EDUCATION

Intellectual, Moral, and Physical

BY

HERBERT SPENCER

READING-CIRCLE EDITION

With Notes, Criticisms, and a Topical Index for Reviews

SYRACUSE, N. Y.

C. W. BARDEEN, PUBLISHER

1894

Copyright, 1894, by C. W. Bardeen
There are three Englishmen who have written so well that, as it seems, they will be read by English-speaking teachers of all time. These are Ascham, Locke, and Herbert Spencer. If a teacher does not know these he is not likely to know or care anything about the literature of education.—R. H. Quick.

I agree with Mr. Quick in considering it one of the most important works on education in the English language. I strongly recommend any of you to get it, and to read it with all possible attention.—Joseph Payne.

Mr. Spencer's essay, then deserves the attention of educators. There is scarcely a book in which a keen scent for details comes more agreeably to animate a fund of solid arguments, and from which it is more useful to extract the substance. However, it must not be read save with precaution. The brilliant English thinker sometimes falls in justice and measure, and his bold generalizations need to be tested with care.—Gilbert Compayré.
INTRODUCTION

Herbert Spencer was born in Derby, April 27, 1820. His father, his grandfather, and his uncles were all teachers. His father prepared an "Inventional Geometry", consisting of questions and problems designed to familiarize the pupil with geometrical conceptions, and to exercise his inventive capacity in actual and accurate constructions with instruments. The book has been reprinted in this country, and is still in considerable use.

When Herbert was three years old, his father's health broke down, compelling him to give up his school and remove to Nottingham, where he engaged in lace manufacture. Three or four years later the family returned to Derby, and the father took to private teaching.

Herbert did not learn to read till he was seven, being first attracted to "Sanford and Merton." When afterward he went to school he was inatten-
tive and idle. He was greatly given to games, fishing, birds-nesting, country rambles, gathering wild fruit and mushrooms.

His father did not permit him to be urged, but encouraged him to keep insects through their transformations, and led him into drawing from objects. Subsequently he attended his uncle's school, where he was considered backward in things requiring memory and recitation, but in advance of the rest in intelligence. He was often in disgrace for disobedience. He browsed over his father's library, picking up much varied information, and was encouraged in constructive operations, such as carpentering.

At thirteen (1833) he was sent to another uncle, a Cambridge graduate, but would not be persuaded to go to the university, and prepared to be a civil engineer. He did little in classics, but excelled in mathematics, and though he yielded more than before to discipline he was still in occasional disgrace.

At sixteen (1836) he returned for a year's study at home, and the next year taught for three months as a supply in the school he had first attended. His father wanted him to become a teacher, but that fall he became assistant to a civil-engineer, and spent a year in making surveys and drawings, and in mathematical studies. In 1838 he became an assistant to the engineer of one of the railways, and while here invented the velocimeter.
While here he became interested in geology, and rejected the doctrine of the development of species set forth in Lyell's "Principles". In 1839 he had become a believer in the general idea that all organized beings had arisen by development.

In April, 1841, he came home, and spent two years in miscellaneous study. In the spring of 1843 he went to London hoping to find some literary occupation, but after a temporary engagement as engineer returned to Derby. During 1846, '47, he was occupied with inventions, and contributed papers to scientific periodicals. In 1848 he began writing "Social Statistics", and completed his first volume in 1850, having in the meanwhile become sub-editor of The Economist.

At thirty-five, his health gave way from the intense labor he put upon "The Principles of Psychology" published that year (1855); and when he entered in 1860 upon his philosophical undertaking, laying out twenty years of original work, many thought the project was foolhardy, and must prove fatal. He has, however, published "First Principles" (1862, 1867); "Principles of Biology" (1864); "Principles of Sociology, I–IV (1876–1880); "Data of Ethics" (1879); "Study of Sociology" (1872); "Descriptive Sociology" (1873–78); "Ceremonial Institutions" (1879); "Political Institutions" (1882); "Ecclesiastical Institutions" (1885); "Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative" (4 vols.), etc.,
besides a multitude of magazine articles; and he is still at work. He visited the United States in 1882, and in 1883 was elected corresponding member of the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences to fill the place left vacant by the death of Ralph Waldo Emerson.

His "Education" appeared as a book in 1861, being made up of previous review articles, as stated in the preface. It is undoubtedly the most important and influential treatise upon the subject of the present century.

This edition differs from those that have previously appeared principally in these three features:

(1) Side-indexing throughout the text, making the book more ready of reference;

(2) Notes, with extracts from the principal criticisms upon the book, including those of R. H. Quick, Joseph Payne, W. H. Payne, and Gilbert Compayré;

(3) A minute topical index for reviews.

It is believed that the notes will be found especially valuable. So forceful is Mr. Spencer's style that a young teacher reading the book for the first time might feel that there was no other side to the views presented. By reading the sharp criticisms here given, he will be better prepared to judge of the principles Mr. Spencer lays down, and to defend them, if they are attacked. C. W. Bardeen.

Syracuse, N. Y., 1894.
PREFACE

The four chapters of which this work consists, originally appeared as four Review-articles: the first in the Westminster Review for July, 1859; the second in the North British Review for May, 1854; and the remaining two in the British Quarterly Review, for April, 1858, and for April, 1859. Severally treating different divisions of the subject, but together forming a tolerably complete whole, I originally wrote them with a view to their republication in a united form; and they would some time since have thus been issued, had not a legal difficulty stood in the way. This difficulty being now removed, I hasten to fulfil the intention with which they were written.

That in their first shape these chapters were severally independent, is the reason to be assigned for some slight repetitions which occur in them: one leading idea, more especially, re-appearing twice. As, however, this idea is on each occasion presented under a new form, and as it can scarcely be too much enforced, I have not thought well to omit any of the passages embodying it.

Some additions of importance will be found in
the chapter on Intellectual Education; and in the one on Physical Education there are a few minor alterations. But the chief changes which have been made, are changes of expression: all of the essays having undergone a careful verbal revision.

H. S.

*London, May, 1861.*
CONTENTS

I. What Knowledge is of the Most Worth? 11
II. Intellectual Education, - - - - - - 93
III. Moral Education, - - - - - - - - 163
IV. Physical Education, - - - - - - 225
   Notes, - - - - - - - - - - - - 295
   Topical Analysis, - - - - - - - - 324
EDUCATION

CHAPTER I

WHAT KNOWLEDGE IS OF MOST WORTH?

It has been truly remarked that in order of time decoration precedes dress. Among people who submit to great physical suffering that they may have themselves handsomely tattooed, extremes of temperature are borne with but little attempt at mitigation. Humboldt tells us that an Orinoco Indian, though quite regardless of bodily comfort, will yet labor for a fortnight to purchase pigment wherewith to make himself admired; and that the same woman who would not hesitate to leave her hut without a fragment of clothing on, would not dare to commit such a breach of decorum as to go out unpainted. Voyagers uniformly find that colored beads and trinkets are much more prized by wild tribes than are calicoes or broadcloths. And the anecdotes we have of the ways in which, when shirts and coats are given, they turn them to some ludicrous display, show how completely the idea of ornament predominates over that of use.

(11)
Nay, there are still more extreme illustrations: witness the fact narrated by Capt. Speke of his African attendants, who strutted about in their goat-skin mantles when the weather was fine, but when it was wet, took them off, folded them up, and went about naked, shivering in the rain! Indeed, the facts of aboriginal life seem to indicate that dress is developed out of decorations. And when we remember that even among ourselves most think more about the fineness of the fabric than its warmth, and more about the cut than the convenience—when we see that the function is still in great measure subordinated to the appearance—we have further reason for inferring such an origin.

It is not a little curious that the like relations hold with the mind. Among mental as among bodily acquisitions, the ornamental comes before the useful. Not only in times past, but almost as much in our own era, that knowledge which conduces to personal wellbeing has been postponed to that which brings applause. In the Greek schools, music, poetry, rhetoric, and a philosophy which, until Socrates taught, had but little bearing upon action, were the dominant subjects; while knowledge aiding the arts of life had a very subordinate place. And in our own universities and schools at the present moment the like antithesis holds.
We are guilty of something like a platitude when we say that throughout his after-career a boy, in nine cases out of ten, applies his Latin and Greek to no practical purposes. The remark is trite that in his shop, or his office, in managing his estate or his family, in playing his part as director of a bank or a railway, he is very little aided by this knowledge he took so many years to acquire—so little, that generally the greater part of it drops out of his memory; and if he occasionally vents a Latin quotation, or alludes to some Greek myth, it is less to throw light on the topic in hand than for the sake of effect. If we inquire what is the real motive for giving boys a classical education, we find it to be simply conformity to public opinion. Men dress their children's minds as they do their bodies, in the prevailing fashion. As the Orinoco Indian puts on his paint before leaving his hut, not with a view to any direct benefit, but because he would be ashamed to be seen without it, so a boy's drilling in Latin and Greek is insisted on, not because of their intrinsic value, but that he may not be disgraced by being found ignorant of them—that he may have "the education of a gentleman"—the badge marking a certain social position, and bringing a consequent respect.

This parallel is still more clearly displayed in the case of the other sex. In the treatment of both mind and body the decorative dress to be admired.
element has continued to predominate in a greater degree among women than among men. Originally, personal adornment occupied the attention of both sexes equally. In these latter days of civilization, however, we see that in the dress of men the regard for appearance has in a considerable degree yielded to the regard for comfort; while in their education the useful has of late been trenching on the ornamental. In neither direction has this change gone so far with women. The wearing of earrings, finger-rings, bracelets; the elaborate dressings of the hair; the still occasional use of paint; the immense labor bestowed in making habiliments sufficiently attractive, and the great discomfort that will be submitted to for the sake of conformity, show how greatly, in the attiring of women, the desire of approbation overrides the desire for warmth and convenience.

And similarly in their education, the immense preponderance of "accomplishments" proves how here, too, use is subordinated to display. Dancing, deportment, the piano, singing, drawing—what a large space do these occupy! If you ask why Italian and German are learnt, you will find that, under all the sham reasons given, the real reason is, that a knowledge of those tongues is thought ladylike. It is not that the books written in them may be utilized, which they scarcely ever are, but that Italian and German songs may be
sung, and that the extent of attainment may bring whispered admiration. The births, deaths, and marriages of kings, and other like historic trivialities, are committed to memory, not because of any direct benefits that can possibly result from knowing them, but because society considers them parts of a good education—because the absence of such knowledge may bring the contempt of others. When we have named reading, writing, spelling, grammar, arithmetic, and sewing, we have named about all the things a girl is taught with a view to their actual uses in life; and even some of these have more reference to the good opinion of others than to immediate personal welfare.

Thoroughly to realize the truth that with the mind as with the body the ornamental precedes the useful, it is requisite to glance at its rationale. This lies in the fact that, from the far past down even to the present, social needs have subordinated individual needs, and that the chief social need has been the control of individuals. It is not, as we commonly suppose, that there are no governments but those of monarchs, and parliaments, and constituted authorities. These acknowledged governments are supplemented by other unacknowledged ones, that grow up in all circles, in which every man or woman strives to be king or queen or lesser dignitary. To get above some and be reverenced by them, and to propitiate those who
are above us, is the universal struggle in which the chief energies of life are expended. By the accumulation of wealth, by style of living, by beauty of dress, by display of knowledge or intellect, each tries to subjugate others, and so aids in weaving that ramified network of restraints by which society is kept in order.

It is not the savage chief only, who, in formidable war-paint, with scalps at his belt, aims to strike awe into his inferiors; it is not only the belle who, by elaborate toilet, polished manners, and numerous accomplishments, strives to "make conquests"; but the scholar, the historian, the philosopher, use their acquirements to the same end. We are none of us content with quietly unfolding our own individualities to the full in all directions, but have a restless craving to impress our individualities upon others, and in some way subordinate them.

And this it is which determines the character of our education. Not what knowledge is of most real worth, is the consideration, but what will bring most applause, honor, respect—what will most conduce to social position and influence—what will be most imposing. As, throughout life, not what we are, but what we shall be thought, is the question; so in education, the question is, not the intrinsic value of knowledge, so much as its extrinsic effects on others. And this being our dominant idea, direct utility is scarcely more regarded than by the
barbarian when filing his teeth and staining his nails.

If there requires further evidence of the rude, undeveloped character of our education, we have it in the fact that the comparative worths of different kinds of knowledge have been as yet scarcely even discussed—much less discussed in a methodic way with definite results. Not only is it that no standard of relative values has yet been agreed upon, but the existence of any such standard has not been conceived in a clear manner. And not only is it that the existence of such a standard has not been clearly conceived, but the need for it seems to have been scarcely even felt. Men read books on this topic, and attend lectures on that; decide that their children shall be instructed in these branches of knowledge, and shall not be instructed in those; and all under the guidance of mere custom, or liking, or prejudice; without ever considering the enormous importance of determining in some rational way what things are really most worth learning.

It is true that in all circles we hear occasional remarks on the importance of this or the other order of information. But whether the degree of its importance justifies the expenditure of the time needed to acquire it; and whether there are not things of more importance to which such time might be better devoted; are queries which, if raised at all, are dis-
posed of quite summarily, according to personal predilections.

It is true also, that now and then we hear revived the standing controversy respecting the comparative merits of classics and mathematics. Not only, however, is this controversy carried on in an empirical manner, with no reference to an ascertained criterion, but the question at issue is totally insignificant when compared with the general question of which it is part. To suppose that deciding whether a mathematical or a classical education is the best, is deciding what is the proper *curriculum*, is much the same thing as to suppose that the whole of dietetics lies in ascertaining whether or not bread is more nutritive than potatoes!

The question which we contend is of such transcendent moment, is, not whether such or such knowledge is of worth, but what is its *relative* worth. When they have named certain advantages which a given course of study has secured them, persons are apt to assume that they have justified themselves: quite forgetting that the adequateness of the advantages is the point to be judged.

There is, perhaps, not a subject to which men devote attention that has not *some* value. A year dilligently spent in getting up heraldry, would very possibly give a little further insight into ancient manners and morals, and into the origin of names.
RELATIVE WORTH OF STUDIES

Any one who should learn the distances between all the towns in England, might, in the course of his life, find one or two of the thousand facts he had acquired of some slight service when arranging a journey. Gathering together all the small gossip of a county, profitless occupation as it would be, might yet occasionally help to establish some useful fact—say, a good example of hereditary transmission.

But in these cases, every one would admit that there was no proportion between the required labor and the probable benefit. No one would tolerate the proposal to devote some years of a boy’s time to getting such information, at the cost of much more valuable information which he might else have got. And if here the test of relative value is appealed to and held conclusive, then should it be appealed to and held conclusive throughout. Had we time to master all subjects we need not be particular. To quote the old song:

Could a man be secure
That his days would endure
As of old, for a thousand long years,
What things might he know!
What deeds might he do!
And all without hurry or care.

“But we that have but span-long lives” must ever bear in mind our limited time for acquisition. And remembering how narrowly this time is limited, not only by the shortness of life, but also still more by the business of life, we ought to be especially
solicitous to employ what time we have to the greatest advantage. Before devoting years to some subject which fashion or fancy suggests, it is surely wise to weigh with great care the worth of the results, as compared with the worth of various alternative results, which the same years might bring if otherwise applied.

In education, then, this is the question of questions, which it is high time we discussed in some methodic way. The first in importance, though the last to be considered, is the problem—how to decide among the conflicting claims of various subjects on our attention. Before there can be a rational curriculum, we must settle which things it most concerns us to know; or, to use a word of Bacon's, now unfortunately obsolete—we must determine the relative values of knowledges.

To this end, a measure of value is the first requisite. And happily, respecting the true measure of value, as expressed in general terms, there can be no dispute. Every one in contending for the worth of any particular order of information, does so by showing its bearing upon some part of life. In reply to the question, "Of what use is it?" the mathematician, linguist, naturalist, or philosopher, explains the way in which his learning beneficially influences action—saves from evil or secures good—conduces to happiness.

When the teacher of writing has pointed out how
great an aid writing is to success in business—that is, to the obtainment of sustenance—that is, to satisfactory living—he is held to have proved his case. And when the collector of dead facts (say a numismatist) fails to make clear any appreciable effects which these facts can produce on human welfare, he is obliged to admit that they are comparatively valueless. All then, either directly or by implication, appeal to this as the ultimate test.

How to live?—that is the essential question for us. Not how to live in the mere material sense only, but in the widest sense. The general problem which comprehends every special problem is—the right ruling of conduct in all directions under all circumstances. In what way to treat the body; in what way to treat the mind; in what way to manage our affairs; in what way to bring up a family; in what way to behave as a citizen; in what way to utilize all those sources of happiness which nature supplies—how to use all our faculties to the greatest advantage of ourselves and others—how to live completely? And this being the great thing needful for us to learn, is, by consequence, the great thing which education has to teach. To prepare us for complete living is the function which education has to discharge; and the only rational mode of judging of an educational course is to judge in what degree it discharges such function.
This test, never used in its entirety, but rarely even partially used, and used then in a vague, half conscious way, has to be applied consciously, methodically, and throughout all cases. It behooves us to set before ourselves, and ever to keep clearly in view, complete living as the end to be achieved, so that in bringing up our children we may choose subjects and methods of instruction with deliberate reference to this end. Not only ought we to cease from the mere unthinking adoption of the current fashion in education, which has no better warrant than any other fashion, but we must also rise above that rude, empirical style of judging displayed by those more intelligent people who do bestow some care in overseeing the cultivation of their children’s minds. It must not suffice simply to think that such or such information will be useful in after life, or that this kind of knowledge is of more practical value than that, but we must seek out some process of estimating their respective values, so that as far as possible we may positively know which are most deserving of attention.

Doubtless the task is difficult—perhaps never to be more than approximately achieved. But, considering the vastness of the interests at stake, its difficulty is no reason for pusillanimously passing it by, but rather for devoting every energy to its mastery. And if we only proceed systematically we
may very soon get at results of no small moment.

Our first step must obviously be to classify, in the order of their importance, the leading kinds of activity which constitute human life. They may be naturally arranged into:

1. Those activities which directly minister to self-preservation.

2. Those activities which, by securing the necessities of life, indirectly minister to self-preservation.

3. Those activities which have for their end the rearing and discipline of offspring.

4. Those activities which are involved in the maintenance of proper social and political relations.

5. Those miscellaneous activities which fill up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of the tastes and feelings.

That these stand in something like their true order of subordination it needs no long consideration to show. The actions and precautions by which, from moment to moment, we secure personal safety, must clearly take precedence of all others. Could there be a man, ignorant as an infant of all surrounding objects and movements, or how to guide himself among them, he would pretty certainly lose his life the first time he went into the street: notwithstanding any amount of learning he might have on other matters. And as entire ignorance in all other directions would be less promptly fatal than entire ignorance in this direc-
tion, it must be admitted that knowledge immediately conducive of self-preservation is of primary importance.

That next after direct self-preservation comes the indirect self-preservation which consists in acquiring the means of living, none will question. That a man's industrial functions must be considered before his parental ones, is manifest from the fact that, speaking generally, the discharge of the parental functions is made possible only by the previous discharge of the industrial ones. The power of self-maintenance necessarily preceding the power of maintaining offspring, it follows that knowledge needful for self-maintenance has stronger claims than knowledge needful for family welfare—is second in value to none save knowledge needful for immediate self-preservation.

As the family comes before the State in order of time—as the bringing up of children is possible before the State exists, or when it has ceased to be, whereas the State is rendered possible only by the bringing up of children—it follows that the duties of the parent demand closer attention than those of the citizen. Or, to use a further argument—since the goodness of a society ultimately depends on the nature of its citizens; and since the nature of its citizens is more modifiable by early training than by anything else—we must conclude that the welfare of the family underlies the welfare
of society. And hence knowledge directly conducing to the first, must take precedence of knowledge directly conducing to the last.

Those various forms of pleasurable occupation which fill up the leisure left by graver occupations—the enjoyments of music, poetry, painting, etc.—manifestly imply a pre-existing society. Not only is a considerable development of them impossible without a long-established social union, but their very subject-matter consists in great part of social sentiments and sympathies. Not only does society supply the conditions to their growth, but also the ideas and sentiments they express. And, consequently, that part of human conduct which constitutes good citizenship is of more moment than that which goes out in accomplishments or exercise of the tastes; and, in education, preparation for the one must rank before preparation for the other.

Such then, we repeat, is something like the rational order of subordination:—That education which prepares for direct self-preservation; that which prepares for indirect self-preservation; that which prepares for parenthood; that which prepares for citizenship; that which prepares for the miscellaneous refinements of life. We do not mean to say that these divisions are definitely separable. We do not deny that they are intricately entangled with each other in such way that there
can be no training for any that is not in some measure a training for all. Nor do we question that of each division there are portions more important than certain portions of the preceding divisions; that, for instance, a man of much skill in business but little other faculty, may fall further below the standard of complete living than one of but moderate ability in money-getting but great judgment as a parent; or that exhaustive information bearing on right social action, joined with entire want of general culture in literature and the fine arts, is less desirable than a more moderate share of the one joined with some of the other. But, after making due qualifications, there still remain these broadly-marked divisions; and it still continues substantially true that these divisions subordinate one another in the foregoing order, because the corresponding divisions of life make one another possible in that order.

Of course the ideal of education is—complete preparation in all these divisions. But failing this ideal, as in our phase of civilization every one must do more or less, the aim should be to maintain a due proportion between the degrees of preparation in each. Not exhaustive cultivation in any one, supremely important though it may be; not even an exclusive attention to the two, three, or four divisions of greatest importance; but an attention to all; greatest
where the value is greatest, less where the value is
less, least where the value is least. For the average
man (not to forget the cases in which peculiar apti-
tude for some one department of knowledge rightly
makes pursuit of that one the bread-winning occupa-
tion)—for the average man, we say, the desideratum
is, a training that approaches nearest to perfection in
the things which most subserve complete living, and
falls more and more below perfection in the things
that have more and more remote bearings on com-
plete living.

In regulating education by this standard, there
are some general considerations that should be ever present to us. The worth
of any kind of culture, as aiding complete living,
may be either necessary or more or less contingent.
There is knowledge of intrinsic value; knowledge of
quasi-intrinsic value; and knowledge of conven-
tional value. Such facts as that sensations of numb-
ness and tingling commonly precede paralysis, that
the resistance of water to a body moving through it
varies as the square of the velocity, that chlorine is a
disinfectant,—these, and the truths of Science in gen-
eral, are of intrinsic value: they will bear on human
conduct ten thousand years hence as they do now.

The extra knowledge of our own language, which
is given by an acquaintance with Latin and Greek, may be considered to have a
value that is quasi-intrinsic: it must exist for us
and for other races whose languages owe much to these sources; but will last only as long as our languages last.

While that kind of information which, in our schools, usurps the name History—the mere tissue of names and dates and dead unmeaning events—has a conventional value only: it has not the remotest bearing upon any of our actions, and is of use only for the avoidance of those unpleasant criticisms which current opinion passes upon its absence. Of course, as those facts which concern all mankind throughout all time must be held of greater moment than those which concern only a portion of them during a limited era, and of far greater moment than those which concern only a portion of them during the continuance of a fashion, it follows that in a rational estimate, knowledge of intrinsic worth must, other things equal, take precedence of knowledge that is of quasi-intrinsic or conventional worth.

One further preliminary. Acquisition of every kind has two values—value as knowledge and value as discipline. Besides its use for guidance in conduct, the acquisition of each order of facts has also its use as mental exercise, and its effects as a preparative for complete living have to be considered under both these heads.

These, then, are the general ideas with which we
must set out in discussing a curriculum:—Life as divided into several kinds of activity of successively decreasing importance; the worth of each order of facts as regulating these several kinds of activity, intrinsically, quasi-intrinsically, and conventionally; and their regulative influences estimated both as knowledge and discipline.

A. KNOWLEDGE FOR GUIDANCE

I. SELF-PRESERVATION

Happily, that all-important part of education which goes to secure direct self-preservation, is in great part already provided for. Too momentous to be left to our blundering, Nature takes it into her own hands. While yet in its nurse's arms, the infant, by hiding its face and crying at the sight of a stranger, shows the dawning instinct to attain safety by flying from that which is unknown and may be dangerous; and when it can walk, the terror it manifests if an unfamiliar dog comes near, or the screams with which it runs to its mother after any startling sight or sound, shows this instinct further developed.

Moreover, knowledge subserving direct self-preservation is that which it is chiefly busied in acquiring from hour to hour. How to balance its body; how to control its movements so as to avoid collisions; what objects are hard, and will hurt if struck; what
objects are heavy, and injure if they fall on the limbs; which things will bear the weight of the body, and which not; the pains inflicted by fire, by missiles, by sharp instruments—these, and various other pieces of information needful for the avoidance of death or accident it is ever learning. And when, a few years later, the energies go out in running, climbing, and jumping, in games of strength and games of skill, we see in all these actions by which the muscles are developed, the perceptions sharpened, and the judgment quickened, a preparation for the safe conduct of the body among surrounding objects and movements, and for meeting those greater dangers that occasionally occur in the lives of all.

Being thus, as we say, so well cared for by Nature, this fundamental education needs comparatively little care from us. What we are chiefly called upon to see, is, that there shall be free scope for gaining this experience, and receiving this discipline, that there shall be no such thwarting of Nature as that by which stupid schoolmistresses commonly prevent the girls in their charge from the spontaneous physical activities they would indulge in, and so render them comparatively incapable of taking care of themselves in circumstances of peril.

This, however, is by no means all that is comprehended in the education that prepares for direct self-preservation. Besides guarding the body against mechanical damage or destruction,
it has to be guarded against injury from other causes—against the disease and death that follow breaches of physiologic law. For complete living it is necessary, not only that sudden annihilations of life shall be warded off, but also that there shall be escaped the incapacities and the slow annihilation which unwise habits entail. As, without health and energy, the industrial, the parental, the social, and all other activities become more or less impossible, it is clear that this secondary kind of direct self-preservation is only less important than the primary kind, and that knowledge tending to secure it should rank very high.

It is true that here, too, guidance is in some measure ready supplied. By our various physical sensations and desires Nature has insured a tolerable conformity to the chief requirements. Fortunately for us, want of food; great heat, extreme cold, produce promptings too peremptory to be disregarded. And would men habitually obey these and all like promptings when less strong, comparatively few evils would arise. If fatigue of body or brain were in every case followed by desistance; if the oppression produced by a close atmosphere always led to ventilation; if there were no eating without hunger, or drinking without thirst; then would the system be but seldom out of working order. But so profound an ignorance is there of the laws of life that men do not even know that their sensations are
their natural guides, and (when not rendered morbid by long-continued disobedience) their trustworthy guides. So that though, to speak teleologically, Nature has provided efficient safeguards to health, lack of knowledge makes them in a great measure useless.

If any one doubts the importance of an acquaintance with the fundamental principles of physiology as a means to complete living, let him look around and see how many men and women he can find in middle or later life who are thoroughly well. Occasionally only do we meet with an example of vigorous health continued to old age; hourly do we meet with examples of acute disorder, chronic ailment, general debility, premature decrepitude. Scarcely is there one to whom you put the question, who has not, in the course of his life, brought upon himself illnesses which a little information would have saved him from.

Here is a case of heart disease consequent on a rheumatic fever that followed reckless exposure. There is a case of eyes spoiled for life by overstudy. Yesterday the account was of one whose long-enduring lameness was brought on by continuing, in spite of the pain, to use a knee after it had been slightly injured. And to-day we are told of another who has had to lie by for years because he did not know that the palpitation he suffered under resulted from overtaxed brain. Now we hear of an irremediable
injury that followed some silly feat of strength, and, again, of a constitution that has never recovered from the effects of excessive work needlessly undertaken, while on all sides we see the perpetual minor ailments which accompany feebleness.

Not to dwell on the natural pain, the weariness, the gloom, the waste of time and money thus entailed, only consider how greatly ill-health hinders the discharge of all duties—makes business often impossible, and always more difficult; produces an irritability fatal to the right management of children; puts the functions of citizenship out of the question, and makes amusement a bore. Is it not clear that the physical sins—partly our forefathers' and partly our own—which produce this ill-health, deduct more from complete living than anything else? and to a great extent make life a failure and a burden instead of a benefaction and a pleasure?

To all which add the fact, that life, besides being thus immensely deteriorated, is also cut short. It is not true, as we commonly suppose, that a disorder or disease from which we have recovered leaves us as before. No disturbance of the normal course of the functions can pass away and leave things exactly as they were. In all cases a permanent damage is done—not immediately appreciable, it may be, but still there, and, along with other such items which Nature in her strict account-keeping never drops, it will tell against us to the
inevitable shortening of our days. Through the accumulation of small injuries it is that consti-
tusions are commonly undermined and break down long be-
fore their time. And if we call to mind how far the 
average duration of life falls below the possible 
duration, we see how immense is the loss. When, to 
the numerous partial deductions which bad health en-
tails, we add this great final deduction, it results that 
ordinarily one-half of life is thrown away.

Hence, knowledge which subserves direct self-
preservation by preventing this loss of 
health is of primary importance. We do 
not contend that possession of such knowledge would 
by any means wholly remedy the evil. For it is 
clear that in our present phase of civilization men’s 
necessities often compel them to transgress. And it 
is further clear that, even in the absence of such 
compulsion, their inclinations would frequently lead 
them, spite of their knowledge, to sacrifice future 
good to present gratification. But we do contend 
that the right knowledge impressed in the right way 
would effect much; and we further contend that, 
as the laws of health must be recognized before they 
can be fully conformed to, the imparting of such 
knowledge must precede a more rational living— 
come when that may. We infer that as vigorous 
health and its accompanying high spirits are larger 
elements of happiness than any other things what-
ever, the teaching how to maintain them is a teach-
ing that yields in moment to no other whatever. And therefore we assert that such a course of physiology as is needful for the comprehension of its general truths, and their bearings on daily conduct, is an all-essential part of a rational education.

Strange that the assertion should need making! Stranger still that it should need defending! Yet are there not a few by whom such a proposition will be received with something approaching to derision. Men who would blush if caught saying Iphigénia instead of Iphigenía, or would resent as an insult any imputation of ignorance respecting the fabled labors of a fabled demi-god, show not the slightest shame in confessing that they do not know where the Eustachian tubes are, what are the actions of the spinal cord, what is the normal rate of pulsation, or how the lungs are inflated. While anxious that their sons should be well up in the superstitions of two thousand years ago, they care not that they should be taught anything about the structure and functions of their own bodies—nay, even wish them not to be so taught. So overwhelming is the influence of established routine! So terribly in our education does the ornamental override the useful!

II. Self-Maintenance

We need not insist on the value of that knowledge which aids indirect self-preservation by facilitating the gaining of a livelihood. This is admitted by all, and, indeed, by the mass is
perhaps too exclusively regarded as the end of education. But while every one is ready to endorse the abstract proposition that instruction fitting youths for the business of life is of high importance, or even to consider it of supreme importance, yet scarcely any inquire what instruction will so fit them. It is true that reading, writing, and arithmetic are taught with an intelligent appreciation of their uses, but when we have said this we have said nearly all. While the great bulk of what else is acquired has no bearing on the industrial activities, an immensity of information that has a direct bearing on the industrial activities is entirely passed over.

For, leaving out only some very small classes, what are all men employed in? They are employed in the production, preparation, and distribution of commodities. And on what does efficiency in the production, preparation, and distribution of commodities depend? It depends on the use of methods fitted to the respective natures of these commodities; it depends on an adequate knowledge of their physical, chemical, or vital properties, as the case may be; that is, it depends on Science. This order of knowledge, which is in great part ignored in our school courses, is the order of knowledge underlying the right performance of all those processes by which civilized life is made possible. Undeniable as is this truth, and thrust upon us as it is at every turn, there seems to be no
living consciousness of it: its very familiarity makes it unregarded. To give due weight to our argument we must, therefore, realize this truth to the reader by a rapid review of the facts.

For all the higher arts of construction some acquaintance with Mathematics is indispensable. The village carpenter, who, lacking rational instruction, lays out his work by empirical rules learnt in his apprenticeship, equally with the builder of a Britannia Bridge, makes hourly reference to the laws of quantitative relations. The surveyor on whose survey the land is purchased; the architect in designing a mansion to be built on it; the builder in preparing his estimates; his foreman in laying out the foundations; the masons in cutting the stones, and the various artisans who put up the fittings, are all guided by geometrical truths. Railway-making is regulated from beginning to end by mathematics; alike in the preparation of plans and sections; in staking out the line; in the mensuration of cuttings and embankments; in the designing, estimating, and building of bridges, culverts, viaducts, tunnels, stations. And similarly with the harbors, docks, piers, and various engineering and architectural works that fringe the coasts and overspread the face of the country, as well as the mines that run underneath it.

Out of geometry, too, as applied to astronomy, the art of navigation has grown; and so, by this
science, has been made possible that enormous foreign commerce which supports a large part of our population, and supplies us with many necessaries and most of our luxuries. And now-a-days even the farmer, for the correct laying out of his drains, has recourse to the level—that is, to geometrical principles.

When from those divisions of mathematics which deal with space and number, some small smattering of which is given in schools, we turn to that other division which deals with force, of which even a smattering is scarcely ever given, we meet with another large class of activities which this science presides over. On the application of rational mechanics depends the success of nearly all modern manufacture. The properties of the lever, the wheel and axle, etc., are involved in every machine—every machine is a solidified mechanical theorem, and to machinery in these times we owe nearly all production.

Trace the history of the breakfast-roll. The soil out of which it came was drained with machine-made tiles; the surface was turned over by a machine; the seed was put in by a machine; the wheat was reaped, thrashed, and winnowed by machines; by machinery it was ground and bolted; and, had the flour been sent to Gosport, it might have been made into biscuits by a machine.

Look around the room in which you sit. If modern, probably the bricks in its walls were machine-made;
by machinery the flooring was sawn and planed, the mantel-shelf sawn and polished; the paper-hangings made and printed; the veneer on the table, the turned legs of the chairs, the carpet, the curtains, are all products of machinery. And your clothing—plain, figured, or printed—is it not wholly woven, nay, perhaps even sewed, by machinery? And the volume you are reading—are not its leaves fabricated by one machine and covered with these words by another? Add to which that for the means of distribution over both land and sea, we are similarly indebted.

And then let it be remembered that according as the principles of mechanics are well or ill used to these ends, comes success or failure—individual and national. The engineer who misapplies his formula for the strength of materials, builds a bridge that breaks down. The manufacturer whose apparatus is badly devised, cannot compete with another whose apparatus wastes less in friction and inertia. The ship-builder adhering to the old model is outsailed by one who builds on the mechanically-justified wave-line principle. And, as the ability of a nation to hold its own against other nations depends on the skilled activity of its units, we see that on such knowledge may turn the national fate. Judge then the worth of mathematics.

Pass next to Physics. Joined with mathematics, it has given us the steam-engine, which Physics does the work of millions of laborers. That
section of physics which deals with the laws of heat, has taught us how to economize fuel in our various industries; how to increase the produce of our smelting furnaces by substituting the hot for the cold blast; how to ventilate our mines; how to prevent explosions by using the safety-lamp; and, through the thermometer, how to regulate innumerable processes. That division which has the phenomena of light for its subject, gives eyes to the old and the myopic; aids through the microscope in detecting diseases and adulterations, and by improved lighthouses prevents shipwrecks. Researches in electricity and magnetism have saved incalculable life and property by the compass; have subserved sundry arts by the electrotype; and now, in the telegraph, have supplied us with the agency by which for the future mercantile transactions will be regulated, political intercourse carried on, and perhaps national quarrels often avoided. While in the details of indoor life, from the improved kitchen-range up to the stereoscope on the drawing-room table, the applications of advanced physics underlie our comforts and gratifications.

Still more numerous are the bearings of Chemistry on those activities by which men obtain the means of living. The bleacher, the dyer, the calico-printer, are severally occupied in processes that are well or ill done according as they do or do not conform to chemical laws. The
economical reduction from their ores of copper, tin, zinc, lead, silver, iron, are in a great measure questions of chemistry. Sugar-refining, gas-making, soap-boiling, gunpowder manufacture, are operations all partly chemical, as are likewise those which produce glass and porcelain. Whether the distiller's work stops at the alcoholic fermentation or passes into the acetous, is a chemical question on which hangs his profit or loss, and the brewer, if his business is very extensive, finds it pay to keep a chemist on his premises.

Glance through a work on technology, and it becomes at once apparent that there is now scarcely any process in the arts or manufactures over some part of which chemistry does not preside. And then, lastly, we come to the fact that in these times, agriculture, to be profitably carried on, must have like guidance. The analysis of manures and soils; their adaptations to each other; the use of gypsum or other substance for fixing ammonia; the utilization of coprolites; the production of artificial manures—all these are boons of chemistry which it behooves the farmer to acquaint himself with. Be it in the lucifer match, or in disinfected sewage, or in photographs—in bread made without fermentation, or perfumes extracted from refuse—we may perceive that chemistry affects all our industries, and that, by consequence, knowledge of it concerns every one who is directly or indirectly connected with our industries.
And then the science of life—Biology: does not this, too, bear fundamentally upon these processes of indirect self-preservation? With what we ordinarily call manufactures, it has, indeed, little connection, but with the all-essential manufacture—that of food—it is inseparably connected. As agriculture must conform its methods to the phenomena of vegetal and animal life, it follows necessarily that the science of these phenomena is the rational basis of agriculture. Various biological truths have indeed been empirically established and acted upon by farmers while yet there has been no conception of them as science: such as that particular manures are suited to particular plants; that crops of certain kinds unfit the soil for other crops; that horses cannot do good work on poor food; that such and such diseases of cattle and sheep are caused by such and such conditions. These, and the everyday knowledge which the agriculturist gains by experience respecting the right management of plants and animals, constitute his stock of biological facts, on the largeness of which greatly depends his success. And as these biological facts, scanty, indefinite, rudimentary, though they are, aid him so essentially, judge what must be the value to him of such facts when they become positive, definite, and exhaustive.

Indeed, even now we may see the benefits that rational biology is conferring on him. The truth
that the production of animal heat implies waste of substance, and that, therefore, preventing loss of heat prevents the need for extra food—a purely theoretical conclusion—now guides the fattening of cattle; it is found that by keeping cattle warm, fodder is saved. Similarly with respect to variety of food. The experiments of physiologists have shown that not only is change of diet beneficial, but that digestion is facilitated by a mixture of ingredients in each meal: both which truths are now influencing cattle-feeding. The discovery that a disorder known as "the staggers", of which many thousands of sheep have died annually, is caused by an entozoon which presses on the brain, and that if the creature is extracted through the softening place in the skull which marks its position, the sheep usually recovers, is another debt which agriculture owes to biology. When we observe the marked contrast between our farming and farming on the Continent, and remember that this contrast is mainly due to the far greater influence science has had upon farming here than there, and when we see how, daily, competition is making the adoption of scientific methods more general and necessary, we shall rightly infer that very soon agricultural success in England will be impossible without a competent knowledge of animal and vegetal physiology.

Yet one more science we have to note as bearing
directly on industrial success—the Science of Society. Without knowing it, men who daily look at the state of the money-market, glance over prices current, discuss the probable crops of corn, cotton, sugar, wool, silk, weigh the chances of war, and from all these data decide on their mercantile operations, are students of social science: empirical and blundering students it may be, but still students who gain the prizes or are plucked of their profits, according as they do or do not reach the right conclusion. Not only the manufacturer and the merchant must guide their transactions by calculations of supply and demand, based on numerous facts, and tacitly recognizing sundry general principles of social action, but even the retailer must do the like: his prosperity very greatly depending upon the correctness of his judgments respecting the future wholesale prices and the future rates of consumption. Manifestly, all who take part in the entangled commercial activities of a community are vitally interested in understanding the laws according to which those activities vary.

Thus, to all such as are occupied in the production, exchange, or distribution of commodities, acquaintance with science in some of its departments is of fundamental importance. Whoever is immediately or remotely implicated in any form of industry (and few are not) has a direct interest in understanding some-
thing of the mathematical and chemical properties of things; perhaps, also, has a direct interest in biology, and certainly has in sociology. Whether he does or does not succeed well in that indirect self-preservation which we call getting a good livelihood, depends in a great degree on his knowledge of one or more of these sciences: not, it may be, a rational knowledge, but still a knowledge, though empirical.

For what we call learning a business really implies learning the science involved in it, though not perhaps under the name of science. And hence a grounding in science is of great importance, both because it prepares for all this, and because rational knowledge has an immense superiority over empirical knowledge.

Moreover, not only is it that scientific culture is requisite for each, that he may understand the how and the why of the things and processes with which he is concerned as maker or distributor, but it is often of much moment that he should understand the how and the why of various other things and processes. In this age of joint-stock undertakings, nearly every man above the laborer is interested as capitalist in some other occupation than his own, and, as thus interested, his profit or loss often depends on his knowledge of the sciences bearing on this other occupation. Here is a mine, in the sinking of which many shareholders ruined themselves from not knowing that a certain fossil be-
longed to the old red sand-stone, below which no coal is found. Not many years ago £20,000 was lost in the prosecution of a scheme for collecting the alcohol that distils from bread in baking: all of which would have been saved to the subscribers had they known that less than a hundredth part by weight of the flour is changed in fermentation. Numerous attempts have been made to construct electro-magnetic engines in the hope of superseding steam, but had those who supplied the money understood the general law of the correlation and equivalence of forces, they might have had better balances at their bankers. Daily are men induced to aid in carrying out inventions which a mere tyro in science could show to be futile. Scarcely a locality but has its history of fortunes thrown away over some impossible project.

And if already the loss from want of science is so frequent and so great, still greater and more frequent will it be to those who hereafter lack science. Just as fast as productive processes become more scientific, which competition will inevitably make them do, and just as fast as joint-stock undertakings spread, which they certainly will, so fast must scientific knowledge grow necessary to every one. That which our school courses leave almost entirely out, we thus find to be that which most nearly concerns the business of life. All our industries would cease were it not for that
information which men begin to acquire as they best may after their education is said to be finished. And were it not for this information, that has been from age to age accumulated and spread by unofficial means, these industries would never have existed. Had there been no teaching but such as is given in our public schools, England would now be what it was in feudal times. That increasing acquaintance with the laws of phenomena which has through successive ages enabled us to subjugate Nature to our needs, and in these days gives the common laborer comforts which a few centuries ago kings could not purchase, is scarcely in any degree owed to the appointed means of instructing our youth. The vital knowledge—that by which we have grown as a nation to what we are, and which now underlies our whole existence—is a knowledge that has got itself taught in nooks and corners; while the ordained agencies for teaching have been mumbling little else but dead formulas.

III. Parental Duties

We come now to the third great division of human activities—a division for which no preparation whatever is made. If by some strange chance not a vestige of us descended to the remote future save a pile of our school-books or some college examination papers, we may imagine how puzzled an antiquary of the period would be
on finding in them no indication that the learners were ever likely to be parents. "This must have been the *curriculum* for their celibates," we may fancy him concluding. "I perceive here an elaborate preparation for many things; especially for reading the books of extinct nations and of co-existing nations (from which indeed it seems clear that these people had very little worth reading in their own tongue), but I find no reference whatever to the bringing up of children. They could not have been so absurd as to omit all training for this gravest of responsibilities. Evidently then, this was the school course of one of their monastic orders."

Seriously, is it not an astonishing fact, that though on the treatment of offspring depend their lives or deaths, and their moral welfare or ruin, yet not one word of instruction on the treatment of offspring is ever given to those who will hereafter be parents? Is it not monstrous that the fate of a new generation should be left to the chances of unreasoning custom, impulse, fancy—joined with the suggestions of ignorant nurses and the prejudiced counsel of grandmothers? If a merchant commenced business without any knowledge of arithmetic and book-keeping, we should exclaim at his folly and look for disastrous consequences. Or if, before studying anatomy, a man set up as a surgical operator, we should wonder at his audacity and pity his patients. But that parents should begin the difficult task of
rearing children without ever having given a thought to the principles—physical, moral or intellectual—which ought to guide them, excites neither surprise at the actors nor pity for their victims.

To tens of thousands that are killed, add hundreds of thousands that survive with feeble constitutions, and millions that grow up with constitutions not so strong as they should be, and you will have some idea of the curse inflicted on their offspring by parents ignorant of the laws of life. Do but consider for a moment that the regimen to which children are subject is hourly telling upon them to their life-long injury or benefit—and that there are twenty ways of going wrong to one way of going right—and you will get some idea of the enormous mischief that is almost everywhere inflicted by the thoughtless, haphazard system in common use.

Is it decided that a boy shall be clothed in some flimsy short dress and be allowed to go playing about with limbs reddened by cold? The decision will tell on his whole future existence—either in illnesses, or in stunted growth, or in deficient energy, or in a maturity less vigorous than it ought to have been, and consequent hindrances to success and happiness. Are children doomed to a monotonous dietary, or a dietary that is deficient in nutritiveness? Their ultimate physical power, and their efficiency as men and women, will inevitably be
more or less diminished by it. Are they forbidden vociferous play, or (being too ill-clothed to bear exposure), are they kept in-doors in cold weather? They are certain to fall below that measure of health and strength to which they would else have attained.

When sons and daughters grow up sickly and feeble, parents commonly regard the event as a misfortune—as a visitation of providence. Thinking after the prevalent chaotic fashion, they assume that these evils come without causes or that the causes are supernatural. Nothing of the kind. In some cases the causes are doubtless inherited, but in most cases foolish regulations are the causes. Very generally parents themselves are responsible for all this pain, this debility, this depression, this misery. They have undertaken to control the lives of their offspring from hour to hour; with cruel carelessness they have neglected to learn anything about these vital processes which they are unceasingly affecting by their commands and prohibitions; in utter ignorance of the simplest physiologic laws, they have been year by year undermining the constitutions of their children, and have so inflicted disease and premature death, not only on them but on their descendants.

Equally great are the ignorance and the consequent injury when we turn from physical training to moral training. Consider the young mother and her nursery legislation. But a few years ago she was at school,
where her memory was crammed with words, and names, and dates, and her reflective faculties scarcely in the slightest degree exercised—where not one idea was given her respecting the methods of dealing with the opening mind of childhood, and where her discipline did not in the least fit her for thinking out methods of her own. The intervening years have been passed in practising music, in fancy-work, in novel-reading, and in party-going: no thought having yet been given to the grave responsibilities of maternity; and scarcely any of that solid intellectual culture obtained which would be some preparation for such responsibilities.

And now see her with an unfolding human character committed to her charge—see her profoundly ignorant of the phenomena with which she has to deal, undertaking to do that which can be done but imperfectly even with the aid of the profoundest knowledge. She knows nothing about the nature of the emotions, their order of evolution, their functions, or where use ends and abuse begins. She is under the impression that some of the feelings are wholly bad, which is not true of any one of them; and that others are good, however far they may be carried, which is also not true of any one of them. And then, ignorant as she is of the structure she has to deal with, she is equally ignorant of the effects that will be produced on it by this or that treatment.

What can be more inevitable than the disastrous
results we see hourly arising? Lacking knowledge of mental phenomena, with their causes and consequences, her interference is frequently more mischievous than absolute passivity would have been. This and that kind of action, which are quite normal and beneficial, she perpetually thwarts, and so diminishes the child's happiness and profit, injures its temper and her own, and produces estrangement. Deeds which she thinks it desirable to encourage, she gets performed by threats and bribes, or by exciting a desire for applause; considering little what the inward motive may be, so long as the outward conduct conforms, and thus cultivating hypocrisy, and fear, and selfishness, in place of good feeling. While insisting on truthfulness, she constantly sets an example of untruth by threatening penalties which she does not inflict. While inculcating self-control, she hourly visits on her little ones angry scoldings for acts undeserving of them.

She has not the remotest idea that in the nursery, as in the world, that alone is the truly salutary discipline which visits on all conduct, good and bad, the natural consequences—the consequences, pleasurable or painful, which in the nature of things such conduct tends to bring. Being thus without theoretic guidance, and quite incapable of guiding herself by tracing the mental processes going on in her children, her rule is impulsive, inconsistent,
mischievous, often, in the highest degree; and would indeed be generally ruinous, were it not that the overwhelming tendency of the growing mind to assume the moral type of the race, usually subordinates all minor influences.

And then the culture of the intellect—is not this, too, mismanaged in a similar manner? Grant that the phenomena of intelligence conform to laws; grant that the evolution of intelligence in a child also conforms to laws; and it follows inevitably that education can be rightly guided only by a knowledge of these laws. To suppose that you can properly regulate this process of forming and accumulating ideas without understanding the nature of the process, is absurd.

How widely, then, must teaching as it is, differ from teaching as it should be, when hardly any parents, and but few teachers, know anything about psychology. As might be expected, the system is grievously at fault, alike in matter and in manner. While the right class of facts is withheld, the wrong class is forcibly administered in the wrong way and in the wrong order. Under that common limited idea of education which confines it to knowledge gained from books, parents thrust primers into the hands of their little ones years too soon, to their injury. Not recognizing the truth that the function of books is supplementary—that they form an indirect means to knowledge
when direct means fail—a means of seeing through other men what you cannot see for yourself—teachers are eager to give second-hand facts in place of first-hand facts.

Not perceiving the enormous value of that spontaneous education which goes on in early years—not perceiving that a child's restless observation, instead of being ignored or checked, should be diligently ministered to, and made as accurate and complete as possible—they insist on occupying its eyes and thoughts with things that are, for the time being, incomprehensible and repugnant. Possessed by a superstition which worships the symbols of knowledge instead of the knowledge itself, they do not see that only when his acquaintance with the objects and processes of the household, the streets, and the fields, is becoming tolerably exhaustive—only then should a child be introduced to the new sources of information which books supply: and this, not only because immediate cognition is of far greater value than mediate cognition, but also, because the words contained in books can be rightly interpreted into ideas only in proportion to the antecedent experience of things.

Observe next, that this formal instruction, far too soon commenced, is carried on with but little reference to the laws of mental development. Intellectual progress is of necessity from the concrete to the abstract. But regardless
of this, highly abstract studies, such as grammar, which should come quite late, are begun quite early. Political geography, dead and uninteresting to a child, and which should be an appendage of sociological studies, is commenced betimes; while physical geography, comprehensible and comparatively attractive to a child, is in great part passed over. Nearly every subject dealt with is arranged in abnormal order: definitions, and rules, and principles being put first, instead of being disclosed, as they are in the order of nature, through the study of cases.

And then, pervading the whole, is the vicious system of rote learning—a system of sacrificing the spirit to the letter. See the results. What with perceptions unnaturally dulled by early thwarting, and a coerced attention to books—what with the mental confusion produced by teaching subjects before they can be understood, and in each of them giving generalizations before the facts of which they are the generalizations—what with making the pupil a mere passive recipient of others' ideas, and not in the least leading him to be an active inquirer or self-instructor—and what with taxing the faculties to excess—there are very few minds that become as efficient as they might be. Examinations being once passed, books are laid aside; the greater part of what has been acquired, being unorganized, soon drops out of recollection;
what remains is mostly inert—the art of applying knowledge not having been cultivated—and there is but little power either of accurate observation or independent thinking. To all which add, that while much of the information gained is of relatively small value, an immense mass of information of transcendent value is entirely passed over.

Thus we find the facts to be such as might have been inferred à priori. The training of children—physical, moral, and intellectual—is dreadfully defective. And in great measure it is so because parents are devoid of that knowledge by which this training can alone be rightly guided. What is to be expected when one of the most intricate of problems is undertaken by those who have given scarcely a thought to the principles on which its solution depends? For shoe-making or house-building, for the management of a ship or a locomotive-engine, a long apprenticeship is needful. Is it, then, that the unfolding of a human being in body and mind is so comparatively simple a process, that any one may superintend and regulate it with no preparation whatever? If not—if the process is with one exception more complex than any in Nature, and the task of ministering to it one of surpassing difficulty, is it not madness to make no provision for such a task? Better sacrifice accomplishments than omit this all-essential instruction.
When a father, acting on false dogmas adopted without examination, has alienated his sons, driven them into rebellion by his harsh treatment, ruined them, and made himself miserable, he might reflect that the study of ethology would have been worth pursuing, even at the cost of knowing nothing about Æschylus. When a mother is mourning over a first-born that has sunk under the sequelæ of scarlet-fever—when perhaps a candid medical man has confirmed her suspicion that her child would have recovered had not its system been enfeebled by over-study—when she is prostrate under the pangs of combined grief and remorse—it is but a small consolation that she can read Dante in the original.

Thus we see that for regulating the third great division of human activities, a knowledge of the laws of life is the one thing needful. Some acquaintance with the first principles of physiology and the elementary truths of psychology is indispensable for the right bringing up of children. We doubt not that this assertion will by many be read with a smile. That parents in general should be expected to acquire a knowledge of subjects so abstruse, will seem to them an absurdity. And if we proposed that an exhaustive knowledge of these subjects should be obtained by all fathers and mothers, the absurdity would indeed be glaring enough. But we do not. General principles only, accompanied by such illustrations as
may be needed to make them understood, would suffice. And these might be readily taught—if not rationally, then dogmatically.

Be this as it may, however, here are the indisputable facts:—that the development of children in mind and body rigorously obeys certain laws; that unless these laws are in some degree conformed to by parents, death is inevitable; that unless they are in a great degree conformed to, there must result serious physical and mental defects; and that only when they are completely conformed to, can a perfect maturity be reached. Judge, then, whether all who may one day be parents should not strive with some anxiety to learn what these laws are.

IV. Good Citizenship

From the parental functions let us pass now to the functions of the citizen. We have here to inquire what knowledge best fits a man for the discharge of these functions. It cannot be alleged, as in the last case, that the need for knowledge fitting him for these functions is wholly overlooked; for our school courses contain certain studies which, nominally at least, bear upon political and social duties. Of these the only one that occupies a prominent place is History.

But, as already more than once hinted, the historic information commonly given is almost valueless for purposes of guidance. Scarcely any of the facts set down in our school-
histories, and very few even of those contained in the more elaborate works written for adults, give any clue to the right principles of political action. The biographies of monarchs (and our children commonly learn little else) throw scarcely any light upon the science of society. Familiarity with court intrigues, plots, usurpations, or the like, and with all the personalities accompanying them, aids very little in elucidating the principles on which national welfare depends.

We read of some squabble for power, that it led to a pitched battle; that such and such were the names of the generals and their leading subordinates; that they had each so many thousand infantry and cavalry, and so many cannon; that they arranged their forces in this and that order; that they manoeuvred, attacked, and fell back in certain ways; that at this part of the day such disasters were sustained, and at that such advantages gained; that in one particular movement some leading officer fell, while in another a certain regiment was decimated; that after all the changing fortunes of the fight, the victory was gained by this or that army; and that so many were killed and wounded on each side, and so many captured by the conquerors. And now, out of the accumulated details which make up the narrative, say which it is that helps you in deciding on your conduct as a citizen. Supposing even that you had diligently read, not only
"The Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World", but accounts of all other battles that history mentions; how much more judicious would your vote be at the next election?

"But these are facts—interesting facts," you say. Without doubt they are facts (such, at least, as are not wholly or partially fictions), and to many they may be interesting facts. But this by no means implies that they are valuable. Factitious or morbid opinion often gives seeming value to things that have scarcely any. A tulipomania will not part with a choice bulb for its weight in gold. To another man an ugly piece of cracked old china seems his most desirable possession. And there are those who give high prices for the relics of celebrated murderers. Will it be contended that these tastes are any measures of value in the things that gratify them? If not, then it must be admitted that the liking felt for certain classes of historical facts is no proof of their worth; and that we must test their worth as we test the worth of other facts, by asking to what uses they are applicable.

Were some one to tell you that your neighbor's cat kittened yesterday, you would say the information was worthless. Fact though it might be, you would say it was an utterly useless fact—a fact that could in no way influence your actions in life—a fact that would not help you in learning how to live
completely. Well, apply the same test to the great mass of historical facts, and you will get the same result. They are facts from which no conclusions can be drawn—*unorganizable* facts; and therefore facts which can be of no service in establishing principles of conduct, which is the chief use of facts. Read them, if you like, for amusement, but do not flatter yourself they are instructive.

That which constitutes History, properly so called, is in great part omitted from works on the subject. Only of late years have historians commenced giving us, in any considerable quantity, the truly valuable information. As in past ages the king was every thing and the people nothing, so, in past histories the doings of the king fill the entire picture, to which the national life forms but an obscure background; while only now, when the welfare of nations rather than of rulers is becoming the dominant idea, are historians beginning to occupy themselves with the phenomena of social progress.

That which it really concerns us to know is the natural history of society. We want all facts which help us to understand how a nation has grown and organized itself. Among these, let us of course have an account of its government, with as little as may be of gossip about the men who officered it, and as much as possible about the structure, principles, methods, prejudices, corruptions, etc., which it exhibited: and let this account not only include the
nature and actions of the central government, but also those of local governments, down to their minutest ramifications. Let us of course also have a parallel description of the ecclesiastical government—its organization, its conduct, its power, its relations to the State: and accompanying this, the ceremonial, creed, and religious ideas—not only those nominally believed, but those really believed and acted upon. Let us at the same time be informed of the control exercised by class over class, as displayed in all social observances—in titles, salutations, and forms of address. Let us know, too, what were all the other customs which regulated the popular life out of doors and in-doors: including those which concern the relations of the sexes, and the relations of parents to children. The superstitions, also, from the more important myths down to the charms in common use, should be indicated.

Next should come a delineation of the industrial system, showing to what extent the division of labor was carried; how trades were regulated, whether by caste, guilds, or otherwise; what was the connection between employers and employed; what were the agencies for distributing commodities; what were the means of communication; what was the circulating medium. Accompanying all which should come an account of the industrial arts technically considered, stating the processes in use, and the quality of the products.
Further, the intellectual condition of the nation in its various grades should be depicted, not only with respect to the kind and amount of education, but with respect to the progress made in science, and the prevailing manner of thinking. The degree of æsthetic culture, as displayed in architecture, sculpture, painting, dress, music, poetry, and fiction, should be described. Nor should there be omitted a sketch of the daily lives of the people—their food, their homes, and their amusements. And lastly, to connect the whole, should be exhibited the morals, theoretical and practical, of all classes, as indicated in their laws, habits, proverbs, deeds.

All these facts, given with as much brevity as consists with clearness and accuracy, should be so grouped and arranged that they may be comprehended in their ensemble, and thus may be contemplated as mutually dependent parts of one great whole. The aim should be so to present them that we may readily trace the consensus subsisting among them, with the view of learning what social phenomena co-exist with what others. And then the corresponding delineations of succeeding ages should be so managed as to show us, as clearly as may be, how each belief, institution, custom, and arrangement was modified; and how the consensus of preceding structures and functions was developed into the consensus of succeeding ones.

Such alone is the kind of information respecting
past times, which can be of service of the citizen for the regulation of his conduct. The only history that is of practical value, is what may be called Descriptive Sociology. And the highest office which the historian can discharge, is that of so narrating the lives of nations as to furnish materials for a Comparative Sociology, and for the subsequent determination of the ultimate laws to which social phenomena conform.

But now mark that even supposing an adequate stock of this truly valuable historical knowledge has been acquired, it is of comparatively little use without the key. And the key is to be found only in Science. Without an acquaintance with the general truths of biology and psychology, rational interpretation of social phenomena is impossible. Only in proportion as men obtain a certain rude, empirical knowledge of human nature, are they enabled to understand even the simplest facts of social life: as, for instance, the relation between supply and demand. And if not even the most elementary truths of sociology can be reached until some knowledge is obtained of how men generally think, feel, and act under given circumstances, then it is manifest that there can be nothing like a wide comprehension of sociology, unless through a competent knowledge of man in all his faculties, bodily and mental.

Consider the matter in the abstract, and this con-
clusion is self-evident. Thus:—Society is made up of individuals; all that is done in society is done by the combined actions of individuals, and therefore, in individual actions only can be found the solutions of social phenomena. But the actions of individuals depend on the laws of their natures, and their actions cannot be understood until these laws are understood. These laws, however, when reduced to their simplest expression, are found to depend on the laws of body and mind in general. Hence it necessarily follows, that biology and psychology are indispensable as interpreters of sociology. Or, to state the conclusions still more simply:—all social phenomena are phenomena of life—are the most complex manifestations of life—are ultimately dependent on the laws of life—and can be understood only when the laws of life are understood.

Thus, then, we see that for the regulation of this fourth division of human activities, we are, as before, dependent on Science. Of the knowledge commonly imparted in educational courses, very little is of any service in guiding a man in his conduct as a citizen. Only a small part of the history he reads is of practical value, and of this small part he is not prepared to make proper use. He commonly lacks not only the materials for, but the very conception of, descriptive sociology; and he also lacks that knowledge of the organic sciences, without which even descriptive sociology can give him but little aid.
V. The Refinements of Life

And now we come to that remaining division of human life which includes the relaxations, pleasures, and amusements filling leisure hours. After considering what training best fits for self-preservation, for the obtainment of sustenance, for the discharge of parental duties, and for the regulation of social and political conduct, we have now to consider what training best fits for the miscellaneous ends not included in these—for the enjoyments of Nature, of Literature, and of the Fine Arts, in all their forms.

Postponing them as we do to things that bear more vitally upon human welfare, and bringing everything, as we have, to the test of actual value, it will perhaps be inferred that we are inclined to slight these less essential things. No greater mistake could be made, however. We yield to none in the value we attach to aesthetic culture and its pleasures. Without painting, sculpture, music, poetry, and the emotions produced by natural beauty of every kind, life would lose half its charm. So far from thinking that the training and gratification of the tastes are unimportant, we believe the time will come when they will occupy a much larger share of human life than now. When the forces of Nature have been fully conquered to man's use—when the means of production have been
brought to perfection—when labor has been economized to the highest degree—when education has been so systematized that a preparation for the more essential activities may be made with comparative rapidity—and when, consequently, there is a great increase of spare time; then will the poetry, both of Art and Nature, rightly fill a large space in the minds of all.

But it is one thing to admit that aesthetic culture is in a high degree conducive to human happiness, and another thing to admit that it is a fundamental requisite to human happiness. However important it may be, it must yield precedence to those kinds of culture which bear more directly upon the duties of life. As before hinted, literature and the fine arts are made possible by those activities which make individual and social life possible; and manifestly that which is made possible, must be postponed to that which makes it possible. A florist cultivates a plant for the sake of its flower, and regards the roots and leaves as of value, chiefly because they are instrumental in producing the flower. But while, as an ultimate product, the flower is the thing to which everything else is subordinate, the florist very well knows that the root and leaves are intrinsically of greater importance, because on them the evolution of the flower depends. He bestows every care in rearing a healthy plant, and knows it would be folly if, in
his anxiety to obtain the flower, he were to neglect the plant.

Similarly in the case before us. Architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry, etc., may be truly called the efflorescence of civilized life. But even supposing them to be of such transcendent worth as to subordinate the civilized life out of which they grow (which can hardly be asserted), it will still be admitted that the production of a healthy civilized life must be the first consideration, and that the knowledge conducing to this must occupy the highest place.

And here we see most distinctly the vice of our educational system. It neglects the plant for the sake of the flower. In anxiety for elegance, it forgets substance. While it gives no knowledge conducive to self-preservation—while of knowledge that facilitates gaining a livelihood it gives but the rudiments, and leaves the greater part to be picked up any how in after life—while for the discharge of parental functions it makes not the slightest provision—and while for the duties of citizenship it prepares by imparting a mass of facts, most of which are irrelevant, and the rest without a key, it is diligent in teaching every thing that adds to refinement, polish, éclat.

However fully we may admit that extensive acquaintance with modern languages is a valuable accomplishment, which, through reading, conversa-
tion, and travel, aids in giving a certain finish, it by no means follows that this result is rightly purchased at the cost of that vitally important knowledge sacrificed to it. Supposing it true that classical education conduces to elegance and correctness of style, it cannot be said that elegance and correctness of style are comparable in importance to a familiarity with the principles that should guide the rearing of children. Grant that the taste may be greatly improved by reading all the poetry written in extinct languages, yet it is not to be inferred that such improvement of taste is equivalent in value to an acquaintance with the laws of health. Accomplishments, the fine arts, belles-lettres, and all those things which, as we say, constitute the efflorescence of civilization, should be wholly subordinate to that knowledge and discipline in which civilization rests. As they occupy the leisure part of life, so should they occupy the leisure part of education.

Recognizing thus the true position of æsthetics, and holding that while the cultivation of them should form a part of education from its commencement, such cultivation should be subsidiary, we have now to inquire what knowledge is of most use to this end—what knowledge best fits for this remaining sphere of activity. To this question the answer is still the same as heretofore. Unexpected as the assertion may be, it is nevertheless true, that the highest Art of every kind is based
upon Science—that without Science there can be neither perfect production nor full appreciation.

Science, in that limited technical acceptation current in society, may not have been possessed by many artists of high repute; but acute observers as they have been, they have always possessed a stock of those empirical generalizations which constitute science in its lowest phase, and they have habitually fallen far below perfection, partly because their generalizations were comparatively few and inaccurate. That science necessarily underlies the fine arts, becomes manifest, à priori, when we remember that art-products are all more or less representative of objective or subjective phenomena; that they can be true only in proportion as they conform to the laws of these phenomena; and that before they can thus conform the artist must know what these laws are. That this à priori conclusion tallies with experience we shall soon see.

Youths preparing for the practice of sculpture, have to acquaint themselves with the bones and muscles of the human frame in their distribution, attachments, and movements. This is a portion of science, and it has been found needful to impart it for the prevention of those many errors which sculptors who do not possess it commit. For the prevention of other mistakes, a knowledge of mechanical principles is requisite; and such knowledge not being usually possessed,
grave mechanical mistakes are frequently made.

Take an instance. For the stability of a figure it is needful that the perpendicular from the centre of gravity—"the line of direction", as it is called—should fall within the base of support; and hence it happens, that when a man assumes the attitude known as "standing at ease", in which one leg is straightened and the other relaxed, the line of direction falls within the foot of the straightened leg. But sculptors unfamiliar with the theory of equilibrium, not uncommonly so represent this attitude, that the line of direction falls midway between the feet. Ignorance of the laws of momentum leads to analogous errors: as witness the admired Discobolus, which, as it is posed, must inevitably fall forward the moment the quoit is delivered.

In painting, the necessity for scientific knowledge, empirical if not rational, is still more conspicuous. In what consists the grotesqueness of Chinese pictures, unless in their utter disregard of the laws of appearances—in their absurd linear perspective, and their want of aerial perspective? In what are the drawings of a child so faulty, if not in a similar absence of truth—an absence arising, in great part, from ignorance of the way in which the aspects of things vary with the conditions? Do but remember the books and lectures by which students are instructed; or consider the criticisms of Ruskin; or look at the doings of the
Pre-Raffaelites; and you will see that progress in painting implies increasing knowledge of how effects in Nature are produced.

The most diligent observation, if not aided by science, fails to preserve from error. Every painter will indorse the assertion that unless it is known what appearances must exist under given circumstances, they often will not be perceived; and to know what appearances must exist, is, in so far, to understand the science of appearances. From want of science Mr. J. Lewis, careful painter as he is, casts the shadow of a lattice-window in sharply-defined lines upon an opposite wall; which he would not have done, had he been familiar with the phenomena of penumbræ. From want of science, Mr. Rosetti, catching sight of a peculiar iridescence displayed by certain hairy surfaces under particular lights (an iridescence caused by the diffraction of light in passing the hairs), commits the error of showing this iridescence on surfaces and in positions where it could not occur.

To say that music, too, has need of scientific aid will seem still more surprising. Yet it is demonstrable that music is but an idealization of the natural language of emotion, and that consequently music must be good or bad according as it conforms to the laws of this natural language. The various inflections of voice which accompany feelings of different kinds and intensities, have been
shown to be the germs out of which music is developed. It has been further shown that these inflections and cadences are not accidental or arbitrary, but that they are determined by certain general principles of vital action, and that their expressiveness depends on this. Whence it follows that musical phrases, and the melodies built of them, can be effective only when they are in harmony with these general principles.

It is difficult here properly to illustrate this position. But perhaps it will suffice to instance the swarms of worthless ballads that infest drawing rooms, as compositions which science would forbid. They sin against science by setting to music ideas that are not emotional enough to prompt musical expression, and they also sin against science by using musical phrases that have no natural relation to the ideas expressed even where these are emotional. They are bad because they are untrue. And to say they are untrue is to say they are unscientific.

Even in poetry the same thing holds. Like music, poetry has its root in those natural modes of expression which accompany deep feeling. Its rhythm, its strong and numerous metaphors, its hyperboles, its violent inversions, are simply exaggerations of the traits of excited speech. To be good, therefore, poetry must pay respect to those laws of nervous action which excited speech obeys. In intensifying and combining the traits of
excited speech, it must have due regard to proportion—must not use its appliances without restriction, but, where the ideas are least emotional, must use the forms of poetical expression sparingly; must use them more freely as the emotion rises, and must carry them all to their greatest extent only where the emotion reaches a climax. The entire contravention of these principles results in bombast or doggerel. The insufficient respect for them is seen in didactic poetry. And it is because they are rarely fully obeyed that we have so much poetry that is inartistic.

Not only is it that the artist, of whatever kind, cannot produce a truthful work without he understands the laws of the phenomena he represents, but it is that he must also understand how the minds of spectators or listeners will be affected by the several peculiarities of his work—a question in psychology. What impression any given art-product generates manifestly depends upon the mental natures of those to whom it is presented; and, as all mental natures have certain general principles in common, there must result certain corresponding general principles on which alone art-products can be successfully framed.

These general principles cannot be fully understood and applied unless the artist sees how they follow from the laws of mind. To ask whether the composition of a picture is good, is really to ask
how the perceptions and feelings of observers will be affected by it. To ask whether a drama is well constructed, is to ask whether its situations are so arranged as duly to consult the power of attention of an audience, and duly to avoid overtaxing any one class of feelings. Equally in arranging the leading divisions of a poem or fiction, and in combining the words of a single sentence, the goodness of the effect depends upon the skill with which the mental energies and susceptibilities of the reader are economized. Every artist, in the course of his education and after-life, accumulates a stock of maxims by which his practice is regulated. Trace such maxims to their roots and you find they inevitably lead you down to psychological principles. And only when the artist rationally understands these psychological principles and their various corollaries can he work in harmony with them.

We do not for a moment believe that science will make an artist. While we contend that the leading laws both of objective and subjective phenomena must be understood by him, we by no means contend that knowledge of such laws will serve in place of natural perception. Not only the poet, but also the artist of every type, is born, not made. What we assert is, that innate faculty alone will not suffice, but must have the aid of organized knowledge. Intuition will do much, but it will not do all. Only when Genius is mar-
ried to Science can the highest results be produced.

As we have before asserted, Science is necessary not only for the most successful production, but also for the full appreciation of the fine arts. In what consists the greater ability of a man than of a child to perceive the beauties of a picture unless it is in his more extended knowledge of those truths in nature or life which the picture renders? How happens the cultivated gentleman to enjoy a fine poem so much more than a boor does, if it is not because his wider acquaintance with objects and actions enables him to see in the poem much that the boor cannot see? And if, as is here so obvious, there must be some familiarity with the things represented, before the representation can be appreciated, then the representation can be completely appreciated only in proportion as the things represented are completely understood.

The fact is, that every additional truth which a work of art expresses gives an additional pleasure to the percipient mind—a pleasure that is missed by those ignorant of this truth. The more realities an artist indicates in any given amount of work, the more faculties does he appeal to; the more numerous associated ideas does he suggest, the more gratification does he afford. But to receive this gratification the spectator, listener, or reader, must know the realities which the artist has indicated; and to know these realities is to know so much science.
And now let us not overlook the further great fact, that not only does science underlie sculpture, painting, music, poetry, but that science is itself poetic. The current opinion that science and poetry are opposed is a delusion. It is doubtless true that as states of consciousness cognition and emotion tend to exclude each other. And it is doubtless also true that an extreme activity of the reflective powers tends to deaden the feelings, while an extreme activity of the feelings tends to deaden the reflective powers: in which sense, indeed, all orders of activity are antagonistic to each other. But it is not true that the facts of science are unpoetical, or that the cultivation of science is necessarily unfriendly to the exercise of imagination or the love of the beautiful.

On the contrary, science opens up realms of poetry where to the unscientific all is a blank. Those engaged in scientific researches constantly show us that they realize not less vividly, but more vividly, than others, the poetry of their subjects. Whoever will dip into Hugh Miller's works on geology, or read Mr. Lewes's "Seaside Studies", will perceive that science excites poetry rather than extinguishes it. And whoever will contemplate the life of Goethe will see that the poet and the man of science can co-exist in equal activity.

Is it not, indeed, an absurd and almost a sacrilegious belief that the more a man studies Nature the
less he reveres it? Think you that a drop of water, which to the vulgar eye is but a drop of water, loses anything in the eye of the physicist who knows that its elements are held together by a force which, if suddenly liberated, would produce a flash of lightning? Think you that what is carelessly looked upon by the uninitiated as a mere snow-flake, does not suggest higher associations to one who has seen through a microscope the wondrously varied and elegant forms of snow-crystals? Think you that the rounded rock marked with parallel scratches calls up as much poetry in an ignorant mind as in the mind of a geologist, who knows that over this rock a glacier slid a million years ago?

The truth is, that those who have never entered upon scientific pursuits know not a tithe of the poetry by which they are surrounded. Whoever has not in youth collected plants and insects, knows not half the halo of interest which lanes and hedges can assume. Whoever has not sought for fossils, has little idea of the poetical associations that surround the places where imbedded treasures were found. Whoever at the seaside has not had a microscope and aquarium, has yet to learn what the highest pleasures of the seaside are.

Sad, indeed, is it to see how men occupy themselves with trivialities and are indifferent to the grandest phenomena—care not to understand the architecture of the Heavens, but are deeply inter-
ested in some contemptible controversy about the intrigues of Mary Queen of Scots!—are learnedly critical over a Greek ode, and pass by without a glance that grand epic written by the finger of God upon the strata of the Earth!

We find, then, that even for this remaining division of human activities, scientific culture is the proper preparation. We find that aesthetics in general are necessarily based upon scientific principles, and can be pursued with complete success only through an acquaintance with these principles. We find that for the criticism and due appreciation of works of art, a knowledge of the constitution of things, or in other words, a knowledge of science, is requisite. And we not only find that science is the handmaid to all forms of art and poetry, but that, rightly regarded, science is itself poetic.

B. KNOWLEDGE FOR DISCIPLINE

Thus far our question has been, the worth of knowledge of this or that kind for purposes of guidance. We have now to judge the relative values of different kinds of knowledge for purposes of discipline. This division of our subject we are obliged to treat with comparative brevity, and happily, no very lengthened treatment of it is needed. Having found what is best for the one end, we have by implication found what is best for the other. We may be quite sure that the ac-
requirement of those classes of facts which are most useful for regulating conduct, involves a mental exercise best fitted for strengthening the faculties. It would be utterly contrary to the beautiful economy of Nature, if one kind of culture were needed for the gaining of information and another kind were needed as a mental gymnastic.

Everywhere throughout creation we find faculties developed through the performance of those functions which it is their office to perform; not through the performance of artificial exercises devised to fit them for these functions. The Red Indian acquires the swiftness and agility which make him a successful hunter, by the actual pursuit of animals, and by the miscellaneous activities of his life he gains a better balance of physical powers than gymnastics ever give. That skill in tracking enemies and prey which he has reached by long practice, implies a subtlety of perception far exceeding anything produced by artificial training. And similarly throughout. From the Bushman, whose eye, which being habitually employed in identifying distant objects that are to be pursued or fled from, has acquired a quite telescopic range, to the accountant whose daily practice enables him to add up several columns of figures simultaneously, we find that the highest power of a faculty results from a discharge of those duties which the conditions of life require it to discharge. And we may be certain, à priori, that the
same law holds throughout education. The education of most value for guidance, must at the same time be the education of most value for discipline. Let us consider the evidence.

One advantage claimed for that devotion to language-learning which forms so prominent a feature in the ordinary curriculum, is, that the memory is thereby strengthened. And it is apparently assumed that this is an advantage peculiar to the study of words.

But the truth is that the sciences afford far wider fields for the exercise of memory. It is no slight task to remember all the facts ascertained respecting our solar system; much more to remember all that is known concerning the structure of our galaxy. The new compounds which chemistry daily accumulates are so numerous, that few, save professors, know the names of them all; and to recollect the atomic constitutions and affinities of all these compounds, is scarcely possible without making chemistry the occupation of life. In the enormous mass of phenomena presented by the Earth's crust, and in the still more enormous mass of phenomena presented by the fossils it contains, there is matter which it takes the geological student years of application to master. In each leading division of physics—sound, heat, light, electricity—the facts are numerous enough to alarm any one proposing to learn them all.
And when we pass to the organic sciences, the effort of memory required becomes still greater. In human anatomy alone, the quantity of detail is so great that the young surgeon has commonly to get it up half-a-dozen times before he can permanently retain it. The number of species of plants which botanists distinguish amounts to some 320,000, while the varied forms of animal life with which the zoologist deals are estimated at some two millions. So vast is the accumulation of facts which men of science have before them, that only by dividing and subdividing their labors can they deal with it. To a complete knowledge of his own division, each adds but a general knowledge of the rest. Surely, then, science, cultivated even to a very moderate extent, affords adequate exercise for memory. To say the very least, it involves quite as good a training for this faculty as language does.

But now mark that while for the training of mere memory, science is as good as, if not better than, language, it has an immense superiority in the kind of memory it cultivates. In the acquirement of a language the connections of ideas to be established in the mind correspond to facts that are in great measure accidental; whereas, in the acquirement of science the connections of ideas to be established in the mind correspond to facts that are mostly necessary.

It is true that the relations of words to their mean-
ing is in one sense natural, and that the genesis of these relations may be traced back a certain distance; though very rarely to the beginning; (to which let us add the remark that the laws of this genesis form a branch of mental science—the science of philology). But since it will not be contended that in the acquisition of languages, as ordinarily carried on, these natural relations between words and their meanings are habitually traced, and the laws regulating them explained, it must be admitted that they are commonly learned as fortuitous relations. On the other hand, the relations which science presents are causal relations, and, when properly taught, are understood as such. Instead of being practically accidental, they are necessary, and as such, give exercise to the reasoning faculties. While language familiarizes with non-rational relations, science familiarizes with rational relations. While the one exercises memory only, the other exercises both memory and understanding.

Observe next that a great superiority of science over language as a means of discipline, is that it cultivates the judgment. As, in a lecture on mental education delivered at the Royal Institution Professor Faraday well remarks, the most common intellectual fault is deficiency of judgment. He contends that "Society, speaking generally, is not only ignorant as respects education of the judgment, but it is also ignorant of its ignor-
The knowledge of most worth

And the cause to which he ascribes this state is want of scientific culture.

The truth of his conclusion is obvious. Correct judgment with regard to all surrounding things, events, and consequences, becomes possible only through knowledge of the way in which surrounding phenomena depend on each other. No extent of acquaintance with the meanings of words, can give the power of forming correct inferences respecting causes and effects. The constant habit of drawing conclusions from data, and then of verifying those conclusions by observation and experiment, can alone give the power of judging correctly. And that it necessitates this habit is one of the immense advantages of science.

Not only, however, for intellectual discipline is science the best, but also for moral discipline. The learning of languages tends, if anything, further to increase the already undue respect for authority. Such and such are the meanings of these words, says the teacher or the dictionary. So and so is the rule in this case, says the grammar. By the pupil these dicta are received as unquestionable. His constant attitude of mind is that of submission to dogmatic teaching. And a necessary result is a tendency to accept without inquiry whatever is established.

Quite opposite is the attitude of mind generated by the cultivation of science. By science, constant
appeal is made to individual reason. Its truths are not accepted upon authority alone, but all are at liberty to test them—nay, in many cases, the pupil is required to think out his own conclusions. Every step in a scientific investigation is submitted to his judgment. He is not asked to admit it without seeing it to be true. And the trust in his own powers thus produced, is further increased by the constancy with which Nature justifies his conclusions when they are correctly drawn. From all which there flows that independence which is a most valuable element in character.

Nor is this the only moral benefit bequeathed by scientific culture. When carried on, as it should always be, as much as possible under the form of independent research, it exercises perseverance and sincerity. As says Professor Tyndall of inductive inquiry: "It requires patient industry, and an humble and conscientious acceptance of what Nature reveals. The first condition of success is an honest receptivity and a willingness to abandon all preconceived notions, however cherished, if they be found to contradict the truth. Believe me, a self-renunciation which has something noble in it, and of which the world never hears, is often enacted in the private experience of the true votary of science."

Lastly we have to assert—and the assertion will, we doubt not, cause extreme surprise—that the discipline of science is superior to

Religious culture.
that of our ordinary education because of the religious culture that it gives. Of course we do not here use the words scientific and religious in their ordinary limited acceptations; but in their widest and highest acceptations. Doubtless, to the superstitions that pass under the name of religion, science is antagonistic; but not to the essential religion which these superstitions merely hide. Doubtless, too, in much of the science that is current, there is a pervading spirit of irreligion; but not in that true science which has passed beyond the superficial into the profound.

"True science and true religion," says Professor Huxley at the close of a recent course of lectures, "are twin-sisters, and the separation of either from the other is sure to prove the death of both. Science prospers exactly in proportion as it is religious; and religion flourishes in exact proportion to the scientific depth and firmness of its basis. The great deeds of philosophers have been less the fruit of their intellect than of the direction of that intellect by an eminently religious tone of mind. Truth has yielded herself rather to their patience, their love, their single-heartedness, and their self-denial, than to their logical acumen."

So far from science being irreligious, as many think, it is the neglect of science that is irreligious—it is the refusal to study the surrounding creation that is irreligious. Take an humble simile. Suppose a writer were daily saluted
with praises couched in superlative language. Suppose the wisdom, the grandeur, the beauty of his works, were the constant topics of the eulogies addressed to him. Suppose those who unceasingly uttered these eulogies on his works were content with looking at the outsides of them, and had never opened them, much less tried to understand them. What value should we put upon their praises? What should we think of their sincerity?

Yet, comparing small things to great, such is the conduct of mankind in general, in reference to the Universe and its Cause. Nay, it is worse. Not only do they pass by without study these things which they daily proclaim to be so wonderful, but very frequently they condemn as mere triflers those who give time to the observation of Nature—they actually scorn those who show any active interest in these marvels. We repeat then, that not science, but the neglect of science, is irreligious. Devotion to science is a tacit worship—a tacit recognition of worth in the things studied; and by implication in their Cause. It is not a mere lip-homage, but a homage expressed in actions—not a mere professed respect, but a respect proved by the sacrifice of time, thought, and labor.

Nor is it thus only that true science is essentially religious. It is religious, too, inasmuch as it generates a profound respect for, and an implicit faith in, those uniform laws which un-
derlie all things. By accumulated experiences the man of science acquires a thorough belief in the unchanging relations of phenomena—in the invariable connection of cause and consequence—in the necessity of good or evil results. Instead of the rewards and punishments of traditional belief, which men vaguely hope they may gain, or escape, spite of their disobedience, he finds that there are rewards and punishments in the ordained constitution of things, and that the evil results of disobedience are inevitable. He sees that the laws to which we must submit are not only inexorable but beneficent. He sees that in virtue of these laws, the process of things is ever towards a greater perfection and a higher happiness. Hence he is led constantly to insist on these laws and is indignant when men disregard them. And thus does he, by asserting the eternal principles of things and the necessity of conforming to them, prove himself intrinsically religious.

To all which add the further religious aspect of science, that it alone can give us true conceptions of ourselves and our relation to the mysteries of existence. At the same time that it shows us all which can be known, it shows us the limits beyond which we can know nothing. Not by dogmatic assertion does it teach the impossibility of comprehending the ultimate cause of things; but it leads us clearly to recognize this impossibility by bringing us in every direction to
boundaries we cannot cross. It realizes to us in a way which nothing else can, the littleness of human intelligence in the face of that which transcends human intelligence.

While towards the traditions and authorities of men its attitude may be proud, before the impenetrable veil which hides the Absolute its attitude is humble—a true pride and a true humility. Only the sincere man of science (and by this title we do not mean the mere calculator of distances, or analyzer of compounds, or labeller of species; but him who through lower truths seeks higher, and eventually the highest)—only the genuine man of science, we say, can truly know how utterly beyond, not only human knowledge, but human conception, is the Universal Power of which Nature, and Life, and Thought are manifestations.

We conclude, then, that for discipline, as well as for guidance, science is of chiefest value. In all its effects, learning the meanings of things is better than learning the meanings of words. Whether for intellectual, moral, or religious training, the study of surrounding phenomena is immensely superior to the study of grammars and lexicons.

Thus to the question with which we set out—What knowledge is of most worth?—the uniform reply is—Science. This is the Science is of most worth. verdict on all the counts. For direct self-preservation, or the maintenance of life and health, the all-
important knowledge is—Science. For that indirect self-preservation which we call gaining a livelihood, the knowledge of greatest value is—Science. For the due discharge of parental functions, the proper guidance is to be found only in—Science. For that interpretation of national life, past and present, without which the citizen cannot rightly regulate his conduct, the indispensable key is—Science. Alike for the most perfect production and highest enjoyment of art in all its forms, the needful preparation is still—Science. And for purposes of discipline—intellectual, moral, religious—the most efficient study is, once more—Science.

The question which at first seemed so perplexed, has become, in the course of our inquiry, comparatively simple. We have not to estimate the degrees of importance of different orders of human activity, and different studies as severally fitting us for them, since we find that the study of Science, in its most comprehensive meaning, is the best preparation for all these orders of activity. We have not to decide between the claims of knowledge of great though conventional value, and knowledge of less though intrinsic value; seeing that the knowledge which we find to be of most value in all other respects, is intrinsically most valuable: its worth is not dependent upon opinion, but is as fixed as is the relation of man to the surrounding world. Necessary and eternal as are its truths, all Science concerns all
mankind for all time. Equally at present, and in the remotest future, must it be of incalculable importance for the regulation of their conduct that men should understand the science of life, physical, mental, and social, and that they should understand all other science as a key to the science of life.

And yet the knowledge which is of such transcendent value is that which, in our age of boasted education, receives the least attention. While this which we call civilization could never have arisen had it not been for science, science forms scarcely an appreciable element in what men consider civilized training. Though to the progress of science we owe it that millions find support where once there was food only for thousands, yet of these millions but a few thousands pay any respect to that which has made their existence possible. Though this increasing knowledge of the properties and relations of things has not only enabled wandering tribes to grow into populous nations, but has given to the countless members of those populous nations comforts and pleasures which their few naked ancestors never even conceived, or could have believed, yet is this kind of knowledge only now receiving a grudging recognition in our highest educational institutions. To the slowly growing acquaintance with the uniform co-existences and sequences of phenomena—to the establishment of invariable laws, we owe our emancipation from the
grossest superstitions. But for science we should be still worshipping fetishes; or, with hecatombs of victims, propitiating diabolical deities. And yet this science, which, in place of the most degrading conceptions of things, has given us some insight into the grandeurs of creation, is written against in our theologies and frowned upon from our pulpits.

Paraphrasing an Eastern fable, we may say that in the family of knowledges, Science is the household drudge, who, in obscurity, hides unrecognized perfections. To her has been committed all the work; by her skill, intelligence, and devotion, have all the conveniences and gratifications been obtained; and while ceaselessly occupied ministering to the rest, she has been kept in the background, that her haughty sisters might flaunt their fripperies in the eyes of the world. The parallel holds yet further. For we are fast coming to the dénouement, when the positions will be changed; and while these haughty sisters sink into merited neglect, Science, proclaimed as highest alike in worth and beauty, will reign supreme.
CHAPTER II

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION

There cannot fail to be a relationship between the successive systems of education, and the successive social states with which they have co-existed. Having a common origin in the national mind, the institutions of each epoch, whatever be their special functions, must have a family likeness.

When men received their creed and its interpretations from an infallible authority deigning no explanations, it was natural that the teaching of children should be purely dogmatic. While "believe and ask no questions" was the maxim of the Church, it was fitly the maxim of the school. Conversely, now that Protestantism has gained for adults a right of private judgment and established the practice of appealing to reason, there is harmony in the change that has made juvenile instruction a process of exposition addressed to the understanding.

Along with political despotism, stern in its commands, ruling by force of terror, visiting trifling crimes with death, and implacable in its vengeance on the disloyal, there necessarily grew up an academic discipline similarly harsh—a discipline of multiplied injunctions and blows for
every breach of them—a discipline of unlimited autocracy upheld by rods, and ferules, and the black-hole. On the other hand, the increase of political liberty, the abolition of law restricting individual action, and the amelioration of the criminal code, have been accompanied by a kindred progress towards non-coercive education: the pupil is hampered by fewer restraints, and other means than punishments are used to govern him.

In those ascetic days when men, acting on the greatest misery principle, held that the more gratifications they denied themselves the more virtuous they were, they, as a matter of course, considered that the best education which most thwarted the wishes of their children, and cut short all spontaneous activity with—"You mustn't do so." While on the contrary, now that happiness is coming to be regarded as a legitimate aim—now that hours of labor are being shortened and popular recreations provided, parents and teachers are beginning to see that most childish desires may rightly be gratified, that childish sports should be encouraged, and that the tendencies of the growing mind are not altogether so diabolical as was supposed.

The age in which all thought that trades must be established by bounties and prohibitions; that manufacturers needed their materials and qualities and prices to be prescribed, and that the value of money could be determined by law, was
an age which unavoidably cherished the notions that a child’s mind could be made to order; that its powers were to be imparted by the schoolmaster; that it was a receptacle into which knowledge was to be put and there built up after its teacher’s ideal. In this free-trade era, however, when we are learning that there is much more self-regulation in things than was supposed; that labor and commerce, and agriculture, and navigation can do better without management than with it; that political governments, to be efficient, must grow up from within and not be imposed from without, we are also beginning to see that there is a natural process of mental evolution which is not to be disturbed without injury; that we may not force on the unfolding mind our artificial forms; but that Psychology, also, discloses to us a law of supply and demand, to which, if we would not do harm, we must conform.

Thus alike in its oracular dogmatism, in its harsh discipline, in its multiplied restrictions; in its professed asceticism, and in its faith in the devices of men, the old educational regime was akin to the social systems with which it was contemporaneous; and similarly, in the reverse of these characteristics our modern modes of culture correspond to our more liberal religious and political institutions.

But there remain further parallelisms to which we have not yet adverted: that, namely, between the processes by which these re-
spective changes have been wrought out, and that between the several states of heterogeneous opinion to which they have led.

Some centuries ago there was uniformity of belief—religious, political, and educational. All men were Romanists, all were Monarchists, all were disciples of Aristotle, and no one thought of calling in question that grammar-school routine under which all were brought up. The same agency has in each case replaced this uniformity by a constantly increasing diversity. That tendency towards assertion of the individuality, which, after contributing to produce the great Protestant movement, has since gone on to produce an ever-increasing number of sects—that tendency which initiated political parties, and out of the two primary ones has, in these modern days, evolved a multiplicity to which every year adds—that tendency which led to the Baconian rebellion against the schools, and has since originated here and abroad sundry new systems of thought—is a tendency which, in education also, has caused division and the accumulation of methods. As external consequences of the same internal change, these processes have necessarily been more or less simultaneous.

The decline of authority, whether papal, philosophic, kingly, or tutorial, is essentially one phenomenon; in each of its aspects a leaning towards free action is seen alike in the work-
ing out of the change itself, and in the new forms of theory and practice to which the change has given birth.

While many will regret this multiplication of schemes of juvenile culture, the catholic observer will discern in it a means of ensuring the final establishment of a rational system. Whatever may be thought of theological dissent, it is clear that dissent in education results in facilitating inquiry by the division in labor. Were we in possession of the true method, divergence from it would, of course, be prejudicial; but the true method having to be found, the efforts of numerous independent seekers, carrying out their researches in different directions, constitute a better agency for finding it than any that could be devised. Each of them struck by some new thought which probably contains more or less of basis in facts—each of them zealous on behalf of his plan, fertile in expedients to test its correctness, and untiring in his efforts to make known its success—each of them merciless in his criticism on the rest—there cannot fail, by composition of forces, to be a gradual approximation of all towards the right course. Whatever portion of the normal method any one of them has discovered, must, by the constant exhibition of its results, force itself into adoption; whatever wrong practices he has joined with it must, by repeated experiment and failure, be exploded.
And by this aggregation of truths and elimination of errors, there must eventually be developed a correct and complete body of doctrine. Of the three phases through which human opinion passes—the unanimity of the ignorant, the disagreement of the inquiring, and the unanimity of the wise—it is manifest that the second is the parent of the third. They are not sequences in time only; they are sequences in causation. However impatiently, therefore, we may witness the present conflict of educational systems, and however much we may regret its accompanying evils, we must recognize it as a transition stage needful to be passed through, and beneficent in its ultimate effects.

Meanwhile may we not advantageously take stock of our progress? After fifty years of discussion, experiment, and comparison of results, may we not expect a few steps towards the goal to be already made good? Some old methods must by this time have fallen out of use; some new ones must have become established, and many others must be in process of general abandonment or adoption. Probably we may see in these various changes, when put side by side, similar characteristics—may find in them a common tendency, and so, by inference, may get a clue to the direction in which experience is leading us, and gather hints how we may achieve yet further improvements. Let us then,
as a preliminary to a deeper consideration of the matter, glance at the leading contrasts between the education of the past and of the present.

The suppression of every error is commonly followed by a temporary ascendancy of the contrary one; and it so happened that after the ages when physical development alone was aimed at, there came an age when culture of the mind was the sole solicitude—when children had lesson-books put before them at between two and three years old—when school-hours were protracted, and the getting of knowledge was thought the one thing needful.

As, further, it usually happens that after one of these reactions the next advance is achieved by co-ordinating the antagonistic errors and perceiving that they are opposite sides of one truth; so we are now coming to the conviction that body and mind must both be cared for, and the whole being unfolded. The forcing system has been in great measure given up and precocity is discouraged. People are beginning to see that the first requisite to success in life is to be a good animal. The best brain is found of little service if there be not enough vital energy to work it; and hence to obtain the one by sacrificing the source of the other, is now considered a folly—a folly which the eventual failure of juvenile prodigies constantly illustrates. Thus we are discovering the wisdom of the saying,
that one secret in education is "to know how wisely to lose time".

The once universal practice of learning by rote is daily falling more into discredit. All modern authorities condemn the old mechanical way of teaching the alphabet. The multiplication table is now frequently taught experimentally. In the acquirement of languages, the grammar-school plan is being superseded by plans based on the spontaneous process followed by the child in gaining its mother tongue. Describing the methods there used, the "Reports on the Training School at Battersea" say:—"The instruction in the whole preparatory course is chiefly oral, and is illustrated as much as possible by appeals to nature." And so throughout. The rote-system, like other systems of its age, made more of the forms and symbols than of the things symbolized. To repeat the words correctly was everything; to understand their meaning, nothing,—and thus the spirit was sacrificed to the letter. It is at length perceived that in this case, as in others, such a result is not accidental but necessary—that in proportion as there is attention to the signs, there must be inattention to the things signified; or that, as Montaigne long ago said—Sa\v\o\ir \ pa\ r c\\ \ o\e\ u\ r \ n'\ e\ s\ t\ p\ a\ s \ sa\v\o\i\r.

Along with rote-teaching, is declining also the nearly allied teaching by rules. The particulars first and then the generalization,
is the new method—a method, as the Battersea School Reports remark, which, though "the reverse of the method usually followed, which consists in giving the pupil the rule first," is yet proved by experience to be the right one. Rule-teaching is now condemned as imparting a merely empirical knowledge—as producing an appearance of understanding without the reality. To give the net product of inquiry without the inquiry that leads to it is found to be both enervating and inefficient. General truths to be of due and permanent use, must be earned. "Easy come easy go," is a saying as applicable to knowledge as to wealth.

While rules, lying isolated in the mind—not joined to its other contents as outgrowths from them—are continually forgotten, the principles which those rules express piecemeal, become, when once reached by the understanding, enduring possessions. While the rule-taught youth is at sea when beyond his rules, the youth instructed in principles solves a new case as readily as an old one.

Between a mind of rules and a mind of principles, there exists a difference such as that between a confused heap of materials, and the same materials organized into a complete whole, with all its parts bound together. Of which types this last has not only the advantage that its constituent parts are better retained, but the much greater advantage, that it forms an efficient agent for inquiry, for in-
dependent thought, for discovery—ends for which the first is useless. Nor let it be supposed that this is a simile only: it is the literal truth. The union of facts into generalizations is the organization of knowledge, whether considered as an objective phenomenon, or a subjective one: and the mental grasp may be measured by the extent to which this organization is carried.

From the substitution of principles for rules, and the necessarily co-ordinate practice of leaving abstractions untaught until the mind has been familiarized with the facts from which they are abstracted, has resulted the postponement of some once early studies to a late period. This is exemplified in the abandonment of that intensely stupid custom, the teaching of grammar to children. As M. Marcel says:—“It may without hesitation be affirmed that grammar is not the stepping-stone, but the finishing instrument.” As Mr. Wyse argues:—“Grammar and Syntax are a collection of laws and rules. Rules are gathered from practice; they are the results of induction to which we come by long observation and comparison of facts. It is, in fine, the science, the philosophy of language. In following the process of nature, neither individuals nor nations ever arrive at the science first. A language is spoken, and poetry written, many years before either a grammar or prosody is even thought of. Men did not wait till Aristotle
had constructed his logic, to reason. In short, as grammar was made after language, so ought it to be taught after language: an inference which all who recognize the relationship between the evolution of the race and of the individual, will see to be unavoidable."

Of new practices that have grown up during the decline of these old ones, the most important is the systematic culture of the powers of observation. After long ages of blindness men are at last seeing that the spontaneous activity of the observing faculties in children has a meaning and a use. What was once thought mere purposeless action, or play, or mischief, as the case might be, is now recognized as the process of acquiring a knowledge on which all after-knowledge is based. Hence the well-conceived but ill-conducted system of object-lessons. The saying of Bacon, that physics is the mother of sciences, has come to have a meaning in education. Without an accurate acquaintance with the visible and tangible properties of things, our conceptions must be erroneous, our inferences fallacious, and our operations unsuccessful. "The education of the senses neglected, all after education partakes of a drowsiness, a haziness, an insufficiency which it is impossible to cure."

Indeed, if we consider it, we shall find that exhaustive observation is an element in all great success. It is not to artists, naturalists, and men of
science only, that it is needful; it is not only that the skilful physician depends on it for the correctness of his diagnosis, and that to the good engineer it is so important that some years in the workshop are prescribed for him; but we may see that the philosopher also is fundamentally one who observes relationships of things which others had overlooked, and that the poet, too, is one who sees the fine facts in nature which all recognize when pointed out, but did not before remark. Nothing requires more to be insisted on than that vivid and complete impressions are all-essential. No sound fabric of wisdom can be woven out of a rotten raw-material.

While the old method of presenting truths in the abstract has been falling out of use, there has been a corresponding adoption of the new method of presenting them in the concrete. The rudimentary facts of exact science are now being learnt by direct intuition, as textures, and tastes, and colors are learnt. Employing the ball-frame for first lessons in arithmetic exemplifies this. It is well illustrated, too, in Professor De Morgan's mode of explaining the decimal notation. M. Marcel, rightly repudiating the old system of tables, teaches weights and measures by referring to the actual yard and foot, pound and ounce, gallon and quart, and lets the discovery of their relationships be experimental. The use of geographical models and models of the regular bodies, etc., as introduc-
tory to geography and geometry respectively, are facts of the same class.

Manifestly a common trait of these methods is, that they carry each child’s mind through a process like that which the mind of humanity at large has gone through. The truths of number, of form, of relationship in position, were all originally drawn from objects, and to present these truths to the child in the concrete is to let him learn them as the race learnt them. By and by, perhaps, it will be seen that he cannot possibly learn them in any other way; for that if he is made to repeat them as abstractions, the abstractions can have no meaning for him, until he finds that they are simply statements of what he intuitively discerns.

But of all the changes taking place the most significant is the growing desire to make the acquisition of knowledge pleasurable rather than painful—a desire based on the more or less distinct perception that at each age the intellectual action which a child likes is a healthful one for it; and conversely. There is a spreading opinion that the rise of an appetite for any kind of knowledge implies that the unfolding mind has become fit to assimilate it and needs it for the purposes of growth; and that on the other hand, the disgust felt toward any kind of knowledge is a sign either that it is prematurely presented, or that it is presented in an indigestible form.
Hence the efforts to make early education amusing, and all education interesting. Hence the lectures on the value of play. Hence the defence of nursery rhymes and fairy tales. Daily we more and more conform our plans to juvenile opinion. Does the child like this or that kind of teaching? does he take to it? we constantly ask. "His natural desire of variety should be indulged," says M. Marcel; "and the gratification of his curiosity should be combined with his improvement." "Lessons," he again remarks, "should cease before the child evinces symptoms of weariness." And so with later education. Short breaks during school-hours, excursions into the country, amusing lectures, choral songs—in these and many like traits, the change may be discerned. Asceticism is disappearing out of education as out of life; and the usual test of political legislation—its tendency to promote happiness—is beginning to be, in a great degree, the test of legislation for the school and the nursery.

What now is the common characteristic of these several changes? Is it not an increasing conformity to the methods of nature? The relinquishment of early forcing against which nature ever rebels, and the leaving of the first years for exercise of the limbs and senses, show this. The superseding of rote-learnt lessons by lessons orally and experimentally given, like those of the field and play-ground, shows this. The disuse of rule-teach-
ing, and the adoption of teaching by principles—that is, the leaving of generalizations until there are particulars to base them on—show this. The system of object-lessons shows this. The teaching of the rudiments of science in the concrete instead of the abstract, shows this.

And above all, this tendency is shown in the variously directed efforts to present knowledge in attractive forms, and so to make the acquirement of it pleasurable. For as it is the order of nature in all creatures that the gratification accompanying the fulfilment of needful functions serves as a stimulus to their fulfilment—as during the self-education of the young child, the delight taken in the biting of corals, and the pulling to pieces of toys, becomes the prompter to actions which teach it the properties of matter, it follows that, in choosing the succession of subjects and the modes of instruction which most interest the pupil, we are fulfilling nature's behests, and adjusting our proceedings to the laws of life.

Thus, then, we are on the highway toward the doctrine long ago enunciated by Pestalozzi, that alike in its order and its methods, education must conform to the natural process of mental evolution—that there is a certain sequence in which the faculties spontaneously develop, and a certain kind of knowledge which each requires during its development, and that it is for us to ascertain this sequence, and supply this knowledge.
All the improvements above alluded to are partial applications of this general principle. A nebulous perception of it now prevails among teachers, and it is daily more insisted on in educational works. "The method of nature is the archetype of all methods," says M. Marcel. "The vital principle in the pursuit is to enable the pupil rightly to instruct himself," writes Mr. Wyse.

The more science familiarizes us with the constitution of things the more do we see in them an inherent self-sufficingness. A higher knowledge tends continually to limit our interference with the processes of life. As in medicine the old "heroic treatment" has given place to mild treatment, and often no treatment save a normal regimen—as we have found that it is not needful to mold the bodies of babes by bandaging them in papoose fashion or otherwise—as in jails it is being discovered that no cunningly devised discipline of ours is so efficient in producing reformation as the natural discipline, the making prisoners maintain themselves by productive labor—so in education we are finding that success is to be achieved only by rendering our measures subservient to that spontaneous unfolding which all minds go through in their progress to maturity.

Of course this fundamental principle of tuition, that the arrangement of matter and method must correspond with the order of evolution and mode of activity of the faculties—a
principle so obviously true, that once stated it seems almost self-evident—has never been wholly disregarded. Teachers have unavoidably made their school-courses coincide with it in some degree, for the simple reason that education is possible only on that condition. Boys were never taught the rule-of-three until after they had learnt addition. They were not set to write exercises before they had got into their copy-books. Conic sections have always been preceded by Euclid.

But the error of the old methods consists in this, that they do not recognize in detail what they are obliged to recognize in the general. Yet the principle applies throughout. If from the time when a child is able to conceive two things as related in position, years must elapse before it can form a true concept of the earth as a sphere made up of land and sea, covered with mountains, forests, rivers, and cities, revolving on its axis, and sweeping round the sun—if it gets from the one concept to the other by degrees—if the intermediate concepts which it forms are consecutively larger and more complicated—is it not manifest that there is a general succession through which only it can pass; that each larger concept is made by the combination of smaller ones, and presupposes them; and that to present any of these compound concepts before the child is in possession of its constituent ones, is only less absurd than to present the final concept of the series before the initial one?
In the mastering of every subject some course of increasingly complex ideas has to be gone through. The evolution of the corresponding faculties consists in the assimilation of these; which, in any true sense, is impossible without they are put into the mind in the normal order. And when this order is not followed, the result is that they are received with apathy or disgust, and that unless the pupil is intelligent enough to eventually fill up the gaps himself, they lie in his memory as dead facts, capable of being turned to little or no use.

"But why trouble ourselves about any *curriculum* at all?" it may be asked. "If it be true that the mind like the body has a predetermined course of evolution,—if it unfolds spontaneously,—if its successive desires for this or that kind of information arise when these are severally required for its nutrition,—if there thus exists in itself a prompter to the right species of activity at the right time, why interfere in any way? Why not leave children *wholly* to the discipline of nature? —why not remain quite passive and let them get knowledge as they best can?—why not be consistent throughout?"

This is an awkward looking question. Plausibly implying as it does, that a system of complete *laissez-faire* is the logical outcome of the doctrines set forth, it seems to furnish a disproof of them by *reductio ad absurdum*. In truth, however, they do
not, when rightly understood, commit us to any such untenable position.

A glance at the physical analogies will clearly show this. It is a general law of all life that the more complex the organism to be produced, the longer the period during which it is dependent on a parent organism for food and protection. The contrast between the minute, rapidly-formed, and self-moving spore of a conferva, and the slowly developed seed of a tree, with its multiplied envelopes and large stock of nutriment laid by to nourish the germ during its first stages of growth, illustrates this law in its application to the vegetable world. Among animal organisms we may trace it in a series of contrasts from the monad, whose spontaneously-divided halves are as self-sufficing the moment after their separation as was the original whole, up to man, whose offspring not only passes through a protracted gestation, and subsequently long depends on the breast for sustenance, but after that must have its food artificially administered; must, after it has learned to feed itself, continue to have bread, clothing, and shelter provided, and does not acquire the power of complete self-support until a time varying from fifteen to twenty years after its birth.

Now this law applies to the mind as to the body. For mental pabulum, also, every higher creature, and especially man, is at first dependent on adult aid. Lacking the ability to move about, the babe
is as powerless to get materials on which to exercise its perceptions as it is to get supplies for its stomach. Unable to prepare its own food, it is in like manner unable to reduce many kinds of knowledge to a fit form for assimilation. The language through which all higher truths are to be gained it wholly derives from those surrounding it. And we see in such an example as the Wild Boy of Aveyron, the arrest of development that results when no help is received from parents and nurses.

Thus, in providing from day to day the right kind of facts, prepared in the right manner, and giving them in due abundance at appropriate intervals, there is as much scope for active ministration to a child's mind as to its body. In either case it is the chief function of parents to see that the conditions requisite to growth are maintained. And, as in supplying aliment, and clothing, and shelter, they may fulfil this function without at all interfering with the spontaneous development of the limbs and viscera either in their order or mode; so they may supply sounds for imitation, objects for examination, books for reading, problems for solution; and, if they use neither direct or indirect coercion, may do this without in any way disturbing the normal process of mental evolution; or rather, may greatly facilitate that process. Hence the admission of the doctrines enunciated does not, as some might argue, involve the abandonment of all teaching, but leaves
ample room for an active and elaborate course of culture.

Passing from generalities to special considerations, it is to be remarked that in practice, the Pestalozzian system seems scarcely to have fulfilled the promise of its theory. We hear of children not at all interested in its lessons,—dissatisfied with them rather; and, so far as we can gather, the Pestalozzian schools have not turned out any unusual proportion of distinguished men,—if even they have reached the average.

We are not surprised at this. The success of every appliance depends mainly upon the intelligence with which it is used. It is a trite remark, that, having the choicest tools, an unskilful artisan will botch his work; and bad teachers will fail even with the best methods. Indeed, the goodness of the method becomes in such case a cause of failure; as, to continue the simile, the perfection of the tool becomes in undisciplined hands a source of imperfection in results.

A simple, unchanging, almost mechanical routine of tuition may be carried out by the commonest intellects, with such small beneficial effect as it is capable of producing; but a complete system,—a system as heterogeneous in its appliances as the mind in its faculties—a system proposing a special means for each special end, demands for its right employment powers such as few teachers possess.
The mistress of a dame-school can hear spelling-lessons; any hedge-schoolmaster can drill boys in the multiplication-table; but to teach spelling rightly by using the powers of the letters instead of their names, or to instruct in numerical combinations by experimental synthesis, a modicum of understanding is needful: and to pursue a like rational course throughout the entire range of studies, asks an amount of judgment, of invention, of intellectual sympathy, of analytical faculty, which we shall never see applied to it while the tutorial office is held in such small esteem. The true education is practicable only to the true philosopher.

Judge, then, what prospect a philosophical method now has of being acted out! Knowing so little as we yet do of Psychology, and ignorant as our teachers are of that little, what chance has a system which requires Psychology for its basis?

Further hindrance and discouragement has arisen from confounding the Pestalozzian principle with the forms in which it has been embodied. Because particular plans have not answered expectation, discredit has been cast upon the doctrine associated with them, no inquiry being made whether these plans truly conform to such doctrine. Judging as usual by the concrete rather than the abstract, men have blamed the theory for the bunglings of the practice. It is as though Papin's futile attempt to construct a steam-engine had been held to prove
that steam could not be used as a motive power.

Let it be constantly borne in mind that while right in his fundamental ideas Pestalozzi was not therefore right in all his applications of them: and we believe the fact to be that he was often wrong. As described even by his admirers, Pestalozzi was a man of partial intuitions, a man who had occasional flashes of insight, rather than a man of systematic thought. His first great success at Stanz was achieved when he had no books or appliances of ordinary teaching, and when "the only object of his attention was to find out at each moment what instruction his children stood peculiarly in need of, and what was the best manner of connecting it with the knowledge they already possessed." Much of his power was due, not to calmly reasoned-out plans of culture, but to his profound sympathy, which gave him an instinctive perception of childish needs and difficulties. He lacked the ability logically to co-ordinate and develop the truths which he thus from time to time laid hold of, and had in great measure to leave this to his assistants, Kruesi, Tobler, Buss, Niederer, and Schmid.

The result is that in their details, his own plans, and those vicariously devised, contain numerous crudities and inconsistencies. His nursery-method, described in "The Mother's Manual", beginning as it does with a nomenclature of the different parts of the body, and proceeding
next to specify their relative positions, and next their connections, may be proved not at all in accordance with the initial stages of mental evolution. His process of teaching the mother tongue by formal exercises in the meanings of words and in the construction of sentences, is quite needless, and must entail on the pupil loss of time, labor, and happiness. His proposed mode of teaching geography is utterly unpestalozzian. And often where his plans are essentially sound they are either incomplete or vitiated by some remnant of the old regime.

While, therefore, we would defend in its entire extent the general doctrine which Pestalozzi inaugurated, we think great evil likely to result from an uncritical reception of his specific devices. That tendency which mankind constantly exhibit to canonize the forms and practices along with which any great truth has been bequeathed to him,—their liability to prostrate their intellects before the prophet, and swear by his every word,—their proneness to mistake the clothing of the idea for the idea itself—renders it needful to insist strongly upon the distinction between the fundamental principle of the Pestalozzian system, and the set of expedients devised for its practice: and to suggest that while the one may be considered as established, the other is probably nothing but an adumbration of the normal course.

Indeed, on looking at the state of our knowledge
we may be quite sure that this is the case. Before our educational methods can be made to harmonize in character and arrangement with the faculties in their mode and order of unfolding, it is first needful that we ascertain with some completeness how the faculties do unfold. At present our knowledge of the matter extends only to a few general notions. These general notions must be developed in detail,—must be transformed into a multitude of specific propositions, before we can be said to possess that science on which the art of education must be based. And then when we have definitely made out in what succession, and in what combinations the mental powers become active, it remains to choose out of the many possible ways of exercising each of them that which best conforms to its natural mode of action. Evidently, therefore, it is not to be supposed that even our most advanced modes of teaching are the right ones, or nearly the right ones.

I. The Theory of Education

Bearing in mind then this distinction between the principle and the practice of Pestalozzi, and inferring from the grounds assigned that the last must necessarily be very defective, the reader will rate at its true worth the dissatisfaction with the system which some have expressed, and will see that the due realization of the Pestalozzian idea remains to be achieved. Should he argue,
however, from what has just been said that no such realization is at present practicable, and that all effort ought to be devoted to the preliminary inquiry, we reply, that though it is not possible for a scheme of culture to be perfected either in matter or form until a rational Psychology has been established, it is possible, with the aid of certain guiding principles, to make empirical approximations towards a perfect scheme. To prepare the way for further research we will now specify these principles. Some of them have already been more or less distinctly implied in the foregoing pages, but it will be well here to state them all in logical order.

1. That in education we should proceed from the simple to the complex is a truth which has always been to some extent acted upon; not professedly, indeed, nor by any means consistently. The mind grows. Like all things that grow it progresses from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, and a normal training system being an objective counterpart of this subjective process, must exhibit the like progression.

Moreover, regarding it from this point of view, we may see that this formula has much wider applications than at first appears. For its rationale involves not only that we should proceed from the single to the combined in the teaching of each branch of knowledge, but that we should do the like with knowledge as a whole. As the mind, con-
sisting at first of but few active faculties, has its later-completed faculties successively awakened, and ultimately comes to have all its faculties in simultaneous action, it follows that our teaching should begin with but few subjects at once, and successively adding to these, should finally carry on all subjects abreast—that not only in its details should education proceed from the simple to the complex, but in its ensemble also.

2. To say that our lessons ought to start from the concrete and end in the abstract, may be considered as in part a repetition of the foregoing. Nevertheless it is a maxim that needs to be stated: if with no other view, then with the view of showing in certain cases what are truly the simple and the complex.

For unfortunately there has been much misunderstanding on this point. General formulas which men have devised to express groups of details, and which have severally simplified their conceptions by uniting many facts into one fact, they have supposed must simplify the conceptions of the child also; quite forgetting that a generalization is simple only in comparison with the whole mass of particular truths it comprehends—that it is more complex than any one of these truths taken singly—that only after many of these single truths have been acquired does the generalization ease the memory and help the reason—and that to the child not pos-
sessing these single truths it is necessarily a mystery. Thus confounding two kinds of simplification, teachers have constantly erred by setting out with "first principles"; a proceeding essentially, though not apparently, at variance with the primary rule, which implies that the mind should be introduced to principles through the medium of examples, and so should be led from the particular to the general—from the concrete to the abstract.

3. The education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of mankind as considered historically; or in other words, the genesis of knowledge in the individual must follow the same course as the genesis of knowledge in the race. To M. Comte we believe society owes the enunciation of this doctrine—a doctrine which we may accept without committing ourselves to his theory of the genesis of knowledge, either in its causes or its order.

In support of this doctrine two reasons may be assigned, either of them sufficient to establish it. One is deducible from the law of hereditary transmission as considered in its wider consequences. For if it be true that men exhibit likeness to ancestry both in aspect and character—if it be true that certain mental manifestations, as insanity, will occur in successive members of the same family at the same age—if, passing from individual cases in which the traits of many dead ancestors mixing with those of
a few living ones greatly obscure the law, we turn to national types, and remark how the contrasts between them are persistent from age to age—if we remember that these respective types came from a common stock, and that hence the present marked differences between them must have arisen from the action of modifying circumstances upon successive generations who severally transmitted the accumulated effects to their descendants—if we find the differences to be now organic, so that the French child grows into a French man even when brought up among strangers—and if the general fact thus illustrated is true of the whole nature, intellect inclusive—then it follows that if there be an order in which the human race has mastered its various kinds of knowledge, there will arise in every child an aptitude to acquire these kinds of knowledge in the same order. So that even were the order intrinsically indifferent, it would facilitate education to lead the individual mind through the steps traversed by the general mind.

But the order is not intrinsically indifferent, and hence the fundamental reason why education should be a repetition of civilization in little. It is alike provable that the historical sequence was, in its main outlines, a necessary one, and that the causes which determined it apply to the child as to the race. Not to specify these causes in detail, it will suffice here to point out that as the mind of human-
ity placed in the midst of phenomena and striving to comprehend them, has, after endless comparisons, speculations, experiments, and theories, reached its present knowledge of each subject by a specific route, it may rationally be inferred that the relationship between mind and phenomena is such as to prevent this knowledge from being reached by any other route, and that as each child's mind stands in this same relationship to phenomena, they can be accessible to it only through the same route. Hence in deciding upon the right method of education, an inquiry into the method of civilization will help to guide us.

4. One of the conclusions to which such an inquiry leads is that in each branch of instruction we should proceed from the empirical to the rational. A leading fact in human progress is, that every science is evolved out of its corresponding art. It results from the necessity we are under, both individually and as a race, of reaching the abstract by way of the concrete, that there must be practice and an accruing experience with its empirical generalizations before there can be science. Science is organized knowledge; and before knowledge can be organized some of it must first be possessed.

Every study, therefore, should have a purely experimental introduction; and only after an ample fund of observations has been accumulated, should
reasoning begin. As illustrative applications of this rule, we may instance the modern course of placing grammar, not before language, but after it; or the ordinary custom of prefacing perspective by practical drawing. By and by further applications of it will be indicated.

5. A second corollary from the foregoing general principle, and one which cannot be too strenuously insisted upon, is, that in education the process of self-development should be encouraged to the fullest extent. Children should be led to make their own investigations and to draw their own inferences. They should be told as little as possible, and induced to discover as much as possible. Humanity has progressed solely by self-instruction; and that to achieve the best results, each mind must progress somewhat after the same fashion, is continually proved by the marked success of self-made men.

Those who have been brought up under the ordinary school-drill, and have carried away with them the idea that education is practicable only in that style, will think it hopeless to make children their own teachers. If, however, they will call to mind that the all-important knowledge of surrounding objects which a child gets in its early years is got without help—if they will remember that the child is self-taught in the use of its mother tongue—if they will estimate the amount of that experience
of life, that out-of-school wisdom, which every boy gathers for himself—if they will mark the unusual intelligence of the uncared for London gamin, as shown in all the directions in which his faculties have been tasked—if further, they will think how many minds have struggled up unaided, not only through the mysteries of our irrationally-planned curriculum, but through hosts of other obstacles besides—they will find it a not unreasonable conclusion, that if the subjects be put before him in right order and right form, any pupil of ordinary capacity will surmount his successive difficulties with but little assistance.

Who indeed can watch the ceaseless observation, and inquiry, and inference going on in a child's mind, or listen to its acute remarks on matters within the range of its faculties, without perceiving that these powers which it manifests, if brought to bear systematically upon any studies within the same range, would readily master them without help? This need for perpetual telling is the result of our stupidity, not of the child's. We drag it away from the facts in which it is interested, and which it is actively assimilating of itself; we put before it facts far too complex for it to understand, and therefore distasteful to it; finding that it will not voluntarily acquire these facts, we thrust them into its mind by force of threats and punishment; by thus denying the knowledge it craves, and cramming it with
knowledge it cannot digest, we produce a morbid state of its faculties, and a consequent disgust for knowledge in general; and when, as a result partly of the stolid indolence we have brought on, and partly of still continued unfitness in its studies, the child can understand nothing without explanation, and becomes a mere passive recipient of our instruction, we infer that education must necessarily be carried on thus. Having by our method induced helplessness, we straightway make the helplessness a reason for our method.

Clearly then the experience of pedagogues cannot rationally be quoted against the doctrine we are defending. And whoever sees this will see that we may safely follow the method of nature throughout—may, by a skilful ministration, make the mind as self-developing in its later stages as it is in its earlier ones—and that only by doing this can we produce the highest power and activity.

6. As a final test by which to judge any plan of culture, should come the question,—Does study made enjoyable it create a pleasurable excitement in the pupils? When in doubt whether a particular mode or arrangement is or is not more in harmony with the foregoing principles than some other, we may safely abide by this criterion. Even when, as considered theoretically, the proposed course seems the best, yet if it produce no interest, or less interest than another course, we should relinquish it; for a
child's intellectual instincts are more trustworthy than our reasonings.

In respect to the knowing faculties we may confidently trust in the general law, that under normal conditions, healthful action is pleasurable, while action which gives pain is not healthful. Though at present very incompletely conformed to by the emotional nature, yet by the intellectual nature, or at least by those parts of it which the child exhibits, this law is almost wholly conformed to. The repugnances to this and that study which vex the ordinary teacher, are not innate, but result from his unwise system. Fellenberg says, "Experience has taught me that indolence in young persons is so directly opposite to their natural disposition to activity, that unless it is the consequence of bad education, it is almost invariably connected with some constitutional defect." And the spontaneous activity to which children are thus prone, is simply the pursuit of those pleasures which the healthful exercise of the faculties gives.

It is true that some of the higher mental powers as yet but little developed in the race, and con-genitally possessed in any considerable degree only by the most advanced, are indisposed to the amount of exertion required of them. But these, in virtue of their very complexity, will, in a normal course of culture, come last into exercise, and will therefore have no demands made upon them until the pupil
has arrived at an age when ulterior motives can be brought into play, and an indirect pleasure made to counterbalance a direct displeasure.

With all faculties lower than these, however, the direct gratification consequent on activity is the normal stimulus, and under good management the only needful stimulus. When we are obliged to fall back upon some other we must take the fact as evidence that we are on the wrong track. Experience is daily showing with greater clearness that there is always a method to be found productive of interest—even of delight—and it ever turns out that this is the method proved by all other tests to be the right one.

II. The Practice of Education

With most, these guiding principles will weigh but little if left in this abstract form. Partly, therefore, to exemplify their application, and partly with a view of making sundry specific suggestions, we propose now to pass from the theory of education to the practice of it.

It was the opinion of Pestalozzi—an opinion which has ever since his day been gaining ground—that education of some kind should begin from the cradle. Whoever has watched with any discernment, the wide-eyed gaze of the infant at surrounding objects, knows very well that education does begin thus early, whether we intend
it or not, and that these fingerings and suckings of every thing it can lay hold of, these open-mouthed listenings to every sound, are the first steps in the series which ends in the discovery of unseen planets, the invention of calculating engines, the production of great paintings, or the composition of symphonies and operas. This activity of the faculties from the very first being spontaneous and inevitable, the question is whether we shall supply in due variety the materials on which they may exercise themselves; and to the question so put, none but an affirmative answer can be given.

As before said, however, agreement with Pestalozzi's theory does not involve agreement with his practice; and here occurs a case in point. Treating of instruction in spelling he says:

"The spelling-book ought, therefore, to contain all the sounds of the language, and these ought to be taught in every family from the earliest infancy. The child who learns his spelling-book ought to repeat them to the infant in the cradle, before it is able to pronounce even one of them, so that they may be deeply impressed upon its mind by frequent repetition."

Joining this with the suggestions for "a nursery-method", as set down in his "Mother's Manual", in which he makes the names, positions, connections, numbers, properties, and uses of the limbs and body his first lessons, it becomes clear that Pestalozzi's
notions on early mental development were too crude to enable him to devise judicious plans. Let us inquire into the course which Psychology dictates.

The earliest impressions which the mind can assimilate, are those given to it by the undecomposable sensations—resistance, light, sound, etc. Manifestly decomposable states of consciousness cannot exist before the states of consciousness out of which they are composed. There can be no idea of form until some familiarity with light in its gradations and qualities, or resistance in its different intensities, has been acquired; for, as has been long known, we recognize visible form by means of varieties of light, and tangible form by means of varieties of resistance. Similarly, no articulate sound is cognizable until the inarticulate sounds which go to make it up have been learned. And thus must it be in every other case.

Following, therefore, the necessary law of progression from the simple to the complex, we should provide for the infant a sufficiency of objects presenting different degrees and kinds of resistance, a sufficiency of objects reflecting different amounts and qualities of light, and a sufficiency of sounds contrasted in their loudness, their pitch, and their timbre. How fully this à priori conclusion is confirmed by infantile instincts all will see on being reminded of the delight which every young child has in biting its toys, in feeling its brother’s bright jacket-buttons,
and pulling papa's whiskers—how absorbed it becomes in gazing at any gaudily painted object, to which it applies the word "pretty", when it can pronounce it, wholly in virtue of the bright colors—and how its face broadens into a laugh at the tattlings of its nurse, the snapping of a visitor's fingers, or any sound which it has not before heard.

Fortunately, the ordinary practices of the nursery fulfil these early requirements of education to a considerable degree. Much, however, remains to be done, and it is of more importance that it should be done than at first appears. Every faculty during the period of its greatest activity—the period in which it is spontaneously evolving itself—is capable of receiving more vivid impressions than at any other period. Moreover, as these simplest elements must eventually be mastered, and as the mastery of them whenever achieved must take time, it becomes an economy of time to occupy this first stage of childhood, during which no other intellectual action is possible, in gaining a complete familiarity with them in all their modifications. Add to which, that both temper and health will be improved by the continual gratification resulting from a due supply of these impressions which every child so greedily assimilates.

Space, could it be spared, might here be well filled by some suggestions toward a more systematic ministration to these simplest of the perceptions. But it must suffice to point out that any such ministra-
tion ought to be based upon the general truth that in the development of every faculty, markedly contrasted impressions are the first to be distinguished: that hence sounds greatly differing in loudness and pitch, colors very remote from each other, and substances widely unlike in hardness or texture, should be the first supplied; and that in each case the progression must be by slow degrees to impressions more nearly allied.

Passing on to object-lessons, which manifestly form a natural continuation of this primary culture of the senses, it is to be remarked that the system commonly pursued is wholly at variance with the method of nature, as alike exhibited in infancy, in adult life, and in the course of civilization. "The child," says M. Marcel, "must be shown how all the parts of an object are connected, etc.;" and the various manuals of these object-lessons severally contain lists of the facts which the child is to be told respecting each of the things put before it.

Now it needs but a glance at the daily life of the infant to see that all the knowledge of things which is gained before the acquirement of speech, is self-gained—that the qualities of hardness and weight associated with certain visual appearances, the possession of particular forms and colors by particular persons, the production of special sounds by animals of special aspects, are phenomena which it observes
for itself. In manhood too, when there are no longer teachers at hand, the observations and inferences required for daily guidance, must be made unhelped, and success in life depends upon the accuracy and completeness with which they are made.

Is it probable then, that while the process displayed in the evolution of humanity at large is repeated alike by the infant and the man, a reverse process must be followed during the period between infancy and manhood? and that too, even in so simple a thing as learning the properties of objects? Is it not obvious, on the contrary, that one method must be pursued throughout? And is not nature perpetually thrusting this method upon us, if we had but the wit to see it, and the humility to adopt it?

What can be more manifest than the desire of children for intellectual sympathy? Mark how the infant sitting on your knee thrusts into your face the toy it holds, that you too may look at it. See when it makes a creak with its wet finger on the table, how it turns and looks at you; does it again, and again looks at you; thus saying as clearly as it can—"Hear this new sound." Watch how the elder children come into the room exclaiming—"Mamma, see what a curious thing," "Mamma, look at this," "Mamma, look at that;" and would continue the habit, did not the silly mamma tell them not to tease her. Observe how, when out with the nurse-maid, each little one runs up to her with
the new flower it has gathered, to show her how pretty it is, and to get her also to say it is pretty. Listen to the eager volubility with which every urchin describes any novelty he has been to see, if only he can find some one who will attend with any interest.

Does not the induction lie on the surface? Is it not clear that we must conform our course to these intellectual instincts—that we must just systematize the natural process—that we must listen to all the child has to tell us about each object, must induce it to say everything it can think of about such object, must occasionally draw its attention to facts it has not yet observed, with the view of leading it to notice them itself whenever they recur, and must go on by and by to indicate or supply new series of things for a like exhaustive examination?

See the way in which, on this method, the intelligent mother conducts her lessons. Step by step she familiarizes her little boy with the names of the simpler attributes, hardness, softness, color, taste, size, etc., in doing which she finds him eagerly help by bringing this to show her that it is red, and the other to make her feel that it is hard, as fast as she gives him words for these properties. Each additional property, as she draws his attention to it in some fresh thing which he brings her, she takes care to mention in connection with those he already knows, so that by the natural tendency to imitate, he may
get into the habit of repeating them one after another.

Gradually as there occur cases in which he omits to name one or more of the properties he has become acquainted with, she introduces the practice of asking him whether there is not something more that he can tell her about the thing he has got. Probably he does not understand. After letting him puzzle awhile she tells him; perhaps laughing at him a little for his failure. A few recurrences of this and he perceives what is to be done. When next she says she knows something more about the object than he has told her, his pride is roused; he looks at it intently; thinks over all that he has heard, and the problem being easy, presently finds it out. He is full of glee at his success, and she sympathizes with him. In common with every child, he delights in the discovery of his powers. He wishes for more victories, and goes in quest for more things about which to tell her.

As his faculties unfold she adds quality after quality to his list: progressing from hardness and softness to roughness and smoothness, from color to polish, from simple bodies to composite ones—thus constantly complicating the problem as he gains competence, constantly taxing his attention and memory to a greater extent, constantly maintaining his interest by supplying him with new impressions such as his mind can assimilate, and constantly gratifying
him by conquests over such small difficulties as he can master. In doing this she is manifestly but following out that spontaneous process that was going on during a still earlier period—simply aiding self-evolution—and is aiding it in the mode suggested by the boy's instinctive behavior to her.

Manifestly, too, the course she is pursuing is the one best calculated to establish a habit of exhaustive observation; which is the professed aim of these lessons. To tell a child this and to show it the other, is not to teach it how to observe, but to make it a mere recipient of another's observations: a proceeding which weakens rather than strengthens its powers of self-instruction—which deprives it of the pleasures resulting from successful activity—which presents this all-attractive knowledge under the aspect of formal tuition—and which thus generates that indifference and even disgust with which these object-lessons are not unfrequently regarded.

On the other hand, to pursue the course above described is simply to guide the intellect to its appropriate food; to join with the intellectual appetites their natural adjunets—amour propre and the desire for sympathy; to induce by the union of all these an intensity of attention which insures perceptions alike vivid and complete, and to habituate the mind from the beginning to that practice of self-help which it must ultimately follow.

Object-lessons should not only be carried on after
quite a different fashion from that commonly pur- object- objects lessons sued, but should be extended to a range of things far wider, and continue to a period far later, than now. They should not be limited to the contents of the house, but should include those of the fields and the hedges, the quarry and the sea-shore. They should not cease with early childhood, but should be so kept up during youth as insensibly to merge into the investigations of the naturalist and the man of science.

Here again we have but to follow nature's lead- ings. Where can be seen an intenser delight than that of children picking up new flowers and watching new insects, or hoarding pebbles and shells? And who is there but perceives that by sympathizing with them they may be led on to any extent of inquiry into the qualities and structures of these things? Every botanist who has had children with him in the woods and the lanes must have noticed how eagerly they joined in his pursuits, how keenly they searched out plants for him, how intently they watched whilst he examined them, how they over-whelmed him with questions.

The consistent follower of Bacon—the "servant and interpreter of nature", will see that we ought modestly to adopt the course of culture thus indicated. Having gained due familiarity with the simpler properties of inorganic objects, the child should by the same process be led on to a like exhaustive
examination of the things it picks up in its daily walks—the less complex facts they present being alone noticed at first: in plants, the color, number and forms of the petals and shapes of the stalks and leaves: in insects, the number of wings, legs, and antennae, and their colors.

As these become fully appreciated and invariably observed, further facts may be successively introduced: in the one case, the numbers of stamens and pistils, the forms of the flowers, whether radical or bilateral in symmetry, the arrangement and character of the leaves, whether opposite or alternate, stalked or sessile, smooth or hairy, serrated, toothed, or crenate; in the other, the divisions of the body, the segments of the abdomen, the markings of the wings, the number of joints in the legs, and the forms of the smaller organs—the system pursued throughout being that of making it the child's ambition to say respecting everything it finds, all that can be said.

Then when a fit age has been reached, the means of preserving these plants which have become so interesting in virtue of the knowledge obtained of them, may as a great favor be supplied; and eventually, as a still greater favor, may also be supplied the apparatus needful for keeping the larvæ of our common butterflies and moths through their transformations—a practice which, as we can personally testify, yields the highest gratification; is continued
with ardor for years; when joined with the formation of an entomological collection, adds immense interest to Saturday afternoon rambles, and forms an admirable introduction to the study of physiology.

We are quite prepared to hear from many that all this is throwing away time and energy, and that children would be much better occupied in writing their copies or learning their pence-tables, and so fitting themselves for the business of life.

We regret that such crude ideas of what constitutes education and such a narrow conception of utility, should still be generally prevalent. Saying nothing on the need for a systematic culture of the perceptions and the value of the practices above inculcated as subserving that need, we are prepared to defend them even on the score of the knowledge gained. If men are to be mere cits, mere porers over ledgers, with no ideas beyond their trades—if it is well that they should be as the cockney whose conception of rural pleasures extends no further than sitting in a tea-garden smoking pipes and drinking porter; or as the squire who thinks of woods as places for shooting in, of uncultivated plants as nothing but weeds, and who classifies animals into game, vermin, and stock—then indeed it is needless for men to learn anything that does not directly help to replenish the till and fill the larder. But if there is a more worthy aim for us than to be
drudges—if there are other uses in the things around us than their power to bring money—if there are higher faculties to be exercised than acquisitive and sensual ones—if the pleasures which poetry and art and science and philosophy can bring are of any moment—then is it desirable that the instinctive inclination which every child shows to observe natural beauties and investigate natural phenomena should be encouraged.

But this gross utilitarianism which is content to come into the world and quit it again without knowing what kind of a world it is or what it contains, may be met on its own ground. It will by and by be found that a knowledge of the laws of life is more important than any other knowledge whatever—that the laws of life include not only all bodily and mental processes, but by implication all the transactions of the house and the street, all commerce, all politics, all morals—and that therefore without a due acquaintance with them neither personal nor social conduct can be rightly regulated.

It will eventually be seen too, that the laws of life are essentially the same throughout the whole organic creation, and further, that they cannot be properly understood in their complex manifestations until they have been studied in their simpler ones. And when this is seen, it will be also seen that in aiding the child to acquire the out-of-door information for which it shows so great an avidity, and in
encouraging the acquisition of such information throughout youth, we are simply inducing it to store up the raw material for future organization—the facts that will one day bring home to it with due force those great generalizations of science by which actions may be rightly guided.

The spreading recognition of drawing as an element of education, is one amongst many signs of the more rational views on mental culture now beginning to prevail. Once more it may be remarked that teachers are at length adopting the course which nature has for ages been pressing upon their notice. The spontaneous efforts made by children to represent the men, houses, trees, and animals around them—on a slate if they can get nothing better, or with lead-pencil on paper, if they can beg them—are familiar to all. To be shown through a picture-book is one of their highest gratifications, and as usual, their strong imitative tendency presently generates in them the ambition to make pictures themselves also. This attempt to depict the striking things they see is a further instinctive exercise of the perceptions—a means whereby still greater accuracy and completeness of observation is induced. And alike by seeking to interest us in their discoveries of the sensible properties of things, and by their endeavors to draw, they solicit from us just that kind of culture which they most need.
Had teachers been guided by nature's hints, not only in the making of drawing a part of education, but in the choice of their modes of teaching it, they would have done still better than they have done. What is it that the child first tries to represent? Things that are large, things that are attractive in color, things around which its pleasurable associations most cluster—human beings from whom it has received so many emotions, cows and dogs which interest by the many phenomena they present, houses that are hourly visible and strike by their size and contrast of parts. And which of all the processes of representation gives it most delight? Coloring. Paper and pencil are good in default of something better; but a box of paints and a brush—these are the treasures. The drawing of outlines immediately becomes secondary to coloring—is gone through mainly with a view to the coloring; and if leave can be got to color a book of prints, how great is the favor!

Now, ridiculous as such a position will seem to drawing-masters, who postpone coloring and who teach form by a dreary discipline of copying lines, we believe that the course of culture thus indicated is the right one. That priority of color to form, which, as already pointed out, has a psychological basis, and in virtue of which psychological basis arises this strong preference in the child, should be recognized from the very beginning; and from the
very beginning also the things imitated should be real. That greater delight in color which is not only conspicuous in children but persists in most persons throughout life, should be continuously employed as the natural stimulus to the mastery of the comparatively difficult and unattractive form—should be the prospective reward for the achievement of form.

And these instinctive attempts to represent interesting actualities should be all along encouraged, in the conviction that as, by a widening experience, smaller and more practicable objects become interesting, they too will be attempted, and that so a gradual approximation will be made towards imitations having some resemblance to the realities. No matter how grotesque the shapes produced; no matter how daubed and glaring the colors. The question is not whether the child is producing good drawings; the question is, whether it is developing its faculties. It has first to gain some command over its fingers, some crude notions of likeness; and this practice is better than any other for these ends, seeing that it is the spontaneous and the interesting one.

During these early years, be it remembered, no formal drawing-lessons are possible: shall we therefore repress, or neglect to aid, these efforts at self-culture? or shall we encourage and guide them as normal exercises of the perceptions and the powers
of manipulation? If by the supply of cheap woodcuts to be colored, and simple contour-maps to have their boundary lines tinted, we can not only pleasurably draw out the faculty of color, but can incidentally produce some familiarity with the outlines of things and countries, and some ability to move the brush steadily; and if by the supply of temptingly-painted objects we can keep up the instinctive practice of making representations, however rough, it must happen that by the time drawing is commonly commenced there will exist a facility that would else have been absent. Time will have been gained, and trouble both to teacher and pupil saved.

From all that has been said it may be readily inferred that we wholly disapprove of the Geometrical practice of drawing from copies, and still more so of that formal discipline in making straight lines and curved lines and compound lines, with which it is the fashion of some teachers to begin. We regret to find that the Society of Arts has recently, in its series of manuals on "Rudimentary Art-Instruction", given its countenance to an elementary drawing-book which is the most vicious in principle that we have seen. We refer to the "Outline from Outline, or from the Flat", by John Bell, sculptor. As expressed in the prefatory note, this publication proposes "to place before the student a simple, yet logical mode of instruction"; and to this end sets out with a number of definitions thus:
A simple line in drawing is a thin mark drawn from one point to another.

Lines may be divided, as to their nature in drawing, into two classes:—

1. *Straight*, which are marks that go the shortest road between two points, as A B.

2. Or *Curved*, which are marks which do not go the shortest road between two points, as C D.

And so the introduction progresses to horizontal lines, perpendicular lines, angles of the several kinds, and the various figures which lines and angles make up. The work is, in short, a grammar of form, with exercises. And thus the system of commencing with a dry analysis of elements, which, in the teaching of language, has been exploded, is to be re-instituted in the teaching of drawing. The abstract is to be preliminary to the concrete. Scientific conceptions are to precede empirical experiences.

That this is an inversion of the normal order, we need scarcely repeat. It has been well said concerning the custom of prefacing the art of speaking any tongue by a drilling in the parts of speech and their functions, that it is about as reasonable as prefacing the art of walking by a course of lessons on the bones, muscles, and nerves of the legs; and much the same thing may be said of the proposal to preface the art of representing objects by a nomenclature and definitions of the lines which they yield on analysis.
These technicalities are alike repulsive and needless. They render the study distasteful at the very outset, and all with the view of teaching that, which, in the course of practice, will be learnt unconsciously. Just as the child incidentally gathers the meanings of ordinary words from the conversations going on around it, without the help of dictionaries, so, from the remarks on objects, pictures, and its own drawings, will it presently acquire, not only without effort but even pleasurably, those same scientific terms, which, if presented at first, are a mystery and a weariness.

If any dependence is to be placed upon the general principles of education that have been laid down, the process of learning to draw should be throughout continuous with those efforts of early childhood described above as so worthy of encouragement. By the time that the voluntary practice thus initiated has given some steadiness of hand and some tolerable ideas of proportion, there will have arisen a vague notion of body as presenting its three dimensions in perspective. And when, after sundry abortive, Chinese-like attempts to render this appearance on paper, there has grown up a pretty clear perception of the thing to be achieved, and a desire to achieve it, a first lesson in empirical perspective may be given by means of the apparatus occasionally used in explaining perspective as a science.

This sounds formidable, but the experiment is
both comprehensive and interesting to any boy or
girl of ordinary intelligence. A plate of glass so
framed as to stand vertically on the table, being
placed before the pupil, and a book or like simple
object laid on the other side of it, he is requested,
whilst keeping the eye in one position, to make ink
dots upon the glass so that they may coincide with
or hide the corners of this object. He is then told
to join these dots by lines, on doing which he per-
ceives that the lines he makes hide, or coincide with,
the outlines of the object. And then on being asked
to put a sheet of paper on the other side of the glass,
he discovers that the lines he has thus drawn repre-
sent the object as he saw it. They not only look
like it, but he perceives that they must be like it,
because he made them agree with its outlines, and
by removing the paper he can repeatedly convince
himself that they do agree with its outlines.

The fact is new and striking and serves him as an
experimental demonstration that lines of certain
lengths, placed in certain directions on a plane, can
represent lines of other lengths and having other
directions in space. Subsequently, by gradually
changing the position of the object, he may be led
to observe how some lines shorten and disappear
whilst others come into sight and lengthen. The
convergence of parallel lines, and indeed all the
leading facts of perspective may, from time to time,
be similarly illustrated to him.
If he has been duly accustomed to self-help he will gladly, when it is suggested, make the attempt to draw one of these outlines upon paper by the eye only, and it may soon be made an exciting aim to produce, unassisted, a representation as like as he can to one subsequently sketched on the glass. Thus, without the unintelligent, mechanical practice of copying other drawings, but by a method at once simple and attractive—rational, yet not abstract—a familiarity with the linear appearances of things, and a faculty of rendering them, may be, step by step, acquired.

To which advantages add these:—that even thus early the pupil learns almost unconsciously the true theory of a picture—namely, that it is a delineation of objects as they appear when projected on a plane placed between them and the eye, and that when he reaches a fit age for commencing scientific perspective he is already thoroughly acquainted with the facts which form its logical basis.

As exhibiting a rational mode of communicating primary conceptions in geometry, we cannot do better than quote the following passage from Mr. Wyse:

"A child has been in the habit of using cubes for arithmetic; let him use them also for the elements of geometry. I would begin with solids, the reverse of the usual plan. It saves all the difficulty of absurd definitions, and bad explanations on points, lines,
and surfaces, which are nothing but abstractions. * * * A cube presents many of the principal elements of geometry; it at once exhibits points, straight lines, parallel lines, angles, parallelograms, etc., etc. These cubes are divisible into various parts. The pupil has already been familiarized with such divisions in numeration, and he now proceeds to a comparison of their several parts, and of the relation of these parts to each other. * * * From thence he advances to globes, which furnish him with elementary notions of the circle, of curves generally, etc., etc.

"Being tolerably familiar with solids, he may now substitute planes. The transition may be made very easy. Let the cube, for instance, be cut into thin divisions, and placed on paper; he will then see as many plane rectangles as he has divisions; so with all the others. Globes may be treated in the same manner; he will thus see how surfaces really are generated, and be enabled to abstract them with facility in every solid.

"He has thus acquired the alphabet and reading of geometry. He now proceeds to write it.

"The simplest operation, and therefore the first, is merely to place these planes on a piece of paper, and pass the pencil round them. When this has been frequently done the plane may be put at a little distance, and the child required to copy it, and so on."
A stock of geometrical conceptions having been obtained, in some such manner as this recommended by Mr. Wyse, a further step may, in course of time, be taken, by introducing the practice of testing the correctness of all figures drawn by the eye, thus alike exciting an ambition to make them exact, and continually illustrating the difficulty of fulfilling that ambition.

There can be little doubt that geometry had its origin (as, indeed, the word implies) in the methods discovered by artisans and others of making accurate measurement for the foundations of buildings, areas of inclosures, and the like, and that its truths came to be treasured up merely with a view to their immediate utility. They should be introduced to the pupil under analogous relationships. In the cutting out of pieces for his card-houses, in the drawing of ornamental diagrams for coloring, and in those various instructive occupations which an inventive teacher will lead him into, he may be for a length of time advantageously left, like the primitive builder, to tentative processes, and will so gain an abundant experience of the difficulty of achieving his aims by the unaided senses.

When, having meanwhile undergone a valuable discipline of the perceptions, he has reached a fit age for using a pair of compasses, he will, whilst duly appreciating these as enabling him to verify his ocular guesses, be still hindered by the difficul-
ties of the approximative method. In this stage he may be left for a further period: partly as being yet too young for anything higher; partly because it is desirable that he should be made to feel still more strongly the want of systematic contrivances. If the acquisition of knowledge is to be made continuously interesting, and if, in the early civilization of the child, as in the early civilization of the race, science becomes attractive only as ministering to art, it is manifest that the proper preliminary to geometry is a long practice in those constructive processes which geometry will facilitate.

Observe that here, too, nature points the way. Almost invariably, children show a strong propensity to cut out things in paper, to make, to build—a propensity which, if duly encouraged and directed, will not only prepare the way for scientific conceptions, but will develop those powers of manipulation in which most people are so deficient.

When the observing and inventive faculties have attained the requisite power, the pupil may be introduced to empirical geometry, that is—geometry dealing with methodical solutions, but not with the demonstrations of them. Like all other transitions in education, this should be made not formally but incidentally, and the relationship to constructive art should still be maintained.

To make a tetrahedron in cardboard like one given to him is a problem which will alike interest
the pupil and serve as a convenient starting-point. In attempting this he finds it needful to draw four equilateral triangles arranged in special positions. Being unable in the absence of an exact method to do this accurately, he discovers on putting the triangles into their respective positions that he can not make their sides fit and that their angles do not properly meet at the apex. He may now be shown how by describing a couple of circles, each of these triangles may be drawn with perfect correctness and without guessing, and after his failure he will duly value the information.

Having thus helped him to the solution of his first problem, with the view of illustrating the nature of geometrical methods, he is in future to be left altogether to his own ingenuity in solving the questions put to him. To bisect a line, to erect a perpendicular, to describe a square, to bisect an angle, to draw a line parallel to a given line, to describe a hexagon, are problems which a little patience will enable him to find out. And from these he may be led on step by step to questions of a more complex kind, all of which, under judicious management, he will puzzle through unhelped.

Doubtless many of those brought up under the old regime will look upon this assertion sceptically. We speak from facts, however, and those neither few nor special. We have seen a class of boys become so interested in making out solutions to
these problems as to look forward to their geometry-
lesson as a chief event of the week. Within the
last month, we have been told of one girls' school,
in which some of the young ladies voluntarily occu-
pied themselves with geometrical questions out of
school-hours; and of another, in which they not
only do this, but in which one of them is begging
for problems to find out during the holidays—both
which facts we state on the authority of the teacher.
There could indeed be no stronger proofs than are
thus afforded of the practicability and the immense
advantage of self-development. A branch of knowl-
edge which as commonly taught is dry and even
repulsive, may, by following the method of nature,
be made extremely interesting and profoundly
beneficial.

We say profoundly beneficial, because the effects
are not confined to the gaining of geometrical facts,
but often revolutionize the whole state of mind. It
has repeatedly occurred that those who have been
stupified by the ordinary school-drill—by its abstract
formulas, by its wearisome tasks, by its cramming,
have suddenly had their intellects roused by thus
ceasing to make them passive recipients, and induc-
ing them to becoming active discoverers. The dis-
couragement brought about by bad teaching having
been diminished by a little sympathy, and sufficient
perseverance induced to achieve a first success, there
arises a revulsion of feeling affecting the whole
nature. They no longer find themselves incompetent; they too can do something. And gradually as success follows success, the incubus of despair disappears and they attack the difficulties of their other studies with a courage that insures conquest.

This empirical geometry which presents an endless series of problems, and should be continued along with other studies for years, may throughout be advantageously accompanied by those concrete applications of its principles which serves as its preliminary. After the cube, the octahedron, and the various forms of pyramid and prism have been mastered, may come the more complex regular bodies—the dodecahedron, and the icosahedron—to construct which out of single pieces of cardboard requires considerable ingenuity. From these the transition may naturally be made to such modified forms of the regular bodies as are met with in crystals—the truncated cube, the cube with its dihedral as well as its solid angles truncated, the octahedron and the various prisms as similarly modified—in imitating which numerous forms assumed by different metals and salts, an acquaintance with the leading facts of mineralogy will be incidentally gained.

After long continuance in exercises of this kind, rational geometry, as may be supposed, presents no obstacles. Constantly habituated to contemplate relationships of form and quantity, and vaguely per-
ceiving from time to time the necessity of certain results as reached by certain means, the pupil comes to regard the demonstrations of Euclid as the missing supplements to his familiar problems. His well-disciplined faculties enable him easily to master its successive propositions and to appreciate their value, and he has the occasional gratification of finding some of his own methods proved to be true.

Thus he enjoys what is to the unprepared a dreary task. It only remains to add, that his mind will presently arrive at a fit condition for that most valuable of all exercises for the reflective faculties—the making of original demonstrations. Such theorems as those appended to the successive books of the Messrs. Chambers' Euclid, will soon become practicable to him, and in proving them the process of self-development will be not intellectual only, but moral.

To continue much further these suggestions would be to write a detailed treatise on education, which we do not purpose. The foregoing outlines of plans for exercising the perceptions in early childhood, for conducting object-lessons, for teaching drawing and geometry, must be considered as roughly-sketched illustrations of the method dictated by the general principles previously specified. We believe that on examination they will be found not only to progress from the simple to the complex, from the concrete to the abstract, from the empirical
to the rational; but to satisfy the further requirements that education shall be a repetition of civilization in little, that it shall be as much as possible a process of self-evolution, and that it shall be pleasurable. That there should be one type of method capable of satisfying all these conditions, tends alike to verify the conditions and to prove that type of method the right one.

And when we add that this method is the logical outcome of the tendency characterizing all modern systems of instruction—that it is but an adoption in full of the method of nature which they adopt partially—that it displays this complete adoption of the method of nature, not only by conforming to the above principles, but by following the suggestions which the unfolding mind itself gives, facilitating its spontaneous activities, and so aiding the developments which nature is busy with—when we add this, there seems abundant reason to conclude that the mode of procedure above exemplified closely approximates to the true one.

III. Two Fundamental Principles

A few paragraphs must be appended in further inculcation of the two general principles, alike the most important and the least attended to: we mean the principle that throughout youth, as in early childhood and in maturity, the process shall be one of self-instruction; and the obverse principle, that
the mental action induced by this process shall be throughout intrinsically grateful. If progression from simple to complex, and from concrete to abstract, be considered the essential requirements as dictated by abstract psychology, then do these requirements that knowledge shall be self-mastered, and pleasurably mastered, become the tests by which we may judge whether the dictates of abstract psychology are being fulfilled. If the first embody the leading generalizations of the science of mental growth, the last are the chief canons of the art of fostering mental growth. For manifestly if the steps in our curriculum are so arranged that they can be successively ascended by the pupil himself with little or no help, they must correspond with the stages of evolution in his faculties; and manifestly if the successive achievements of these steps are intrinsically gratifying to him, it follows that they require no more than a normal exercise of his powers.

But the making education a process of self-evolution has other advantages than this of keeping our lessons in the right order. In the first place it guarantees a vividness and permanency of impression which the usual methods can never produce. Any piece of knowledge which the pupil has himself acquired, any problem which he has himself solved, becomes by virtue of the conquest much more thoroughly his than it could else
be. The preliminary activity of mind which his success implies, the concentration of thought necessary to it, and the excitement consequent on his triumph, conspire to register all the facts in his memory in a way that no mere information heard from a teacher, or read in a school-book, can be registered. Even if he fails, the tension to which his faculties have been wound up insures his remembrance of the solution when given to him, better than half a dozen repetitions would.

Observe again, that this discipline necessitates a continuous organization of the knowledge he acquires. It is in the very nature of facts and inferences, assimilated in this normal manner, that they successively become the premises of further conclusions,—the means of solving still further questions. The solution of yesterday's problem helps the pupil in mastering to-day's. Thus the knowledge is turned into faculty as soon as it is taken in, and forthwith aids in the general function of thinking—does not lie merely written in the pages of an internal library, as when rote-learnt.

Mark further, the importance of the moral culture which this constant self-help involves. Courage in attacking difficulties, patient concentration of the attention, perseverance through failures—these are characteristics which after-life specially requires; and these are characteristics which this system of making the mind work for its food specially produces.
That it is thoroughly practicable to carry out instruction after this fashion we can ourselves testify, having been in youth thus led to successively solve the comparatively complex problems of Perspective. And that leading teachers have been gradually tending in this direction is indicated alike in the saying of Fellenberg, that "the individual, independent activity of the pupil is of much greater importance than the ordinary busy officiousness of many who assume the office of educators;" in the opinion of Horace Mann, that "unfortunately education amongst us at present consists too much in telling, not in training;" and in the remark of M. Marcel, that "what the learner discovers by mental exertion is better known than what is told to him."

Similarly with the correlative requirement, that the method of culture pursued shall be one productive of an intrinsically happy activity,—an activity not happy in virtue of extrinsic rewards to be obtained, but in virtue of its own healthfulness. Conformity to this requirement not only guards us against thwarting the normal process of evolution, but incidentally secures positive benefits of importance. Unless we are to return to an ascetic morality, the maintenance of youthful happiness must be considered as in itself a worthy aim.

Not to dwell upon this, however, we go on to remark that a pleasurable state of feeling is far more
favorable to intellectual action than one of indifference or disgust. Every one knows that things read, heard, or seen with interest, are better remembered than those read, heard, or seen with apathy. In the one case the faculties appealed to are actively occupied with the subject presented, in the other they are inactively occupied with it and the attention is continually drawn away after more attractive thoughts. Hence the impressions are respectively strong and weak.

Moreover, the intellectual listlessness which a pupil's lack of interest in any study involves, is further complicated by his anxiety, by his fear of consequences, which distract his attention and increase the difficulty he finds in bringing his faculties to bear upon these facts that are repugnant to them. Clearly, therefore, the efficiency of any intellectual action will, other things equal, be proportionate to the gratification with which it is performed.

It should be considered also, that important moral consequences depend upon the habitual moral effects. No one can compare the faces and manners of two boys—the one made happy by mastering interesting subjects, and the other made miserable by disgust with his studies, by consequent failures, by cold looks, by threats, by punishment—without seeing that the disposition of the one is being benefited, and that of the other greatly injured. Who-
ever has marked the effect of intellectual success upon the mind, and the power of the mind over the body, will see that in the one case both temper and health are favorably affected, whilst in the other there is danger of permanent moroseness, of permanent timidity, and even of permanent constitutional depression.

To all which considerations we must add the further one, that the relationship between teachers and their pupils is, other things equal, rendered friendly and influential, or antagonistic and powerless, according as the system of culture produces happiness or misery. Human beings are at the mercy of their associated ideas. A daily minister of pain cannot fail to be regarded with a secret dislike, and if he causes no emotions but painful ones will inevitably be hated. Conversely, he who constantly aids children to their ends, hourly provides them with the satisfactions of conquest, hourly encourages them through their difficulties and sympathizes in their successes, cannot fail to be liked; nay, if his behavior is consistent throughout, must be loved. And when we remember how efficient and benign is the control of a master who is felt to be a friend, when compared with the control of one who is looked upon with aversion, or at best indifference, we may infer that the indirect advantages of conducting education on the happiness principle do not fall far short of the direct ones.
To all who question the possibility of acting out the system here advocated, we reply as before, that not only does theory point to it, but experience commends it. To the many verdicts of distinguished teachers who since Pestalozzi's time have testified this, may be here added that of Professor Pillans, who asserts that "where young people are taught as they ought to be, they are quite as happy in school as at play, seldom less delighted, nay often more, with the well-directed exercise of their mental energies than with that of their muscular powers."

As suggesting a final reason for making education a process of self-instruction, and by consequence a process of pleasurable instruction, we may advert to the fact that, in proportion as it is made so, is there a probability that education will not cease when school-days end. As long as the acquisition of knowledge is rendered habitually repugnant, so long will there be a prevailing tendency to discontinue it when free from the coercion of parents and masters. And when the acquisition of knowledge has been rendered habitually gratifying, then will there be as prevailing a tendency to continue, without superintendence, that same self-culture previously carried on under superintendence.

These results are inevitable. While the laws of mental association remain true—while men dislike the things and places that suggest painful recollections, and delight in those which call to mind by-
gone pleasures—painful lessons will make knowledge repulsive, and pleasurable lessons will make it attractive. The men to whom in boyhood information came in dreary tasks along with threats of punishment, and who were never led into habits of independent inquiry, are unlikely to be students in after years; while those to whom it came in the natural forms, at the proper times, and who remember its facts as not only interesting in themselves, but as the occasions of a long series of gratifying successes, are likely to continue through life that self-instruction commenced in youth.
CHAPTER III

MORAL EDUCATION

Strangely enough, the most glaring defect in our programmes of education is entirely overlooked. While much is being done in the detailed improvement of our systems in respect both of matter and manner, the most pressing desideratum has not yet been even recognized as a desideratum. To prepare the young for the duties of life is tacitly admitted by all to be the end which parents and schoolmasters should have in view; and happily the value of the things taught, and the goodness of the method followed in teaching them, are now ostensibly judged by their fitness to this end. The propriety of substituting for an exclusively classical training, a training in which the modern languages shall have a share, is argued on this ground. The necessity of increasing the amount of science is urged for like reasons.

But though some care is taken to fit youth of both sexes for society and citizenship, no care whatever is taken to fit them for the still more important position they will ultimately have to fill—the position of parents. While it is seen that for the purpose of gaining a livelihood an elaborate preparation...
MORAL EDUCATION

is needed, it appears to be thought that for the bringing up of children no preparation whatever is needed. While many years are spent by a boy in gaining knowledge, of which the chief value is that it constitutes "the education of a gentleman", and while many years are spent by a girl in those decorative acquirements which fit her for evening parties, not an hour is spent by either of them in preparation for that gravest of all responsibilities—the management of a family.

Is it that this responsibility is but a remote contingency? On the contrary, it is certain to devolve on nine out of ten. Is it that the discharge of it is easy? Certainly not: of all functions which the adult has to fulfil this is the most difficult. Is it that each may be trusted by self-instruction to fit himself, or herself, for the office of parent? No: not only is the need for such self-instruction unrecognized, but the complexity of the subject renders it the one of all others in which self-instruction is least likely to succeed.

No rational plea can be put forward for leaving the Art of Education out of our curriculum. Whether as bearing upon the happiness of parents themselves, or whether as affecting the characters and lives of their children and remote descendants, we must admit that a knowledge of the right methods of juvenile culture, physical, intellectual, and moral, is a knowledge second to none in importance. This
topic should occupy the highest and last place in the course of instruction passed through by each man and woman. As physical maturity is marked by the ability to produce offspring, so mental maturity is marked by the ability to train those offspring. *The subject which involves all other subjects, and therefore the subject in which the education of every one should culminate, is the Theory and Practice of Education.*

In the absence of this preparation, the management of children, and more especially the moral management, is lamentably bad. Parents either never think about the matter at all, or else their conclusions are crude and inconsistent. In most cases, and especially on the part of mothers, the treatment adopted on every occasion is that which the impulse of the moment prompts: it springs not from any reasoned-out conviction as to what will most conduce to the child's welfare, but merely expresses the passing parental feelings, whether good or ill; and varies from hour to hour as these feelings vary. Or if these blind dictates of passion are supplemented by any definite doctrines and methods, they are those that have been handed down from the past, or those suggested by the remembrances of childhood, or those adopted from nurses and servants—methods devised not by the enlightenment, but by the ignorance of the time.

Commenting on the chaotic state of opinion and
practice relative to family government, Richter writes:—

If the secret variances of a large class of ordinary fathers were brought to light, and laid down as a plan of studies, and reading catalogued for a moral education, they would run somewhat after this fashion:—In the first hour “Pure morality must be read to the child, either by myself or the tutor;” in the second, “Mixed morality, or that which may be applied to one’s own advantage;” in the third, “Do you not see that your father does so and so?” in the fourth, “You are little, and this is only fit for grown-up people;” in the fifth, “The chief matter is that you should succeed in the world, and become something in the state;” in the sixth, “Not the temporary, but the eternal, determines the worth of a man;” in the seventh, “Therefore rather suffer injustice, and be kind;” in the eighth, “But defend yourself bravely if any one attack you;” in the ninth, “Do not make a noise, dear child;” in the tenth, “A boy must not sit so quiet;” in the eleventh, “You must obey your parents better;” in the twelfth, “And educate yourself.” So by the hourly change of his principles, the father conceals their untenableness and onesidedness. As for his wife, she is neither like him, nor yet like that harlequin who came on to the stage with a bundle of papers under each arm, and answered to the inquiry, what he had under his right arm, “orders”, and to what
he had under his left arm, "counter-orders". But the mother might be much better compared to a giant Briareus, who had a hundred arms, and a bundle of paper under each.

This state of things is not to be readily changed. Generations must pass before any great amelioration of it can be expected. Like political constitutions, educational systems are not made, but grow; and within brief periods growth is insensible. Slow, however, as must be any improvement, even that improvement implies the use of means, and among the means is discussion.

We are not among those who believe in Lord Palmerston's dogma, that "all children are born good". On the whole, the opposite dogma, untenable as it is, seems to us less wide of the truth. Nor do we agree with those who think that, by skilful discipline, children may be made altogether what they should be. Contrariwise, we are satisfied that though imperfections of nature may be diminished by wise management, they cannot be removed by it. The notion that an ideal humanity might be forthwith produced by a perfect system of education, is near akin to that shadowed forth in the poems of Shelley, that would mankind give up their old institutions, prejudices, and errors, all the evils in the world would at once disappear: neither notion being acceptable to such as have dispassionately studied human affairs.
Not that we are without sympathy with those who entertain these too sanguine hopes. Enthusiasm, pushed even to fanaticism, is a useful motive-power—perhaps an indispensable one. It is clear that the ardent politician would never undergo the labors and make the sacrifices he does, did he not believe that the reform he fights for is the one thing needful. But for his conviction that drunkenness is the root of almost all social evils, the teetotaller would agitate far less energetically. In philanthropy as in other things great advantage results from division of labor; and that there may be division of labor, each class of philanthropists must be more or less subordinated to its function—must have an exaggerated faith in its work. Hence, of those who regard education, intellectual or moral, as the panacea, we may say that their undue expectations are not without use; and that perhaps it is part of the beneficent order of things that their confidence cannot be shaken.

Even were it true, however, that by some possible system of moral government children could be moulded into the desired form, and even could every parent be duly indoctrinated with this system, we should still be far from achieving the object in view. It is forgotten that the carrying out of any such system presupposes, on the part of adults, a degree of intelligence, of goodness, of self-control, possessed by no one.
The great error made by those who discuss questions of juvenile discipline, is in ascribing all the faults and difficulties to the children and none to the parents. The current assumption respecting family government, as respecting national government, is, that the virtues are with the rulers and the vices with the ruled. Judging by educational theories, men and women are entirely transfigured in the domestic relation. The citizens we do business with, the people we meet in the world, we all know to be very imperfect creatures. In the daily scandals, in the quarrels of friends, in bankruptcy disclosures, in lawsuits, in police reports, we have constantly thrust before us the pervading selfishness, dishonesty, brutality. Yet when we criticise nursery management, and canvass the misbehavior of juveniles, we habitually take for granted that these culpable men and women are free from moral delinquency in the treatment of their offspring! So far is this from the truth, that we do not hesitate to say that to parental misconduct is traceable a great part of the domestic disorder commonly ascribed to the perversity of children.

We do not assert this of the more sympathetic and self-restrained, among whom we hope most of our readers may be classed, but we assert it of the mass. What kind of moral discipline is to be expected from a mother who, time after time, angrily shakes her infant because it will not suckle her,
which we once saw a mother do? How much love of justice and generosity is likely to be instilled by a father who, on having his attention drawn by his child’s scream to the fact that its finger is jammed between the window sash and the sill, forthwith begins to beat the child instead of releasing it? Yet that there are such fathers is testified to us by an eye-witness. Or, to take a still stronger case, also vouched for by direct testimony—what are the educational prospects of the boy who, on being taken home with a dislocated thigh, is saluted with a castigation?

It is true that these are extreme instances—instances exhibiting in human beings that blind instinct which impels brutes to destroy the weakly and injured of their own race. But extreme though they are, they typify feelings and conduct daily observable in many families. Who has not repeatedly seen a child slapped by nurse or parent for a fretfulness probably resulting from bodily derangement? Who, when watching a mother snatch up a fallen little one, has not often traced, both in the rough manner and in the sharply-uttered exclamation—“You stupid little thing!”—an irascibility foretelling endless future squabbles? Is there not in the harsh tones in which a father bids his children be quiet, evidence of a deficient fellow-feeling with them? Are not the constant, and often quite needless, thwartings that the young experience—the injunctions to sit still, which an active child cannot
obey without suffering great nervous irritation, the commands not to look out of the window when travelling by railway, which on a child of any intelligence entails serious deprivation—are not these thwartings, we ask, signs of a terrible lack of sympathy? The truth is, that the difficulties of moral education are necessarily of dual origin—necessarily result from the combined faults of parents and children. If hereditary transmission is a law of nature, as every naturalist knows it to be, and as our daily remarks and current proverbs admit it to be, then on the average of cases, the defects of children mirror the defects of their parents;—on the average of cases, we say, because, complicated as the results are by the transmitted traits of remoter ancestors, the correspondence is not special but only general. And if, on the average of cases, this inheritance of defects exists, then the evil passions which parents have to check in their children imply like evil passions in themselves: hidden, it may be, from the public eye, or perhaps obscured by other feelings; but still there. Evidently, therefore, the general practice of any ideal system of discipline is hopeless: parents are not good enough.

Moreover, even were there methods by which the desired end could be at once effected, and even had fathers and mothers sufficient insight, sympathy, and self-command to employ these methods consistently, it might still be
contended that it would be of no use to reform family discipline faster than other things are reformed. What is it that we aim to do? Is it not that education of whatever kind has for its proximate end to prepare a child for the business of life—to produce a citizen who, at the same time that he is well conducted, is also able to make his way in the world? And does not making his way in the world (by which we mean, not the acquirement of wealth, but of the means requisite for properly bringing up a family)—does not this imply a certain fitness for the world as it now is? And if by any system of culture an ideal human being could be produced, is it not doubtful whether he would be fit for the world as it now is? May we not, on the contrary, suspect that his too keen sense of rectitude and too elevated standard of conduct would make life alike intolerable and impossible? And however admirable the results might be, considered individually, would it not be self-defeating in so far as society and posterity are concerned?

It may, we think, be argued with much reason, that as in a nation so in a family, the kind of government is, on the whole, about as good as the general state of human nature permits it to be. It may be said that in the one case, as in the other, the average character of the people determines the quality of the control exercised. It may be inferred that in both cases amelioration of the average char-
acter leads to an amelioration of system; and further, that were it possible to ameliorate the system without the average character being first ameliorated, evil, rather than good, would follow. It may be urged that such degree of harshness as children now experience from their parents and teachers, is but a preparation for that greater harshness which they will meet with on entering the world, and that were it possible for parents and teachers to behave toward them with perfect equity and entire sympathy, it would but intensify the sufferings which the selfishness of men must, in after life, inflict on them.*

"But does not this prove too much?" some one will ask. "If no system of moral culture can forthwith make children altogether what they should be; if, even were there a system that would do this, existing parents are too imperfect to carry it out; and if even could such a system

* This is the plea put in by some for the rough treatment experienced by boys at our public schools; where, as it is said, they are introduced to a miniature world whose imperfections and hardships prepare them for those of the real world; and it must be admitted that the plea has some force. But it is a very insufficient plea. For whereas domestic and school discipline, though they should not be very much better than the discipline of adult life, should at any rate be somewhat better; the discipline which boys meet with at Eton, Winchester, Harrow, etc., is much worse than that of adult life—much more unjust, cruel, brutal. Instead of being an aid to human progress, which all culture should be, the culture of our public schools, by accustoming boys to a despotie form of government and an intercourse regulated by brute force, tends to fit them for a lower state of society than that which exists. And chiefly recruited as our legislature is from among those who are brought up at these schools, the barbarizing influence becomes a serious hindrance to national progress.
be successfully carried out, its results would be disastrously incongruous with the present state of society; does it not follow that a reform in the system now in use is neither practicable nor desirable?"

No. It merely follows that reform in domestic government must go on, pari passu, with other reforms. It merely follows that methods of discipline neither can be nor should be ameliorated except by instalments. It merely follows that the dictates of abstract rectitude will, in practice, inevitably be subordinated by the present state of human nature—by the imperfections alike of children, of parents, and of society; and can only be better fulfilled as the general character becomes better.

"At any rate, then," may rejoin our critic, "it is clearly useless to set up any ideal standard of family discipline. There can be no advantage in elaborating and recommending methods that are in advance of the time."

Again we must contend for the contrary. Just as in the case of political government, though pure rectitude may be at present impracticable, it is requisite to know where the right lies, so that the changes we make may be towards the right instead of away from it; so in the case of domestic government, an ideal must be upheld, that there may be gradual approximations to it.

We need fear no evil consequences from the maintenance of such an ideal. On the average the con-
stitutional conservatism of mankind is always strong enough to prevent a too rapid change. So admirable are the arrangements of things that until men have grown up to the level of a higher belief, they cannot receive it: nominally, they may hold it, but not virtually. And even when the truth gets recognized, the obstacles to conformity with it are so persistent as to outlive the patience of philanthropists and even philosophers. We may be quite sure, therefore, that the many difficulties standing in the way of a normal government of children, will always put an adequate check upon the efforts to realize it.

With these preliminary explanations let us go on to consider the true aims and methods of moral education—moral education, strictly so called, we mean; for we do not propose to enter upon the question of religious education as an aid to the education exclusively moral. This we omit as a topic better dealt with separately. After a few pages devoted to the settlement of general principles, during the perusal of which we bespeak the reader's patience, we shall aim by illustrations to make clear the right methods of parental behavior in the hourly occurring difficulties of family government.

I. General Principles

When a child falls, or runs its head against the table, it suffers a pain the remembrance of which tends to make it more careful for the future, and by an occasional repetition of
like experiences it is eventually disciplined into a proper guidance of its movements. If it lays hold of the fire-bars, thrusts its finger into the candle-flame, or spills boiling water on any part of its skin, the resulting burn or scald is a lesson not easily forgotten. So deep an impression is produced by one or two such events, that afterwards no persuasion will induce it again to disregard the laws of its constitution in these ways.

Now in these and like cases, Nature illustrates to us in the simplest way the true theory and practice of moral discipline—a theory and practice which, however much they may seem to the superficial like those commonly received, we shall find on examination to differ from them very widely.

Observe, in the first place, that in bodily injuries and their penalties we have misconduct and its consequences reduced to their simplest forms. Though according to their popular acceptations, right and wrong are words scarcely applicable to actions that have none but direct bodily effects, yet whoever considers the matter will see that such actions must be as much classifiable under these heads as any other actions.

From whatever basis they start, all theories of morality agree in considering that conduct whose total results, immediate and remote, are beneficial, is good conduct, while conduct whose total results, immediate and remote are injurious, is bad conduct.
The happiness or misery caused by it are the ultimate standards by which all men judge of behavior. We consider drunkenness wrong because of the physical degeneracy and accompanying moral evils entailed on the transgressor and his dependents. Did theft uniformly give pleasure both to taker and loser, we should not find it in our catalogue of sins. Were it conceivable that benevolent actions multiplied human pains, we should condemn them—we should not consider them benevolent. It needs but to read the first newspaper leader, or listen to any conversation touching social affairs, to see that acts of parliament, political movements, philanthropic agitations, in common with the doings of individuals, are judged by their anticipated results in multiplying the pleasures or pains of men. And if on looking on all secondary superinduced ideas, we find these to be our ultimate tests of right and wrong, we cannot refuse to class purely physical actions as right or wrong according to the beneficial or detrimental results they produce.

Note, in the second place, the character of the punishments by which these physical transgressions are prevented. Punishments, we call them, in the absence of a better word, for they are not punishments in the literal sense. They are not artificial and unnecessary inflictions of pain, but are simply the beneficent checks to actions that are essentially at variance with bodily
welfare—checks in the absence of which life would quickly be destroyed by bodily injuries. It is the peculiarity of these penalties, if we must so call them, that they are nothing more than the unavoidable consequences of the deeds which they follow: they are nothing more than the inevitable reactions entailed by the child's actions.

Let it be further borne in mind that these painful reactions are proportionate to the degree in which the organic laws have been transgressed. A slight accident brings a slight pain, a more serious one, a greater pain. When a child tumbles over the door-step it is not ordained that it shall suffer in excess of the amount necessary, with the view of making it still more cautious than the necessary suffering will make it. But from its daily experience it is left to learn the greater or less penalties of greater or less errors, and to behave accordingly.

And then mark, lastly, that these natural reactions which follow the child's wrong actions, are constant, direct, unhesitating, and not to be escaped. No threats: but a silent, rigorous performance. If a child runs a pin into its finger, pain follows. If it does it again, there is again the same result: and so on perpetually. In all its dealings with surrounding inorganic nature it finds this unswerving persistence, which listens to no excuse, and from which there is no appeal; and very soon recognizing this stern though beneficent discipline,
it becomes extremely careful not to transgress.

Still more significant will these general truths appear when we remember that they hold throughout adult life as well as throughout infantile life. It is by an experimentally-gained knowledge of the natural consequences, that men and women are checked when they go wrong. After home education has ceased, and when there are no longer parents and teachers to forbid this or that kind of conduct, there comes into play a discipline like that by which the young child is taught its first lessons in self-guidance.

If the youth entering upon the business of life idles away his time and fulfils slowly or unskillfully the duties entrusted to him, there by and by follows the natural penalty: he is discharged, and left to suffer for awhile the evils of relative poverty. On the unpunctual man, failing alike his appointments of business and pleasure, there continually fall the consequent inconveniences, losses, and deprivations. The avaricious tradesman who charges too high a rate of profit, loses his customers, and so is checked in his greediness. Diminishing practice teaches the inattentive doctor to bestow more trouble on his patients. The too credulous creditor and the oversanguine speculator alike learn by the difficulties which rashness entails on them, the necessity of being more cautious in their engagements.

And so throughout the life of every citizen. In
the quotation so often made *à propos* of these cases—“The burnt child dreads the fire”—we see not only that the analogy between this social discipline and Nature’s early discipline of infants is universally recognized; but we also see an implied conviction that this discipline is of the most efficient kind.

Nay more, this conviction is not only implied, but distinctly stated. Every one has heard others confess that only by “dearly bought experience” had they been induced to give up some bad or foolish course of conduct formerly pursued. Every one has heard, in the criticisms passed on the doings of this spendthrift or the other speculator, the remark that advice was useless, and that nothing but “bitter experience” would produce any effect: nothing, that is, but suffering the unavoidable consequences.

And if further proof be needed that the penalty of the natural reaction is not only the most efficient, but that no humanly-devised penalty can replace it, we have such further proof in the notorious ill-success of our various penal systems. Out of the many methods of criminal discipline that have been proposed and legally enforced, none have answered the expectations of their advocates. Not only have artificial punishments failed to produce reformation, but they have in many cases increased the criminality. The only successful reformatories are those privately-established ones which have approximated their régime to the method of Nature—which have done
little more than administer the natural consequences of criminal conduct: the natural consequences being, that by imprisonment or other restraint, the criminal shall have his liberty of action diminished as much as is needful for the safety of society; and that he shall be made to maintain himself while living under this restraint.

Thus we see not only that the discipline by which the young child is so successfully taught to regulate its movements is also the discipline by which the great mass of adults are kept in order, and more or less improved, but that the discipline humanly-devised for the worst adults, fails when it diverges from this divinely-ordained discipline and begins to succeed when it approximates to it.

Have we not here, then, the guiding principle of moral education? Must we not infer that the system so beneficent in its effects, alike during infancy and maturity, will be equally beneficent throughout youth? Can any one believe that the method which answers so well in the first and the last divisions of life will not answer in the intermediate division? Is it not manifest that as "ministers and interpreters of Nature" it is the function of parents to see that their children habitually experience the true consequences of their conduct—the natural reactions: neither warding them off, nor intensifying them, nor putting artificial consequences in place of them? No
unprejudiced reader will hesitate in his assent.

Probably, however, not a few will contend that already most parents do this—that the punishments they inflict are, in the majority of cases, the true consequences of ill-conduct—that parental anger, venting itself in harsh words and deeds, is the result of a child's transgression—and that, in the suffering, physical or moral, which the child is subject to, it experiences the natural reaction of its misbehavior.

Along with much error this assertion, doubtless, contains some truth. It is unquestionable that the displeasure of fathers and mothers is a true consequence of juvenile delinquency, and that the manifestation of it is a normal check upon such delinquency. It is unquestionable that the scoldings, and threats, and blows, which a passionate parent visits on offending little ones, are effects actually produced in such a parent by their offences, and so are, in some sort, to be considered as among the natural reactions of their wrong actions. And we are by no means prepared to say that these modes of treatment are not relatively right—right, that is, in relation to the uncontrollable children of ill-controlled adults; and right in relation to a state of society in which such ill-controlled adults make up the mass of the people.

As already suggested, educational systems, like political and other institutions, are generally as good
as the state of human nature permits. The barbarous children of barbarous parents are probably only to be restrained by the barbarous methods which such parents spontaneously employ, while submission to these barbarous methods is perhaps the best preparation such children can have for the barbarous society in which they are presently to play a part. Conversely, the civilized members of a civilized society will spontaneously manifest their displeasure in less violent ways—will spontaneously use milder measures: measures strong enough for their better-natured children. Thus it is doubtless true that, in so far as the expression of parental feeling is concerned, the principle of the natural reaction is always more or less followed. The system of domestic government ever gravitates towards its right form.

But now observe two important facts. In the first place, observe that, in states of rapid transition like ours, which witness a long-drawn battle between old and new theories and old and new practices, the educational methods in use are apt to be considerably out of harmony with the times. In deference to dogmas fit only for the ages that uttered them, many parents inflict punishments that do violence to their own feelings, and so visit on their children unnatural reactions; while other parents, enthusiastic in their hopes of immediate perfection, rush to the opposite extreme.
And then observe, in the second place, that the discipline on which we are insisting is not so much the experience of paternal approbation or disapprobation, which, in most cases, is only a secondary consequence of a child’s conduct, but it is the experience of those results which would naturally flow from the conduct, in the absence of parental opinion or interference. The truly instructive and salutary consequences are not those inflicted by parents when they take upon themselves to be Nature’s proxies, but they are those inflicted by Nature herself. We will endeavor to make this distinction clear by a few illustrations, which, while they show what we mean by natural reactions as contrasted with artificial ones, will afford some directly practical suggestions.

In every family where there are young children there almost daily occurs cases of what mothers and servants call "making a litter". A child has had out its box of toys and leaves them scattered about the floor. Or a handful of flowers, brought in from a morning walk, is presently seen dispersed over tables and chairs. Or a little girl, making doll’s-clothes, disfigures the room with shreds. In most cases the trouble of rectifying this disorder falls anywhere but in the right place: if in the nursery, the nurse herself, with many grumblings about "tiresome little things", etc., undertakes the task; if below stairs, the task usually
devolves either on one of the elder children or on the housemaid; the transgressor being visited with nothing more than a scolding.

In this very simple case, however, there are many parents wise enough to follow out, more or less consistently, the normal course—that of making the child itself collect the toys or shreds. The labor of putting things in order is the true consequence of having put them in disorder. Every trader in his office, every wife in her household, has daily experience of this fact. And if education be a preparation for the business of life, then every child should also, from the beginning, have daily experience of this fact.

If the natural penalty be met by any refractory behavior (which it may perhaps be where the general system of moral discipline previously pursued has been bad), then the proper course is to let the child feel the ulterior reaction consequent on this disobedience. Having refused or neglected to pick up and put away the things it has scattered about, and having thereby entailed the trouble of doing this on someone else, the child should, on subsequent occasions be denied the means of giving this trouble. When next it petitions for its toy-box, the reply of its mamma should be—"The last time you had your toys you left them lying on the floor, and Jane had to pick them up. Jane is too busy to pick up every day the things you leave about, and I cannot
do it myself. So that, as you will not put away your toys when you have done with them, I cannot let you have them."

This is obviously a natural consequence, neither increased nor lessened, and must be so recognized by a child. The penalty comes, too, at the moment when it is most keenly felt. A new-born desire is balked at the moment of anticipated gratification, and the strong impression so produced can scarcely fail to have an effect on the future conduct: an effect which, by consistent repetition, will do whatever can be done in curing the fault. Add to which, that, by this method, a child is early taught the lesson which cannot be learnt too soon, that in this world of ours pleasures are rightly to be obtained only by labor.

Take another case. Not long since we had frequently to listen to the reprimands visited on a little girl who was scarcely ever ready in time for the daily walk. Of eager disposition, and apt to become thoroughly absorbed in the occupation of the moment, Constance never thought of putting on her things until the rest were ready. The governess and the other children had almost invariably to wait, and from the mamma there almost invariably came the same scolding.

Utterly as this system failed it never occurred to the mamma to let Constance experience the natural penalty. Nor, indeed, would she try it when it was
suggested to her. In the world the penalty of being behind time is the loss of some advantage that would else have been gained: the train is gone, or the steamboat is just leaving its moorings, or the best things in the market are sold, or all the good seats in the concert-room are filled. And every one, in cases perpetually occurring, may see that it is the prospective deprivations entailed by being too late which prevent people from being too late.

Is not the inference obvious? Should not these prospective deprivations control the child's conduct also? If Constance is not ready at the appointed time, the natural result is that of being left behind and losing her walk. And no one can, we think, doubt that after having once or twice remained at home while the rest were enjoying themselves in the fields, and after having felt that this loss of a much-prized gratification was solely due to want of promptitude, some amendment would take place. At any rate the measure would be more effective than that perpetual scolding which ends only in producing callousness.

Again, when children, with more than usual carelessness, break or lose the things given to them, the natural penalty—the penalty which makes grown-up persons more careful—is the consequent inconvenience. The want of the lost or damaged article, and the cost of supplying its place, are the experiences by which men and women are
disciplined in these matters; and the experience of children should be as much as possible assimilated to theirs. We do not refer to that early period at which toys are pulled to pieces in the process of learning their physical properties, and at which the results of carelessness cannot be understood, but to a later period, when the meaning and advantages of property are perceived.

When a boy, old enough to possess a penknife, uses it so roughly as to snap the blade, or leaves it in the grass by some hedge-side, where he was cutting a stick, a thoughtless parent or some indulgent relative, will commonly forthwith buy him another, not seeing that, by doing this, a valuable lesson is lost. In such a case a father may properly explain that penknives cost money, and that to get money requires labor; that he cannot afford to purchase new penknives for one who loses or breaks them, and that until he sees evidence of greater carefulness he must decline to make good the loss. A parallel discipline may be used as a means of checking extravagance.

These few familiar instances, here chosen because of the simplicity with which they illustrate our point, will make clear to every one the distinction between those natural penalties which we contend are the truly efficient ones, and those artificial penalties which parents commonly substitute for them. Before going on to exhibit the higher and subtler ap-
plications of this principle, let us note its many and great superiorities over the principle, or rather the empirical practice, which prevails in most families. In the first place, right conceptions of cause and effect are early formed, and by frequent and consistent experience are eventually rendered definite and complete. Proper conduct in life is much better guaranteed when the good and evil consequences of actions are rationally understood, than when they are merely believed on authority. A child who finds that disorderliness entails the subsequent trouble of putting things in order, or who misses a gratification from dilatoriness, or whose want of care is followed by the loss or breakage of some much-prized possession, not only experiences a keenly-felt consequence, but gains a knowledge of causation—both the one and the other being just like those which adult life will bring—whereas a child who in such cases receives some reprimand or some factitious penalty, not only experiences a consequence for which it often cares very little, but lacks that instruction respecting the essential natures of good and evil conduct, which it would else have gathered.

It is a vice of the common system of artificial rewards and punishments, long since noticed by the clear-sighted, that by substituting for the natural results of misbehavior certain threatened tasks or castigations, it produces a radically wrong standard
of moral guidance. Having throughout infancy and boyhood always regarded parental or tutorial displeasure as the result of a forbidden action, the youth has gained an established association of ideas between such action and such displeasure, as cause and effect; and consequently when parents and tutors have abdicated and their displeasure is not to be feared, the restraint on a forbidden action is in great measure removed: the true restraints, the natural reactions, having yet to be learnt by sad experience. As writes one who has had personal knowledge of this shortsighted system:—"Young men let loose from school, particularly those whose parents have neglected to exert their influence, plunge into every description of extravagance; they know no rule of action—they are ignorant of the reasons for moral conduct—they have no foundation to rest upon—and until they have been severely disciplined by the world are extremely dangerous members of society."

Another great advantage of this natural system of discipline is, that it is a system of pure justice and will be recognized by every child as such. Whoso suffers nothing more than the evil which obviously follows naturally from his own misbehavior, is much less likely to think himself wrongly treated than if he suffers an evil artificially inflicted on him; and this will be true of children as of men.
Take the case of a boy who is habitually reckless of his clothes—scrambles through hedges without caution, or is utterly regardless of mud. If he is beaten, or sent to bed, he is apt to regard himself as ill-used, and his mind is more likely to be occupied by thinking over his injuries than repenting of his transgressions. But suppose he is required to rectify as far as he can the harm he has done—to clean off the mud with which he has covered himself, or to mend the tear as well as he can. Will he not feel that the evil is one of his own producing? Will he not while paying this penalty be continuously conscious of the connection between it and its cause? And will he not, spite his irritation, recognize more or less clearly the justice of the arrangement?

If several lessons of this kind fail to produce amendment—if suits of clothes are prematurely spoiled—if pursuing this same system of discipline a father declines to spend money for new ones until the ordinary time has elapsed—and if meanwhile, there occur occasions on which, having no decent clothes to go in, the boy is debarred from joining the rest of the family on holiday excursions and fête days, it is manifest that while he will keenly feel the punishment, he can scarcely fail to trace the chain of causation, and to perceive that his own carelessness is the origin of it; and seeing this, he will not have that same sense of injustice as when there is no
obvious connection between the transgression and its penalty.

Again the tempers both of parents and children are much less liable to be ruffled under this system than under the ordinary system. Instead of letting children experience the painful results which naturally follow from wrong conduct, the usual course pursued by parents is to inflict on themselves certain other painful results.

A double mischief arises from this. Making, as they do, multiplied family laws, and identifying their own supremacy and dignity with the maintenance of these laws, it happens that every transgression comes to be regarded as an offence against themselves and a cause of anger on their part. Add to which the further irritations which result from taking upon themselves, in the shape of extra labor or cost, those evil consequences which should have been allowed to fall on the wrongdoers.

Similarly with the children. Penalties which the necessary reaction of things brings round upon them—penalties which are inflicted by impersonal agency, produce an irritation that is comparatively slight and transient; whereas, penalties which are voluntarily inflicted by a parent, and are afterwards remembered as caused by him or her, produce an irritation both greater and more continued.

Just consider how disastrous would be the result if this empirical method were pursued from the be-
ginning. Suppose it were possible for parents to take upon themselves the physical sufferings entailed on their children by ignorance and awkwardness, and that while bearing these evil consequences they visited on their children certain other evil consequences with the view of teaching them the impropriety of their conduct. Suppose that when a child, who had been forbidden to meddle with the kettle, spilt some boiling water on its foot, the mother vicariously assumed the scald and gave a blow in place of it; and similarly in all other cases. Would not the daily mishaps be sources of far more anger than now? Would there not be chronic ill-temper on both sides?

Yet an exactly parallel policy is pursued in after years. A father who punishes his boy for carelessly or wilfully breaking a sister's toy, and then himself pays for a new toy, does substantially this same thing—inflicts an artificial penalty on the transgressor and takes the natural penalty on himself; his own feelings and those of the transgressor being alike needlessly irritated.

If he simply required restitution to be made, he would produce far less heartburning. If he told the boy that a new toy must be bought at his, the boy's, cost and that his supply of pocket-money must be withheld to the needful extent, there would be much less cause for ebullition of temper on either side, while in the deprivation afterwards felt, the boy
would experience the equitable and salutary consequence. In brief, the system of discipline by natural reactions is less injurious to temper, alike because it is perceived on both sides to be nothing more than pure justice, and because it more or less substitutes the impersonal agency of nature for the personal agency of parents.

Whence also follows the manifest corollary, that under this system the parental and filial relation will be a more friendly, and therefore a more influential one. Whether in parent of child, anger, however caused, and to whomsoever directed, is more or less detrimental. But anger in a parent towards a child, and in a child towards a parent, is especially detrimental, because it weakens that bond of sympathy which is essential to a beneficent control.

In virtue of the general law of association of ideas, it inevitably results, both in young and old, that dislike is contracted towards things which in our experience are habitually connected with disagreeable feelings. Or where attachment originally existed, it is weakened, or destroyed, or turned into repugnance, according to the quantity of painful impressions received. Parental wrath, with its accompanying reprimands and castigations, cannot fail, if often repeated, to produce filial alienations, while the resentment and sulkiness of children cannot fail to weaken the affection felt for them, and
may even end in destroying it. Hence the numerous cases in which parents (and especially fathers, who are commonly deputed to express the anger and inflict the punishment) are regarded with indifference, if not with aversion, and hence the equally numerous cases in which children are looked upon as inflictions.

Seeing, then, as all must do, that estrangement of this kind is fatal to a salutary moral culture, it follows that parents cannot be too solicitous in avoiding occasions of direct antagonism with their children — occasions of personal resentment. And therefore they cannot too anxiously avail themselves of this discipline of natural consequences — this system of letting the penalty be inflicted by the laws of things; which, by saving the parent from the function of a penal agent, prevents these mutual exasperations and estrangements.

Thus we see that this method of moral culture by experience of the normal reactions, which is the divinely-ordained method alike for infancy and for adult life, is equally applicable during the intermediate childhood and youth. And among the advantages of this method we see — First. That it gives that rational comprehension of right and wrong conduct which results from actual experience of the good and bad consequences caused by them. Second. That the child, suffering nothing more than the painful effects brought upon it by its own wrong
actions, must recognize more or less clearly the justice of the penalties. Third. That, recognizing the justice of the penalties, and receiving those penalties through the working of things, rather than at the hands of an individual, its temper will be less disturbed; while the parent occupying the comparatively passive position of taking care that the natural penalties are felt, will preserve a comparative equanimity. And Fourth. That mutual exasperation being thus in great measure prevented, a much happier, and a more influential state of feeling will exist between parent and child.

"But what is to be done with more serious misconduct?" some will ask. "How is this plan to be carried out when a petty theft has been committed? or when a lie has been told? or when some younger brother or sister has been ill-used?"

Before replying to these questions, let us consider the bearings of a few illustrative facts.

Living in the family of his brother-in-law, a friend of ours had undertaken the education of his little nephew and niece. This he had conducted, more perhaps from natural sympathy than from reasoned-out conclusions, in the spirit of the method above set forth. The two children were in doors his pupils and out of doors his companions. They daily joined him in walks and botanizing excursions, eagerly sought out plants for him, looked
on while he examined and identified them, and in this and other ways were ever gaining both pleasure and instruction in his society. In short, morally considered, he stood to them much more in the position of parent than either their father or mother did.

Describing to us the results of this policy, he gave, among other instances, the following. One evening, having need for some article lying in another part of the house, he asked his nephew to fetch it for him. Deeply interested as the boy was in some amusement of the moment, he, contrary to his wont, either exhibited great reluctance or refused, we forget which. His uncle, disapproving of a coercive course, fetched it himself, merely exhibiting by his manner the annoyance this ill-behavior gave him. And when, later in the evening, the boy made overtures for the usual play, they were gravely repelled—the uncle manifested just that coldness of feeling naturally produced in him, and so let the boy experience the necessary consequences of his conduct.

Next morning at the usual time for rising, our friend heard a new voice outside the door, and in walked his little nephew with the hot water; and then the boy, peering about the room to see what else could be done, exclaimed, "Oh! you want your boots," and forthwith rushed down stairs to fetch them. In this and other ways he showed a true penitence for his misconduct; he endeavored by unusual services to make up for the service he had
refused; his higher feelings had of themselves conquered his lower ones, and acquired strength by the conquest; and he valued more than before the friendship he thus regained.

This gentleman is now himself a father; acts on the same system, and finds it answer completely. He makes himself thoroughly his children's friend. The evening is longed for by them because he will be at home, and they especially enjoy the Sunday because he is with them all day. Thus possessing their perfect confidence and affection, he finds that the simple display of his approbation or disapprobation gives him abundant power of control.

If, on his return home, he hears that one of his boys has been naughty, he behaves toward him with that comparative coldness which the consciousness of the boy's misconduct naturally produces, and he finds this a most efficient punishment. The mere withholding of the usual caresses is a source of the keenest distress—produces a much more prolonged fit of crying than a beating would do. And the dread of this purely moral penalty is, he says, ever present during his absence: so much so, that frequently during the day his children inquire of their mamma how they have behaved and whether the report will be good.

Recently, the eldest, an active urchin of five, in one of those bursts of animal spirits common in healthy children, committed sundry extravagances
during his mamma's absence—cut off part of his brother's hair and wounded himself with a razor taken from his father's dressing-case. Hearing of these occurrences on his return, the father did not speak to the boy either that night or next morning. Not only was the tribulation great, but the subsequent effect was, that when, a few days after, the mamma was about to go out, she was earnestly entreated by the boy not to do so; and on inquiry, it appeared his fear was that he might again transgress in her absence.

We have introduced these facts before replying to the question—"What is to be done with the graver offences?" for the purpose of first exhibiting the relation that may and ought to be established between parents and children; for on the existence of this relation depends the successful treatment of these graver offences. And as a further preliminary, we must now point out that the establishment of this relation will result from adopting the system we advocate. Already we have shown that by letting a child experience simply the painful reactions of its own wrong actions, a parent in great measure avoids assuming the attitude of an enemy, and escapes being regarded as one; but it still remains to be shown that where this course has been consistently pursued from the beginning, a strong feeling of active friendship will be generated.
At present, mothers and fathers are mostly considered by their offspring as friend-enemies. Determined as their impressions inevitably are by the treatment they receive, and oscillating as that treatment does between bribery and thwarting, between petting and scolding, between gentleness and castigation, children necessarily acquire conflicting beliefs respecting the parental character.

A mother commonly thinks it quite sufficient to tell her little boy that she is his best friend, and assuming that he is in duty bound to believe her, concludes that he will forthwith do so. "It is all for your good;" "I know what is proper for you better than you do yourself;" "You are not old enough to understand it now, but when you grow up you will thank me for doing what I do;"—these, and like assertions, are daily reiterated.

Meanwhile the boy is daily suffering positive penalties, and is hourly forbidden to do this, that, and the other, which he was anxious to do. By words he hears that his happiness is the end in view, but from the accompanying deeds he habitually receives more or less pain. Utterly incompetent as he is to understand that future which his mother has in view, or how this treatment conduces to the happiness of that future, he judges by such results as he feels, and finding these results any thing but pleasurable, he becomes sceptical respecting these professions of friendship.
And is it not folly to expect any other issue? Must not the child judge by such evidence as he has got? and does not this evidence seem to warrant his conclusion? The mother would reason in just the same way if similarly placed. If, in the circle of her acquaintance, she found some one who was constantly thwarting her wishes, uttering sharp reprimands, and occasionally inflicting actual penalties on her, she would pay but little attention to any professions of anxiety for her welfare which accompanied these acts. Why, then, does she suppose that her boy will conclude otherwise?

But now observe how different will be the results if the system we contend for be consistently pursued—if the mother not only avoids becoming the instrument of punishment, but plays the part of a friend, by warning her boy of the punishments which Nature will inflict.

Take a case; and that it may illustrate the mode in which this policy is to be early initiated, let it be one of the simplest cases. Suppose that, prompted by the experimental spirit so conspicuous in children, whose proceedings instinctively conform to the inductive method of inquiry—suppose that so prompted the child is amusing himself by lighting pieces of paper in the candle and watching them burn.

If his mother is of the ordinary unreflective stamp, she will either, on the plea of keeping the child "out of mischief", or from fear that he will burn
himself, command him to desist, and in case of non-compliance will snatch the paper from him. On the other hand, should he be so fortunate as to have a mother of sufficient rationality, who knows that this interest with which the child is watching the paper burn results from a healthy inquisitiveness, without which he would never have emerged out of infantine stupidity, and who is also wise enough to consider the moral results of interference, she will reason thus:—"If I put a stop to this I shall prevent the acquirement of a certain amount of knowledge. It is true that I may save the child from a burn; but what then? He is sure to burn himself sometime, and it is quite essential to his safety in life that he should learn by experience the properties of flame. Moreover, if I forbid him from running this present risk, he is sure hereafter to run the same or a greater risk when no one is present to prevent him; whereas, if he should have any accident now that I am by, I can save him from any great injury; add to which the advantage that he will have in future some dread of fire, and will be less likely to burn himself to death, or set the house in a flame when others are absent. Furthermore, were I to make him desist, I should thwart him in the pursuit of what is in itself a purely harmless, and indeed, instructive gratification, and he would be sure to regard me with more or less ill-feeling. Ignorant as he is of the pain from which I would save him,
and feeling only the pain of a balked desire, he could not fail to look upon me as the cause of that pain. To save him from a hurt which he cannot conceive, and which has therefore no existence for him, I inflict upon him a hurt which he feels keenly enough, and so become, from his point of view, a minister of evil. My best course then, is simply to warn him of the danger, and to be ready to prevent any serious damage.” And following out this conclusion, she says to the child—“I fear you will hurt yourself if you do that.”

Suppose, now, that the child perseveres—as he will very probably do—and suppose that he ends by burning himself. What are the results? In the first place he has gained an experience which he must gain eventually and which, for his own safety, he cannot gain too soon. And in the second place he has found that his mother’s disapproval or warning was meant for his welfare, he has a further positive experience of her benevolence—a further reason for placing confidence in her judgment and her kindness—a further reason for loving her.

Of course, in those occasional hazards where there is a risk of broken limbs or other serious bodily injury, forcible prevention is called for. But leaving out these extreme cases, the system pursued should be not that of guarding a child against the small dangers into which it daily runs, but that of advising and warning it against
them. And by consistently pursuing this course a much stronger filial affection will be generated than commonly exists. If here, as elsewhere, the discipline of the natural reactions is allowed to come into play—if in all those out-of-door scramblings and in-door experiments, by which children are liable to hurt themselves, they are allowed to persevere, subject only to dissuasion more or less earnest according to the risk, there cannot fail to arise an ever-increasing faith in the parental friendship and guidance.

Not only, as before shown, does the adoption of this principle enable fathers and mothers to avoid the chief part of that odium which attaches to the infliction of positive punishment, but, as we here see, it enables them further to avoid the odium that attaches to constant thwartings, and even to turn each of those incidents which commonly cause squabbles, into a means of strengthening the mutual good feeling. Instead of being told in words, which deeds seem to contradict, that their parents are their best friends, children will learn this truth by a consistent daily experience, and so learning it, will acquire a degree of trust and attachment which nothing else can give.

And now having indicated the much more sympathetic relation which must result from the habitual use of this method, let us return to the question above put—How is this method to be applied to the graver offences?
Note, in the first place, that these graver offences are likely to be both less frequent and less grave under the régime we have described than under the ordinary régime. The perpetual ill-behavior of many children is itself the consequence of that chronic irritation in which they are kept by bad management. The state of isolation and antagonism produced by frequent punishment, necessarily deadens the sympathies; necessarily, therefore, opens the way to those transgressions which the sympathies should check. That harsh treatment which children of the same family inflict on each other is often, in great measure, a reflex of the harsh treatment they receive from adults—partly suggested by direct example, and partly generated by the ill-temper and the tendency to vicarious retaliation which follow chastisement and scoldings.

It cannot be questioned that the greater activity of the affections and happier state of feeling, maintained in children by the discipline we have described, must prevent their sins against each other from being either so great or so frequent. Moreover, the still more reprehensible offences, as lies and petty thefts, will, by the same causes, be diminished. Domestic estrangement is a fruitful source of such transgressions. It is a law of human nature, visible enough to all who observe, that those who are debarred the higher gratifications fall back upon the lower; those who have no sympathetic pleasures
seek selfish ones; and hence, conversely, the maintenance of happier relations between parents and children is calculated to diminish the number of those offences of which selfishness is the origin.

When, however, such offences are committed, as they will occasionally be even under the best system, the discipline of consequences may still be resorted to; and if there exist that bond of confidence and affection which we have described, this discipline will be found efficient.

For what are the natural consequences, say, of a theft? They are of two kinds—direct and indirect. The direct consequence, as dictated by pure equity, is that of making restitution. An absolutely just ruler (and every parent should aim to be one) will demand that wherever it is possible, a wrong act shall be undone by a right one: and in the case of theft this implies either the restoration of the thing stolen, or, if it is consumed, then the giving of an equivalent, which, in the case of a child, may be effected out of its pocket-money. The indirect and more serious consequence is the grave displeasure of parents—a consequence which inevitably follows among all peoples sufficiently civilized to regard theft as a crime; and the manifestation of this displeasure is, in this instance, the most severe of the natural reactions produced by the wrong action.

"But," it will be said, "the manifestation of parental displeasure, either in words or blows, is the
ordinary course in these cases: the method leads here to nothing new." Very true. Already we have admitted that, in some directions, this method is spontaneously pursued. Already we have shown that there is a more or less manifest tendency for educational systems to gravitate towards the true system. And here we may remark, as before, that the intensity of this natural reaction will, in the beneficent order of things, adjust itself to the requirements—that this parental displeasure will vent itself in violent measures during comparatively barbarous times, when the children are also comparatively barbarous, and will express itself less cruelly in those more advanced social states in which, by implication, the children are amenable to milder treatment.

But what it chiefly concerns us here to observe is that the manifestation of strong parental displeasure, produced by one of these graver offences, will be potent for good just in proportion to the warmth of the attachment existing between parent and child. Just in proportion as the discipline of the natural consequences has been consistently pursued in other cases, will it be efficient in this case. Proof is within the experience of all if they will look for it.

For does not every man know that when he has offended another person, the amount of genuine regret he feels (of course, leaving worldly considerations out of the question) varies with the degree of sympathy he has for that
person? Is he not conscious that when the person offended stands to him in the position of an enemy, the having given him annoyance is apt to be a source rather of secret satisfaction than of sorrow? Does he not remember that where umbrage has been taken by some total stranger, he has felt much less concern than he would have done had such umbrage been taken by one with whom he was intimate? While, conversely, has not the anger of an admired and cherished friend been regarded by him as a serious misfortune, long and keenly regretted?

Clearly, then, the effects of parental displeasure upon children must similarly depend upon the pre-existing relationship. Where there is an established alienation, the feeling of a child who has transgressed is a purely selfish fear of the evil consequences likely to fall upon it in the shape of physical penalties or deprivations, and after these evil consequences have been inflicted, there are aroused an antagonism and dislike which are morally injurious, and tend further to increase the alienation.

On the contrary, where there exists a warm filial affection produced by a consistent parental friendship—a friendship not dogmatically asserted as an excuse for punishments and denials, but daily exhibited in ways that a child can comprehend—a friendship which avoids needless thwartings, which warns against impending evil consequences, and which sympathizes with juvenile pursuits—there the
state of mind caused by parental displeasure will not only be salutary as a check to future misconduct of like kind, but will also be intrinsically salutary.

The moral pain consequent upon having, for the time being, lost so loved a friend, will stand in place of the physical pain usually inflicted, and where this attachment exists, will prove equally, if not more, efficient; while instead of the fear and vindictiveness excited by the one course, there will be excited by the other more or less of sympathy with parental sorrow, a genuine regret for having caused it, and a desire, by some atonement, to re-establish the habitual friendly relationship. Instead of bringing into play those purely egoistic feelings whose predominance is the cause of criminal acts, there will be brought into play those altruistic feelings which check criminal acts. Thus the discipline of the natural consequences is applicable to grave as well as trivial faults, and the practice of it conduces not simply to the repression, but to the eradication of such faults.

In brief, the truth is that savageness begets savageness, and gentleness begets gentleness. Children who are unsympathetically treated become relatively unsympathetic; whereas treating them with due fellow-feeling is a means of cultivating their fellow-feeling. With family governments as with political ones, a harsh despotism itself generates a great part of the crimes it has to repress; while conversely a mild and liberal rule
not only avoids many causes of dissension, but so ameliorates the tone of feeling as to diminish the tendency to transgression.

As John Locke long since remarked, "Great severity of punishment does but very little good, nay, great harm, in education; and I believe it will be found that, \textit{cæteris paribus}, those children who have been most chastised seldom make the best men." In confirmation of which opinion we may cite the fact not long since made public by Mr. Rogers, Chaplain of the Pentonville Prison, that those juvenile criminals who have been whipped are those who most frequently return to prison.

On the other hand, as exhibiting the beneficial effects of a kinder treatment, we will instance the fact stated to us by a French lady, in whose house we recently staid in Paris. Apologizing for the disturbance daily caused by a little boy who was unmanageable both at home and at school, she expressed her fear that there was no remedy save that which had succeeded in the case of an elder brother; namely, sending him to an English school. She explained that at various schools in Paris this elder brother had proved utterly untractable; that in despair they had followed the advice to send him to England; and that on his return home he was as good as he had before been bad. And this remarkable change she ascribed entirely to the comparative mildness of the English discipline.
II. Maxims and Rules

After this exposition of principles, our remaining space may best be occupied by a few of the chief maxims and rules deducible from them; and with a view to brevity we will put these in a more or less hortatory form.

Do not expect from a child any great amount of moral goodness. During early years every civilized man passes through that phase of character exhibited by the barbarous race from which he is descended. As the child's features—flat nose, forward-opening nostrils, large lips, wide-apart eyes, absent frontal sinus, etc.—resemble for a time those of the savage, so, too, do his instincts. Hence the tendencies to cruelty, to thieving, to lying, so general among children—tendencies which, even without the aid of discipline, will become more or less modified just as the features do.

The popular idea that children are "innocent", while it may be true in so far as it refers to evil knowledge, is totally false in so far as it refers to evil impulses, as half an hour's observation in the nursery will prove to any one. Boys when left to themselves, as at a public school, treat each other far more brutally than men do, and were they left to themselves at an earlier age their brutality would be still more conspicuous.

Not only is it unwise to set up a high standard for juvenile good conduct, but it is even unwise to
use very urgent incitements to such good conduct. 

Already most people recognize the detrimental results of intellectual precocity, but there remains to be recognized the truth that there is a moral precocity which is also detrimental.

Our higher moral faculties, like our higher intellectual ones, are comparatively complex. By consequence they are both comparatively late in their evolution. And with the one as with the other, a very early activity produced by stimulation will be at the expense of the future character. Hence the not uncommon fact that those who during childhood were instanced as models of juvenile goodness, by and by undergo some disastrous and seemingly inexplicable change, and end by being not above but below par, while relatively exemplary men are often the issue of a childhood by no means so promising.

Be content, therefore, with moderate measures and moderate results. Constantly bear in mind the fact that a higher morality, like a higher intelligence, must be reached by a slow growth, and you will then have more patience with those imperfections of nature which your child hourly displays. You will be less prone to that constant scolding, and threatening, and forbidding, by which many parents induce a chronic domestic irritation in the foolish hope that they will thus make their children what they should be.

This comparatively liberal form of domestic gov-
ernment, which does not seek despotically to regulate all the details of a child's conduct, necessarily results from the system for which we have been contending. Satisfy yourself with seeing that your child always suffers the natural consequences of his actions and you will avoid that excess of control in which so many parents err. Leave him wherever you can to the discipline of experience, and you will so save him from that hot-house virtue which over-regulation produces in yielding natures, or that demoralizing antagonism which it produces in independent ones.

By aiming in all cases to administer the natural reactions to your child's actions, you will put an advantageous check upon your own temper. The method of moral education pursued by many, we fear by most, parents, is little else than that of venting their anger in the way that first suggests itself. The slaps, and rough shakings, and sharp words, with which a mother commonly visits her offspring's small offences (many of them not offences considered intrinsically), are very generally but the manifestations of her own ill-controlled feelings—result much more from the promptings of those feelings than from a wish to benefit the offenders.

While they are injurious to her own character, these ebullitions tend, by alienating her children and by decreasing their respect for her, to diminish
her influence over them. But by pausing in each case of transgression to consider what is the natural consequence, and how that natural consequence may best be brought home to the transgressor, some little time is necessarily obtained for the mastery of yourself; the mere blind anger first aroused in you settles down into a less vehement feeling, and one not so likely to mislead you.

Do not, however, seek to behave as an utterly passionless instrument. Remember that besides the natural consequences of your child's conduct which the working of things tends to bring round on him, your own approbation or disapprobation is also a natural consequence, and one of the ordained agencies for guiding him.

The error which we have been combating is that of substituting parental displeasure and its artificial penalties, for the penalties which nature has established. But while it should not be substituted for these natural penalties, it by no means follows that it should not, in some form, accompany them. The secondary kind of punishment should not usurp the place of the primary kind, but, in moderation, it may rightly supplement the primary kind. Such amount of disapproval, or sorrow, or indignation, as you feel, should be expressed in words or manner or otherwise; subject, of course, to the approval of your judgment. The degree and kind of feeling produced in you will necessarily depend upon your
own character, and it is therefore useless to say it should be this or that. All that can be recom-
menended is that you should aim to modify the feeling into that which you believe ought to be en-
tertained.

Beware, however, of the two extremes, not only in respect of the intensity, but in respect of the duration of your displeasure. On the one hand, anxiously avoid that weak impulsiveness, so general among mothers, which scolds and forgives almost in the same breath. On the other hand, do not unduly continue to show estrangement of feeling, lest you accustom your child to do without your friendship, and so lose your influence over him. The moral reactions called forth from you by your child’s actions, you should as much as possible assimilate to those which you conceive would be called forth from a parent of perfect nature.

Be sparing of commands. Command only in those cases in which other means are in-
applicable or have failed. “In frequent orders the parents’ advantage is more considered than the child’s,” says Richter. As in primitive societies a breach of law is punished, not so much because it is intrinsically wrong as because it is a disregard of the king’s authority—a rebellion against him—so in many families, the penalty visited on a transgressor proceeds less from reprobation of the offence than from anger at the disobedience.
Listen to the ordinary speeches—"How dare you disobey me?" "I tell you I'll make you do it, sir;" "I'll soon teach you who is master"—and then consider what the words, the tone, and the manner imply. A determination to subjugate is much more conspicuous in them than an anxiety for the child's welfare. For the time being the attitude of mind differs but little from that of the despot bent on punishing a recalcitrant subject.

The right-feeling parent, however, like the philanthropic legislator, will not rejoice in coercion, but will rejoice in dispensing with coercion. He will do without law in all cases where other modes of regulating conduct can be successfully employed; and he will regret the having recourse to law when it is necessary. As Richter remarks—"The best rule in politics is said to be 'pas trop gouverner': it is also true in education." And in spontaneous conformity with this maxim, parents whose lust of dominion is restrained by a true sense of duty, will aim to make their children control themselves wherever it is possible, and will fall back upon absolutism only as a last resort.

But whenever you do command, command with decision and consistency. If the case is one which really cannot be otherwise dealt with, then issue your fiat, and having issued it, never afterward swerve from it. Consider well beforehand what you are going to do; weigh all the
consequences; think whether your firmness of purpose will be sufficient; and then, if you finally make the law, enforce it uniformly at whatever cost.

Let your penalties be like the penalties inflicted by inanimate nature—inevitable. The hot cinder burns a child the first time he seizes it; it burns him the second time; it burns him the third time; it burns him every time, and he very soon learns not to touch the hot cinder. If you are equally consistent—if the consequences which you tell your child will follow certain acts, follow with like uniformity, he will soon come to respect your laws as he does those of Nature.

And this respect once established will prevent endless domestic evils. Of errors in education one of the worst is that of inconsistency. As in a community, crimes multiply when there is no certain administration of justice, so in a family, an immense increase of transgressions results from a hesitating or irregular infliction of penalties.

A weak mother, who perpetually threatens and rarely performs—who makes rules in haste and repents of them at leisure—who treats the same offence now with severity and now with leniency, according as the passing humor dictates, is laying up miseries both for herself and her children. She is making herself contemptible in their eyes; she is setting them an example of uncontrolled feelings; she is
encouraging them to transgress by the prospect of probable impunity; she is entailing endless squabbles and accompanying damage to her own temper and the tempers of her little ones; she is reducing their minds to a moral chaos, which after-years of bitter experience will with difficulty bring into order. Better even a barbarous form of domestic government carried out consistently, than a human one inconsistently carried out. Again we say, avoid coercive measures whenever it is possible to do so, but when you find despotism really necessary, be despotic in good earnest.

Bear constantly in mind the truth that the aim of your discipline should be to produce a self-governing being, not to produce a being to be governed by others. Were your children fated to pass their lives as slaves you could not too much accustom them to slavery during their childhood, but as they are by and by to be free men, with no one to control their daily conduct, you cannot too much accustom them to self-control while they are still under your eye.

This it is which makes the system of discipline by natural consequences, so especially appropriate to the social state which we in England have now reached. Under early, tyrannical forms of society, when one of the chief evils the citizen had to fear was the anger of his superiors, it was well that during childhood parental vengeance should be a pre-
dominant means of government. But now that the citizen has little to fear from any one—now that the good or evil which he experiences throughout life is mainly that which in the nature of things results from his own conduct—it is desirable that from his first years he should begin to learn, experimentally, the good or evil consequences which naturally follow this or that conduct.

Aim, therefore, to diminish the amount of parental government, as fast as you can substitute for it in your child’s mind that self-government arising from a foresight of results. In infancy a considerable amount of absolutism is necessary. A three-year old urchin playing with an open razor cannot be allowed to learn by this discipline of consequences, for the consequences may, in such a case, be too serious. But as intelligence increases, the number of instances calling for peremptory interference may be, and should be, diminished, with the view of gradually ending them as maturity is approached.

All periods of transition are dangerous, and the most dangerous is the transition from the restraint of the family circle to the non-restraint of the world. Hence the importance of pursuing the policy we advocate, which, alike by cultivating a child’s faculty of self-restraint, by continually increasing the degree in which it is left to its self-restraint, and by so bringing it, step by step, to a state of unaided self-restraint, obliterates the ordinary sudden and hazard-
ous change from externally-governed youth to internally-governed maturity.

Let the history of your domestic rule typify, in little, the history of our political rule: at the outset, autocratic control, where control is really needful; by and by an incipient constitutionalism, in which the liberty of the subject gains some express recognition; successive extensions of this liberty of the subject gradually ending in parental abdication.

Do not regret the exhibition of considerable self-will on the part of your children. It is the correlative of that diminished coerciveness so conspicuous in modern education. The greater tendency to assert freedom of action on the one side, corresponds to the smaller tendency to tyrannize on the other. They both indicate an approach to the system of discipline we contend for, under which children will be more and more led to rule themselves by the experience of natural consequences, and they are both the accompaniments of our more advanced social state.

The independent English boy is the father of the independent English man, and you cannot have the last without the first. German teachers say that they had rather manage a dozen German boys than one English one. Shall we, therefore, wish that our boys had the manageableness of the German ones, and with it the submissiveness and political serfdom of adult Germans? Or shall we not rather
tolerate in our boys those feelings which make them free men and modify our methods accordingly?

Lastly, always remember that to educate rightly is not a simple and easy thing, but a complex and extremely difficult thing: the hardest task which devolves upon adult life. The rough and ready style of domestic government is indeed practicable by the meanest and most un-cultivated intellects. Slaps and sharp words are penalties that suggest themselves alike to the least reclaimed barbarian and the most stolid peasant. Even brutes can use this method of discipline, as you may see in the growl and half-bite with which a bitch will check a too-exigeant puppy.

But if you would carry out with success a rational and civilized system, you must be prepared for considerable mental exertion—for some study, some ingenuity, some patience, some self-control. You will have habitually to trace the consequences of conduct—to consider what are the results which in adult life follow certain kinds of acts, and then you will have to devise some methods by which parallel results shall be entailed on the parallel acts of your children.

You will daily be called upon to analyze the motives of juvenile conduct: you must distinguish between acts that are really good and those which, though externally simulating them, proceed from inferior impulses, while you must be ever on your
guard against the cruel mistake, not unfrequently made, of translating neutral acts into transgressions, or ascribing worse feelings than were entertained. You must more or less modify your method to suit the disposition of each child; and must be prepared to make further modifications as each child's disposition enters on a new phase.

Your faith will often be taxed to maintain the requisite perseverance in a course which seems to produce little or no effect. Especially if you are dealing with children who have been wrongly treated, you must be prepared for a lengthened trial of patience before succeeding with better methods; seeing that that which is not easy even where a right state of feeling has been established from the beginning, becomes doubly difficult when a wrong state of feeling has to be set right. Not only will you have constantly to analyze the motives of your children, but you will have to analyze your own motives—to discriminate between those internal suggestions springing from a true parental solicitude, and those which spring from your own selfishness, from your love of ease, from your lust of dominion. And then, more trying still, you will have not only to detect, but to curb these baser impulses.

In brief, you will have to carry on your higher education at the same time that you are educating your children. Intellectually you must cultivate to good purpose that most complex of subjects—human
nature and its laws, as exhibited in your children, in yourself, and in the world. Morally, you must keep in constant exercise your higher feelings, and restrain your lower.

It is a truth yet remaining to be recognized, that the last stage in the mental development of each man and woman is to be reached only through the proper discharge of the parental duties. And when this truth is recognized, it will be seen how admirable is the ordination in virtue of which human beings are led by their strongest affections to subject themselves to a discipline which they would else elude.

While some will probably regard this conception of education as it should be, with doubt and discouragement, others will, we think, perceive in the exalted ideal which it involves, evidence of its truth. That it cannot be realized by the impulsive, the unsympathetic, and the short-sighted, but demands the higher attributes of human nature, they will see to be evidence of its fitness for the more advanced states of humanity. Though it calls for much labor and self-sacrifice, they will see that it promises an abundant return of happiness, immediate and remote. They will see that while in its injurious effects on both parent and child a bad system is twice cursed, a good system is twice blessed—it blesses him that trains and him that's trained.

It will be seen that we have said nothing in this Chapter about the transcendental distinction be-
between right and wrong, of which wise men know so little, and children nothing. All thinkers are agreed that we may find the criterion of right in the effect of actions, if we do not find the rule there, and that is sufficient for the purpose we have had in view. Nor have we introduced the religious element. We have confined our inquiries to a nearer, and a much more neglected field, though a very important one. Our readers may supplement our thoughts in any way they please; we are only concerned that they should be accepted as far as they go.
CHAPTER IV

PHYSICAL EDUCATION

Equally at the squire's table after the withdrawal of the ladies, at the farmers' market-ordinary, and at the village ale-house, the topic which, after the political question of the day, excites perhaps the most general interest is the management of animals. Riding home from hunting, the conversation is pretty sure to gravitate towards horse-breeding and pedigrees and comments on this or that "good point"; while a day on the moors is very unlikely to pass without something being said on the treatment of dogs. When crossing the fields together from church, the tenants of adjacent farms are apt to pass from criticisms on the sermon to criticisms on the weather, the crops, and the stock, and thence to slide into discussions on the various kinds of fodder and their feeding qualities. Hodge and Giles, after comparing notes over their respective pig-styes, show by their remarks that they have been more or less observant of their masters' beasts and sheep, and of the effects produced on them by this or that kind of treatment.

Nor is it only among the rural population that the regulations of the kennel, the stable, the cow-shed,
and the sheep-pen, are favorite subjects. In towns, too, the numerous artisans who keep dogs, the young men who are rich enough to now and then indulge their sporting tendencies, and their more staid seniors who talk over agricultural progress or read Mr. Mechi's annual reports and Mr. Caird's letters to the *Times*, form, when added together, a large portion of the inhabitants. Take the adult males throughout the kingdom, and a great majority will be found to show some interest in the breeding, rearing, or training of animals, of one kind or other.

But, during after-dinner conversations, or at other times of like intercourse, who hears anything said about the rearing of children? When the country gentleman has paid his daily visit to the stable, and personally inspected the condition and treatment of his horses; when he has glanced at his minor live stock, and given directions about them, how often does he go up to the nursery and examine into its dietary, its hours, its ventilation? On his library shelves may be found White's *Farriery*, Stephen's *Book of the Farm*, Nimrod *On the Condition of Hunters*, and with the contents of these he is more or less familiar: but how many books has he read on the management of infancy and childhood? The fattening properties of oil-cake, the relative values of hay and chopped straw, the dangers of unlimited clover, are points on which every landlord, farmer, and peasant has some knowl-
edge; but what proportion of them know much about the qualities of the food they give their children, and its fitness to the constitutional needs of growing boys and girls?

Perhaps the business interests of these classes will be assigned as accounting for this anomaly. The explanation is inadequate, however, seeing that the same contrast holds more or less among other classes. Of a score of townspeople few, if any, would prove ignorant of the fact that it is undesirable to work a horse soon after it has eaten; and yet, of this same score, supposing them all to be fathers, probably not one would be found who had considered whether the time elapsing between his children's dinner and their resumption of lessons was sufficient. Indeed, on cross-examination, nearly every man would disclose the latent opinion that the regimen of the nursery was no concern of his. "Oh, I leave all those things to the women," would probably be the reply. And in most cases the tone and manner of this reply would convey the implication that such cares are not consistent with masculine dignity.

Consider the fact from any but the conventional point of view and it will seem strange that while the raising of first-rate bullocks is an occupation on which men of education willingly bestow much time, inquiry, and thought, the bringing up of fine human beings is an occupation tacitly voted unworthy of their attention. Mammas who have been
taught little but languages, music, and accomplishments, aided by nurses full of antiquated prejudices, are held competent regulators of the food, clothing, and exercise of children.

Meanwhile the fathers read books and periodicals, attend agricultural meetings, try experiments, and engage in discussions, all with the view of discovering how to fatten prize pigs! Infinite pains will be taken to produce a racer that shall win the Derby: none to produce a modern athlete. Had Gulliver narrated of the Laputans that the men vied with each other in learning how best to rear the offspring of other creatures, and were careless of learning how best to rear their own offspring, he would have paralleled any of the other absurdities he ascribes to them.

The matter is a serious one, however. Ludicrous as is the antithesis, the fact it expresses is not less disastrous. As remarks a suggestive writer, the first requisite to success in life is "to be a good animal"; and to be a nation of good animals is the first condition to national prosperity. Not only is it that the event of a war often turns on the strength and hardiness of soldiers, but it is that the contests of commerce are in part determined by the bodily endurance of producers.

Thus far we have found no reason to fear trials of strength with other races in either of these fields. But there are not wanting signs that our powers will presently be taxed to the uttermost. Already, under
the keen competition of modern life, the application required of almost every one is such as few can bear without more or less injury. Already thousands break down under the high pressure they are subject to. If this pressure continues to increase, as it seems likely to do, it will try severely all but the soundest constitutions. Hence it is becoming of especial importance that the training of children should be so carried on, as not only to fit them mentally for the struggle before them, but also to make them physically fit to bear its excessive wear and tear.

Happily the matter is beginning to attract attention. The writings of Mr. Kingsley indicate a reaction against over-culture; carried, as reactions usually are, somewhat too far. Occasional letters and leaders in the newspapers have shown an awakening interest in physical training. And the formation of a school, significantly nicknamed that of "muscular Christianity", implies a growing opinion that our present methods of bringing up children do not sufficiently regard the welfare of the body. The topic is evidently ripe for discussion.

To conform the regimen of the nursery and the school to the established truths of modern science—this is the desideratum. It is time that the benefits which our sheep and oxen have for years past derived from the investigations of the laboratory, should be participated in by our children. Without calling in question the great importance of
horse-training and pig-feeding, we would suggest that, as the rearing of well-grown men and women is also of some moment, the conclusions indicated by theory, and endorsed by practice, ought to be acted on in the last case as in the first.

Probably not a few will be startled—perhaps offended—by this collocation of ideas. But it is a fact not to be disputed, and to which we had best reconcile ourselves, that man is subject to the same organic laws as inferior creatures. No anatomist, no physiologist, no chemist, will for a moment hesitate to assert, that the general principles which rule over the vital processes in animals equally rule over the vital processes in man. And a candid admission of this fact is not without its reward: namely, that the truths established by observation and experiment on brutes, become more or less available for human guidance. Rudimentary as is the Science of Life, it has already attained to certain fundamental principles underlying the development of all organisms, the human included. That which has now to be done, and that which we shall endeavor in some measure to do, is to show the bearing of these fundamental principles upon the physical training of childhood and youth.

The rhythmical tendency which is traceable in all departments of social life—which is illustrated in the access of despotism after revolution, or, among ourselves, in the alternation
of reforming epochs and conservative epochs—which, after a dissolute age, brings an age of asceticism, and conversely—which, in commerce, produces the regularly recurring inflations and panics—which carries the devotees of fashion from one absurd extreme to the opposite one;—this rhythmical tendency affects also our table-habits, and by implication, the dietary of the young. After a period distinguished by hard drinking and hard eating, has come a period of comparative sobriety, which, in teetotalism and vegetarianism, exhibits extreme forms of its protest against the riotous living of the past.

And along with this change in the regimen of adults, has come a parallel change in the regimen for boys and girls. In past generations, the belief was, that the more a child could be induced to eat, the better; and even now, among farmers and in remote districts, where traditional ideas most linger, parents may be found who tempt their children to gorge themselves. But among the educated classes, who chiefly display this reaction towards abstinence, there may be seen a decided leaning to the under-feeding, rather than the over-feeding, of children. Indeed their disgust for bygone animalism is more clearly shown in the treatment of their offspring than in the treatment of themselves; seeing that while their disguised asceticism is, in so far as their personal conduct is concerned, kept in
check by their appetites, it has full play in legislating for juveniles.

That over-feeding and under-feeding are both bad is a truism. Of the two, however, the last is the worst. As writes a high authority, "the effects of casual repletion are less prejudicial, and more easily corrected, than those of inanition."* Add to which, that where there has been no injudicious interference, repletion will seldom occur. "Excess is the vice rather of adults than of the young, who are rarely either gourmands or epicures, unless through the fault of those who rear them."* This system of restriction which many parents think so necessary, is based upon very inadequate observation and very erroneous reasoning. There is an over-legislation in the nursery as well as an over-legislation in the State, and one of the most injurious forms of it is this limitation in the quantity of food.

"But are children to be allowed to surfeit themselves? Shall they be suffered to take their fill of dainties and make themselves ill, as they certainly will do?" As thus put, the question admits of but one reply. But as thus put, it assumes the point at issue. We contend that, as appetite is a good guide to all the lower creation—as it is a good guide to the infant—as it is a good guide to the invalid—as it is a good guide to the differently-placed races of men, and as it is a good

* Cyclopædia of Practical Medicine.
guide for every adult who leads a healthful life—it may safely be inferred that it is a good guide for childhood. It would be strange indeed were it here alone untrustworthy.

Probably not a few will read this reply with some impatience; being able, as they think, to cite facts totally at variance with it. It will appear absurd if we deny the relevancy of these facts; and yet the paradox is quite defensible. The truth is, that the instances of excess which such persons have in mind, are usually the consequences of the restrictive system they seem to justify. They are the sensual reactions caused by a more or less ascetic regimen.

They illustrate on a small scale that commonly remarked fact, that those who during youth have been subject to the most rigorous discipline, are apt afterward to rush into the wildest extravagances. They are analogous to those frightful phenomena, once not uncommon in convents, where nuns suddenly lapsed from the extremest austerities into an almost demoniac wickedness. They simply exhibit the untrollable vehemence of a long-denied desire.

Consider the ordinary tastes and the ordinary treatment of children. The love of sweets is conspicuous and almost universal among them. Probably ninety-nine people in a hundred, presume that there is nothing more in this than gratification of the palate, and that, in common with
other sensual desires, it should be discouraged. The physiologist, however, whose discoveries lead him to an ever-increasing reverence for the arrangements of things, will suspect that there is something more in this love of sweets than the current hypothesis supposes; and a little inquiry confirms the suspicion. Any work on organic chemistry shows that sugar plays an important part in the vital processes. Both saccharine and fatty matters are eventually oxidized in the body, and there is an accompanying evolution of heat. Sugar is the form to which sundry other compounds have to be reduced before they are available as heat-making food, and this formation of sugar is carried on in the body. Not only is starch changed into sugar in the course of digestion, but it has been proved by M. Claude Bernard that the liver is a factory in which other constituents of food are transformed into sugar.

Now, when to the fact that children have a marked desire for this valuable heat food, we join the fact that they have usually a marked dislike to that food which gives out the greatest amount of heat during its oxidation (namely, fat), we shall see strong reason for thinking that excess of the one compensates for defect of the other—that the organism demands more sugar because it cannot deal with much fat.

Again, children are usually very fond of vegetable acids. Fruits of all kinds are their delight, and, in the absence of anything better, they
will devour unripe gooseberries and the sourest of crabs. Now, not only are vegetable acids, in common with mineral ones, very good tonics, and beneficial as such when taken in moderation, but they have, when administered in their natural forms, other advantages. "Ripe fruit," says Dr. Andrew Combe, "is more freely given on the Continent than in this country, and, particularly when the bowels act imperfectly, it is often very useful."

See, then, the discord between the instinctive wants of children and their habitual treatment. Here are two dominant desires, which there is good reason to believe express certain needs of the juvenile constitution, and not only are they ignored in the nursery regimen, but there is a general tendency to forbid the gratification of them. Bread-and-milk in the morning, tea and bread-and-butter at night, or some dietary equally insipid, is rigidly adhered to, and any ministration to the palate is thought not only needless but wrong.

What is the necessary consequence? When on fête-days there is an unlimited access to good things—when a gift of pocket-money brings the contents of the confectioner's window within reach, or when by some accident the free run of a fruit-garden is obtained—then the long-denied, and therefore intense, desires lead to great excesses. There is an impromptu carnival, caused not only by the release from past restraints, but also by the con-
ociousness that a long Lent will begin on the mor-
row. And then, when the evils of repletion display
themselves, it is argued that children must not be
left to the guidance of their appetites! These dis-
astrous results of artificial restrictions are them-
selves cited as proving the need for further restric-
tions!

We contend, therefore, that the reasoning com-
monly used to justify this system of interference is
vicious. We contend that, were children allowed
daily to partake of these more sapid edibles, for
which there is a physiological requirement, they
would rarely exceed, as they now mostly do when
they have the opportunity: were fruit, as Dr. Combe
recommends, "to constitute a part of the regular
food" (given, as he advises, not between meals, but
along with them), there would be none of that craving
which prompts the devouring of such fruits as crabs
and sloes. And similarly in other cases.

Not only is it that the à priori reasons for trusting
the appetites of children are so strong,
and that the reasons assigned for distrust-
ing them are invalid, but it is that no other guidance
is worthy of any confidence. What is the value of
this parental judgment, set up as an alternative reg-
ulator? When to "Oliver asking for more", the
mamma or the governess replies in the negative, on
what data does she proceed? She thinks he has had
enough.
But where are her grounds for so thinking? Has she some secret understanding with the boy's stomach—some clairvoyant power enabling her to discern the needs of his body? If not, how can she safely decide? Does she not know that the demand of the system for food is determined by numerous and involved causes—varies with the temperature, with the hygrometric state of the air, with the electric state of the air—varies also according to the exercise taken, according to the kind and quality of food eaten at the last meal, and according to the rapidity with which the last meal was digested? How can she calculate the result of such a combination of causes?

As we heard said by the father of a five-years-old boy, who stands a head taller than most of his age, and is proportionately robust, rosy, and active:—

"I can see no artificial standard by which to mete out his food. If I say, 'This much is enough,' it is a mere guess; and the guess is as likely to be wrong as right. Consequently, having no faith in guesses, I let him eat his fill." And certainly, any one judging of his policy by its effect, would be constrained to admit its wisdom.

In truth, this confidence, with which most parents take upon themselves to legislate for the stomachs of their children, proves their unacquaintance with the principles of physiology: if they knew more, they would be more modest. "The pride of science is humble when compared with the pride of ignor-
ance.” If any one would learn how little faith is to be placed in human judgments, and how much in the pre-established arrangements of things, let him compare the rashness of the inexperienced physician with the caution of the most advanced; or let him dip into Sir John Forbes’ work, *On Nature and Art in the Cure of Disease*; and he will then see that, in proportion as men gain a greater knowledge of the laws of life, they come to have less confidence in themselves, and more in Nature.

Turning from the question of *quantity* of food to that of *quality*, we may discern the same ascetic tendency. Not simply a more or less restricted diet, but a comparatively low diet, is thought proper for children. The current opinion is that they should have but little animal food. Among the less wealthy classes, economy seems to have dictated this opinion—the wish has been father to the thought. Parents not affording to buy much meat, and liking meat themselves, answer the petitions of juveniles with—“Meat is not good for little boys and girls;” and this, at first, probably nothing but a convenient excuse, has by repetition grown into an article of faith: while the classes with whom cost is not a consideration, have been swayed partly by the example of the majority, partly by the influence of nurses drawn from the lower classes, and in some measure by the reaction against past animalism.
If, however, we inquire for the basis of this opinion, we find little or none. It is a dogma repeated and received without proof, like that which, for thousands of years, insisted on the necessity of swaddling-clothes. It may indeed be true that, to the young child's stomach, not yet endowed with much muscular power, meat, which requires considerable trituration before it can be made into chyme, is an unfit aliment. But this objection does not tell against animal food from which the fibrous part has been extracted, nor does it apply when, after the lapse of two or three years, considerable muscular vigor has been acquired. And while the evidence in support of this dogma, partially valid in the case of very young children, is not valid in the case of older children, who are nevertheless ordinarily treated in conformity with the dogma, the adverse evidence is abundant and conclusive. The verdict of science is exactly opposite to the popular opinion. We have put the question to two of our leading physicians, and to several of the most distinguished physiologists, and they uniformly agree in the conclusion, that children should have a diet not less nutritive, but, if anything, more nutritive than that of adults.

The grounds for this conclusion are obvious, and the reasoning simple. It needs but to compare the vital processes of a man with those of a boy, to see at once that the demand for
sustenance is relatively greater in the boy than in the man.

What are the ends for which a man requires food? Each day his body undergoes more or less wear—wear through muscular exertion, wear of the nervous system through mental actions, wear of the viscera in carrying on the functions of life—and the tissue thus wasted has to be renewed. Each day, too, by perpetual radiation, his body loses a large amount of heat; and as, for the continuance of the vital actions, the temperature of the body must be maintained, this loss has to be compensated by a constant production of heat: to which end certain constituents of the food are unceasingly undergoing oxidation. To make up for the day's waste, and to supply fuel for the day's expenditure of heat, are, then, the sole purposes for which the adult requires food.

Consider, now, the case of the boy. He, too, wastes the substance of his body by action, and it needs but to note his restless activity to see that, in proportion to his bulk, he probably wastes as much as a man. He, too, loses heat by radiation, and, as his body exposes a greater surface in proportion to its mass than does that of a man, and therefore loses heat more rapidly, the quantity of heat-food he requires is, bulk for bulk, greater than that required by a man. So that even had the boy no other vital processes to carry on than the man has, he
would need, relatively to his size, a somewhat larger supply of nutriment.

But, besides repairing his body and maintaining its heat, the boy has to make new tissue—to grow. After waste and thermal loss have been provided for, such surplus of nutriment as remains goes to the further building up of the frame, and only in virtue of this surplus is normal growth possible—the growth that sometimes takes place in the absence of such surplus, causing a manifest prostration consequent upon defective repair. How peremptory is the demand of the unfolding organism for materials, is seen alike in that "school-boy hunger", which after-life rarely parallels in intensity, and in the comparatively quick return of appetite. And if there needs further evidence of this extra necessity for nutriment, we have it in the fact that, during the famines following shipwrecks and other disasters, the children are the first to die.

This relatively greater need for nutriment being admitted, as it must perforce be, the question that remains is—shall we meet it by giving an excessive quantity of what may be called dilute food, or a more moderate quantity of concentrated food? The nutriment obtainable from a given weight of meat is obtainable only from a larger weight of bread, or from a still larger weight of potatoes, and so on. To fulfill the requirement, the quantity must be increased as the nutritiveness
is diminished. Shall we, then, respond to the extra wants of the growing child by giving an adequate quantity of food as good as that of adults? Or, regardless of the fact that its stomach has to dispose of a relatively larger quantity even of this good food, shall we further tax it by giving an inferior food in still greater quantity?

The answer is tolerably obvious. The more the labor of digestion can be economized, the more energy is left for the purposes of growth and action. The functions of the stomach and intestines cannot be performed without a large supply of blood and nervous power; and in the comparative lassitude that follows a hearty meal, every adult has proof that this supply of blood and nervous power is at the expense of the system at large. If the requisite nutriment is furnished by a great quantity of innutritious food, more work is entailed on the viscera than when it is furnished by a moderate quantity of nutritious food. This extra work is so much sheer loss—a loss which in children shows itself either in diminished energy, or in smaller growth, or in both. The inference is, then, that they should have a diet which combines, as much as possible, nutritiveness and digestibility.

It is doubtless true that boys and girls may be brought up upon an exclusively, or almost exclusively, vegetable diet. Among the upper classes are to be found children to whom
comparatively little meat is given, and who, nevertheless, grow and appear in good health. Animal food is scarcely tasted by the offspring of laboring people; and yet they reach a healthy maturity.

But these seemingly adverse facts have by no means the weight commonly supposed. In the first place, it does not follow that those who in early years flourish on bread and potatoes, will eventually reach a fine development; and a comparison between the agricultural laborers and the gentry in England, or between the middle and lower classes in France, is by no means in favor of vegetable feeders.

In the second place, the question is not only a question of bulk, but also a question of quality. A soft, flabby flesh makes as good a show as a firm one; but though to the careless eye, a child of full, flaccid tissue may appear the equal of one whose fibres are well toned, a trial of strength will prove the difference. Obesity in adults is often a sign of feebleness. Men lose weight in training. And hence the appearance of these low-fed children is by no means conclusive.

In the third place, not only size but energy has to be considered. Between children of the meat-eating classes and those of the bread and potato-eating classes, there is a marked contrast in this respect. Both in mental and physical vivacity the low-fed peasant-boy is greatly inferior to the better-fed son of a gentleman.
If we compare different classes of animals, or different races of men, or the same animals or men when differently fed, we find still more distinct proof that the degree of energy essentially depends on the nutritiveness of the food.

In a cow, subsisting on so innutritive a food as grass, we see that the immense quantity required to be eaten necessitates an enormous digestive system; that the limbs, small in comparison with the body, are burdened by its weight; that in carrying about this heavy body and digesting this excessive quantity of food, a great amount of force is expended; and that, having but little energy remaining, the creature is sluggish.

Compare with the cow a horse—an animal of nearly allied structure, but adapted to a more concentrated food. Here we see that the body, and more especially its abdominal region, bears a much smaller ratio to the limbs; that the powers are not taxed by the support of such massive viscera, nor the digestion of so bulky a food; and that as a consequence, there is great locomotive energy and considerable vivacity.

If, again, we contrast the stolid inactivity of the graminivorous sheep with the liveliness of a dog, subsisting upon flesh or farinaceous food, or a mixture of the two, we see a difference similar in kind, but still greater in degree. And after walking through the Zoölogical Gardens, and noting the restlessness
with which the carnivorous animals pace up and down their cages, it needs but to remember that none of the herbivorous animals habitually display this superfluous energy, to see how clear is the relation between concentration of food and degree of activity.

That these differences are not directly consequent upon differences of constitution, as some well-fed races may argue, but are directly consequent upon differences in the food which the creatures are constituted to subsist on, is proved by the fact, that they are observable between different divisions of the same species. Take the case of mankind. The Australians, Bushmen, and others of the lowest savages who live on roots and berries, varied by larvae of insects and the like meagre fare, are comparatively puny in stature, have large abdomens, soft and undeveloped muscles, and are quite unable to cope with Europeans, either in a struggle or in prolonged exertion. Count up the wild races who are well grown, strong and active, as the Kaffirs, North-American Indians, and Patagonians, and you find them large consumers of flesh. The ill-fed Hindoo goes down before the Englishman fed on more nutritive food; to whom he is as inferior in mental as in physical energy. And generally, we think, the history of the world shows that the well-fed races have been the energetic and dominant races.

Still stronger, however, becomes the argument,
when we find that the same individual animal becomes capable of more or less exertion according as its food is more or less nutritious. This has been clearly demonstrated in the case of the horse. Though flesh may be gained by a grazing horse, strength is lost; as putting him to hard work proves. "The consequence of turning horses out to grass is relaxation of the muscular system." "Grass is a very good preparation for a bullock for Smithfield market, but a very bad one for a hunter."

It was well known of old that, after passing the summer months in the fields, hunters required some months of stable-feeding before becoming able to follow the hounds, and that they did not get into good condition until the beginning of the next spring. And the modern practice is that insisted on by Mr. Apperley—"Never to give a hunter what is called 'a summer's run at grass', and except under particular and very favorable circumstances, never to turn him out at all." That is to say, never give him poor food: great energy and endurance are to be obtained only by the continuous use of very nutritive food. So true is this that, as proved by Mr. Apperley, prolonged high-feeding will enable a middling horse to equal, in his performances, a first-rate horse fed in the ordinary way. To which various evidences add the familiar fact that, when a horse is required to do double duty, it is the practice
to give him beans—a food containing a larger proportion of nitrogenous or flesh-making material, than his habitual oats.

Once more, in the case of individual men the truth has been illustrated with equal, or still greater, clearness. We do not refer to men in training for feats of strength, whose regimen, however, thoroughly conforms to the doctrine. We refer to the experience of railway contractors and their laborers. It has been for years past a well-established fact that the English navvy, eating largely of flesh, is far more efficient than a Continental navvy living on a less nutritive food: so much more efficient, that English contractors for Continental railways have habitually taken their laborers with them.

That difference of diet and not difference of race caused this superiority, has been of late distinctly shown. For it has turned out, that when the Continental navvies live in the same style as their English competitors, they presently rise, more or less nearly, to a par with them in efficiency. To which fact let us here add the converse one, to which we can give personal testimony based upon six months' experience of vegetarianism, that abstinence from meat entails diminished energy of both body and mind.

Do not these various evidences distinctly endorse our argument respecting the feeding of children?
Do they not imply that, even supposing the same stature and bulk to be attained on an innutritive as on a nutritive diet, the quality of tissue is greatly inferior? Do they not establish the position that, where energy as well as growth has to be maintained, it can only be done by high feeding? Do they not confirm the à priori conclusion that, though a child of whom little is expected in the way of bodily or mental activity, may thrive tolerably well on farinaceous substances, a child who is daily required, not only to form the due amount of new tissue, but to supply the waste consequent on great muscular action, and the further waste consequent on hard exercise of brain, must live on substances containing a larger ratio of nutritive matter? And is it not an obvious corollary, that denial of this better food will be at the expense either of growth, or of bodily activity, or of mental activity, as constitution and circumstances may determine? We believe no logical intellect will question it. To think otherwise is to entertain in a disguised form the old fallacy of the perpetual-motion schemers—that it is possible to get power out of nothing.

Before leaving the question of food, a few words must be said on another requisite—variety of food. In this respect the dietary of the young is very faulty. If not, like our soldiers, condemned to "twenty years of boiled beef", our children have mostly to bear a monotony which, though less
THE FOOD OF CHILDREN

extreme and less lasting, is quite as clearly at variance with the laws of health. At dinner, it is true, they usually have food that is more or less mixed, and that is changed day by day. But week after week, month after month, year after year, comes the same breakfast of bread-and-milk, or, it may be, oatmeal porridge. And with like persistence the day is closed, perhaps with a second edition of the bread-and-milk, perhaps with tea and bread-and-butter.

This practice is opposed to the dictates of physiology. The satiety produced by an often-repeated dish, and the gratification caused by one long a stranger to the palate, are not meaningless, as many carelessly assume, but they are the incentives to a wholesome diversity of diet. It is a fact, established by numerous experiments, that there is scarcely any one food, however good, which supplies in due proportions or right forms all the elements required for carrying on the vital processes in a normal manner: from whence it is to be inferred that frequent change of food is desirable to balance the supply of all the elements. It is a further fact, well known to physiologists, that the enjoyment given by a much-liked food is a nervous stimulus, which, by increasing the action of the heart and so propelling the blood with increased vigor, aids in the subsequent digestion. And these truths are in harmony with the maxims of modern cattle-feeding, which dictate a rotation of diet.
Not only, however, is periodic change of food very desirable, but, for the same reasons, it is very desirable that a mixture of food should be taken at each meal. The better balance of ingredients, and the greater nervous stimulation, are advantages which hold here as before. If facts are asked for, we may name as one, the comparative ease with which the stomach disposes of a French dinner, enormous in quantity but extremely varied in material. Few will contend that an equal weight of one kind of food, however well cooked, could be digested with as much facility. If any desire further facts, they may find them in every modern book on the management of animals. Animals thrive best when each meal is made up of several things. And indeed, among men of science the truth has been long ago established. The experiments of Goss and Stark "afford the most decisive proof of the advantage; or rather the necessity, of a mixture of substances, in order to produce the compound which is the best adapted for the action of the stomach."

Should any object, as probably many will, that a rotating dietary for children, and one which also requires a mixture of food at each meal, would entail too much trouble, we reply, that no trouble is thought too great which conduces to the mental development of children, and that for their future wel-
fare, good bodily development is equally important. Moreover, it seems alike sad and strange that a trouble which is cheerfully taken in the fattening of pigs, should be thought too great in the rearing of children.

One more paragraph, with the view of warning those who may propose to adopt the regimen indicated. The change must not be made suddenly, for continued low-feeding so enfeebles the system, as to disable it from at once dealing with a high diet. Deficient nutrition is itself a cause of dyspepsia. This is true even of animals. "When calves are fed with skimmed milk, or whey, or other poor food, they are liable to indigestion."* Hence, therefore, where the energies are low, the transition to a generous diet must be gradual, each increment of strength gained, justifying a further increase of nutriment.

Further, it should always be borne in mind that the concentration of nutriment may be carried too far. A bulk sufficient to fill the stomach is one requisite of a proper meal, and this requisite negatives a diet deficient in those waste matters which give adequate mass. Though the size of the digestive organs is less in the well-fed civilized races than in the ill-fed savage ones, and though their size may eventually diminish still further, yet, for the time being, the bulk of the ingesta must be determined by the existing capacity.

*Morton's Cyclopaedia of Agriculture.
But, paying due regard to these two qualifications, our conclusions are—that the food of children should be highly nutritive; that it should be varied at each meal and at successive meals; and that it should be abundant.

With clothing as with food, the established tendency is toward an improper scantness. Here, too, asceticism peeps out. There is a current theory, vaguely entertained, if not put into a definite formula, that the sensations are to be disregarded. They do not exist for our guidance, but to mislead us, seems to be the prevalent belief reduced to its naked form.

It is a grave error: we are much more beneficiently constituted. It is not obedience to the sensations, but disobedience to them, which is the habitual cause of bodily evils. It is not the eating when hungry, but the eating in the absence of appetite, which is bad. It is not the drinking when thirsty, but the continuing to drink when thirst has ceased, that is the vice. Harm results not from breathing that fresh air which every healthy person enjoys, but from continuing to breathe foul air, spite of the protest of the lungs. Harm results not from taking that active exercise which, as every child shows us, nature strongly prompts, but from a persistent disregard of nature's promptings. Not that mental activity which is spontaneous and enjoyable does the mischief, but that which is persevered in after a
hot or aching head commands desistance. Not that bodily exertion which is pleasant or indifferent, does injury, but that which is continued when exhaustion forbids.

It is true that, in those who have long led unhealthy lives, the sensations are not trustworthy guides. People who have for years been almost constantly in-doors, who have exercised their brains very much and their bodies scarcely at all, who in eating have obeyed their clocks without consulting their stomachs, may very likely be mislead by their vitiated feelings. But their abnormal state is itself the result of transgressing their feelings. Had they from childhood up never disobeyed what we may term the physical conscience, it would not have been seared, but would have remained a faithful monitor.

Among the sensations serving for our guidance are those of heat and cold, and a clothing "Hardening" for children which does not carefully consult these sensations is to be condemned. The common notion about "hardening" is a grievous delusion. Children are not unfrequently "hardened" out of the world, and those who survive, permanently suffer either in growth or constitution. "Their delicate appearance furnishes ample indication of the mischief thus produced, and their frequent attacks of illness might prove a warning even to unreflecting parents," says Dr. Combe.
The reasoning on which this hardening theory rests is extremely superficial. Wealthy parents, seeing little peasant boys and girls playing about in the open air only half-clothed, and joining with this fact the general healthiness of laboring people, draw the unwarrantable conclusion that the healthiness is the result of the exposure, and resolve to keep their own offspring scantily covered!

It is forgotten that these urchins who gambol upon village-greens are in many respects favorably circumstanced—that their days are spent in almost perpetual play; that they are always breathing fresh air, and that their systems are not disturbed by over-taxed brains. For aught that appears to the contrary, their good health may be maintained not in consequence of, but in spite of, their deficient clothing. This alternative conclusion we believe to be the true one, and that an inevitable detriment results from the needless loss of animal heat to which they are subject.

For when, the constitution being sound enough to bear it, exposure does produce hard-Exposure at expense of ness, it does so at the expense of growth. This truth is displayed alike in animals and in man. The Shetland pony bears greater inclemencies than the horses of the south, but is dwarfed. Highland sheep and cattle, living in a colder climate, are stunted in comparison with English breeds. In both the arctic and antarctic regions the human race
falls much below its ordinary height: the Laplander and Esquimaux are very short, and the Terra del Fuegians, who go naked in a cold latitude, are described by Darwin as so stunted and hideous, that "one can hardly make one's self believe they are fellow-creatures."

Science clearly explains this dwarfishness produced by great abstraction of heat, showing that, food and other things being equal, it unavoidably results. For, as before pointed out, to make up for that cooling by radiation which the body is constantly undergoing, there must be a constant oxidation of certain matters which form part of the food. And in proportion as the thermal loss is great, must the quantity of these matters required for oxidation be great. But the power of the digestive organs is limited. Hence it follows, that when they have to prepare a large quantity of this material needful for maintaining the temperature, they can prepare but a small quantity of the material which goes to build up the frame. Excessive expenditure for fuel entails diminished means for other purposes: wherefore there necessarily results a body small in size, or inferior in texture, or both.

Hence the great importance of clothing. As Liebig says:—"Our clothing is, in reference to the temperature of the body, merely an equivalent for a certain amount of food." By diminishing the loss of heat, it diminishes the amount of
fuel needful for maintaining the heat, and when the stomach has less to do in preparing fuel, it can do more in preparing other materials.

This deduction is entirely confirmed by the experience of those who manage animals. Cold can be borne by animals only at an expense of fat, or muscle, or growth, as the case may be. "If fattening cattle are exposed to a low temperature, either their progress must be retarded, or a great additional expenditure of food incurred." * Mr. Apperley insists strongly that to bring hunters into good condition it is necessary that the stable should be kept warm. And among those who rear racers it is an established doctrine that exposure is to be avoided.

The scientific truth thus illustrated by ethnology, and recognized by agriculturalists and sportsmen, applies with double force to children. In proportion to their smallness and the rapidity of their growth is the injury from cold great. In France, new-born infants often die in winter from being carried to the office of the maire for registration. "M. Quetelet has pointed out that in Belgium two infants die in January for one that dies in July." And in Russia the infant mortality is something enormous. Even when near maturity the undeveloped frame is comparatively unable to bear exposure: as witness the quickness

* Morton's Cyclopaedia of Agriculture.
with which young soldiers succumb in a trying campaign.

The *rationale* is obvious. We have already adverted to the fact that in consequence of the varying relation between surface and bulk, a child loses a relatively larger amount of heat than an adult; and here we must point out that the disadvantage under which the child thus labors is very great. Lehmann says:—"If the carbonic acid excreted by children or young animals is calculated for an equal bodily weight, it results that children produce nearly twice as much acid as adults." Now the quantity of carbonic acid given off varies with tolerable accuracy as the quantity of heat produced. And thus we see that in children the system, even when not placed at a disadvantage, is called upon to provide nearly double the proportion of material for generating heat.

See, then, the extreme folly of clothing the young scantily. What father, full-grown though he is, losing heat less rapidly as he does, and having no physiological necessity but to supply the waste of each day—what father, we ask, would think it salutary to go about with bare legs, bare arms, and bare neck? Yet this tax upon the system, from which he would shrink, he inflicts upon his little ones, who are so much less able to bear it! or, if he does not inflict it, sees it inflicted without protest. Let him remember that every ounce of nutriment needlessly expended for the maintenance of temperature, is so
much deducted from the nutriment going to build up the frame and maintain the energies, and that even when colds, congestions, or other consequent disorders are escaped, diminished growth or less perfect structure is inevitable.

"The rule is, therefore, not to dress in an invariable way in all cases, but to put on clothing in kind and quantity sufficient in the individual case to protect the body effectually from an abiding sensation of cold however slight." This rule, the importance of which Dr. Combe indicates by the italics, is one in which men of science and practitioners agree. We have met with none competent to form a judgment on the matter, who do not strongly condemn the exposure of children's limbs. If there is one point above others in which "pestilent custom" should be ignored, it is this.

Lamentable, indeed, is it to see mothers seriously damaging the constitutions of their children out of compliance with an irrational fashion. It is bad enough that they should themselves conform to every folly which our Gallic neighbors please to initiate, but that they should clothe their children in any mountebank dress which Le petit Courrier des Dames indicates, regardless of its insufficiency and unfitness, is monstrous. Discomfort, more or less great, is inflicted; frequent disorders are entailed; growth is checked or stamina undermined; premature death not uncommonly
caused; and all because it is thought needful to make frocks of a size and material dictated by French caprice.

Not only is it that for the sake of conformity, mothers thus punish and injure their little ones by scantiness of covering; but it is that from an allied motive they impose a style of dress which forbids healthful activity. To please the eye, colors and fabrics are chosen totally unfit to bear that rough usage which unrestrained play involves, and then to prevent damage the unrestrained play is interdicted. "Get up this moment: you will soil your clean frock," is the mandate issued to some urchin creeping about on the floor. "Come back: you will dirty your stockings," calls out the governess to one of her charges, who has left the footpath to scramble up a bank.

Thus is the evil doubled. That they may come up to their mamma's standard of prettiness, and be admired by her visitors, children must have habiliments deficient in quantity and unfit in texture; and that these easily-damaged habiliments may be kept clean and uninjured, the restless activity, so natural and needful for the young, is more or less restrained. The exercise which becomes doubly requisite when the clothing is insufficient, is cut short, lest it should deface the clothing.

Would that the terrible cruelty of this system could be seen by those who maintain it. We do
not hesitate to say that, through enfeebled health, defective energies, and consequent non-success in life, thousands are annually doomed to unhappiness by this unscrupulous regard for appearances; even when they are not, by early death, literally sacrificed to the Moloch of maternal vanity. We are reluctant to counsel strong measures, but really the evils are so great as to justify, or even to demand, a peremptory interference on the part of fathers.

Our conclusions are, then—that, while the clothing of children should never be in such excess as to create oppressive warmth, it should always be sufficient to prevent any general feeling of cold; * that, instead of the flimsy cotton, linen, or mixed fabrics commonly used, it should be made of some good non-conductor, such as coarse woolen cloth; that it should be so strong as to receive little damage from the hard wear and tear which childish sports will give it, and that its colors should be such as will not soon suffer from use and exposure.

To the importance of bodily exercise most people are in some degree awake. Perhaps less needs saying on this requisite of physical education than on most others: at any rate, in so far

* It is needful to remark that children whose legs and arms have been from the beginning habitually without covering, cease to be conscious that the exposed surfaces are cold: just as by use we have all ceased to be conscious that our faces are cold, even when out of doors. But though in such children the sensations no longer protest, it does not follow that the system escapes injury, any more than it follows that the Fuegian is undamaged by exposure, because he bears with indifference the melting of the falling snow on his naked body.
as boys are concerned. Public schools and private schools alike furnish tolerably adequate play-grounds, and there is usually a fair share of time for out-of-door games, and a recognition of them as needful. In this, if in no other direction, it seems admitted that the natural promptings of boyish instinct may advantageously be followed, and, indeed, in the modern practice of breaking the prolonged morning and afternoon's lessons by a few minutes' open-air recreation, we see an increasing tendency to conform school regulations to the bodily sensations of the pupils. Here, then, little needs to be said in the way of expostulation or suggestion.

But we have been obliged to qualify this admission by inserting the clause "in so far as boys are concerned". Unfortunately, the fact is quite otherwise in the case of girls. It chances, somewhat strangely, that we have daily opportunity of drawing a comparison. We have both a boy's and a girl's school within view, and the contrast between them is remarkable.

In the one case, nearly the whole of a large garden is turned into an open, gravelled space, affording ample scope for games, and supplied with poles and horizontal bars for gymnastic exercises. Every day before breakfast, again towards eleven o'clock, again at mid-day, again in the afternoon, and once more after school is over, the neighborhood is awakened by a chorus of shouts and laugh-
ter as the boys rush out to play; and for as long as they remain, both eyes and ears give proof that they are absorbed in that enjoyable activity which makes the pulse bound and ensures the healthful activity of every organ.

How unlike is the picture offered by the "Establishment for Young Ladies"! Until the fact was pointed out, we actually did not know that we had a girls' school as close to us as the school for boys. The garden, equally large with the other, affords no sign whatever of any provision for juvenile recreation, but is entirely laid out with prim grass-plots, gravel-walks, shrubs and flowers, after the usual suburban style. During five months we have not once had our attention drawn to the premises by a shout or a laugh. Occasionally girls may be observed sauntering along the paths with their lesson-books in their hands, or else walking arm-in-arm. Once, indeed, we saw one chase another round the garden, but with this exception, nothing like vigorous exertion has been visible.

Why this astonishing difference? Is it that the Delicate constitution of a girl differs so entirely from that of a boy as not to need these active exercises? Is it that a girl has none of the promptings to vociferous play by which boys are impelled? Or is it that, while in boys these promptings are to be regarded as securing that bodily activity without which there cannot be adequate
development, to their sisters nature has given them for no purpose whatever—unless it be for the vexation of schoolmistresses?

Perhaps, however, we mistake the aim of those who train the gentler sex. We have a vague suspicion that to produce a robust physique is thought undesirable; that rude health and abundant vigor are considered somewhat plebeian; that a certain delicacy, a strength not competent to more than a mile or two's walk, an appetite fastidious and easily satisfied, joined with that timidity which commonly accompanies feebleness, are held more lady-like. We do not expect that any would distinctly avow this, but we fancy the governess-mind is haunted by an ideal young lady bearing not a little resemblance to this type. If so, it must be admitted that the established system is admirably calculated to realize this ideal.

But to suppose that such is the ideal of the opposite sex is a profound mistake. That men are not commonly drawn towards masculine women, is doubtless true. That such relative weakness as calls for the protection of superior strength is an element of attraction we quite admit. But the difference to which the feelings thus respond is the natural, pre-established difference which will assert itself without artificial appliances. And when, by artificial appliances, the degree of this difference is increased, it becomes an element of repulsion rather than attraction.
"Then girls should be allowed to run wild—to become as rude as boys, and grow up into romps and hoydens!" exclaims some defender of the proprieties. This, we presume, is the ever-present dread of schoolmistresses. It appears, on inquiry, that at "Establishments for Young Ladies" noisy play like that daily indulged in by boys, is a punishable offence, and it is to be inferred that this noisy play is forbidden, lest unlady-like habits should be formed.

The fear is quite groundless, however. For if the sportive activity allowed to boys does not prevent them from growing up into gentlemen, why should a like sportive activity allowed to girls prevent them from growing up into ladies? Rough as may have been their accustomed play-ground frolics, youths who have left school do not indulge in leapfrog in the street, or marbles in the drawing-room. Abandoning their jackets, they abandon at the same time boyish games, and display an anxiety—often a ludicrous anxiety—to avoid whatever is not manly.

If now, on arriving at the due age, this feeling of masculine dignity puts so efficient a restraint on the romping sports of boyhood, will not the feeling of feminine modesty, gradually strengthening as maturity is approached, put an efficient restraint on the like sports of girlhood? Have not women even a greater regard for appearances than men? and will there not consequently arise in them even a stronger
check to whatever is rough or boisterous? How absurd is the supposition that the womanly instincts would not assert themselves but for the rigorous discipline of schoolmistresses!

In this, as in other cases, to remedy the evils of one artificiality, another artificiality has been introduced. The natural spontaneous exercise having been forbidden, and the bad consequences of no exercise having become conspicuous, there has been adopted a system of factitious exercise—gymnastics. That this is better than nothing we admit, but that it is an adequate substitute for play we deny.

The defects are both positive and negative. In the first place, these formal, muscular motions, necessarily much less varied than those accompanying juvenile sports, do not secure so equable a distribution of action to all parts of the body; whence it results that the exertion, falling on special parts, produces fatigue sooner than it would else have done: add to which, that, if constantly repeated, this exertion of special parts leads to a disproportionate development.

Again, the quantity of exercise thus taken will be deficient not only in consequence of uneven distribution, but it will be further deficient in consequence of lack of interest. Even when not made repulsive, as they sometimes are, by assuming the shape of appointed lessons, these monotonous movements are
sure to become wearisome, from the absence of amusement. Competition, it is true, serves as a stimulus, but it is not a lasting stimulus, like that enjoyment which accompanies varied play.

Not only, however, are gymnastics inferior in respect of the quantity of muscular exertion which they secure; they are still more inferior in respect of the quality. This comparative want of enjoyment to which we have just referred as a cause of early desistance from artificial exercises, is also a cause of inferiority in the effects they produce on the system. The common assumption that so long as the amount of bodily action is the same, it matters not whether it be pleasurable or otherwise, is a grave mistake. An agreeable mental excitement has a highly invigorating influence. See the effect produced upon an invalid by good news, or by the visit of an old friend. Mark how careful medical men are to recommend lively society to debilitated patients. Remember how beneficial to the health is the gratification produced by change of scene.

The truth is that happiness is the most powerful of tonics. By accelerating the circulation of the blood, it facilitates the performance of every function, and so tends alike to increase health when it exists, and to restore it when it has been lost. Hence the essential superiority of play to gymnastics. The extreme interest felt by children in their games, and the riotous glee with which they
carry on their rougher frolics, are of as much importance as the accompanying exertion. And as not supplying these mental stimuli, gymnastics must be fundamentally defective.

Granting then, as we do, that formal exercises of the limbs are better than nothing—granting, further, that they may be used with advantage as supplementary aids—we yet contend that such formal exercises can never supply the place of the exercises prompted by nature. For girls, as well as boys, the sportive activities to which the instincts impel, are essential to bodily welfare. Whoever forbids them, forbids the divinely-appointed means to physical development.

A topic remains—one perhaps more urgently demanding consideration than any of the foregoing. It is asserted by not a few, that among the educated classes the younger adults and those who are verging upon maturity are, on the average, neither so well grown nor so strong as their seniors.

When first we heard this assertion we were inclined to disregard it as one of the many manifestations of the old tendency to exalt the past at the expense of the present. Calling to mind the facts that, as measured by ancient armor, modern men are proved to be larger than ancient men, and that the tables of mortality show no diminution, but rather an increase in the duration of life, we paid
little attention to what seemed a groundless belief. Detailed observation, however, has greatly shaken our opinion. Omitting from the comparison the laboring classes, we have noticed a majority of cases in which the children do not reach the stature of their parents, and, in massiveness, making due allowance for difference of age, there seems a like inferiority.

In health, the contrast appears still greater. Men of past generations, living riotously as they did, could bear much more than men of the present generation, who live soberly, can bear. Though they drank hard, kept irregular hours, were regardless of fresh air, and thought little of cleanliness, our recent ancestors were capable of prolonged application without injury, even to ripe old age: witness the annals of the bench and the bar.

Yet we who think much about our bodily welfare; who eat with moderation, and do not drink to excess; who attend to ventilation, and use frequent ablutions; who make annual excursions, and have the benefit of greater medical knowledge;—we are continually breaking down under our work. Paying considerable attention to the laws of health, we seem to be weaker than our grandfathers who, in many respects, defied the laws of health. And, judging from the appearance and frequent ailments of the rising generation, they are likely to be even less robust than ourselves.
MENTAL STRAIN

What is the meaning of this? Is it that past over-feeding, alike of adults and juveniles, was less injurious than the under-feeding to which we have adverted as now so general? Is it that the deficient clothing which this delusive hardening theory has encouraged, is to blame? Is it that the greater or less discouragement of juvenile sports, in deference to a false refinement, is the cause? From our reasonings it may be inferred that each of these has probably had a share in producing the evil. But there has been yet another detrimental influence at work, perhaps more potent than any of the others: we mean—excess of mental application.

On old and young, the pressure of modern life puts a still-increasing strain. In all business and professions, intenser competition taxes the energies and abilities of every adult, and, with the view of better fitting the young to hold their place under this intenser competition, they are subject to a more severe discipline than heretofore. The damage is thus doubled. Fathers, who find not only that they are run hard by their multiplying competitors, but that, while laboring under this disadvantage, they have to maintain a more expensive style of living, are all the year round obliged to work early and late, taking little exercise and getting but short holidays. The constitutions, shaken by this long-continued over-application, they bequeath to their children. And then these comparatively
feeble children, predisposed as they are to break down even under an ordinary strain upon their energies, are required to go through a *curriculum* much more extended than that prescribed for the unenfeebled children of past generations.

That disastrous consequences must result from this cumulative transgression might be predicted with certainty; and that they do result, every observant person knows. Go where you will, and before long there come under your notice cases of children, or youths, of either sex, more or less injured by undue study. Here, to recover from a state of debility thus produced, a year's rustication has been found necessary. There you find a chronic congestion of the brain, that has already lasted many months and threatens to last much longer. Now you hear of a fever that resulted from the over-excitement in some way brought on at school. And, again, the instance is that of a youth who has already had once to desist from his studies, and who, since he has returned to them, is frequently taken out of his class in a fainting fit.

We state facts—facts that have not been sought for, but have been thrust upon our observation during the last two years: and that, too, within a very limited range. Nor have we by any means exhausted the list. Quite recently we had the opportunity of marking how the evil becomes hereditary: the case being that of a lady of robust parentage,
MENTAL STRAIN

whose system was so injured by the régime of a Scotch boarding-school, where she was under-fed and over-worked, that she invariably suffers from vertigo on rising in the morning, and whose children, inheriting this enfeebled brain, are several of them unable to bear even a moderate amount of study without headache or giddiness.

At the present time we have daily under our eyes, a young lady whose system has been damaged for life by the college course through which she has passed. Taxed as she was to such an extent that she had no energy left for exercise, she is, now that she has finished her education, a constant complainant. Appetite small and very capricious, mostly refusing meat; extremities perpetually cold, even when the weather is warm; a feebleness which forbids anything but the slowest walking, and that only for a short time; palpitation on going up stairs; greatly impaired vision—these, joined with checked growth and lax tissue, are among the results entailed. And to her case we may add that of her friend and fellow-student who is similarly weak; who is liable to faint even under the excitement of a quiet party of friends, and who has at length been obliged by her medical attendant to desist from study entirely.

If injuries so conspicuous are thus frequent, how very general must be the smaller and inconspicuous injuries. To one case where positive illness is directly traceable to over-application, there are
probably at least half-a-dozen cases where the evil is unobtrusive and slowly accumulating—cases where there is frequent derangement of the functions, attributed to this or that special cause, or to constitutional delicacy; cases where there is retardation and premature arrest of bodily growth; cases where a latent tendency to consumption is brought out and established; cases where a predisposition is given to that now common cerebral disorder brought on by the hard work of adult life. How commonly constitutions are thus undermined will be clear to all who, after noting the frequent ailments of hard-worked professional and mercantile men, will reflect on the disastrous effects which undue application must produce upon the undeveloped systems of the young. The young are competent to bear neither as much hardship, nor as much physical exertion, nor as much mental exertion, as the full grown. Judge, then, if the full grown so manifestly suffer from the excessive mental exertion required of them, how great must be the damage which a mental exertion often equally excessive, inflicts upon the young!

Indeed, when we examine the merciless school-drill to which many children are subjected, the wonder is, not that it does great injury, but that it can be borne at all. Take the instance given by Sir John Forbes from personal knowledge, and which he asserts, after much inquiry, to be an average sample of the middle-class girls'-school sys-

In a girls' school.
tem throughout England. Omitting the detailed divisions of time, we quote the summary of the twenty-four hours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In bed</td>
<td>9 hours (the younger 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school, at their studies and tasks</td>
<td>9 “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In school, or in the house, the older at optional studies or the work, younger at play</td>
<td>$3\frac{1}{2}$ “ (the younger $2\frac{1}{2}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At meals</td>
<td>1 “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise in the open air, in the shape of a formal walk, often with lesson-books in hand, and even this only when the weather is fine at the appointed time</td>
<td>1 “</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24 “</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

And what are the results of this "astounding regimen", as Sir John Forbes terms it? Of course feebleness, pallor, want of spirits, general ill-health. But he describes something more. This utter disregard of physical welfare, out of extreme anxiety to cultivate the mind—this prolonged exercise of the brain and deficient exercise of the limbs,—he found to be habitually followed, not only by disordered functions but by malformation. He says:—"We lately visited, in a large town, a boarding-school containing forty girls, and we learnt, on close and accurate inquiry, that there was not one of the girls who had been at the school two years (and the majority had been as long) that was not more or less crooked!"*

* Cyclopaedia of Practical Medicine, vol. i. pp. 697, 698.
It may be that since 1833, when this was written, some improvement has taken place. We hope it has. But that the system is still common—nay, that it is in some cases carried even to a greater extreme than ever—we can personally testify. We recently went over a training college for young men; one of those instituted of late years for the purpose of supplying schools with well-disciplined teachers. Here, under official supervision, where something better than the judgment of private schoolmistresses might have been looked for, we found the daily routine to be as follows:

At 6 o'clock the students are called
" 7 to 8 studies,
" 8 to 9 scripture reading, prayers and breakfast,
" 9 to 12 studies,
" 12 to 1¼ leisure, nominally devoted to walking or other exercise, but often spent in study,
" 1¼ to 2 dinner, the meal commonly occupying twenty minutes,
" 2 to 5 studies,
" 5 to 6 tea and relaxation,
" 6 to 8½ studies,
" 8½ to 9½ private studies in preparing lessons for the next day,
" 10 to bed.

Thus, out of twenty-four hours, eight are devoted to sleep; four and a quarter are occupied in dressing, prayers, meals, and the brief periods of rest accompanying them; ten and a half are given to study, and one and a quarter to exercise, which is optional and often avoided.
MENTAL STRAIN

Not only, however, is it that the ten and a half hours of recognized study are frequently increased to eleven and a half by devoting to books the time set apart for exercise, but some of the students who are not quick in learning, get up at four o’clock in the morning to prepare their lessons, and are actually encouraged by their teachers to do this! The course to be passed through in a given time is so extensive; the teachers, whose credit is at stake in getting their pupils well through the examinations, are so urgent, and the difficulty of satisfying the requirements is so great, that pupils are not uncommonly induced to spend twelve and thirteen hours a day in mental labor!

It needs no prophet to see that the bodily injury inflicted must be great. As we were told by one of the inmates, those who arrive with fresh complexions quickly become blanched. Illness is frequent: there are always some on the sick list. Failure of appetite and indigestion are very common. Diarrhoea is a prevalent disorder; not uncommonly a third of the whole number of students suffering under it at the same time. Headache is generally complained of and by some is borne almost daily for months, while a certain percentage break down entirely and go away.

That this should be the regimen of what is in some sort a model institution, established and super-intended by the embodied enlightenment of the age, is a startling fact. That the severe examinations,
joined with the short period assigned for preparation, should practically compel recourse to a system which inevitably undermines the health of all who pass through it, is proof if not of cruelty, then of woeful ignorance.

Doubtless the case is in a great degree exceptional—perhaps to be paralleled only in other institutions of the same class. But that cases so extreme should exist at all, indicates pretty clearly how great is the extent to which the minds of the rising generation are overtaxed. Expressing as they do the ideas of the educated community, these training colleges, even in the absence of all other evidence, would conclusively imply a prevailing tendency to an unduly urgent system of culture.

It seems strange that there should be so little consciousness of the dangers of over-education during youth, when there is so general a consciousness of the dangers of over-education during childhood. Most parents are more or less aware of the evil consequences that follow infant precocity. In every society may be heard reprobation of those who too early stimulate the minds of their little ones. And the dread of this early stimulation is great in proportion as there is adequate knowledge of the effects: witness the implied opinion of one of our most distinguished professors of physiology, who told us that he did not intend his little boy to learn any lessons until he was eight years old.
But while to all it is a familiar truth that a forced development of intelligence in childhood entails disastrous results—either physical feebleness, or ultimate stupidity, or early death—it appears not to be perceived that throughout youth the same truth holds. Yet it is certain that it must do so. There is a given order in which, and a given rate at which, the faculties unfold. If the course of education conforms itself to that order and rate, well. If not—if the higher faculties are early taxed by presenting an order of knowledge more complex and abstract than can be readily assimilated; or if, by excess of culture, the intellect in general is developed to a degree beyond that which is natural to the age, the abnormal result so produced will inevitably be accompanied by some equivalent, or more than equivalent, evil.

For Nature is a strict accountant; and if you demand of her in one direction more than she is prepared to lay out, she balances the account by making a deduction elsewhere. If you will let her follow her own course, taking care to supply, in right quantities and kinds, the raw materials of bodily and mental growth required at each age, she will eventually produce an individual more or less evenly developed. If, however, you insist on premature or undue growth of any one part, she will, with more or less protest, concede the point; but that she may do your extra work, she
must leave some of her more important work undone. Let it never be forgotten that the amount of vital energy which the body at any moment possesses is limited, and that being limited, it is impossible to get from it more than a fixed quantity of results. In a child or youth the demands upon this vital energy are various and urgent. As before pointed out, the waste consequent on the day's bodily exercise has to be repaired; the wear of brain entailed by the day's study has to be made good; a certain additional growth of body has to be provided for, and also a certain additional growth of brain: add to which the amount of energy absorbed in the digestion of the large quantity of food required for meeting these many demands.

Now, that to divert an excess of energy into any one of these channels is to abstract it from the others, is not only manifest à priori, but may be shown à posteriori from the experience of every one. Every one knows, for instance, that the digestion of a heavy meal makes such a demand on the system as to produce lassitude of mind and body, ending not unfrequently in sleep. Every one knows, too, that excess of bodily exercise diminishes the power of thought—that the temporary prostration following any sudden exertion, or the fatigue produced by a thirty miles' walk, is accompanied by a disinclination to mental effort; that, after a month's pedestrian tour, the mental inertia is such that some days are re-
quired to overcome it: and that in peasants who spend their lives in muscular labor the activity of mind is very small.

Again, it is a truth familiar to all that during those fits of extreme rapid growth which sometimes occur in childhood, the great abstraction of energy is shown in the attendant prostration, bodily and mental. Once more, the facts that violent muscular exertion after eating will stop digestion, and that children who are early put to hard labor become stunted, similarly exhibit the antagonism—similarly imply that excess of activity in one direction involves deficiency of it in other directions.

Now the law which is thus manifest in extreme cases holds in all cases. These injurious abstractions of energy as certainly take place when the undue demands are slight and constant, as when they are great and sudden. Hence, if in youth, the expenditure in mental labor exceeds that which nature had provided for, the expenditure for other purposes falls below what it should have been, and evils of one kind or other are inevitably entailed. Let us briefly consider these evils.

Supposing the over-activity of brain not to be extreme, but to exceed the normal activity only in a moderate degree, there will be nothing more than some slight reaction on the development of the body; the stature falling a little below that which it would else have reached;
or the bulk being less than it would have been; or the quality of tissue being not so good. One or more of these effects must necessarily occur. The extra quantity of blood supplied to the brain, not only during the period of mental exertion, but during the subsequent period in which the waste of cerebral substance is being made good, is blood that would else have been circulating through the limbs and viscera, and the amount of growth or repair for which that blood would have supplied materials, is lost. This physical reaction being certain, the question is, whether the gain resulting from the extra culture is equivalent to the loss?—whether defect of bodily growth, or the want of that structural perfection which gives high vigor and endurance, is compensated for by the additional knowledge gained?

When the excess of mental exertion is greater, there follow results far more serious; telling not only against bodily perfection, but against the perfection of the brain itself. It is a physiological law, first pointed out by M. Isidore St. Hilaire, and to which attention has been drawn by Mr. Lewes in his essay on *Dwarfs and Giants*, that there is an antagonism between growth and development. By growth, as used in this antithetical sense, is to be understood *increase of size*; by development, *increase of structure*. And the law is, that great activity in either of these processes involves retardation or arrest of the other.
A familiar illustration is furnished by the cases of the caterpillar and the chrysalis. In the caterpillar there is extremely rapid augmentation of bulk; but the structure is scarcely at all more complex when the caterpillar is full-grown than when it is small. In the chrysalis the bulk does not increase; on the contrary, weight is lost during this stage of the creature's life, but the elaboration of a more complex structure goes on with great activity.

The antagonism, here so clear, is less traceable in higher creatures, because the two processes are carried on together. But we see it pretty well illustrated among ourselves by contrasting the sexes. A girl develops in body and mind rapidly, and ceases to grow comparatively early. A boy's bodily and mental development is slower, and his growth greater. At the age when the one is mature, finished, and having all faculties in full play, the other, whose vital energies have been more directed towards increase of size, is relatively incomplete in structure, and shows it in a comparative awkwardness, bodily and mental.

Now this law is true not only of the organism as a whole, but of each separate part. The abnormally rapid advance of any part in respect of structure involves premature arrest of its growth, and this happens with the organ of the mind as certainly as with any other organ. The brain, which during early years is relatively large in mass but imperfect
in structure, will, if required to perform its functions with undue activity, undergo a structural advance greater than is appropriate to the age; but the ultimate effect will be a falling short of the size and power that would else have been attained. And this is a part cause—probably the chief cause—why precocious children, and youths who up to a certain time were carrying all before them, so often stop short and disappoint the high hopes of their parents.

But these results of over-education, disastrous as they are, are perhaps less disastrous than the results produced upon the health—the undermined constitution, the enfeebled energies, the morbid feelings. Recent discoveries in physiology have shown how immense is the influence of the brain over the functions of the body. The digestion of the food, the circulation of the blood, and through these all other organic processes, are profoundly affected by cerebral excitement.

Whoever has seen repeated, as we have, the experiment first performed by Weber, showing the consequence of irritating the *vagus* nerve which connects the brain with the viscera—whoever has seen the action of the heart suddenly arrested by the irritation of the nerve; slowly recommencing when the irritation is suspended, and again arrested the moment it is renewed—will have a vivid conception of the depressing influence which an over-wrought brain exercises on the body.
MENTAL STRAIN

The effects thus physiologically explained, are indeed exemplified in ordinary experience. There is no one but has felt the palpitation accompanying hope, fear, anger, joy—no one but has observed how labored becomes the action of the heart when these feelings are very violent. And though there are many who have never themselves suffered that extreme emotional excitement which is followed by arrest of the heart's action and fainting, yet every one knows them to be cause and effect.

It is a familiar fact, too, that disturbance of the stomach is entailed by mental excitement exceeding a certain intensity. Loss of appetite is a common result alike of very pleasurable and very painful states of mind. When the event producing a pleasurable or painful state of mind occurs shortly after a meal, it not unfrequently happens either that the stomach rejects what has been eaten, or digests it with great difficulty and under prolonged protest. And as every one who taxes his brain much can testify, even purely intellectual action will, when excessive, produce analogous effects.

Now the relation between brain and body which is so manifest in these extreme cases, holds equally in ordinary, less-marked cases. Just as these violent but temporary cerebral excitements produce violent but temporary disturbances of the viscera, so do the less violent but chronic cerebral excitements, produce less violent but chronic visceral disturbances. This
is not simply an inference—it is a truth to which every medical man can bear witness; and it is one to which a long and sad experience enables us to give personal testimony.

Various degrees and forms of bodily derangement, often taking years of enforced idleness to set partially right, result from this prolonged over-exertion of mind. Sometimes the heart is chiefly affected: habitual palpitations; a pulse much enfeebled; and very generally a diminution in the number of beats from seventy-two to sixty, or even fewer. Sometimes the conspicuous disorder is of the stomach: a dyspepsia which makes life a burden, and is amenable to no remedy but time. In many cases both heart and stomach are implicated. Mostly the sleep is short and broken. And very generally there is more or less mental depression.

Consider, then, how great must be the damage inflicted by undue mental excitement on children and youths. More or less of this constitutional disturbance will inevitably follow an exertion of brain beyond that which nature had provided for, and when not so excessive as to produce absolute illness, is sure to entail a slowly accumulating degeneracy of physique. With a small and fastidious appetite, an imperfect digestion, and an enfeebled circulation, how can the developing body flourish? The due performance of every vital process depends on the adequate supply of good blood.
Without enough good blood, no gland can secrete properly, no viscus can fully discharge its office. Without enough good blood, no nerve, muscle, membrane, or other tissue can be efficiently repaired. Without enough good blood, growth will neither be sound nor sufficient. Judge, then, how bad must be the consequences when to a growing body the weakened stomach supplies blood that is deficient in quantity and poor in quality, while the debilitated heart propels this poor and scanty blood with unnatural slowness.

And if, as all who candidly investigate the matter must admit, physical degeneracy is a consequence of excessive study, how grave is the condemnation to be passed upon this cramming system above exemplified. It is a terrible mistake, from whatever point of view regarded.

It is a mistake in so far as the mere acquirement of knowledge is concerned: for it is notorious that the mind, like the body, cannot assimilate beyond a certain rate, and if you ply it with facts faster than it can assimilate them, they are very soon rejected again: they do not become permanently built into the intellectual fabric, but fall out of recollection after the passing of the examination for which they were got up.

It is a mistake, too, because it tends to make study distasteful. Either through the painful associations produced by careless mental toil, or through the abnormal state of brain
it leaves behind, it often generates an aversion to books, and, instead of that subsequent self-culture induced by a rational education, there comes a continued retrogression.

It is a mistake, also, inasmuch as it assumes that the acquisition of knowledge is everything, and forgets that a much more important matter is the organization of knowledge, for which time and spontaneous thinking are requisite. Just as Humboldt remarks respecting the progress of intelligence in general, that "the interpretation of nature is obscured when the description languishes under too great an accumulation of insulated facts;" so it may be remarked, respecting the progress of individual intelligence, that the mind is overburdened and hampered by an excess of ill-digested information. It is not the knowledge stored up as intellectual fat which is of value, but that which is turned into intellectual muscle.

But the mistake is still deeper. Even were the system good as a system of intellectual training, which it is not, it would still be bad, because, as we have shown, it is fatal to that vigor of physique which is needful to make intellectual training available in the struggle of life. Those who, in eagerness to cultivate their pupils' minds, are reckless of their bodies, do not remember that success in the world depends much more upon energy than upon information, and that a policy
which in cramming with information undermines energy, is self-defeating. The strong will and untiring activity which result from abundant animal vigor, go far to compensate even for great defects of education, and when joined with that quite adequate education which may be obtained without sacrificing health, they ensure an easy victory over competitors enfeebled by excessive study, prodigies of learning though they may be. A comparatively small and ill-made engine, worked at high pressure, will do more than a larger and well-finished one worked at low-pressure. What folly is it, then, while finishing the engine, so to damage the boiler that it will not generate steam!

Once more, the system is a mistake, as involving a false estimate of welfare in life. Even supposing it were a means to worldly success, instead of a means to worldly failure, yet, in the entailed ill-health, it would inflict a more than equivalent curse. What boots it to have attained wealth, if the wealth is accompanied by ceaseless ailments? What is the worth of distinction, if it has brought hypochondria with it? Surely none needs telling that a good digestion, a bounding pulse, and high spirits are elements of happiness which no external advantages can outbalance. Chronic bodily disorder casts a gloom over the brightest prospects, while the vivacity of strong health gilds even misfortune.
We contend, then, that this over-education is vicious in every way—vicious, as giving knowledge that will soon be forgotten; vicious, as producing a disgust for knowledge; vicious, as neglecting that organization of knowledge which is more important than its acquisition; vicious, as weakening or destroying that energy, without which a trained intellect is useless; vicious, as entailing that ill-health for which even success would not compensate, and which makes failure doubly bitter.

On women the effects of this forcing system are, if possible, even more injurious than on men. Being in great measure debarred from those vigorous and enjoyable exercises of body by which boys mitigate the evils of excessive study, girls feel these evils in their full intensity. Hence, the much smaller proportion of them who grow up well made and healthy.

In the pale, angular, flat-chested young ladies, so abundant in London drawing-rooms, we see the effect of merciless application, unrelieved by youthful sport: and this physical degeneracy exhibited by them, hinders their welfare far more than their many accomplishments aid it. Mammas anxious to make their daughters attractive, could scarcely choose a course more fatal than this, which sacrifices the body to the mind. Either they disregard the tastes of the opposite sex, or else their conception of those tastes is erroneous. Men care comparatively
little for erudition in women, but very much for physical beauty, and good-nature, and sound sense. How many conquests does the blue stocking make through her extensive knowledge of history? What man ever fell in love with a woman because she understood Italian? Where is the Edwin who was brought to Angelina's feet by her German?

But rosy cheeks and laughing eyes are great attractions. A finely rounded figure draws admiring glances. The liveliness and good humor that overflowing health produces, go a great way towards establishing attachments. Every one knows cases where bodily perfections, in the absence of all other recommendations, have incited a passion that carried all before it; but scarcely any one can point to a case where mere intellectual acquirements, apart from moral or physical attributes, have aroused such a feeling.

The truth is that, out of the many elements uniting in various proportions to produce in a man's breast that complex emotion which we call love, the strongest are those produced by physical attractions; the next in order of strength are those produced by moral attractions; the weakest are those produced by intellectual attractions; and even those are dependent much less upon acquired knowledge than on natural faculty—quickness, wit, insight.

If any think the assertion a derogatory one, and inveigh against the masculine character for being
thus swayed, we reply that they little know what they say when they thus call in question the Divine ordinations. Even were there no obvious meaning in the arrangement, we might be sure that some important end was subserved. But the meaning is quite obvious to those who examine. It needs but to remember that one of Nature’s ends, or rather her supreme end, is the welfare of posterity—it needs but to remember that, in so far as posterity are concerned, a cultivated intelligence based upon a bad \textit{physique} is of little worth, seeing that its descendants will die out in a generation or two—it needs but to bear in mind that a good \textit{physique}, however poor the accompanying mental endowments, is worth preserving, because throughout future generations, the mental endowments may be indefinitely developed—it needs but to contemplate these truths, to see how important is the balance of instincts above described.

But, purpose apart, the instincts being thus balanced, it is a fatal folly to persist in a system which undermines a girl’s constitution that it may overload her memory. Educate as highly as possible—the higher the better—providing no bodily injury is entailed (and we may remark, in passing, that a high standard might be so reached were the parrot-faculty cultivated less, and the human faculty more, and were the discipline extended over that now wasted period between leaving school and being married.) But to
educate in such a manner, or to such extent, as to produce physical degeneracy, is to defeat the chief end for which the toil and cost and anxiety are submitted to. By subjecting their daughters to this high-pressure system, parents frequently ruin their prospects in life. Not only do they inflict on them enfeebled health, with all its pains and disabilities and gloom, but very often they actually doom them to celibacy.

Our general conclusion is, then, that the ordinary treatment of children is, in various ways, seriously prejudicial. It errs in deficient feeding; in deficient clothing; in deficient exercise (among girls at least), and in excessive mental application. Considering the régime as a whole, its tendency is too exacting; it asks too much and gives too little. In the extent to which it takes the vital energies, it makes the juvenile life much more like the adult life than it should be. It overlooks the truth that, as in the foetus the entire vitality is expended in the direction of growth—as in the infant, the expenditure of vitality in growth is so great as to leave extremely little for either physical or mental action—so throughout childhood and youth growth is the dominant requirement to which all others must be subordinated: a requirement which dictates the giving of much and the taking away of little—a requirement which, therefore, restricts the exertion of body and mind to a degree propor-
tionate to the rapidity of growth—a requirement which permits the mental and physical activities to increase only as fast as the rate of growth diminishes.

Regarded from another point of view, this high-pressure education manifestly results from our passing phase of civilization. In primitive times, when aggression and defence were the leading social activities, bodily vigor with its accompanying courage were the desiderata, and then education was almost wholly physical: mental cultivation was little cared for, and indeed, as in our own feudal ages, was often treated with contempt. But now that our state is relatively peaceful—now that muscular power is of use for little else than manual labor, while social success of nearly every kind depends very much on mental power—our education has become almost exclusively mental. Instead of respecting the body and ignoring the mind, we now respect the mind and ignore the body. Both these attitudes are wrong. We do not yet sufficiently realize the truth that as, in this life of ours, the physical underlies the mental, the mental must not be developed at the expense of the physical. The ancient and modern conceptions must be combined.

Perhaps nothing will so much hasten the time when body and mind will both be adequately cared for, as a diffusion of the belief that the preservation of health is a duty. Few
seem conscious that there is such a thing as physical morality. Men's habitual words and acts imply the idea that they are at liberty to treat their bodies as they please. Disorders entailed by disobedience to Nature's dictates, they regard simply as grievances: not as the effects of a conduct more or less flagitious. Though the evil consequences inflicted on their dependents, and on future generations, are often as great as those caused by crime, yet they do not think themselves in any degree criminal. It is true, that, in the case of drunkenness, the viciousness of a purely bodily transgression is recognized; but none appear to infer that, if this bodily transgression is vicious, so too is every bodily transgression. The fact is, that all breaches of the laws of health are physical sins. When this is generally seen, then, and perhaps not till then, will the physical training of the young receive all the attention it deserves.
NOTES.

Page 21—Value of knowledge.—An anecdote is told of an English professor who asked the man rowing across the lake: "Do you understand Latin?"—"No, your honor."—"Then a quarter of your life is lost. Do you understand Greek?—"No, your honor."—"Then a half of your life is lost. Do you understand mathematics?"—No, your honor."—"Then three-fourths of your life is lost." But meantime a sudden squall came up, and the boat shipped too much water. "Can your honor swim?" asked the boatman. "No."—"Then all your life is lost, for we are going to the bottom."

Page 23—Kinds of activity.—On this classification M. Compayré remarks:

Mr. Spencer is wrong in putting into the last category of activities that which is the crown of the others, all that which concerns the moral development of the individual. Between the second and the third class of activities we ask to interpolate another form of activity,—that which constitutes the individual moral life, that which, in every man, even the humblest and the poorest, calls into exercise the conscience, the reason, and the will. Mr. Spencer's system is decidedly too aristocratic. It seems to reserve the moral life for men of leisure. In a democratic society, which believes in equality and which would not have this an empty term, there are efforts which must be made for the moral development of the human being in all conditions, and it would be wrong to reduce personal activity to the care of health and material well-being.—History of Pedagogy, pp. 543, 544.

Page 34—Physiology all-essential.—Prof. W. H. Payne says:

Admitting the inestimable value of physiological knowledge to the human race, does it follow that every one should make a study of this (295)
science as a means of guidance? The answer is to be found in the fact that only the simplest rudiments of this subject, scarcely more than its empirical precepts, come within the range of the average pupil's opportunities; but that the real science has been monopolized for professional use by physicians. The fact in the case is that, with the exception of the parts directly connected with hygiene, physiological knowledge is as little available for individual guidance as astronomical knowledge. Under normal and usual conditions, the human body is a machine that will perform its functions without the need of assistance; and under abnormal conditions, nothing but the highest knowledge and skill can be trusted in the way of intervention. Daily experience shows that in this domain nothing is more dangerous than half knowledge, or "a little knowledge". Every man, for his own daily guidance, should know the plain conditions of healthy living, with respect to food, air, exercise, etc., and this easy knowledge should be communicated to all; but when a man is sick, or bruised, or wounded, he should employ a physician—he should hire the knowledge and skill that his own preoccupations and predilections have forbidden him to acquire. In the first case, physiology has a practical value of the direct order; in the second case, it is of indirect or mediate practical value. The case just presented is a typical one. For example, all men have need of hats; shall all men therefore, learn the hatter's trade? By no means. It suffices that each man knows enough of hats to judge of their quality when he buys, and to take proper care of the one he chances to own. Any knowledge beyond this must be relegated to the craft of hatters.—Contributions to the Science of Education, pp. 53, 54.

Prof. Joseph Payne says in his Lectures:

The general conclusion, then, from our review of Mr. Spencer's theory is, that its due satisfaction involves the assumption that every man is to be his own doctor, lawyer, architect, bailiff, tailor, and I suppose,—clergyman.

* * * Knowledge which may be unquestionably useful to some persons may not be useful at all to others; therefore, although education is to be a preparation for after life, yet it is to be a general, not a professional, preparation, and cannot provide for minute and special contingencies. The object of education is to form the man, not the baker—the man, not the lawyer—the man, not the civil engineer.—Small's Edition, pp. 247, 249.

Page 36—Business dependent on science.—Mr. Quick says:

Should we teach all sciences to everybody? This is clearly impossible.
Should we, then, decide for each child what is to be his particular means of money-getting, and instruct him in those sciences which will be most useful in that business or profession? In other words, should we have a separate school for each calling? The only attempt of this kind which has been made is, I believe, the institution of Handelschulen (commercial schools) in Germany. In them, youths of fifteen or sixteen enter for a course of two or three years' instruction which aims exclusively at fitting them for commerce. But, in this case, their general education is already finished. With us, the lad commonly goes to work at the business itself quite as soon as he has the faculties for learning the sciences connected with it. If the schools send him to it with a love of knowledge, and with a mind well disciplined to acquire knowledge, this will be of more value to him than any special information.—*Educational Reformers, Syracuse Edition*, p. 230.

Page 37—*Disciplinary development.*—R. H. Quick says of this in his *Educational Reformers*:

But it seems to me that different subjects must be used to train the faculties at different stages of development. The processes of science, which form the staple of education in Mr. Spencer's system, cannot be grasped by the intellect of a child. "The scientific discoverer does the work, and when it is done the schoolboy is called in to witness the result, to learn its chief features by heart, and to repeat them when called upon, just as he is called on to name the mothers of the patriarchs, or to give an account of the Eastern campaigns of Alexander the Great." (Pall Mall Gazette, Feb. 8, 1867.) This, however, affords but scanty training for the mind. We want to draw out the child's interests, and to direct them to worthy objects. We want not only to teach him, but to enable and encourage him to teach himself; and if, following Mr. Spencer's advice, we make him get up the species of plants, "which amount to some 220,000," and the varied forms of animal life, which are "estimated at some 2,000,000," we may, as Mr. Spencer tells us, have strengthened his memory as effectually as by teaching him languages; but the pupil will, perhaps, have no great reason to rejoice over his escape from the horrors of the "As in Praesenti," and "Propria quaer Maribus". The consequences will be the same in both cases. We shall disgust the great majority of our scholars with the acquisition of knowledge, and with the use of the powers of their minds. Whether, therefore, we adopt or reject Mr. Spencer's conclusion, that there is one sort of knowledge which is universally the most valuable, I think I must deny that there is one sort
of knowledge which is universally, and at every stage in education, the best adapted to develop the intellectual faculties. Mr. Spencer himself acknowledges this elsewhere. "There is," says he, "a certain sequence in which the faculties spontaneously develop, and a certain kind of knowledge, which each requires during its development. It is for us to ascertain this sequence, and supply this knowledge."—Pp. 225, 226.

Page 45—*Investments guided by science.*—Mr. Quick says:

As far as money-getting is concerned, then, science will not be found to be universally serviceable. Mr. Spencer gives instances, indeed, where science would prevent very expensive blundering; but the true inference is, not that the blunderers should learn science, but that they should mind their own business, and take the opinion of scientific men about theirs. "Here is a mine," says he, "in the sinking of which many shareholders ruined themselves, from not knowing that a certain fossil belonged to the old red sandstone, below which no coal is found." Perhaps they were misled by the little knowledge which Pope tells us is a dangerous thing. If they had been entirely ignorant, they would surely have called in a professional geologist, whose opinion would have been more valuable than their own, even though geology had taken the place of classics in their schooling. "Daily are men induced to aid in carrying out inventions which a mere tyro in science could show to be futile." But these are men whose function it would always be to lose money, not make it, whatever you might teach them.—*Educational Reformers*, p. 231.

Page 58—*History valueless.*—Mr. Quick says:

As it has been often said, the effect of reading history is, in some respects the same as that of travelling. Any one in Mr. Spencer's vein might ask, "If a man has seen the Alps, of what use will that be to him in weighing out groceries?" Directly none at all; but indirectly, much. The travelled man will not be such a slave to the petty views and customs of his trade as the man who looks on his county town as the centre of the universe. The study of history, like travelling, widens the student's mental vision, frees him, to some extent, from the bondage of the present, and prevents his mistaking conventionalities for laws of nature. It brings home to him, in all its force, the truth that "there are also people beyond the moun-

* "The brewer," as Mr. Spencer himself tells us, "if his business is very extensive, finds it pay to keep a chemist on the premises"—pay a good deal better, I suspect, than learning chemistry at school.
tains" (Hinter dem Berge sind auch Leute), that there are higher interests in the world than his own business concerns, and nobler men than himself, or the best of his acquaintance. It teaches him what men are capable of, and thus gives him juster views of his race. And to have all this truth worked into the mind contributes, perhaps, as largely to "complete living" as knowledge of the Eustachian tubes, or of the normal rate of pulsation.—

Educational Reformers, p. 234.

Page 66—Importance of aesthetics.—Mr. Quick says:

This language is rather obscure; but the only meaning I can attach to it is, that music, drawing, poetry, etc., may be taught if time can be found when all other knowledges are provided for. This reminds me of the author whose works are so valuable that they will be studied when Shakespeare is forgotten—but not before. Any one of the sciences which Mr. Spencer considers so necessary might employ a lifetime. Where, then, shall we look for the leisure part of education when education includes them all?—Educational Reformers, p. 235.

Page 69—Esthetics based on science.—M. Compayré remarks:

That which it is more difficult to grant Mr. Spencer, is that æsthetic education, in its turn, is based on science. Is there not some exaggeration, for example, in asserting that poor musical compositions are poor because they are lacking in truth? and that they are lacking in truth "because they are lacking in science"? Does one become a man of letters and an artist as one becomes a geometrician? To cultivate with success those arts which are as the flower of civilization, is there not required, besides talent and natural gifts, a long practice, a slow initiation, something, in a word, more delicate than the attention which suffices for being instructed in science?—History of Pedagogy, p. 546.

Page 72—Mistakes of artists.—Mr. Quick remarks:

It is difficult to treat seriously the arguments by which Mr. Spencer endeavors to show that a knowledge of science is necessary for the practice or the enjoyment of the fine arts. Of course, the highest art of every kind is based on science, that is, on truths which science takes cognizance of and explains; but it does not therefore follow that "without science there can be neither perfect production nor full appreciation." Mr. Spencer tells us of mistakes which John Lewis and Rossetti have made for want of science. Very likely: and had those gentlemen devoted much of their time to science
we should never have heard of their blunders—or of their pictures either.—
*Educational Reformers, pp. 235, 236.*

Page 77—*Hugh Miller* (Scotch, 1802-1856), was among the most remarkable of self-taught men of genius. At 13 he was an incorrigible truant, and the schoolmaster thought he would grow up a dunce. But he had a great fancy for authorship, and became a stone-mason that he might have the unemployed winter time for literary composition. Under the discipline of labor, the refractory schoolboy became a sober-minded man. After his marriage he got employment in a bank, but after a pamphlet-letter to Lord Brougham in 1839 had made him famous, he became an editor of *The Witness*, of Edinburgh, which position he held until his death, which occurred from a pistol-shot from his own hand, while crazed from overwork. His autobiographical "My Schools and Schoolmasters" ranks among the masterpieces of its kind in English literature, but he is best known for his contributions to geology.

Page 80—*The beautiful economy of Nature.*—Prof. W. H. Payne says:

The whole school of educational writers of which Mr. Spencer is the representative are accustomed to resort to the myth "Nature," whenever their favorite theses cannot be supported by legitimate argument. The existing order of things is personified under the term "Nature," and then this "Nature" is assumed to be a sort of goddess who administers all the affairs of terrestrial existence with incomparable accuracy and wisdom; and then the validity of any assumption is established by showing that it conforms to a so-called "Order of Nature." In the case under consideration the authority of "Nature" is quoted as a sufficient ground for a very large assumption—"the beautiful economy of Nature" constrains us to
believe that studies that are most valuable for use are also the most valuable for discipline.

Naville, in his "Logique de l'Hypothèse," finely ridicules the easy resort to authority as follows: "Aristotle teaches that the sun is incorruptible. At the time when the discovery of spots on the sun began to circulate, a student called the attention of his old professor to the matter, and received the following reply: "My friend, I have read Aristotle twice from beginning to end, and I know there can be no spots on the sun. Wipe your lenses better. If the spots are not in your telescope, they must be in your eyes!" Is it any more absurd to quote the dictum of Aristotle in questions of physical science than an assumed "Order of Nature" in questions of educational science? It may fairly be counted a standing wonder that a philosopher of this day still adheres to a mode of philosophizing that has long since been abandoned by all reputable scientists. It is only in educational science that the mediaeval logic is still in full force.

"The beautiful economy of Nature!" that were finely said by a satirist. To succeed in raising one plant from the sowing of a thousand seeds; to choke the growth of a wholesome plant by a wilderness of noxious weeds; to abandon a crop of promising fruit to a horde of ravenous bugs; to carry off a score of robust children by infection from insidious disease-germs—such is "the beautiful economy of Nature"!—Contributions, pp. 43, 44. See also pp. 140-156.

Prof. Joseph Payne in his Lectures points out six reasons why Nature's teaching is not to be implicitly followed.

1. Nature's teaching is desultory. She minglest lessons in physics, language, morality, all together. Her main business seems to be the training of faculty, and she subordinates to this the orderly acquisition of knowledge by her pupils. We are to imitate Nature in training faculty, but with a definite aim as regards subjects.

2. Nature's teaching is often inaccurate; not, however, from any defect in her method, but from inherited defects in her pupils. If she has not originally given a sound brain, she does not generally herself improve upon her handiwork. The impressions received by a feeble brain become blurred, imperfect conceptions, and nature often leaves them so. It is the educator's business, however, to endeavor to improve upon her labors,—to ascertain the original fault, and by apt exercises to amend it.

3. Nature's teaching often appears to be overdone. She gives ten thousand
exercises to develop faculty, but she continues to give them when that purpose is answered. The educator is to imitate her in very frequently repeating his lessons, but to cease when the object is gained.

4. *Nature does not secure the results of her lessons with a direct aim to mental and moral improvement.* She exercises various powers to a certain extent and with certain objects; but she does not prompt to their improvement beyond this point, nor exercise them equally upon objects unconnected with animal wants and instincts. We are to imitate *Nature* in gaining such results for our pupils as she gains, but we are to go beyond her in securing these results as a means to the attainment of a higher platform of knowledge and power.

5. *Nature accustoms her pupils to little, and that the simplest, generalization.* For any care that she takes, the materials suitable for this process may remain unquickened throughout the whole of a man's life. The educator is to imitate *Nature* in prompting his pupils to generalize on facts; but to surpass her in carrying them forward in practice.

6. *Nature is relentless in her discipline.* She takes no account of extenuating circumstances. To disobey is to die. She not only punishes the offender for his offence, but often makes him suffer for the offences of others. She involves him in all the consequences of his actions, and often gives him no opportunity for repentance. The educator, on the other hand, while allowing his pupil to be visited by the consequences of his actions, is to prevent ruinous consequences—to give him room for repentance, to love the offender while punishing the offence, and to allow for extenuating circumstances.

*Nature*'s teaching, then, while in general the model of the educator's, requires adaptation, extension, and correction, in order to make the best use of it. The old adage, "Art improves *Nature,"" applies undoubtedly to the art of education: a truth which even Pestalozzi—certainly himself a choice specimen of *Nature*'s teaching, a head boy in her school—failed, as we shall see, to appreciate.—*Syracuse edition*, pp. 93, 94.

On the other hand, M. Compayré says:

Mr. Spencer is to be commended for having shown that for moral education as for intellectual education, the method which approaches nature the nearest is also the best. The return to nature which was the characteristic of Rousseau's theories and of Pestalozzi's practice, is also the dominant trait of Mr. Spencer's pedagogy.

If we look closely into the matter, this decided purpose to follow nature
implicates something besides the superficial condemnation of methods introduced by art and human device. It supposes a fundamental belief,—the belief in the beneficent purpose of natural instincts. To have confidence in nature, to fall back on the spontaneous forces of the soul, because we discern behind them or in them a higher providence or an internal foresight, is a belief generally useful and suggestive for conducting human affairs, but particularly necessary for directing the education of man. It is not without some surprise that we discover this belief at the basis of Mr. Spencer's pedagogy, as though, by a contradiction which is not new, the evolutionist philosophy, which seems to exclude final causes from the conception of the universe, had been practically constrained to bow before them, and to proclaim, at least in the matter of education, the salutary efficacy of the theory which admits them.— *History of Pedagogy*, pp. 553, 554.

Page 80— *The Red Indian and the Bushman.*—Prof. W. H. Payne says:

Now a few words as to the Red Indian, the Bushman, and the accountant. Whatever proof there is in these illustrations is evidently of this sort: for his guidance, the Indian needs agility and swiftness, and these endowments are best secured by the actual pursuit of animals; what the Bushman needs for his guidance is telescopic vision, and this is best acquired by obeying the needs of his daily life; the accountant needs the ability of rapid computation, and the stress of his daily life forces this ability upon him. When generalized, the thought takes this form: the stress of one's environment begets the very power that is needed to support the conditions of that environment.

Mr. Spencer's theory of education values is in perfect accord with his philosophy. The Red Indian for example, was evolved out of certain fixed conditions, and, if he is to remain a Red Indian (as by the new philosophy he ought), he must in no respect transcend his environment. He must support existence in the spot where fate planted him, and just the guidance he needs for this purpose is best gained in his predetermined struggle for existence. Any greater power would be useless, and any new endowment would unfit him for the place to which "Nature" had assigned him. All the walks of life furnish illustrations of Mr. Spencer's meaning. Each man is predetermined to follow some craft; and the endowment he needs for this purpose is best acquired by devoting himself to the duties of his craft. For example, the comfort of the tailor requires him to be bow-legged, and
the practice of his art tends to make him bow-legged. Under this conception, it must be granted that "the education of most value for guidance must, at the same time, be the education of most value for discipline."

But there is a different conception of human destiny, and this involves a different theory of education values. The principal elements in this other conception are as follows: (1) Man is not the passive victim of his environment, but has such power of modification and control as either to transcend that environment or virtually to recreate it. (2) Man is a member of the human race, rather than of a caste, and he is predetermined to an upward growth towards the highest type of his kind. (3) Education is not fate, but is a process of growth, modified, controlled, and perfected by human art. (4) The main purpose of education is to permit the individual to participate in the conscious life of the race.

On these grounds we object to Mr. Spencer's treatment of the Red Indian, the Bushman, and the accountant. The first need of the Indian and the Bushman in particular, is to become men; and for this purpose there should be considerably less activity in the lines of swiftness, agility, and telescopic vision; and considerably more in the lines of ploughing, building, and thinking. Abilities not given by "Nature" should be created by human art. This "Nature" should not dominate over man, but should be subjugated by man. Even the accountant deserves better treatment than Mr. Spencer prescribes for him. He should aspire to something better than "to add up several columns of figures simultaneously." He is a man by better right than he is a machine, and, as such, he may even learn to philosophize; but for this purpose, he has need of a discipline quite different from that which will merely furnish him with the guidance required by an accountant. When we consider the requirements of a liberal education, or that course of training which will raise a human being from the bondage of "Nature" up towards the typical man, it is not true that the practical value of a study is identical with its disciplinary value. On the contrary, it is much nearer the truth to assert that these two values are in an inverse ratio to each other, or that a subject that is most valuable for maintaining the struggle for existence is least valuable for purposes of human culture.

* * * Arithmetic and history furnish examples of my statement. To be intensely practical to the business man, arithmetic should be taught as a system of rules, or better still, as a manipulation of tables, as in the case cited; the nearer an accountant approaches an arithmetical machine the
more rapidly and the more surely can he do his specific tasks. To be mindful of the rationale of processes would sadly hamper Mr. Spencer's accountant.

"The centipede was happy quite,
Until the toad in fun
Asked, 'Pray, which leg comes after which?'
Which worked her mind to such a pitch,
She lay distracted in a ditch,
Considering how to run."*

Now arithmetic, taught in this mechanical way, while having a high value for guidance, has almost no value whatever for discipline; while arithmetic, taught as a science, has a very high value as a specific discipline, but has a much lower practical value than in the previous case. It is a fact of common observation that a pupil well taught in the science of arithmetic cannot compete with the merchant's or the grocer's clerk in rapid and accurate computation. Plato was at least instinctively right in declaring that, for purposes of a liberal education, arithmetic should not be cultivated "with a view to buying and selling, as merchants or shopkeepers."—*Contributions, pp. 44-47, 62.*

Page 84—The moral powers.—Here M. Compayré protests:

That science develops the intellectual qualities, such as judgment, memory, reasoning, we admit; that it develops them better than the study of the languages, let even this be granted! But it is impossible for us not to protest when Mr. Spencer represents science as endowed with the same efficacy for inspiring moral qualities, such as perseverance, sincerity, activity, resignation to the will of nature, piety even, and religion. Science appears to us an infallible means of animating and exciting the different energies of the soul; but will it also have the quality of disciplining them? Thanks to science, man will know that which it is proper to do, if he wishes to be a workman, a parent, or a citizen, but on this express condition, that he wills; and this education of the will, is it still science which shall be charged with it? We may be allowed to doubt it.

Mr. Spencer himself now seems to share this doubt, if we may trust one of his recent works.† "Faith in books and in nature," it is there said, "is one of the superstitions of our times." We deceive ourselves, says the

*Quoted from "The Universities, in their Relation to the Training of Teachers", by Rev. H. Quick.
† Introduction to Social Science, p. 390.
author, when we establish a connection between the intelligence and the will, for conduct is determined not by knowledge but by emotion.

"He who would hope to teach geometry by giving lessons in Latin, would scarcely be more unreasonable than those who count on producing better sentiments by means of a discipline of the intellectual faculties."—
*History of Pedagogy*, p. 547.

Page 92—*The chapter as a whole.*—Of this Prof. W. H. Payne says:

The worth of knowledge is tested solely by the practical use that can be made of it; a child must be taught that which will soonest and most effectually convert him into an instrument. In no part of this famous chapter do I discover a sentence that can be interpreted in favor of a liberal education; that is, of an education that is catholic and humane, or that is to be administered on the hypothesis that the child's humanity takes precedence of his functions as an instrument. On this subject Renan speaks as follows:

"The reasoning that I oppose starts from the low and false doctrine that instruction serves only for the practical use that is made of it.... The poor man should be ignorant, for education and knowledge are useless to him. Blasphemy, gentlemen! The culture of the mind and soul are duties for every man. They are not simply ornaments. They are things as sacred as religion."*—*Contributions*, p. 245.

Prof. Joseph Payne says:

After all, however, it will be observed that, while the study of the physical sciences tends to give power over the material forces of the universe, it leaves untouched the greater forces of the human heart; it makes a botanist, a geologist, an electrician, an architect, an engineer, but it does not make a man. The hopes, the fears, the hatreds and the loves, the emotions which stir us to heroic action, the reverence which bows in the presence of the inexpressibly good and great; the sensitive moral taste, which shrinks from vice and approves virtue; the sensitive mental taste which appreciates the sublime and beautiful in art, and sheds delicious tears over the immortal works of genius—all this wonderful world of sensation and emotion lies outside that world which is especially cultivated by the physical sciences. This is no argument, of course, against their forming a proper, nay an

*"La Famille et l'État,"* p. 3.
essential, part of the curriculum, but it is an argument against their taking the first place.—*Lectures, Small's edition, p. 261.*

And again:

I think that his main argument involves a fundamental fallacy. Stated briefly it is this, that as the function which education has to discharge is how to prepare us for complete living, the child ought even while yet a child to learn everything which may conduce to the end. It would be easy to show from the manner in which the organism gradually acquires its powers, that it is quite impossible to comply with this demand. The growing mind, for instance, is utterly incapable of learning—*i. e.*, so as to know—the immense number of subjects necessary by the theory for complete living; and even if it were capable of getting a smattering of universal knowledge, such a knowledge would not be a preparation for complete living. It is quite extraordinary that Mr. Spencer, who shows us in his second essay how well he appreciates the problem of intellectual education, did not perceive that such education is directly opposed by its very nature, to the theory that the attempt to grasp universal knowledge is the same thing as a preparation for complete living.—*Lectures on the History of Education, p. 185.*

Prof. Williams says:

On a closer examination of this famous chapter, philosophical though its analysis appears, strongly as its conclusions seem to be enforced, and convincing as its argument is likely to impress one as being on a cursory reading,—it is sure to rouse in the critical reader a feeling that something essential is lacking, that there is some latent source of error in the discussion.

A critical examination shows that the source of error is twofold, being first, an imperfect view of what constitutes complete living; and second, a temporary massing together under the vague name science, of subjects generically unlike in character, omitting only from this heterogeneous mass a group of subjects whose use especially characterizes man, and is both the symbol and the instrument of his superiority among living beings: for man is not merely an observing, thinking, morally judging, and religiously aspiring animal; but he is all these, and that too in a constantly increasing degree, because he is also a talking animal, who uses language as the embodiment of his various experiences and is thus enabled to grow more intelligent by his experiences.—*History of Modern Education, p. 246.*
Montaigne.—Michael Eyquem de Montaigne (French, 1533–1592), in his brilliant "Essays" founded the school of thinkers on education of which Locke and Rousseau were afterward the great exponents. In teaching languages he would discard grammar and teach by conversation. He insisted upon physical education. "We have not to train up a soul, nor yet a body, but a man; and we cannot divide him." Put in the shortest form, Montaigne's idea of the end of education is, that a man should be trained to the use of his own reason. "A man can never be wise save by his own wisdom." The key-notes to his method are these:—self-activity of the pupil in the use of all his powers and capabilities; things before words; judgment and understanding before memory; adaptation of instruction to the pupil's present abilities. Like Milton and Locke, he dealt only with the education of gentlemen.

Battersea Training School.—This school in London was founded as a private enterprise in 1839 by James Phillip Kay (afterward Sir James Kay Shuttleworth), secretary of the Committee of Council on Education, and E. C. Tunfel, in order to train teachers for charitable and reformatory institutions. In 1843 it came under management of the National Society. It was conducted on principles derived from Pestalozzi and De Fellenberg, "to reconcile a simplicity of life not remote from the habits of the humbler classes, with such proficiency in intellectual attainments, such a knowledge of method, and such skill in the art of teaching, as would enable the pupils selected to become
efficient masters of elementary schools." The diet was frugal, the pupils did all the housework, a garden was cultivated, gymnastics was introduced, and long walks were taken. See Barnard, ix. 170-200.

Page 102—Marcel.—Claude Marcel (French, 1793-1876), was one of Napoleon's soldiers. From 1825 to 1863 he lived in Cork, being French consul after 1848; and there he was the exclusive teacher of his nine children. In 1865 he returned to Paris, where he became an influential member of the society for elementary instruction, and was made chevalier of the legion of honor. His "Language as a Means of Mental Culture" appeared in two volumes in 1853, and is among the most rare and most valuable of pedagogic treatises. Quick summarizes his treatise thus:

Marcel's notion of education is three-fold, viz., Physical, Intellectual, and Moral Education; the 1st aiming at health, strength, and beauty; the 2nd at mental power and the acquisition of knowledge; the 3rd at piety, justice, goodness, and wisdom. According to him the Creator has made the exercise of our faculties pleasurable.

Prof. Joseph Payne says of Marcel's book: *

A work of conspicuous excellence on the whole art of teaching, and well deserving to be reprinted.

Other references to Marcel will be found on pp. 104, 106, 108, 131, 158.

Page 102—Wyse.—Sir Thomas Wyse (English, 1801-?) was chairman of committees of the Central Society of Education, which issued in 1837, 1838, and 1849 three "Publications", made up of papers by members. Those of Mr. Wyse were: in the "First Publication", "Education in the United Kingdom" (pp. 27-64); in the "Second Publication", "On the Lyceum System in America" (pp. 203-228); and in the "Third Publication", "On the present State of Prussian Education" (pp. 375-

* Lectures, Syracuse edition, p. 120.
The article on Geometry from which this extract is taken will be found in Barnard xiii. 383. Mr. Spencer makes another reference to Wyse on page 108.

Page 104—De Morgan.—Augustus De Morgan (English, 1806-1871) was fourth wrangler at Cambridge, and first professor of mathematics in University College, which chair he held till death except from 1831 to 1836. His works on mathematics and allied subjects are standard.

Page 107—Pestalozzi.—Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (Swiss, 1746-1827), known as the founder of "object-teaching", is the most celebrated of educational reformers. He was a lonely child, and grew up with excitable feelings and a lively imagination which prevented circumspection and forethought. He failed as a clergyman, failed as a schoolmaster, but was unexpectedly successful as an author, his "Leonard and Gertrude" (1781) making him famous, afterward followed by "How Gertrude teaches her Children". After the French revolution, his friends came into power, and asked him what post he would accept. He replied, "I want to be a schoolmaster." So in 1798 he was sent to Stanz to care for orphan children, removing in 1799 to Burgdorf, and in 1805 to Yverdun, where his school gained a European reputation. Pupils flocked to it, and his fame attracted many distinguished visitors. His life by De Guimps is one of the most interesting of biographies. Other references to him will be found on pp. 113, 127, 128, 161.

Page 120—Rediscovery.—Mr. W. H. Payne devotes chapter v. of his "Contributions" to a refutation of this theory of Mr. Spencer. He says:
Mr. Spencer attributes the enunciation of this doctrine to Comte, though Condillac had previously drawn up a scheme of education avowedly based on this assumed principle.

Mr. Spencer's proof of this doctrine is to this effect: what is true of the aggregate must be true of each of the units comprising the aggregate; the race acquired its knowledge in a certain way, and therefore each individual of the race must acquire his knowledge in the same way. The word Must, in Mr. Spencer's thought, at once involves us in a curious dilemma. Had he said Should, or Ought, we might be forewarned against an error; but if it be true that there is but one way in which the individual can gain his knowledge, as Mr. Spencer declares, then error is impossible; the current mode of acquisition is the normal mode, and to preach a reform in this particular is an inexcusable waste of breath. But, as a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer prescribes a radical reform; it follows, therefore, that the genesis of knowledge in the individual need not of necessity be the same as the genesis of knowledge in the race. The only form in which the question can be discussed is this: Should the individual gain his knowledge in the same way in which the race as a whole gained its knowledge? * * *

It will be granted that in knowledge, as in wealth, the race has made progress from age to age, and even from generation to generation. Now progress is possible only under this condition: inheritance supplemented by individual acquisition.* Without inheritance there can be no progress; for then, each generation must start where the preceding generation started. And progress is quite as impossible without individual acquisition; for in this case each generation would stop where the preceding generation stopped.—Contributions, pp. 87-89.

M. Compayré remarks:

There is, doubtless, an element of truth in the error of Condillac. The sciences and the arts began with the observation of particulars, and thence slowly rose to general principles; and to-day no one thinks of denying the necessity of proceeding in the same manner in education, so far as this is possible. It is well at the first to present facts to the child, and to lead him step by step, from observation to observation, to the law which governs

* "The science of humanity, like humanity, ought to be progressive; and there is progress only on two conditions: first, to represent all one's predecessors; then, to be one's self, to sum up all anterior labors, and to add to them."—Cousin, "History of Modern Philosophy" (New York, 1869), i., p. 212.
them and includes them; but there is a wide distance between the discreet use of the inductive and experimental method, and the exaggerations of Condillac. No one should seriously think of absolutely suppressing the synthetic method of exposition, which, taking advantage of the work accomplished through the centuries, teaches at the outset the truths that have been already acquired. It would be absurd to compel the child painfully to recommence the toil of the race.—History of Pedagogy, p. 313.

Page 120—Comte.—Auguste Comte (French, 1795 ?-1857), whom G. H. Lewes considers the Bacon of the 19th century, began his bold speculations at fourteen, and in 1826 nearly died of overwork. In 1832 he was made professor of mathematics at the Ecole Polytechnique, but in 1852 was obliged to resign on account of differences with his colleague. His "positive philosophy" claims that man passes through three stages: 1st, the theological, in which a supernatural origin is sought for all phenomena; 2d, the metaphysical, in which the sensuously supernatural is set aside as incredible; 3d, the positive, in which the mind gives up the inquiry into causes and essences, and concerns itself with the laws of phenomena.

Page 125—Study made pleasurable.—On this point Prof. W. H. Payne says:

The latest criterion for judging of the quality of teaching is the amount of pleasure-giving that it furnishes. While no one questions that good teaching will inspire a general air of happiness, there are very many who insist that work is not always pleasure-giving, but that even such work must be done in every good school. This is a psychological problem of no great difficulty, and its solution would set at rest a disputed question of great importance. It will probably be found that a study may be disagreeable because it involves a mode of mental activity that has never been developed or that has fallen into disuse; and so the study may serve a far better purpose than one that accords with the free working of a well-developed power. The distribution of mental aliment follows the same law as the distribution of physical aliment: the more vigorous faculty or organ will take the lion's share, while the weaker faculty or organ will be left to starve.
We know that this is a law even of the spiritual life: "For he that hath, to him shall be given; and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath."—Contributions, p. 28.

Prof. Joseph Payne says:

The apt teacher, however, succeeds, not by amusing his pupil, but by sympathizing with him and thus gaining his confidence—by understanding and entering into his difficulties—by encouraging him with word or look, when he is puzzled,—never intruding help when it is not needed, never withholding it when it is.—Lectures, Boston edition, p. 273.

But M. Compayré says:

Children of every age are jealous of their independence and eager for pleasure. No one before Locke had so clearly recognized the need of the activity and liberty which are natural to the child, or so strongly insisted on the necessity of respecting his independent disposition and his personal tastes. Here again English pedagogy of the seventeenth century meets its illustrious successor of the nineteenth. Herbert Spencer has thoroughly demonstrated the fact that the mind really appropriates only the knowledge that affords it pleasure and agreeable exercise.—History of Pedagogy, pp. 206, 207.

And Mr. Quick speaks with emphasis:

But the present dullness of school-work is not without its defenders. They insist on the importance of breaking in the mind to hard work. This can only be done, they say, by tasks which are only repulsive to it. The school-boy does not like, and ought not to like, learning Latin grammar any more than the colt should find pleasure in running round in a circle: the very fact that these things are not pleasant makes them beneficial. Perhaps a certain amount of such training may train down the mind and qualify it for some drudgery from which it might otherwise revolt; but if this result is attained, it is attained at the sacrifice of the intellectual activity which is necessary for any higher function. As Carlyle says, when speaking of routine work generally, you want nothing but a sorry nag to draw your sand-cart; your high-spirited Arab will be dangerous in such a capacity. But who would advocate for all colts a training which should render them fit for nothing but such humble toil? I have spoken elsewhere on this subject, and here I will merely express my strong conviction that boys' minds are frequently dwarfed, and their interest in intellectual pursuits blighted,
by the practice of employing the first years of their school life in learning by heart things which it is quite impossible for them to understand or care for. Teachers set out by assuming that little boys can not understand anything, and that all we can do with them is to keep them quiet and cram them with forms which will come in useful at a later age. When the boys have been taught on this system for two or three years, their teacher complains that they are stupid and inattentive, and that so long as they can say a thing by heart they never trouble themselves to understand it. In other words, the teacher grumbles at them for doing precisely what they have been taught to do, for repeating words without any thought of their meaning. * * * It would be a great step in advance if teachers in general were as dissatisfied with themselves as they usually are with their pupils.—*Educational Reformers, pp. 252, 253.

Page 126—*Fellenberg.*—Philip Emanuel von Fellenberg (Swiss, 1771-1844) studied law at Tübingen, and afterward made a walking-tour in southern Europe, taking quarters in the cottages of the peasantry, that he might know at first hand the real condition and the manners of the poor, and the education of the agricultural peasantry. He took some part in the French Revolution, but in 1799 he purchased the estate of Hofwyl, near Bern, and in 1804 founded an asylum for forsaken children. In 1807 he opened a school of agriculture; in 1808 a philanthropin, or, school for children of the higher classes; in 1830 a real school for children of the middle classes, and afterward an infant school and normal classes. He aimed to make agriculture the basis of a new system "for elevating the lower and rightly training the higher orders of the State, and welding them together in a closer union." He considered the school self-supporting through the manual labor of the pupils, and it became
famous. In 1804 and in 1817 Pestalozzi was for a time associated with him, and Herbart was at one time employed as a teacher.

Page 133—Names of the attributes.—Prof. Joseph Payne says:

Is it not singular that so ingenious a man does not see that this process, which he lauds so highly, is only a sensible way of teaching, not science merely, but the mother tongue? The teacher is trying to get the pupil to attach clear ideas to the use of words; and while professing to despise the teaching of words, is in reality doing little else; for words are, in a well understood sense, the depositories of the knowledge, spirit and wisdom of a nation. I am perfectly aware that the pupil, while thus engaged, is learning much more than mere words; but I maintain that he is also learning words while he is learning things, and that the antithesis so much insisted on is more specious than real.—Lectures, Small's edition, p. 258.

Page 136—Bacon.—Francis Bacon (English, 1521–1626) was a precocious child, and entered Cambridge at 13. After study in Paris he practised law, and began to advance rapidly about 1603, becoming attorney-general in 1613, keeper of the great seal in 1617, and lord chancellor in 1619, with the title Baron Verulam. (He was never Lord Bacon.) But he used this last office corruptly, and in 1621 was convicted on his own confession, and banished from public life. Though he was mean in character, he was magnificent in intellect. His "Essays" appeared in 1597, his "Advancement of Learning" in 1605, his Novum Organon" in 1620. "By recalling the minds of men from barren speculation, and from exclusive humanistic study, to the relief of man's estate through the investigation of nature by exact observation and rigorous experiment leading to induction of her laws, he added an entire pedagogy and new realm of profitable study."
Horace Mann.—(American, 1796–1859), was the most eminent and successful pro-
moter of popular education of his time. As lawyer, statesman, and
philanthropist he had achieved considerable reputation, when in
1837 he became secretary of the newly-established Board of Edu-
cation of Massachusetts. He held this position for 12 years, working
16 hours a day. He made use mainly of three agencies: (1) a
series of teacher's institutes; (2) a monthly Common School Jour-
nal; and (3) a wide circulation of his Annual School Reports to the
Board of Education, which still rank as among the best of educa-
tional literature. In 1843, he visited Europe, and his compar-
sions in his 7th report led to a heated controversy with the masters
of the Boston schools. In 1848 he resigned to become United
States Senator, and in 1854 he became president of Antioch Col-
lege, where he remained till his death.

Page 161—Pillans.—James Pillans (Scotch, 1779–1865) after
graduation from Edinburgh taught for a time at Eton, and in
1809 became rector of the high school of Edinburgh, where he
was so successful that foreigners came to that city to visit his
classes. He used to say that he was never perfectly happy except
when teaching. In 1820 he became professor of humanity in
the university, retiring in 1863 at the ripe age of 84. He took
great interest in national education, and was one of the first to
advocate governmental inspection of schools, and the establish-
ment of normal schools. His principal writings on education
were gathered in 1856 into a volume called "Contributions to the
Cause of Education".
Page 162—*The chapter as a whole.*—Prof. Joseph Payne says:

The second essay, on "Intellectual Education", is most excellent. Most of what Mr. Spencer says on this point is in perfect accordance with the doctrines I have set before you in my lectures, though I have arrived at them by an entirely different course of inquiry. *Lectures on the History of Education,* p. 186.

Mr. Quick says:

These principles are, perhaps, not all of them unassailable, and even where they are true, many mistakes must be expected before we arrive at the best method of applying them: but the only reason that can be assigned for the small amount of influence they have hitherto exercised is, that most teachers are as ignorant of them as of the abstrusest doctrines of Kant and Hegel. *Educational Reformers,* p. 250.

Page 165—*The culmination of education.*—Prof. S. S. Laurie says:

We cannot, of course, teach boys and girls at school how to discharge their duties as parents at the school age; such instructions could have no link of association with the knowledge and experience of the boy and girl, and would, therefore, be wholly futile. We teach children these their future duties when they grow to be men and women, by being ourselves an example to them which they will remember and imitate; nothing in education is so potent as tradition early received. But when Spencer suggests that the education of young men and women should culminate in the study of education—that is to say, of moral education—I think he gives utterance to a novel idea which is not to be set hastily aside because of its novelty. Perhaps it will one day be accepted as a truism—at least as regards young women. *Educational Review,* iv. 485.

Page 172—*Proximate aim.*—Prof. Laurie says:

The proximate end as conceived by Mr. Spencer has its value, but as an educational end it is contemptible, and would take the heart out of any teacher worth his salt. There is such a conception as that of the ideal man; that is to say, the man to whom the great ethical ideas of justice, benevolence, integrity, purity, and so forth, are a sacred possession, and who strives daily to make them the guide of his conduct, though they may often lead him to suffering, nay, sometimes to death. No man succeeds
perfectly; but, that each may be even such as he is, it is necessary that he strive after something higher than his actual attainment. In the idea resides the imperative moral law, and it is this the true man would fain, by God's help, fulfil. The fulfilment of the law in the idea is the spiritual life—the true life of a rational spirit; all else is life inadequate and imperfect. This true life is, for each, simply the completion of himself as man. All created things tend, unconsciously or consciously, through the forces within them, to their own fulfilment or completion, while the self-conscious man purposely endeavors to realize that fulfilment in himself, if he is to be truly man. This I submit, is the true doctrine; and it is to this we have to educate children and youths. It is also, substantially at least, the doctrine of Plato, Aristotle, and the New Testament.—Educational Review, iv. 486, 487.

Page 210—Locke.—John Locke (English, 1632-1704), long celebrated as a philosopher, has exerted wide influence on educational history through his "Thoughts concerning Education", and in a much smaller degree by his essay on "Studies". He thinks education consists in 1st, virtue; 2d, wisdom; 3d, good-breeding; and 4th and last, learning. "Not but that I think learning a great help to well-disposed minds; but yet it must be confessed that in others not so disposed it helps them only to be more foolish or worse men." Wisdom is a blending of prudence, foresight, knowledge of the world, and ability in affairs, with an aversion to mere cunning. Locke strenuously objects to frequent resorts to the rod. "In all the parts of education, most time and application is to be bestowed on that which is like to be of greatest consequence and frequentest use." Quick says it may be doubted whether we have yet reached the full application of his principles.
Page 210—Punishment by consequences.—M. Compayré remarks:

Mr. Spencer's principle is excellent, but the opportunities for applying it are far less frequent than our philosopher believes. The child, in most cases, is too little reflective, too little reasonable, to comprehend, and especially to heed, the suggestions of personal interest.

Let us add that this principle is wholly negative, that it furnishes at most only the means of shunning evil; that even in according to it an efficacy it does not have, it would still be necessary to reproach it with narrowing moral culture by reducing it to the rather mean solicitude for simple utility; finally, that it exercises no influence on the development of the positive virtues, on the disinterested education of morality in what is noble and exalted.

Finally, the system of natural punishments would incur the danger of often being cruel, and of causing the child an irreparable injury. Let pass the pin-cushion, the boiling water, and the candle-flame,—examples which Mr. Spencer proposes; but what shall we say of the bar of red-hot iron which he lets the child pick up? What shall be said, above all, of the grave consequences entailed by the faults of a young man left to himself?

"Would it not be," says Gréard justly, "to condemn the child to a régime so severe as to be an injustice, to count solely on the effects of natural reactions and inevitable consequences, for the purpose of disciplining his will? The penalty which they provoke is the most often enormous as compared with the fault which has produced them, and man himself demands for his conduct other sanctions than those of a harsh reality. He desires that we judge the intention as well as the fact; that he be commended for his efforts; that in the first instance extreme measures be not taken against him; that the blow fall on him if needs be, but without crushing him, and while extending to him a hand to help him up." *—History of Pedagogy, pp. 552, 553.

E. E. White points out† that in discussing punishment by natural consequences Mr. Spencer does not recognize the obvious limitation of insubordination or rebellion.

Mr. Laurie says:

* See the Esprit de discipline dans l'éducation, a memoir of Gréard published in the Revue Pédagogique, 1883, No. 11.
† School Management, p. 207.
Now we accept this. In our case, however, the consequences of misconduct are the inner pain of sentiment ignored, of a foregone ideal, of a broken law, of an outraged nature; and in the case of the young, the pain of the disapprobation of teachers and parents, as embodying for the young the ideal and the law. Material consequences may or may not follow—that is to say, the punishment of the body in various ways, direct and indirect, positive and negative, whether they should ever follow is one of the debated questions. * * *

If I amuse myself by sticking a pin into my leg I feel pain, and I seek some other amusement in future. There is here a "natural reaction"—that is to say, nature instantaneouslypunishes an infraction of nature's laws. Spencer's main proposition, then, as regards method of moral training, is, let the reaction of nature take place. Now, it is not morally wrong to stick a pin into my leg. It is a physical miscalculation. Mr. Spencer confounds moral and emotional with purely physical reactions. When a little boy, in his anger, smashes his mother's best china-bowl, the natural reaction is a feeling of great satisfaction. When he burns his catechism in the hope of so ending a painful series of daily lessons, the flames are less bright and joyous than those that blaze up in his own heart. This is the natural reaction. Then, again, when he climbs a tree, and falls and breaks a leg, the natural reaction of his being such a goose as to lose hold of one footing before he has secured the next, is manifest. He has broken a physical law, but not a moral law, and must take the physical consequences. If he has taken firm hold, and secures the object of his ambition—the thrush's nest—and sells the eggs for 6d. a piece, he now enjoys the natural reaction, as before he suffered from it. It is quite clear from these illustrations that "natural reactions" are outside the moral sphere altogether, and that, if there be anything immoral in his act, it must arise in some other way. In what way? It arises from the fact that he has broken a moral law; and that moral law can only be the command of his parents and teachers. What, then, is the natural reaction? Spencer gets so muddled over his natural reactions that he begins, toward the end of this chapter, to see that he is somehow wrong, and says that the disapprobation of the parent or teacher is itself a "natural reaction". Here he is at last on the right scent. But what becomes of his original "natural" reaction? The natural reactions he has been talking of are the reactions of nature in the sense of physical laws. He would now include the parent's disapprobation under the same head, using the word
"natural" in the vulgar sense of what might be "reasonably expected to follow." I see my boy in the tree where he has been told not to go. Am I cunningly to shake it that it may cause him to fall and break his leg, and so facilitate the natural reaction? What natural reaction—the reaction of physical law or of moral law? Is this to be his punishment, a fall that breaks his leg and to which I have cunningly contributed? I think not. The parent who did it would soon be in the hands of the police.

In fact, the much-landed doctrine of natural reactions, in the sense of reactions of physical law, carries us a very little way indeed. At best it is a physical reaction to a breach of physical law. We are compelled from the first to consider moral reactions for moral offences, and let the physical blunders correct themselves, after we have given due warning.

It is evident enough that, following the rule of natural reactions without considering moral elements, we should constantly be led into blunders. When a boy breaks a wineglass through carelessness, we might say that he should be required to replace it; but "nature" does not require this, and to insist on it would be unjust. If he is the son of poor parents, and makes great efforts to economize, with a view to replacing it, he does so because of his feeling of sympathy with his parents in their loss, and of vexation with himself, as having inadvertently caused a loss. The replacement, then, is a moral act pure and simple, and has nothing to do with nature's reactions. If, again, he has broken a glass intentionally, in order to pay his parents out for some imaginary injustice, there is no natural reaction of replacement, but quite the reverse. He would like to break two glasses. This is the natural reaction; and if I wish to correct the boy, I must first get him to feel what the good boy, who inadvertently broke the glass, felt, and, out of the strength of that feeling, condemn himself, and seek to make restitution. Bentham's recommendation is a sound one, because, among other advantages, it brings in reason and common-sense to control nature's reactions, which are generally irrational. A good thing it is that we have to determine punishments, and not nature; for nature is blind, and stupid, and often cruel. Spencer says that natural reactions are "pure justice". On the contrary, they very seldom are justice at all, if men do not guide and control them. Natural reactions are constantly too slight for the offence, more frequently too grave. Two boys are clambering over a high wall. They have no right to do so, but "boys will be boys," and one falls and breaks his leg: the other falls, and escapes with a slight bruise. Which of
them has been *justly* treated by nature? Both boys will certainly be more careful in future, but the boy who broke his leg will, perhaps, be ever after afraid of high places. This, surely, is an unfortunate result. Courage is a virtue. By over-severity, nature has extinguished the growth of a possible virtue.

I would, in conclusion, point out that Mr. Spencer's method is a method of merely negative training in morality, not a word is said about positive training. Negative training can repress the external exhibition of a vice, while the vice itself may be more deeply rooted than ever. I say there is no positive training to moral ideas, and to a habit of virtue; but with Spencer's moral theory how could there be? That theory is: Do so-and-so or you will suffer; you will get the minimum of pleasure and the maximum of pain, and the maximum of pain *is* vice. Accordingly you cannot train except negatively, if you are to work out this theory consistently. And negative training will produce only negative results.—*Educational Review* iv. 489-491.

Page 215—**Richter.**—Johann Paul Friederich Richter (German, 1763-1825), often referred to as "Jean Paul", came of a race of pedagogues, both his father and grandfather having been schoolmasters. He was himself a teacher, starting in 1789 a school of seven scholars. He was much loved by his pupils, seeking not to instil knowledge but to invoke faculty; to teach, not to preach. He gathered here the ideas for his "Levana", the German representative of "Emile". Richter, like Rousseau, is a sentimentalist, and approaches the problem of education from the emotional rather than the intellectual side, but Richter repudiates Rousseau's careful system. "Levana" is a mighty maze, without a plan, yet with fixed ideas and principles, and a safer guide than "Emile". To educate by illusions
and carefully prepared accidents is futile, he says, for sooner or later the boy will discover the deception.

Page 229—Mr. Kingsley.—Charley Kingsley (English, 1819–1875) after graduation from Cambridge became a clergyman, but soon became known as an author, and as an associate of F. D. Maurice in efforts for bettering the physical and moral condition of the working-classes. In 1860 he was made professor of modern history at Cambridge, in 1869 canon at Chester, and in 1873 canon at Westminster. Among his works are "Alexandria and her Schools" (1854), and "Health and Education" (1874).
# Topical Analysis, for Reviews

## Introduction. Sketch of Spencer's Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION. Sketch of Spencer's Life</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[: ]</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Preface

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PREFACE</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter I. What Knowledge is of Most Worth?</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1. Introduction

- **A. Function subordinated to appearance**
  - Latin and Greek useless
  - Women dress to be admired
  - Their education "accomplishments"
- **B. The ornamental before the useful**
  - 1. Latin and Greek useless
  - 2. Women dress to be admired
  - 3. Their education "accomplishments"
- **C. Social influence the aim**

### D. Comparative Value of Studies

1. The question of relative worth
   - a. Importance of the subject
   - b. The measure of value
     - The problem of right living
2. Importance of right selection of studies
3. Kinds of activity
   - a. Self-preservation
   - b. Self-maintenance
   - c. Parental duties
   - d. Good citizenship
   - e. The refinements of life
4. Due proportion to be maintained
   - a. Intrinsic value
   - b. Quasi-intrinsic value
   - c. Conventional value
   - d. Disciplinary value

(324)
## ii. KNOWLEDGE FOR GUIDANCE

### A. FOR SELF-PRESERVATION
1. Self-preservation an instinct
2. Hygienic knowledge important
   - a. Vigorous health exceptional
   - b. Half of life thrown away
   - c. Physiology all-essential

### B. FOR SELF-Maintenance
1. The business of life
2. Dependent on science
   - a. Mathematics
   - b. Machinery
   - c. Physics
   - d. Chemistry
   - e. Biology
   - f. Sociology
3. Scientific knowledge essential
4. Schools have taught dead formulas

### C. FOR PARENTAL Duties
1. No training for parentage
2. Mischief from parental ignorance
   - a. Physical
   - b. Moral
   - c. Intellectual
     - Books given too soon
     - Observation checked
     - Abstract taught before concrete
     - Rote-learning
3. Parents should be trained for their duties
   - a. Should know physiology and psychology

### D. GOOD CITIZENSHIP
1. History as taught valueless
   - a. Unorganizable facts
   - b. Natural history of society
2. Science the key to history

### E. THE REFINEMENTS OF LIFE
1. The finer enjoyments
   a. Their importance
   b. The root before the blossom
   c. Mistake of modern education
2. Æsthetic accomplishment still based on science
   a. In sculpture
   b. In painting
   c. In music
   d. In poetry
   e. Art based on psychology
   f. Genius married to science
3. Science necessary for appreciation
4. Science itself poetic

iii. KNOWLEDGE FOR DISCIPLINE
   A. Nature consistent
   B. The memory
   C. The judgment
   D. The moral powers
      1. Religious culture
         a. Neglect of science irreligious
         b. True science essentially religious
            Respect for law
            Recognition of the unknowable
   iv. CONCLUSION
      A. Science is of most worth
         1. Strange neglect of it
         2. The Cinderella of our century

Chapter II. INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION

i. INTRODUCTION
   A. The old and the new
      1. In religion
      2. In government
      3. In enjoyment
      4. In trade restrictions
   B. Diversity succeeds uniformity
      1. The decline of authority
C. **The Past and the Present in Education**

1. The text-book period
   a. *First a good animal*
2. Learning by rote
3. Grammar after language
4. Object lessons
   a. *Science from objects*
5. Study pleasurable

D. **Conforming to Nature**

1. Pestalozzi's principle
2. Curriculum dependent on development
   a. *Study must be directed*

E. **The Pestalozzian System**

1. Pestalozzi's character
2. His inconsistencies
   a. *His principles vs. his methods*

ii. **The Theory of Education**

A. **Principles of Education**

1. From simple to complex
2. From concrete to abstract
3. The child learns as the race has learned
4. From empirical to rational
5. Self-development encouraged
6. Study made enjoyable

iii. **The Practice of Education**

A. **Begins in the Cradle**

B. **How Pestalozzi Taught Spelling**

C. **What Psychology Directs**

D. **Object-Lessons**

1. Extended
2. Value of this knowledge

E. **Drawing**

1. Color
2. Geometrical drawing
3. Perspective
F. Primary conceptions of geometry
1. Geometry
   a. Inventional geometry
   b. Rational geometry
G. All education on like principles
iv. Two fundamental principles
  A. Self-evolution
  B. A happy activity
  1. Moral effects
  C. Education never finished

Chapter III. Moral Education
i. Introduction
  A. Preparation for the duties of parents
  B. Unreasoning moral training
  1. Children not born good
  2. Parents usually at fault
  3. Harsh discipline not the best preparation for life
  4. Improvement possible
  5. An ideal standard
ii. General principles
  A. Nature's method
  B. Actions judged by results
  C. Punishment by consequences
  1. Proportionate to transgression
  2. Inevitable
  3. Permanent
  4. Following nature
  5. How different from usual punishments
     a. Methods behind the times
     b. Consequences through the parent
        Illustrations
        The child's litter on the floor
        The child tardy in getting ready for a walk
        The child who breaks or loses his knife
  6. Advantages over usual punishments
     a. Conception of cause and effect
     b. Recognition of justice
### TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TOPICAL ANALYSIS, FOR REVIEWS</strong></td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>c. Avoidance of ill-feeling toward parents</strong></td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>d. Estrangement of parents from children avoided</strong></td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>e. The four advantages summarized</strong></td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>7. More serious misconduct</strong></td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a. Illustrations</strong></td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>8. The relation between parents and children</strong></td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a. Now friend-enemies</strong></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>b. Better recognized friends</strong></td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>c. Advice better than command</strong></td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>9. Grave offences less frequent</strong></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a. Still punishment by consequences</strong></td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Proportionate to existing sympathy</strong></td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Gentleness begets gentleness</strong></td>
<td>209, 318, 319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>iii. MAXIMS AND RULES</strong></td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>A. The child at first a savage</strong></td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>B. Moral precocity detrimental</strong></td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>C. Excess of control</strong></td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1. Parental self-control</strong></td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2. Expression of disapproval</strong></td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>3. Commands only as a last resort</strong></td>
<td>215, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4. But to be rigorously obeyed</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>D. Self-government the aim</strong></td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1. Self-will not deplorable</strong></td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>E. Duties of parents disciplinary</strong></td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>i. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>A. The care of animals</strong></td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>B. Neglect of children's health</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>C. First, a good animal</strong></td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>D. The science of life</strong></td>
<td>229, 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ii. FOOD</strong></td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>A. The quantity of food</strong></td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1. Appetite a good guide</strong></td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>a. Gluttony a consequence of restriction</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>The taste of sweets</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fruit</strong></td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHAPTER IV. PHYSICAL EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>i. INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>225</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. The care of animals</strong></td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>B. Neglect of children's health</strong></td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>C. First, a good animal</strong></td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>D. The science of life</strong></td>
<td>229, 323</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ii. FOOD</th>
<th>230</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>A. The quantity of food</strong></td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Appetite a good guide</strong></td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. Gluttony a consequence of restriction</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The taste of sweets</strong></td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fruit</strong></td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Instinctive wants denied - - - - 245
Natural reaction - - - - 235
b. Parents not infallible - - - - 236

B. The quality of food - - - - 238
1. Children’s diet more nutritive - - - - 239
   a. Man and boy - - - - 239
2. Digestion economized - - - - 241
   a. Vegetarian diet - - - - 242
3. Energy dependent on nutritive food - - - 244
   a. Well-fed races dominant - - - - 235
   b. Effect upon the horse - - - - 246
   c. Effect upon the laborer - - - - 247
4. Variety of food - - - - 248
   a. Change essential - - - - 249
   b. Mixture of food - - - - 250
C. Dyspepsia from low-feeding - - - - 251

iii. CLOTHING - - - - - - 252
A. Scanty clothing - - - - - - 252
1. “Hardening” children - - - - - 253
   a. Exposure at expense of growth - - - - 254
      Shown by scientific exploration - - - - 255
   b. Clothing an equivalent for food - - - - 255
   c. Children must provide double heat - - - - 256
      d. No abiding sensation of cold permitted - - - - 258
B. Clothing too delicate for rough usage - - - - 258
C. Clothing should be warm, woolen, strong - - - - 260

iv. EXERCISE - - - - - - 260
1. For boys - - - - - 260
2. For girls - - - - - 261
   a. Delicate women not attractive - - - - 262
   b. No danger of making women boisterous - - - - 264
   c. Gymnastics inadequate - - - - 265
      d. Happiness a tonic - - - - 266

v. MENTAL STRAIN - - - - - - 267
1. Modern physical inferiority - - - - - 267
2. Produced by mental strain - - - - - 269
   a. Illustrations - - - - - 270
b. In a girls’ school - - - - 272

c. In a normal school - - - - 274

3. As dangerous in youth as in early childhood - - 276

4. Nature’s close account - - - - 277

5. Effects of mental strain - - - - 279
   a. On growth - - - - 279
   b. On the brain - - - - 280
   c. On health - - - - 282
   d. On children - - - - 284

6. Cramming a mistake - - - - 285
   a. Knowledge not acquired - - - - 285
   b. Study distasteful - - - - 285
   c. Thought hampered - - - - 286
   d. Health injured - - - - 286
   e. Unhappiness inevitable - - - - 287
   f. Women made unattractive - - - - 288

vi. CONCLUSION - - - - - 289

   A. Education too entirely mental - - - - 292
   B. Preservation of health a duty - - - - 292

NOTES - - - - - - 295
Biographies of Great Teachers.


Besides the biography of Ascham in full this volume contains selections from “The Scholemaster,” with facsimile of the ancient title-page. We also publish Ascham’s Complete Works in four handsome volumes at $5.00.

From Stanley’s “Life of Arnold” those chapters have been taken which refer to his work as a teacher, and are published without change. Thus the book gives in small compass and at a low price all that is most important in the lives of these two great teachers.

“No better reading could be selected for the teacher, none more stimulating, none more softening, than the lives of these two men, so conspicuous for their achievements as teachers.”—The Evangelist.

2. John Amos Comenius, Bishop of the Moravians; his Life and Educational Works. By S. S. Laurie. 16mo, pp. 232. Manilla, 50 cts.; Cloth, $1.00.


It was this Hartlib to whom Milton addressed his “Small Tractate of Education,” and who brought Comenius to England. He was foremost in educational movements of the time, and this rare volume, of which we purchased the remainder of the edition, is of great value.


Dr. Bell was the founder of the Monitorial System that swept over England and America in the early part of this century, and was at that time the most famous teacher in the world.


C. W. Bardeen, Publisher, Syracuse, N. Y.
John Amos Comenius.


This edition differs from those hitherto published (1) in being indexed by head-lines, (2) in the insertion of five portraits, and (3) in the addition of a bibliography, with fifteen photographic reproductions of pages from early editions of his works. The core of the book is the account of The Great Didactic, pages 73-153, the best treatise on Method ever published, at once broad, sound, suggestive, and practically helpful. As a contribution both to the history of education and to its theories this book occupies a unique place, and is indispensable in even a small library of teachers' books.

2. The Orbis Pictus of John Amos Comenius. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 232. §3.00.

This beautiful volume is a reprint of the English edition of 1727, but with reproduction of the 151 copper-plate illustrations of the original edition of 1658. A copy of the rare original commands a hundred dollars, and this reprint must be considered a most important contribution to pedagogical literature. The Orbis Pictus was not only the first book of object lessons, but the first text-book in general use, and indeed, as the Encyclopædia Britannica states, "the first children's picture-book."

The book is a beautiful piece of work, and in every way superior to most of the fac-similes we have so far been presented with.—N. Y. World.

We welcome this resurrection of the Orbis Pictus, which has lain too long in suspended animation. The master-piece of Comenius, the prince of European educators of the 17th century, was the greatest boon conferred on the little ones in primary schools.—Nation.

The old wood illustrations are reproduced with absolute fidelity by a photographic process, and as the text follows closely letter by letter the old text, the book is substantially a copy of the rare original.—Literary World.


Everyone who feels that he cannot afford that beautiful volume, the Orbis Pictus, should invest a quarter in this, and find out what Comenius did.—Educational Courant.

C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse, N. Y.
John Henry Pestalozzi.

1. **Pestalozzi; his Aim and Work.** By Baron De Guimps. Translated by Margaret Cuthbertson Crombie. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 336. $1.50.

   Among the best books that could be added to the teacher's library.—The Chautauquan, Oct., 1889.

   It is sufficient to say that the book affords the fullest material for a knowledge of the life of the great educational reformer.—Literary World, June 22, 1889.

   The most satisfactory biography of Pestalozzi accessible to English readers.—Wisconsin Journal of Education, Aug., 1889.

   There is not a teacher anywhere who cannot learn something by the perusal of this work.—Science, June 7, 1889.

   The work is a timely reminder how far we have strayed in following the deity of "examination", which should have been kept in its place as the handmaid of education.—The Schoolmaster, London, Feb. 16, 1889.


4. **Lessons in Form, or, an Introduction to Geometry as given in a Pestalozzian School, Cheam, Surrey.** By C. Reiner. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 215. $1.50.

   Both 3 and 4 in one volume, $2.00.

   These works were prepared in 1835 under the supervision of Dr. C. Mayo in the first English Pestalozzian school, and have particular value as representing directly the educational methods of the great reformer.

5. **Object Lessons; or Words and Things.** By T. G. Rooper. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 56. 50 cts.

   This little work is at once philosophical and practical. It gives the basis on which the theory of object-teaching rests, adds hints as to how it may be made useful, and then gives a lesson on The Duck, which for interest and suggestiveness has nowhere been equalled. It partakes of the true spirit of Pestalozzi.


   In many schools this system is considered the only true method.

C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse, N. Y.
Friedrich Froebel.


   Useful and interesting * * * among the best that could be added to the teacher's library.—The Chautauquan, Oct., 1889.

   There is no better introduction to the Kindergarten.—Wisconsin Journal of Education, Sept., 1889.


   It is a fit companion to the Autobiography and the two are published in the same style—a capital idea—and a royal pair of volumes they make.—Educational Courant, Oct., 1889.

   Its design is to illustrate the theory and philosophy of Froebel's system. It does this so clearly and pleasingly as to give no excuse for criticism. * * * The volume is one profitable for every mother, as well as every teacher of children.—Chicago Interocean, Sept. 14, 1889.

3. The First Three Years of Childhood. By B. Perez, with an Introduction by Prof. Sully. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 294. $1.50.

   The eminent English psychologist, Prof. Sully, says that Perez combines in a very happy and unusual way the different qualifications of a good observer of children, and that he has given us the fullest account yet published of the facts of child-life.—Journal of Pedagogy, April, 1889.


7. The New Education. Edited by W. N. Hailmann. Vol. VI., the last published. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 146. $2.00.


C. W. BARDEEN, Publisher, Syracuse, N. Y.
1. The Theory and Practice of Teaching. By David P. Page. 16mo, pp. 448, with Biography, Notes, Portraits of Page, Mann, Colburn, Emerson, Potter, Wadsworth, and Olmsted, and Topical Index for Review. Price in Manila, 50 cts.; in Cloth, $1.00.

No other American book on teaching has so much claim as this to be considered a classic. For nearly fifty years it has been regarded almost universally as the one book the young teacher would most profit by. A hundred thousand teachers have drawn help and inspiration from its pages.

It seems only just to the author of a work so successful that his book should be printed just as he wrote it. The day is past when commentators re-write Shakspere. They may annotate and explain and conjecture, but they take the text as they find it, and print their observations in another type. This book has been less fortunate. In different editions since Mr. Page’s death chapters have been added, details have been changed, passages have been entirely rewritten.

This volume goes back to the book that Mr. Page published, and follows word for word the text of the only edition he ever authorized. Where the times have changed and we in them, references to present conditions are given in the Notes that follow, which are also in some part explanatory and historical.

In short this is so much the best edition issued, that even those who already have another edition can afford to throw that aside and use this alone.


It anticipates all the difficulties likely to be encountered, and gives the beginner the counsel of an older friend.


As distinguished from others of the modern standards, this is a book of Methods instead of theories. It tells the teacher just what to do and how to do it; and it has proved more practically helpful in the details of the school-room than any other book ever issued.

C. W. Bardeen, Publisher, Syracuse, N.Y.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sketch of, by R. H. Quick.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How to Obtain Greatest Benefit from a Book.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perforated Erasers, per doz.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Experiments in Natural Science.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps for the Wall.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Send for Special Circulars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief Maps. Switzerland, 11x17½, $3.50; 23x34, $10.00.</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissected Maps United States sown into States.</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same, New York State sown into Counties.</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Onondaga County. 4x4½ feet.</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powers of School Officers.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Work-shops.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child and Child Nature.</td>
<td>Frecel's Ed'1 Theories.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex in Mind and Education.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examinations as Tests for Promotion.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Text-Books of Comenius, with cuts from the Orbis Pictus.</td>
<td>8vo, pp. 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Education.</td>
<td>Dr. Andrew Bell. 16mo, pp. 182.</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algebra for Beginners.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 120</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inaugural Address at St. Andrews.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education as a Dept of Government.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tree of Mythology.</td>
<td>Cloth, 8vo, pp. 255</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers' Institutes, Past and Present.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Small Treatise of Education.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 26</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sketch of, by R. H. Quick.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 55</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes of the International Congress of Education. 1889.</td>
<td>Cloth, 4 vols</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Government of Northam.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 151</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor of Henry Barnard.</td>
<td>Leath, 16mo, pp. 35</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question Book, with all the Questions of the Uniform, State, Cornell.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 461</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplement No. 1, to June, 1891.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 63</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplement No. 2, to June, 1892.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 139</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions in Drawing to Date.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions in School Law and Civil Gov't.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Examination Questions to date.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 492</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions in Book-Keeping, with Answers.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 31</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of the Empire State, Hendrick.</td>
<td>Cloth, 12mo, pp. 293</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Government of the State of Northam.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 185</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code of Public Instruction.</td>
<td>Latest Edition</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural History and Cabinet Reports.</td>
<td>Write for information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Government.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 231</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The same for Missouri.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 151</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixing the Facts of American History.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 300</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conversational Lessons Leading to Geography.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 39</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory Selections.</td>
<td>Three series. Each</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Schools.</td>
<td>Paper, 8vo, pp. 26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camps and Tramps in the Adirondacks.</td>
<td>16mo, pp. 302</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number Lessons. On card-board, 7x11, after the Grube Method.</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Theory and Practice of Teaching.</td>
<td>16mo, pp. 448</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oral Instruction in Geography.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussian Schools through American Eyes.</td>
<td>Cloth, 8vo, pp. 91</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Schools through American Eyes.</td>
<td>Cloth, 8vo, pp. 130</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lectures on the Art of Education.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 231</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Short History of Education.</td>
<td>Cloth, 16mo, pp. 105</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogical Primers.</td>
<td>Manilla, 16mo, pp. 40, each</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Management.</td>
<td>45, 2. Letter-Writing, pp. 37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiedemann's Record of Infant Life.</td>
<td>Manilla, pp. 46</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The School Bulletin. Monthly, 16 pp., 10x14. Per year.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bound Vols. I-XIX.</td>
<td>Cloth, 200 pp, each</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The School Room. Bound volumes I-V.</td>
<td>Each</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Education.</td>
<td>Vol. VI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His Aim and Work.</td>
<td>by De Guimps. 12mo, pp. 206</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sketch of, by R. H. Quick.</td>
<td>Paper, 16mo, pp. 40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pestalozzian Arithmetics.</td>
<td>by J. H. Hoose. Boards, 16mo, 1st Year, pp. 217. 2d Year, pp. 236.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS.

--- Lessons on Number and Form, by C. Reiner. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 429. .... 3 00

Pick (Dr. E.) Dr. Pick's French Method. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 148. .... 1 00

--- Memory, and the Rational Means of Improving It. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 193. .... 1 00

Pitcher (James) Outlines of Surveying and Navigation. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 121 50

Plumb (Chas. G.) Map Drawing of New York. Manila, 8vo, pp. 16. .... 25

Pooler (Chas. T.) Chart of Civil Government. Sheets 12X18, per hundred. .... 5 00

--- Hints on Teaching Orthoepy. Paper, 16mo, pp. 1 15

Prentice (Mrs. J. B.) Review Problems in Arithmetic. Paper, 16mo, pp. 93. .... 20

--- Key to the above. Paper, 16mo, pp. 20. .... 1 25

--- Review Questions in Geography. Paper, 16mo, pp. 48. .... 25

--- of Letter-Writing. Manila, pp. 37. .... 25

Quick (R. H.) Essays on Educational Reformers. Cloth, 12mo, pp., 331. .... 1 55

Redway (J. W.) School Geography of Pennsylvania. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 98 35

*Regents' Examination Paper. Per 1000 half-sheets in box. ..... 3 00

Regents' Examination Pons. 1/2 Gross, 25c. Per Gross, post-paid. .... 1 00

--- Fourth Year Latin. Caesar's Conspiracy. Paper, 16mo, pp. 20 10

--- Selections in American, German, and French Literature. Leatherette, pp. 55. 25 cents. Each separate, paper. .... 10

--- Examination Record. For 432 scholars, $3.00; 864 scholars. .... 6 00

--- Examination Syllabus, in U. S. History. Paper, per dozen, .... 50

Regents' Questions. To June, 1882. (No later are printed.) Eleven Editions.

1. Complete with Key. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 476. .... 2 00

2. Complete. The same as the above, but without the answers. Pp. 333. .... 1 00

3. Arithmetic. The 1,293 questions in Arithmetic. Pp. 93. .... 25

4. Key to Arithmetic, Answers to the above. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 20. .... 25

5. Geography. The 1,987 questions in Geography. Pp. 70. .... 25

6. Key to Geography. Answers to the above. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 36. .... 25


8. Grammar and Key. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 198. .... 1 00

9. Key to Grammar. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 88. .... 25

10. Spelling. The 4,400 words given in Spelling. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 61. .... 25

Rein (W.) Outlines of Pedagogies. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 203. .... 1 25

Richardson (B. W.) Learning and Health. Paper, 16mo, pp. 89. .... 15


Rousseau (J. J.) Sketch of by R. H. Quick. Paper, 16mo, pp. 30. .... 15

Rooper (T. G.) “A Pot of Green Feathers.” Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 591. ..... 50

Object Teaching or Words and Things. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 56. .... 50

Ryan (G. W.) School Record. 56 blanks on each of 14 sheets. .... 50

Sabin (Henry) “Organization” vs. Individuality. Paper, 8vo, pp. 9. .... 25

Sanford (H. R.) The Word Method in Number. Per box of 45 cards. .... 50

--- The Limited Speller. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 104. .... 35

Schepmoes (A. E.) Rise of the New York School System. Leath., 16mo, pp. 32 35

School Room Classics. 11 vols. Paper, 16mo, pp. 40, each. .... 15

--- Huntington's Unconscious Tuition.

II. Fitch's Art of Questioning.

III. Kennedy's Philosophy of School Discipline.

--- Fitch's Art of Securing Attention.

V. Richardson's Learning and Health.

VI. Meiklejohn's New Education.

VII. Milton's Tractate of Education.

VIII. Von Buclow's School Workshop.

IX. Maudsley's Sex in Mind and in Education.

XI. Harris's How to Teach Natural Science in the Public Schools.

XII. Dickinson's Oral Teaching.

XIII. Tiedemann's Record of Infant Life.

XIV. Butler's Place of Comenius in Education.

XV. Harris's Theory of Education.

Schréber (D. G. R.) Home Exercise for Health and Cure. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 91 50

Shaw's Scholar's Register. Paper, 5x7, pp. 16. Per dozen .... 50

Sheely (Aaron) Anecdotes and Humors of School Life. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 350 1 50

Sherrill (J. E.) The Normal Question Book. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 405. .... 1 50

Shirreff (Emily). The Kindergarten System. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 200. .... 1 00


--- The New York Question Book. Cloth. 8vo, pp. 481. .... 2 00

Smith (C. F.) Honorary Degrees in American Colleges. Paper, 8vo, pp. 9. .... 15

--- (E. F.) History of the Schools of Syracuse. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 347. .... 3 00

--- (Geo. M.) Vocabulary to Caesar's Gallic War. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 67. .... 50

Smith (Wm.) Geometry Test Papers. Package of 100, 8½ x 10. .... 1 00

Song Budget, The. 18th Thousand. Paper, small 4to pp. 76. .... 15

--- Century, The. Paper, small 4to, pp. 87. .... 15
THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS.

--- (c) Like (b) but with one-half more (72) pages ........................................ 35
--- Pencil Holder, numbered for 60 pupils ......................................................... 200
--- Pencil Sharpener.............................................................................................. 35
--- Ink-Well Filler, holding One Quart .................................................................. 125

Burnham (W. P.) Duties of Outposts U. S. Army. Cloth, 24mo, pp. 171 ......... 50
Burritt (J. L.) Penmanship in Public Schools. 12mo, pp. 62 and chart ......... 60
Butler (Nicholas Murray) The Place of Comenius. Paper, 16mo, pp. 20 ... 15

Cæsar's Conspiracy of the Helvetians. Paper, 16mo, pp. 26 ......................... 10

Canfield (James H.) Rural Higher Education. Paper, 8vo, pp. 24 ............... 15
Carlisle (J. S.) Two Great Teachers, Ascham and Arnold. 16mo, pp. 252 .... 10

Manilla, 50 cts.; Cloth ................................................................. 100

Catalogue of Books for Teachers. 8vo, pp. 72 ............................................. 10


Civil Service Question Book, Cloth, 16mo, pp. 282 ..................................... 50

Clarke (Noah T.) Chart of U. S. History, 8½x12. Each 6c.; per dozen ... 50

Code of Public Instruction, New York, 1888, Leather, 8vo, pp. 1075, net .... 20

Colored Crayon, for Blackboard, per box of one dozen, nine colors ........ 25

Collins (Henry.) The International Date Line. Paper, 16mo, pp. 15 ......... 15

Comenius, Orbis Pictus. Cloth, 8vo, large paper, top edge gilt. Pp. 232 .... 30

--- Life and Educational Works, by S. S. Laurie. Cloth, Ill, 16mo, pp. 272 .... 10

--- Sketch of, by R. H. Quick. Paper, 16mo, pp. 25 ........................................ 15

Comfort (Geo. F.) Modern Languages in Education. Paper, 16mo, pp. 40 .... 25

Cooper (Oscar R.) Compulsory Laws and their Enforcement. P., 8vo, pp. 6 . 15

Cube Root Blocks, carried to 3 places ............................................................. 100

Cyclopaedia of Education. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 562 ............................................. 75

Davis (W. W.) Suggestions for Teaching Fractions. Paper, 16mo, pp. 48 .... 25

--- *Fractional Apparatus, in box ................................................................. 400

De Graaf (E. V.) Practical Phonics. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 108 ........................... 75

--- Pocket Pronunciation Book. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 47 ............................... 15


--- Development Lessons. Cloth, 8vo., pp. 301 ........................................... 150

--- The School-Room Chorus. Boards, small 4to, pp. 147 ......................... 35

--- Catlnesihen and Disciplinary Exercises. Manilla, 16mo, pp. 39 ........... 25

De Guimpœ (Roger). Pestalozzi, his Aim and Work. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 331 .... 150

Denominational Schools. Discussion of 1889. Paper, 8vo, pp. 71 ............. 25

Dickinson (John W.) The Limits of Oral Teaching. Paper, 16mo, pp. 24 .... 15

Diehl (Anna Randall) A Practical Désarte Primer. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 66 .... 50

Diplomas, printed to order from any design furnished. Specimens sent.

(a) Bond paper, 14x17, for 25 ........................................................................... 50
(b) " 16x20, " 25 ...................................................................................... 50
(c) Parchment, 15x20 " 1 ............................................................................ 35
Each additional copy ................................................................................. 75

Donaldson (James). Lectures on Education. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 185 ............ 100

Eckardt's Anatomical Charts, per set ............................................................ 1500

Education as Viewed by Thinkers. Paper, 16mo, pp. 47 ............................. 15


--- 500 Every Day Business Problems in Arithmetic, 500 cards, 1½x3½, with Key 50
--- 500 Pertinent Questions in Civics, with Answers, and References to North- am's Civil Government. Paper, 16mo, pp. 54 ............................................. 15

--- The same, with Questions on 250 slips of cardboard, in box ................. 50

--- Historical Game, " Our Country," 100 cards, 2½x3½ ................................ 50

--- Historical Cards, 3½x5½.
(a) General History. 200 cards ................................................................. 100
(b) United States History. Part I. 92 cards .................................................. 50
(c) United States History. Part II. 108 cards ............................................... 50
(d) United States History, Complete. 200 cards ........................................... 100
--- Outline and Topic Book in U. S. History. Paper, 8vo, pp. 212 ............. 50
--- Geographical Game, " Our Country." 100 cards, 2½x3½ .......................... 50
--- Geographical Cards, 3½x5½.
(a) Part I. Physical Geography and North America. 100 cards ................. 50
(b) Part II. The Rest of the World. 100 cards ............................................. 50
(c) Complete. 200 cards ............................................................................ 100

Emerson (H. P.) Latin in High Schools. Paper, 8vo, pp. 9 ......................... 25

Emerson (A. W.) Composition and Criticism. A Manual for the aid of teachers and pupils in Essay Work, with 1000 subjects, grouped accord-
THE SCHOOL BULLETIN PUBLICATIONS.

Essays on the Kindergarten. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 82
Essays on the Text of the New Testament. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 82

Farnham (Geo. L.) The Sentences in the Method of Reading. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 50
Fitch (Joshua G.) The Art of Questioning. Paper, 16mo, pp. 36
Froebel (Fr.) An Alphabet of the Kindergarten. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 183

Gaines (J. T.) Principles of Teaching. Paper, 8vo, pp. 83
Geometric Test Papers, by Wm. Smith. Packages of 100, 8½x10
Geddes (Patrick.) Industrial Exhibitions. Paper, 16mo, pp. 57

Gill (John.) School Management. 4th Thousand. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 276
Gore (J. Howard) Manual for the Parliamentary Practice. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 112
Granger (James) History of the Burghs of Scotland. Cloth, 8vo, pp. 591
Gray (Thos. J.) Methods and Courses in Normal Schools. Paper, 8vo, pp. 19

Hails (W. N.) Kindergarten Manual. Boards, 8vo, pp. 58
Hall (Marcella W.) Orthoepia Made Easy. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 100
Harrington (W. B.) Early English Literature. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 188
Harris (W. T.) Natural Science in the Public Schools. Paper, 16mo, pp. 40

Hartlib (Samuel.) Memoirs of, by H. Drieks. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 124
Heermann (Forbes.) Stories of the Far West. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 260
Hendrick (Mary F.) Questions in Literature. Boards, 16mo, pp. 100
Hendrick (W.) The Table is Set. A Comedy for Schools, 16mo, pp. 30

Hinsdale (B. A.) Pedagogical Chairs in Colleges. Paper, 8vo, pp. 11
Hooke (James H.) Studies in Articulation. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 70
Honor (Province of Methods of Teaching. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 376
Hull (Manilla.) First-Year Arithmetic. Boards, 16mo, pp. 217
Huckel (A.) Second-Year Arithmetic. Boards, 16mo, pp. 286

Slating, the best eray surface made. Per gallon

Slated Paper, per square yard (if by mail, 60 cts)
Hotchkiss (Viala F.) Lessons in Object Drawing. Leath., 4to, pp. 82
Hughes (James L.) Mistakes in Teaching. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 135
Huntington (F.) U. S. History. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 98
Jackson (E. F.) Class Record Cards. 90 white and 10 colored cards
Jacotif (Joseph.) Sketch of, by R. H. Quick. Paper, 16mo, pp. 28
Johnson's Chart of Astronomy. On blue enamelled cloth, 40x46 inches

Johnston's Wall Maps. Send for Circulars.

*Jones's Vacuum Blackboard Erasers. Per dozen
Julian (Anna M.) Brief Views of U. S. History. Leatherette, 16mo, pp. 69
Karoly (Akin) The Dilemmas of Labor and Education. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 71
Kay (David.) Education and Educators. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 490
Keller (C.) Monthly Report Cards. 2½x2 inches. Per hundred
Kennedy (John.) The Philosophy of School Discipline. 16mo, pp. 25

Kiddle (Henry.) 3000 Grammar Questions, with Full Answers and Reference
to all leading Text Books. Cloth, 16mo, pp. 220

Kindergarten Essays. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 175
Landon (Jos.) School Management. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 376
Latham (Henry) On the Action of Examinations. 12mo, pp. 400
Laurie (S. S.) John Amos Comenius. 16mo, pp. 272. Manilla. 50 cts.; Cloth, 1
Lawrence (E. G.) Recreations in Ancient Fields. Cloth, 12mo, pp. 177