of him are shown by his few words to the Senechal von Wolden. 'He is to do exactly as I desire, to get French and English ways out of his head, and anything else that is not Prussian; he is to be loyal to his lord and father, to have a German heart, to cease from foppery and from French, political, damnable falsity; he should pray diligently to God for His grace and keep the same ever before him, for then will God so dispose all things as to be opportune and eternally serviceable to him.' The change in the king's temper, the renewal of his confidence in his son, was brought about by the latter's straightforward repentance and confession that he had done wrong and had led astray the accomplice in his attempted flight. Then followed the heavy trial of marrying a wife he did not love, whom his father had chosen for him, the Duchess Elizabeth Christine of Brunswick-Bevern. This great sacrifice was made on June 12, 1733. In the end he was able to live with his wife, if not in complete happiness, at any rate without disagreement, and at times with something of sympathy. His father, too, no longer opposed his mental development, his philosophical and scientific studies, his interest in art; for he recognised that Frederick was a thoroughly efficient officer and an excellent regimental commander. Upon his deathbed (May 31, 1740), Frederick William could say to the officers whom he had summoned to take leave of him, "Has not God been gracious to me, in giving me so brave and noble a son?" In the dreams which came to this son, when he found himself opposed to the armies of Europe, he once met his father, as Reinhold Koser relates, at Charlottenburg. He had been fighting against Marshal Daun. "Have I borne myself well?" he asked; and Frederick William replied, "Yes." "Well, then, I am satisfied; your approval is worth more to me than that of the whole world."

B. Frederick II, The Great

The foundations for the rise of Prussia to the status of a great power had been laid by Frederick William. Frederick II (1740–1786) recognised the full extent of what had been done, and put the State to that proof of its strength which was to make its importance manifest to Europe at large. This importance consisted in its capacity for carrying out the intentions which had been declared in the foundation of its system; namely, effective resistance to a superior number of great powers. However, the immediate object was the aggrandisement of Prussia in the Oder district, the strengthening of the central district, in which the electorate itself had risen, the strengthening of the marks on the Havel and the Spree, the securing of Berlin by pushing forward the frontier toward the southeast. There lay the Silesian principality with an evangelical population closely related to that of the Marks. For three hundred years the Hohenzollerns had been turning their eyes in this direction. In 1523 they had bought the duchy of Jägerndorf; in 1537 they had concluded an hereditary alliance with Frederick II, the Duke of Liegnitz, Sigtuna, and Wohldau whereby the Great Elector in 1686 had fondly hoped to acquire the Schleswig district. He had been deceived, as his son had promised to restore this insignificant strip of territory to Austria after his father's death. In 1694 Austria insisted upon her rights, and did not spare the elector—to whom she was afterwards obliged to concede the title of king—the shame of this
compulsory transference. She was formally within her rights; but it was an act of indiscretion which led to disastrous results. By statutes and judgments a State can be neither created nor upheld. Moreover, the period had long since passed by when the affairs of the individual, and especially personal claims to the inheritance and amalgamation of territories, could be of decisive importance in such questions as these. Such claims were only made as a means of proposing those demands which a State was obliged to make by virtue of its own necessities. The conception of "rounding off territories as was expedient" was bound up with the practice of "adjustment of conflicting interests," which had become naturalised in every court since the time when the European powers had bid against one another for the Spanish inheritance.

A few months after Frederick had ascended the throne, the male line of the Hapsburgs became extinct (October 20, 1740). He had no objection to seeing the Hapsburg territories pass undivided to the successor; he was even ready to lend the support of his army; but he demanded a quid pro quo, a cession of territory, which would have enabled his own State to carry on an independent policy regardless of its powerful neighbours. He desired the immediate cession of Lower Silesia, and in return for this he was ready to waive those rights to the Juliers inheritance which his father had so highly valued. It is a matter of indifference to the patriotic historian whether the proofs were sound or not which the old professor Johann Peter von Ludewig put together in Halle in favour of the Brandenburg rights to the four Silesian principalities; and the question of right is of no importance to the attempt to form a judgment of the character of the young king. Certainly the question was neither simple nor straightforward, and both sides may have well believed in the justice of their respective claims. If Frederick was convinced that it was his duty to protect the interests of his house in Silesia, patriots will not blame him for seizing the opportunity of making good his demands. To us it appears a more important fact that he looked to the rights of his State as arising out of his help to his neighbour, to whom his house had rendered important services, which he had recently declared himself ready to continue to the same or even greater extent.

Thus we can easily understand the king's anxiety to turn a favourable political situation to the best advantage. It is no less easy to understand his resolution to secure himself in the possession of Silesia by force of arms, before the negotiations with Austria had begun, because the political talent which has conceived a plan at once begins to calculate the means available for carrying it into execution, and because, of all the means whereby territory may be acquired, seizure is undoubtedly the easiest and the most certain. Frederick II could not presume that his invasion of Silesia (December 16, 1740) would inevitably lead to war. But for war he was prepared if Austria should reject his demands.

As a matter of fact, he was obliged to employ the whole of the yet untied power of his State to gain possession of Silesia, and therefore exposed himself to the danger of collapse and total ruin. His action is not to be justified by the intrinsic worth of Silesia, but by the enormous importance attaching to the accomplishment of his own will and the maintenance of the claims which he had preferred. The three Silesian wars are something more than a struggle for Silesia. They are the struggle for the success of Prussian policy; that is, the creation of a new German great power. Of final importance for the result was the solid-
arity of the Prussian system of government, the loyalty and capability of its people in all the emergencies of war and of peace, the moral strength and military qualifications of the king. As a leader the great Fritz not only saved his Prussian kingdom from destruction, but also won the hearts of the Germans. For how long a time had there been no warrior to rejoice the heart of every honest German? Not since Warsaw and Fehrbellin (see the plate facing this page, “Frederick William the Great Elector, and Frederick the Great”). The little Savoyard had dealt hard blows, Guido Starhemberg had directed many a fierce charge, splendid songs were sung of Marlborough at Malplaquet, but none of these possessed the popularity which Frederick the Great enjoyed. What made so deep an impression was the fact that the fate of the king himself was wholly contingent upon the result of his battles. The same phenomenon recurs in the case of Napoleon I. Moreover, it was a new art of war which Frederick had learned, an art which in some respects developed before the eyes of his contemporaries as he practised it.

No poet and no painter has yet escaped the critic’s censure, and the truth holds good of every general and strategist. “Strategy is not a science,” as Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-Ingelheimen shows; “it is an art, which must be inborn.” Strength of character, power of decision, is an element indispensable to strategical capacity. Study may improve a man’s powers, but it cannot make him a strategist. To this he must be born. Frederick the Great was a born strategist. He certainly did not gain much advantage by study; he learned the art of war by waging it. It is by no means generally admitted that he was a master in the art of war. His nearest relation, his brother Prince Henry (1726–1802), has given vent to the severest stricture upon his methods, without consideration for the fact that such criticisms recoiled upon himself. Now he is said to have been always ready to give battle; again, we are told in confidence that he was a coward at heart. Frederick William Ernest of Gaudy and George Henry of Berenhorst impute all kinds of errors to him with the intention of rehabilitating his generals, to whom many a defeat is to be ascribed. The contemporaries of Frederick the Great never realised the great strides which the art of war made under him. Napoleon was the first to give him his due merit. Frederick abandoned the system of keeping the enemy occupied by a number of concurrent operations, of inflicting a blow here and there, of driving him out of his positions and so gradually gaining ground. The destruction of his enemy’s main power was the object which he invariably kept in view. “Throughout the Seven Years’ War, in every one of the battles which he planned — battles far more decisive than any of Napoleon’s combinations — the object in view was the utter destruction of the hostile army. Such especially was the case at Prague and at Leuthen, where the plan of destruction proved entirely successful. So also at Zorndorf, at Kunersdorf, and even at Kolin; to a less extent at Rossbach, where it was necessary to take immediate advantage of a sudden favourable opportunity, produced by instantaneous decision.” — Theodor von Bernhardi.

(a) The First Two Silesian Wars. — The first Silesian war coincided with the Bavarian invasion of Upper Austria and the Franco-Bavarian attempt in Bohemia. The Field-Marshal General Kurt Christoph von Schwerin won the battle of Mollwitz (April 10, 1741) chiefly owing to the admirable manoeuvring powers and the excellent firing drill of the Prussian infantry. At Chotusitz-Caslav (May 17, 1742) it was the king’s generalship which brought the campaign to a
FREDERICK WILLIAM THE GREAT ELECTOR

(After an Etching of Antoine Masson.)


Masson's copper-plate was ordered for "Les Césars de l'empereur Juliens, traduit du grec" (Paris, Denys Thierry, 1683) by Ezekiel Spanheim, a jurist of Geneva, who stayed at Paris after 1680 in Frederick William's service as ambassador extraordinary of Brandenburg and dedicated to the Great Elector his French translation of the "Alexandrines" by Julianus Apostata, which was illustrated with numerous facsimiles of coins. The inscription to the portrait which formed the frontispiece of this work runs as follows:

Tel est de ce héros le port et le visage, sur les plus grands Césars il a tout l'avantage
de l'Empire Germain le solsien et l'honneur du prix de la vertu, du prix de la valeur.

Spanheim's library was bought by Frederick I, and incorporated in the royal library at Berlin.
FREDERICK THE GREAT

(After an Etching of Johann Georg Wille.)

The Great King. After the engraving of Antoine Pesne’s picture by Johann Georg Wille, engraver on copper (born 1715 at Obernithle at Dinsberg in Hesse, was in Paris at an early age, was strongly influenced by the French school, and died at Paris in the year 1808).

(Partly after the collection entitled “Copper and Wood Engravings of the Old Masters,” illustrated, published by the directors of the Royal Press with the collaboration of Dr. F. Lippmann, Director of the Royal copper-plate cabinet in Berlin.)
favourable issue. He it was who decided upon the timely retreat from Moravia; he personally carried out the opportune junction with the younger Leopold (Maximilian II) of Anhalt-Dessau. The battle was decided by the invincible steadiness of the Prussian battalions. Surprising had been the rapidity of the king's attack upon Silesia, and no less surprising to the allies was the one-sided peace of Breslau, in which for the first time the possession of Silesia was promised to him. In calm confidence as to his own strength, he paid no attention to the irritation and the reproaches of France. He knew that his co-operation in the general war would meet with glad approval, should he find himself again obliged to take up arms.

The conventions which Maria Theresa concluded with England, Saxony, and Sardinia aroused his anxiety for Silesia. On June 5, 1744, he concluded a fresh alliance with France, at Versailles, and invaded Bohemia, the second Silesian war. In the autumn he was obliged to evacuate the country. However, by a brilliant victory at Hohenfriedeberg (June 4, 1745) he shattered the hopes of his destruction which had been entertained by the quadruple alliance (Austria, Saxony, England, and Holland). The decision and the simplicity of his arrangements had revived the confidence of the army in the leader whom they did not yet understand. He was able quietly to observe the advance of the Austrian and Saxon armies over the mountains, until he made a night march from Schweidnitz and attacked the enemy before they could concentrate. The Saxons were overthrown at Striegau before the Austrians could get into line of battle. They began the fight when they had completed this operation, with their customary loyalty and bravery, but could not resist the fury of the Prussian cavalry; the dragoon regiment "Bayreuth," under Lieutenant-General Frederick Leopold von Gessler, made a wonderful charge. The victories of Soor (September 30) and of Kesselsdorf (December 15) so decisively proved the superiority of the Prussian arms, that the empress was again forced to yield Silesia in the peace of Dresden (December 25, 1745). Frederick did not attempt to disturb the position of the Austrian House in Germany. Brandenburg-Prussia also recognised the dignity of Franz Stephan I, the husband of Maria Theresa.

(b) The Seven Years' War. — Even till recent times, the most divergent opinions have been held upon the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, which Prussia began by invading Saxony, August 28, 1756. The question is, whether the compact concluded between Austria, France, and Russia (the compact of Versailles, signed at Jassy, May 1, 1756) aimed at war with Prussia under any conditions, so that Frederick was forced to anticipate the attack of an overwhelming force, or whether Frederick made the existence of an alliance which in no way threatened himself an excuse for carrying out the conquest of Saxony, upon which he had determined long before. Prussian opinion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, being able to adduce evidence from the king's confidential advisers, has pointed to Lieutenant-General Hans Karl von Winterfeldt as the instigator of the plan, and declared that the remonstrances of Schwerin and of Wolf Frederick were thwarted by his violent persistence. This latter idea is not consistent with the king's character, and the evidence adduced does not justify the heavy strictures passed upon his policy of incorporation. On January 16, 1756, the compact of Westminster was concluded at Whitehall between Prussia and England, which it was hoped would
bring about a rapprochement with Russia, at that time in alliance with England. Even Frederick could hardly have foreseen that the only result of the compact would be to arouse Elizabeth's dissent and to cause the withdrawal of France. Nor would any one maintain that if Frederick had not himself anticipated the outbreak of hostilities, Prussia would have been left in undisturbed possession of Silesia, and that the policy of Count Kaunitz would have made it unnecessary for him to defend his acquisition. It was impossible to pass by this short cut through the protracted operation of defining the internal relations of Germany; and whether the path was entered earlier or later, is a question of very minor importance.

Entirely independent of this question is the deep impression made by Frederick's personality upon the German nation. That impression is founded upon the fact that the great king and his loyal people fought for seven years against the five greatest powers, who in mere point of numbers were far superior to them,—Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, and the German Empire,—that they survived the bitter struggle, and were not crushed to the earth. Whether Prussia had only herself to thank for the war, or whether it was forced upon her by her enemies, the fact remains that it was a heroic fight of the weak against the strong, which excites admiration and has caught the fancy and imagination of those contemporary with it. "A true instinct guided the German people even in paths where the way could not be clearly seen or the landmarks noted; that instinct taught them that upon this struggle their all was staked, that once again the past, as in the Thirty Years' War, was summoning all her strength to destroy the future of Germany. Every mind which strove to cast away the narrow trammels of German intellectual life at that time, and to rise to a future of greater freedom, splendour, and beauty, ranged itself upon Frederick's side,—the youthful Goethe and the older Lessing, who had now risen to the full height of his powers."—Th. von Bernhardi.

At the outset the war was brilliantly successful. Saxony was occupied and its army forced to surrender at Pirna, October 16, 1756. By the victory of Lobositz on October 1, Frederick opened the way for his march into Bohemia. On May 6, 1757, he defeated the Austrians at Prague (in which battle Count Schwerin was killed), advanced to besiege the town, and then turned upon the army which was advancing to its relief under Field-Marshal Leopold Joseph Count Daun.

At Kolin (June 18, 1757) his impetuous advance received its first check. The victory of the Austrians is to be ascribed rather to the bravery and endurance of their troops, especially those of Saxony, than to the combinations of the general, and principally to the fact that Prince Moritz of Anhalt-Dessau misunderstood an important order from the king, and made a movement which thwarted his plans. This victory speedily freed Bohemia from the enemy. After the defeat, which had utterly crushed the spirit of his generals, Frederick alone retained his perspicacity and presence of mind. He saw that he must give up the bold offensive movements which he had hitherto carried out, and act upon a general method of defence, to be maintained by offensive measures upon occasion. However, he did not give up the advantages to be gained by keeping his troops in the enemy's country until the last moment, and remained in Bohemia until he was forced to retreat upon the Lausitz by the advance of Prince Charles Alexander of Lorraine and Bar upon Silesia.

Frederick left his brother Augustus William (the father of Frederick William II) in charge of the defence of the line of the Oder, and having successfully induced,
the Austrians to give battle at Zittau, he crossed the Elbe at Dresden, in order to repulse Prince Charles of Rohan-Soubise, who had joined the imperial army under the Field-Marshal Prince Joseph Frederick William of Saxony-Hildburghausen. Their advance upon the Elbe was an important movement, in view of the fact that the English-Hanoverian army had been defeated by a French army under Marshal Louis François Armand Duplessis, Duke of Richelieu, and had been forced to capitulate at Zevon on September 8. Frederick, however, had already determined to act on the defensive only against the French, and to attack the Austrians, who were making rapid progress in Silesia, when Soubise and Hildburghausen gave him the opportunity of fighting the battle of Rossbach (November 5, 1757), one of the most welcome victories which was ever gained by a German army. Frederick's intellectual superiority made it an easy task for him to cut through the slow enveloping movement of his opponents by a single adroit manoeuvre. The brilliant charge of the Seydlitz cavalry then routed and put to flight the forty-three thousand men who were attacking eight thousand five hundred Prussians. The French fled to Hesse and Frankfort, the imperial troops to Franconia.

The danger of losing the whole of Silesia was now extreme, and a movement was accordingly made in that direction. The brilliant raid of the Austrian hussars to Berlin under the Lieutenant Field-Marshal Andreas Hadik had no real military importance, but it showed with appalling clearness how far the enemy's lines had been pushed toward the capital. Two months later the army commanded by the Duke Augustus William of Brunswick-Bevern had been several times defeated by the Austrians and driven back to the walls of Breslau. On November 22, 1757, they were there attacked in their entrenchments and forced to retreat from the right bank of the Oder. As the king was hastening from Saxony to Silesia, he was met by messages of misfortune upon misfortune: first, the loss of the battle, and two days later the capture of the Duke of Bevern and the surrender of Breslau without attempt at resistance.

On December 2 Frederick joined Hans Joachim of Zieten at Parchwitz, who brought him the remains of the defeated army. Frederick's forces now amounted to twenty-two thousand infantry, twelve thousand cavalry, ninety-six light battalion guns, and seventy-one pieces of heavier artillery. The only possibility of saving Silesia lay in striking a decisive blow. Who before Frederick would have dared the venture? However, his mind was made up, even before the Austrians had determined to march against him. Charles of Lorraine had urged the policy of attack, in spite of the advice of the cautious Daun, who would have preferred to await the king in security at Breslau. Charles seems not to have desired to bring about a battle, but to have been convinced that Frederick would be forced to evacuate Silesia forthwith, when he found the vastly superior Austrian army in motion against him (it consisted of ninety thousand men, including the Württemberg and Bavarian contingents). On December 5, 1757, the king saw from Heidau the long battle line of his enemy, extended over the space of a German mile. Before their eyes Frederick concentrated almost his entire force against the Austrian left wing, after his own left had made a successful attack upon the Saxon advanced guard, which was not pushed home. Daun and the Duke Charles did not perceive Frederick's plan when their left wing under Franz Leopold of Nádasdy was vigorously attacked and thrown back upon the centre at Leuthen. When the duke brought up reinforcements from the right wing, the cavalry of
Count Luechesi were broken by the charge of sixty Prussian squadrons under the Lieutenanr-General George William of Driesen, who had been standing under cover. There was then no protection for Nádasdy and the centre, and an utter rout was the consequence. The Austrians lost twenty-one thousand men (twelve thousand of them prisoners), one hundred and sixteen guns, fifty-one standards, and four thousand wagons. The price paid by the Prussians for the victory was six thousand three hundred men and two hundred officers.

The result of the victory of Leuthen, the most complete and remarkable which Frederick ever gained, was only equalled by the skill with which it had been won. The king had directed his blow against the hostile power, so as to drive it from the Bohemian line of retreat in a northeasterly direction, and the defeat consequently produced entire confusion. Charles of Lorraine only brought thirty-five thousand men back with him across the mountains. Eighteen thousand fled to Breslau, where they were forced to surrender on December 21. The whole of Silesia was evacuated as far as Schweidnitz. The action of a leader of genius, who addresses himself to the heaviest tasks, and at the decisive moment calmly chooses the means calculated to produce the required result, was never more brilliantly displayed. The victor of Leuthen was henceforward indestructible.

The campaign of 1757 is typical of the whole war. The king acted prematurely in supposing that the retreat of the Russians from Prussia implied their retirement from the alliance with Austria. By calling up the division of the old Field-Marshal Hans von Lehwald he made the kingdom the theatre of the war from that time onward. In spite of the redoubled attack of the Lieutenant-General Frederick William von Seydlitz, he was unable to gain a victory at Zorndorf (August 25, 1758). He could not avoid the defeat inflicted by Daun at Hochkirch, October 14, 1758, who outnumbered him by two to one. During the war of 1759 Laudon’s victory at Kunersdorf on the Oder (12th August) seemed to make the downfall of Prussia inevitable; for on September 4 Dresden was evacuated by General Karl Christoph, Count of Schmettau, and on November 21 the Lieutenant-General Frederick Augustus von Finck capitulated at Maxen. But the allies did not prosecute their advantage; they were restrained by their fears of the Prussian king’s rapidity of decision, and confined themselves to a tentative advance, when success was only to be attained by a bold venture.

Until the autumn of 1760 Frederick was able to prevent the junction of the armies of Laudon and Daun. The amalgamation of these forces would have been his inevitable ruin. On August 15 he succeeded in checking Laudon at Liegnitz. On November 3 fortune smiled upon him at Torgau, where Zieten snatched a victory from the Austrians which they had thought within their grasp, and forced Daun to retreat upon Dresden. In 1761, ill-feeling between Laudon and Alexander Borissovitch Baturin saved him from being overwhelmed by one hundred and thirty thousand Austrians and Russians at Bunzelwitz (August 18 to September 9). There was no other decisive battle. The enemy surrounded the weak and wounded lion; but they dared not grapple with him in a death struggle. The war ran its course in skirmishes and manoeuvring until the death of the Empress Elizabeth (January 5, 1762) and the definite retirement of Russia brought its conclusion near.

The peace of Hubertusburg (February 15, 1763) caused no change in the distribution of territory in Germany. However, it secured Prussia for the third time
in possession of Silesia, and so paid her the price for which she had spent her power. The imperial throne was secured to the house of Maria Theresa. With the assent of Brandenburg her son was elected at Frankfort, March 27, 1764; but this imperial dignity had no real existence, it was no longer a political office, but merely the expression of a tradition, the memorial of a power which had passed away. In north Germany a new power had arisen, vigorous and unconstrained, its evangelical people living under one constitution and welded together by a devoted struggle of unexampled duration, which was destined to take the lead of the German peoples and to assemble them under its banner.

Frederick, King of Prussia, has become a German national hero, however little he may have desired that honour. He did not appreciate the future open to the nation which admired him, and whose poets sang his praises; but he made his will to be law from the Baltic to the Alps. The destiny of the Hohenzollerns was not yet accomplished. A century was to pass by before the will of the nation made them the guardians of its honour and power, and bound up its fortunes indissolubly with theirs. And the road travelled to that goal was the road marked out by the Great Elector and the Great Frederick, the road of force and ruthlessness, by which most modern States have travelled.
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